

# Quiz#3-Chap3-PPML-HomomorphicEncryptionAlgorithms

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## Quiz#3-Chap3-PPML-HomomorphicEncryptionAlgorithms

### Quiz#3-Chap3-PPML-HomomorphicEncryptionAlgorithms

Scheduled for 4:00 pm, 10th April 2023, Duration: Strictly 50 minutes.

1. The quiz must be attempted using your SVNIT email ID only. If attempted using any other email ID, it would NOT be considered. There will not be any exceptions to this. If you are not visible on the Meet link for the purpose, then also no marks would be graded.
2. Please attend the quiz that is assigned to you.
3. Total Questions: 30, Total Marks:60. There is NO negative marking.
4. Google classroom may not show the correct scores. Please do not assume that is your real score.
5. Any quiz **that is received 2 minutes after the deadline, shall NOT be graded and shall be considered as Not Attempted**. Therefore, DO NOT continue attempting after the deadline - in order to ensure that your quiz is submitted and received in the next two minutes. No excuses would be tolerated. **Thus, any delay in receiving the quiz on classroom beyond the time specified would render the submission invalid and yield zero marks.**



In El Gamal Homomorphic encryption algorithm if the public key chosen is  $p_k = \{p, \alpha, \beta\} = \{107, 9, 94\}$ , and the other parameters are as shown, and if the two pairs of ciphertexts to be aggregated are (26,101) and (15,31), then the output of the node aggregating the ciphertext is \_\_\_\_\_.

### ElGamal code for Exams

- Prime  $p = 107$  and primitive root  $\alpha = 2$
- Private key is chosen at random from  $\{1..p-1\}$  i.e.  $S_k = a$
- $\beta = \alpha^a \bmod p = 2^{67} \bmod 107 = 94$
- Public Key is  $\{p, \alpha, \beta\} = \{107, 2, 94\}$

Encryption is as follows: If Public Key  $p_k = \{p, \alpha, \beta\}$

$$C_1 = \alpha^r \bmod p$$

$$C_2 = m * \beta^r \bmod p$$

Decryption is as follows: Secret Key  $S_k = a$

$$d_1 = C_2 * (C_1^{-1} \bmod p)^a \bmod p$$

- ☐ (15,19)
- ☐ none of these
- ☐ (10,17)
- ☒ (69,28)

Clear selection



In El Gamal Homomorphic encryption algorithm if the public key chosen is  $pk = \{p, \alpha, \beta\} = \{107, 9, 94\}$ , then \_\_\_\_\_ cryptosystem. 2 points

#### ElGamal code for Exams

- Prime  $p = 107$  and primitive root  $\alpha = 2$
- Private key is chosen at random from  $\{1..p-1\}$  i.e.  $S_k = a$
- $\beta = \alpha^a \bmod p = 2^{67} \bmod 107 = 94$
- Public Key is  $\{p, \alpha, \beta\} = \{107, 2, 94\}$

Encryption is as follows: If Public Key  $p_k = \{p, \alpha, \beta\}$

$$C_1 = \alpha^r \bmod p$$

$$C_2 = m * \beta^r \bmod p$$

Decryption is as follows: Secret Key  $S_k = a$

$$d_1 = C_2 * (C_1^{-1} \bmod p)^a \bmod p$$

☒ is not a valid

☐ is a valid

Clear selection

IF  $C_1 = Ek_{pub}(X_1)$  and  $C_2 = Ek_{pub}(X_2)$ , then the crypto-system is multiplicatively homomorphic if \_\_\_\_\_. [Here,  $C_1, C_2$  are ciphertexts and  $X_1, X_2$  are the associated plaintexts and  $EK_{pub}$  and  $EK_{pri}$  are the public and private keys.] 2 points

- ☐  $X_1 + X_2 = Ek_{pub}(C_1) * Ek_{pub}(C_2)$
- ☐  $C_1 + C_2 = Dk_{pri} [Ek_{pub}(X_1) + Ek_{pub}(X_2)]$
- ☐  $C_1 + C_2 = Ek_{pub}(X_1) + Ek_{pub}(X_2)$
- ☒  $X_1 + X_2 = Dk_{pri} [Ek_{pub}(X_1) * Ek_{pub}(X_2)]$

Clear selection



In Domingo Ferrer's algorithm, if the plaintext values obtained after splitting the input plaintext is (11,3,6), the value of  $n$  is 39, the secret parameter  $r = 7$ , and the intermediate ciphertext communicated to the destination node is  $(c_1, c_2, c_3)$ , then  $(c_1, c_2, c_3) = \underline{\hspace{2cm}}$  . 2 points

**Algorithm Domingo-Ferrer ()**

Parameters:

Public Key: integer  $d \geq 2$ , large integer  $M$

Secret Key:  $g$  that divides  $M$ ;  $r$  so that  $r^{-1}$  exists in  $Z_M$

Encryption: Split  $m$  into  $d$  parts  $m_1 \dots m_d$  such that

$$\sum_{i=1}^d (m_i) \bmod g = m$$

$$C = [c_1, \dots, c_d] = [m_1 r^1 \bmod M, m_2 r^2 \bmod M, \dots, m_d r^d \bmod M]$$

Decryption:  $m = (c_1 r^{-1} + c_2 r^{-2} + \dots + c_d r^{-d}) \bmod M$

Aggregation: Scalar addition modulo  $M$ :  $C_{12} = C_1 + C_2 = [(c_1 1 + c_2 1) \bmod M, \dots, (c_1 d + c_2 d) \bmod M]$

☒ (38, 21, 3)

☐ (39, 21, 42)

☐ (40, 19, 4)

☐ (77, 20, 3)

Clear selection



Stefeen Peter's homomorphic encryption algorithm is \_\_\_\_\_ homomorphic.

2 points

**Algorithm Casstelluccia+Domingo-Ferrer ()**  
**Parameters:**  
**Public Key:** integer  $d \geq 2$ , large integer  $M$   
**Secret Key:**  $g$  that divides  $M$ ;  $r$  so that  $r^{-1}$  exists in  $Z_M$   
**Encryption:** Randomly generated key stream  $k \in [0, M-1]$   
 $e1 = (k + m) \bmod M$   
 Split  $e1$  into  $d$  parts  $m_1..m_d$  such that  
 $\sum_{i=1}^d (m_i) \bmod g = m$   
 $C = [c_1, ..., c_d] = [m_1 r^1 \bmod M, m_2 r^2 \bmod M, ..., m_d r^d \bmod M]$   
**Aggregation:** Scalar addition modulo  $M$ :  $C_{12} = C_1 + C_2 = [(c_1 1 + c_2 1) \bmod M, ..., (c_1 d + c_2 d) \bmod M]$   
**Decryption:**  $d_1 = (c_1 r^{-1} + c_2 r^{-2} + ... + c_d r^{-d}) \bmod M$   
 $m = (d_1 - k) \bmod M$   
 where  $k$  is the sum of aggregated key streams

- ☐ non-homomorphic
- ☒ additively
- ☐ Fully
- ☐ multiplicatively

Clear selection



In Castellucia's scheme, given that  $n=303$ ,  $k_1=50$ ,  $k_2=50$ , plaintexts  $m_1=30$ ,  $m_2=30$ , and if the ciphertext received at the destination node(base station) is  $C_i$ , then the expression for decryption that would get the plaintext at the base station as \_\_\_\_\_, and the resulting plaintext, computed from the ciphertext received at the base station is\_\_\_\_\_.

2 points

**Algorithm Casstelluccia ()****Parameters:** Select large integer  $M$ **Encryption:** Message  $m \in [0, M - 1]$ ,Randomly generated key stream  $k \in [0, M - 1]$  $c = (m + k) \bmod M$ **Decryption:**  $m = (c - k) \bmod M$ **Aggregation:**  $c_{12} = (c_1 + c_2) \bmod M$ 

- ☐  $C_i - 10, 60$
- ☐  $C_i - 50, 100$
- ☒  $C_i - 100, 60$
- ☐  $C_i - 60, 100$

Clear selection



In El Gamal Homomorphic encryption algorithm if the public key chosen is  $pk = \{p, \alpha, \beta\} = \{107, 9, 94\}$ , and the other parameters are as shown, and if the two pairs of ciphertexts to be aggregated are (104,29) and (68,67), then the output of the node aggregating the ciphertext is \_\_\_\_\_.

### ElGamal code for Exams

- Prime  $p = 107$  and primitive root  $\alpha = 2$
- Private key is chosen at random from  $\{1..p-1\}$  i.e.  $S_k = a$
- $\beta = \alpha^a \bmod p = 2^{67} \bmod 107 = 94$
- Public Key is  $\{p, \alpha, \beta\} = \{107, 2, 94\}$

Encryption is as follows: If Public Key  $p_k = \{p, \alpha, \beta\}$

$$C_1 = \alpha^r \bmod p$$

$$C_2 = m * \beta^r \bmod p$$

Decryption is as follows: Secret Key  $S_k = a$

$$d_1 = C_2 * (C_1^{-1} \bmod p)^a \bmod p$$

- ☐ (15,19)
- ☐ (69,28)
- ☒ (10,17)
- ☒ none of these

Clear selection

In Castellucia's scheme, given that  $n = 200$ ,  $m = 300$ ,  $k = 50$ , the Ciphertext  $C$  = \_\_\_\_\_.

- ☐ 45
- ☐ 91
- ☒ 100
- ☐ 41
- ☐ cannot be computer

Clear selection



A cryptosystem that uses an encryption scheme, viz.  $C=E(x)=e^x$ , is \_\_\_\_\_ 1 point  
homomorphic, where  $e$  is an exponent operation and  $x$  is any integer.

- ☐ not homomorphic
- ☒ multiplicatively
- ☐ fully
- ☐ additively

Clear selection

In Paillier homomorphic encryption algorithm, if the public key  $pk = \{n, g\} = \{77, 5652\}$ , random  $r=19$  and the plaintext  $m=25$ , then the ciphertext  $c$  is \_\_\_\_\_ . 2 points

#### Algorithm Paillier ()

##### Key Generation:

- 1 Choose two large prime numbers  $p$  and  $q$  randomly and independently of each other such that  $\gcd(pq, (p-1)(q-1))=1$ .
- 2 This property is assured if both primes are of equivalent length, i.e.  $p, q \in 1 || \{0, 1\}^{(s-1)}$  for security parameter  $s$ .
- 3 Compute  $n=pq$  and  $\lambda = \text{lcm}(p-1, q-1)$ .
- 4 Select random integer  $g$  where  $g \in Z_{n^2}^*$ .  
Ensure  $n$  divides the order of  $g$  by checking the existence of the following modular multiplicative inverse:  
 $\mu = (L(g^\lambda \bmod n^2))^{-1} \bmod n$ ,  
where function  $L$  is defined as,  $L(u) = (u-1)/n$ .
- 5 The public (encryption) key is  $(n, g)$ .
- 6 The private (decryption) key is  $(\lambda, \mu)$ .

**Message Encryption:** Let  $m$  be a message to be encrypted where  $m \in Z_n$ .

Select a random  $r$  where  $r \in Z_n^*$ .

Compute ciphertext as:  $c = g^m \cdot r^n \bmod n^2$

**Decryption:** Ciphertext  $c \in Z_{n^2}^*$

Compute message:  $m = L(c^\lambda \bmod n^2) \cdot \mu \bmod n$

- ☐ 3052
- ☐ 2976
- ☐ 2526
- ☒ 3390

Clear selection





In Castellucia's scheme, given that  $n=303$ ,  $k_1=40$ ,  $k_2=34$ , plaintexts  $m_1=30$ ,  $m_2=46$ , the ciphertext value received at the destination node(base station) is \_\_\_\_\_ . 2 points

Algorithm Casstelluccia ()  
Parameters: Select large integer  $M$   
Encryption: Message  $m \in [0, M - 1]$ ,  
Randomly generated key stream  $k \in [0, M - 1]$   
 $c = (m + k) \bmod M$   
Decryption:  $m = (c - k) \bmod M$   
Aggregation:  $c_{12} = (c_1 + c_2) \bmod M$

☒ 150

☐ 80

☐ 153

☐ 70

Clear selection



When using Castellucia's homomorphic encryption algorithm, say the key values used by two sensor nodes node1 and node2 are  $k_1 = 220$  and  $k_2 = 320$  respectively. Let the large integer  $n$  for the system is chosen to be 2048. If the plaintext values sensed are 480 and 540 respectively, then the ciphertext at the base station computed is \_\_\_\_\_.

Algorithm Castellucia ()  
 Parameters: Select large integer  $M$   
 Encryption: Message  $m \in [0, M - 1]$ ,  
               Randomly generated key stream  $k \in [0, M - 1]$   
                $c = (m + k) \bmod M$   
 Decryption:  $m = (c - k) \bmod M$   
 Aggregation:  $c_{12} = (c_1 + c_2) \bmod M$

- ☒ 1560
- ☐ 1600
- ☐ 1500
- ☐ 1650

Clear selection

In Castellucia's scheme, given that  $n=303$ ,  $k_1=50$ ,  $k_2=50$ , plaintexts  $m_1=100$ ,  $m_2=100$ , and if the ciphertext received at the destination node(base station) is  $C_i$ , then the expression for decryption that would get the aggregated plaintext at the base station is \_\_\_\_\_, and the resulting plaintext, computed from the aggregated ciphertext received at the base station is\_\_\_\_\_.

- ☐  $C_i - 100, 50$
- ☐  $C_i - 200, 200$
- ☐  $C_i - 60, 100$
- ☒  $C_i - 100, 200$

Clear selection



Castellucia's scheme is \_\_\_\_\_ homomorphic, whereas the Domingo Ferrer 1 point scheme is \_\_\_\_\_, whereas \_\_\_\_\_ scheme is also multiplicatively homomorphic.

#### Algorithm Domingo-Ferrer ()

Parameters:

Public Key: integer  $d \geq 2$ , large integer  $M$

Secret Key:  $g$  that divides  $M$ ;  $r$  so that  $r^{-1}$  exists in  $Z_M$

Encryption: Split  $m$  into  $d$  parts  $m_1..m_d$  such that

$$\sum_{i=1}^d (m_i) \bmod g = m$$

$$C = [c_1, \dots, c_d] = [m_1 r^1 \bmod M, m_2 r^2 \bmod M, \dots, m_d r^d \bmod M]$$

Decryption:  $m = (c_1 r^{-1} + c_2 r^{-2} + \dots + c_d r^{-d}) \bmod M$

Aggregation: Scalar addition modulo  $M$ :  $C_{12} = C_1 + C_2 = [(c_1 + c_2) \bmod M, \dots, (c_d + c_d) \bmod M]$

- ☐ multiplicatively, additively, RSA
- ☐ multiplicatively, multiplicatively, RSA
- ☐ additively, multiplicatively, Goldwasser-Micali
- ☐ multiplicatively, additively, Goldwasser-Micali
- ☒ additively, additively, RSA

Clear selection

Castellucia's scheme is \_\_\_\_\_ key based scheme.

1 point

- ☐ Asymmetric-key based
- ☒ Symmetric-key based

Clear selection



Castellucia's scheme is \_\_\_\_\_ homomorphic, whereas the Stefen Peter's scheme is \_\_\_\_\_, whereas \_\_\_\_\_ scheme is multiplicatively homomorphic.

2 points

- ☐ multiplicatively, additively, Goldwasser-Micali
- ☐ multiplicatively, multiplicatively, RSA
- ☒ additively, additively, RSA
- ☐ additively, multiplicatively, Goldwasser-Micali
- ☐ multiplicatively, additively, RSA

Clear selection

In Castellucia's scheme, given that  $n = 193$ ,  $m = 45$ ,  $k = 41$ , the Ciphertext  $C =$  \_\_\_\_\_ .

1 point

```

Algorithm Casstelluccia ()
Parameters: Select large integer M
Encryption: Message  $m \in [0, M - 1]$ ,
            Randomly generated key stream  $k \in [0, M - 1]$ 
             $c = (m + k) \bmod M$ 
Decryption:  $m = (c - k) \bmod M$ 
Aggregation:  $c_{12} = (c_1 + c_2) \bmod M$ 
  
```

- ☐ 41
- ☐ 45
- ☐ 91
- ☒ 86

Clear selection



Consider the multiplicative group  $Z_{11}^*$ . Given that 8 is one of the generators of this group, the set of Quadratic residues of  $Z_{11}^*$  is \_\_\_\_\_.

2 points

- ☐ {1,3,4,5,11}
- ☒ {1,3,4,5,9}
- ☐ {1,2,4,5,9}
- ☐ {1,3,4,5,9,10}
- ☐ {1,3,4,5,12}

Clear selection

If RSA system modulus  $n=91$ , and if the encryption key selected is  $(5, \phi(n))$  then the decryption key must be \_\_\_\_\_, considering the value of  $\phi(n) =$  \_\_\_\_\_.

2 points

- ☐ (27,90)
- ☐ (29,90)
- ☒ (29,72)
- ☐ (27,72)

Compute the following moduli:  $-14 \bmod 3 \equiv$  \_\_\_\_\_  $\bmod 3$ .  $73 \bmod 23 \equiv$  \_\_\_\_\_  $\bmod 23$ .  $(3) - 82 \bmod 9 \equiv$  \_\_\_\_\_  $\bmod 9$ .

2 points

- ☐ 1, 4, 1
- ☒ 1, 4, 8
- ☐ 3, 4, 1
- ☐ 4, 1, 8

Clear selection



\_\_\_\_\_ homomorphic cryptosystems are those that allow for either addition OR multiplication operation ONLY to be performed on the ciphertext, but not both.

2 points

- ☐ Asymmetric-key based
- ☐ Fully
- ☐ Symmetric-key based
- ☒ Partially

Clear selection

Consider the multiplicative group  $\mathbb{Z}_{19}^*$ . This is \_\_\_\_\_ group, because \_\_\_\_\_. The number of generators in this group is equal to \_\_\_\_\_; one of which is \_\_\_\_\_.

2 points

- ☐ acyclic, the number  $p$   $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$  is a non-prime, 5, 12
- ☐ acyclic, the number  $p$   $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$  is a nonprime, 5, 12
- ☐ cyclic, the number  $p$   $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$  is a prime, 5, 12
- ☒ cyclic, the number  $p$   $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$  is a prime, 6, 15
- ☐ acyclic, the number  $p$   $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$  is a prime, 6, 14
- ☐ cyclic, the number  $p$   $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$  is a nonprime, 6, 15

Clear selection



Consider the El Gamal cryptosystem as per the scheme shown in the figure. If the plaintext  $m=66$  and the random  $r = 45$  then the ciphertext pairs are \_\_\_\_\_.

2 points

### ElGamal code for Exams

- Prime  $p = 107$  and primitive root  $\alpha = 2$
- Private key is chosen at random from  $\{1..p-1\}$  i.e.  $S_k = a$
- $\beta = \alpha^a \bmod p = 2^{67} \bmod 107 = 94$
- Public Key is  $\{p, \alpha, \beta\} = \{107, 2, 94\}$

Encryption is as follows: If Public Key  $p_k = \{p, \alpha, \beta\}$

$$C_1 = \alpha^r \bmod p$$

$$C_2 = m * \beta^r \bmod p$$

Decryption is as follows: Secret Key  $S_k = a$

$$d_1 = C_2 * (C_1^{-1} \bmod p)^a \bmod p$$

- ☐ {97,84}
- ☐ {97,85}
- ☐ {96,85}
- ☐ {96,84}

\_\_\_\_\_ homomorphic cryptosystems are those that allow for either addition OR multiplication operation ONLY to be performed on the ciphertext, but not both.

1 point

- ☐ Asymmetric-key based
- ☐ Symmetric-key based
- ☒ Partially
- ☐ Fully

Clear selection

As per the design of the RSA homomorphic algorithm, if the system modulus  $n=15$ , then it is NOT possible to have an encryption key with value

2 points

$(e, \phi(n)) = \underline{\hspace{2cm}}$  .

- ☐ (4,8)
- ☒ (3,10)
- ☐ (5,8)
- ☐ (11,14)

Clear selection

In Steffen 's algorithm, if the input plaintext value is 7,  $n=39$ , the key  $k=2$ , the value of  $d=3$  and the secret parameter  $n'=13$ , then the plaintext values that could be obtained after splitting is  $\underline{\hspace{2cm}}$  .

2 points

**Algorithm Casstelluccia+Domingo-Ferrer ()**

**Parameters:**

**Public Key:** integer  $d \geq 2$ , large integer  $M$

**Secret Key:**  $g$  that divides  $M$ ;  $r$  so that  $r^{-1}$  exists in  $Z_M$

**Encryption:** Randomly generated key stream  $k \in [0, M-1]$

$e1 = (k + m) \bmod M$

Split  $e1$  into  $d$  parts  $m_1..m_d$  such that

$\sum_{i=1}^d (m_i) \bmod g = m$

$C = [c_1, \dots, c_d] = [m_1 r^1 \bmod M, m_2 r^2 \bmod M, \dots, m_d r^d \bmod M]$

**Aggregation:** Scalar addition modulo  $M$ :  $C_{12} = C_1 + C_2 =$

$[(c_1 1 + c_2 1) \bmod M, \dots, (c_1 d + c_2 d) \bmod M]$

**Decryption:**  $d_1 = (c_1 r^{-1} + c_2 r^{-2} + \dots + c_d r^{-d}) \bmod M$

$m = (d_1 - k) \bmod M$

where  $k$  is the sum of aggregated key streams

- ☐ (6,11,11)
- ☐ (5,9,8)
- ☐ (16,17,12)
- ☒ (9,12,11)

Clear selection





IF  $C_1 = \text{Ek}_{\text{pub}}(X_1)$  and  $C_2 = \text{Ek}_{\text{pub}}(X_2)$ , then the crypto-system is additively homomorphic if \_\_\_\_\_. [Here,  $C_1, C_2$  are ciphertexts and  $X_1, X_2$  are the associated plaintexts and  $\text{Ek}_{\text{pub}}$  and  $\text{Ek}_{\text{pri}}$  are the public and private keys.]

2 points

- ☐  $C_1 + C_2 = \text{Dk}_{\text{pri}} [\text{Ek}_{\text{pub}}(X_1) + \text{Ek}_{\text{pub}}(X_2)]$
- ☐  $X_1 + X_2 = \text{Ek}_{\text{pub}}(C_1) + \text{Ek}_{\text{pub}}(C_2)$
- ☒  $X_1 + X_2 = \text{Dk}_{\text{pri}} [\text{Ek}_{\text{pub}}(X_1) + \text{Ek}_{\text{pub}}(X_2)]$
- ☐  $C_1 + C_2 = \text{Ek}_{\text{pub}}(X_1) * \text{Ek}_{\text{pub}}(X_2)$

Clear selection

In El Gamal Homomorphic encryption algorithm if the public key chosen is  $pk = \{p, \alpha, \beta\} = \{107, 9, 94\}$ , and the other parameters are as shown, and if the two pairs of ciphertexts to be aggregated are (42,104) and (8,65), then the output of the node aggregating the ciphertext is \_\_\_\_\_.

2 points

### ElGamal code for Exams

- Prime  $p = 107$  and primitive root  $\alpha = 2$
- Private key is chosen at random from  $\{1..p-1\}$  i.e.  $S_k = a$
- $\beta = \alpha^a \text{ mod } p = 2^{67} \text{ mod } 107 = 94$
- Public Key is  $\{p, \alpha, \beta\} = \{107, 2, 94\}$

Encryption is as follows: If Public Key  $p_k = \{p, \alpha, \beta\}$

$$C_1 = \alpha^r \text{ mod } p$$

$$C_2 = m * \beta^r \text{ mod } p$$

Decryption is as follows: Secret Key  $S_k = a$

$$d_1 = C_2 * (C_1^{-1} \text{ mod } p)^a \text{ mod } p$$

- ☐ none of these
- ☐ (10,17)
- ☐ (69,28)
- ☒ (15,19)

Clear selection

A natural application of homomorphic encryption is \_\_\_\_\_ .

1 point

- ☐ encrypting data using an asymmetric key cipher.
- ☐ outsourcing computations to a trusted third party.
- ☒ outsourcing computations to an untrusted third party.
- ☐ generating a keyed MAC using a hash function.
- ☐ encrypting data using a symmetric key cipher.

Clear selection

In Goldwasser-Micali Homomorphic encryption algorithm, if the chosen random  $r = 51$  where  $1 < r < n$ , the public Key  $Pk=(a,n)=(80,851)$  & plaintext bit  $m=1$ , then the ciphertext  $c=$  \_\_\_\_\_ .

2 points

#### Key generation [edit]

The modulus used in GM encryption is generated in the same manner as in the [RSA](#) cryptosystem. (See [RSA](#), key generation for details.)

1. Alice generates two distinct large [prime numbers](#)  $p$  and  $q$ , randomly and independently of each other.
2. Alice computes  $N = p \cdot q$ .
3. She then finds some non-residue  $x$  such that the [Legendre symbols](#) satisfy  $\left(\frac{x}{p}\right) = \left(\frac{x}{q}\right) = -1$  and hence the [Jacobi symbol](#)  $\left(\frac{x}{N}\right)$  is  $-1$ . The value  $x$  can for example be found by selecting random values and testing the two Legendre symbols. If  $p, q \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$  (i.e.,  $N$  is a [Blum integer](#)), then the value  $N - 1$  is guaranteed to have the required property.

The [public key](#) consists of  $(x, N)$ . The secret key is the factorization  $(p, q)$ .

#### Message encryption [edit]

Suppose Bob wishes to send a message  $m$  to Alice:

1. Bob first encodes  $m$  as a string of bits  $(m_1, \dots, m_d)$ .
2. For every bit  $m_i$ , Bob generates a random value  $y_i$  from the group of units modulo  $N$ , or  $\gcd(y_i, N) = 1$ . He outputs the value  $c_i = y_i^2 x^{m_i} \pmod{N}$ .

Bob sends the ciphertext  $(c_1, \dots, c_d)$ .

#### Message decryption [edit]

Alice receives  $(c_1, \dots, c_d)$ . She can recover  $m$  using the following procedure:

1. For each  $i$ , using the prime factorization  $(p, q)$ , Alice determines whether the value  $c_i$  is a quadratic residue; if so,  $m_i = 0$ , otherwise  $m_i = 1$ .

Alice outputs the message  $m = (m_1, \dots, m_d)$ .

- ☐ 173
- ☐ 273
- ☐ 171
- ☒ 436

Clear selection

In Domingo Ferrer's algorithm, if the plaintext values obtained after splitting the sensed plaintext at the leaf node is (2,4,8), the value of  $n$  is 39, the secret parameter  $r$  is 7, then the intermediate ciphertext communicated to the parent node by this leaf node is \_\_\_\_\_ . 2 points

**Algorithm Domingo-Ferrer ()**  
**Parameters:**  
**Public Key:** integer  $d \geq 2$ , large integer  $M$   
**Secret Key:**  $g$  that divides  $M$ ;  $r$  so that  $r^{-1}$  exists in  $Z_M$   
**Encryption:** Split  $m$  into  $d$  parts  $m_1..m_d$  such that  
 $\sum_{i=1}^d (m_i) \bmod g = m$   
 $C = [c_1, ..., c_d] = [m_1 r^1 \bmod M, m_2 r^2 \bmod M, ..., m_d r^d \bmod M]$   
**Decryption:**  $m = (c_1 r^{-1} + c_2 r^{-2} + ... + c_d r^{-d}) \bmod M$   
**Aggregation:** Scalar addition modulo  $M$ :  $C_{12} = C_1 + C_2 = [(c_1 1 + c_2 1) \bmod M, ..., (c_1 d + c_2 d) \bmod M]$

- ☐ (14, 196, 2744)
- ☐ (14,28,17)
- ☐ (14, 28, 56)
- ☒ (14, 1, 14)

Clear selection

If RSA system modulus  $n=21$ , and the encryption exponent chosen could be \_\_\_\_\_ (a valid  $e$ ). Then the value of decryption exponent is \_\_\_\_\_ . 2 points

- ☐ 4,5
- ☐ 6,7
- ☒ 7, 7
- ☐ 7,3



In Steffen Peter's algorithm, if the plaintext values obtained after splitting the input plaintext is (11,7,6), the value of  $n$  is 39, the secret parameter  $r = 5$ , and the intermediate ciphertext communicated to the destination node is  $(c_1, c_2, c_3)$ , then  $(c_1, c_2, c_3) = \underline{\hspace{2cm}}$  . 2 points

**Algorithm Casstelluccia+Domingo-Ferrer ()**

**Parameters:**

**Public Key:** integer  $d \geq 2$ , large integer  $M$

**Secret Key:**  $g$  that divides  $M$ ;  $r$  so that  $r^{-1}$  exists in  $Z_M$

**Encryption:** Randomly generated key stream  $k \in [0, M-1]$

$e1 = (k + m) \bmod M$

Split  $e1$  into  $d$  parts  $m_1..m_d$  such that

$\sum_{i=1}^d (m_i) \bmod g = m$

$C = [c_1, \dots, c_d] = [m_1 r^1 \bmod M, m_2 r^2 \bmod M, \dots, m_d r^d \bmod M]$

**Aggregation:** Scalar addition modulo  $M$ :  $C_{12} = C_1 + C_2 =$

$[(c_1 + c_2) \bmod M, \dots, (c_d + c_d) \bmod M]$

**Decryption:**  $d_1 = (c_1 r^{-1} + c_2 r^{-2} + \dots + c_d r^{-d}) \bmod M$

$m = (d_1 - k) \bmod M$

where  $k$  is the sum of aggregated key streams

- ☐ (30,2,10)
- ☒ (16,19,9)
- ☐ (21,36,18)
- ☐ (25,30,25)

Clear selection

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