



# HIERARCHICAL DETERMINISTIC WALLET

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# HIERARCHICAL DETERMINISTIC WALLETS

- ▶ The problems of address reuse
- ▶ BIP 32 - HD Wallets
- ▶ BIP 39 - Mnemonics for HD wallet seeds
- ▶ BIPs 43 and 44 - Multi-Account Hierarchy for HD Wallets

# INTER-DEPARTMENT DELIVERY

WRITE OUT ENTIRE LINE WHEN RECEIVED AND RE-USE UNTIL ALL LINES ARE USED

DELIVER TO	DEPARTMENT	SENT BY
recruitment	MN008-B217	Cathy Behre
Kaltman	CA235-2700	Kittackman
Le Wendorff	MN 008-W340	Dolores Kell
S. FAYABLE	1860	McDonagh
b. Obermeyer	<del>MN008-F0920</del>	Cheryl Ther
June Zaugg	MN008-T850	C. Dex
my lam	MN008-W340	
SA	MN045-S200	
RAD JOHNSON	MN012-N106	Thuy N

## THE PROBLEMS OF ADDRESS REUSE

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# THE PROBLEMS OF ADDRESS REUSE

- ▶ Privacy
- ▶ ECDSA Security
- ▶ Quantum Security

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# PRIVACY

- ▶ Bitcoin transactions are public
- ▶ *Chain analysis* can uncover patterns
- ▶ Re-using addresses can reveal information

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
# SECURITY

- ▶ ECDSA requires a (cryptographically secure random) ephemeral key
- ▶ Signing with the same ephemeral key reveals the private key
- ▶ If your PRNG is broken, then reusing an address can reveal the private key

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## QUANTUM SECURITY

- ▶ Sending *to* an address (using P2PKH) does not reveal the public key
- ▶ Spending *from* an address reveals the public key
- ▶ ECDSA is not quantum secure
- ▶ SHA256 is more quantum resistant



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# BIP 32 HD WALLETS



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## HD WALLETS – USE CASES

- ▶ Full wallet sharing
- ▶ Per-office or per-department balances
- ▶ Recurrent transactions
- ▶ Unsecure money receiver

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## SINGLE-USE ADDRESSES

- ▶ Best practice is to only use addresses once
- ▶ Having many unlinked private keys is difficult to backup and share
- ▶ Better to have a *seed* and a way to deterministically derive new private keys
- ▶ Sharing a hash chain is all or nothing
- ▶ A tree allows sub-branches to be shared individually

Seed


```
graph TD; Seed[Seed] --> PK1[Private key 1]; PK1 --> PK2[Private key 2]; PK2 --> PK3[Private key 3]; PK3 --> Ellipsis[...];
```

Private  
key 1

Private  
key 2

Private  
key 3

...



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## BIP 32 OVERVIEW

- ▶ Generate a random 128-512 bit seed **S**
- ▶ Use HMACs (Hash Message Authentication Codes) to derive child nodes.
- ▶ For the *master key* **m**:
  - ▶  $I = \text{HMAC-SHA512}(\text{Key} = \text{"Bitcoin seed"}, \text{data} = S)$
  - ▶  $I_L$  (the left 256 bits) is the *master private key*.
  - ▶  $I_R$  (the right 256 bits) is the *master chain code*.

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## CHILD KEY DERIVATION (PRIVATE)

- ▶ Derive child key from parent key using HMACs
- ▶  $I = \text{HMAC-SHA512}(\text{key} = C_{\text{par}}, \text{data} = K_{\text{par}} \parallel i)$   
non-hardened,  $i < 2^{31}$
- ▶  $I = \text{HMAC-SHA512}(\text{key} = C_{\text{par}}, \text{data} = 0x00 \parallel k_{\text{par}} \parallel i)$   
hardened,  $i \geq 2^{31}$       notation:  $i_H == i' == i + 2^{31}$
- ▶  $I_L + k_{\text{par}}$  is the *child private key*
- ▶  $I_R$  is the *child chain code*
- ▶ This function is called CKDpriv

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## CHILD KEY DERIVATION (PUBLIC)

- ▶ Only possible for non-hardened child keys
- ▶  $I = \text{HMAC-SHA512}(\text{key} = C_{\text{par}}, \text{data} = K_{\text{par}} \parallel i)$   
(non-hardened)
- ▶  $I_L + K_{\text{par}}$  is the *child public key*
- ▶  $I_R$  is the *child chain code*
- ▶ This function is called CKDpub

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# SERIALIZATION FORMAT

- ▶ BIP 32 defines a 78 byte *extended key format*:
  - ▶ 4 bytes: "version" (eg 0x0488b21e - "xpub") for Bitcoin main net
  - ▶ 1 byte: depth in key derivation tree
  - ▶ 4 bytes: fingerprint of the parent's key
  - ▶ 4 bytes: child index
  - ▶ 32 bytes: chain code
  - ▶ 33 bytes: pub key compressed or 0x00 || priv key



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## KEY IDENTIFIER AND FINGERPRINT

- ▶ *Identifier* of extended key is HASH160(Public Key)
- ▶ This is the same data used in the Bitcoin address
- ▶ *fingerprint* of key is first 32 bits of identifier

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## KEY TREE

- ▶ Construct a tree of keys by repeatedly applying CKDpriv
- ▶ Notation: index of each child key, separated by slashes
- ▶ eg:  $m/3_H/2/5$  or  $m/3'/2/5$


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## DEFAULT WALLET LAYOUT (1)

- ▶ Wallet is organized as several 'accounts', indexed by  $i$
- ▶ Each account has two keypair chains:
  - ▶ internal: used for giving out addresses.  
Key notation:  $m/i_H/1/k$
  - ▶ external: used for change addresses, etc.  
Key notation  $m/i_H/0/k$

# DEFAULT WALLET LAYOUT (2)

## BIP 32 - Hierarchical Deterministic Wallets



Child Key Derivation Function  $\sim \text{CKD}(x, n) = \text{HMAC-SHA512}(x_{\text{Chain}}, x_{\text{PubKey}} || n)$

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## SECURITY OF HD WALLETS

- ▶ Given a child extended private key  $(k_i, c_i)$  and  $i$ , attacker cannot derive parent private key
- ▶ given any number of extended private keys  $(k_{i_j}, c_{i_j})$  and  $i_j$ , attacker cannot determine if they are from a common parent
- ▶ HOWEVER!
- ▶ given a parent extended public key  $(K_{par}, c_{par})$  and a non-hardened child private key, it is possible to derive a parent extended private key
  - ▶ a compromised extended private key compromises all private keys up to the first hardened parent



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# **BIP 39**

# **MNEMONICS**

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## BIP 39

- ▶ A way to generate a BIP 32 seed using a mnemonic
- ▶ Submitted by Slush (Satoshi Labs) and used in Trezor
- ▶ Used in the Trezor hardware wallet
- ▶ There are some criticisms of this method

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## GENERATING THE MNEMONIC SENTENCE

- ▶ Generate 128-256 bits of entropy. Call these bits **ENT**
- ▶ Append the first  $\text{len}(\text{ENT})/32$  bits of  $\text{SHA256}(\text{ENT})$
- ▶ Split the concatenated bits into 11 bit chunks
- ▶ Each 11 bit chunk corresponds to an entry in a 2048 word list
- ▶ Example:  
**SCHEME SPOT PHOTO CARD BABY MOUNTAIN**  
**DEVICE KICK CRADLE PACT JOIN BORROW**



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## LENGTH OF MNEMONIC SENTENCE

len(ENT)	len(CS)	len(ENT + CS)	Number of words
128	4	132	12
192	6	198	18
256	8	264	24

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## FROM MNEMONIC SENTENCE TO SEED

- ▶ Generate 128-256 bits of entropy. Call these bits **ENT**
- ▶ Append the first  $\text{len}(\text{ENT})/32$  bits of  $\text{SHA256}(\text{ENT})$
- ▶ Split the concatenated bits into 11 bit chunks
- ▶ Each 11 bit chunk corresponds to an entry in a 2048 word list

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## GENERATING THE SEED FROM THE MNEMONIC SENTENCE

- ▶ Use PBKDF2 (Password-based Key Derivation Function 2)
  - ▶ 2048 rounds of HMAC-SHA256
- ▶ Password: the mnemonic sentence
- ▶ Salt: "mnemonic" + optional passphrase

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## CRITICISMS

- ▶ A fixed wordlist is required (because of the way the checksum is computed)
- ▶ Does not have 'versioning' - the seed does not indicate how the tree should be derived
- ▶ Relies on the security of the CSPRNG. Not clear whether using a random input to the PBKDF is any better than using a user-supplied password



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# BIPS 43 & 44 – MULTI-ACCOUNT HIERARCHIES

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## BIPS 43 AND 44

- ▶ Another two BIPs from Slush (Satoshi Labs)
- ▶ Imposes structure on the key tree
- ▶ Intended for portability between wallet implementations

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## BIP 43

- ▶ First level of tree hierarchy should be 'purpose'  
**m / purpose' / \***
- ▶ For example, BIP 44 hierarchy starts:  
**m / 44' / \***

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## BIP 44

- ▶ Defines entire structure for trees
- ▶ **m / purpose' / coin\_type' / account' / change / address\_index**
- ▶ purpose: 44'
- ▶ coin\_type: defined in Satoshi Labs SLIP-0044. Bitcoin main net is 0'
- ▶ account: used for wallet user organization
- ▶ change: 0 for external chain, 1 for internal chain (same as BIP 32 default layout)
- ▶ address\_index: set of addresses for use by the wallet



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## ACCOUNT DISCOVERY

- ▶ Used to restore wallet from backup seed
- ▶ Account field starts from 0
- ▶ Scans external chain until there's a gap of 20 unused addresses
- ▶ If account  $i$  has transactions, also try scanning account  $i + 1$