

Homomorphic Secret-Sharing with Certified Deletion

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Abstract

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1 Preliminaries

2 HSS with Certified Deletion

Unless otherwise specified, we will consider the following kind of HSS schemes by default:

- Are 2-out-of-2 secret-sharing schemes.
- Allow evaluation for a single secret.

An HSS scheme with certified deletion must have the following syntax and correctness requirements:

2.1 HSS-CD Syntax

A scheme satisfying the HSS-CD syntax for a PPT circuit family \mathcal{C} is a tuple of 5 algorithms $\text{HSS-CD} = (\text{Share}, \text{Eval}, \text{Del}, \text{Vrfy}, \text{Rec})$ with the following properties:

Syntax:

$\text{Share}(s) \rightarrow (sh_0^0, vk_0), (sh_1^0, vk_1)$: The sharing algorithm outputs quantum (possibly-entangled) secret-shares sh_0^0, sh_1^0 encoding an input secret s . It also outputs the corresponding classical verification keys vk_0, vk_1 .

$\text{Eval}(C_j, i, sh_i^{j-1}) \rightarrow sh_i^j$: The evaluation algorithm takes the description of a PPT computable circuit C_j , an index $i \in \{0, 1\}$, and an input share sh_i^{j-1} . It outputs a possibly-altered output share sh_i^j .

$\text{Del}(i, sh_i^j) \rightarrow \text{cert}_i$: The deletion algorithm takes an index $i \in \{0, 1\}$, a corresponding share sh_i^j , and produces a deletion certificate cert_i .

$\text{Vrfy}(i, vk_i, \text{cert}_i) \rightarrow \top / \perp$: The verification algorithm takes an index $i \in \{0, 1\}$, the corresponding verification key vk_i and a certificate cert_i . It outputs \top or \perp .

$\text{Rec}(sh_0^q, sh_1^q) \rightarrow (d_1, \dots, d_q)$: The reconstruction algorithm takes two evaluated input shares sh_0^q, sh_1^q and outputs a q -tuple (d_1, \dots, d_q) .

Evaluation Correctness: $\forall q = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ and $\forall (C_1, \dots, C_q) \in \mathcal{C}^q$, the following condition holds:

$$\Pr \left[(d_1, \dots, d_q) = (C_1(s), \dots, C_q(s)) : \begin{array}{l} (sh_0^0, vk_0), (sh_1^0, vk_1) \leftarrow \text{Share}(s) \\ \forall i, j \in \{0, 1\} \times [q] : sh_i^j \leftarrow \text{Eval}(C_j, i, sh_i^{j-1}) \\ (d_1, \dots, d_q) \leftarrow \text{Rec}(sh_0^q, sh_1^q) \end{array} \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

Deletion Correctness: The following condition holds for all $i \in \{0, 1\}$, $q = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ and $(C_1, \dots, C_q) \in \mathcal{C}^q$:

$$\Pr \left[\text{Vrfy}(i, vk_i, \text{cert}_i) \rightarrow \top : \begin{array}{l} (sh_0^0, vk_0), (sh_1^0, vk_1) \leftarrow \text{Share}(s) \\ \forall j \in [q] : sh_i^j \leftarrow \text{Eval}(C_j, i, sh_i^{j-1}) \\ \text{cert}_i \leftarrow \text{Del}(i, sh_i^q) \end{array} \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

Compactness: The following condition holds for all $i \in \{0, 1\}$, $q = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ and $(C_1, \dots, C_q) \in \mathcal{C}^q$, where l_q denotes the output length of the circuit C_q :

$$\left[|sh_i^q| - |sh_i^{q-1}| = \text{poly}(1^\lambda, l_q) : \begin{array}{l} (sh_0^0, vk_0), (sh_1^0, vk_1) \leftarrow \text{Share}(s) \\ \forall j \in [q] : sh_i^j \leftarrow \text{Eval}(C_j, i, sh_i^{j-1}) \end{array} \right]$$

2.2 Additive Strong HSS-CD Syntax

A scheme satisfying the additive strong HSS-CD syntax for a PPT circuit family \mathcal{C} is a tuple of 5 algorithms $\text{HSS-CD} = (\text{Share}, \text{Eval}, \text{Obs}, \text{Del}, \text{Vrfy})$ with the following properties:

Syntax:

$\text{Share}(s) \rightarrow (sh_0^0, vk_0), (sh_1^0, vk_1)$: The sharing algorithm outputs quantum (possibly-entangled) secret-shares sh_0^0, sh_1^0 encoding an input secret s . It also outputs the corresponding classical verification keys vk_0, vk_1 .

$\text{Eval}(C_j, i, sh_i^{j-1}) \rightarrow sh_i^j$: The evaluation algorithm takes the description of a PPT computable circuit C_j , an index $i \in \{0, 1\}$ and a share sh_i^{j-1} . It outputs a quantum share sh_i^j .

$\text{Obs}(i, sh_i^j) \rightarrow (y_0^j, \dots, y_1^j)$: The observation algorithm takes an index $i \in \{0, 1\}$ and a quantum state sh_i^j and produces a j -tuple of classical shares.

$\text{Del}(i, sh_i^j) \rightarrow \text{cert}_i$: The deletion algorithm takes an index $i \in \{0, 1\}$, a corresponding quantum share sh_i^j , and produces a deletion certificate cert_i .

$\text{Vrfy}(i, vk_i, \text{cert}_i) \rightarrow \top / \perp$: The verification algorithm takes an index $i \in \{0, 1\}$, the corresponding verification key vk_i and a certificate cert_i . It outputs \top or \perp .

Evaluation Correctness: The following condition holds for all $q = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ and $(C_1, \dots, C_q) \in \mathcal{C}^q$:

$$\Pr \left[(y_0^1 \oplus y_1^1, \dots, y_0^q \oplus y_1^q) = (C_1(s), \dots, C_q(s)) : \begin{array}{l} (sh_0^0, vk_0), (sh_1^0, vk_1) \leftarrow \text{Share}(s) \\ \forall i, j \in \{0, 1\} \times [q] : sh_i^j \leftarrow \text{Eval}(C_j, i, sh_i^{j-1}) \\ (y_i^1, \dots, y_i^q) \leftarrow \text{Obs}(i, sh_i^q) \end{array} \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

In the case of additive strong HSS-CD, we will consider the following weaker deletion guarantee:

Deletion Correctness: The following condition holds for all $i \in \{0, 1\}$, $q = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ and $(C_1, \dots, C_q) \in \mathcal{C}^q$:

$$\Pr \left[\text{Vrfy}(i, vk_i, \text{cert}_i) \rightarrow \top : \begin{array}{l} (sh_0^0, vk_0), (sh_1^0, vk_1) \leftarrow \text{Share}(s) \\ \forall j \in [q] : sh_i^j \leftarrow \text{Eval}(C_j, i, sh_i^{j-1}) \\ \text{cert}_i \leftarrow \text{Del}(i, sh_i^q) \end{array} \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

2.3 Security Definitions

Deletion Security wrt Share j : The following security notion is defined wrt a non-local quantum adversary $(\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1)$:

$\text{Expt}_{\text{HSS-CD}, (\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1)}^{\text{del}}(1^\lambda, j, b)$:

1. \mathcal{A}_0 sends $(s_0, s_1) \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ to the challenger.
2. The challenger runs $(sh_0^0, vk_0), (sh_1^0, vk_1) \leftarrow \text{Share}(s_b)$ and sends each sh_i^0 to \mathcal{A}_i .
3. \mathcal{A}_j sends (cert_j, R_j) and \mathcal{A}_{1-j} sends R_{1-j} where R_0, R_1 are some registers.
4. If $\text{Vrfy}(j, vk_j, \text{cert}_j) = \top$, then output (R_0, R_1) .

Statistical Deletion Security wrt Share j holds if the following holds:

$$TD\left(\text{Expt}_{\text{HSS-CD}, (\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1)}^{\text{del}}(1^\lambda, j, 0), \text{Expt}_{\text{HSS-CD}, (\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1)}^{\text{del}}(1^\lambda, j, 1)\right) \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

Computational Deletion Security wrt Share j holds if the following holds for all QPT \mathcal{A} :

$$\left| \Pr \left[\mathcal{A} \left(\text{Expt}_{\text{HSS-CD}, (\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1)}^{\text{del}}(1^\lambda, j, 0) \right) = 1 \right] - \Pr \left[\mathcal{A} \left(\text{Expt}_{\text{HSS-CD}, (\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1)}^{\text{del}}(1^\lambda, j, 1) \right) = 1 \right] \right| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

Double-Deletion Security: The following security notion is defined wrt a non-local quantum adversary $(\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1)$:

$\text{Exp}_{\text{HSS-CD}, (\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1)}^{\text{del-2}}(1^\lambda, b)$:

1. \mathcal{A}_0 sends $(s_0, s_1) \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ to the challenger. The challenger runs $(sh_0^0, vk_0), (sh_1^0, vk_1) \leftarrow \text{Share}(s_b)$ and sends each sh_i^0 to \mathcal{A}_i .
2. \mathcal{A}_0 sends (cert_0, R_0) and \mathcal{A}_1 sends (cert_1, R_1) where R_0, R_1 are some registers.
3. If $\text{Vrfy}(0, vk_0, \text{cert}_0) = \text{Vrfy}(1, vk_1, \text{cert}_1) = \top$, then output (R_0, R_1) .

Statistical Double-Deletion Security holds if the following holds:

$$TD\left(\text{Exp}_{\text{HSS-CD}, (\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1)}^{\text{del-2}}(1^\lambda, 0), \text{Exp}_{\text{HSS-CD}, (\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1)}^{\text{del-2}}(1^\lambda, 1)\right) \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

Computational Double-Deletion Security holds if the following holds for all QPT \mathcal{A} :

$$\left| \Pr \left[\mathcal{A} \left(\text{Exp}_{\text{HSS-CD}, (\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1)}^{\text{del-2}}(1^\lambda, 0) \right) = 1 \right] - \Pr \left[\mathcal{A} \left(\text{Exp}_{\text{HSS-CD}, (\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1)}^{\text{del-2}}(1^\lambda, 1) \right) = 1 \right] \right| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

Computational Secrecy wrt Share j : The following security notion is defined wrt a QPT adversary \mathcal{A} :

$\text{Expt}_{\text{HSS-CD}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind}}(1^\lambda, j, b)$:

1. \mathcal{A} sends $(s_0, s_1) \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ to the challenger. The challenger runs $(sh_0^0, vk_0), (sh_1^0, vk_1) \leftarrow \text{Share}(s_b)$ and sends sh_i^0 to \mathcal{A} .
2. \mathcal{A} sends b' to the challenger. The challenger outputs b' .

$$\left| \Pr \left[\text{Expt}_{\text{HSS-CD}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind}}(1^\lambda, j, 0) = 1 \right] - \Pr \left[\text{Expt}_{\text{HSS-CD}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind}}(1^\lambda, j, 1) = 1 \right] \right| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

Hereafter, we will use *stat* to denote statistical security and *comp* to denote computational security.

Definition 2.1 ((Additive Strong) (X, Y)-HSS-CD scheme for \mathcal{C}). An (Additive Strong) (X, Y) -HSS-CD scheme for \mathcal{C} , where $X, Y \in \{\text{stat}, \text{comp}\}^2$ is a scheme that satisfies the (Additive Strong) HSS-CD syntax for \mathcal{C} , the X deletion security for share 0, and the Y deletion security for share 1.

Definition 2.2 ((Additive Strong) (X)-HSS-CD scheme for \mathcal{C}). An (Additive Strong) (X) -HSS-CD scheme for \mathcal{C} where $X \in \{\text{stat}, \text{comp}\}$ is a scheme satisfying the (Additive Strong) HSS-CD syntax for \mathcal{C} , the X double-deletion security, and computational secrecy wrt share 0 and share 1.

Remark 2.3. Notice that Deletion Security wrt Share j implies Computational Secrecy wrt Share $1 - j$, but the Double Deletion security does not imply Computational Secrecy.

Remark 2.4. Observe that a (stat, comp)-HSS-CD scheme for \mathcal{C} is also a (stat)-HSS-CD scheme for \mathcal{C} . Likewise, a (comp, comp)-HSS-CD scheme for \mathcal{C} is also a (comp)-HSS-CD scheme for \mathcal{C} .

3 Feasibility and Impossibility

Lemma 3.1. *Any (stat, stat)-HSS-CD scheme for \mathcal{C} is also an information-theoretic HSS scheme for \mathcal{C} .*

Proof. Suppose there exists a (stat, stat)-HSS-CD scheme that does not satisfy information-theoretic secrecy. Then, there exists an unbounded adversary \mathcal{D} that receives some share sh_i^0 and distinguishes between the secrets s_0, s_1 . Then, there exists an adversary $(\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1)$ in the statistical security wrt share $1 - i$ game that works as follows. \mathcal{A}_{1-i} honestly deletes its share and outputs a dummy register while \mathcal{A}_i outputs a register containing its share sh_i^0 . In the second-stage, the distinguisher \mathcal{D} is run on sh_i^0 to tell apart the secrets s_0, s_1 . \square

The following theorem shows that the classical impossibility result regarding information-theoretic HSS by [BGI⁺18] also applies to the setting of quantum shares.

Theorem 3.2. *TBD.*

Theorem 3.3. *There does not exist an Additive Strong (comp)-HSS-CD scheme HSS-CD for any PPT circuit class \mathcal{C} , given that HSS-CD.Share(s) outputs shares sh_0, sh_1 that are not entangled with each other.*

Proof. In fact, we will prove that this holds even for a weaker notions of evaluation and deletion correctness, where *Eval* and *Del* support only a single evaluation. Specifically, for shares (sh_0, sh_1) output by *Share*(s), *Eval*(i, C, sh_i) outputs a share \tilde{sh}_i , and *Obs*(i, \tilde{sh}_i) outputs a value y_i such that $y_0 \oplus y_1 = C(s)$. Moreover, *Del*(i, \tilde{sh}_i) outputs cert_i such that $\text{Vrfy}(i, \text{vk}_i, \text{cert}_i) = \top$. Furthermore, we will not need to rely on computational secrecy of either share, but only the computational double deletion security. The argument proceeds as follows:

Let $(|\psi_0\rangle, \text{vk}_0), (|\psi_1\rangle, \text{vk}_1)$ be some pure state output by *Share*(s), where $|\psi_0\rangle, |\psi_1\rangle$ are not entangled with each other. Let $|\tilde{\psi}_i\rangle$ be the state output by *Eval*($i, C, |\psi_i\rangle$). Wlog, let $\{\Pi_0, \mathbb{I} - \Pi_0\}$ be the projective measurement equivalent of *Obs*($0, |\tilde{\psi}_0\rangle$), i.e., Π_0 corresponds to $y_0 = 0$ and $\mathbb{I} - \Pi_0$ corresponds to $y_0 = 1$. Let Y_0 denote the random variable of the output y_0 . Likewise, consider the projective measurement $\{\Pi_1, \mathbb{I} - \Pi_1\}$ equivalent of *Obs*($1, |\tilde{\psi}_1\rangle$) and let Y_1 be the corresponding output random variable. Notice that for every outcome y_0 of Y_0 , there is a single outcome y_1 of Y_1 that satisfies $y_1 = C(s) \oplus y_0$. Let \tilde{Y}_0 be the random variable for \tilde{y}_0 sampled as $\tilde{y}_0 = C(s) \oplus y_1 : y_1 \leftarrow Y_1$. By the evaluation correctness requirement, we require that $\Pr[Y_0 = \tilde{Y}_0] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$. Since Y_0 and \tilde{Y}_0 are independent random variables, this is only possible if there exists y_0^* such that $\Pr[Y_0 = y_0^*] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$ and $\Pr[\tilde{Y}_0 = y_0^*] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$. In other words, the measurement $\{\Pi_0, \mathbb{I} - \Pi_0\}$ either accepts the state $|\psi_0\rangle$ with probability $1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$ or rejects it with probability $1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$. Consequently, by the gentle measurement lemma, the leftover state is close in trace distance to the state $|\psi_0\rangle$. As a result, it can be certifiably deleted after obtaining y_0 . By a similar argument, y_1 can be obtained in the same way. Since this holds for every possible pure state output by *Share*(s), it also holds for arbitrary mixed states. As a result, the adversary can efficiently compute $y_0 \oplus y_1 = C(s)$ in the second-stage, breaking the computational double-deletion security. Since this security notion is the weakest one, this also rules out the other notions. \square

3.1 FHE-CD based Construction

We construct a (stat, comp)-HSS-CD scheme $\text{HSS-CD} = \text{HSS-CD}(\text{Share}, \text{Eval}, \text{Del}, \text{Vrfy}, \text{Rec})$ using the following building blocks.

- Fully Homomorphic Encryption with Certified Deletion (FHE-CD) scheme $\text{FHE-CD} = \text{FHE-CD}(\text{Setup}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{Eval}, \text{Del}, \text{Vrfy})$.
- Secret Sharing with Certified Deletion (SS-CD) scheme $\text{SS-CD} = \text{SS-CD}(\text{Share}, \text{Rec}, \text{Del}, \text{Vrfy})$.

The construction is as follows.

HSS-CD.Share(s):

1. Generate $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{FHE-CD.Setup}(1^\lambda)$.
2. Compute $(\text{fhecd.ct}^0, \text{fhecd.vk}) \leftarrow \text{FHE-CD.Enc}(s)$.
3. Compute $(\text{sscd.sh}, \text{sscd.csh}), \text{sscd.vk} \leftarrow \text{SS-CD.Share}(sk)$.
4. Set $\text{sh}_0^0 := (\text{fhecd.pk}, \text{fhecd.ct}^0, \text{sscd.csh})$ and $\text{vk}_0 := \text{fhecd.vk}$.
5. Set $\text{sh}_1^0 := \text{sscd.sh}$ and $\text{vk}_1 := \text{sscd.vk}$.
6. Output $(\text{sh}_0^0, \text{vk}_0), (\text{sh}_1^0, \text{vk}_1)$.

HSS-CD.Eval($C_j, i, \text{sh}_i^{j-1}$): If $i = 1$, set $\text{sh}_1^j := \text{sh}_1^{j-1}$. Else, execute the following:

1. Parse sh_0^{j-1} as $(\text{fhecd.pk}, \text{fhecd.ct}^{j-1}, \text{sscd.csh})$.
2. Compute $\text{fhecd.ct}^j \leftarrow \text{FHE-CD.Eval}(\text{fhecd.pk}, C_j, \text{fhecd.ct}^{j-1})$.
3. Set $\text{sh}_0^j := (\text{fhecd.pk}, \text{fhecd.ct}^j, \text{sscd.csh})$.
4. Output sh_i^j .

HSS-CD.Del(i, sh_i^j):

1. If $i = 0$, execute the following:
 - (i) Parse sh_0^j as $(\text{fhecd.pk}, \text{fhecd.ct}^j, \text{sscd.csh})$.
 - (ii) Compute and output $\text{cert}_0 \leftarrow \text{FHE-CD.Del}(\text{fhecd.ct}^j)$.
2. If $i = 1$, execute the following:
 - (i) Parse sh_1^j as sscd.sh .
 - (ii) Compute and output $\text{cert}_1 \leftarrow \text{SS-CD.Del}(\text{sscd.sh})$.

HSS-CD.Vrfy($i, \text{vk}_i, \text{cert}_i$):

1. If $i = 0$, output $\text{ans}_0 \leftarrow \text{FHE-CD.Vrfy}(\text{vk}_0, \text{cert}_0)$.
2. If $i = 1$, output $\text{ans}_0 \leftarrow \text{SS-CD.Vrfy}(\text{vk}_1, \text{cert}_1)$.

HSS-CD.Rec($\text{sh}_0^q, \text{sh}_1^q$):

1. Parse sh_0^q as $(\text{fhecd.pk}, \text{fhecd.ct}^q, \text{sscd.csh})$.
2. Parse sh_1^q as sscd.sh .
3. Compute $sk \leftarrow \text{SS-CD.Dec}(\text{sscd.sh}, \text{sscd.csh})$.
4. Compute and output $(d_1, \dots, d_q) \leftarrow \text{FHE-CD.Dec}(sk, \text{fhecd.ct}^q)$.

Theorem 3.4. *There exists a (stat, comp)-HSS-CD scheme assuming the existence of a fully homomorphic encryption scheme with certified deletion (FHE-CD), and a secret-sharing scheme with certified deletion (SS-CD).*

Proof. We will prove that the construction HSS-CD is a (stat, comp)-HSS-CD scheme. First, we will assume that $(\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1)$ is a non-local adversary that breaks the statistical deletion security of share 0. We will use this adversary to break the certified deletion security of the FHE-CD scheme FHE-CD. Consider a QPT reduction \mathcal{R} that runs as follows in the FHE-CD game:

Execution of $\mathcal{R}^{(\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1)}$ in $\text{Exp}_{\text{FHE-CD}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{fhe-cd}}(1^\lambda, b)$:

1. \mathcal{A}_0 sends $(s_0, s_1) \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ to \mathcal{R} , which \mathcal{R} forwards to the challenger.

2. The challenger samples $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ and sends pk to \mathcal{R} .
3. The challenger encrypts s_b as $ct \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk, s_b)$ and sends ct to \mathcal{R} .
4. \mathcal{R} computes $sh_0^0 := (pk, ct, \text{sscd.csh})$, where $\text{sscd.csh} \leftarrow \text{SS-CD.Sim}(1^\lambda)$.
5. \mathcal{R} runs \mathcal{A}_0 on input sh_0^0 . If \mathcal{A}_0 outputs (cert_0, R_0) , \mathcal{R} sends cert_0 to the challenger.
6. The challenger computes $\text{ans} \leftarrow \text{Vrfy}(vk, \text{cert}_0)$. If $\text{ans} = \top$, it sends sk to \mathcal{R} . Else, it outputs \perp .
7. \mathcal{R} computes sscd.sh conditioned on $(\text{sscd.sh}, \text{sscd.sh})$ encoding sk .
8. \mathcal{R} sends $sh_1^0 := \text{sscd.sh}$ to \mathcal{A}_1 . If \mathcal{A}_1 outputs R_1 , send (R_0, R_1) to the challenger.

We will now argue that if $(\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1)$ break statistical security wrt share 0, then \mathcal{R} breaks the certified-deletion security of FHE-CD. Observe that the view of \mathcal{A}_0 in the reduction is identically distributed to its view in $\text{Expt}_{\text{HSS-CD}, (\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1)}^{\text{del}}(1^\lambda, 0, b)$. Now, notice that if $\text{HSS-CD.Vrfy}(0, vk_0, \text{cert}_0)$ passes, then $\text{FHE-CD.Vrfy}(vk, \text{cert}_0)$ also passes. Consequently, \mathcal{R} receives the secret key sk . By the information-theoretic secrecy of the scheme SS-CD, the view of \mathcal{A}_1 is identically distributed to that in the original experiment. As a result, (R_0, R_1) are identically distributed to that of the HSS-CD game. By assumption, there exists an unbounded algorithm that can use (R_0, R_1) to guess b with non-negligible probability. This breaks the certified-deletion security of FHE-CD.

Next, we will assume that $(\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1)$ is a non-local adversary that breaks the computational deletion security of share 1. We will use this adversary to break the certified deletion security of the SS-CD scheme SS-CD. Consider a non-local reduction $(\mathcal{R}_0, \mathcal{R}_1)$ that runs as follows:

Execution of $(\mathcal{R}_0^{\mathcal{A}_0}, \mathcal{R}_1^{\mathcal{A}_1})$ in $\text{Exp}_{\text{SS-CD}, (\mathcal{R}_0, \mathcal{R}_1)}^{\text{ss-cd}}(1^\lambda, b)$:

1. \mathcal{R}_0 samples $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{FHE-CD.Setup}(1^\lambda)$. It sets $s_0 := 0^\lambda$ and $s_1 := sk$ and sends (s_0, s_1) to the challenger.
2. The challenger computes $(sh, csh, vk) \leftarrow \text{Share}(s_b)$. It sends csh to \mathcal{R}_0 and sh to \mathcal{R}_1 .
3. \mathcal{R}_0 runs \mathcal{A}_0 . \mathcal{A}_0 sends (s'_0, s'_1) to \mathcal{R}_0 .
4. \mathcal{R}_0 sends (pk, ct, csh) to \mathcal{A}_0 , where $ct \leftarrow \text{FHE-CD.Enc}(pk, s'_c)$ and $c \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$.
5. \mathcal{A}_0 sends R'_0 to \mathcal{R}_0 . \mathcal{R}_0 sets $R_0 := (R'_0, c)$ and sends it to the challenger.
6. \mathcal{R}_1 runs \mathcal{A}_1 on input sh . If \mathcal{A}_1 outputs (cert_1, R'_1) , then \mathcal{R}_1 sets $R_1 := R'_1$ and sends it to the challenger.
7. The challenger computes $\text{ans} = \text{Vrfy}(vk, \text{cert}_1)$. If $\text{ans} = \top$, it outputs (R_0, R_1) .

Consider now the experiment $\text{Exp}_{\text{SS-CD}, (\mathcal{R}_0, \mathcal{R}_1)}^{\text{ss-cd}}(1^\lambda, 0)$. Notice that if there exists a QPT algorithm \mathcal{A} that obtains the registers (R'_0, R'_1) and outputs $c' = c$ with probability $\frac{1}{2} + \text{non-negl}(\lambda)$, then the security of FHE-CD is broken. This is because a reduction can obtain an FHE-CD ciphertext and simulate the view of $\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1$ as needed, because knowledge of sk is not required.

By assumption, there exists a QPT algorithm \mathcal{A} that obtains (R'_0, R'_1) and outputs $c' = c$ with probability $\frac{1}{2} + \text{non-negl}(\lambda)$ in the experiment $\text{Exp}_{\text{SS-CD}, (\mathcal{R}_0, \mathcal{R}_1)}^{\text{ss-cd}}(1^\lambda, 1)$.

Now, consider an algorithm \mathcal{R} that obtains $(R_0 = (c, R'_0), R_1 = R'_1)$. It runs \mathcal{A} on (R'_0, R'_1) and checks if the value c' equals c or not. If it is, then \mathcal{R} outputs $b' = 1$, otherwise it outputs $b' = 0$. Consequently, \mathcal{R} outputs $b' = b$ with probability $\frac{1}{2} + \text{non-negl}(\lambda)$, breaking the security of the scheme SS-CD. This gives us a contradiction. \square

4 Additive HSS with Certified-Deletion

4.1 Motivation

1. Distributed Storage (and ability to evaluate). No single point of attack.
2. Can obtain evaluated outputs and also deletion guarantee without choosing between two. This is achieved with classical deletion certificate as well, w/o needing quantum revocation.

3. Additive shares are Optimally Compact unlike FHE ciphertexts (for instance). This ensures smaller communication overhead.
4. Reconstruction computation overhead is minimal. Meaningful if have to perform many of them.
5. Most importantly, additive shares are linearly homomorphic. This allows computation over shares of multiple parties. For instance, two hospitals may secret share patient data between two servers. The servers can compute (C_O, C_B, C_A) functions say, where each one returns number of instances of that blood group. The shares can simply be added after evaluation and single share can be sent back (both hospitals learn total number of patients of each kind between both of them). This is especially nice since input shares cannot be evaluated on together because they are in CD form (we don't know how to do multi-key FHE-CD). Another thing to note is that CD shares do not have any linear homomorphism also.

4.2 Additive HSS-CD Syntax

A scheme satisfying the additive HSS-CD syntax for a PPT circuit family \mathcal{C} is a tuple of 4 algorithms $\text{HSS-CD} = \text{HSS-CD}(\text{Share}, \text{Eval}, \text{Del}, \text{Vrfy})$ with the following properties:

Syntax:

$\text{Share}(s) \rightarrow (sh_0^0, vk_0), (sh_1^0, vk_1)$: The sharing algorithm outputs quantum (possibly-entangled) secret-shares sh_0^0, sh_1^0 encoding an input secret s . It also outputs the corresponding classical verification keys vk_0, vk_1 .

$\text{Eval}(C_j, i, sh_i^{j-1}) \rightarrow (y_i^j, sh_i^j)$: The evaluation algorithm takes the description of a PPT computable circuit C_j , an index $i \in \{0, 1\}$ and a share sh_i^{j-1} . It outputs a quantum share sh_i^j and a classical additive share y_i^j .

$\text{Del}(i, sh_i^j) \rightarrow \text{cert}_i$: The deletion algorithm takes an index $i \in \{0, 1\}$, a corresponding quantum share sh_i^j , and produces a deletion certificate cert_i .

$\text{Vrfy}(i, vk_i, \text{cert}_i) \rightarrow \top / \perp$: The verification algorithm takes an index $i \in \{0, 1\}$, the corresponding verification key vk_i and a certificate cert_i . It outputs \top or \perp .

Evaluation Correctness: The following condition holds for all $q = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ and $(C_1, \dots, C_q) \in \mathcal{C}^q$:

$$\Pr \left[(y_0^1 \oplus y_1^1, \dots, y_0^q \oplus y_1^q) = (C_1(s), \dots, C_q(s)) : \begin{array}{l} (sh_0^0, vk_0), (sh_1^0, vk_1) \leftarrow \text{Share}(s) \\ \forall i, j \in \{0, 1\} \times [q] : (y_i^j, sh_i^j) \leftarrow \text{Eval}(C_j, i, sh_i^{j-1}) \end{array} \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

Deletion Correctness: The following condition holds for all $i \in \{0, 1\}$, $q = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ and $(C_1, \dots, C_q) \in \mathcal{C}^q$:

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{Vrfy}(i, vk_i, \text{cert}_i) \rightarrow \top : \\ \forall j \in [q] : (y_i^j, sh_i^j) \leftarrow \text{Eval}(C_j, i, sh_i^{j-1}) \\ \text{cert}_i \leftarrow \text{Del}(i, sh_i^q) \end{array} : (sh_0^0, vk_0), (sh_1^0, vk_1) \leftarrow \text{Share}(s) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

4.3 Security Definitions

Deletion Security wrt Share j , Circuit Class \mathcal{C} , and Distribution \mathcal{D} : The following security notion is defined wrt a non-local quantum adversary $(\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1)$:

$\text{Expt}_{\text{HSS-wCD}, (\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1)}^{\text{del}}(1^\lambda, j, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{D}, b)$:

1. The challenger samples $(s_0, s_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{D}$ and sends (s_0, s_1) to both $\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1$.
2. The challenger runs $(sh_0^0, vk_0), (sh_1^0, vk_1) \leftarrow \text{Share}(s_b)$ and sends each sh_i^0 to \mathcal{A}_i .
3. \mathcal{A}_j sends (cert_j, R_j) and \mathcal{A}_{1-j} sends R_{1-j} where R_0, R_1 are some registers.

4. If $\text{Vrfy}(j, \text{vk}_j, \text{cert}_j) = \top$, then output (R_0, R_1) .

Need to Formalize this: Let \mathcal{D} be a distribution such that for (s_0, s_1) drawn from \mathcal{D} , any QPT oracle algorithm $\mathcal{B}^{\mathcal{C}(\cdot)}$ cannot distinguish between (s_0, s_1) .

Statistical (*likewise*, Computational) Deletion Security holds if the following holds for all *hard-given- \mathcal{C}* distributions \mathcal{D} and unbounded (*likewise*, QPT) algorithms \mathcal{A} :

$$\left| \Pr \left[\mathcal{A} \left(\text{Expt}_{\text{HSS-wCD}, (\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1)}^{\text{del}}(1^\lambda, j, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{D}, 0) \right) = 1 \right] - \Pr \left[\mathcal{A} \left(\text{Expt}_{\text{HSS-wCD}, (\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1)}^{\text{del}}(1^\lambda, j, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{D}, 1) \right) = 1 \right] \right| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

Double-Deletion Security wrt Circuit Class \mathcal{C} , and Distribution \mathcal{D} : The following security notion is defined wrt a non-local quantum adversary $(\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1)$:

$\text{Exp}_{\text{HSS-wCD}, (\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1)}^{\text{del-2}}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{D}, b)$:

1. The challenger samples $(s_0, s_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{D}$ and sends (s_0, s_1) to both $\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1$.
2. The challenger runs $(sh_0^0, \text{vk}_0), (sh_1^0, \text{vk}_1) \leftarrow \text{Share}(s_b)$ and sends each sh_i^0 to \mathcal{A}_i .
3. \mathcal{A}_0 sends (cert_0, R_0) and \mathcal{A}_1 sends (cert_1, R_1) where R_0, R_1 are some registers.
4. If $\text{Vrfy}(0, \text{vk}_0, \text{cert}_0) = \text{Vrfy}(1, \text{vk}_1, \text{cert}_1) = \top$, then output (R_0, R_1) .

Statistical (*likewise*, Computational) Double-Deletion Security holds if the following holds for all *hard-given- \mathcal{C}* distributions \mathcal{D} and unbounded (*likewise*, QPT) algorithms \mathcal{A} :

$$\left| \Pr \left[\mathcal{A} \left(\text{Exp}_{\text{HSS-wCD}, (\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1)}^{\text{del-2}}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{D}, 0) \right) = 1 \right] - \Pr \left[\mathcal{A} \left(\text{Exp}_{\text{HSS-wCD}, (\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1)}^{\text{del-2}}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{D}, 1) \right) = 1 \right] \right| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

Computational Secrecy wrt Share j : The following security notion is defined wrt a QPT adversary \mathcal{A} :

$\text{Exp}_{\text{HSS-wCD}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind}}(1^\lambda, j, b)$:

1. \mathcal{A} sends $(s_0, s_1) \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ to the challenger. The challenger runs $(sh_0^0, \text{vk}_0), (sh_1^0, \text{vk}_1) \leftarrow \text{Share}(s_b)$ and sends sh_i^0 to \mathcal{A} .
2. \mathcal{A} sends b' to the challenger. The challenger outputs b' .

$$\left| \Pr \left[\text{Exp}_{\text{HSS-wCD}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind}}(1^\lambda, j, 0) = 1 \right] - \Pr \left[\text{Exp}_{\text{HSS-wCD}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind}}(1^\lambda, j, 1) = 1 \right] \right| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

References

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