Online Appendix for
Echoes of a Fading Past: Authoritarian Legacies and Far-Right Voting

Contents

A Descriptive Statistics and Information about Data

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables in the Main Models

Statistics	N	Mean	Median	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Country-Year Level						
Far-right vote share	292	5.040	0	8.307	0	40.31
Right-wing dictatorship	292		0		0	1
Left-wing dictatorship	292		0		0	1
Years since transition	292	39.30	42	20.94	0	73
ENP_{t-1}	292	3.884	3.550	1.613	1.690	10.44
$\ln(\text{District magnitude})_{t-1}$	292	1.920	2.208	1.264	-0.105	5.011
GDP growth_{t-1}	292	2.798	2.866	3.365	-14.24	25.16
$\text{Unemployment}_{t-1}$	292	8.430	8.430	7.450	0.500	26.50
$\ln(\text{Number of refugees per capita})_{t-1}$	292	-2.839	-2.466	2.191	-11.41	0.872
$\text{Level of democracy}_{t-1}$	292	9.603	10	0.666	5.250	10
Individual Level						
Far-right support	57,755		0		0	1
Right-wing dictatorship exposure (year 18-25)	57,755		0		0	8
Left-wing dictatorship exposure (year 18-25)	57,755		0		0	8
Female	57,627		1		0	1
Post-secondary education[a]	57,027		1		0	1
Secondary education[a]	57,027		0		0	1
Unemployment	54,862		0		0	1

[a] Reference group for the education is the individuals which have less than secondary education.

Table A2: List of the Countries and Surveys Used in the Study

Countries in Models	Years that Far-Right Parties are present	Mean Vote Share	Far-Right Vote in Sample (N)	Total (N)
Right-Wing Dictatorship				
Argentina				
Austria	1986, 1990, 1994, 1995, 1999, 2002, 2006, **2008**, **2013**, **2017**	19.75%	512	2,963
Bolivia				
Brazil[a]	1994, 2018	No data	42	931
Chile	2017	No data		
Greece	2007, 2009, **2012**, **2015**	16.38%	184	2,772
Italy	1987, 1992, 1994, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008, 2013, **2018**	14.41%	161	1,203
Japan	2014	2.65%		
Portugal				
South Korea				
Spain				
Uruguay				
Left-Wing Dictatorship				
Bulgaria	1994, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2014, 2017	7.48%		
Croatia	2000, 2003, **2007**, 2011, 2016	32.67%	312	756
Czech Republic	**1996**, 1998, 2002, 2013, 2017	5.60%	69	1,084
Estonia	2015	8.15%		
Hungary[a]	**1998**, 2010, 2014	12.78%	182	1,719
Latvia	1993, 1995, 1998, 2002, 2006, **2010**, **2011**, **2014**, 2018	13.71%	269	2,762
Lithuania	1992, 2008, 2012,**2016**	6.96%	44	890
Romania	**1996**, 2000, **2004**, **2012**	13.81%	241	3,571
Slovakia	1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2012, **2016**	18.90%	140	1,150
Slovenia	**1996**, 2000, **2004**, **2008**, 2011	3.93%	122	2,214
Old Democracies				
Australia	2013, 2016	0.79%		
Belgium	1981, 1985, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2010, 2014	6.38%		
Canada				
Cyprus	1996, 2001, 2006, 2011, 2016	33.59%		

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Table A2 – *Continued from previous page*

Denmark	1981, 1984, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1994, **1998**, **2001**, 2005, **2007**, 2011, 2015	10.12%	521	5,086
Finland	1987, 1991, 1995, 2003, **2007**, **2011**, **2015**	6.97%	414	3,588
France	1986, 1988, 1993, 1997, **2002**, 2007, **2012**, 2017	11.18%	320	2,337
Iceland				
Ireland				
Israel	2009, **2013**, 2015	6.24%	69	1,017
Luxembourg				
Malta				
Netherlands	1982, 1989, 1994, **2002**, 2003, **2006**, **2010**, 2012, 2017	8.14%	707	5,647
New Zealand	1993, **1996**, 1999, **2002**, **2011**, **2014**, 2017	8.35%	978	8,891
Norway	1981, 1985, 1989, 1993, **1997**, **2001**, **2005**, **2009**, **2013**, 2017	13.39%	1,148	8,342
Sweden	2010, **2014**, 2018	13.39%	71	832
Switzerland	1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007	3.05%		
United Kingdom				
United States of America				

Note: Country-years listed are included in the main models. Far-right parties are identified based on the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP)'s classification. We exclude Mexico and Germany from our sample, although they are democracies today, as their authoritarian pasts cannot be classified as either right- or left-wing. Years in **bold** indicate the country-years included in the main models in the individual-level analysis.

[a] Although Brazil in the 2002, Hungary 2002, 2018 elections are not included in the country-level analysis, they are included in the individual analysis since parties which are identified as far-right by the CMP are included in the CSES data, which includes all parties that received more than 2% of the vote share, regardless of whether they obtained seats in the parliament.

Table A3: List of the Far-Right Parties

Country	Far-Right Party	
	CMP (1980-2018)	PopuList (1998-2018)
Australia	Katter's Australian Party	***Country not included**
Austria	Austrian Freedom Party	Austrian Freedom Party
	Alliance for the Future of Austria	Alliance for the Future of Austria
Belgium	Flemish Interest	Flemish Interest
		National Front
Brazil	Party of the Reconstruction of the National Order	***Country not included**
	Brazil above everything, God above everyone	
Bulgaria	National Union Attack	National Union Attack
	United Patriots	United Patriots
	People's Union	IMRO-National Bulgarian Movement
		National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria
		Order, Law and Justice
Croatia	Croatian Democratic Union	Croatian Democratic Union
	Croatian Party of Rights	Croatian Party of Rights
Cyprus	Democratic Coalition	
	National Popular Front	National Popular Front
Czech Republic	Republican Party of Czechoslovakia	Republican Party of Czechoslovakia
	Tomio Okamura's Dawn of Direct Democracy	Tomio Okamura's Dawn of Direct Democracy
	Freedom and Direct Democracy	Freedom and Direct Democracy
Denmark	Danish People's Party	Danish People's Party
	Progress Party	Progress Party
Estonia	Conservative People's Party of Estonia	Conservative People's Party of Estonia
Finland	True Fins	True Fins
France	National Front	National Front
Greece	Golden Dawn	Golden Dawn
	Independent Greeks	

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Table A3 – *Continued from previous page*

	Popular Orthodox Rally	Popular Orthodox Rally
Hungary	Hungarian Justice and Life Party	Hungarian Justice and Life Party
	Movement for a Better Hungary	Movement for a Better Hungary
		Hungarian Civic Alliance
Iceland	Republican Party	***Country not included**
Israel	The Jewish Home	***Country not included**
Italy	Italian Social Movement (-1992)	
	National Alliance	
	Northern League	Northern League
		Brothers of Italy
		Tricolor Flame Social Movement
Japan	Party for Future Generations	***Country not included**
Latvia	For Fatherland and Freedom	***No party applicable**
	National Alliance All For Latvia!'	
	Popular Movement for Latvia-Zigerista Party	
	Who Owns the State?	
Lithuania	Lithuanian National Union (1992)	***No party applicable**
	Order and Justice	
Netherlands	Centre Democrats (-1994)	
	Forum for Democracy	
	List Pim Fortuyn	List Pim Fortuyn
	Party of Freedom	Party of Freedom
New Zealand	New Zealand First Party	***Country not included**
Norway	Progress Party	Progress Party
Poland	Confederation for an Independent Poland (-1993)	
	Party X (1991)	
	Polish Western Union (1991)	
		Law and Justice
		League of Polish Families
		Coalition for the Renewal of the Republic

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Table A3 – *Continued from previous page*

Portugal	Popular Monarchist Party (-1983)	
Romania	Greater Romania Party	Greater Romania Party
	People's Party - Dan Dianconescu	
	Republican Party (1990)	
	Romanian National Unity Party	
	Romanian Unity Alliance (1990)	
		United Romania Party
Slovakia	Slovak National Party	Slovak National Party
	People's Party Our Slovakia	People's Party Our Slovakia
	We are family	We are family
	Movement for a Democratic Slovakia	
	National Democratic Party - New Alternative	
		Real Slovak National Party
Slovenia	Slovenian National Party	***No party applicable**
Sweden	Sweden Democrats	Sweden Democrats
Switzerland	Federal Democratic Union	
	Swiss Democrats	
		Swiss People's Party
United Kingdom		United Kingdom Independence Party

Note: The two lists are compiled following different criteria. While the CMP only codes parties which have at least two seats in parliament in the period between 1945-2018 (Volkens et al., 2019; Krause et al., 2019), the PopuList includes parties, which obtained at least 2% of the vote in national parliamentary elections in Europe between 1998-2018 (Rooduijn et al., 2019).

The scatter plots in Figure A1 summarize the data by showing far-right vote share for the three groups of countries: post-right- and left-wing dictatorships and old democracies. Each dot represents the vote share of far-right parties at the country-election-year. Local smoothing functions indicate that although far-right vote share in all groups of countries increases over time, both post-right- and left-wing dictatorship countries have different trends compared to old democracies. Countries with a left-wing dictatorship past have a higher far-right vote share compared to old democracies over time. On the other hand, in most the countries with a right-wing dictatorship past far-right parties never had any support until the late 2000s. This would imply that past regime type may affect the far-right vote share in new democracies depending on the ideology of the previous regime.

Figure A1: Distribution of Vote Share of Far-Right Parties



Note: Lines show the predicted difference in far-right vote share by different country-groups, calculated by the fractional-polynomial prediction with the 95% confidential intervals. The axis countries are not included in the figures.

Table A4: Identification Strategy using Difference-in-Difference

		Cohort-Level: Exposure to Dictatorship	Cohort-Level: No Exposure to Dictatorship	
Country-Level	Dictatorship Past	A	C	A-C
	No Dictatorship Past	B	D	B-D
				(A-C)-(B-D)

Note: We estimate $(A - C) - (B - D)$ as a treatment effect.

B Robustness Check: Individual-Level Analysis

In this section, to determine the sensitivity of our results, we ran several robustness tests. In general, our robustness tests add significant confidence to our results.

First, the most important robustness check is to test if authoritarian exposure affects far-right support when we use the PopuList project to identify far-right parties. Table B1 presents the statistical results using the PopuList project. The model specification is the same as the main models. The effect of right-wing dictatorship exposure during the formative years is negative and statistically significant at high levels of confidence across the models. We also present the effect of variables in different scenarios based on Model 2. Figure B1 indicates the predicted probabilities of far-right support for the average voters in countries that transitioned from right-wing dictatorships and those without any authoritarian past since World War II. The predicted probability of far-right support for voters with more than two years of authoritarian exposure during the formative years is statistically lower than the predicted probability for voters in countries without a dictatorship past. In addition, there is a statistically significant difference in the predicted probabilities of far-right support among voters in post right-wing dictatorships. For instance, voters with more than three years of exposure to the right-wing dictatorship are less likely to support far-right parties compared to voters in the same group of countries without authoritarian experience during their formative years. Although the predicted number of years is slightly different compared to the

main models, the difference may be due to the difference in the sample included in the model since the PopuList only includes European countries in their list. Nevertheless, the robustness of the findings using the PopuList project increases the level of confidence in our results.

Table B1: Effects of Variables on Far-Right Support (PopuList)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Individual-Level				
Female		-0.245***	-0.400***	-0.259***
		(0.093)	(0.042)	(0.094)
Post-secondary education		0.113	-0.283	0.054
		(0.315)	(0.202)	(0.244)
Secondary education		0.285	0.041	0.220
		(0.328)	(0.190)	(0.244)
Unemployment		0.120	0.252**	
		(0.122)	(0.125)	
Right-wing dictatorship exposure	**-0.317*** **	**-0.346*** **	**-0.090** **	**-0.140*** **
	(0.030)	**(0.066)**	**(0.042)**	**(0.050)**
Left-wing dictatorship exposure	-0.023	-0.025	-0.054	-0.003
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.042)	(0.025)
Country-Year Level				
Right-wing dictatorship	0.055	0.053		0.191
	(0.302)	(0.326)		(0.564)
Left-wing dictatorship	0.500*	0.490		1.156
	(0.292)	(0.307)		(0.977)
ENP_{t-1}				0.018
				(0.203)
$\ln(\text{District magnitude})_{t-1}$				-0.026
				(0.387)
GDP growth_{t-1}				0.053
				(0.046)
$\text{Unemployment}_{t-1}$				0.074
				(0.068)
$\ln(\text{Number of refugees per capita})_{t-1}$				0.283
				(0.240)
$\text{Level of democracy}_{t-1}$				0.364
				(0.860)
Constant	-1.894***	-1.927***	-1.192***	-5.876
	(0.172)	(0.456)	(0.251)	(8.593)
Country FE	NO	NO	YES	NO
Observations	54,626	51,588	41,864	53,078
Number of Countries	18	18	12	17
Log-Likelihood	-22340.315	-21129.785	-15674.982	-21292.32
Pr. > chi^2	.00	.00	.00	.00

Note: Dependent variable is whether the individual supports the far-right party in their country. Dummy variables indicating each age groups included in the models. Robust standard errors clustered by countries in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure B1: Predicted Probability of Far-Right Party Support (PopuList)



Note: Lines show the predicted probabilities of individual far-right support in the right-wing dictatorship countries and the old democracies, contingent on the years of authoritarian exposure (Model 2).

Next, we also look at if the different operationalization of the country-level variables would change our results. First, Models 5-8 of Table B2 show statistical results for the countries without a majoritarian system. This is to test whether the expected effects are evident if we only look at voters in proportional systems, since voting patterns may be differ depending on electoral system.[1] In addition, we also tested if the effect of authoritarian exposure is robust if we control for majoritarian systems (Model 9). The effect of the right-wing dictatorship exposure during the formative years is negative and statistically significant at high confidence level across the models. This indicates that the effect of authoritarian exposure is robust regardless of electoral system.

Finally, Model 10 tests the robustness of our findings when we control for the number of migrants per capita, instead of the number of refugees per capita. Since the data is only available for the European countries, the sample is restricted in this region. Nevertheless, the effect of the right-wing dictatorship exposure in formative years is negative and statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. Thus, the statistical result is robust regardless of the

[1]The dummy variable indicating the majoritarian system is extracted from the Quality of Government Institute (Teorell et al., 2019).

operationalization of the level of immigration.

Table B2: Model Specification with Different Operationalization of Country-Level Variables

	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Sample	Countries without Majoritarian System				All Sample	
Individual-Level						
Female		-0.300***	-0.354***	-0.304***	-0.299***	-0.320***
		(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.048)	(0.063)
Post-secondary education		0.027	-0.065	0.015	-0.056	0.057
		(0.195)	(0.233)	(0.204)	(0.186)	(0.195)
Secondary education		0.306**	0.258	0.255*	0.245*	0.285**
		(0.140)	(0.170)	(0.141)	(0.128)	(0.136)
Unemployment		0.226*	0.242			
		(0.132)	(0.151)			
Right-wing dictatorship exposure	**-0.177*** **	**-0.178*** **	**-0.070*** **	**-0.098** **	**-0.131*** **	**-0.146*** **
	(0.045)	**(0.051)**	**(0.024)**	**(0.043)**	**(0.049)**	**(0.036)**
Left-wing dictatorship exposure	-0.013	-0.012	-0.020	-0.003	-0.009	-0.008
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.033)
Country-Year Level						
Right-wing dictatorship	0.058	0.069		0.044	0.092	-0.223
	(0.275)	(0.285)		(0.757)	(0.668)	(0.629)
Left-wing dictatorship	-0.137	-0.161		0.201	0.051	-0.256
	(0.242)	(0.248)		(0.532)	(0.418)	(0.593)
Majoritarian system					0.179	
					(0.242)	
ENP_{t-1}				-0.157		-0.157
				(0.125)		(0.181)
$\ln(\text{District magnitude})_{t-1}$				0.096		0.153
				(0.220)		(0.209)
GDP growth_{t-1}				-0.005	0.020	-0.003
				(0.036)	(0.041)	(0.040)
$\text{Unemployment}_{t-1}$				0.005	0.012	0.010
				(0.065)	(0.059)	(0.061)
$\ln(\text{Number of refugees per capita})_{t-1}$				0.162	0.072	
				(0.159)	(0.101)	
$\text{Number of migrants per capita}_{t-1}$						37.048
						(47.717)
$\text{Level of democracy}_{t-1}$				-0.099	0.086	-0.071
				(0.413)	(0.336)	(0.679)
Constant	-2.016***	-2.018***	-1.390***	-0.440	-2.845	-1.028
	(0.076)	(0.201)	(0.240)	(4.285)	(3.325)	(6.670)
Country FE	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO
Observations	55,418	51,914	46,322	53,557	56,966	45,351
Number of Countries	19	19	13	18	20	16
Log-Likelihood	-19334.126	-17933.489	-15631.959	-18533.137	-19773.367	-16067.546
Pr. > chi^2	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00

Note: Dependent variable is whether the individual supports the far-right party in their country. Dummy variables indicating each age groups included in the models. Robust standard errors clustered by countries in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In Table B3 we present models where we vary the threshold of far-right support needed for inclusion in the sample. To deal with the separation problem in the logistic regression, in the main models we only include survey-years in which at least 3% of respondents stated that they would vote for a far-right party. This way we exclude survey-years with very small variation in the dependent variable and avoid cases where a specific country-year becomes a complete predictor of the DV. However, this threshold may be subjective, and the results may be sensitive to this choice since far-right parties generally have limited support. Thus, we test the robustness of our result using 1% and 5% thresholds. Models 11-14 present the statistical results using a 1% threshold, whereas Models 15-18 show the results using a 5% threshold.

Regardless of the sample included in the models, the effect of exposure to the right-wing dictatorship is negative and statistically significant at high levels of confidence. This result indicates that our findings do not depend on our choice of threshold.

Finally, we test the robustness of the findings when using a different operationalization of the treatment variable. Although in the main models we distinguish right- and left-wing dictatorships, we now test whether authoritarian socialization has an effect on far-right support when we do not differentiate between them. So, we look at the effects of exposure to authoritarianism regardless of their ideological origin. Models 19-22 in Table B4 present the effects of authoritarian exposure in voters' formative years on their support on far-right parties. The result indicates that the effect of years of exposure to dictatorship is not statistically significant if we do not distinguish their ideological origin. Thus, the experience of authoritarianism itself does not affect whether voters support far-right parties. This result indicates that ideological learning under authoritarianism, not the experience under authoritarianism, is important for far-right support after regime change.

In sum, all robustness checks add confidence to our findings from the main results - citizens who spent their formative years under right-wing dictatorships will be less likely to support far-right parties.

Table B3: 1% and 5% Response as Threshold

	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Dataset	1% Response as Threshold				5% Response as Threshold			
Individual-Level								
Female		-0.291***	-0.343***	-0.300***		-0.294***	-0.342***	-0.295***
		(0.061)	(0.055)	(0.050)		(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.060)
Post-secondary education		0.133	0.019	0.070		-0.109	-0.185	-0.091
		(0.206)	(0.226)	(0.189)		(0.150)	(0.167)	(0.164)
Secondary education		0.364***	0.374**	0.275**		0.185*	0.143	0.181*
		(0.134)	(0.168)	(0.110)		(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.108)
Unemployment		0.221*	0.220			0.269*	0.242	
		(0.113)	(0.136)			(0.146)	(0.151)	
Right-wing dictatorship exposure	**-0.177*** **	**-0.175*** **	**-0.055*** **	**-0.094** **	**-0.193*** **	**-0.206*** **	**-0.109*** **	**-0.163*** **
	(0.045)	**(0.051)**	**(0.018)**	**(0.044)**	**(0.028)**	**(0.047)**	**(0.024)**	**(0.031)**
Left-wing dictatorship exposure	-0.009	-0.007	-0.054	-0.002	-0.016	-0.014	-0.043	-0.007
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.046)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.036)	(0.029)
Country-Year Level								
Right-wing dictatorship	0.189	0.215		0.116	0.201	0.212		0.093
	(0.284)	(0.295)		(0.590)	(0.197)	(0.222)		(0.398)
Left-wing dictatorship	-0.282	-0.290		-0.034	0.072	0.034		0.650
	(0.225)	(0.245)		(0.467)	(0.304)	(0.302)		(0.973)
ENP_{t-1}				-0.201**				-0.101
				(0.092)				(0.143)
$\ln(\text{District magnitude})_{t-1}$				0.162				0.008
				(0.138)				(0.172)
GDP growth_{t-1}				0.015				0.019
				(0.055)				(0.045)
$\text{Unemployment}_{t-1}$				0.007				0.035
				(0.060)				(0.049)
$\ln(\text{Number of refugees per capita})_{t-1}$				0.188				0.214
				(0.132)				(0.175)
$\text{Level of democracy}_{t-1}$				-0.264				0.048
				(0.299)				(0.712)
Constant	-2.160***	-2.253***	-2.369***	1.038	-1.952***	-1.836***	-1.413***	-1.952
	(0.130)	(0.262)	(0.565)	(3.032)	(0.062)	(0.137)	(0.260)	(7.256)
Country FE	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO
Observations	69,680	66,048	57,631	67,740	50,923	47,509	43,723	49,111
Number of Countries	23	23	15	23	18	18	14	17
Log-Likelihood	-22076.602	-20645.353	-17874.270	-21120.154	-18880.366	-17491.722	-15641.005	-18053.485
Pr. > chi^2	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00

Note: Dependent variable is whether the individual supports the far-right party in their country. Dummy variables indicating each age groups included in the models. Sample includes survey-years that have 1% (Models 11-14) or 5% of respondents (Models15-18) who support for far-right parties. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table B4: Effects of Exposure to Authoritarianism Regardless of Their Ideological Origins

	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)
Individual-Level				
Female		-0.291***	-0.342***	-0.293***
		(0.062)	(0.058)	(0.060)
Post-secondary education		0.006	-0.101	-0.024
		(0.184)	(0.208)	(0.193)
Secondary education		0.315**	0.252*	0.253**
		(0.131)	(0.148)	(0.120)
Unemployment		0.235*	0.254*	
		(0.127)	(0.138)	
Dictatorship exposure	**-0.034**	**-0.036**	**-0.023**	**0.002**
	(0.039)	**(0.041)**	**(0.032)**	**(0.049)**
Country-Year Level				
Dictatorship	-0.035	-0.042		0.086
	(0.214)	(0.222)		(0.310)
ENP_{t-1}				-0.157
				(0.124)
$\ln(\text{District magnitude})_{t-1}$				0.067
				(0.147)
GDP growth_{t-1}				0.001
				(0.033)
$\text{Unemployment}_{t-1}$				0.003
				(0.060)
$\ln(\text{Number of refugees per capita})_{t-1}$				0.148
				(0.115)
$\text{Level of democracy}_{t-1}$				-0.087
				(0.345)
Constant	-2.011***	-2.009***	-1.383***	-0.470
	(0.072)	(0.184)	(0.212)	(3.561)
Country FE	NO	NO	YES	NO
Observations	57,755	54,237	48,645	55,882
Number of Countries	20	20	14	19
Log-Likelihood	-20293.456	-18876.791	-16550.183	-19464.776
Pr. > chi^2	.04	.00	.00	.00

Note: Dependent variable is whether the individual supports the far-right party in their country. Dummy variables indicating each age groups included in the models. Robust standard errors clustered by countries in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

C Robustness Check: Country-Level Analysis

In this section, we run several robustness tests for the country-level analysis. Since the country-level analysis is a purely observational study, it is crucial to test the sensitivity of the results with different model specifications. In general, our robustness tests add the confidence to our main results presented in the manuscript.

We first test whether different operationalization of the variables would change our results. First, Models 23-24 of Table C1 indicate the statistical results for the countries without a majoritarian system. In addition, we also test if the results are robust to controlling for the majoritarian system (Model 25-26).[2] Accordant to our main findings, the effect of the right-wing dictatorship past is negative and statistically significant at high confidence levels in all models. In addition, the interaction term between the right-wing dictatorship past and years since the democratic transition is positive and statistically significant. Thus, the negative effect of past dictatorship decreases as time goes by since their transition to democracy. This result indicates that the effect of the right-wing dictatorship past is robust regardless of electoral system.

Models 27-28 test the robustness of the findings when we control for the number of migrants per capita, instead of the number of refugees per capita. Since the data is only available for the European countries, the sample is restricted in this region. Nevertheless, the effect of the right-wing dictatorship past is negative and statistically significant at the 99% confidence level in both models. In addition, the interaction term between the right-wing dictatorship past and years since transition is positive and statistically significant. Thus, our main findings are robust regardless of the operationalization of the level of the immigration.

Finally, we test the robustness of the findings using different operationalization of the independent variable. We first account for the heterogeneity among dictatorships that may affect the magnitude of the effect of authoritarian experience on far-right vote share. We

[2]Since the dummy variable indicating the majoritarian system might be highly correlated with the number of parties as well as the district magnitude, we exclude these two variables from the models.

Table C1: Model Specification with Different Operationalization of Explanatory Variables

	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)
Sample	Without Majoritarian System		All Samples			
Right-wing dictatorship	**-95.461*** **	**-114.711*** **	**-86.111*** **	**-112.264*** **	**-72.954*** **	**-106.135*** **
	(25.811)	**(35.102)**	**(23.652)**	**(35.565)**	**(21.470)**	**(37.255)**
Left-wing dictatorship	11.783	23.362***	18.688**	29.571***	4.979	18.625**
	(8.174)	(7.786)	(7.723)	(7.209)	(8.786)	(8.308)
Right-wing * Years since transition	**2.793*** **	**3.363*** **	**2.513*** **	**3.327*** **	**2.164*** **	**3.131*** **
	(0.837)	**(0.984)**	**(0.782)**	**(0.991)**	**(0.729)**	**(1.003)**
Left-wing * Years since transition	0.092	-0.148	-0.131	-0.261	0.340	0.028
	(0.254)	(0.184)	(0.263)	(0.166)	(0.257)	(0.188)
Years since transition	0.206	0.311***	0.291**	0.345***	0.314**	0.305***
	(0.149)	(0.080)	(0.124)	(0.067)	(0.141)	(0.085)
Majoritarian system			-14.176**	-6.380*		
			(6.277)	(3.691)		
ENP_{t-1}	0.441	1.189			1.828*	2.061***
	(0.888)	(0.786)			(1.038)	(0.792)
$\ln(\text{District magnitude})_{t-1}$	0.898	1.626*			2.633*	1.696*
	(2.065)	(0.981)			(1.559)	(0.985)
GDP growth_{t-1}	-0.228	-0.141	-0.314	-0.160	-0.155	-0.098
	(0.307)	(0.191)	(0.311)	(0.188)	(0.344)	(0.186)
$\text{Unemployment}_{t-1}$	0.103	-0.524**	0.237	-0.474**	0.164	-0.314
	(0.368)	(0.235)	(0.362)	(0.227)	(0.431)	(0.247)
$\ln(\text{Number of refugees per capita})_{t-1}$	1.943	1.264**	2.134*	1.518***		
	(1.238)	(0.583)	(1.109)	(0.556)		
$\text{Number of migrants per capita}_{t-1}$					278.116	401.234*
					(345.969)	(210.959)
$\text{Level of democracy}_{t-1}$	-4.724**	-3.426**	-5.072**	-3.835***	-8.893***	-4.212***
	(2.344)	(1.485)	(2.003)	(1.322)	(1.789)	(1.458)
Constant	37.127*	14.712	39.688*	23.314*	57.972***	13.099
	(22.000)	(16.176)	(20.298)	(13.414)	(18.037)	(16.131)
Country RE	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
Observations	240	239	295	294	215	215
Censored	120	119	163	162	100	100
Uncensored	120	120	132	132	115	115
Number of Countries	35	34	39	38	28	28
Log-Likelihood	-521.379	-463.839	-585.513	-516.445	-502.860	-441.312

Note: Dependent variable is vote share of the far-right parties. Countries without the axis countries are included. Model 27-28 only include European nations due to the data availability of the number of migrants. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

specifically account for *the level of repression.*[3] Focusing on left- and right-wing regimes separately, we interact these scores with years since the transition.

With regard to the level of repression, we use the Civil Liberties Scale from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) indicators,[4] which measures the threat of physical violence as well

[3]Although it is ideal to run the models within the same country groups to compare the magnitude of the effect (Dinas and Northmore-Ball, 019); we include all samples in the models. Due to the limited number of observations with a limited variation in the dependent variable, we are unable to to run the models without having the issue of separation. Instead, we estimate the baseline effect as the level of repression used in old democracies. However, since it is difficult to estimate the level of repression in old democracies, since it is unclear which period we should refer to, we simply estimate the level of repression as 0 for old democracies. Thus, it is not a perfect measurement to account for the heterogeneity among dictatorships.

[4]The data is extracted from the V-Dem project (Coppedge et al., 2019).

as freedom of expression. We take the average level of repression throughout each regime as an indicator of the overall level of repression used by each regime. We expect higher levels of repression would decrease the level of far-right vote share in the post right-wing authoritarian regimes.

Models 29-30 in Table C2 present the statistical results. According to these results, if the level of repression used by the right-wing dictatorship was higher, far-right vote share in the post transition period decreases. This negative bias diminishes as the distance since the transition increases. Thus, the negative bias which originates from the right-wing dictatorship past is evident when we take into account the level of repression.

Second, we also examine the effects of authoritarian past, regardless of ideological origins. Models 31-32 in Table C2 present the effect of authoritarian past on far-right vote share. The results indicate that the effect of the authoritarian past is not statistically significant if we do not distinguish their ideological origins. Thus, the experience of authoritarianism itself does not affect far-right vote share. This result increases our confidence that ideological learning under authoritarianism, not having experience of authoritarianism, is important for far-right support after regime change.

In sum, all robustness checks add confidence in our findings - far-right parties will receive lower vote shares in countries that transitioned from right-wing dictatorships. Also, the effects of anti far-right bias on voting behavior in countries that transitioned from right-wing dictatorships will diminish over time.

Table C2: Authoritarian Past on Far-Right Support

Explanatory Variable	(29)	(30)	(31)	(32)
	Level of Repression		Authoritarianism	
Level of repression (Right-wing)	**-144.377*** **	**-141.727*** **		
	(38.357)	**(44.361)**		
Level of repression (Left-wing)	6.592	29.933***		
	(10.776)	(10.515)		
Repression (Right) * Years since transition	**4.204*** **	**4.167*** **		
	(1.189)	**(1.250)**		
Repression (Left) * Years since transition	0.296	-0.064		
	(0.302)	(0.246)		
Authoritarianism			**14.229**	**8.991**
			(8.997)	**(7.562)**
Authoritarianism * Years since transition			**-0.191**	**0.153**
			(0.277)	**(0.153)**
Years since transition	0.084	0.297***	0.227*	0.321***
	(0.125)	(0.066)	(0.133)	(0.072)
ENP_{t-1}	0.976	1.259*	1.102	1.748**
	(0.798)	(0.734)	(0.956)	(0.766)
$\ln(\text{District magnitude})_{t-1}$	3.000*	1.896**	3.624**	1.915**
	(1.584)	(0.810)	(1.789)	(0.874)
GDP growth_{t-1}	-0.206	-0.104	-0.239	-0.113
	(0.327)	(0.187)	(0.327)	(0.197)
$\text{Unemployment}_{t-1}$	0.115	-0.386*	0.360	0.067
	(0.391)	(0.225)	(0.420)	(0.205)
$\text{Number of immigrants per capita}_{t-1}$	1.812	1.244**	2.848**	1.180**
	(1.272)	(0.561)	(1.286)	(0.581)
$\text{Level of democracy}_{t-1}$	-5.409*	-3.682***	-2.637	-3.943***
	(3.009)	(1.423)	(2.908)	(1.492)
Constant	41.740	14.301	3.581	8.261
	(27.711)	(15.011)	(29.987)	(16.029)
Country RE	NO	YES	NO	YES
Observations	292	291	292	291
Censored	162	161	162	161
Uncensored	130	130	130	150
Number of Countries	39	38	39	38
Log-Likelihood	-581.096	-507.186	-609.870	-525.506

Note: Dependent variable is vote share of the far-right parties. Countries without the axis countries are included. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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