## Stability of defection, optimisation of strategies and testing for extortion in the Prisoner's Dilemma

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Software Sustainability Institute




## NICE? NOT NICE?






$$S_p = \begin{pmatrix} 3 & 0 \\ 5 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \quad S_q = \begin{pmatrix} 3 & 5 \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$


## Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma - Robert Axelrod 1980




Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent - William H. Press and Freeman J. Dyson, 2012




Recognising and evaluating the effectiveness of extortion in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma - Vincent A. Knight, Marc Harper, Nikoleta E. Glynatsi and Jonathan Gillard, 2019




## Extortion and cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma - A. J. Stewart and J. B. Plotkin., 2012








Stability of defection, optimisation of strategies and th limits of memory in the Prisoner's Dilemma - Nikoleta E. Glynatsi and Dr Vincent Knight




$$u_q(p) = \frac{\frac{1}{2}pQp^T + cp + a}{\frac{1}{2}p\bar{Q}p^T + \bar{c}p + \bar{a}}$$
$$p^* = \operatorname{argmax}_p u_q(p)$$











• ZD strategies are not adaptable.

 $\bullet$  Extortion is not optimal.

Longer memory is beneficial.

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https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.00973



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