Stability of defection, optimisation of strategies and testing for extortion in the Prisoner's Dilemma

Nikoleta E. Glynatsi

Dr Vincent Knight Dr Jonathan Gillard Dr Marc Harper





Software Sustainability Institute




NICE? NOT NICE?






$$S_p = \begin{pmatrix} 3 & 0 \\ 5 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \quad S_q = \begin{pmatrix} 3 & 5 \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$


Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma - Robert Axelrod 1980




Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent - William H. Press and Freeman J. Dyson, 2012




Recognising and evaluating the effectiveness of extortion in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma - Vincent A. Knight, Marc Harper, Nikoleta E. Glynatsi and Jonathan Gillard, 2019




Extortion and cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma - A. J. Stewart and J. B. Plotkin., 2012








Stability of defection, optimisation of strategies and th limits of memory in the Prisoner's Dilemma - Nikoleta E. Glynatsi and Dr Vincent Knight




$$u_{q}(p) = rac{rac{1}{2}pQp^{T} + cp + a}{rac{1}{2}par{Q}p^{T} + ar{c}p + ar{a}}$$
 $p^{*} = \operatorname{argmax} \quad u_{q}(p)$











• ZD strategies are not adaptable.

• Extortion is not optimal.

 \bullet Longer memory is beneficial.



"Recognising and evaluating the.." is the #1 paper on Arxiv today in computer science and game theory. Github code (testing...) supports their results. Congrats @joelvincent @NikoletaGlyn. See it at assert.pub/arxiv/cs/cs.gt + assert.pub/papers/1904.00.... Please retweet.

11:21 PM - 1 Apr 2019

@NikoletaGlyn Glynatsine@cardiff.ac.uk

https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.00973

Stability of defection, optimisation of strategies and th limits of memory in the Prisoner's Dilemma - Nikoleta E. Glynatsi and Dr Vincent Knight



