







Rhinos with a bit of Python

@NikoletaGlyn



rhino-ceros

		Manager strategies	
		Horn devalued	Horn intact
Poacher strategies	Selective	 	
	Indiscriminate		 



<http://www.bbc.com/earth/story/20150518-the-epic-history-of-rhinos?ocid=twert>





selective



indiscriminate







$$\mathbf{u}(\sigma, \chi) = \mathbf{H}(\theta_{\mathbf{r}}\mathbf{r}(\mathbf{1} - \mathbf{s}) - \mathbf{r} + \mathbf{1})\theta(\mathbf{r}, \mathbf{x})^{-\alpha} -$$

$$\mathbf{F}\left(\mathbf{1} - \mathbf{s} + \frac{\mathbf{s}}{\mathbf{1} - \mathbf{r}}\right)(\mathbf{1} - \mathbf{r}\mathbf{x})^{\gamma}(\mathbf{1} - \mathbf{r})^{\beta}$$


```
>>> import sympy as sympy
```

```
>>> (2 + 3) ** 2
```

```
25
```

```
>>> a, b = sym.symbols('a, b')
```

```
>>> expr = (a + b) ** 2
```


```
>>> expr.expand()
```

```
a**2 + 2*a*b + b**2
```

```
>>> import imp
>>> tools = imp.load_source('tools', '../tools.py')

>>> tools.utility(1, 1)
-F*(-r + 1)**beta*(-r + 1)**gamma/(-r + 1) + H*(-r + 1)*(-r + 1)**(-alpha)

>>> tools.utility(0, 1)
-F*(-r + 1)**beta*(-r + 1)**gamma + H*(-r + 1)**(-alpha)*(r*(theta_r - 1) + 1)
```



Dear Sirs,

Here's to the merry men. The
The rebels. The traitorous men. The
The next page in the sequence below. The
The ones who see things different. They're
The rest of them. And they have a
The respect for the rebel side. You can
The speak them, disagree with them, glorify
The or vilify them. About the only thing you
The can't do is ignore them. Because they
The change things. They push the forward
The even forward. And with the same song
The and there at the very end, see how good
The because the people who are more
The enough to think they can change the
The world, are the ones who do.


Yours own,
John Appleseed




Theorem (Indiscriminate)

Using the modified utility model, a population of selective poachers is stable if and only if:

$$\theta_r H - F(1r)^{\gamma+\beta+\alpha-1} < \frac{\Gamma(1-r)^\alpha}{r}$$





@NikoletaGlyn

<https://github.com/Nikoleta-v3>

<https://arxiv.org/abs/1712.07640>