

Reactive strategies with longer memory

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Abstract

We focus on repeated games and the strategies players can employ in these games. It is famously assumed in repeated games that strategies utilizing past history can be employed. Here, we concentrate on a specific set of strategies known as reactive strategies. Notably, our work stands out by exploring strategies with longer memory spans, in contrast to the prevailing norm in existing literature.

We demonstrate how this set of strategies has an immediate effect on the co-player and show that a history that is not shared does not benefit the longer strategy.

In the following, we study repeated games and the strategies players can employ in these games. Famously, in repeated games, it is assumed that strategies that use past history can be adopted. Here, we focus on such a set, called reactive strategies. In comparison to previous studies, this work explores higher memory strategies, greater than one, compared to the majority of the works in the literature. We demonstrate how this set of strategies has an immediate effect on the co-player and show that a history that is not shared does not benefit the longer strategy.

We then characterize partner strategies, which are strategies assuring mutual cooperation without being exploited—a recipe for evolutionary stability. We show that the class of Tit For Tat and Generous Tit For strategies, even in their delayed versions, are partner strategies.

For memory lengths of two and three, we characterize all partner strategies among the reactive set. The conditions are simple yet newly found. For a specific class of reactive counting strategies—counting defections/defections instead of remembering the actual occurrence of the action—we can characterize partner strategies at all memory lengths.

We further test the evolutionary properties of partner strategies in higher memory. The results show that..

1 Introduction

The emergence of cooperation can be explained by direct reciprocity, where individuals provide assistance to each other through repeated interactions [2, 19, 23]. Traditionally, researchers have adopted the repeated prisoner’s dilemma as a conceptual framework for capturing the dynamics of direct reciprocity. In this model, two individuals, often referred to as players, engage in multiple rounds of interaction. During each round, both players face the decision of whether to cooperate or defect. Mutual cooperation results in more favorable outcomes compared to mutual defection, but the self-interest of each individual frequently leads to the temptation to defect.

Strategies employed in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma can become notably complex. Examples of sophisticated strategies include those that consider the entire past history of interactions when deciding whether to cooperate in the next round, or those that take into account additional information derived from the history, such as the number of defections that occurred by both players [8, 14, 16]. Empirical studies have shown that human behavior often demonstrates conditional cooperation in repeated games [5, 22, 7]. Moreover, several experiments suggest that the complexity of human strategies is limited. However, it is important to note that some of these assumptions have also been challenged and debunked.

Theoretical models have primarily focused on one side, namely, they have extensively concentrated on naive subjects who do not remember anything beyond the outcome of the very last round [20, 6, 21, 24, 18, 15, 12, 3, 11, 4, 9, 1]. These strategies are known as memory-1 strategies and can be described by four parameters, specifically, the probabilities of cooperating after each possible outcome of the last round. Extensive research has centered on these strategies, allowing us to explore the entire space and characterize when strategies are Nash equilibria. Furthermore, we have uncovered other interesting properties of these strategies. Examples include zero-determinant strategies, which constitute a set of strategies capable of enforcing a linear relationship between the payoffs of the two players [21], equalizers, a set of strategies that equalize the co-player’s score, assigning it a predetermined value independent of the co-player’s strategy [11], and partner strategies, which ensure mutual cooperation without exploitation [9].

Attempts have been made to extend these results to strategy sets that consider more turns, and equivalently more memory. Notable works include those of [10, 25]. Specifically, the work [25] characterized zero-determinant strategies for memory-two strategies, and [10] managed to characterize subsets of memory- n partner strategies. Exploring higher memory spaces is not a trivial issue. While a memory-1 strategy can be defined by four parameters, a memory-2 strategy is defined by 16, and a memory-3 strategy is defined by 256 parameters. This makes the space of strategies in higher memory spaces intractable.

Herein, we approach higher memory strategies by focusing on a specific set of memory- n strategies that react only to one player’s actions. There can be two such sets. One is reactive strategies, which only consider the co-player’s actions in the previous turns. Another reactive class is that of self-reactive strategies, which consider the focal player’s actions. However, it can easily be shown that in the case of self-reactive strategies, the Nash equilibrium is that of always defect. As such, we focus on reactive strategies.

We manage to characterize all partner strategies amongst the reactive-2 and reactive-3 sets.

To assess whether a given strategy class is favourable to the evolution of cooperation, we consider the Moran process in a finite population of players.

2 Model

Repeated Game. We consider an infinitely repeated game with two players. In each round, player 1 and player 2, can choose to cooperate (C) or to defect (D). If both players cooperate, they receive a payoff R (the reward for mutual cooperation), and if both players defect, they receive a payoff P (the punishment for mutual defection). If one player cooperates, the cooperative player receives the sucker’s payoff S , and the defecting player receives the temptation payoff T . We assume that the payoff are such that $T > R > P > S$ and $2R > T + S$. This game is known as the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Here, we employ a specific parametrization of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, where cooperation implies incurring a cost c for the co-player to derive a benefit $b > c$. Consequently, the payoffs are defined as follows: $R = b - c, S = -c, T = b, P = 0$. In the Appendix, we present results applicable to the general Prisoner’s Dilemma.

We assume in the following, that the players’ decisions only depend on the outcome of the previous n rounds. To this end, an n -history for player $i \in \{1, 2\}$ is a string $h^i = (a_{-n}^i, \dots, a_{-1}^i) \in \{C, D\}^n$ where an entry a_{-k}^i corresponds to player i ’s action k rounds ago. Let H^i denote the space of all n -histories for player i where set H^i contains $|H^i| = 2^n$ elements. A *reactive- n strategy* for player 1 is a vector $\mathbf{p} = (p_h)_{h \in H^2} \in [0, 1]^n$. Each entry p_h corresponds to the player’s cooperation probability in the next round, based on the co-player’s actions in the previous n rounds. Therefore, reactive- n strategies exclusively rely on the co-player’s n -history, independent of the focal player’s own actions. For $n = 1$, this definition of reactive- n strategies recovers the typical format of reactive-1 strategies [3, 26, 17], $\mathbf{p} = (p_C, p_D,)$.

Another class of strategies we will be discussing in this work are, *self-reactive- n* strategies which only consider the focal player's own n -history, and ignore the co-player's. Formally, a self-reactive- n strategy for player 1 is a vector $\tilde{\mathbf{p}} = (\tilde{p}_h)_{h \in H^1} \in [0, 1]^n$. Each entry \tilde{p}_h corresponds to the player's cooperation probability in the next, depending on the player's own actions in the previous n rounds. We say that a reactive or self-reactive strategy is pure if all the entries of the strategy are either 0 or 1. We refer to the set of all pure self-reactive strategies as \tilde{P}_n .




Figure 1: **Model.** **a.** In each turn of the repeated game, players 1 and 2 decide on an action, denoted as C (cooperate) or D (defect), respectively. We assume, that the information that a player can use in subsequent turns is limited to the actions taken by both players in the current turn. **b.** Memory-1 strategies, a well-studied set of strategies, utilize the actions of both players in the previous turn to make decisions. In the graphical representation of memory-1 strategies, we use a single square to illustrate this concept. **c.** This work primarily focuses on reactive- n strategies, which take into account only the actions of the co-players. **e.** For the case of $n = 1$, a reactive-1 strategy is represented as a vector $\mathbf{p} = (p_C, p_D)$, where p_C is the probability of cooperating given that the co-player cooperated, and p_D is the probability of cooperating given that the co-player defected. In the example shown, the bottom player employs a reactive-1 strategy. They cooperate with a probability p_C in the second round because the co-player cooperated in the first round. In the second round, the player cooperates with a probability p_D since the co-player previously defected. Finally, the player defects in the third round with a probability of $1 - p_C$, considering that the co-player cooperated. **d.** Another set of strategies we consider is that of self-reactive- n strategies, which rely solely on a player's own previous n actions. **f.** For the case of $n = 1$, a self-reactive-1 strategy is represented as a vector $\tilde{\mathbf{p}} = (\tilde{p}_C, \tilde{p}_D)$, where \tilde{p}_C is the probability of cooperating given that the player's last action was cooperation, and \tilde{p}_D is the probability of cooperating given that the player's last action was defection. In the example shown, the bottom player employs a self-reactive-1 strategy. They cooperate with a probability \tilde{p}_D in the second round given that they defected in the first. In the second round, the player cooperates with a probability \tilde{p}_C since they cooperated in the previous round. Finally, the player defects in the third round with a probability of $1 - \tilde{p}_C$, considering that they cooperated in the previous round.

Evolutionary process. To examine the evolutionary properties of reactive strategies, we perform an evolutionary study based on the framework of Imhof and Nowak [13]. The framework considers a population of size N where initially all members are of the same strategy. In our case the initial population consists of unconditional defectors. In each elementary time step, one individual switches to a new mutant strategy. The mutant strategy is generated by randomly drawing cooperation probabilities from the unit interval $[0, 1]$. If the mutant strategy yields a payoff of $s_{M,k}$, where k is the number of mutants in the population, and

if residents get a payoff of $\mathbf{s}_{R,k}$, then the fixation probability ϕ_M of the mutant strategy can be calculated explicitly,

$$\phi_M = \left(1 + \sum_{i=1}^{N-1} \prod_{j=1}^i e^{(-\beta(\mathbf{s}_{M,j} - \mathbf{s}_{R,i}))} \right)^{-1} \quad (1)$$

The parameter $\beta \geq 0$ is called the strength of selection, and it measures the importance of the relative payoff advantages for the evolutionary success of a strategy. For small values of β , $\beta \approx 0$, payoffs become irrelevant, and a strategy's fixation probability approaches $\phi_M \approx 1/N$. The larger the value of β , the more strongly the evolutionary process favours the fixation of strategies that yield high payoffs.

Depending on the fixation probability ϕ_M the mutant either fixes (becomes the new resident) or goes extinct. Regardless, in the elementary time step another mutant strategy is introduced to the population. We iterate this elementary population updating process for a large number of mutant strategies and we record the resident strategies at each time step.

3 Results

3.1 Self-Reactive Sufficiency

To predict which reactive- n strategies are partner strategies, we must first characterize which nice reactive- n strategies are Nash equilibria. Determining whether a given strategy, \mathbf{p} , is a Nash equilibrium is not straightforward. In principle, this would involve comparing the payoff of \mathbf{p} to the payoff of all possible mutant strategies. However, in this work, we demonstrate otherwise. Specifically, we show that if a player adopts a reactive strategy, it is only necessary to consider mutant strategies that are self-reactive- n . In other words, we show the following result (see Appendix for proof),

Lemma 3.1. Let \mathbf{p} be a reactive- n strategy for player 1. Then, for any memory- n strategy \mathbf{m} used by player 2, player 1's score is exactly the same as if 2 had played a specific self-reactive memory- n strategy $\tilde{\mathbf{p}}$.

Our result aligns with the findings of [21]. They explored a scenario where one player uses a memory-1 strategy while the other employs a longer memory strategy. They demonstrated that the payoff of the player with the longer memory is exactly the same as if they had used a specific shorter-memory strategy, disregarding any history beyond what is shared with the short-memory player. Our results hint at a more general insight: if one player does not observe a part of the history, the co-player gains no advantage by considering the unshared history.

Lemma 3.1 allows us to focus on self-reactive strategies when evaluating whether a reactive strategy is a Nash equilibrium. This significantly reduces the search space for potential mutants. Our next result further reduces this space:

Lemma 3.2. A reactive- n strategy \mathbf{p} , is a Nash strategy if and only if the payoff when playing against itself is greater than or equal to any payoff that a pure self-reactive- n strategy, $\tilde{\mathbf{p}} \in \tilde{P}$, can achieve against it.

See Appendix for proof.

In the case of $n = 3$ there are $2^8 = 256$ possible self-reactive strategies. As opposed to memory-3 strategies where there are $2^8 \times 2^8 = 65536$. Thus, the number of strategies we need to check against is reduced by a factor of 256.

3.2 Partner Strategies Amongst Reactive-2 and Reactive-3 Strategies

Previous studies have characterized subsets of partner strategies for $n = 2$, and while we also focus on characterizing a subset, our contribution extends to the complete set of reactive-2 strategies. Furthermore, we extend the analysis to the case of $n = 3$. We begin by characterizing partner strategies amongst the set of reactive-2.

Theorem 3.3 (“Reactive-2 Partner Strategies”). A nice reactive-two strategy \mathbf{p} , is a partner strategy if and only if, the strategy entries satisfy the conditions:

$$p_{DD} < 1 - \frac{c}{b} \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{p_{CD} + p_{DC}}{2} < 1 - \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{c}{b}. \quad (2)$$

These conditions can be summarized as follows: For the strategy to be Nash, the strategy ALLD must not be able to invade ($p_{DD} \leq 1 - \frac{c}{b}$ ensures this), and the average cooperation rate following a defection must be less than half of the cost-benefit ratio (c/b).

We can characterizing partner strategies amongst the set of reactive-3. In the case of $n = 3$, a nice reactive-3 strategy is given by a vector

$$\mathbf{p} = (p_{CCC}, p_{CCD}, p_{CDC}, p_{CDD}, p_{DCC}, p_{DCD}, p_{DDC}, p_{DDD}).$$

Theorem 3.4 (“Reactive-Three Partner Strategies”). A nice reactive-three strategy \mathbf{p} , is a partner strategy if and only if, the strategy entries satisfy the conditions:

$$\begin{aligned} p_{DDD} &< 1 - \frac{c}{b} \\ \frac{p_{CCD} + p_{CDC} + p_{DCC}}{3} &< 1 - \frac{1}{3} \cdot \frac{c}{b} \\ \frac{p_{CDD} + p_{DCD} + p_{DDC}}{3} &< 1 - \frac{2}{3} \cdot \frac{c}{b} \\ \frac{p_{CCD} + p_{CDD} + p_{DCC} + p_{DDC}}{4} &< 1 - \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{c}{b} \\ \frac{p_{CDC} + p_{DCD}}{2} &< 1 - \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{c}{b} \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

Increasing the memory we allow strategies by one results to five conditions instead of two. Inherently, these conditions still exhibit some symmetry with the previous case. The strategy should not be invaded by the strategy ALLD, resulting in the condition $p_{DDD} < 1 - \frac{c}{b}$. Additionally, the average cooperation following a single defection must be lower than $2/3$ of the cost-benefit ratio, and the average cooperation following two defections must be smaller than $1/3$ of the cost-benefit ratio. There are two additional conditions that do not appear to have clear interpretations. We hypothesize that as the memory space we allow increases, the number of conditions will also increase, and some of the conditions will deviate from the symmetry.

The proofs for both theorems can be found in the Appendix. We can prove the results of this in two independent ways. One leverages the findings of Lemma 3.2, where we explicitly derive the payoff expressions against all pure self-reactive strategies. The second method utilizes the techniques and results presented in [Akin, 2016]. In the Appendix, we demonstrate how one of the central results from Akin’s work can be generalized.

3.3 Partner Strategies Amongst Reactive Counting Strategies

A special case of reactive strategies is reactive counting strategies. These are strategies that respond to the co-player's actions, but they do not distinguish between when cooperations/defections occurred; they solely consider the count of cooperations in the last n turns. A reactive- n counting strategy is represented by a vector $\mathbf{r} = (r_i)_{i \in \{n, n-1, \dots, 0\}}$, where the entry r_i indicates the probability of cooperating given that the co-player cooperated i times in the last n turns.

In the case of $n = 1$ a reactive-1 strategy and a counting strategy are equivalent. Since both strategies consider that a defection or cooperation occurred in the previous turn. A reactive-2 counting strategies are denoted by the vector $\mathbf{r} = (r_2, r_1, r_0)$, and we can characterise partner strategies among the reactive-2 counting strategies by simply setting $r_2 = 1$, and $p_{CD} = p_{DC} = r_1$ and $p_{DD} = r_0$ in conditions (2). This gives us the following result.

Corollary 3.4.1. A nice reactive-2 counting strategy $\mathbf{r} = (1, r_1, r_0)$ is a partner strategy if and only if,

$$r_1 < 1 - \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{c}{b} \text{ and } r_0 < 1 - \frac{c}{b}. \quad (4)$$

Note that even though the strategies themselves are not equivalent, the conditions for partner are. In both cases cooperating after full defection and the average. The difference is that there are less counting strategies. They fall in the same space but are a plane where areas counting strategies are. A graphical representation of this is given in Appendix.

Reactive-3 counting strategies are denoted by the vector $\mathbf{r} = (r_3, r_2, r_1, r_0)$. We can characterise partner strategies among reactive-3 counting strategies by setting $r_3 = 1$, and $p_{CCD} = p_{CDC} = p_{DCC} = r_2, p_{DCD} = p_{DDC} = p_{CDD} = r_1$ and $p_{DDD} = r_0$ in conditions (3). This gives us the following result.

Corollary 3.4.2. A nice reactive-3 counting strategy $\mathbf{r} = (1, r_2, r_1, r_0)$ is a partner strategy if and only if,

$$r_2 < 1 - \frac{1}{3} \cdot \frac{c}{b}, \quad r_1 < 1 - \frac{2}{3} \cdot \frac{c}{b} \text{ and } r_0 < 1 - \frac{c}{b}. \quad (5)$$

In the case of reactive-1 strategies, counting strategies are equivalent. However, even in the case of reactive-2 strategies the conditions do not change. The ratio has to be smaller than. It's the case of reactive-3 strategies that we observe the biggest difference. That is there are three conditions instead of five. The top conditions we can not account for are the conditions.

The properties of the reactive counting strategies are interesting. They allow us to characterise partner strategies in all memory lengths.

Corollary 3.4.3 (“Reactive-Counting Partner Strategies”). A nice reactive- n counting strategy \mathbf{r} , is a partner strategy if and only if:

$$r_{n-k} < 1 - \frac{k}{n} \cdot \frac{c}{b}, \text{ for } k \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}. \quad (6)$$

Regardless of the memory length, the conditions are the same. The ratio has to be smaller than the fraction of benefit and the tolerance or otherwise, the forgiveness which is measured by a higher probability of cooperation given a defection, decreases as the number of defections by the co-player increases.

3.4 Evolutionary Dynamics

Based on our previous equilibrium analysis, we know what conditions a reactive strategy must satisfy to be a partner strategy. The next step is to determine whether these strategies are likely to evolve through an evolutionary process. Thus, we want to assess the evolutionary potential of partner strategies. Additionally, what remains unclear is the impact of increased memory, as well as the consequences of limiting strategies to counting alone. In this context, our objective is to evaluate whether partner strategies hold evolutionary advantages. Here, we will empirically test these hypotheses by simulating an imitation process, drawing from the dynamics described by Imhof and Nowak [13]. We will examine the evolutionary potential of reactive-1, reactive-2, and reactive-3 strategies, as well as the counting set.

First, we explore which strategies evolve from the evolutionary dynamics for a fixed set of parameters. We ran 10 independent simulations for each set of strategies and recorded the resident strategy at each elementary time step. Once a strategy has become a resident we also record the number of time steps it remained a resident. Thus, the number of mutants that have unsuccessfully tried to invade the resident population. In Fig. 2A and B we represent those strategies that repelled the highest number of mutant in each run. We call these strategies the “most abundant”. Fig. 2A shows the most abundant strategies for reactive strategies. Fig. 2B shows the most abundant strategies for counting strategies.

Next we compare the evolving cooperation rates for different memory sizes whilst varying the selection strength. To this end, we ran simulations for different b/c ratios.

4 Discussion

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


Figure 2: **Evolving strategies for $n = 1, n = 2$ and $n = 3$.** In the previous sections we characterized partners strategies for reactive-2 and reactive-3, and we have also discussed the case of reactive counting strategies. Here we want to assess whether partner strategies are strategies that evolve, thus are beneficial to adopt in an evolutionary setting. We ran simulations based on Imhof and Nowak. For a single run of the evolutionary process, we record the cooperating probabilities of the resident at each elementary time step.

A. Reactive Strategies. We ran 10 independent simulations for each set of strategies and recorded the most abundant strategy for each run. The abundant strategy is the resident that was fixed for the most time steps. For the simulations we used $b = 1$ and $c = .5$. For n equal to 1 and 2, $T = 10^7$ and for $n = 3$ then $T = 2 \times 10^7$.

B. Reactive Counting Strategies. In the top panel we show the most abundant strategies of the evolutionary process when the population can use any counting two-bit reactive strategy (r_0, r_1, r_2). The abundant strategies are the residents that were fixed for the most time steps. The most abundant strategies fall within the region of the partner strategies. In the bottom panel we look at the evolving cooperation rate closer. The average cooperation is calculated by considering the cooperation rate within the resident population. For a given β value we vary the cost $c \in [0, 1]$ whilst we have fixed $b = 1$. Three curves are shown, these are for different values of selection strength, $\beta \in 10^{-1}, 10^0, 10^1$.

Abundance of partner strategies. We ran simulations based on Imhof and Nowak, varying the cost (c) and strength of selection (β). The cooperation benefit (b) is fixed at a value of 1. The results demonstrate that partner strategies evolve notably under strong selection ($\beta = 1$) and lower cost conditions. Furthermore, the abundance of partner strategies is consistently higher when individuals have access to greater memory. The bottom panel displays how these partner strategies lead to increased levels of cooperation.

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