


A reactive-1 vs memory-1




Realized Repeated Game

Player 1 *C C C D D ...*
Player 2 *D D C D D ...*

Outcome distribution

<i>C C</i> 15%	<i>C D</i> 44%
<i>D C</i> 1%	<i>D D</i> 30%

B reactive-1 vs equivalent self-reactive-1



Realized Repeated Game


Player 1 *C C C D D ...*
Player 2 *D D C D D ...*

Outcome distribution

<i>C C</i> 15%	<i>C D</i> 44%
<i>D C</i> 1%	<i>D D</i> 30%


C Partners among the reactive-2 strategies

Donation Game ($b/c = 2$)





D


Axelrod's Prisoner's Dilemma





A



B






A


Most Abundant Strategies

Reactive Strategies



B

Reactive Counting Strategies



C

Dependence on Parameters

Abundance of partner strategies

Average cooperation

 $\beta=0.1$ $\beta=1$ $\beta=2$

$n=1$ (orange solid line)
 $n=1$ (green dashed line)
 $n=1$ (blue dotted line)

0.0 0.5 1.0

0.0 0.5 1.0

0.0 0.5 1.0

0.0 0.5 1.0

0.0 0.5 1.0

0.0 0.5 1.0

D

Abundance of partner strategies

Average cooperation

$n=1$ (blue solid line)
 $n=1$ (orange dashed line)
 $n=1$ (green dotted line)

0.0 0.5 1.0

0.0 0.5 1.0

0.0 0.5 1.0

0.0 0.5 1.0

0.0 0.5 1.0

0.0 0.5 1.0