

Malware Reverse Engineering- CSEC 743 : Reversing Project.


Nilesh Jakamputi, Msc. Information Technology and Analytics.

Select a malware program to analyze from one of the repositories listed above.

Malware Specimen- 300qg8yXEZ.exe



<https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/77ca916ed8a882b528550b4ce53f6da2c919156cf7891760c2c74d5aa8f0997c/>

Malware Family -



Unfortunate, that this is a mixture of a couple different families of malware, but it's mostly pony according to INTEZER ANALYZE, JOES sandbox etc.

Behaviour Overview – Grabbed from a few sandboxes – Basic Dynamic essentially.





Basic Static Analysis of file titled - **77ca916ed8a882b528550b4ce53f6da2c919156cf7891760c2c74d5aa8f0997c.exe**

Tools used for Basic static phase -

Strings[Standalone version, IDA strings], PEID, Dependency Walker, Cff explorer 8 ,
FLOSS[nothing to deobfuscate in static, all dlls and strings are brought in at runtime.].


PE ID -



Got the base image, header sizes, offsets, linker information, DateStamp, etc. Not too useful, but gave linker info, can enumerate further using some popular linker scripts and try matching some compiled pseudocode to get exact information.

Strings –



Before runtime Unpacking –



```
n desktop.ini
[New Text Document.txt - Notepad]
File Edit Format View Help
nyy19W
-% ?
CompareFileTime
ExitProcess
GetModuleHandleA
InterlockedIncrement
ReleaseSemaphore
SetUnhandledExceptionFilter
TlsAlloc
VirtualProtectEx
__getmainargs
__p_environ
__p_fmode
...
__set_app_type
_cexit
_iob
_onexit
_setmode
...
atexit
fclose
malloc
signal
BroadcastSystemMessageA
CallNextHookEx
ChangeDisplaySettingsA
CharLowerA
CharLowerBuffA
CharNextA
<
```

The unpacker, with a few checks.


Interesting information from CFF explorer -
DOS header information



From this, I was able to hypothesize that something is packed in resource section, 1 icon but metadata

about icon is greater than the icon size, so that was fishy.


Upon exploring further in IDA Strings -



Same thing.

Moving on to Advanced Static yields better results –
 Tools : IDA Free, Ghidra.

Was able tell its packed because of repeated instructions with small changes in certain values, junk code probably. This was done about every function except the ones the named ones, _exit, Signal etc etc.




```

File Edit Jump Search View Debugger Options Windows Help
Library function Regular function Instruction Data Unexplored External symbol Lumina function
Functions Strings Hex View-1 Structures Enums Imports Exports
Function name
sub_401260
sub_406C70
sub_407A00
sub_407A30
sub_407A40
sub_407B50
_cexit
_p.environ
signal
_p_fmode
_setmode
_getmainargs
exp
SetUnhandledExceptionFilter
ExitProcess
sub_409410
sub_409442
sub_409469
sub_4095E0
sub_40962B
Line 19 of 36
Output
Propagating type information...
Function argument information has been propagated
The initial autoanalysis has been finished.
Command "MakeCode" failed
IDA
6:27 PM


```

After looking at ida and ghidra, I was able to trace to actual main function that unpacks the file, couldnt tell which packer was used, But looking at a decent packer such as Aegis Cryptor, I understood that its packed with stubs. What aegis Cryptor does is make 3 process using malloc, all of them are legitimate, after creating a new process, it injects the actual program into the process space, similar to fork() exec(). In this case they manipulating headers- .



Algorithm to extract real exe that sets the connection host and all the fun stuff.

But before we even get to unpacking, this version of the malware does N number of checks, all to setup a safe space for the real exe, I was able to get these



```

File Edit Jump Search View Debugger Options Windows Help
File Edit Jump Search View Debugger Options Windows Help
Library function Regular function Instruction Data Unexplored External symbol Lumina function
Functions Hex View-A Structures Enums Imports Exports
Function name
sub_401260
sub_406C70
sub_407A00
sub_407A30
sub_407A40
sub_407B50
_cexit
_p_environ
signal
_p_fmode
_setmode
_getmainargs
exp
SetUnhandledExceptionFilter
ExitProcess
sub_409410
sub_409442
sub_409469
sub_4095E0
sub_40962B
Line 19 of 36
Output
Using FLIRT signature: SEH for vc7-14
Propagating type information...
Function argument information has been propagated
The initial autoanalysis has been finished.
IDC
DOS Debug Dump Hex View-1 Structures Enums Imports Exports
Type here to search
Cloud 43°F 6:13 PM 12/7/2022
Right Ctrl
No comments found for this malware sample

```

Anti-Debugging.

```

File Edit Jump Search View Debugger Options Windows Help
File Edit Jump Search View Debugger Options Windows Help
Library function Regular function Instruction Data Unexplored External symbol Lumina function
Functions Hex View-A Structures Enums Imports Exports
Function name
sub_401260
sub_406C70
sub_407A00
sub_407A30
sub_407A40
sub_407B50
_cexit
_p_environ
signal
_p_fmode
_setmode
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exp
SetUnhandledExceptionFilter
ExitProcess
sub_409410
sub_409442
sub_409469
sub_4095E0
sub_40962B
Line 19 of 36
Output
Propagating type information...
Function argument information has been propagated
The initial autoanalysis has been finished.
Command "MakeCode" failed
IDC
DOS Debug Dump Hex View-1 Structures Enums Imports Exports
Type here to search
Cloud 43°F 6:15 PM 12/7/2022
Right Ctrl
No comments found for this malware sample

```

© abuse.ch 2022


Exception handling dictates control flow. Certain api calls are made at runtime to check for debuggers and exceptions, ideally, the program only wants 1 exception to be hit so it goes to specific jump. I will show you the results of hitting that check in dynamic, the file deletes itself if wrong exception gets hit.

Basic Dynamic Analysis -

Tools used : Multiple sandboxes , Procmon, Regshot

For these I just used online sandboxes, the behaviour and malware family descriptions are from the sandboxes.

With procmon, I took a snapshot and ran the exe as an admin before which I also took regshot captures.



The Connhost was new, Issas was new as well, I don't understand why that process. But the connhost is from the exe post execution itself, the malware launches as random program, then a foreign address is chosen to be unpacked to and the original program after completing checks and setting up a SAFE space for the program, exits. Can trace it with dynamic analysis, malloc and virtual realloc functions are used.

REGSHOT – Post Run.

flarevm (Before_dynamic) [Running] - Oracle VM VirtualBox

File Machine View Input Devices Help

~res-x64.txt - Notepad

File Edit Format View Help

```
HKU\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001\SOFTWARE\Sysinternals\Process Explorer\HandleSortDirection: 0x00000001
HKU\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001\SOFTWARE\Sysinternals\Process Explorer\DllSortColumn: 0x00000000
HKU\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001\SOFTWARE\Sysinternals\Process Explorer\DllSortDirection: 0x00000001
HKU\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001\SOFTWARE\Sysinternals\Process Explorer\ProcessSortColumn: 0x00000000
HKU\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001\SOFTWARE\Sysinternals\Process Explorer\ProcessSortDirection: 0x00000000
HKU\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001\SOFTWARE\Sysinternals\Process Explorer\HighlightServices: 0x00000001
HKU\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001\SOFTWARE\Sysinternals\Process Explorer\HighlightOwnProcesses: 0x00000001
HKU\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001\SOFTWARE\Sysinternals\Process Explorer\HighlightRelocatedDlls: 0x00000000
HKU\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001\SOFTWARE\Sysinternals\Process Explorer\HighlightJobs: 0x00000000
HKU\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001\SOFTWARE\Sysinternals\Process Explorer\HighlightNewProc: 0x00000001
HKU\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001\SOFTWARE\Sysinternals\Process Explorer\HighlightDelProc: 0x00000001
HKU\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001\SOFTWARE\Sysinternals\Process Explorer\HighlightImmersive: 0x00000001
HKU\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001\SOFTWARE\Sysinternals\Process Explorer\HighlightProtected: 0x00000000
HKU\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001\SOFTWARE\Sysinternals\Process Explorer\HighlightPacked: 0x00000001
HKU\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001\SOFTWARE\Sysinternals\Process Explorer\HighlightNetProcess: 0x00000000
HKU\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001\SOFTWARE\Sysinternals\Process Explorer\HighlightSuspend: 0x00000001
HKU\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001\SOFTWARE\Sysinternals\Process Explorer\HighlightDuration: 0x000003E8
HKU\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001\SOFTWARE\Sysinternals\Process Explorer>ShowCpuFractions: 0x00000001
HKU\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001\SOFTWARE\Sysinternals\Process Explorer>ShowLowerpane: 0x00000000
HKU\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001\SOFTWARE\Sysinternals\Process Explorer>ShowAllUsers: 0x00000001
HKU\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001\SOFTWARE\Sysinternals\Process Explorer>ShowProcessTree: 0x00000000
HKU\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001\SOFTWARE\Sysinternals\Process Explorer\SymbolWarningShown: 0x00000001
HKU\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001\SOFTWARE\Sysinternals\Process Explorer\HideWhenMinimized: 0x00000000
HKU\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001\SOFTWARE\Sysinternals\Process Explorer\AlwaysOnTop: 0x00000000
HKU\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001\SOFTWARE\Sysinternals\Process Explorer\OneInstance: 0x00000000
HKU\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001\SOFTWARE\Sysinternals\Process Explorer\NumColumnSets: 0x00000000
HKU\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001\SOFTWARE\Sysinternals\Process Explorer\ConfirmKill: 0x00000001
HKU\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001\SOFTWARE\Sysinternals\Process Explorer\RefreshRate: 0x000003E8
HKU\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001\SOFTWARE\Sysinternals\Process Explorer\ProcessColumnCount: 0x00000007
HKU\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001\SOFTWARE\Sysinternals\Process Explorer\DllColumnCount: 0x00000004
HKU\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001\SOFTWARE\Sysinternals\Process Explorer\HandleColumnCount: 0x00000002
HKU\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001\SOFTWARE\Sysinternals\Process Explorer\DefaultProcPropPage: 0x00000006
HKU\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001\SOFTWARE\Sysinternals\Process Explorer\DefaultSysInfoPage: 0x00000000
HKU\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001\SOFTWARE\Sysinternals\Process Explorer\DefaultDllPropPage: 0x00000000
HKU\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001\SOFTWARE\Sysinternals\Process Explorer\DebugHelpPath: "C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\d
HKU\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001\SOFTWARE\Sysinternals\Process Explorer\SymbolPath: ""
```

flarevm (Before_dynamic) [Running] - Oracle VM VirtualBox

Name	Taken
Base_install	12/6/2022 4:08 PM (1 day ago)
just b4 flare	12/7/2022 12:20 AM (21 hours ago)

File Machine View Input Devices Help

~res-x64.txt - Notepad

File Edit Format View Help

HKU\\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001_Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\Bags\49\Shell

```
Values deleted: 61
-----
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\1000\Terminator: "HAM"
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\1000\Reason: 0x00000004
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\1000\CreationTime: 0x01D90AAC4B4D330B
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\1924\Terminator: "HAM"
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\1924\Reason: 0x00000004
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\1924\CreationTime: 0x01D90AB29892A4A4
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\1992\Terminator: "HAM"
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\1992\Reason: 0x00000004
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\1992\CreationTime: 0x01D90AAA8BF58528
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\1996\Terminator: "HAM"
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\1996\Reason: 0x00000004
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\1996\CreationTime: 0x01D90AAB02DE0CE6
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\2660\Terminator: "HAM"
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\2660\Reason: 0x00000004
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\2660\CreationTime: 0x01D90AB274C0343E
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\2780\Terminator: "HAM"
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\2780\Reason: 0x00000004
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\2780\CreationTime: 0x01D90ABD05DC68FD
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\300\Terminator: "HAM"
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\300\Reason: 0x00000004
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\300\CreationTime: 0x01D90ABDE2EA6929
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\3232\Terminator: "HAM"
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\3232\Reason: 0x00000004
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\3232\CreationTime: 0x01D90AB5027F4B53
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\3364\Terminator: "HAM"
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\3364\Reason: 0x00000004
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\3364\CreationTime: 0x01D90AB025904909
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\4300\Terminator: "HAM"
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\4300\Reason: 0x00000004
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\4300\CreationTime: 0x01D90ABFAE2EF84D
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\4308\Terminator: "HAM"
< Ln 23, Col 72 100% Windows (CRLF) UTF-16 LE 10:19 PM
```

Type here to search

File Machine View Input Devices Help



~res-x64.txt - Notepad


File Edit Format View Help

Computer: DESKTOP-0IIP935, DESKTOP-0IIP935


Username: cr38, cr38

```
Keys deleted: 24
-----
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy\ServiceInstances
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy\ServiceInstances\f3001d4b-c1f8-40e2-b46d-226452f0aa87
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\1000
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\1924
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\1992
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\1996
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\2660
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\2780
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\300
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\3232
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\3364
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\4300
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\4308
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\4516
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\4916
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\5424
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\5608
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\5656
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\6456
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\6804
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Error Reporting\TermReason\7148
HKLM\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy\ServiceInstances
HKLM\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy\ServiceInstances\f3001d4b-c1f8-40e2-b46d-226452f0aa87
HKU\$-1-5-21-2654026734-3726892564-1949300298-1001\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Search\JumpListData
```





This malware keeps a log of all the tampering I did with as well as its own information in registry, I was trial and erring with x32 dbg and every exception that I missed or hit was tracked. This log combined with wireshark, I was able to see requests made to a foreign fqdn




Advanced Dynamic Analysis : Tools:


Just x32 dbg.

From the information in static, was able to understand that it was 32 bit binary. So loaded it up in x32


My approach was to beat the Anti VM and Anti Debug just to get to the file. This is what I got




2 Threads –




Trying to unpack it.




Strings at runtime.




Found the real entry, pre unpacking .




Checks for windows, cpu, filetime etc etc.




Memset, just before moving to new process space.





Post information gathering, vm checks and memset, the file filepath for extraction is found.





Realloc call.





All of these svchosts proc are from the malware, I ran it multiple times to get it to do this, also interesting to note, the process goes to sleep after a while, I couldn't find that function as such don't know where he defined it.

So this malware has too many strings to screenshot post runtime, but I will try to mention a few more that I found.

```
2.5.29.37 wsoc32.dll Software\FTPWare\COREFTP\Sites Software\Microsoft\Internet Account Manager value=" Password michael FTP Now
\BlazeFtp IMAP Password nss3.dll WSASStartup ;3+#>6.& WTSGetActiveConsoleSessionId NNTP User Name Software\VanDyke\SecureFX
Technology uM91$}G CredEnumerateA Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\IntelliForms\Storage2 1234567890 StrStrIA account.cfg
Connection: close sqlite3.dll Process32Next HostName \SiteDesigner http://chai-design.com/m.htm?
wXjGYZHrZMwnz2F7g4MsCG9kF4fZTwIM5ygsBwtwH GetPrivateProfileStringA wisefpsrvs.ini StrStrA InternetCreateUrlA iloveyou!
HostDirName kernel32.dll
```

This is a password stealer from the looks of it, with a lot of enumeration and c2 capabilities. This guy wouldn't run for the longest, I had to check Pafish, <https://github.com/aOrtega/pafish>, for antivm.

I didn't encounter any c2 communications with tcp socket as such, create etc, but the function was there and I skipped over it., just the strings of fqdn were loaded in and I was able to grab them. This malware uses encryption to exfiltrate data using xor, but hashes it, with sha1/aes.

Remediation :

The malware gets removed, via malawre bytes and/ windows defender, all antivirus detect it via heuristics, but they are not able to tell me what exactly it does. General malware recovery steps will work for this, no fileless persistence as such, just a regedit to allow it start as a service.