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# Civil Liberties vs. Security: Public Opinion in the Context of the Terrorist Attacks on America

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*In the tradition of research on political tolerance and democratic rights in context, this study uses a national survey of Americans conducted shortly after the September 11, 2001 attack on America to investigate people's willingness to trade off civil liberties for greater personal safety and security. We find that the greater people's sense of threat, the lower their support for civil liberties. This effect interacts, however, with trust in government. The lower people's trust in government, the less willing they are to trade off civil liberties for security, regardless of their level of threat. African Americans are much less willing to trade civil liberties for security than whites or Latinos, even with other factors taken into account. This may reflect their long-standing commitment to the struggle for rights. Liberals are less willing to trade off civil liberties than moderates or conservatives, but liberals converge toward the position taken by conservatives when their sense of the threat of terrorism is high. While not a forecast of the future, the results indicate that Americans' commitment to democratic values is highly contingent on other concerns and that the context of a large-scale threat to national or personal security can induce a substantial willingness to give up rights.*

*We're likely to experience more restrictions on our personal freedom than has ever been the case in our country. . . . It will cause us to re-examine some of our laws pertaining to criminal surveillance, wiretapping, immigration and so on.*

(Justice Sandra Day O'Connor,  
*New York Times*, September 29, 2001).

One of the most important findings of research on mass beliefs about democracy and civil liberties is the importance of context. Although understanding the support for abstract principles of democracy is important, what matters more is the level of support for democratic norms when they conflict with other important values (Gibson 1987; Peffley, Knigge, and Hurwitz 2001; Sniderman et al. 1996). Context-specific events provide critical insight into the level of commitment to democratic principles. Democracy often requires

a great deal of forbearance, but when individuals have to tolerate and live with the consequences of their democratic beliefs the strength of their commitment to democratic norms may be best understood. As Sniderman et al. observe, "arguments over rights are arguments embedded in a context" (1996, 62). For ordinary citizens during ordinary times, civil liberties issues are likely to be remote from everyday experience; but in certain contexts civil liberties issues have immediate implications for people's sense of freedom and well-being (Gibson 1989; Gibson and Bingham 1985; Gibson and Gouws 2000).

As the most horrific act of violence committed against innocent American citizens, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks created a phenomenal period for examining people's commitment to democratic norms. At the same time that democratic and personal freedoms have been threatened by the terrorist attacks, the U.S. government's

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efforts to provide for the safety and security of society have required Americans to accept certain restrictions on their freedom—more surveillance of their papers and communications, more searches of their belongings, possible detention without a writ of habeas corpus, and possible proceedings by military tribunals without the standard protections of due process provided by civil courts. To the extent that the trade-off between civil liberties and personal security rests on the notion that the very openness of American society contributed to the planning and execution of the terrorist attacks, the desire to live in a peaceful and orderly society should favor greater acceptance of limitations on personal freedom and civil liberties.

By means of a national survey conducted shortly after the September 11, 2001 attack on America, we explore the willingness of American citizens to trade off civil liberties and personal freedom for a greater sense of security. The research question driving this analysis is: How much are American citizens willing to sacrifice to make themselves feel safe from the threat of terrorism? If safety and security are truly more basic needs than self-actualization and freedom (Maslow 1954), then individuals, in particular American citizens accustomed to freedom, broad civil liberties, and a safe and secure society, should be willing to sacrifice a great deal to maintain this comfortable aspect of the American way of life, even at the expense of greater limitations on their personal freedom.

## Civil Liberties Trade-Offs

America's response to the terrorist attacks reveals a "contestability of rights" (Sniderman et al. 1996) in which the commitment to civil liberties collides with other cherished values. This issue of the trade-offs between civil liberties and the threat to personal security not only parallels how individuals make normal civil liberties judgments, but it accounts for why people find it difficult to apply abstract democratic norms to practical situations. We may sincerely believe in free speech and association, but we may also believe in protecting our society from those who use these freedoms to plan or carry out criminal acts.

As Gibson and Bingham have noted, support for civil liberties should not be regarded as an attitude in itself or as an abstract concept; instead it should be treated as a construct that characterizes the priorities assigned in cases of value trade-offs. "The exercise of rights generates costs, and these costs are sometimes so substantial that conflict

ensues" (1985, 108–9). McClosky and Brill (1983) similarly suggest that the choice of liberty is bedeviled by the need to strike a proper balance between freedom and control. To the extent that the support for civil liberties is most reasonably understood as contingent on the relevance of other important values, as opposed to being unequivocal and absolute, measurement approaches need to consider the continual play of competing forces that impinge upon civil liberties judgments. Sniderman et al. maintain that the exercise of liberty "unavoidably collides with other values" (1996, 244). This research maintains that no right can be exercised without limitations before it clashes with the rights of others and the maintenance of order, and one cannot support both liberty and order at the same time. More precisely, as support for civil liberties increases, support for order and security decreases, and vice versa. In a similar vein, Peffley, Knigge, and Hurwitz (2001) argue that the way citizens rank competing values plays a major role in conditioning civil liberties judgments.

Our civil liberties trade-off approach takes the form of counterposing individuals' support for civil liberties against governmental efforts to provide for the safety and security from terrorism—two important values. Although civil liberties and personal security are not necessarily at odds, the bases of contention that we identify rest on the efforts of government and law enforcement agencies to maintain order or provide security in the post-9/11 era. It is not order per se that clashes with individual rights, but rather the government's methods of maintaining security that may challenge individual civil rights or liberties. In much of the research that adopts a value trade-off approach in the study of civil liberties and tolerance, the struggle is between preserving individual security and tolerating the civil liberties of disliked or threatening groups. In the post-September 11 period, however, the civil liberties vs. security trade-off has mainly been framed as one of protecting individual rights or civil liberties *from the government* as the government seeks to defend the country against a largely external enemy, albeit one that has infiltrated American society and poses a domestic risk to public safety and security.

The competing issues in the civil liberties vs. security trade-off are thus fundamental to the very idea of democracy as reflected in the Bill of Rights: that citizens should be protected *from the government*. Because it is the government's actions that may clash with individual rights, we expect popular perceptions of government—trust in government, as well as patriotism—to play an important role in determining people's willingness to trade off civil liberties for security. Using the contextual issues surrounding the trade-offs and the Patriot

Act legislation, we identify several dimensions of support for civil liberties. Each of these became an important public issue in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks.

## Model Development

Our analysis focuses on the effects of trust in government and the sense of threat on support for civil liberties. In order to test for these effects we need to take into consideration other theoretically important factors that may confound these relationships. Perhaps foremost among these is race, because of the current tension between African Americans and government, and because of the historical struggle for civil rights, which should heighten the concern of African Americans for the protection of civil liberties.

## Core Explanations

**Threat.** If any single factor is likely to drive people to cede civil liberties for security it is threat. In contrast to previous experimental research in which threat perceptions are only hypothetical, the 9/11 attacks were real and caused widespread anxiety and concern among Americans. One emotional response to threat is to try to reduce the discomfort by increasing personal security, increasing physical and psychological distance, or eliminating the threatening stimuli. Emotional reactions to threat may lead to greater support for personal security and the government's efforts to reduce the risk of future terrorist attacks. That threat tends to increase support for restrictions on civil rights and liberties is a consistent finding in the tolerance literature (Gibson 1998; Marcus et al. 1995; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982).

In a different way, threat perceptions can exert a *cognitive* influence on the willingness to trade civil liberties for personal security. According to LeDoux (1996), Marcus and MacKuen (2001, 1993), and Marcus, Newman, and MacKuen (2000), the perception of threat enhances attention to contemporary information and to the source of anxiety. It also promotes political learning and decreased reliance on habitual cues (Marcus and MacKuen 1993). Following this logic, if a heightened sense of threat releases people from standing decisions, habits, and ideological predispositions, then people may rely less on social norms protecting civil liberties and come to favor increased governmental efforts to combat terrorism. This would be consistent with experimental research after the

9/11 attacks, which shows that fear enhanced support for cautionary public policy measures (Lerner et al., 2003), which, we argue in this case, could involve granting greater authority to the government to take measures to prevent terrorism.

According to the tolerance literature, threat, in particular *sociotropic* threat against society or cherished values and norms, usually outweighs the sense of *personal* threat in leading people to act in antidemocratic or intolerant ways. Nonetheless, when threat is personalized the response may become overwhelmingly intolerant toward perceived outgroups or threatening groups (Davis 1995). Because the September 11 attacks evoked both sociotropic and personal threat among American citizens, it is important to investigate the effects of both types of threat on the willingness to sacrifice civil liberties for security.

**Trust in Government.** Support for civil liberties is typically connected to a larger set of beliefs about democratic institutions and processes. If the willingness to exchange civil liberties for security translates into a concession of power to government, then trust and confidence in government should take on great importance. Trust in government may be thought of as a resource upon which government can draw when it needs latitude from its citizens in tolerating restrictions on their civil liberties (Hetherington 1998; Weatherford 1987). Hetherington (1998) shows that rather than just revealing dissatisfaction, low levels of trust make it more difficult for the government to succeed.

We expect citizens to make a distinction between different levels of government when asked about their willingness to trade off rights. Although federal agencies such as the FBI, the INS, the CIA, and the Defense Department have played the most visible roles in the anti-terrorist fight, it was law enforcement that was most immediately responsible for the safety and protection of American citizens.

Not only were trust and the sense of threat contemporaneously affected by the terrorist attacks, but they are also integrally related. It seems reasonable to expect that high levels of perceived threat among those who are more trusting of government may create a greater willingness to adopt a prosecurity position than what would be expected based on their level of trust alone. A similar condition may apply to people who are the least trusting in government but also perceive less threat from terrorism. Such individuals may be even more concerned about protecting individual rights.



## Other Social, Psychological and Political Attitudes

While we hypothesize that people's willingness to trade off civil liberties for security will be predictable from their sense of threat from terrorism and their trust in government, it is important to take into consideration other attitudes that might account for the willingness to make the exchange.

**Dogmatism.** Psychological insecurity and inflexibility, in particular the level of dogmatism, is expected to influence people's willingness to trade civil liberties for personal security. Dogmatic people, according to Rokeach (1960), often reject conflicting information and are more likely to be ideologically conservative in their political beliefs. Whereas a closed belief system tends to be less tolerant of differences and more apt to take an either-or approach in the face of complex or confusing information, an open and flexible belief system is adaptable, responsive to additional information, and open to persuasion. Because a closed belief system is associated with a sense of pessimism, fearfulness, trust in authority, and intolerance, which became intensified in the context of the terrorist attacks, we expect more dogmatic people to support personal security over the protection of civil liberties.

**Interpersonal Trust.** High levels of interpersonal trust (sometimes referred to as "social trust") are seen as important indicators of social capital and mark the ability of citizens to work in concert to influence what the government does. Furthermore, if people trust other people, they may feel that it is less necessary to grant the government additional powers to control misbehavior. If they trust their neighbors or other members of their communities, they may also have a stronger sense of personal security and be less anxious about the possibility of finding terrorists in their midst. Therefore, higher interpersonal trust might partly compensate for the effect of higher trust in government.

We might pose as a counterhypothesis, however, that greater interpersonal trust should be expected to be positively correlated with a willingness to concede civil liberties to the government, because more trusting individuals may tend to grant greater trust to the authorities as well, and to be less concerned that intrusive government surveillance will be misused against them.

**National Pride and Patriotism.** Intense feelings of national pride, loyalty, and love of the country were widely portrayed in the mass media as positive by-products of the

terrorist attacks. Taken to the extreme, however, patriotism may undermine democratic values and processes. Patriotism can take on chauvinistic tones and lead to a narrow definition of who and what may be considered "American" and the rejection of out-groups who may not fit traditional American characteristics. Echoing language from the 1950s, in the post-9/11 era people who voice questions about government policies or practices are sometimes branded as "anti-American." In such instances, a strong sense of patriotism and rallying people to support the common cause is associated with intolerance (Adorno et al. 1950; Gombert 2002). Research by Schatz and Staub (1996) shows that blind patriotism is strongly associated with political conservatism and the belief that the U.S. national security is vulnerable to foreign threat. This result informs Hurwitz and Peffley's (1987) and Sullivan, Friend, and Dietz's (1992) findings that patriotism is associated with aggressive views on national defense and security.

**Liberalism-Conservatism.** Previous research shows strong ideological differences in the support for civil liberties and reactions to threat (McClosky 1964; McClosky and Brill 1983; McCutcheon 1985; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982). Far more than liberals, conservatives have been associated with beliefs about duty, respect for authority, and the primacy of law and order. Liberals, on the other hand, are often seen as willing to risk a measure of social instability for the sake of promoting certain changes (McClosky and Brill 1983). According to McClosky and Brill (1983), liberals tend to think of rights as natural and inalienable that government cannot take away, while conservatives tend to view rights as more situational and contingent.

## Demographic Factors

Social background explanations reflect broader historical, cultural, and economic contexts in which the trade-offs for civil liberties and the further empowerment of government may be evaluated.

**Race and Ethnicity.** African Americans tend to be strongly supportive of civil liberties (Davis 1995), due in part to their struggle for civil rights and a distrust of government. As a result, African Americans may be reluctant to concede rights that they have worked hard to achieve or to empower a government in which they have little confidence, even for the sake of personal security. Hispanics may not have as profound a history of struggle for civil liberties and civil rights as African Americans, but they

have also not been fully integrated into American society and show little faith in government (Howell and Fagan 1988).

**Education.** Education has been instrumental in shaping the support for civil liberties. But in the context of the terrorist attacks, the expected effects of education are not very clear. Taking the traditional view that greater education exposes people to the requirements of democracy, those who have higher education should be less willing to accept restrictions on civil liberties. At the same time, it is plausible that those who are more educated would understand that support for civil liberties cannot always be absolute and that temporary restrictions are sometimes necessary to provide for the safety and security of American citizens as a whole.

**Age.** Younger individuals are generally more committed to democratic norms than older individuals (Davis 1975; McClosky and Brill 1983; Nunn, Crockett, and Williams 1978; Stouffer 1955). We doubt the terrorist attacks created a more intense emotional reaction among older people than younger people. We posit that along with the conservative nature of aging, the emotional reactions among older people are due largely to a general sense of vulnerability to threatening events.

**Type of Community.** Individuals living in large urbanized areas have usually been seen as more committed to civil liberties than people living in other areas (Wilson 1991). As a result of the contact with diverse individuals and different beliefs, it is generally believed that people living in urbanized areas would learn to “live and let live” (Stouffer 1955). Following this logic, we hypothesize that individuals living in large urbanized areas are probably more supportive of civil liberties, despite a concern that where they live might make them vulnerable.

## Data and Measurement

The “Civil Liberties Survey” data come from a national random-digit-dialing telephone survey of persons 18 years of age and older. The average interview lasted 26 minutes. The survey was conducted between November 14, 2001 and January 15, 2002.<sup>1</sup> With an oversample of African Americans and Hispanics, we interviewed 1,448 respondents. The completion rate (RR4) was

<sup>1</sup>The survey was conducted by the Office for Survey Research of the Institute for Public Policy and Social Research at Michigan State University.

52.3%; the refusal rate (REF3), 19.0%.<sup>2</sup> The survey data are weighted to be representative of the adult population of the United States (Hembroff 2002).<sup>3</sup>

Many of our survey questions reflect the salient issues in the government’s battle against terrorism during the first two months after the September 11 attack. Because of the timing of the survey and to capitalize on the recency of the attacks, we did not ask questions about other civil liberties issues that would later become important, such as military tribunals, the rights of foreign prisoners (e.g., under the Geneva Convention), and the rights of American citizens accused of fighting for the enemy.

**Civil Liberties vs. Security.** Panel A in Table 1 reports the distributions of responses to the nine items used initially to assess the public’s willingness to trade off civil liberties for greater personal security (complete question wording given in the appendix). As expected from the tolerance and civil liberties literature, American citizens are more in favor of protecting civil liberties over personal security in the abstract than in actual situations. In response to a general question of giving up some civil liberties in order to curb terrorism in this country, 55% favored protecting civil liberties. As Huddy, Khatib, and Capelos (2002) show in their analysis of public opinion polls conducted after the terrorist attacks, however, this level of support for civil liberties breaks down when applied to specific situations. In our Civil Liberties Survey, when the value trade-off is framed as the need to be safe and secure against judging people guilty by association—“people who belong to or associate with terrorist organizations should be considered a terrorist”—71% support treating people as guilty based on their associations. Although people’s willingness to judge people guilty by association reflects an extreme position, other applications of the value trade-offs reveal a similar but lesser willingness to concede civil liberties for personal security. In a trade-off of values involving support for freedom of speech, 60% think that schoolteachers should not criticize U.S. antiterrorism policy but should promote loyalty to the country. In a trade-off involving the right to privacy, 54% support requiring national identity cards.

At the same time that a majority of Americans are willing to concede some civil liberties and freedoms, majorities also favor safeguarding certain liberties. In a *habeas*

<sup>2</sup>See the American Association for Public Opinion Research’s (AAPOR’s) “standard definitions” at [http://www.aapor.org/default.asp?page=survey\\_methods/standards\\_and\\_best\\_practices](http://www.aapor.org/default.asp?page=survey_methods/standards_and_best_practices).

<sup>3</sup>One weight (USAWT) is used when the entire sample is included in the analysis. Others are designed for analysis of the African American subsample (RACEWT) and the Hispanic/Latino subsample (HISPWT).

**TABLE 1 Civil Liberties vs. Security Responses**

Panel A. Percentage of Prosecurity or Pro-Civil Liberties Responses to Each Item				
Questions	Prefer Security	Protect Civil Liberties		
1. Give up some civil liberties	45	55		
2. Investigate protestors	8	92		
3. Racial Profiling	18	82		
4. Warrantless searches on suspicion	23	77		
5. Monitor telephone and e-mail	34	66		
6. Detain non-citizens indefinitely	47	53		
7. Require national ID cards	54	46		
8. Teachers criticize antiterrorist policies	60	40		
9. Crime to belong to terrorist organization	71	29		
Panel B. Distribution of Total Number of Pro-Civil Liberties Responses				
Number of Pro-Civil Liberties Responses	Whites	African Americans	Latinos	All
0	1%	0%	1%	1%
1	4	0	1	3
2	8	4	12	8
3	13	12	15	13
4	16	15	17	16
5	21	25	22	22
6	18	17	18	18
7	12	16	10	12
8	7	12	4	7
Total Percent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

*corpus* issue framed as the ability to detain noncitizens suspected of belonging to a terrorist organization indefinitely without formally charging them with a crime, 53% support the civil libertarian position. In a trade-off of the right to privacy by allowing the monitoring of telephone conversations and e-mail communications, 66% take the pro-civil liberties position. In a trade-off of Fourth Amendment rights by allowing law enforcement to conduct a warrantless search of a residence on suspicion that terrorist acts are being planned there, 77% give a pro-civil liberties response. When the right to privacy issue is framed as racial profiling—the ability to stop and detain people of certain racial or ethnic backgrounds because they are thought to be more likely to commit crimes—82% prefer civil liberties to security. The least support for security at the expense of civil liberties—8%—is given when the exchange involves freedom of speech and assembly, framed as whether nonviolent protesters against the U.S. government should be investigated.

Following Weissberg's (1976) position that the level of consistency across survey items, as opposed to just their

associational relationships, is an important element in determining attitude coherence, Panel B in Table 1 shows the consistency of pro-civil liberties responses across the eight value trade-off items.<sup>4</sup> The preference for civil liberties over personal security is not a matter of individuals agreeing with only a few items, but rather a matter of supporting a wide range of elements of civil liberties. Whereas fewer than 1% endorse a pro-personal security position across all of the items, and only 7.6% consistently prefer a civil liberties position, 61% of American citizens take a pro-civil liberties position on at least five (out of eight) trade-off questions. Similar overall distributions are found for different racial and ethnic groups, though as we shall see, the groups differ in their willingness to trade civil liberties for greater security.

Given the high level of consistency of pro-civil liberties responses, which is **suggestive of a coherent measure**

<sup>4</sup>We omitted the abstract item *a priori* because it taps a more general civil liberties trade-off rather than referring to specific civil liberties. However, including the item would not have altered any of our substantive conclusions.

tapping into democratic norms, we put these items to a more rigorous test. In a principal components factor analysis, the value trade-off approach appears to do quite well in producing a one-dimensional structure of support for civil liberties (eigenvalue of 1.97, 33% explained variance), but one item—investigate protestors—has a low correlation with the first factor. We used Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) to specify and test a first-order structure of the data. Although the analysis indicates that the first-order structure is not perfect ( $X^2_{15} = 44.64$ ,  $p = .001$ ), the first-order structure adequately fits the data. The normed fit index (.94) and comparative fit index (.95) reflect a good fit. The average covariance residuals and average standardized residuals are low. The average off-diagonal standardized residual is .032, which also reflects a fairly good fit. All residuals fall between  $-.10$  and  $+.10$ . Taken together, the information based on the EFA and CFA data shows a good fit of the model.

While the use of factor scores would be appropriate to construct a civil liberties value trade-off scale, for ease of interpretation and to recapture missing cases our measure of support for civil liberties is the percentage of pro-civil liberty responses out of the seven trade-off items.<sup>5</sup> Correlated at .98, a factor score and our summary measure capture an essentially identical underlying civil liberties dimension.

Although individuals do differ in the levels of support in predictable ways, what is most notable about demographic differences in support for civil liberties is their small magnitude (see Table 2). Few groups differ much from the overall mean of 56% (s.d. = 25). The exceptional categories with somewhat higher than average levels of support for civil liberties are African Americans (66%), those age 18–24 (69%), urban residents (62%), and college graduates (62%); but not persons with an advanced degree. One group with distinctly low support for civil liberties is persons age 60 and over (50%). Even regions of the country hardly differ from one another in the average level of support for civil liberties.

**Sociotropic and Personal Threat.** To reflect how a sense of threat is manifested in the context of the terrorist attacks, we rely on two classes of measures: sociotropic threat and personal threat. Whereas *sociotropic threat* is a generalized anxiety and sense of threat to society, the country as a whole, or the region where one lives, *personal threat* is a sense of threat to oneself or one’s family.

<sup>5</sup>Respondents had to give valid responses to at least five of the seven civil liberties questions to be included. Item nonresponse was limited overall, in part because of built-in probes. However, on the last three questions, a series of follow-up experiments led to somewhat larger numbers of respondents electing not to answer.

**TABLE 2** Mean Pro-Civil Liberties Scores, by Demographic Characteristics<sup>a</sup>

	Mean	Standard Deviation	N
All Respondents	56	25	1,386
Race/Ethnicity			
African American	66	23	285
Latino/Hispanic	53	25	195
White	55	25	894
Sex			
Female	56	24	789
Male	57	27	597
Education			
0–11 Years	56	23	111
High School Grad	51	24	388
Some College	57	25	374
College Grad	62	24	346
Advanced Degree	55	30	149
Age			
18–24	69	21	129
25–29	58	25	111
30–39	55	24	256
40–49	57	25	298
50–59	55	25	230
60–64	50	28	89
65+	50	25	245
Type of Community			
Urban	62	25	363
Suburban	54	25	255
Small City, Town	56	25	456
Rural	55	26	259
Other	55	25	21
Census Region			
New England	55	22	45
Mid-Atlantic	53	26	187
East North Central	56	25	224
West North Central	60	26	89
South Atlantic	55	25	274
East South Central	59	26	79
West South Central	59	27	265
Mountain	56	22	86
Pacific	58	25	137

<sup>a</sup>The Pro-Civil Liberties score is the *percentage* of the items that the respondent answered in a pro-civil liberties direction. Respondents had to answer at least five of the seven questions to be included. The items are listed in the appendix as CL2, CL4, CL5, CL6, CL7, CL8, and CL9. Maximum possible score 100; minimum, 0.

We could not experiment in the survey with different ways to measure the emotion that we call a sense of threat. In colloquial terms, this emotion may also be regarded as a sense of fear that terrorists will harm an individual or



the country. In operational terms, our survey asked how “concerned” people were about several potential sources of threat. We chose this term in part because it had been used in national surveys conducted by news media during the period<sup>6</sup> and in part because of our own concern that some respondents, especially males and perhaps people from some subcultures, might be reluctant to admit to a sense of threat or fear in the survey context.<sup>7</sup>

We use a single item as our indicator of sociotropic threat. To capture the internalized sense of threat, we use a scale based on the mean of the responses to the five personal threat items: concern about flying in an airplane, opening the mail, the safety of food and drinking water, going into tall buildings, and being in large crowds or stadiums. This mean score correlates .99 with a factor score based on the same items. Scores on both the sociotropic threat and personal threat indicators range from 1 (lowest threat) to 4 (highest threat). The sociotropic and personal threat scales are correlated with one another (at  $r = .44$ ) but are expected to capture the effects of distinct aspects of the perceived threat of terrorism on support for civil liberties.

We find lower overall levels of personal threat than sociotropic threat. We also find more individual variation in the levels of personal threat than of sociotropic threat. The coefficient of variation at the individual level is .25 for sociotropic threat and .35 for personal threat. In addition, in our initial review we find clear differences in levels of personal threat by race and ethnicity, as well as by gender. Blacks, Latinos, and women express greater personal threat than whites and men. Persons with the lowest levels of education express greater personal threat than persons with the highest levels. However, we do not find sharp geographic differences in personal threat.

**Political Trust.** We measure trust in government with two survey questions. To capture trust in the federal government in Washington, we use a four-point scale, in which “always” is scored as 4 and “none of the time” is scored as 1; we find an overall mean of 2.5 (s.d. = .71). The second

trust item focuses on law enforcement agencies: Using another four-point scale, we find an overall mean of 2.9 (s.d. = .68), which indicates greater overall levels of trust in law enforcement than in the government in Washington. The answers to the two questions are positively correlated, at  $r = .42$ ; however, on their face they seem to capture different aspects of people’s view of government, while both referring to salient aspects of the potential trade-off of civil liberties for greater security. It may also be the case that when asked about trust in “law enforcement,” people are more inclined to think of *local* law enforcement than national.

The dogmatism measure used in the equations is a factor score based on six four-point items (see Appendix). The factor analytic results revealed a single dimension on which all of the items loaded .50 or higher. To measure interpersonal trust, we use two of the original items from Rosenberg’s (1956) faith-in-people scale (see Appendix). Respondents who volunteer that “neither” position is close to their own are coded in a middle position. We use the mean score of the responses to the two items. Scores range from 3 (highest) to 1 (lowest). For national pride, we rely on a single-item indicator which taps a sense of pride in being an American (see Appendix).

## Multivariate Analysis

### Threat, Trust, and Civil Liberties Trade-Offs

Table 3 reports the results of four OLS regression models exploring the effects of threat and trust on the percent of pro-civil liberties responses. Model 1 establishes the independent and additive effects of threat and trust in government on support for civil liberties. While personal threat does not appear to play an independent role in the support for civil liberties, concern that the country will come under another terrorist attack does appear to have an effect. The higher the level of concern about another terrorist attack on the United States, the more people prefer order and security over civil liberties. Each increase in the level of concern about another attack is associated with a 5-percentage-point decrease in support for civil liberties.

Trust in the federal government and local law enforcement is also associated with support for civil liberties. The more people trust the federal government or law enforcement agencies, the more willing they are to allow the government leeway in fighting the domestic war on terrorism by conceding some civil liberties. Likewise, individuals more trusting of local law enforcement are more willing to concede certain civil liberties.

There is good reason to expect people’s willingness to concede some civil liberties to be affected jointly by their

<sup>6</sup>For example, the *Washington Post*/ABCNews polls had asked, “How concerned are you about the chance that you personally might be the victim of a terrorist attack—does that worry you a great deal, somewhat, not too much or not at all?” (<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/vault/stories/data/090802.htm>). And the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press had asked, for example, whether people were having trouble sleeping because “concerns” about terrorist attacks or the war on terrorism (Pew Center 2001).

<sup>7</sup>Lerner et al. (2003) show that males were much less likely to admit to fear after the 9/11 attacks than females. Whether this is an artifact of the terminology used in the survey, however, or instead a difference in emotional dispositions, was not addressed.

TABLE 3    Regression Effects on Pro-Civil Liberties Responses of Threat, Political Trust, Attitudinal, and Demographic Factors

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Threat and Trust				
Sociotropic Threat	<b>−4.93**</b> (.98)	<b>11.41**</b> (3.68)	<b>13.42**</b> (3.81)	<b>10.99**</b> (3.80)
Personal Threat	<b>−.15</b> (.50)	<b>4.04</b> (2.68)	<b>4.12</b> (2.70)	<b>4.92</b> (2.67)
Trust in Fed Gov.	<b>−3.59**</b> (1.04)	<b>3.87</b> (3.76)	<b>6.80</b> (3.86)	<b>3.92</b> (3.86)
Trust in Law Enforcement	<b>−4.58**</b> (1.09)	<b>−4.61**</b> (1.09)	<b>−4.85**</b> (1.17)	<b>−3.53**</b> (1.19)
Sociotropic × Trust in Fed Gov.		<b>−4.00**</b> (−1.28)	<b>−4.79**</b> (1.30)	<b>−3.66**</b> (1.29)
Personal × Trust in Fed Gov.		<b>1.45*</b> (.65)	<b>1.72**</b> (.65)	<b>1.47**</b> (.65)
Sociotropic × Personal Threat		<b>−2.44**</b> (.62)	<b>−2.51**</b> (.63)	<b>−2.56**</b> (.61)
Attitudinal				
Dogmatism			<b>−4.72**</b> (.77)	<b>−4.77**</b> (.78)
Faith in People			<b>1.58</b> (1.02)	<b>2.07*</b> (1.00)
Liberalism			<b>4.05**</b> (1.02)	<b>3.54**</b> (1.02)
Pride			<b>−5.68**</b> (1.02)	<b>−4.47**</b> (1.05)
Demographic				
African American				<b>8.99**</b> (2.31)
Latino/Hispanic				<b>−5.59*</b> (2.21)
Age 25–59				<b>−8.39**</b> (2.21)
Age 60+				<b>−10.68**</b> (−2.63)
High School Grad				<b>−5.89*</b> (2.99)
Some College				<b>−4.55</b> (3.01)
College Grad				<b>−3.37</b> (3.05)
Male				<b>1.69</b> (1.38)
Urban				<b>5.11**</b> (1.75)
Constant	<b>94.36**</b> (4.15)	<b>56.79**</b> (10.80)	<b>63.85**</b> (11.52)	<b>70.03**</b> (11.68)
R <sup>2</sup> /Adj R <sup>2</sup>	<b>.06/.06</b>	<b>.08/.08</b>	<b>.19/.19</b>	<b>.23/.22</b>
Root MSE	<b>24.32</b>	<b>24.10</b>	<b>22.79</b>	<b>22.21</b>
N	<b>1,309</b>	<b>1,309</b>	<b>1,153</b>	<b>1,142</b>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*Significant at  $p \leq .01$ . \*Significant at  $p \leq .05$ .

level of threat and their trust in government, that is, the effects of threat will be contingent on how much people trust the government, and the effects of trust will be contingent on how threatened by terrorism people are. Model 2 presents the interaction effects between trust and threat. A joint F test supports the use of this model specification ( $F = 4.26, p = .05$ ). These effects become clearer in Model 3, in which additional variables are taken into account. A joint-F test again supports the existence of interaction effects between the threat and the trust variables ( $F = 5.15, p = .01$ ).<sup>8</sup>

Because of the complexity of these interaction effects, it is difficult just to read the individual regression coefficients in Models 3 or 4 to assess the magnitude or direction of the joint effects of threat and trust on support for civil liberties. We shall show later that these effects are substantial and in the expected direction: the greater people's sense of threat, and the more trust they have in the federal government and law enforcement, the less people's support for civil liberties. Before showing the magnitude of the effects of threat and trust, however, we need to attend to another matter: to rule out the role of alternative factors that might account for the relationships between trust, threat, and civil liberties trade-offs.

Model 4 tests for effects of threat and trust in a fully specified model. Even after controlling for both attitudinal and demographic factors that are associated with support for civil liberties, the story remains the same. Threat interacts with trust in its effect on civil liberties trade-offs.

Many of our other hypotheses are also supported. Among the attitudinal explanations, dogmatism performs as expected. High levels of dogmatism—closed-mindedness—lead to the acceptance of personal security and order over protecting civil liberties and personal freedom.

Faith-in-people is also a consideration in the civil liberties value trade-offs. On average, individuals who think that people are basically trustworthy and helpful are less willing to sacrifice civil liberties for greater personal security. This result might at first appear to be consistent with the assumption that higher faith-in-people leads to greater faith in democracy (Putnam 2000). However, the zero-order correlation between the faith-in-people scale and pro-civil liberties responses is .06, positive but not statistically significant. Moreover, when the multivariate analysis is replicated by race and ethnicity

(Table 4), a positive relationship between faith-in-people and support for civil liberties is found only among African Americans.

This statistically significant positive relationship between support for civil liberties and social trust among African Americans suggests that social trust is especially important to this community. Those who have greater trust in people can rely more on others for their personal security. Among whites, however, there is no relationship between social trust and support for civil liberties, and among Latinos the relationship is negative, though not statistically significant. These results are consistent with evidence that the effect of social trust on support for democracy is contingent on context and likely to vary by ethnicity (Dowley and Silver 2002).

Self-reported political ideology is also a determinant of civil liberties value trade-offs.<sup>9</sup> Even after adjusting for the effects of their trust in government, a sense of threat from terrorism, and other attitudinal and demographic differences, liberals are more likely than conservatives to favor maintaining civil liberties over personal security and order. Traditionally, political liberals possess great concern for the protection of individual rights while political conservatives have given greater priority to maintaining social order and the interests of the community as a whole. We find that political beliefs remain important to how people react in the context of a terrorist threat.

We surmised that a large component underlying national pride was a sense of authoritarianism, intolerance, and concern for order. Our results show that high levels of national pride may lead to willingness to trade off civil liberties for greater security. Even after adjusting for the effects of other factors, including threat and trust in government, a move of one rung up the national pride scale is associated with a decline of 4.47 percentage points in support for civil liberties (Model 4).

Among the demographic explanations, age seems to matter. Persons age 18–24 show 8 percentage points more support for civil liberties than older cohorts, even after adjusting for other factors. Urban residence is significantly related to the support for civil liberties.

The other important demographic predictors are race and ethnicity. African Americans score almost 9 percentage points higher than whites on the civil liberties trade-off scale. African Americans are less willing than whites to trade off civil liberties for personal security. We speculate that the historical struggle to secure civil rights and liberties and a distrust of government may make giving up civil

<sup>8</sup>The specified interaction effects reported in Table 3 are a distillation after testing for the joint effects of the two types of threat and the two types of trust (in the federal government and local law enforcement).

<sup>9</sup>See the appendix for the question. In this analysis we collapse the responses into three categories.

liberties especially difficult, even during a period of national crisis. Despite high levels of national pride (African Americans do not differ from whites on this measure), cultural and historical experience may be a powerful force for the defense of individual rights.

In contrast, Latinos score almost 6 percentage points lower than whites on the civil liberties value trade-off scale. Latinos are more willing than whites to give up civil liberties in favor of greater personal security. This result may be a function of sample selectivity and the fact that the interviews were conducted in English, which might produce a more affluent and acculturated Latino subsample.

That African Americans and Latinos react differently from whites and from each other in the support for civil liberties requires further analysis. Although we expected racial and ethnic experiences to condition how individuals perceive the terrorist attacks and governmental efforts to provide for safety and security, it is important to examine whether our explanations transcend ethnic and racial experiences. In Table 4 we present results of separate OLS regression analyses by race and ethnicity.<sup>10</sup> In these equations, because of the smaller sample sizes for Latinos and African Americans, we treat the education and age variables more simply than in Table 3. In addition, we exclude Asian Americans and other minority groups from this part of the analysis. Otherwise, the equations in Table 4 mimic Model 4 in Table 3.

The results for whites and Latinos are very similar to those for the respondents as a whole. Among whites, although we observe some differences, the effect of a sense of threat on support for civil liberties is conditioned by people's trust in the federal government. Whites who are concerned about another terrorist attack, either against the country or against them personally, and who are trusting of the federal government, are more willing to concede civil liberties for personal security than whites who are less threatened and less trusting of the federal government. However, unlike for whites, as trust in law enforcement increases among Latinos they are more likely to cede civil liberties for security.

We present two equations for African Americans in Table 3 to show that the effect of perceived threat is not moderated by the level of trust. Instead, among African Americans sociotropic threat and trust in the federal government are additive functions. African Americans with higher levels of perceived threat are more likely to favor a prosecution position, as are African Americans with

higher levels of trust in the federal government. The sign reversal on dogmatism among African Americans is unexpected. We suspect that in answering several of the dogmatism questions (e.g., "a group tolerating too many differences" and "to compromise with our political enemies") African Americans' frame of reference may involve an identity with blacks as a group. If dogmatism captures an aspect of a challenge to racial solidarity among African American respondents, the negative relationship between dogmatism and support for civil liberties among blacks becomes explicable. Gender differences are also significant among African Americans.

## Illustrating the Effects of Threat and Trust on Support for Civil Liberties

We can now examine the predicted probabilities of pro-civil liberties responses associated with different values of threat, trust in the federal government, and trust in law enforcement. This approach allows us to move beyond looking at the signs and magnitudes of individual regression coefficients. For each prediction, we report the confidence intervals to assess the sensitivity of our estimates to small cell *N*'s. Substantively, it provides a simulation of pro-civil liberties responses under different conditions.

One general inference from this analysis is that when they feel threatened, people who previously protected civil liberties and personal freedom may compromise on these values for greater security. For instance, Figure 1 shows the predicted probabilities of pro-civil liberties responses on the vertical axis, conditional on how much trust people have in the federal government on the horizontal axis.<sup>11</sup> Taking into account that the effect of trust on support for civil liberties is contingent on how threatened people

<sup>11</sup>The estimates in Figures 1 and 2 are based on Equation 3 in Table 3 using the CLARIFY program developed by King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000) and distributed at <http://gking.harvard.edu/stats.shtml> for use with the STATA statistical program. CLARIFY also produces standard errors; in Figures 1 through 4 we show the 95% confidence interval around each estimate. Although for reasons of space it is not shown in Table 3, the actual equation used to generate the estimates in Figures 1 and 2 is a further wrinkle on Model 3. In order to relax the assumption of linearity of the effects of the threat and political trust variables, we specify curvilinear functional forms. Each of those variables (separately as well as in the interaction terms) was transformed into a quadratic function. This data transformation produces the curvilinearity of some of the lines in Figures 1 and 2. Analogous quadratic transformations are used for the estimates by race and ethnicity in Figure 4. Nonlinear specifications provide a better overall fit than the linear ones, based on the MSE and the adjusted  $R^2$ .

<sup>10</sup>A Chow test of a pooled and fully interactive model for African Americans and Latinos revealed that the parameters were not equal across groups (African Americans  $F_{7,111} = 3.30$ ,  $p = .001$ ; Latinos  $F_{7,111} = 4.38$ ,  $p = .001$ ).



TABLE 4    **Regression Effects on Pro-Civil Liberties Responses of Threat, Political Trust, Attitudinal, and Demographic Factors, Race and Ethnic Group**

	Whites	Latinos	African Americans	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Threat and Trust				
Sociotropic Threat	13.26** (5.27)	−6.79 (12.48)	−9.72 (6.91)	−6.37** (1.98)
Personal Threat	2.88 (3.61)	14.19* (7.35)	−9.23* (4.82)	.51 (1.09)
Trust in Fed Gov.	3.90 (5.52)	6.11 (15.17)	−11.35 (5.61)	−4.03* (2.09)
Trust in Law Enforcement	−2.80 (1.49)	−15.09** (3.23)	−.96 (2.22)	−1.17 (2.20)
Sociotropic × Trust in Fed Gov.	−4.42** (1.85)	1.57 (5.03)	−.04 (2.01)	
Personal × Trust in Fed Gov.	2.07** (.81)	−2.81 (1.99)	2.27 (1.35)	
Sociotropic × Personal Threat	−2.59** (.83)	−2.81 (1.99)	1.19 (1.05)	
Attitudinal				
Dogmatism	−5.96** (.96)	−6.95* (2.64)	3.67** (1.53)	3.34* (1.50)
Faith in People	1.28 (1.26)	−2.23 (2.99)	4.08 (2.24)	4.82* (2.22)
Liberalism	2.03 (1.33)	12.05** (2.70)	5.64** (2.04)	4.26* (1.95)
Pride	−6.11** (1.46)	.29 (2.32)	−3.56 (2.15)	−3.67 (2.15)
Demographic				
Age	−.12* (.05)	−.06 (.15)	−.35** (.11)	−.31** (.10)
Years of Education	−.81* (.38)	−.75 (.91)	2.45** (.61)	2.67** (.59)
Male	.56 (1.71)	−7.01 (4.19)	10.24** (3.14)	9.81** (3.10)
Urban	6.17** (2.42)	11.01** (4.45)	5.02 (3.21)	4.09 (3.13)
Constant	85.93** (17.56)	94.89** (35.85)	99.33** (23.27)	67.97** (14.14)
R <sup>2</sup> /Adj R <sup>2</sup>	.23/.21	.43/.37	.38/.33	.36/.33
Root MSE	22.41	19.85	19.68	19.76
N	752	158	222	222


Note: Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*Significant at  $p \leq .01$ . \*Significant at  $p \leq .05$ .

are, each line represents a different level of sociotropic threat.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>12</sup>Figure 1 omits the estimates for people who are “not concerned at all” about a terrorist attack. Only 56 (fewer than 4%) of the respondents fall into this category.

At every level of concern about another terrorist attack, increased trust in the government is associated with a greater exchange of civil liberties for security. Especially among those who claim at least some trust in the federal government, greater concern about another terrorist

**FIGURE 1** Effects of Trust in Federal Government and Sociotropic Threat on Support for Civil Liberties



*Note:* Estimates are the predicted percentage of pro-civil liberties responses associated with the stated levels of trust in federal government and concern about another terrorist attack on the United States in the next few months.

attack is associated with greater willingness to cede some civil liberties for greater personal security and safety. The two variables clearly interact with one another, however. At low levels of trust in the government, those who have great concern about another terrorist attack differ little in their support for civil liberties from those who have little or no concern about another terrorist attack; but among those who have some or a lot of trust in the government, greater concern about another attack is associated with a sharply lower support for civil liberties. Indeed, reflecting the interactive or joint effects of the two variables, those who are very concerned about another terrorist attack and who always trust the federal government support the pro-civil liberties position only 35% of the time. Very threatened people with high trust in the government show little support for civil liberties.


Figure 2 depicts analogous relationships for personal threat and trust in the federal government.<sup>13</sup> The threat factor and the trust factor in combination work differently for the two types of sociotropic and personal threat. For

<sup>13</sup> Because of the small number of cases, Figure 2 omits the estimates for the most extreme values on the personal threat variables—persons with mean scores of 1.0 to 1.4 (lowest threat) or 3.6 to 4.0 (highest threat).

sociotropic threat (Figure 1), the magnitude of the trade-off of civil liberties for each increment in perceived threat appears to increase with the level of trust in government—that is, the distance between the lines diverges from left to right on the graph. For personal threat, on the other hand (Figure 2), the magnitude of the trade-off in civil liberties for each unit increment in perceived threat is negligible, especially considering the size of the confidence intervals. The differences in support for civil liberties associated with different levels of personal threat are not statistically significant. Because of the small cell *N*, the one apparently anomalous relationship between threat and support for civil liberties—among those at the high end in personal threat—does not actually differ much from the relationships among those who feel less personally threatened.

Thus, although the two types of threat have joint or interactive effects on support for civil liberties, we see that higher levels of sociotropic threat are associated with lower support for civil liberties. However, the effects of both types of threat are modulated by the degree of trust in the government. The greater the trust in the federal government, the greater the preference for security over civil liberties.

**FIGURE 2** Effects of Trust in Federal Government and Personal Threat on Support for Civil Liberties



Note: Estimates are the predicted percentage of pro-civil liberties responses associated with the stated levels of trust in federal government and sense of personal threat.

Trust in government and threat combine to have powerful effects on support for civil liberties. At one extreme, completely “unthreatened” individuals who “never” trust the government support pro-civil liberties positions between 63 and 73% of the time. At the other extreme, very “threatened” individuals who “always” trust the government support the pro-civil liberties positions only 47 to 53% of the time.


**Liberals, Conservatives—Perceived Threat and Civil Liberties.** In the face of the terrorist threat, an extreme defense of individual liberties has been deemed by some to be tantamount to constitutional suicide. By defending individual liberties to the hilt, we leave ourselves vulnerable to those who would exploit our open society to achieve evil ends and ultimately destroy democracy. On the other hand, others have deemed a willingness to sacrifice civil liberties to preserve democracy as self-contradictory—trying to save democracy by giving up the very rights that we are trying to defend.

Table 1 (panel B) shows that few people are doctrinaire advocates of either extreme on the civil liberties scale. At the same time, we find that people’s reactions to the shocking events of 9/11 are anchored to a significant degree in their prior political predispositions. But their level of support for civil liberties is also affected by their

sense of the danger of another terrorist attack. To illustrate this effect, we examine how the response to sociotropic threat differs for people of different ideological predispositions. It is important to keep in mind that perceptions of sociotropic threat are not related to people’s ideology. The percentages of liberals, moderates, and conservatives who are somewhat concerned or very concerned about the possibility of another terrorist attack on the U.S. (sociotropic threat) are virtually identical: 85%, 82%, and 85%, respectively.


Like the previous two charts, Figure 3 is based on Equation 3 in Table 3. That is, the relationships between support for civil liberties, sociotropic threat, and political ideology are adjusted for the effects of other variables in the equation (personal threat, trust in government, dogmatism, faith in people, and national pride). On the whole, liberals support the largest percentage of the pro-civil liberties positions; moderates support fewer; and conservatives, the fewest. But for each ideological group the level of support for civil liberties depends on the perceived level of threat. For all three ideological groups, the greater the sense of threat the lower their support for civil liberties. Liberals who are not concerned at all about the likelihood of another terrorist attack support 78% of the pro-civil liberties positions; liberals who are very concerned about another attack support only 54% of the

**FIGURE 3** Effects of Liberalism-Conservatism and Sociotropic Threat on Support for Civil Liberties



*Note:* Estimates are the predicted percentage of pro-civil liberties responses associated with the stated levels of concern about another terrorist attack and respondent's self-identification on a political ideology scale.

**FIGURE 4** Race, Ethnicity, Sociotropic Threat, and Support for Civil Liberties



*Note:* Estimates are the predicted percentage of pro-civil liberties responses associated with race-ethnicity and the stated levels of concern about another terrorist attack.



pro-civil liberties positions. The analogous percentages for conservatives are 69% and 45%.

Thus, whatever their ideological position, people's willingness to exchange liberties for security increases as their perception of threat increases. Those who in ordinary times would want to protect civil liberties most strongly (liberals) are willing to concede some of these liberties in the context of a terrorist threat. Far from wishing to commit constitutional suicide, in the face of a terrorist threat both liberals and conservatives endorse granting greater authority to the state. Indeed, liberals who are very concerned about the possibility of a future terrorist attack on the U.S. support fewer civil liberties positions than do conservatives who are not at all concerned about such an attack.

**African Americans, Latinos, Whites—Threat and Civil Liberties.** Figure 4 illustrates that African Americans are much more supportive of civil liberties than whites at all levels of sociotropic threat.<sup>14</sup> Figure 4 also reveals the fundamental identity between Latinos and whites in support for civil liberties among persons who express some or a lot of concern about another terrorist attack. Although the results are unstable for those who say they are not very concerned or not at all concerned because of the small number of cases among both African Americans and Latinos, we again find that regardless of race or ethnicity people are more willing to exchange civil liberties for security if they are more afraid of a terrorist attack.

## Conclusion

The term "9/11" has come to symbolize a watershed in American history. How we regard one another, our government, our democratic freedoms, and the external world are all said to have changed fundamentally and irreversibly. The terrorist attack raised many important questions about the institutional framework of civil society and the commitment to democratic principles. Much of the story about the consequences of the attack on America still has to be played out. Many issues regarding civil liberties—electronic surveillance, immigration limitations, habeas corpus, rights of the accused, military tribunals, and material witness laws—are undetermined and will perhaps take years to understand well.

We have addressed some of the important questions about constitutional rights brought to the forefront by the

terrorist attacks. What weight do American citizens attach to civil liberties in the context of a sense of threat? Does the desire to live in a peaceful and orderly society outweigh the value of personal freedom? Because of the timing of our national survey, we were able to address these questions and capture an aspect of the initial reaction to the terrorist attacks. By using the "natural experiment" of the terrorist attacks on 9/11, our estimates of how people's support for constitutional rights might hold up in a period of crisis are not just simulations. In addition, by studying civil liberties trade-offs in this context we are able to extend and inform the existing scientific literature on political tolerance and support for democratic norms.

Americans are not ready to concede all of their civil liberties and personal freedoms in order to feel secure from the terrorist threat. While many citizens are willing to trade off civil liberties for greater security, Americans as whole adopt a moderate position. But a sense of threat makes for more reluctant defenders of constitutional rights across the political spectrum and among whites, Latinos, and African Americans.

Our account of the underlying reasons why citizens are willing to trade off certain civil liberties for greater security is complex. Threat and trust do not uniformly lead to favoring one set of values over another, but instead they interact with one another to determine the support for civil liberties over security. The effect of trust in the federal government on support for civil liberties is conditioned by a sense of sociotropic threat—concern that the country will come under another terrorist attack—as well as personal threat. However, at every level of trust in the federal government, increased sense of threat leads to a greater willingness to concede some civil liberties in favor of security and order.

Attitudinal measures, such as political ideology, national pride, and social trust, influence how citizens react to the government's efforts to combat terrorism. These attitudes may either promote or weaken the support for civil liberties. Civil liberties may suffer, for example, when the emotional appeals of patriotism favor order and security over civil liberties.

The level of support for civil liberties is not entirely contemporaneously determined. In addition to feelings of national pride and interpersonal trust, prior beliefs such as political ideology play a role even during the post-9/11 crisis period. So does prior group experience. Though they are just as patriotic as other Americans (see also Dowley and Silver 2000), African Americans' distrust of government and their history of struggle for civil rights leads to a greater support for civil liberties in the wake of the terrorist attacks. When concern about another terrorist attack is moderate to high, African Americans are substantially

<sup>14</sup>The estimates are based on elaborated versions of the equations in Table 3. The trust and threat variables are transformed into quadratic functions to generate the estimates reported in Figure 4.

more supportive of civil liberties than either whites or Latinos.

While our study provides insight into some of the trade-offs that people are willing to make when they perceive an immediate threat to their safety and security, it cannot be used to forecast the future. The relationships between threat, trust, and civil liberties that we observe in our survey reflect a picture taken shortly after the September 11<sup>th</sup> attack, at a time when the visual images of the events were played and replayed in the mass media and in people's minds. A year and a half after the attack, however, it is very rare to see pictures of the World Trade Center or the Pentagon in flames on television—as if the media believe that reliving the day of the attack on America would be too traumatic. Yet the war on terrorism is far from over.

Unpredictable events will provide the empirical reality that will answer some of the following questions about people's willingness to trade civil liberties for security in the future. If public anxiety about another terrorist attack wanes over time, will political and social attitudes remain fixed because of the recency of the national trauma, or will they change as well? If another major attack were to occur, will there be further intensification of some of the changes that have been observed—such as increased trust in government, patriotic fervor, or greater interpersonal trust—or might there be a reversal of direction if people lose confidence in the ability of the government to protect them from harm or if they begin to seek scapegoats among certain groups of people? These are, of course, questions about just a few of the plausible future contexts in which support for individual rights might be put to the test. They remind us not to assume that the immediate post-9/11 experience foretells how people will resolve the balance between civil liberties and security in the future.

## Appendix

### Main Batteries of Questions Used

#### Civil Liberties

- CL1.** Next I am going to read you a series of two statements. Please tell me which one you agree with most. The first is, in order to curb terrorism in this country, it will be necessary to give up some civil liberties. **-or-** We should preserve our freedoms above all, even if there remains some risk of terrorism?
- CL2.** Everyone should be required to carry a national identity card at all times to show to a police officer upon request. **-or-** Being required to carry

an identity card would violate people's freedom of association and right to privacy.

- CL4.** Some people say it should be a crime for anyone to belong to or contribute money to any organization that supports international terrorism. Others say that a person's guilt or innocence should not be determined only by who they associate with or the organizations to which they belong.
- CL5.** Some people say the government should be able to arrest and detain a noncitizen indefinitely if that person is suspected of belonging to a terrorist organization. Others say nobody should be held for a long period of time without being formally charged with a crime.
- CL6.** Some people say that law enforcement should be able to stop or detain people of certain racial or ethnic backgrounds if these groups are thought to be more likely to commit crimes. This is called racial profiling. Others think racial profiling should not be done because it harasses many innocent people just because of their race or ethnicity.
- CL7.** Some people say high school teachers have the right to criticize America's policies toward terrorism. Others say that all high school teachers should defend America's policies in order to promote loyalty to our country.
- CL8.** Some people say that law enforcement should be free to search a property without a warrant solely on the suspicion that a crime or a terrorist act is being planned there. Others say that protection against searches without a warrant is a basic right that should not be given up for any reason.
- CL9.** Some people say that government should be allowed to record telephone calls and monitor e-mail in order to prevent people from planning terrorist or criminal acts. Others say that people's conversations and e-mail are private and should be protected by the constitution.
- CL10.** Some say that people who participate in nonviolent protests against the United States government should be investigated. Others say that people have the right to meet in public and express unpopular views as long as they are not violating the law.

#### Dogmatism

- DG1.** Next, I would like to read you a series of statements and have you tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each. The first is, there are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the truth and those who are against it.

- DG2.** A group that tolerates too many differences of opinion among its members cannot exist for long.
- DG3.** To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.
- DG4.** Of all the different philosophies that exist in the world there is probably only one that is correct.
- DG5.** In the long run the best way to live is to pick friends and associates whose tastes and beliefs are the same as one's own.
- DG6.** Most of the ideas that get printed nowadays aren't worth the paper they are printed on.

### Threat

- SEC4.** I'd like to start by asking you some questions about your feelings since the terrorist attacks on September 11<sup>th</sup>. All in all, how concerned are you that the United States might suffer another terrorist attack in the next three months?
- F1.** How concerned are you about flying on an airplane?
- F2.** How concerned are you about opening your mail?
- F3.** How concerned are you about the safety of food and drinking water?
- F5.** How concerned are you about going into tall buildings?
- F6.** How concerned are you about being in large crowds or stadiums?

### Liberalism-Conservatism

- P17a.** Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a conservative, a moderate, or a liberal? Would you consider yourself very conservative (very liberal) or somewhat conservative (somewhat liberal)? If moderate, do you generally think of yourself as closer to the conservative side or the liberal side?

### Trust in Authorities

- T1.** The next set of questions are about trust. How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right?
- GT2.** Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all people?
- GT3.** How much of the time do you think you can trust law enforcement to do what is right?
- GT4.** Since the terrorist attacks, has your confidence in law enforcement increased, decreased, or has stayed about the same?

### Interpersonal Trust

- FIP1.** Some people say that most people can be trusted. Others say you can't be too careful in your dealings with people. Which of these opinions comes closest to your own?
- FIP2.** Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?

To both of the above questions, "It depends" was a volunteered response, treated here as a middle position.

### National Pride

- P1.** How proud are you to be an American? Would you say very proud, proud, somewhat proud, not very proud, or not proud at all?

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