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Funerals and Elections: The Effects of Terrorism on Voting Behavior in Turkey

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Abstract

This article empirically analyzes the effects of terrorism on the electoral choices of the Turkish voters in the 1991 and 1995 general elections. It relies on a unique data set that includes the date and the place of burial of Turkish soldiers and police officers who died in the fight against the terrorist organization PKK. The author uses the number of these security force terror casualties at the district level as a measure of the level of terrorism that the people of that district have been exposed to and analyzes whether and how exposure to terrorism affects people's electoral choices. The results indicate that Turkish voters are highly sensitive to terrorism and that they blame the government for their losses. Moreover, exposure to terrorism leads to an increase in the vote share of the right-wing parties who are less concessionist toward the terrorist organization's cause compared to their left-wing counterparts.

Keywords

terrorism, Turkey, electoral outcomes, terror casualties

Introduction

On November 13, 2009, the Turkish Grand National Assembly convened to discuss the latest “democratic opening” initiative of the government. The initiative consisted of a package of reforms that the government believed would solve, or at least,

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help ameliorate the age-old “Kurdish problem,” and would put an end to the terrorist campaign that is argued to have stemmed from it, and which, for most Turkish people, has become synonymous with the “Kurdish problem” itself. Thus, the meeting was in all the newspapers and on television, and was expected to be a historical one. Unfortunately, not much of a discussion took place at the meeting as the members of the main opposition party left the assembly in protest when the prime minister, in his opening talk, blamed the opposition for not wanting to put an end to terrorism. In his exact words, the prime minister argued that there were those who built their entire political career on “terror martyrs” and that these politicians were actually hoping for the escalation of violence, and hence for more “martyrs,” so that they could attend the funeral ceremonies and join the protests to further provoke the public against the government. His choice of words may sound peculiar to outsiders, but the prime minister was actually referring to the more than 6,500 security force terror casualties that PKK terrorism claimed in the last twenty-five years and he was arguing that these casualties hurt the political standing of the government in the eyes of the electorate to the benefit of the opposition. This argument has been made numerous times, by numerous politicians in Turkey over the last twenty-five years, but interestingly, it still remains as an intuitive one. In other words, no one has actually tried, so far, to scientifically assess the effects of terrorism on the political behavior of the Turkish electorate. In this article, I use a unique data set to investigate whether terrorism has had any effects on Turkish voters’ electoral choices. Using spatially disaggregated data on military and police force terror casualties over the 1987-1996 period, I offer a multivariate linear regression model of vote choice as a function of these casualties and a set of socio-economic variables.

Terrorism is now considered the plague of our times and researchers are probing this common affliction in many different ways to find a cure. In the last decade, and especially after the attacks of September 11, 2001, an impressive body of research that studies the correlates, historical and institutional causes, forms, and strategies of terrorism has accumulated offering us valuable insights into terrorism’s relationship to some key structural variables such as the economy, government policy, and democratic freedoms, into how terrorism works, and into the issues faced by governments in their efforts to counteract terrorism.¹ More recently, academic interest has turned toward the effects of terrorism on the targeted populations. Economists have questioned the effects of terrorist attacks on various economic sectors and activities.² In terms of political effects, a growing body of literature is now available with very interesting results about how exposure to terrorism affects people’s evaluation of their political leaders’ performances (Davis and Silver 2004; Shambaugh and Josiger 2004; Guilmartin 2004; Ludvigsen 2005). However, empirical studies investigating the effects of terrorism on the actual political behavior of the targeted societies are still very much needed. The relative lack of such studies is a rather important shortcoming of the literature because in nonauthoritarian societies, the political reaction of the people to terrorism greatly influences how their governments respond to terrorism. It is often argued that terrorism aims to pressure societies to coerce their

governments to grant concessions to the terrorist organization's cause. If this claim is valid, then whether terrorism is an effective way of coercion or not depends on how the targeted societies react to terrorist attacks. In democracies, the ballot box constitutes the main venue where people can best exert influence on government policies. Thus, we should be able to see whether terrorism is an effective way of coercion or not by analyzing the voting behavior of citizens of democracies that have been subject to terrorist attacks.

Turkey is one of the unfortunate countries for which dealing with terrorism has long become the top priority issue. Since August 1984, the country has been suffering from a terrorist insurgency campaign led by the ethnic separatist terrorist organization Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan), the PKK.³ Turkish governments of the last twenty-five years have spent billions of dollars to fight the PKK.⁴ However, the financial burden that PKK terrorism inflicted on the country pales in comparison with the more than thirty thousand lives, both civil and military, that it claimed during the period. Over the years, a lot has been written on the history, and the reasons of the conflict, and the "Kurdish problem." Many suggestions were made, many policy changes proposed, but interestingly no one has paid much attention to how this situation, which became "Turkey's number one problem,"⁵ has affected the Turkish people and their political preferences. The results in this article consistently demonstrate the importance the Turkish electorate has attributed to the problem and how costly the issue had been for Turkish governments politically. In addition, the analyses bring to light the significant relation between PKK terrorism and the success of the right-wing parties in Turkey in the 1990s. This last result also demonstrates that terrorism proved to be an ineffective way of coercion in Turkey since in the time period that the analyses focus on, the right-wing parties in Turkey were less concessionist than their left-wing counterparts in terms of their stance toward the PKK and toward the "Kurdish problem" in general.

This article is a first in its attempt to empirically study the political effects of terrorism in Turkey. It uses a unique data set that contains military and police force terror casualties at the district level and analyzes whether and how these casualties affected the results of the 1991 and 1995 Turkish general elections. Consequently, it also contributes to the literature on the determinants of voting behavior in Turkey. This is a small literature that has so far been dominated by survey studies that link declared personal characteristics with declared ideological and party preferences (Kalaycıoğlu 1994; Esmer 1995, 2002; Çarkoğlu and Hinich 2006).

In the following section, I present a brief overview of the terrorism problem in Turkey. Then, in the third section, I conduct a brief overview of the literature on the political effects of terrorism and the literature on the determinants of electoral behavior in Turkey. In the fourth section, I present my model and introduce my variables. The fifth section discusses the data and how it were assembled. I present my results in the sixth section and conclude in the seventh.

Turkey's Fight with Terrorism

The PKK is an ethnic Kurdish separatist terrorist organization that has been conducting armed attacks on Turkish citizens (both ethnic Turks and Kurds) since August 1984. The organization was first founded with the goal of establishing an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey, though later on in the 1990s, it appeared to have rolled back on its goal to a federational structure that would grant more autonomy to the Kurdish population in Turkey. First dismissed as the acts of “a handful of outlaws,” PKK terrorism soon became “Turkey’s most important problem.”⁵ The PKK’s terrorist acts are almost completely concentrated in southeastern Turkey, which is the poorest and the most underdeveloped part of the country and which is traditionally inhabited by Kurds. The attacks targeted villages and civilians (mostly Kurds) whom the PKK named as “collaborators with the Republic,” military bases, and police stations in the area. The lack of infrastructure, the mountainous terrain, and the economic misery in the area accompanied by high levels of unemployment, all worked to the advantage of the terrorist organization in their recruitment efforts in finding shelters and hideouts and in staging attacks. Interrupted by short-lived cease-fires by the PKK, the armed conflict between the Turkish security forces and the PKK has been going on for twenty-five years now. It has cost the country billions of dollars, more than thirty thousand lives, of which around seven thousand are from the military and police forces and hundreds of destroyed villages.

Turkey has a mandatory military service system that requires each Turkish man, when he comes to age, to serve in the army for about twelve months. These young men are first subject to a basic training program and then are sent to military bases all over the country to serve the rest of their terms. They can be assigned to any military base that has room for newcomers except those in their home district⁷ and the assignments are randomly done, but considering the ongoing fight with the PKK and the substantial military deployment it requires, there is a good chance that a young soldier will be sent to some military base in the southeast. Similarly, most public servants in Turkey, including police and army officers, are subject to an appointment system in which they can be required to serve in any part of the country where there is need.⁸ Consequently, most of the police and army officers that serve in the southeastern districts of Turkey are not originally from the area. When a soldier or a police officer dies in service he or she is considered a “martyr”⁹ both legally by the state and culturally by the people. Legally, there are different types of “martyrdom” depending on how the person died (in battle, or in an accident, or due to health problems, etc.). The soldiers and police officers who die while fighting the PKK are considered “terror martyrs” and are the highest regarded both officially and culturally. A state funeral is held for each of them in their hometowns where they are buried. These funerals have always been important public events attended by high-level military and state officials (even the president joins if he is in the area), and thousands of locals, and have always been the scene to nationalistic demonstrations.¹⁰ The funerals are publicly announced beforehand and are open to everyone. Attending a

“martyr funeral” is usually regarded as a citizenship and a religious duty. The national and the local media cover the story of the deceased soldier or police officer, his grief-stricken family, and the funeral ceremony. Usually, a cortege containing thousands of people following the cascade marches through the main streets of town on its way to the cemetery. In Turkey, almost all cities and big towns have military and police force cemeteries that are called “martyr cemeteries.”

Interestingly, these funerals constitute the only times most Turkish people face and feel the adverse effects of terrorism. Since the PKK’s terrorist acts are almost completely concentrated in southeastern Turkey, for people living in other parts of the country, PKK terrorism is usually only what they hear on the news about the recent attacks on distant outposts or villages in the southeast. It is only when a soldier or a police officer from their hometown dies in those attacks and they see and join the thousands marching on the streets of their hometown following the cascade that these people come face to face with a real, tangible loss. In other words, the security force terror casualties from their hometowns constitute the most tangible and important cost of terrorism for the Turkish people living outside the terror-stricken southeastern parts of the country and the funeral ceremonies are the occasions when they really feel this cost. In addition, the feeling is strengthened and deepened by the demonstrations of public anger toward terrorism, the cries of the family members, and the nationalistic fervor at these funerals. Thus, the number of state funerals of security force terror casualties, held in a district in a certain period of time, provides a good measure of the costs of terrorism that the people of that district suffer within that period.

The first half of the nineties has been the bloodiest period of PKK terrorism. The authority vacuum that formed in Northern Iraq after the Gulf War, created a safe haven for the PKK. The PKK militants stationed in the camps in Northern Iraq easily infiltrated Turkish soil and staged attacks. There were clashes between the security forces and the PKK terrorists almost every day. Only in 1994, 1,031 soldiers and 37 police officers were killed in the attacks. Nevertheless, the losses subsided significantly in the second half of the nineties as the Turkish security forces gained experience in guerilla tactics and better learned to maneuver in the mountainous terrain. Finally, the PKK received a major blow when its leader Abdullah Öcalan was captured in Africa in 1999, brought back to Turkey, tried, and sentenced to life in prison. Headless and divided, the PKK ceased its attacks in the early 2000s. Unfortunately, peace in the area did not last long. The PKK resumed its armed attacks in the second half of 2004 and the Turkish people started attending “martyr funerals” again in the last couple of years.

The Literature

Terrorism and Electoral Behavior

The literature on the effects of terrorism on electoral behavior is a new, and hence, a small one. Arian and Olzaeker (1999) examine the relationships between public

opinion and policy during the Gulf War crisis in Israel using data from two surveys that were conducted in 1990 and 1991, respectively. They find that although the relationships between public opinion and policy are recursive in normal times, in crisis situations, the influence of policy on public opinion is greater than the influence of public opinion on policy.

Hetherington and Nelson (2003) analyze, within the American context, the causes and consequences of the “rally-round-the-flag” effect that they define as the “sudden and substantial increase in public approval of the president that occurs in response to certain kinds of dramatic international events involving the United States.” They argue that the patriotism school, which holds that in time of crisis Americans turn to the president as a living symbol of unity, is better at explaining the causes of the rally effect and that the opinion leadership school, which holds that in time of crisis opposition leaders stop criticizing the president is better at explaining the duration of rally effects.

Berrebi and Klor (2006) develop a game theoretical model to study the equilibrium electoral behavior of a society targeted by terrorist attacks. Their model generates two empirical predictions about the effects of terrorism on electoral outcomes. First, assuming that right-wing parties are less concessionary compared to the left-wing parties, the relative support for the right-wing party is expected to increase after periods with high levels of terrorism and to decrease after periods of relative calm. Second, the expected level of terrorism is higher when the left-wing party is in office. The authors then test these hypotheses using a data set on terrorist attacks in Israel between 1990 and 2003 and data from public opinion polls.

In a follow-up article, Berrebi and Klor (2008), estimate the effects of civil terror fatalities on the electoral choice of Israeli voters. Their work is a first in its attempt to derive results about the effects of terrorism on vote choice, based on actual voting behavior rather than personal declarations about party preferences. Their results demonstrate that local terror fatalities significantly increase the relative vote share of right-wing parties in all the localities in Israel. In other words, terrorist attacks have significant effects on Israeli voters’ preferences but interestingly voters turn to parties that are more intransigent toward terrorism rather than pushing for concessions. They also argue that terrorism polarizes the Israeli electorate based on their finding that in left-leaning localities, terror fatalities that take place in other localities increase the vote share of left-wing parties.

Bali (2007) analyzes the effects of Madrid train station bombings by Islamist terrorists on the turnout and the electoral choices of the Spanish voters in the 2004 general elections using survey data before and after the elections. Her results demonstrate the significant effect the attacks had on both the turnout and voting decisions of Spaniards and explain the unexpected electoral upset the ruling party suffered from.

Gassabner, Jong-A-Pin, and Mierau (2008) examine the relationship between terrorism and electoral accountability using a panel data set containing more than 800 elections from 115 countries over the 1968-2002 period. They find that terror

has a robust positive effect on the probability that the incumbent government is replaced and the magnitude of the effect increases with the severity of the terrorist attack.

In this article, I focus on the results of the 1991 and 1995 Turkish general elections and, using data on military and police force terror casualties, I investigate whether terrorism has had any effect on the electoral choices of the Turkish voters. In line with the conclusions of Gassabner, Jong-A-Pin, and Mierau (2008) and Bali (2007), my results demonstrate that security force terror casualties significantly damage the political standing of the incumbent party in the eyes of the electorate. Moreover, the results allow me to draw a parallel between the findings of Berrebi and Klor (2008) and my own findings and to argue that the positive relation between the relative vote share of less concessionary parties and terrorism is not limited to Israel but is also valid for Turkey. In other words, when faced with terrorist attacks, the Turkish electorate, rather than pushing for concessions, assumed a more hawkish stance toward the issue.

Electoral Behavior in Turkey

Empirical studies that explore electoral behavior in Turkey are few in number and are mostly based on survey data. In terms of theoretical background, the literature is heavily influenced by the seminal work of Mardin (1975) who argued that the center–periphery relations provide a good explanatory scheme to understand Turkish politics. According to this scheme, Turkish political system is composed of a coherent body of nationalist, laicist, etatist, educated, urban, “elite,” which constitutes the “center” and a “periphery” constituted by the more traditional, more conservative, more religious, more rural and, in a sense, “antietatist” populations. The center–periphery divide in the Turkish politics nicely coincides with the left–right divide. The right–wing parties have always been supporters of peripheral values such as free market economy, religious conservatism, family values, religious education, and so on, whereas left–wing parties have appealed to the laicist, etatist values of the center.

Using the results of a 1990 survey study that was conducted as part of the World Values Survey, Kalaycıoğlu (1994) examines the factors that mold party preferences of Turkish voters and concludes that the center–periphery framework retains its validity as a major determinant of electoral behavior in Turkey. He measures the center–periphery cleavage in terms of respondents’ level of religiosity. Using the results of the same survey, Esmer (1995) examines the differences and similarities among the supporters of major political parties in terms of values and attitudes. He emphasizes the role of the level of religiosity and left–right ideology in determining party choice. In a later study based on a postelection survey conducted right after the 1999 general election, Esmer (2002) analyzes the factors that affect voter preferences, and concludes that the most important predictor of voter behavior in Turkey is the left–right ideology, and that religious values prove much more important than indicators of economic well-being. Çarkoğlu and Hinich (2006), based on the results

of a 2001 survey, conclude that two dimensions dominate the ideological competition in the Turkish party system: the relatively more dominant secularist versus pro-Islamist cleavage that largely overlaps with the center versus periphery formations in Turkish politics and the ethnic-based nationalist cleavage contrasting the Turkish and Kurdish identities. Çarkoğlu (1997) also has an aggregate-level study in which he investigates the macroeconomic determinants of electoral support for incumbents in Turkey at the national level using the results of parliamentary and municipality elections. He concludes that while party attachments and loyalties are hard to break, Turkish governments, nevertheless, are rewarded or punished electorally for their economic performance. He measures economic performance by per capita gross national product (GNP) growth rate, inflation, and unemployment levels. Akarca and Tansel (2006) study the results at the national level of twenty-five elections for parliament and local administrations between 1950 and 2004. Their results also point to ideological attachments as the most significant determinant of vote choice but they also indicate that Turkish voters take government's economic performance into account even though they do not look back beyond one year. Their measure of economic performance is the growth rate of the per capita real gross domestic product (GDP) during the one-year period preceding the election and the inflation rate in the same period. In a 2007 article, Akarca and Tansel, study the district-level results of the 1995 Turkish general election and confirm that the national-level findings in their earlier study hold at the district level as well.

Note that, none of the above-mentioned studies control for the effects of terrorism on the voting behavior of the Turkish electorate. This serious shortcoming is not due to the lack of importance or relevance of the issue but rather is due to lack of data. To be able to measure the effects of terrorism on people's electoral behavior, one needs a credible measure of terrorism based on a credible set of data which, up until now, did not exist in Turkey. Consequently, this article is a first in its attempt to empirically study the political effects of terrorism in Turkey. It is based on a unique data set that contains military and police force terror casualties at the district level and analyzes whether and how these casualties affected the results of the 1991 and 1995 Turkish general elections.

Model

I propose a multivariate linear regression model to estimate the effects of terrorism on the vote choice of the Turkish electorate:

$$V_{\{t,i\}} = \alpha + \beta C_{\{t,i\}} + \delta V_{\{t-1,i\}} + \gamma X_{\{t,i\}} + \rho E + \phi K_{\{t,i\}} + \varepsilon_{\{t,i\}},$$

where $V_{\{t,i\}}$ is the vote share of the party or group of parties on whose votes we explore the effects of terrorism at election t in the i th district; $C_{\{t,i\}}$ is the number of security force terror casualties per hundred thousand voters in district i within a certain period of time before the election t ; $V_{\{t-1,i\}}$ is the vote share of that party

or group of parties at election $t - 1$ in the i th district; $X_{\{t,i\}}$ is a vector of socioeconomic and demographic control variables at the time of election t in the i th district; E is a dummy variable that assumes the value 1 for the 1995 general election and 0 for the 1991 general election to capture any election-specific effects; and $K_{\{t,i\}}$ is the percentage of Kurdish population in district i at the time of election t . I use the number of security terror casualties as a measure of the level of PKK terrorism Turkish people have been exposed to over the years. I use the number of security force terror casualties per hundred thousand voters rather than the absolute number since the population size of the district should also be considered in measuring the effects of terrorism in the district. People living in small districts have much more closer relations and are much more aware of the happenings in their district. A funeral cortege of thousands of people marching through the main street is much more effective in a district with only a couple hundred thousand residents and a single main street than in a district like Istanbul with millions of residents and hundreds of neighborhoods each with numerous main streets of its own.

The analyses consist of two parts: In the first part, I estimate the effects of terrorism on the government's vote share. In other words, I estimate the parameters in the following equation:

$$G_{\{t,i\}} = \alpha + \beta C_{\{t,i\}} + \delta G_{\{t-1,i\}} + \gamma X_{\{t,i\}} + \rho E + \phi K_{\{t,i\}} + \varepsilon_{\{t,i\}},$$

where $G_{\{t,i\}}$ corresponds to the vote share in percentage points that the party or group of parties in government received at election t in district i and $G_{\{t-1,i\}}$ corresponds to the vote share this party/these parties received in the previous election in the same district. In this regression, based on the expectation that the voters will interpret each casualty as a sign of the government's failure in dealing with, and suppressing terrorism, and will punish the government for their losses, I expect the vote share of the government to fall as the number of security force terror casualties per hundred thousand voters increases. In other words, I expect β to be negative.

In the second part, I estimate the effects of terrorism on the vote share of right-wing parties in Turkey. In other words, I estimate the parameters in the following equation:

$$R_{\{t,i\}} = \alpha + \beta C_{\{t,i\}} + \delta R_{\{t-1,i\}} + \gamma X_{\{t,i\}} + \rho E + \phi K_{\{t,i\}} + \varepsilon_{\{t,i\}},$$

where $R_{\{t,i\}}$ corresponds to the vote share in percentage points that the right-wing parties received at election t in district i and $R_{\{t-1,i\}}$ corresponds to the vote share these parties received in the previous election in the same district. Based on the less concessionary attitudes of the right-wing parties in the 1991 and 1995 general elections compared to their left-wing counterparts, and the theoretical and empirical results by Berrebi and Klor (Berrebi and Klor 2006, 2008), I expect the vote share of the right-wing parties to increase with the number of security force terror casualties per hundred thousand voters. In other words, I expect β to be positive.

Given that Turkey had right-wing parties as part of the government in both the 1987-1991 and 1991-1995 periods, in this second part, I will also examine the effects of terrorism on the vote share of the opposition right-wing parties to be able to see how terrorism effects the vote share of the right-wing parties who are not weighed down by incumbency effects. Once again, based on the less concessionary attitudes of right-wing parties, and given that these parties were in opposition, I expect to find a positive β .

I estimate my model of vote choice using ordinary least squares (OLS) with clustered standard errors at the district level. I cluster standard errors at the district level to account for the possibility of intradistrict correlation of errors.

One concern in estimating the effects of terrorism on vote choice might be that there may be a dynamic interaction between terrorism and vote choice. In other words, while terrorist attacks may influence voting behavior in targeted societies, terrorists may also stage attacks in response to electoral choices. In such a case, estimates of effects of terrorism on vote choice will be biased. Note that the situation in Turkey and my research design does not warrant such a concern. As I have already mentioned, PKK terrorism has been almost completely concentrated in southeastern Turkey. That is, the PKK has not staged attacks selectively based on vote choice profiles of districts. Moreover, I use the number of security force terror casualties from a district as a measure of the level of terrorism that the residents of that district have been exposed to. Since there is no way PKK terrorists can know which district a soldier or a police officer comes from, there is no way they can selectively attack the security force personnel from the districts whose residents they want to punish in response to their electoral choices.

Data

Data on Security Force Terror Casualties

I assembled a unique data set on Turkish military and police force terror casualties to empirically test my hypotheses about the political effects of terrorism in Turkey. The data set is at the district level and contains the date and the place of burial for each security force terror casualty since the beginning of armed attacks by the PKK in August 1984. A detailed account of the data collection process and explanations of the resources I referred to are provided in the online appendix available at <http://jcr.sagepub.com>.

The data set contains information on a total of 6,538 soldiers and police officers from 81 districts, all of whom died in the fight against the PKK between August 1984 and September 2009. The period in-between the 1987 and 1995 general elections, which is the period I will be focusing on in my analyses, harbors 3,910 of them from 79 districts.

One difficulty I had to deal with is that the number of districts in Turkey has actually changed over time. In 1987, there were sixty-seven districts. Then some towns




Figure 1. Security force terror casualties per 100,000 voters between the 1987 and 1991 general elections.

acquired district status. At the time of the 1995 general election, the number of districts was at seventy-nine. But since five of these new districts acquired their status after the 1991 election,¹¹ only seventy-four of these districts are of interest to us.

Of these seventy-four districts, I leave out thirteen southeastern districts. These are districts where almost all PKK attacks took place. As a result of the heavy and incessant terrorist activities and attacks, these districts were put under martial law in 1987 and remained so all through the nineties. I have several reasons to exclude these districts. First of all, the number of military and police force terror casualties is not a very good measure of the cost of terrorism the residents of these districts had to suffer. These districts have been the targets of PKK attacks, and thus, suffered heavy civilian casualties. Any reliable measure of exposure to terrorism in these districts should include those civilian casualties as well as the material costs suffered by the locals when their villages and livelihoods were destroyed and they were forced to migrate. Unfortunately, no data is available on civil casualties or destroyed villages. Due to lack of data, I believe conducting a meaningful and credible aggregate-level empirical study of the effects of terrorism on any aspect of the lives of the residents of these districts would be extremely difficult if not impossible. In addition, martial law brought many restrictions on the daily lives of the residents of these districts and the freedoms they should have normally enjoyed. Thus, their vote choices were made in a completely different environment and were driven by a completely different set of circumstances, grievances, and demands. The martial law is hence another important reason why these districts should be treated differently.

Table A1 in the online appendix (available at <http://jcr.sagepub.com>) displays the list of the sixty-one districts that are included and the total number of security force terror casualties from these districts in-between the 1987 and 1995 general elections. Figures 1 and 2 provide visual representations of the distribution of casualties per




Figure 2. Security force terror casualties per 100,000 voters between the 1991 and 1995 general elections.

hundred thousand voters at the district level in-between the 1987 and 1991, and in-between the 1991 and 1995 general elections respectively.⁶

Data on Political Parties and Elections

My data set also contains percentage of votes parties received in the parliamentary elections of November 29, 1987; October 20, 1991; and December 24, 1995, at the district level. The electoral data are obtained from the Turkish Institute of Statistics. Turkey had six general elections since the start of armed attacks by the PKK in 1984 but I analyze the results of the 1991 and 1995 general elections only. I leave out the 1987 election since most parties and political leaders were banned from politics in the 1983 election rendering it impossible to use the 1987 election results for the lack of results from the previous election.¹³ I leave out the 1999 election since the 1995-1999 period was politically very chaotic. Five different coalition governments were formed during the period, none of them long lived, and one of them actually ousted by a “postmodern” military intervention. Thus, it is not even possible to identify who the government was during the period. Moreover, the party that received the highest percentage of votes in the 1995 election could not enter the 1999 election since it was closed down by the Constitutional Court in 1998 and its leader and important figures were banned from politics for five years. In addition, as I have mentioned before, it was right before the 1999 general election that Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, was arrested and brought to Turkey. This event actually was extremely effective on the election results. The Democratic Left Party, who was in charge when Öcalan was arrested, increased its vote share by 52 percent and formed the new government. In that sense, terrorism has been the utmost important determinant of the 1999 election results. The 2002 election is also excluded first

Table 1. Political Parties that Entered the 1987, 1991, and 1995 General Elections and the Percentage Votes They Received

	1987	1991	1995
ANAP (center-right)	36.3	24	19.6
DSP (center-left)	8.5	10.8	14.6
DYP (center-right)	19.1	27	19.2
HADEP (extreme-left)	—	—	4.2
MÇP/MHP (extreme-right)	2.9	—	8.2
RP (extreme-right)	7.2	16.9	21.4
SHP/CHP (center-left)	24.8	20.8	10.7

because some parties and politicians were still banned from politics and second because it was right after the worst economic crisis Turkey had experienced. The election resulted in the landslide victory of a newly found conservative party and the political demise of the existing ones. Çarkoğlu and Hinich argue that the economic situation and the frustration with the existing parties were the major determinants in the vote choice of the Turkish electorate in 2002 (Çarkoğlu and Hinich 2006). Finally, I leave out the 2007 general election for lack of district-level socioeconomic data.

Table 1 below displays the political parties that entered the 1987, 1991, and 1995 elections, the percentage of votes they received, and their general placement on the left-right continuum.¹⁴

The classification of parties on the left-right axis follows closely the widely used classification in Turkish electoral studies (Kalaycıoğlu 1994; Esmer 2002; Başlevent et al. 2005; Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2007; Sayarı 2007). Accordingly, the left bloc includes DSP, SHP/CHP, and HADEP, whereas the right bloc includes ANAP, DYP, RP, and MÇP/MHP.⁷

Among these parties, MÇP/MHP (MHP is the continuation of MÇP) has had the most uncompromising position toward the Kurdish issue. The party has always supported a military solution to the problem and accused those who advocated political concessions with attempting to disintegrate the country. The leader of the party even threatened to spill blood to prevent any kind of political concession (Gunter 1997; Kirişçi and Winrow 1997; Beriker 1997).

DYP was also dominated by hard-liners and shared MHP's belief in military solutions (Gunter 1997; Kirişçi and Winrow 1997; Beriker 1997).

ANAP, a center-right party founded by the late Turgut Özal, had at first a more liberal approach toward the issue. However, with Turgut Özal's departure from leadership in 1989, the party started to oscillate between hard-liners and liberals, and when Özal died in 1993, it shifted for good to a line similar to DYPs (Gunter 1997; Kirişçi and Winrow 1997; Beriker 1997).

The religiously oriented RP's stance was quite interesting though not very different from the other right-wing parties in terms of political concessions. The party leadership argued that Kurds and Turks were all brothers under the greater umbrella

of Islam and believed that appeals to Islamic brotherhood would solve the problem and that political concessions that bring up ethnicity to the forefront would be playing into the hands of Western imperialistic plots to divide up the nation of Islam (Gunter 1997; Kirişçi and Winrow 1997; Beriker 1997). Actually, RP and MHP shared many aspects in their ideologies, so much so that, MHP members entered the 1991 election through RP lists.

All in all, the right in Turkey in the 1991 and 1995 elections was not in favor of political concessions.

The left-wing parties on the other hand were more supportive of political solutions compared to their right-wing counterparts. SHP members have always been advocates of political solutions, some even talked about the need to discuss the idea of a federation for the Southeast.⁸ Moreover, in the 1991 election, SHP enabled twenty-two members of the People's Labor Party (HEP), a political party that was formed to be the legal political organization of the Kurdish movement in Turkey to enter the parliament by including them in the SHP lists. This turned out to be a costly decision for SHP and the costs started to surface on the first day of the new parliament when one of the HEP members attempted to take her oath in Kurdish and another prefaced his oath by declaring that he said it under duress. Later on HEP was closed down by the Constitutional Court, and six MPs from HEP were arrested. The opposition parties and the media accused SHP and its leader İnönü of "carrying the terrorists into the Turkish parliament." SHP was also the first political party in Turkey to issue a detailed report on the Kurdish question that included a number of major reform proposals. In 1995, SHP resolved itself into CHP, which, back then, held a similar position on the Kurdish problem.

The other center-left party, DSP, on the other hand, emphasized the economic side of the issue. The party leadership fully believed that the problem was economic, and thus, should be solved by economic means. It was the underdevelopment of the region that made it vulnerable to separatist attempts. Their proposed solution was to demolish the feudal structure in the southeast through public investment and land reform (Beriker 1997).

Finally, HADEP was a pro-Kurdish political party. Not surprisingly, the party has been the most ardent supporter of political concessions.¹⁷

Data on Socioeconomic Indicators

The data set also includes socioeconomic variables at the district level. One of the stylized facts of the economic voting literature is that voting reacts to a few macro-economic variables, mainly unemployment and inflation (Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000). Unfortunately, there is no district-level inflation data available. Accordingly, I use the rate of unemployment, which is the number of unemployed per hundred persons in labor force, at the district level, and I also include the change in the GDP per capita in U.S. dollars in the year preceding the election.

The second socioeconomic indicator I include is the “infant mortality rate,” which is the mortality rate in one thousand infants less than a year old, as a measure of socioeconomic development in a district. Infant mortality rate is generally accepted to be a good measure of the level of public health services, education, and economic welfare in a district (Dinçer, Özaslan, and Satılmış 1996; Dinçer, Özaslan, and Kavasoğlu 2003).

In estimating the effects of terrorism on the vote share of right-wing parties, I also include the average household size in each district as a proxy to capture the center-periphery distinction in the Turkish society. The center-periphery divide in the Turkish politics nicely coincides with the left-right divide. The right-wing parties have always been supporters of peripheral values such as free market economy, religious conservatism, family values, religious education, and so on, whereas left-wing parties have always appealed to the laicist, statist values of the center (Kalaycıoğlu 1994). Household size is negatively correlated with the level of urbanization, level of education, and positively correlated with the level of religious conservatism. Thus, I argue that it can be used to capture the center-periphery dichotomy.

The set of socioeconomic controls also include net migration, which is the difference between total inward migration and total outward migration in five-year periods, in each district as a percentage of the total number of voters in the district. Due to economic disparities among districts, Turkey has been experiencing heavy migratory flows in especially the last thirty years from the Eastern, Southeastern, and Central Anatolia, and the Black Sea region to industrialized cities like Istanbul, and to the Mediterranean and Aegean coastal cities. Consequently, net migration rates provide a good indicator of economic conditions in districts. Note that, as discussed in endnote 12, migratory flows also affect the distribution of security force terror casualties across districts.

The source for the unemployment rate, infant mortality rate, household size, and net migration are the 1990 and year 2000 population censuses. Population censuses are the most important, and in many cases the only, source of district-level socioeconomic data in Turkey. They were supposed to be conducted every five years, but unfortunately the 1995 census was skipped. Thus, I use the 1990 census results at the district level to construct my unemployment rate, infant mortality rate, and household size series for the 1991 election, and the 2000 census results for the 1995 election. All series refer to the level of the variable in question at the time of the census. Even though the 2000 census results do not accurately reflect the socioeconomic conditions in 1995, they serve as a good proxy since they reflect the general socioeconomic development trend in the country and the variation in the pace of this trend across districts. The net migration numbers refer to total inward migration minus total outward migration in each district in the five-year period prior to each census. I use the net migration numbers in the 1985-1990 period as a control for the 1991 general election and the net migration numbers in the 1995-2000 period as a control for the 1995 general election. The census results are provided by the Turkish Institute of Statistics (TUIK) and are publicly available. TUIK is also the source for the

yearly GDP per capita in US dollars series at the district level, which I use as another socioeconomic control.

Finally, the data set contains estimates of the percentage of Kurdish population in each district (Mutlu 1996). These estimates are actually projections based on the results of the 1965 general census that is the last census that included questions on mother tongue. Those who reported Kurdish as their mother tongue were taken as ethnically Kurdish and the percentages were then updated using fertility rates and migration flows. Since these estimates are only available for 1990, I use the same percentages for both the 1991 and 1995 general election.

Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics for the variables included in the analyses.

Effect of Terrorism on Government’s Vote Share

I first test the hypothesis that the electorate is sensitive to terrorism and that people interpret security force terror casualties as the government’s failure to effectively deal with and suppress terrorism. If this hypothesis is supported by the evidence, we should observe a negative relation between the number of security force terror casualties from a district within a certain period before the elections and the percentage of votes the ruling party/coalition receives in that district.⁹

Table 3 displays the results. It is clear that the Turkish electorate is highly sensitive to terrorism. The number of security force terror casualties per hundred

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics

	1991	1995
District’s security force terror casualties per 100,000 voters since the previous election	2.73 (1.64)	12.91 (5.17)
District’s security force terror casualties per 100,000 voters within three years of the election	2.39 (1.58)	9.43 (3.88)
District’s security force terror casualties per 100,000 voters within two years of the election	1.80 (1.39)	6.94 (3.13)
District’s security force terror casualties per 100,000 voters within one year of the election	0.99 (1.07)	2.74 (1.51)
Unemployment rate	4.76 (1.77)	7.53 (2.67)
Infant mortality rate	66.41 (12.45)	41.48 (7.32)
Change in GDP per capita in the previous year	−2.06 (6.64)	24.51 (7.92)
Net migration as a percentage of voters	−2.29 (5.79)	−0.91 (4.01)
Household size	5.12 (0.88)	4.64 (0.84)
Percentage of Kurdish population ^a	6.41 (11.69)	6.16 (11.24)

Note: GDP = gross domestic product. Number of observations = 117. The columns report the means of the variables listed. The numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations.

^aPercentages for 1991 and 1995 differ only because some districts enter the analyses only for the 1995 election.

Table 3. Effect of Security Force Terror Casualties on the Governing Parties' Vote Share

Vote share in the previous election	0.584 (1.18)	0.580 (10.99)	0.573 (10.53)	0.589 (11.72)
District's security force terror casualties per hundred thousand voters since the previous election	-0.254 (-2.40)			
District's security force terror casualties per hundred thousand voters within three years of the election		-0.392 (-2.58)		
District's security force terror casualties per hundred thousand voters within two years of the election			-0.503 (-2.59)	
District's security force terror casualties per hundred thousand voters within one year of the election				-0.648 (-2.00)
Unemployment rate	-0.880 (-5.41)	-0.892 (-5.49)	-0.884 (-5.30)	-0.885 (-4.87)
Infant mortality rate	-0.176 (-3.10)	-0.171 (-3.09)	-0.171 (-3.16)	-0.177 (-3.10)
Change in per capita GDP in the previous year	0.077 (1.05)	0.084 (1.13)	0.087 (1.16)	0.063 (0.88)
Net migration as a percentage of voters	0.034 (0.29)	0.025 (0.22)	0.031 (0.27)	0.053 (0.49)
Election dummy	-1.948 (-0.70)	-1.684 (-0.60)	-1.965 (-0.71)	-3.077 (-0.95)
Percentage of Kurdish population	-0.001 (-0.03)	-0.005 (-0.17)	-0.010 (-0.36)	0.000 (0.01)
Number of observation	117	117	117	117
R ²	.6827	.6867	.6895	.6878

Note: GDP = gross domestic product; OLS = ordinary least squares. Each column reports the estimated coefficients of a separate OLS regression with clustered errors at the district level, in which the dependent variable is the vote share of the governing party/parties. The t-statistics are in parentheses. Governing parties in the 1987-1991 period: ANAP. Governing parties in the 1991-1995 period: DYP + SHP.

thousand voters has a significant negative effect on the percentage of votes the governing party/coalition receives. Each additional casualty per hundred thousand voters in the two years before the election costs the governing party/parties 0.5 percentage points. This is a very considerable loss considering that the average number of casualties per hundred thousand voters in the two years before the 1995 election was close to seven, which means in the 1995 election, the losses that the security forces suffered as a result of PKK terrorism cost the government on the average 3.5 percent of votes at the district level. Note that in the same equation, the estimated parameter for the effect of unemployment on the government's vote share is -0.88 . That means, in the 1995 general election, the government needed to improve unemployment by around 4 percentage points at the district level to offset the negative effects of terrorism on its vote share.

The effect is larger the shorter the lag is. Accordingly, we might expect funerals that take place closer to elections to be more effective on votes than funerals that take place long before the elections.¹⁹ Unfortunately, I am not able to directly test this argument as casualty series with different lags are highly correlated.¹⁰

The estimated coefficients of the unemployment and infant mortality rate variables are also highly significant indicating the importance Turkish voters attribute to socioeconomic factors when they are evaluating the government's performance. The negative coefficient on the unemployment rate indicates that voters blame the government for the worsening economic conditions and inflict punishment by switching to other parties. Similarly, it can be argued that an increase in the infant mortality rate indicates the worsening of socioeconomic conditions, which, as the estimated coefficient indicates, leads to a decrease in the governing party's/coalition's votes.

Effect of Terrorism on Right-Wing Parties' Vote Share

Table 4 displays the results for the second set of regressions testing the hypothesis that the vote share of right-wing parties increases with the level of terrorism voters are exposed to. As can be seen, the estimated coefficients for casualty variables are positive and highly significant. Moreover, as the lag gets shorter, the effect becomes more pronounced. It is clear that, PKK terrorism has done a great deal in winning votes for the right wing in Turkey. Each additional security force casualty per one hundred thousand voters in a district in the two years before the elections adds 0.37 percent to the vote share for the right-wing parties. This number is very high considering that the average number of casualties per one hundred thousand in a district in the two years before the 1995 election was close to 7. In other words, in the 1995 general election, the PKK attacks that took place within the two years before the election increased the vote share of the right-wing parties by around 2.5 percentage points on the average at the district level.

Given the emphasis the left-wing parties devote to social welfare, social security, and public services, it is expected that the left will gather more votes in districts that

Table 4. Effect of Security Force Terror Casualties on the Right-Wing Parties' Vote Share

Vote share in the previous election	0.889 (33.12)	0.889 (32.89)	0.887 (32.84)	0.891 (35.47)
District's security force terror casualties per hundred thousand voters since the previous election	0.239 (2.42)			
District's security force terror casualties per hundred thousand voters within three years of the election		0.359 (2.63)		
District's security force terror casualties per hundred thousand voters within two years of the election			0.374 (2.43)	
District's security force terror casualties per hundred thousand voters within one year of the election				0.504 (2.01)
Unemployment rate	-0.132 (-0.84)	-0.114 (-0.75)	-0.132 (-0.85)	-0.146 (-0.85)
Infant mortality rate	-0.049 (-1.16)	-0.051 (-1.21)	-0.050 (-1.17)	-0.051 (-1.18)
Net migration as a percentage of voters	0.165 (1.54)	0.163 (1.54)	0.157 (1.45)	0.163 (1.38)
Election dummy	-3.471 (-2.14)	-4.062 (-2.40)	-3.286 (-2.07)	-2.112 (-1.28)
Percentage of Kurdish population	-0.075 (-2.03)	-0.067 (-1.70)	-0.068 (-1.74)	-0.088 (-2.43)
Household size	2.304 (3.32)	2.167 (2.99)	2.262 (3.10)	2.589 (3.79)
Number of observation	117	117	117	117
R ²	.8372	.8388	.8360	.8324

Note: Each column reports the estimated coefficients of a separate ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with clustered errors at the district level, in which the dependent variable is the vote share of the right-wing parties. The t-statistics are in parentheses. Right-wing parties in the 1987-1991 period: ANAP, DYP, and RP (MHP entered through RP lists). Right-wing parties in the 1991-1995 period: ANAP, DYP, RP, and MHP.

lack behind in social and economic development. I would expect, thus, the coefficients on infant mortality rate and unemployment to be negative. As expected, the estimated coefficients are negative, but they are not statistically significant. Household size, on the other hand, is highly significant both statistically and in magnitude, validating once again the usage of the center-periphery framework in the analysis of Turkish politics. The estimated coefficient demonstrates the support right-wing parties get from the more conservative, more rural, less educated voters that make up the “periphery.”

The percentage of Kurdish population has a significant negative effect on the vote share of right-wing parties. The magnitude of the effect is small since the Kurdish populations make up small percentages of voters in most of the districts included in the analysis. The effect might be negative because ethnically Kurdish citizens are not supporting the nonconcessionary attitudes of the right-wing parties toward the Kurdish issue in general or because ethnically Kurdish citizens are more likely to vote for the extreme-leftist, pro-Kurdish political parties.

Election dummy is highly significant indicating the presence of election-specific factors. One such factor might be the difference in the composition of the left and the right wing in the 1991 and 1995 elections. As I mentioned before, MHP did not enter the 1991 election as a separate party. The party formed an alliance with RP as a result of which MHP members were listed under RP lists. Whereas in the 1995 general election, MHP contested as a separate political party. Similarly, CHP, which is the oldest party in Turkish democratic history, and which was closed down after the military coup in 1980, returned to the political arena before the 1995 election.

One important thing to note is that Turkey had a right-wing party in the government both in the 1987-1991 period and in the 1991-1995 period. In the 1987-1991 period, ANAP was in charge as a single-party government, whereas in the 1991-1995 period, the right-left coalition of DYP and SHP formed the government. The results so far indicate that terrorism leads to a decline in the vote share of the incumbent while increasing the vote share of the right-wing parties. Then, it must be that terrorism has even a higher positive effect on the vote share of the right-wing parties in opposition. Table 5 displays the results of the regression in which the dependent variable is the vote share of opposition right-wing parties at the district level in the 1991 and 1995 general elections.

As expected, the number of security force terror casualties per hundred thousand voters has a larger²¹ positive effect on the vote share of the opposition right-wing parties. Each additional casualty per hundred thousand voters in the two years before the elections adds, on the average, close to 0.65 percentage points to the vote share of opposition right-wing parties. This is a very significant amount considering that on the average each district gave seven security force casualties to terrorism per hundred thousand voters within the two years before the 1995 general election. In other words, in the 1995 election, terrorism added on the average close to 4.5 percentage points at the district level to the vote share of the right-wing parties that were in the opposition.

Table 5. Effect of Security Force Terror Casualties on the Opposition Right-Wing Parties' Vote Share

Vote share in the previous election	0.940 (13.57)	0.939 (13.68)	0.937 (13.43)	0.949 (13.26)
District's security force terror casualties per hundred thousand voters since the previous election	0.376 (2.24)			
District's security force terror casualties per hundred thousand voters within three years of the election		0.610 (2.50)		
District's security force terror casualties per hundred thousand voters within two years of the election			0.648 (2.22)	
District's security force terror casualties per hundred thousand voters within one year of the election				0.628 (1.51)
Unemployment rate	0.456 (1.78)	0.496 (1.95)	0.466 (1.77)	0.415 (1.45)
Infant mortality rate	0.074 (1.05)	0.070 (0.98)	0.071 (1.02)	0.073 (1.02)
Change in per capita GDP in the previous year	-0.171 (-1.29)	-0.185 (-1.37)	-0.174 (-1.28)	-0.135 (-0.99)
Net migration as a percentage of voters	0.095 (0.88)	0.091 (0.85)	0.081 (0.74)	0.095 (0.84)
Election dummy	-2.843 (-0.82)	-3.371 (-0.97)	-2.402 (-0.73)	-0.940 (-0.29)
Percentage of Kurdish population	-0.077 (-0.97)	-0.060 (-0.74)	-0.061 (-0.77)	-0.100 (-1.34)
Household size	0.895 (0.63)	0.601 (0.43)	0.733 (0.52)	1.382 (0.96)
Number of observation	117	117	117	117
R ²	.8058	.8101	.8065	.7977

Note: GDP = gross domestic product; OLS = ordinary least squares. Each column reports the estimated coefficients of a separate OLS regression with clustered errors at the district level, in which the dependent variable is the vote share of the opposition right-wing parties. The t-statistics are in parentheses. Opposition right-wing parties in the 1987-1991 period: DYP and RP (MHP entered through RP lists). Opposition right-wing parties in the 1991-1995 period: ANAP, RP, and MHP.

Robustness Tests

Section A.2 in the online appendix (available at <http://jcr.sagepub.com>) presents the results of robustness tests performed to the main results in Tables 3-5. To test the robustness of the main results, I enlarge the time scope of my analyses to include 1987 general election as well and I run a fixed effect model that includes district dummies to capture any district-specific effects my original specifications may have left out. The data for socioeconomic controls, namely, unemployment rate, infant mortality rate, household size, and net migration are from the 1985 population census results. Tables A2-A5 in the appendix present the results and clearly demonstrate the robustness of the main results about the effects of terrorism on the vote choices of the Turkish electorate. As can be seen in these tables, the electoral impact of the security force terror casualties does not change qualitatively in response to the changes I have made in the model and time period specifications.

Conclusion

Turkey has been suffering from an ethnic separatist terrorist campaign led by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) for the last twenty-five years. Terrorism has cost the country dearly in many respects and has been declared the most important problem facing the country both by politicians and by the public on several occasions. A lot has been written on the history of the conflict, on the broader "Kurdish question" the PKK is argued to have stemmed from, and on the remedies that would solve the conflict. It is actually possible to group the proposed remedies under two headings: military solutions and political solutions. Those who advocate military solutions argue that the problem is solely a terror problem that originates from separatist aspirations and that political concessions would lead to the disintegration of the country. Those who advocate political solutions on the other hand, argue that political concessions in terms of broader political and cultural rights for the Kurdish population would drown the PKK by strengthening the loyalty of the Kurdish population to the state. Some scholars argue that terrorist organizations aim for governments to adopt harsh responses that would arouse sympathy in the public toward the organization and its cause (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2006). Whether the PKK aims by its terrorist attacks to get the government to give a harsh military response that would alienate the Kurdish population, and would attract domestic and international sympathy for the organization, or it aims to get the government to grant political concessions in terms of enlarged political and cultural freedoms to the Kurdish population, is a difficult question. If we take the declarations of the terrorist organization at face value, it seems they aim the latter. The critical question is then, whether terrorism proved to be an effective tool of coercion. The results in this article demonstrate that terrorism created just the opposite effect and led the Turkish people to vote for hard-liners. I analyze the effects of military and police force terror casualties on the electoral outcomes in Turkey in the 1991 and 1995 general

elections and demonstrate that the effects correspond to an increase in the vote share of the right-wing parties, who, within the time period analyzed, were less concessionist compared to their left-wing counterparts. These results indicate that the PKK was ineffective in reaching its declared goals since the damages it inflicted on the Turkish people only caused them to vote for parties with more intransigent positions on the issue. It is also conceivable that terrorist organizations may have numerous goals that may lead them to face trade-offs among their goals and pursue strategies that may undermine some of these goals while help reach others (Kydd and Walter 2006). Still if one takes the declared objectives of the PKK at face value, the results here point to the ineffectiveness of terrorism as a way to coerce people to pressure their governments for concessions. Moreover, the analyses provide strong empirical support for the hypotheses that the electorate is highly sensitive to terrorism and that they blame the government for their losses.

My results support the conclusions Berrebi and Klor (2008) derive from analyzing the effects of terror fatalities on election results in Israel and hence demonstrate that their findings about the positive relation between the relative vote share of nonconcessionist right-wing parties and terrorism is not just limited to Israel but is also valid for Turkey.

This article is a first in many ways. It is the first attempt at measuring the political effects of terrorism in Turkey. This is a significant contribution considering that PKK terrorism has been declared as one of the most important problems facing the country, both by the politicians and the public over the last twenty-five years. The analyses use a unique data set, assembled for this project, that includes military and police force terror casualties at the district level, a variable that provides a good measure of the level of terrorism Turkish people have been exposed to over the years. In addition, the article contributes to the literature on the determinants of voting behavior in Turkey.

There is clearly more work to be done in this area. The relation between terrorism and political party ideologies is an interesting issue that remains to be investigated. Similarly, the effects of PKK terrorism on Turkey's foreign relations have not been explored. Such areas have so far remained unexplored due, in part, to lack of a good measure of terrorism. The data set I have assembled for my analyses provides one such measure and opens the way to further empirical studies.

Finally, my results may provide useful insights into analyzing the recent turn of events in Turkey. Most commentators tie the timing of the latest democratic opening initiative that I have mentioned in the introduction to Turkey's EU candidacy. The results in this article point to another factor also. As I have mentioned before, PKK attacks dwindled in the early 2000s with the capture of its leader in 1999. Based on the results here, one can argue that the current government hugely benefited from the period of peace that preceded the 2007 elections.²² But recently, the PKK has given out signs of a new wave of armed attacks. My results indicate that if things turn back to the way they were in the 90s, the government will lose a substantial share of votes in the coming elections, and voters will turn to hard-liners. Thus, this new initiative

might be an attempt to preempt such a scenario and pass the reform package before people change their minds about the way to solve the problem.

Notes

1. For an excellent review of the literature on the political economy of terrorism, see Bueno de Mesquita (2008). Enders and Sandler (1995) provides a review of the earlier literature.
2. For a general survey of the literature on the economic effects of terrorism, see Frey and Luechinger (2005) and Frey, Luechinger, and Stutzer (2007).
3. The PKK is recognized as a terrorist organization by the State Department of the USA, the European Council, the United Nations, and the NATO. Although the organization changed its name to KADEK in 2002, and to Kongra-Gel in late 2003, it is still widely referred to as the PKK.
4. The current prime minister recently gave 300 billion U.S. dollars as a ballpoint estimate for the incurred financial costs of the fight against PKK terrorism.
5. In various surveys conducted in the last decade, terror was ranked the most important problem of the country by large percentages of respondents (Esmer 1999; Çarkoğlu and Toprak 2000; TUSES 2002; Çarkoğlu and Toprak 2006; Kalaycıoğlu 2009; Eurobarometer Autumn 2004 and onward). For example, in a 1993 survey conducted by the Turkish Foundation for Social and Economic Research (TUSES), 45 percent of the respondents ranked terrorism as the most important problem of the country making it the most highest ranked problem. In a 1996 survey conducted by the same institution, 17 percent ranked terrorism as the most important problem making it the second highest ranked problem.
6. In November 1991, the then-prime minister Süleyman Demirel described the “Kurdish situation” as Turkey’s top problem. In 1993, the then-president Turgut Özal, described the situation as “perhaps the most significant problem in the republic’s history” (Gunter 1997).
7. Home district means both place of birth and place of residence.
8. Police officers are subject to a rotating appointment system in which they are required to relocate every two to four years. Those who served in the west in their previous term are usually appointed to the east and vice versa.
9. The usage of the word “martyr” in the article is solely because it is how these security force casualties are referred to by the public and by the state in Turkey. It does not carry any political or religious connotation on the author’s part.
10. Extreme right-wing parties have often been blamed by other parties for manipulating the funeral ceremonies and the nationalistic demonstrations during these ceremonies to their own political advantage.
11. Ardahan and Iğdır, former towns of Kars district, became districts themselves in late 1992; Yalova, Kilis, and Karabük became districts in June 1995.
12. Note that I define a district’s casualties as those whose funerals were held in that district. In other words, these figures actually depict the distribution of “martyr funerals” across districts. This point is very important in understanding the variation across districts in figures 1 and 2. Usually families prefer to bury their sons in their hometowns. And

because of the heavy migration Turkey has been experiencing in especially the last thirty years from the Eastern, Southeastern, and Central Anatolia, and the Black Sea region to industrialized cities like Istanbul, and to the Mediterranean and Aegean coastal cities, this hometown is in many cases different from their place of residence. In other words, a casualty who joined the army from Istanbul can be buried in Istanbul, but he can also be buried next to his grand parents back home that is probably somewhere in Central or Eastern Anatolia considering that most districts in these regions have very high outward migration rates. Consequently, the districts with high outward migration experience more martyr funerals then their actual population size indicates because some of their natives who had formerly migrated to other districts bring back their dead to be buried in their hometown. This pattern is clearly visible on the figures. Those red Central Anatolian districts in figures 1 and 2 are among the top ten districts in terms of outward migration.

13. Turkey had a military coup in 1980. Political parties were closed and political leaders of these parties were banned from politics and/or imprisoned.
14. The table contains the parties that received more than 1 percent of the votes.
15. Note that right-wing includes center-right parties and left-wing includes center-left parties as well.
16. Murat Karayalçın of the SHP was the Deputy Prime Minister in December 1994 when he advocated the need to discuss the federation alternative (Kirişçi and Winrow 1997).
17. For a detailed discussion of the stance of Turkish political parties on the Kurdish issue, see Kirişçi and Winrow (1997) and Barkey and Fuller (1998).
18. Note that the distribution of casualties across time is based on the dates of funeral ceremonies and the lags are applied in exact detail. To give an example, a district's security force terror casualties within three years of the December 24, 1995 general election includes those casualties whose funerals were held in that district within the December 24, 1992 to December 24, 1995 period.
19. Note that this might simply be the result of scale effects.
20. Note that these series include two observations from each district; one corresponding to the period before the 1991 general election and one corresponding to the period before the 1995 general election. Because terrorists' attacks peaked in the 91-period, for each district the second observation is much higher than the first one. The correlation among the series with different time lags comes mostly from this fact that all series alternate between high and low observations simultaneously.
21. Actually, direct comparison of estimated parameters require the two models to have the same set of controls. Note that the set of control variables for the regressions on government vote share, right-wing vote share, and opposition right-wing vote share differ slightly for theoretical reasons. To allow direct comparability, I reran the regressions on the government's vote share with the inclusion of the household size variable and the regressions on the vote share of the right-wing parties with the inclusion of the change in GDP per capita variable (which means using the same set of controls in all three sets of regressions) and reported the results in tables A5 and A6 in the online appendix (available at <http://jcr.sagepub.com>). As these tables demonstrate, the results do not change in any

significant manner and the estimated parameters for the additional variables are completely insignificant as expected.

22. Currently, Turkey has a one-party government. The ruling party AKP has been in power for two consecutive terms.

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