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### Problem

The National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) matches medical students with residency programs. Here is what the NRMP says on their website:

The NRMP conducts its Matches using a mathematical algorithm that pairs the rank ordered preferences of applicants and program directors to produce a best fit for filling available training positions. Research on the NRMP algorithm was a basis for Dr. Alvin Roths receipt of the 2012 Nobel Prize in Economics.

In this matching problem, there are  $n$  students and  $m$  hospitals. Each hospital  $h_i$  has  $p_i$  available positions. Each student ranks the  $m$  hospitals and each hospital ranks the  $n$  students. Since there are more students than total positions available, we assume that  $n > \sum_{i=1}^m p_i$ . Thus, some students are never matched. As a result, we need a slightly expanded version of stability. As before, the matching is unstable if

- $s$  is assigned to  $h$  and  $s'$  is assigned to  $h'$  but  $s$  prefers  $h'$  to  $h$  and  $h'$  prefers  $s$  to  $s'$ .

But it is also unstable if

- $s$  is assigned to  $h$  and  $s'$  is not assigned to a hospital but  $h$  prefers  $s'$  to  $s$ .

Give an algorithm to find a stable matching of students to hospitals where every hospital position is filled with a student. Show that your algorithm is correct and that it runs in time polynomial in  $n$  and  $m$ . Your algorithm description and analysis should be clear and concise.

### Solution

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#### Algorithm 1 Stable matching

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**Require:** set of lists of every student's preference and another set of lists of every hospital's preference.

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1: initialize each student and hospital to be free
2: while some student is free and hasn't "proposed" to every hospital do
3:    $s \leftarrow$  such student
4:    $h_i \leftarrow$  1st hospital on  $s$ 's list to whom  $s$  has not yet proposed
5:   if  $h_i$  still has available positions then
6:     match  $s$  to  $h_i$ 
7:   else if  $h_i$  prefers  $s$  to another student already matched in the hospital then
8:     swap least preferable student with  $s$ 
9:   else
10:     $h_i$  rejects  $s$ 
11:   end if
12: end while
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Space:  $n$  lists of length  $n$ ,  $m$  lists of length  $m$ ,  $m$  heaps of size  $p_i$ :  $O(n^2 + m^2 + mp_i)$

Time: The selection of students, a hospital's ranking of a given student and vice versa, are almost identical to the P-R algorithm which we discussed were all constant time operations. Heaps allow us to check the least preferred student currently in a hospital in constant time. Swapping students takes  $O(\log(n))$  time as the new student added needs to percolate down to their spot in the heap based on the hospital's preference.

Overall Running Time:

- Preprocessing:  $O(n^2)$  for lists +  $O(n)$  for queue of students.
- Loop:  $O(n^2) * O(1) * O(\log(n))$

Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that the algorithm proposed above does not produce a stable matching. Then, the final matching has an instability  $\{s, h\}$ . That is,  $s$  is matched to  $h'$  but  $s$  prefers  $h$  over  $h'$ . Also,  $h$  is matched to  $s'$  but  $h$  prefers  $s$  over  $s'$ . According to the algorithm,  $s$  proposed to  $h$  before proposing to  $h'$ . Therefore,  $h$  either removed  $s$  from its heap, or  $s$  did not rank high enough to get in the heap. However, hospitals always choose the most preferred candidate, so  $h$  prefers  $s'$  over  $s$ . This contradicts the instability defined above, so our algorithm produces a stable matching.