# **CS5322 Database Security**

#### **Last Lecture**

- Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
- Example:
  - Bob:
    - GRANT select, insert ON Employee TO Ann WITH GRANT OPTION
    - REVOKE select ON Employee FROM Ann
- Recursive revocation
- Non-cascading revocation
- DAC with views

## **Coming Next**

- Fine-Grained Access Control
- Oracle Virtual Private Database

#### **Fine-Grained Access**

- Sappose that we have the following table that stores CS5322 grades
  - Grades (<u>student</u>, grade)
- We want to
  - Allow each student to check her own grade but not those of others'
  - Allow each lecturer to check all grades
- If we are to implement such fine-grained access control using standard SQL, we have to use views
  - Create one view for each student about her grade
- Problem: way too many views to manage

## Possible Solution 1: Let the applications handle it

#### Idea:

- Do not create views for students
- Instead, let the applications (e.g., a grade viewing service) check user identities and issue queries like SELECT \* FROM Grades WHERE student = `Bob'

#### Problem:


- Application code can see everything on Grades
  - If the application is hijacked, the whole table can be compromised
- Sometimes it could be better to have access controls inside the database instead of relying on the applications

## Possible Solution 2: Parameterized Views

- Conventional views:
  - CREATE VIEW BobGrades AS SELECT \* FROM Grades WHERE student = `Bob'
- Parameterized views:
  - CREATE VIEW StudentGrades AS
     SELECT \* FROM Grades WHERE student = \$username
  - Here \$username is a variable that is given at runtime
- Problem:
  - Applications need different queries for students and lecturers
    - For students, need to query StudentGrades
    - For lecturers, need to query Grades instead
- It could be more convenient to have an authorizationtransparent method that avoids this

## Possible Solution 3: View Replacement


- Idea: Instead of creating views for users, modify users' queries "behind the scene" to exercise access control
- Bob's query:
  - SELECT \* FROM Grades
- The database system modifies the query into:
  - SELECT \* FROM Grades WHERE student = 'Bob'
- This modification is transparent to the users
- This approach is used in Oracle's Virtual Private Database (VPD)



- VPD attaches a policy to the Grades table
- Predicates in red are added in runtime based on the policy


#### **Oracle VPD**

- Sometimes referred to as Oracle Row-Level Security (RLS) or Fine Grained Access Control (FGAC)
- Idea:
  - Associate security policies to database objects
  - Transparently add predicates to the WHERE clause of queries/updates
  - The predicates are generated by user-defined functions given in the policies
    - Can be in Oracle's PL/SQL, or even C or Java, etc
    - Can access session parameters, e.g., user name



- Suppose that the 'CredicDB' database has the following table
  - Grades( student varchar2(30), grade varchar2(2) );
- Suppose that we want to implement the following policy:
  - Everyone can only see the rows with A+ grades
- We will first create a policy function, check\_grade

- CREATE FUNCTION check\_grade(
   v\_schema IN VARCHAR2, v\_obj IN VARCHAR2)
- RETURN VARCHAR2 AS condition VARCHAR2 (200);
- BEGIN
- condition := 'grade = ''A+''';
- RETURN condition;
- END check\_grade;
- v\_schema would be the database name
- v\_obj would be the table name
- condition would be the predicate to add



• After creating the policy function, we will add a policy based on the function:

- BEGIN
- DBMS RLS.ADD POLICY (
- object\_schema => 'CedricDB',
- object\_name => 'Grades',
- policy\_name => 'check\_grade\_policy',
- policy function => 'check grade');
- END;


```
I associate

I associate

I associate


policy function
```

Grades



- Consider again the Grades table in the 'CredicDB' database:
- Suppose that we want to change the check\_grade\_policy to the following:
  - Every student can only see her own grade
- We will change the check\_grade function

- CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION check\_grade( v\_schema IN VARCHAR2, v\_obj IN VARCHAR2)
- RETURN VARCHAR2 AS condition VARCHAR2 (200);
- BEGIN
- condition := 'student = SYS\_CONTEXT( "grade\_app",
   "stu\_name" )';
- RETURN condition;
- END check\_grade;
- SYS\_CONTEXT( 'grade\_app', 'stu\_name' ) returns the value of the 'stu\_name' parameter in the 'grade\_app' context
- Here we assume that the 'grade\_app' context has been created, and the 'stu\_name' parameter equals the name of the student whose grade is being queried



## SYS\_CONTEXT

- In Oracle, the SYS\_CONTEXT function is used to retrieve parameters in the Oracle environment.
- The syntax for the function is: SYS\_CONTEXT( namespace, parameter, [length] )
  - namespace is a context either built-in or created by the user
    - Oracle provides a built-in namespace called USERENV, which provides information about the current Oracle session
  - parameter is an attribute in the context, and it must be set in advance using the DBMS\_SESSION.set\_context procedure.
  - length is optional; it specifies the length of the parameter value in bytes

# **USERENV:** The built-in namespace

- Some sample parameters in USERENV
  - SESSION\_USER: name of the database user at logon
  - SESSION\_USERID : Id of the database user at logon
  - DB\_NAME: name of the database
  - ISDBA: Returns TRUE if the user has been authenticated as having DBA privileges

- Consider again the Grades table in the 'CredicDB' database:
- Suppose that we want to change the check\_grade\_policy to the following:
  - Every student can only see her own grade
  - The DBA can see all grades
- We will change the check\_grade function

- CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION check\_grade( v\_schema IN VARCHAR2, v\_obj IN VARCHAR2)
- RETURN VARCHAR2 AS condition VARCHAR2 (200);
- BEGIN
- IF ( SYS CONTEXT( 'USERENV', 'ISDBA' ) ) THEN
- RETURN ' ';
- ELSE
- RETURN 'student = SYS\_CONTEXT( "grade\_app", " stu\_name" )'; END IF;
- END check grade;

- Bob accesses the Grades table
  - SELECT \* FROM Grades
- Result?
  - If Bob is a DBA, return everything in Grades
  - Otherwise, if Bob is a student, return his grade in Grades

- What if Bob also issues the following?
  - UPDATE Grades SET grade = 'F' WHERE student = 'Alice'
- Our previous policy does not prevent this, since the policy does not restrict update and insert
  - Solution: Don't grant Bob update rights on Grades
- Now assume (for the sake of argument) that we allows Bob to update his own grade (but not others' grades)
  - We can change our policy for this purpose

```
BEGIN
                                          everything in a begin and end will be executed
                                           atomically
   DBMS_RLS.DROP_POLICY(
   object schema => 'CedricDB',
   object name => 'Grades',
   policy name => 'check grade policy' );
   DBMS RLS.ADD POLICY (
   object schema => 'CedricDB',
   object name => 'Grades',
   policy_name => 'check_grade_policy',
   policy function => 'check grade',
   update check => TRUE );
END:
Bob:
 UPDATE Grades SET grade = 'F' WHERE student = 'Alice'
```

UPDATE Grades SET grade = 'F' WHERE student = 'Bob'

#### Column-Level VPD

- Our previous policy only allows each student to see her own tuple
- But what if we want the following:
  - Each student can only see her own grade
  - Each student can see the names of all other students
- We can use a column-level policy

#### Column-Level VPD

- We can re-use the previous policy function
- CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION check\_grade( v\_schema IN VARCHAR2, v\_obj IN VARCHAR2)
- RETURN VARCHAR2 AS condition VARCHAR2 (200);
- BEGIN
- IF ( SYS CONTEXT( 'USERENV', 'ISDBA' ) ) THEN
- RETURN ":
- ELSE
- RETURN 'student = SYS\_CONTEXT( ''grade\_app'', '' stu\_name'' )'; END IF;
- END check\_grade;
- But we will change the policy

#### Column-Level VPD

```
BEGIN
   DBMS RLS.ADD POLICY (
   object chema => 'CedricDB',
   object name => 'Grades',
   policy name=> 'check grade policy',
   policy function => 'check grade',
   sec relevant cols => 'grade' );
END;
```

#### Column-Level VP

Grades

student	grade
Alice	A+
Bob	B+
Cath	C+

- Bob:
  - SELECT student FROM Grades

student
Alice
Bob
Cath

- Bob:
  - SELECT \* FROM Grades

student	grade
Bob	B+

#### What if we want t

Grades

H	-   '	
	student	grade
	Alice	A+
	Bob	B+
	Cath	C+

- Bob:
  - SELECT student FROM Grades

student	
Alice	
Bob	
Cath	

- Bob:
  - SELECT \* FROM Grades

student	grade
Alice	NULL
Bob	B+
Cath	NULL

#### Column-level VPD

```
BEGIN
   DBMS RLS.ADD POLICY (
   object chema => 'CedricDB',
   object name => 'Grades',
   policy name => 'check grade policy',
   policy function => 'check grade',
   sec relevant cols => 'grade',
   sec relevant cols opt =>
 dbms rls.ALL ROWS);
END;
```

#### **Multiple Policies**

- What happens if we add multiple policies on the same table?
  - The policies are enforced with AND syntax.
- Example: suppose that table T is associated with {P1, P2, P3}
  - Consider a query: SELECT A FROM T WHERE C.
  - It would be modified into:
     SELECT A FROM T WHERE C AND (c1 AND c2 AND c3)
  - c1, c2, and c3 are from P1, P2, and P3, respectively

## **Coming Next**

Issues with VPD

## Issues with VPD: Inconsistencies

- Suppose that a policy authorizes each employee to see his/her own salary
- Alice issues the following query:
  - SELECT MIN(Salary) FROM Employee
- The query will be rewritten to
  - SELECT MIN(Salary) FROM Employee
    WHERE Name = 'Alice'
- The results could confuse users

## Issues with VPD: Recursion

- Consider the following policy function on the Grades table
- CREATE check\_grade(v\_schema IN VARCHAR2, v\_obj IN VARCHAR2)
- RETURN VARCHAR2 AS condition VARCHAR2 (200);
- BEGIN
- SELECT 'grade = ' || MAX( grade ) into condition
   FROM Grades
- RETURN condition;
- END check\_grade;
- This is not allowed
- In general, if we have a policy on a table T, then the policy function F cannot access T



## Issues with VPD: Recursion

- In general, if we have a policy on a table T, then the policy function F cannot access T
- Why?
- Because of potential recursions
  - A query Q wants to access T
  - Oracle invokes the policy function F for Q
  - F executes a query Q' on T
  - Oracle invokes F again for Q'
  - F executes a query Q' again on T

### Summary

- FGAC is a powerful access control mechanism
- Oracle VPD implements FGAC using query rewriting mechanisms