
Ungraded Pre-Lecture Quiz

Master Boot Record (MBR) is used in older disks by BIOS.
 Why do the newer UEFI-based GPT disks also contain MBR in their first sector?



From: Bruce J. Nikkel, "Forensic Analysis of GPT Disks and GUID Partition Tables", https://www.digitalforensics.ch/nikkel09.pdf

Some Quick Reminders/Announcements

- **A1** is out
- Graded Lab Tasks #3: from today's Lab 5
- Please register your group (of 4 members) by 19 February by referring to my Canvas announcement
- After that, I will randomly-assign those unassigned and possibly merge partial groups by 26 February


IFS4102: Digital Forensics

Lecture 5: Windows Forensics (Part 1)

Outline

- Intro to Windows forensics
- File system analysis: FAT
- File system analysis : NTFS & ADS
- MAC times in Windows
- Live/online Windows analysis
- Windows registry analysis
- Lab 5 exercises

This Lecture's Focus



Intro to Windows Forensics


Why Windows Forensics?

- Windows is still the most popular desktop/laptop OS:
 - Net Applications & StatCounter track OSes in devices active on the Web: the most used OS family on PCs: 76.12%-86.19% usage share [Wikipedia]
- Two widely-popular file systems to store user-stored data:
 - File Allocation Table (FAT): also used in USB flash drives, small storage media, embedded/IoT devices
 - New Technology File System (NTFS)
- Various computer-generated artefacts for forensic analysis:
 - Registry, prefetch files, shortcuts & jump lists, thumbnail cache, ...
 - Event logs (in Lecture 6)
 - Network & browser information (in Lecture 7)

Windows Family Overview

- Windows NT: started with Windows NT 3.1, for servers and workstations
 - Windows: Windows XP, Vista, 7, 8, 8.1, 10
 - Windows Server: ..., Windows Server 2019
 - Windows **PE** (a live operating system): ..., Windows PE 10
- Windows IoT (previously Windows Embedded)
- Obsolete:
 - Windows 9x
 - Windows Mobile
 - Windows Phone

Windows Family Tree




IFS4102 From: Wikipedia 9

Potential Challenges in Windows Forensics

- Windows environment is complex, and poses a number of challenges for Digital Forensic Investigator
- Windows version differentiation: important with analysis as different artefacts reside in different locations
- Different versions of **file system types**: FAT12, FAT16, FAT32, ...
- **Invasive** characteristics of the Windows environment: it does *not* mount hard disk drives as read-only
- Possible obsolete legacy Windows systems & versions


Layers of Disk & File Analysis



From: Brian Carrier, "File System Forensic Analysis"

File System Analysis: FAT

Sample Boot Sequence (Using BIOS & MBR)




From: Brian Carrier, "File System Forensic Analysis"



File System Management Categories

• A reference model with **5 categories**, which is also used by TSK




From: Brian Carrier,
"File System Forensic
Analysis"

File Allocation Table (FAT) File System

- The primary file system of the Microsoft DOS & Windows 9x
- Three major **variants**: FAT12, FAT16, FAT32
 - (8-bit FAT): FAT precursor, originally designed in the late 1970s for use on floppy disks and early OS
 - FAT12: Started to emerge ~1980, in early DOS & early Windows
 - FAT16: Emerged in mid 1980's, in DOS 3.1 through to Windows 95
 - FAT32: Emerged in late 1996 with Windows 95 OSR2
- The FAT version number: relates to the size of the entries in the FAT structure
 - → also corresponds to the number of addressable data clusters

File Allocation Table (FAT) File System: Overview



From: Brian Carrier, "File System Forensic Analysis"

FAT Strengths and Shortcomings

Good aspects:

- **Simple** file-system layout: good performance even in lightweight implementations
- Relatively robust for storing data: a FAT backup/duplicate


Problems:

- Limited ability to store **detailed information** about a file: no file owner, file permission or ACL, hard/symbolic links, quotas, ...
- Cannot deliver the same performance, reliability and scalability as newer modern file systems
- No longer the default file system for usage on Windows computers:
 NT, XP and later use NTFS

Relevancy of FAT File System Nowadays

- Yet, FAT is still commonly found on floppy disks, flash & other solid-state memory cards and modules, small storage media, gaming/embedded/IoT devices
- The standard file system for digital cameras per the Design rule for Camera File system (DCF) specification
- Still supported (for compatibility reasons) by nearly all currently developed OSes for PCs (including UNIX/Linux), many mobile devices, and embedded systems
- The point is: FAT is still **relevant** to modern digital forensics!


File Allocation Table (FAT) File System: Overview



From: Brian Carrier, "File System Forensic Analysis"

FAT Key Concepts: Overview

- Each file and directory is allocated a data structure called a directory entry
- A directory entry has information of the *first data cluster*
- If a file/directory has multiple allocated data clusters, the FAT structure indicate the next data clusters
- "Cluster chains": all allocated data clusters of a file/directory
- The FAT structure also indicates the allocation status of all data clusters in the FAT file system, including damaged ones
- FAT32 file-system boot sector: contains additional data,
 e.g. sector address of boot sector's backup copy, root directory,
 FSINFO (which gives the next available cluster, no of free clusters)



From: Brian Carrier, "File System Forensic Analysis"

• Can be inspected using TSK's tool fsstat: e.g. fsstat -f fat fat-4.dd

Overview of the order of structures in a FAT partition or disk

Region	Size in sectors	Contents
Reserved	(number of reserved sectors)	Boot Sector
		FS Information Sector (FAT32 only)
		More reserved sectors (optional)
FAT Region	(number of FATs) * (sectors per FAT)	File Allocation Table #1
		File Allocation Table #2 (optional)
Root Directory Region	(number of root entries * 32) / (bytes per sector)	Root Directory (FAT12 and FAT16 only)
Data Region	(number of clusters) * (sectors per cluster)	Data Region (for files and directories) (to end of partition or disk)

From: Wikipedia

```
# fsstat -f fat fat-4.dd
  The tool used to
                      FILE SYSTEM INFORMATION
   make the FS:
"MSDOS5.0" \rightarrow WinXP
                      File System Type: FAT
                      OEM Name: MSDOS5.0
                      Volume ID: 0x4c194603
                      Volume Label (Boot Sector): NO NAME
                      Volume Label (Root Directory): FAT DISK
  A 4-byte value
                      File System Type Label: FAT32
  based on the
 FS creation time
                      Backup Boot Sector Location: 6
                      FS Info Sector Location: 1
```

From: Brian Carrier, "File System Forensic Analysis"

```
Next Free Sector (FS Info): 1778
Free Sector Count (FS Info): 203836
Sectors before file system: 100800
File System Layout (in sectors)
Total Range: 0 - 205631
* Reserved: 0 - 37
** Boot Sector: 0
** FS Info Sector: 1
** Backup Boot Sector: 6
* FAT 0: 38 - 834
* FAT 1: 835 - 1631
* Data Area: 1632 - 205631
** Cluster Area: 1632 - 205631
*** Root Directory: 1632 - 1635
CONTENT-DATA INFORMATION
Sector Size: 512
Cluster Size: 1024
Total Cluster Range: 2 - 102001
```


From: Brian Carrier, "File System Forensic Analysis"

IFS4102 24

[REMOVED]

Directory

- Directory/folder:
 - Represented as a **special type** of file
 - Root directory: stored in a special location
 - Each file/sub-directory within a folder is represented as a directory entry



From: Brian Carrier,
"File System Forensic
Analysis"

Directory Entry

- Directory entry:
 - Each file and directory is allocated one: fixed 32 bytes in size
 - Contains:
 - File name & extension
 - **Attributes** (1 byte): Read Only, Hidden, System, Volume label (disk volume label is a directory entry), Directory (tells whether the entry is a directory or a file), Archive, ...
 - Created time & created date: the value is to be added to 1980, giving a possible year range of 1980 to 2107
 - Last modified time, last modified date
 - Last accessed date, but no last accessed time!
 - First data cluster
 - **File size** (in bytes)
 - See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Design_of_the_FAT_file_system#Directory_entry

Directory Entry

Sample directory entry as reported by TSK's istat:

```
# istat -f fat fat-4.dd 4-
                                        Directory-entry address/no
Directory Entry: 4
Allocated
                                        (see Brian Carrier's book)
File Attributes: File, Archive
Size: 8689
Name: RESUME-1.RTF
Directory Entry Times:
Written:
                Wed Mar 24 06:26:20 2004
Accessed:
                Thu Apr 8 00:00:00 2004
                Tue Feb 10 15:49:40 2004
Created:
Sectors:
1646 1647 1648 1649 1650 1651 1652 1653
1654 1655 1656 1657 1658 1659 1660 1661
1662 1663
```

IFS4102 27

From: Brian Carrier, "File System Forensic Analysis"

Long File Name (LFN) Support

- Virtual FAT (VFAT):
 - Supports **long filenames** up to 255
 - Was first used in Win 95
- A workaround/hack to support LFN on a file system that only allows 8+3 short file name (SFN):
 - Uses additional multiple directory entries for a file with LFN:
 - "Special" directory entries ("LFN"): uses a previously-invalid file attribute value combination, so that non-VFAT applications will ignore them
 - Uses the first byte in the filename to indicate directory-entry sequence
 - The standard 8+3 SFN entry is kept for backward compatibility reason

Long File Name (LFN) Support

• LFN entry format:

Byte offset	Length (bytes)	Description	
0x00	1	Sequence Number (bit 6: last logical, first physical LFN entry, bit 5: 0; bits 4-0: number 0x010x14 (0x1F), deleted entry: 0xE5)	
0x01	10	Name characters (five UCS-2 characters)	
0x0B	1	Attributes (always 0x0F)	
0x0C	1	Type (always 0x00 for VFAT LFN, other values reserved for future use; for special usage of bits 4 and 3 in SFNs see further up)	
0x0D	1	Checksum of DOS file name	
0x0E	12	Name characters (six UCS-2 characters)	
0x1A	2	First cluster (always 0x0000)	
0x1C	4	Name characters (two UCS-2 characters)	

From: Wikipedia

Long File Name (LFN) Support: Example

```
Atr: File Name: RESUME-1.RTF Cluster: 9
Atr: LFN Seq: 2 CSum: 0xdf Name: Name.rtf
Atr: LFN Seq: 1 CSum: 0xdf Name: My Long File
Atr: File Name: MYLONG~1.RTF Cluster: 26
Atr: File Name: _ILE6.TXT Cluster: 48
```


From: Brian Carrier,
"File System Forensic
Analysis"

```
# fls -f fat fat-2.dd
r/r 3: FAT DISK (Volume Label Entry)
r/r 4: RESUME-1.RTF
r/r 7: My Long File Name.rtf (MYLONG~1.RTF)
r/r * 8: ile6.txt
```

Cluster Chain: Definition & Representation

- **Data cluster**: a data unit of file and directory content
- File data is allocated to a number of data clusters
- The clusters is kept as a **linked list**, forming *cluster chain*:
 - The pointer to the first cluster is kept in the file's directory entry
 - The pointers to **subsequent clusters** are kept in the File Allocation Table (FAT) structure
- A **FAT entry** contains either (see the next slide for an example):
 - FREE (0): its data cluster is unused/free
 - **EOF**: used, a NULL pointer (its cluster is the **last cluster** in the chain)
 - Some number: used, with the number as the next cluster in the chain
 - BAD: its cluster is unusable (i.e. due to disk error)

FAT File System Structure: Cluster Chain



From: Brian Carrier, "File System Forensic Analysis"

FAT File System Structure: Cluster Chain

Sample TSK output dumping the contents of the FAT structure:

```
# fsstat -f fat fat-4.dd

[REMOVED]

1642-1645 (4) -> EOF


1646-1663 (18) -> EOF

1664-1681 (18) -> EOF

[REMOVED]
```

From: Brian Carrier, "File System Forensic Analysis"

FAT File System: Sample Layout & File




From: Brian Carrier, "File System Forensic Analysis"

File Deletion

- Several steps below are performed
- Delete the directory entry:
 - Set the *first letter* in the filename to a special value **0xe5**
- Free the allocated data clusters:
 - Set the corresponding **FAT entries** in the cluster chain to **FREE (0)**
- The actual file content inside the previously-allocated clusters?
 - Remains *intact*: can *possibly* be recovered, but it depends on file system activity (not always possible)
- **Example**: the deletion of file "dir1\file1.txt" (see the next slide)

FAT File System: Sample Layout & Deletion




From: Brian Carrier, "File System Forensic Analysis"

File Recovery


Question: How is the recovery of a deleted file done?

- If the directory is still allocated: the first cluster no is known
- If the directory is already removed: need to check the unallocated clusters (see an illustration below)



File Recovery

- How about the next cluster numbers?
 - → depends on whether the clusters are contiguous or fragmented (see some possible cases and respective issues below)
 - → the clusters must be still unallocated




From: Brian
Carrier, "File
System Forensic
Analysis"

Formatting of FAT File System

- Two types of format with different operations conducted
- A **full** format:
 - Writes the whole disk with zero or 0xf6
- A *quick* format:
 - Zeroes out the FAT area
 - Zeroes out the root directory's entries
 - The FAT file system's data area is left untouched!
 - → forensics tools can extract valuable information!


Tools for Inspecting FAT File System

Autopsy?



Tools for Inspecting FAT File System


- Win-Hex hex editor?
 - Disk editing feature: http://www.winhex.com/winhex/index-m.html
 - Available only in certain license types,
 see: http://www.winhex.com/winhex/comparison.html




Source: http://www.winhex.com/ winhex/index-m.html

Full-Featured Disk Editor

One popular product: Active@ (https://www.disk-editor.org/)





Additional Notes: FAT Derivatives & References

FAT Derivatives:

- Turbo FAT: NetWare File System (NWFS) Novell
- FATX: designed for Microsoft's Xbox video game console hard disk drives and memory cards
- exFAT: intended for use on flash drives (e.g. SDXC and Memory Stick XC)
- FAT+: for storing larger files

References:

- Brian Carrier, "File System Forensic Analysis"
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File Allocation Table
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Design of the FAT file system

File System Comparison

		File System	Content	Metadata	File Name	Application
	ExtX	group	Blocks, block bitmap	Inodes, inode bitmap, extended attributes	Directory entries	Journal
	FAT	Boot sector, FSINFO	Clusters, FAT	Directory entries, FAT	Directory entries	N/A
	NTFS	\$Boot, \$Volume, \$AttrDef	Clusters, \$Bitmap	\$MFT, \$MFTMirr, \$STANDARD_ INFORMATION, \$DATA, \$ATTRIBUTE_LIST, \$SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR	\$FILE_NAME, \$IDX_ROOT, \$IDX_ALLOCATION, \$BITMAP	Disk Quota, Journal, Change Journal
	UFS	Superblock, group descriptor		Inodes, inode bitmap, extended attributes	Directory entries	N/A

From: Brian Carrier, "File System Forensic Analysis"

File System Analysis: NTFS & ADS

NTFS: General

- NTFS: New Technologies File System
- Emerged in 1993 with Windows NT3.1
- Now the most commonly-used file system on end-user computers
- File locations are stored in the *Master File Table* (*MFT*)
- Has a lot more details that FAT: the size of the MFT can grow as needed in order to accommodate more fie entries
- Our lecture only covers some parts of the file system only!


NTFS Design Goals


- Reliability: a journaling file system
 - The NTFS Log (\$LogFile) to record metadata changes to the volume
 - In case of system crashes or data moves performed by the defragmentation API, the FS internal data structures will remain consistent
 - Allow for easy rollback of uncommitted changes when the volume is remounted
- **Security**: by access control information
 - Each file/folder is assigned a **security descriptor** that defines its owner
 - Contains 2 ACLs: discretionary access control list (DACL) & system access control list (SACL)

NTFS Design Goals, Features

- Scalability:
 - Optimized for 4 KB clusters, but supports a max cluster size of 2MB
 - Maximum supported volume size: 2⁶⁴–1 clusters
- Alternate data streams (ADS): more later!
- File compression: using LZNT1 algorithm (a variant of LZ77)
- Support for sparse files:
 - A **sparse file**: a file interspersed with **empty segments** for which **no actual storage space** is used
 - May be used by database applications


Sparse File Illustration





From: Wikipedia

Sparse File in NTFS & Cluster Runs



NTFS Design Paradigm

- Design paradigm: "everything is a file"
 - Each byte of an NTFS file system belongs to a file
 - File system data & file system metadata are also located in files
 - File system metadata files ("*metafiles*"): names start with dollar character \$ (except for '.' which contains the root directory)
- For a list and of metafiles and respective purposes:
 - See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NTFS#Metafiles

NTFS "File System" Metadata Files

Entry File Name		Description			
0	\$MFT	The entry for the MFT itself.			
1	\$MFTMirr	Contains a backup of the first entries in the MFT. See the "File System Category" section in Chapter 12.			
2	\$LogFile	Contains the journal that records the metadata transactions. See the "Application Category" section in Chapter 12.			
3	\$Volume	Contains the volume information such as the label, identifier, and version. See the "File System Category" section in Chapter 12.			
4	\$AttrDef	Contains the attribute information, such as the identifier values, name, and sizes. See the "File System Category" section in Chapter 12.			
5		Contains the root directory of the file system. See the "File Name Category" section in Chapter 12.			
6	\$Bitmap	Contains the allocation status of each cluster in the file system. See the "Content Category" section in Chapter 12.			
7	\$Boot	Contains the boot sector and boot code for the file system. See the "File System Category" section in Chapter 12.			
8	\$BadClus	Contains the clusters that have bad sectors. See the "Content Category" section in Chapter 12.			
9	\$Secure	Contains information about the security and access control for the files (Windows 2000 and XP version only). See the "Metadata Category" section in Chapter 12.			
10	\$Upcase	Contains the uppercase version of every Unicode character.			
11	\$Extend	A directory that contains files for optional extensions. Microsoft does not typically place the files in this directory into the reserved MFT entries.			


From: Brian Carrier, "File System Forensic Analysis"

NTFS Master File Table (MFT)

- Stores all the information about all files and folders
- A relational database that consists of rows of file records, and columns of file attributes:
 - **MFT entry header** (structured, 42 bytes): contains signature (either string 'FILE' or 'BAAD'), allocation status, the used bytes in the MFT record, ...
 - *MFT entry body* (unstructured, 982 bytes): contains **attributes** for file name, file metadata, content data
- Example: see next few slides
- NTFS references:
 - Brian Carrier, "File System Forensic Analysis"
 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NTFS


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MFT Entry Example



From: Brian Carrier, "File System Forensic Analysis"

MFT Entry Example




Attribute's content is **fully stored inside** the MFT entry

From: Brian Carrier, "File System Forensic Analysis"

Data Cluster Allocation: Cluster Runs


- A cluster run:
 - A block of consecutive data clusters
 - Referred to by the starting cluster address and run length
- Cluster runs:
 - Store the content of a non-resident attribute



IFS4102

Inspecting NTFS File System

Active@ disk editor (https://www.disk-editor.org/)



MFTECmd and MFT Explorer

- Two tools by Eric Zimmerman (among many of his tools)
- Can be used to inspect \$MFT and other metafiles of NTFS
- MFTECmd (https://github.com/EricZimmerman/MFTECmd):
 - A CLI-based tool MFT parser
 - See: https://binaryforay.blogspot.com/2018/06/introducing-mftecmd.html, https://aboutdfir.com/toolsandartifacts/windows/mft-explorer-mftecmd/

```
Author: Eric Zimmerman (saericzimmerman@gmail.com)
https://github.com/EricZimmerman/MFTECMd

f File to process. Either this or -d is required
csv Directory to save CSV formatted results to. Be sure to include the full path in double quotes. Required unless --de is specified Dump full details for the entry/sequence number provided. Format is 'Entry-Seq' as decimal or hex. Example: 624-5 or 0x270-0x5

dt The custom date/time format to use when displaying time stamps. Default is: yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss.fffffff sn Include DOS file name types. Default is false
vl Verbose log messages. 1 == Debug, 2 == Trace

Examples: MFTECmd.exe -f "C:\Temp\SomeMFT" --csv "c:\temp\out"
MFTECmd.exe -f "C:\Temp\SomeMFT" --csv "c:\temp\out"
MFTECmd.exe -f "C:\Temp\SomeMFT" --de 5-5
Short options (single letter) are prefixed with a single dash. Long commands are prefixed with two dashes
```

MFTECmd

```
PS C:\Tools> .\MFTECmd.exe -f 'D:\SynologyDrive\MFTs\nromanoff
MFTECmd version 0.2.5.0
Author: Eric Zimmerman (saericzimmerman@gmail.com)
https://github.com/EricZimmerman/MFTECmd
Command line: -f D:\SynologyDrive\MFTs\nromanoff\$MFT --csv C:\Temp\
Warning: Administrator privileges not found!
Processed 'D:\SynologyDrive\MFTs\nromanoff\$MFT' in 3.3311 seconds
```

```
0 EntryNumber,SequenceNumber,InUse,ParentEntryNumber,ParentSequenceNumber,ParentPath,FileName,Extension,FileSize,ReferenceCount,ReparseTarget,IsDirectory,HasAds,Is
1 0,1,True,5,5,.,$MFT,,118751232,1,,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,
2 1,1,True,5,5,.,$MFTMirr,,4096,1,,False,False,False,False,False,False,"Hidden, System",DosWindows,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:48484150,,2010-11-10 17:48484150,,2010-11-10 17:48484150,,2010-11-10 17:48484150,,2010-11-10 17:48484150,,
3 2,2,True,5,5,.,$LogFile,,67108864,1,,False,False,False,False,False,False,"Hidden, System",DosWindows,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,
4 3,3,True,5,5,.,$Volume,,0,1,,False,False,False,False,False,False,"Hidden, System",DosWindows,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10
5 4,4,True,5,5,..,$AttrDef,,2560,1,,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,Tidden, System",DosWindows,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-1
6 5,5,True,5,5,...,0,1,,True,False,False,True,False,False,"Hidden, System",DosWindows,2009-07-14 02:07:54.8957117,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,2012-04-04 11:47:38.
7 6,6,True,5,5,.,$Bitmap,,811104,1,,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,
8 7,7,True,5,5,.,$Boot,,8192,1,,False,False,False,False,False,False,"Hidden, System",DosWindows,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-1
9 8,8,True,5,5,.,$BadClus,,0,1,,False,True,False,False,False,False,"Hidden, System",DosWindows,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10
0 8,8,True,5,5,.,$BadClus:$Bad,,26578251776,1,,False,False,True,False,False,False,"Hidden, System",DosWindows,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,
1 9,9,True,5,5,.,$Secure,,964632,1,,False,True,False,False,False,False,"Hidden, System, IsIndexView",DosWindows,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.48
2 9,9,True,5,5,.,$Secure:$SDS,,964632,1,,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,Tidden, System, IsIndexView",DosWindows,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:
3 10,10,True,5,5,.,$UpCase,,131072,1,,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,Talse,False,False,Talse,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,Fals
4 11,11,True,5,5,.,$Extend,,0,1,,True,False,False,False,False,False,"Hidden, System",DosWindows,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-10 17:37:26.4843750,,2010-11-1
5 24,1,True,11,11,.\$Extend,$Quota,,0,1,,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,F
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7 26,1,True,11,11,.\$Extend,$Reparse,,0,1,,False,False,False,False,False,False,"Hidden, System, Archive, IsIndexView",Posix,2010-11-10 17:37:58.0937500,,2010-11-10
8 27,1,True,11,11,.\$Extend,$RmMetadata,,0,1,,True,False,False,False,False,False,"Hidden, System",Posix,2010-11-10 17:37:58.0937500,,2010-11-10 17:37:58.0937500,,2
9 28,1,True,27,1,.\$Extend\$RmMetadata,$Repair,.0,1,.False,True,False,False,False,False,"Hidden, System, Archive",Posix,2010-11-10 17:37:58.0937500,,2010-11-10 17:


Ω 28 1 True 27 1 \$Evtend\$RmMetadata $Renair $Confiσ 8 1 False False False False False "Hidden System Δrchive" Posiv 2010-11-10 17:37:58 0937500 2010-1
```

MFTECmd

```
--de L651<u>9</u>-4
PS C:\Tools> .\MFTECmd.exe -f 'D:\SynologyDrive\MFTS\nromanoff\$MF
MFTECmd version 0.2.5.0
Author: Eric Zimmerman (saericzimmerman@gmail.com)
https://github.com/EricZimmerman/MFTECmd
Command line: -f D:\SynologyDrive\MFTs\nromanoff\$MFT --de 16519-4
Processed 'D:\SynologyDrive\MFTs\nromanoff\$MFT' in 3.3231 seconds
Entry/seq #: 0x4087/0x4 Offset: 0x1021C00 Flags: InUse LogSequenceNumber: 0x2031B879C MftRecordToBaseRecord: Entry: 0x0, Seq: 0x0
ReferenceCount: 0x1 FixupData: Expected: 05-00 FixupActual: 00-00|00-00 (Fixup OK: True)
Type: StandardInformation, Attr #: 0x0 Size: 0x60, Content size: 0x48, Name size: 0x0, Content offset: 0x18, Resident: True
Flags: Hidden, System, Archive MaxVersion: 0x0 VersionNumber: 0x0, ClassId: 0x0 OwnerId: 0x0 SecurityId: 0x6B4, QuotaCharged: 0x0
UpdateSequenceNumber: 0x7267A550
CreatedOn: 2012-03-15 20:48:24.0000000
ContentModifiedOn: 2012-03-16 20:25:36.0388590
RecordModifiedOn: 2012-04-04 15:21:06.9097813
LastAccessedOn: 2012-03-15 20:48:24.0000000
Type: FileName, Attr #: 0x2 Size: 0x70, Content size: 0x54, Name size: 0x0, Content offset: 0x18, Resident: True
File name: Thumbs.db (Len:0x9)
Flags: Archive, NameType: DosWindows ReparseValue: 0 PhysicalSize: 0x0, LogicalSize: 0x0
ParentMftRecord: Entry: 0x4028, Seq: 0x6
CreatedOn: 2012-03-16 20:25:36.0115170
ContentModifiedOn: 2012-03-16 20:25:36.0115170
RecordModifiedOn: 2012-03-16 20:25:36.0115170
LastAccessedOn: 2012-03-16 20:25:36.0115170
Type: Data, Attr #: 0x3 Size: 0x48, Content size: 0x0, Name size: 0x0, Content offset: 0x0, Resident: False
NonResidentData
StartingVirtualClusterNumber: 0x0 EndingVirtualClusterNumber: 0xC AllocatedSize: 0xD000 ActualSize: 0xC600 InitializedSize: 0xC600
DataRuns Entries
Cluster offset: 0x209108, # clusters: 0xD
**** DATA ****
Type: Data, Attr #: 0x4 Size: 0x58, Content size: 0x1A, Name size: 0xF, Name: Zone.Identifier, Content offset: 0x38, Resident: True
Data: 5B-5A-6F-6E-65-54-72-61-6E-73-66-65-72-5D-0D-0A-5A-6F-6E-65-49-64-3D-33-0D-0A
```

MFT Explorer

MFT Explorer: a GUI-based tool for visualizing the \$MFT



From: https://aboutdfir.com/to olsandartifacts/windows/ mft-explorer-mftecmd/2/



NTFS Journaling

• **Journaling** in NTFS:


- NTFS is a journaling file system
- File changes are logged
- Old files retain their validity until writing is marked as successful in the log file
- Following a system failure, restore operations are automatically executed

Journal files:

- **\$LogFile**: NTFS journal file, which records metadata transactions
- \\$Extend\\$UsrJrnI: change journal, which records changes to files




NTFS File System: Sample Layout & File



From: Brian Carrier, "File System Forensic Analysis"

NTFS File System: Sample Layout & Deletion



From: Brian Carrier, "File System Forensic Analysis"

Break!

NTFS Alternate Data Streams (ADS)

- Introduced into NTFS since Windows NT 3.1
- Allow for more than one data streams to be associated with a file
- Each extra stream is stored as an additional **\$DATA** attribute
- A file on NTFS may therefore have multiple streams:
 - File system by default only shows 1 stream: the unnamed \$DATA attribute
 - All other streams are not visible, and not indicated by the Explorer, and not considered in the file's size
 - When copying a file from an NTFS to a FAT partition,
 only the main stream will be copied

ADS: Example and Detection

- Create two ADS streams on file.txt:
 - C:> type hidden.txt > file.txt:hidden.txt
 - C:> type starwars.jpg > file.txt:starwars.jpg
- **Display** the ADS streams:
 - C:> notepad file.txt:hidden.txt
 - C:> mspaint file.txt:starwars.jpg
- ADS stream detection:
 - Windows 7 and later: dir /R command
 - TSK: fls command
 - Various ADS tracking/scanning tools

IFS4102

ADS: Security & Forensics Implications

- Executable files embedded in ADS: exactly like normal executable files
- They can be executed with a start command
- ADS is thus important for **malware analysis**:
 - Many root kits, viruses, hacking tools can hide executable files in the extra streams
- ADS can also be used to hide evidence/data files:
 - Relevant to forensic investigation!
- See Task 1 of Lab 6 (next week)

File System Comparison

		File System	Content	Metadata	File Name	Application
	ExtX	Superblock, group descriptor	Blocks, block bitmap	Inodes, inode bitmap, extended attributes	Directory entries	Journal
	FAT	Boot sector, FSINFO	Clusters, FAT	Directory entries, FAT	Directory entries	N/A
	NTFS	\$Boot, \$Volume, \$AttrDef	Clusters, \$Bitmap	\$MFT, \$MFTMirr, \$STANDARD_ INFORMATION, \$DATA, \$ATTRIBUTE_LIST, \$SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR	\$FILE_NAME, \$IDX_ROOT, \$IDX_ALLOCATION, \$BITMAP	Disk Quota, Journal, Change Journal
	UFS	Superblock, group descriptor		Inodes, inode bitmap, extended attributes	Directory entries	N/A

From: Brian Carrier, "File System Forensic Analysis"

MAC Times in Windows

MAC Times: Notes on Possible Issues (NIST)

- Among the reasons for *time inaccuracies* are the following:
 - The computer's clock does not have the correct time
 - The time may not be recorded with the expected level of detail, such omitting the seconds or minutes
 - An attacker *may have altered* the recorded file times: general issue of metadata reliability!

MAC Times: Overview

- MAC (common or standard definition):
 - M: modified/modification time
 - A: accessed/access time
 - **C**: created/creation time
- C: created or changed time?
 - Windows (FAT/NTFS): created time
 - Linux/UNIX: changed time, i.e. the last time a file metadata was changed




From: https://digitalforensics.sans.org/blog/2009/02/24/digitalforensic-sifting-registry-and-filesystemtimeline-creation/

 MACB times: Modification time, Access time, Change time, Birth (creation) time

NTFS Timestamps

- Time stamps in NTFS (stored in the \$STANDARD_INFORMATION attribute):
 - Created time: file was created
 - File Modified time: last write access (on the content of the \$DATA or \$INDEX attributes)
 - MFT Modified time: last update of MFT record, which stores the file's metadata
 - Accessed time: last read access on the file's content



From: Brian Carrier, "File System Forensic Analysis"

- Issue: MAC times and file operations, including between media
- Some **scenarios** involving a file named **D:\NTFS\file.txt**:
 - Copying the file to D:\NTFS\SUBDIR or E:\
 - Moving the file to D:\NTFS\SUBDIR or E:\
 - Renaming the file into newfile.txt
- Important questions:
 - What should be the *created time (ctime)* & *modified time (mtime)* of the **new file**?
 - Should the ctime becomes the time of copy/move/rename operation?
 - How about the **mtime** of the new file?

	File Creation	File Access	File Modification	File Rename	File Copy	(Local) File Move
Modified time (mtime)	Time of file creation	Unchanged	Time of modification	?	?	?
Accessed time (atime)	Time of file creation	Time of access*	Unchanged	?	?	?
Metadata changed time	Time of file creation	Unchanged	Time of modification	?	Ş	Ş
Created time (ctime)	Time of file creation	Unchanged	Unchanged	?	?	?

For the **existing** file

For the new **directory entry** of the "**new**" file

Note:

See: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-2000-server/cc959914(v=technet.10)

^{*} Unchanged/disabled in NTFS Win 7+

- Microsoft Knowledge Base article 299648:
 - Describes how file times are affected by copy or move operations from one media to another
- The created time (ctime):
 - Is set when Windows allocates a new directory entry for a new file
 - A new file means a new chain of data clusters is being allocated
 - If a new directory entry is allocated for an already-existing file, even if the original location was on a different disk, then the original ctime is kept
 - Different effects of **file operations** that create **a new directory entry** on the file's ctime: see cases below

- ctime and file operations:
 - **Rename** or **move**: **ctime** = **original** ctime (with an **exception** below)
 - The ctime of the new directory entry is set to the original entry
 - Reason: **no** new file (i.e. chain of data clusters) is allocated
 - An exception: If the move is done from the command line of a 2000/XP system to a different volume, the ctime is the time of the move
 - Copy: ctime = new ctime
 - Reason: a **new file** (i.e. chain of data clusters) is being created
 - The ctime of the new directory entry: the time when the (first) directory entry was allocated

	File Creation	File Access	File Modification	File Rename	File Copy	(Local) File Move
Modified time (mtime)	Time of file creation	Unchanged	Time of modification	?	?	?
Accessed time (atime)	Time of file creation	Time of access*	Unchanged	?	?	?
Metadata changed time	Time of file creation	Unchanged	Time of modification	?	?	?
Created time (ctime)	Time of file creation	Unchanged	Unchanged	Unchanged	Time of file copy	Unchanged

For the **existing** file

For the new **directory entry** of the "**new**" file

- The Modified/written time (mtime):
 - Is set when Windows writes new file content
 - Is *content-based*, and not directory entry-based
- mtime and file operations:
 - Move or copy: mtime = original mtime
 - The new directory entry has the mtime from the original file
 - "mtime follows data as the file is copied/moved around"
 - Changing a file's attributes or name: no changes
 - Does not result in an update to mtime
 - When an application writes content to the file: new mtime
 - The mtime gets updated

	File Creation	File Access	File Modification	File Rename	File Copy	(Local) File Move
Modified time (mtime)	Time of file creation	Unchanged	Time of modification	Unchanged	Unchanged	Unchanged
Accessed time (atime)	Time of file creation	Time of access*	Unchanged	?	?	?
Metadata changed time	Time of file creation	Unchanged	Time of modification	?	?	?
Created time (ctime)	Time of file creation	Unchanged	Unchanged	Unchanged	Time of file copy	Unchanged

For the **existing** file

For the new **directory entry** of the "**new**" file

Note: Unchanged can also mean the **original** time

Summary: MAC Time & File Copy/Move

- The following statements **summarize** how a file copy & move affect the file's modified/written and created times
- If you copy a file from D:\NTFS to D:\NTFS\SUB:
 - The modified date and time are kept **the same**
 - The created date and time are **changed** to the current date and time
- If you move a file from D:\NTFS to D:\NTFS\SUB:
 - The modified date and time are kept **the same**
 - The created date and time are kept the same, unless
 if the move is to a different volume & the command line is used
- If an application writes content to a file:
 - The modified time gets updated

	File Creation	File Access	File Modification	File Rename	File Copy	(Local) File Move
Modified time (mtime)	Time of file creation	Unchanged	Time of modification	Unchanged	Unchanged	Unchanged
Accessed time (atime)	Time of file creation	Time of access*	Unchanged	Unchanged	Time of file copy	Unchanged
Metadata changed time	Time of file creation	Unchanged	Time of modification	?	?	?
Created time (ctime)	Time of file creation	Unchanged	Unchanged	Unchanged	Time of file copy	Unchanged

For the **existing** file

For the new **directory entry** of the "**new**" file

	File Creation	File Access	File Modification	File Rename	File Copy	(Local) File Move
Modified time (mtime)	Time of file creation	Unchanged	Time of modification	Unchanged	Unchanged	Unchanged
Accessed time (atime)	Time of file creation	Time of access*	Unchanged	Unchanged	Time of file copy	Unchanged
Metadata changed time	Time of file creation	Unchanged	Time of modification	Time of rename	Time of file copy	Time of (local) file move
Created time (ctime)	Time of file creation	Unchanged	Unchanged	Unchanged	Time of file copy	Unchanged


For the **existing** file

For the new **directory entry** of the "**new**" file

• For volume file move (using CLI & Explorer), file deletion:

	File Rename	File Copy	(Local) File Move	Volume File Move (CLI)	Volume File Move (Explorer)	File Deletion
Modified time (mtime)	Unchanged	Unchanged	Unchanged	Unchanged	Unchanged	Unchanged
Accessed time (atime)	Unchanged	Time of file copy	Unchanged	Time of file move	Time of file move	Unchanged
Metadata changed time	Time of rename	Time of file copy	Time of (local) file move	Unchanged	Unchanged	Unchanged
Created time (ctime)	Unchanged	Time of file copy	Unchanged	Time of file move	Unchanged	Unchanged

MACB Times: Visual Summary



From:

https://www.sans.org/securityresources/posters/windowsforensic-analysis/170/download

MACB Times Differences in NTFS

- MAC time differences within \$STANDARD_INFORMATION and \$FILE_NAME?
- The \$STANDARD_INFORMATION attribute:
 - Used by Windows API
 - Most frequently changed as a result of file activity
 - The timestamp collected by Windows Explorer, fls, mactime, timestomp, find, ...
 - Can also be modified by user-level processes like timestomp
- The \$FILE_NAME attribute:
 - Most often correspond to the file creation time
 - Rarely updated!
 - Can only be modified by the system kernel
- Question: What if the ctimes in both attributes are different?
 There could be a possible anti-forensic operation done, e.g. using timestomp
- See: https://andreafortuna.org/2017/10/06/macb-times-in-windows-forensic-analysis/

Live/Online Windows Analysis

Live/Online Windows Analysis

- Live analysis on live accessible Windows machine
- Not generally advisable for forensic purposes: it will change the evidence PC's state
- Done in **incident response**, or included if a forensic analysis is done as a part of **incident response**: to detect, contain, eradicate, recover, post-analyse an incident (See: "Computer Security Incident Handling Guide", NIST 2012)

What Information to Collect?

• Goal: To acquire useful information from volatile evidence, such as:

89

- System information
- Running processes
- Memory usage
- Logged in users
- Network interface configuration (is it the promiscuous mode?)
- Routing information
- Network connections
- Open files

• ...

Live/Online Windows Analysis: Some Tools

- Various Windows shell (cmd.exe and PowerShell) commands:
 - Windows commands: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Windows_commands
 - PowerShell commands: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PowerShell
- Various other useful tools:
 - Process Explorer: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Process_Explorer
 - **Autoruns**: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns
 - Many others: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/

• ...

Some will be covered in the incident response segment later

Windows Registry Analysis


Windows Registry

- What is Windows registry?
 - A repository in a Windows system
 - Central place for storing most configuration settings of OS, applications, users, and devices
 - Introduced in Windows 95 and NT
 - Replaces most (not all) .INI files
 - A tree-structured hierarchical database, stored in at least 5 hive files
 - A wealth of important data pertaining to system and users: very useful to forensic investigations, as well as malware analysis

Windows Registry Hives and Contents

- Five main hives (root keys) and their contents:
 - HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE (HLM): settings that are specific to the **local computer** (consists of SAM, Security, System, and Software, ...)
 - **HKEY_CURRENT_CONFIG** (HCC): **current system configuration**, which is regenerated at boot time and gathered at runtime
 - **HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT** (HCR): registered **application**, including program shortcuts, UI information
 - **HKEY_USERS** (HKU): profiles of **all users**, including preferences
 - HKEY_CURRENT_USER (HCU): information about the currently logged-on user
- Refs: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows_Registry, https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc959046.aspx

Windows Registry Hives and Contents



Where Are the Registry Files Stored?

- Binary format files on the file system, which can be exported, loaded & unloaded by the Registry Editor
- **System-wide files** in %SystemRoot%\System32\Config\ (for Windows NT):
 - SAM: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SAM (Security Account Manager), for users' settings (e.g.: info, group) and hashed passwords
 - SECURITY: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SECURITY, for system security settings
 - SOFTWARE: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE, for Windows and application configurations
 - SYSTEM: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM, for system and connected devices (e.g. USBStor)

Registry Files




Figure 1.3 Registry hive files in the Windows\system32\config folder (Windows 7).

From: Harlan Carvey, "Windows Registry Forensics", 2nd Edition

Where Are the Registry Files Stored?

- User-dependant files in each user's profile folder (%USERPROFILE%\):
 - NTUSER.DAT: HKEY_USERS\<*User SID*>
 (linked to by HKEY_CURRENT_USER), for user activities
 (e.g. open/save MRU list, last-visited MRU list, UserAssist, recent files)
 - USRCLASS.DAT
- Notes on environment variables in Windows:
 - **System-path variables**: locations of critical OS resources, e.g. %OS%, %SystemRoot%
 - *User-management variables*: resources and settings owned by various user profiles, e.g. %USERPROFILE%

97

Reference: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Environment_variable#Windows

Registry Elements

- Two basic registry elements:
 - Keys:
 - Container objects similar to folders
 - May contain values and subkeys
 - Values:
 - Non-container objects similar to files
 - Each has its *type* and *data*
 - Registry value types: see https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry-value-types

Windows Registry




Figure 1.4 Registry nomenclature.

From: Harlan Carvey, "Windows Registry Forensics", 2nd Edition


ControlSet00n

- ControlSet00n subkeys represent a control set for the system:
 - The **numbered** ControlSet00*n* subkeys (e.g. ControlSet001 & ControlSet002) contain control sets that can be used to **start & run Windows**
 - Usually **2 numbered control sets**: an **original** & a **backup** copy of a control set that has been used to start the system successfully
 - But can be as many as 4 control sets
 - **Backup copies**: maintained to undo configuration changes that might otherwise prevent you from starting the system
- The Select subkey: stores the control set that was last used successfully, the current control set, and the default control set
- Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-2000-server/cc960234(v=technet.10)


Registry Editing

- Registry access (viewing/editing) on Windows:
 - **RegEdit** (available on Windows)
 - Other tools: RegRipper, MiTeC's Windows Registry Recovery, EricZimmerman's **RECmd & Registry Explorer**
- RegRipper: a popular online and offline registry analysis tool
 - Developed by Harlan Carvey
 - Can be used to perform an analysis on:
 - A live Windows machine: use the machine's registry files
 - An **offline** target machine: use the captured registry files
 - Has both CLI (rip.exe) and GUI (rr.exe) versions
 - Numerous plugins
- See Lab 5, Tasks 1-A and 1-B

Windows RegEdit



Registry-Analysis Tool: RegRipper



Registry-Analysis Tools: Registry Explorer & RECmd

- From Eric Zimmerman
- Quite popular in Digital Forensics & Incident Response
- Registry Explorer:
 - A GUI-based tool
 - Extra **features**: searching, filtering, bookmarking, other visualization
- RECmd:
 - A CLI-based tool
 - Script access to registry hives:
 can automate searching across multiple registry hives at once
- Reference: https://aboutdfir.com/toolsandartifacts/windows/registry-explorer-recmd/

Sample Registry Keys & Useful Information

- HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\WindowsNT\
 CurrentVersion key:
 - Windows version (product name): the data of its ProductName value
 - Windows product ID: the data of its **ProductId** value
 - The registered owner and organization: the data of its
 RegisteredOwner and RegisteredOrganization values,
 respectively
- For IE typed URLs information: NTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\ Internet Explorer\Typed URLs key
- For USB devices information: SYSTEM\Enum\usbstor key
- See Lab 5 Tasks 4-A and 4-B

Other Useful Information: MRU Files

- Various Most Recently Used (MRU) files of Windows applications
- From NTUSER.DAT registry file:
 - Excel's MRU:
 e.g. NTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Office\version\Excel\File MRU
 - Word's MRU: e.g. NTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Office\version\Word\File MRU
 - File Explorer's recently-accessed document folders: e.g.
 NTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\
 RecentDocs\Folder
 (Note: the folder access order is kept in MRUListEx)

Registry Analysis: USB Device's Timestamps


TABLE 5-MSC devices—comparison of artifacts in different operating systems.

	Key/Subkey	Win 7	Win 8	Win 10
First insertion time from DeviceClasses	10497b1b-ba51-44e5-8318-a65c837b6661	~	1	~
key in System Hive	53f56307-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b	~	1	1
	53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b	1	1	1
	65a9a6cf-64 cd-480b-843e-32c86e1ba19f	1		
	6ac27878-a6fa-4155-baS5-f9Sf491d4f33	~	1	1
	7f108a28-9833-4b3b-b780-2c6b5fa5c062		1	1
	7fccc86c-228a-40ad-8a58-f590af7bfdce		1	-
	a5dcbf10-6530-11d2-901f-00c04fb951ed	~	1	1
	EEC5AD98-8080-425f-922A-DABF3DE3F69A	~		
	£22£de04-d1ac-4e8e-9a30-19bbd4b108ae	~	1	1
First insertion time from System Hive	0003	~	1	1
Under USBSTOR Property Key	000A		1	1
	0064	1	1	1
	0065	-	1	-
Last insertion time from System Hive Under USBSTOR Property Key	0066		-	~
Last removal time from System Hive Under USBSTOR Property Key	0067			~
First insertion time from System Hive	VID_[VendorID]&PID_[ProductID]\[SerialNo]\DeviceParameters			~
under USB Key	\e5b3b5ac-9725-4f78-963f-03dfb1d828c7			.1821
Last insertion time from System Hive under USB Key	VID_[VendorID]&PID_[ProductID]\[SerialNo]\			
First insertion time from Software Hive	Microsoft\Windows Portable Devices\Devices \SWD#WPDBUSENUM#_??_ USBSTOR#DISK&VEN_[VenderName] &PROD_[ProductName]&REV_PMAP#[SerialNo]#{53F56307-B6BF-			~
	11D0-94F2-00A0C91EFB8B}			

From: Arshad et al. "USB Storage Device Forensics for Windows 10", 2017

Registry Analysis: USB Device's Timestamps

Example of relevant keys:



From:http://www.swiftforensics.com/2013/11/windows-8-new-registry-artifacts-part-1.html

- Additional reference:
 - https://forensics.wiki/usb_history_viewing/

Registry Analysis: USB Device's Timestamps

TABLE 6-MTP and PTP devices-comparison of artifacts in different operating systems.

	Key/Subkey	Win 7	Win 8	Win 10
First insertion Time from DeviceClasses	10497b1b-ba51-44e5-8318-a65c837b6661	~	1	~
key in System Hive	6ac27878-a6fa-4155-baS5-f9Sf491d4f33	1	1	1
The Problem of the Secretary of the Sec	6bdd1fc6-810f-11d0-bec7-08002be2092f	-	-	1
	a5dcbf10-6530-11d2-901f-00c04fb951ed		1	1
	EEC5AD98-8080-425f-922A-DABF3DE3F69A	1		
	f33fdc04-d1ac-4e8e-9a30-19bbd4b108ae	1	-	1
First insertion time from System Hive	0003		1	-
Under USB Property Key	0007		1	-
	0008			1
	0009		1	1
	000A		1	1
	0064		1	-
	0065		1	-
Last insertion time from System Hive Under USB Property Key	0066			
Last removal time from System Hive Under USB Property Key	0067			1
First insertion time from System Hive under USB Key	VID_[VendorID]&PID_[ProductID]\[SerialNo]\DeviceParameters \e5b3b5ac-9725-4f78-963f-03dfb1d828c7			1
Last insertion time from System Hive under USB Key	VID_[VendorID]&PID_[ProductID]\[SerialNo]\	~	~	

From: Arshad et al. "USB Storage Device Forensics for Windows 10", 2017

Registry for Incident Response

Run & RunOnce registry keys:

- The keys cause programs to run each time that a user logs on
- Used by attackers to achieve persistent access

Locations:

- HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
- HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
- HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
- HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
- For more details: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/setupapi/run-and-runonce-registry-keys
- Can be inspected by: Autoruns from SysInternals (Microsoft)

Useful Registry Keys for Forensics

- Question: Which registry keys to check for forensic purposes?
- Some handy online **references**:
 - *Microsoft Registry Reference*: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-2000-server/cc974061(v=msdn.10)
 - AcessData's Registry Quick Find Chart: uploaded to Canvas
 - Derrick J. Farmer, "A Windows Registry Quick Reference: For the Everyday Examiner": uploaded to Canvas
 - A forensic cheat sheet: <u>https://www.13cubed.com/downloads/dfir_cheat_sheet.pdf</u>
 - Its accompanying video demo: <u>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VYROU-ZwZX8</u>
 - Another video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hPpqWlLbrPl

Additional References on Windows Registry

General registry analysis:

- Harlan Carvey, "Windows Registry Forensics: Advanced Digital Forensic Analysis of the Windows Registry", 2nd Edition, 2016
- Alghafli et al., "Forensic Analysis of the Windows 7 Registry",
 Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 5, No. 4, 2010

USB devices and registry analysis:

- Carvey and Altheide, "Tracking USB storage: Analysis of windows artifacts generated by USB storage devices", Digital Investigation (2005) 2, 94-100
- Arshad et al., "USB Storage Device Forensics for Windows 10", J. Forensic Sci, 2017, onlinelibrary.wiley.com

Lab 5 Exercises

Lab 5 Exercises

- Task 1: Performing an automated file carving on a target disk image using:
 - Carver Recovery (based on Scalpel)
 - Bulk Extractor
- (Optional) Task 2: Performing a manual file carving of a deleted file using FTK Imager
- Task 3-A: Finding **interesting files** using Autopsy
- Task 3-B: Performing **keyword search** in Autopsy
- Task 4-A: Manual registry analysis using RegEdit
- (Optional) Task 4-B: Automated registry analysis using RegRipper

Don't forget your Graded Lab Tasks #3!

For Your Offline Discussion

- Suppose you are given a disk image file of a target Windows machine belonging to a suspect
- You are asked to find out Windows OS, user configurations of the machine, and also some files of interest in the file system
- Question: What pieces of evidence should you check, and how would you inspect them?

Questions? See you next week!