Ungraded Pre-Lecture Quiz

- In digital forensics field, what's the difference between disk copying, cloning and imaging?
- According to the Order of Volatility (OOV) theory, the first 3 most volatile evidence categories are:
 - (1) CPU, cache and register content;
 - (2) Routing table, ARP cache, process table, kernel statistics;
 - (3) Memory.

Why isn't "Memory" the most volatile category?


IFS4102: Digital Forensics


Lecture 3: Live/Volatile Acquisition, Image Analyses

Outline

- Live/volatile acquisition
- Memory image analysis
- Further on disk image acquisition & analysis
- Static acquisition challenges
- Forensic analysis using Autopsy
- Lab 3 exercises

Memory Forensics





Live/Volatile Acquisition

Live/Volatile Acquisition

Live/volatile acquisition:

- Will dump a target machine's physical memory (RAM)
- May be considered necessary nowadays, since many users encrypt their hard drives or use SSDs (more on SSDs later)

General steps:

- Prepare the acquisition software's executable files in a thumb drive
- **Invoke** the acquisition software from the drive (as administrator)
- Output the memory image file into the thumb drive or another connected external storage device, not the machine's HDD!
- Your Lab 3 Task-1 exercises!

Live Acquisition of a Windows Machine

- Useful acquisition software:
 - FTK Imager Lite:
 - A stand-alone imaging tool/set-up from AccessData:
 no installation is required
 - See Lab 3, Task 1-A
 - FireEye/Mandiant Memoryze:
 - A CLI-based acquisition executable: see Lab 3, Task 1-B
 - Can also perform various live analysis tasks on a running computer
 - MoonSols' DumpIt:


Another CLI-based acquisition tool (check out https://www.comae.com/)

Live Acquisition of a Windows Machine

- WinPmem (part of the Pmem Suite):
 - See https://winpmem.velocidex.com/
- (Commercial) Live Response from E-fense: uses a USB key
 - See http://malwarefieldguide.com/LinuxChapter1.html

FTK Imager Lite

FTK Imager Lite: a Windows-based tool



FireEye/Mandiant Memoryze

- A powerful set of *memory analysis tools*: "find evil in live memory"
- Some features:
 - Acquire and/or analyze memory images
 - Enumerate all running processes (including those hidden by rootkits)
 - Identify all loaded kernel modules by walking a linked list
 - ...
- Memoryze takes XML documents that define what to do, and then outputs the result in XML format
- Each XML script has been wrapped by a corresponding batch file

FireEye/Mandiant Memoryze

- Some included batch files:
 - **MemoryDD.bat**: acquires an image of **physical memory**
 - ProcessDD.bat: acquires an image of the process' address space
 - **DriverDD.bat**: acquires an image of a driver
 - **Process.bat**: enumerates everything about a process including handles, virtual memory, network ports, and strings
 - HookDetection.bat: looks for hooks within the OS
 - DriverSearch.bat: finds drivers
 - DriverWalkList.bat: enumerates all modules and drivers in a linked list

FireEye/Mandiant Memoryze in Action

```
F:\Memoryze\Audits> cd EXADATA
F:\Memoryze\Audits\EXADATA> dir
Volume in drive F is SAMSUNG
Volume Serial Number is 3243-30C2
Directory of F:\Memoryze\Audits\EXADATA
11/06/2014 13:51
                     <DIR>
11/06/2014 13:51
                    <DIR>
                                   20140611165146
11/06/2014 13:51
                    <DIR>
              0 File(s)
                                     0 bytes
              3 Dir(s) 535.223.562.240 bytes free
F:\Memoryze\Audits\EXADATA> cd 20140611165146
F:\Memoryze\Audits\EXADATA\20140611165146> dir
Volume in drive F is SAMSUNG
Volume Serial Number is 3243-30C2
Directory of F:\Memoryze\Audits\EXADATA\20140611165146
11/06/2014 13:51
                     <DIR>
11/06/2014 13:51
                    <DIR>
11/06/2014 13:51
                            20.056 BatchResults.xml
11/06/2014 13:51
                               283 Issues.BatchResults.xml
                             2.172
11/06/2014 13:55
issues.memory.4d021d38.img.xml
11/06/2014 13:55 17.951.621.120 memory.4d021d38.img
              4 File(s) 17.951.643.631 bytes
              2 Dir(s) 535.223.562.240 bytes free
```

From: A. Borges, "Memory Acquisition for Forensic Memory Analysis on Windows and Linux", 2014

FireEye Memoryze: Possible Acquisition Issues

- Possible **issues** during live acquisition:
 - Memoryze requires loading a kernel-level driver that gives access to raw memory: no driver, no memory image
 - Several things can **prevent** the driver from being loaded:
 - Not being run with an Admin account (or an Admin-level command prompt): the most common cause
 - Anti-virus software running on the target system
- You may see some error/warning messages during your acquisition
- Reference: https://www.sans.org/blog/digital-forensics-how-to-memory-analysis-with-mandiant-memoryze/

MoonSols' Dumplt in Action

```
F:\DumpIt> DumpIt.exe
  DumpIt - v1.3.2.20110401 - One click memory memory dumper
  Copyright (c) 2007 - 2011, Matthieu Suiche
<http://www.msuiche.net>
  Copyright (c) 2010 - 2011, MoonSols <a href="http://www.moonsols.com">http://www.moonsols.com</a>
    Address space size: 17951621120 bytes ( 17120 Mb)
                             571126833152 bytes ( 544668 Mb)
    Free space size:
    * Destination = \??\F:\DumpIt\EXADATA-20140611-164112.raw
    --> Are you sure you want to continue? [y/n] y
    + Processing... Success.
F:\DumpIt>dir
  Volume in drive F is SAMSUNG
  Volume Serial Number is 3243-30C2
  Directory of F:\DumpIt
 11/06/2014 13:41
                       <DIR>
 11/06/2014 13:41
                       <DIR>
 03/05/2011 02:41
                              207.496 DumpIt.exe
 11/06/2014 13:44
                       17.951.621.120 EXADATA-20140611-164112.raw
 18/07/2011 08:29
                                  743 README.txt
                 3 File(s) 17.951.829.359 bytes
                 2 Dir(s) 535.191.465.984 bytes free
```

From: A. Borges, "Memory Acquisition for Forensic Memory Analysis on Windows and Linux", 2014

F:\DumpIt>

WinPmem

- Download it from: <u>https://github.com/Velocidex/WinPmem/releases</u>
- It used to be under the **Rekall project**:
 - A fork of Volatility: http://blog.rekall-forensic.com/
 - The project is discontinued now
- To write a raw image to physmem.raw: winpmem_1.6.0.exe physmem.raw

```
c:\..> winpmem 1.6.0.exe -h
Winpmem - A memory imager for windows.
Copyright Michael Cohen (scudette@gmail.com) 2012-2014.
Version 1.6.0 May 15 2014
Usage:
  winpmem 1.6.0.exe [option] [output path]
Option:
        load the driver and exit.
        Unload the driver and exit.
  -d [filename]
        Extract driver to this file (Default use random name).
       Display this help.
       Turn on write mode.
       Use MmMapIoSpace method.
       Use \\Device\PhysicalMemory method (Default for 32bit OS).
     Use PTE remapping (AMD64 only - Default for 64bit OS).
       Use PTE remapping with PCI instrospection (AMD64 Only).
        Produce an ELF core dump.
NOTE: an output filename of - will write the image to STDOUT.
Examples:
winpmem 1.6.0.exe physmem.raw
Writes an image to physmem.raw
winpmem 1.6.0.exe -e - | nc 192.168.1.1 80
Writes an elf coredump to netcat for network transport.
```

From: https://rekall.readthedocs.io/en/gh-pages/Tools/pmem.html

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Live Acquisition of a *Linux* Machine

- Useful acquisition software:
 - LiME (Linux Memory Extraction, formerly DMD):
 - A Loadable Kernel Module (LKM), which allows for volatile memory acquisition from Linux & Linux-based devices (e.g. Android)
 - Utilizes the **insmod** command to load the module, passing required arguments for its execution
 - Important requirement: OS type and kernel dependant →
 it must be built for the target machine's specific kernel version
 - Reference: https://markuta.com/live-memory-acquisition-on-linux-systems/
 - Watch LiME in action: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v="

LiME in Action

```
root@hacker:~/LiMe/src# make
make -C /lib/modules/3.7-trunk-amd64/build M=/root/LiMe/src
modules
make[1]: Entering directory \u2014/usr/src/linux-headers-3.7-trunk-
amd64
  CC [M] /root/LiMe/src/tcp.o
         /root/LiMe/src/disk.o
  CC [M] /root/LiMe/src/main.o
/root/LiMe/src/main.c: In function '__check_dio':
/root/LiMe/src/main.c:56:1: warning: return from incompatible
pointer type [enabled by default]
  LD [M] /root/LiMe/src/lime.o
  Building modules, stage 2.
  MODPOST 1 modules
          /root/LiMe/src/lime.mod.o
  LD [M] /root/LiMe/src/lime.ko
make[1]: Leaving directory \u2207/usr/src/linux-headers-3.7-trunk-
amd64'
strip --strip-unneeded lime.ko
my lime.ko lime-3.7-trunk-amd64.ko
make tidy
make[1]: Entering directory \root/LiMe/src'
rm -f *.o *.mod.c Module.symvers Module.markers modules.order
\.*.o.cmd \.*.ko.cmd \.*.o.d
rm -rf \.tmp_versions
make[1]: Leaving directory \root/LiMe/src'
root@hacker:~/LiMe/src#
```

From: A. Borges, "Memory Acquisition for Forensic Memory Analysis on Windows and Linux", 2014

LiME in Action

```
root@hacker:/media/pendrive# insmod /media/pendrive/lime-3.7-
trunk-amd64.ko "path=/media/external_drive/kali_memory_dump.bin
format=lime"
```

```
root@hacker:/media/pendrive# cd /media/external_drive
root@hacker:/media/external_drive# ls -lh kali_memory_dump.bin
-r--r-- 1 root root 18G Jun 11 01:55 kali_memory_dump.bin
```

From: A. Borges, "Memory Acquisition for Forensic Memory Analysis on Windows and Linux", 2014

Live Acquisition of a Linux Machine

- LinPmem (part of the Pmem Suite):
 See https://winpmem.velocidex.com/,
 https://github.com/google/rekall/tree/master/tools/pmem
- Fmem: https://github.com/NateBrune/fmem
- Older & limited tool: Memdump (http://www.porcupine.org/forensics/tct.html)
- For a **comparison** of Linux live-acquisition tools, see: Carbone and Bourdon-Richard, "The definitive guide to Linux-based live memory acquisition tools", Defence R&D Canada, 2013 (https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2016/rddc-drdc/D68-6-319-2012-eng.pdf)

Memory Image Analysis

Analysis of Memory Image File

- We have completed a live/volatile memory acquisition of a target machine
- Question: How can we analyze the memory dump/image* file?
- Some available tools:
 - Volatility: See Lab 3 Task 2-A
 - Other memory analyzer tools, e.g. FireEye Redline
 - FTK Imager: See Lab 3 Tasks 2-B (for string searching)
 - A **hex editor**: See Lab 3 Tasks 2-C (for string searching)

***Note**: Some forensics experts do *not* like the term memory "**image**" since the RAM memory was in constant flux during its acquisition, and prefer the term "**dump**" instead

Volatility

- A popular open-source CLI-based memory image analysis tool
- Can analyse Windows, Linux, Mac memory images
- Extensible and scriptable API
- Various available plugins: https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/volatility/wiki/Command-Reference
- Note: Volatility is not a memory acquisition tool
- See Lab 3 Task 2-A, and also your Assignment 1 (see also the next slide)
- Rekall: a fork of Volatility, but the project is discontinued

Volatility Versions

- Version 3 (released in 2020):
 - A complete rewrite of the framework
 - Released under the Volatility Software License (VSL)
 - New features: see <u>Volatility 3 Public Beta: Insider's Preview</u>, <u>https://www.volexity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Volexity-Cyber-Session-April-2020-Volatility3-Public-Beta.pdf</u>
 - **Usage**: see "Introduction to Memory Forensics with Volatility 3" video (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uk3DEgY5Ue8)

• **Version 2.6**:

- Simple standalone executable for Windows
- Can analyze Windows, Linux (linux_*), Mac (mac_*) memory images
- Used in our lab and possibly mid-term practical test!

Volatility 2.6: General Commands

• Syntax and typical command components:
vol.py -f [image] --profile=[profile] [plugin]

```
# VOI.py - I [Image] --profile=[profile] [plugin]
```

Display profiles, address spaces, plugins:

```
# vol.py -info
```

Display global command-line options:

```
# vol.py -help
```

• Display plugin-specific arguments:

```
# vol.py [plugin] --help
```

Image identification:

• imageinfo: gets a high-level summary of the memory sample, including **profile suggestions** (OS and architecture)

Image identification:

 kdbgscan: positively identifies the correct profile and the correct KDBG (Kernel Debugger Block/_KDDEBUGGER_DATA64) address

```
$ python vol.py -f Win2K3SP2x64-6f1bedec.vmem --profile=Win2003SP2x64 kdbgscan
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.4
************
Instantiating KDBG using: Kernel AS Win2003SP2x64 (5.2.3791 64bit)
Offset (V)
                           : 0xf80001172cb0
Offset (P)
                           : 0x1172cb0
KDBG owner tag check
                           : True
Profile suggestion (KDBGHeader): Win2003SP2x64
                           : 0xf80001172c70 (Major: 15, Minor: 3790)
Version64
Service Pack (CmNtCSDVersion): 0
Build string (NtBuildLab)
PsActiveProcessHead
                           : 0xfffff800011947f0 (0 processes)
                           : 0xfffff80001197ac0 (0 modules)
PsLoadedModuleList
KernelBase
                           : 0xfffff80001000000 (Matches MZ: True)
Major (OptionalHeader)
                           : 5
Minor (OptionalHeader)
                           : 2
Instantiating KDBG using: Kernel AS Win2003SP2x64 (5.2.3791 64bit)
Offset (V)
                           : 0xf80001175cf0
Offset (P)
                           : 0x1175cf0
KDBG owner tag check
                           : True
Profile suggestion (KDBGHeader): Win2003SP2x64
Version64
                           : 0xf80001175cb0 (Major: 15, Minor: 3790)
Service Pack (CmNtCSDVersion) : 2
Build string (NtBuildLab)
                          : 3790.srv03_sp2_rtm.070216-1710
                           : 0xfffff800011977f0 (37 processes)
PsActiveProcessHead
PsLoadedModuleList
                           : 0xfffff8000119aae0 (116 modules)
KernelBase
                           : 0xfffff80001000000 (Matches MZ: True)
Major (OptionalHeader)
                           : 5
Minor (OptionalHeader)
                           : 0xfffff80001177000 (CPU 0)
```

Source:

https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/volatility/wiki/Command-Reference

- Processes & listings:
 - pslist: lists the processes of a system

Offset(V)	Name	PID	PPID	Thds	Hnds	Sess	Wow64	Start	Exit
0xfffffa80004b09e0	System	4	0	78	489		0	2012-02-22 19:58:20	
0xfffffa8000ce97f0	smss.exe	208	4	2	29		0	2012-02-22 19:58:20	
0xfffffa8000c006c0	csrss.exe	296	288	9	385	0	0	2012-02-22 19:58:24	
0xfffffa8000c92300	wininit.exe	332	288	3	74	0	0	2012-02-22 19:58:30	
0xfffffa8000c06b30	csrss.exe	344	324	7	252	1	0	2012-02-22 19:58:30	
0xfffffa8000c80b30	winlogon.exe	372	324	5	136	1	0	2012-02-22 19:58:31	
0xfffffa8000c5eb30	services.exe	428	332	6	193	0	9	2012-02-22 19:58:32	
0xfffffa80011c5700	lsass.exe	444	332	6	557	0	0	2012-02-22 19:58:32	
0xfffffa8000ea31b0	lsm.exe	452	332	10	133	0	9	2012-02-22 19:58:32	
0xfffffa8001296b30	svchost.exe	568	428	10	352	0	0	2012-02-22 19:58:34	
0xfffffa80012c3620	svchost.exe	628	428	6	247	0	0	2012-02-22 19:58:34	
0xfffffa8001325950	sppsvc.exe	816	428	5	154	0	е	2012-02-22 19:58:41	
0xfffffa80007b7960	svchost.exe	856	428	16	404	0	0	2012-02-22 19:58:43	
0xfffffa80007bb750	svchost.exe	889	428	34	1118	0	0	2012-02-22 19:58:43	
0xfffffa80007d09e0	svchost.exe	916	428	19	443	0	0	2012-02-22 19:58:43	
0xfffffa8000c64840	svchost.exe	348	428	14	338	0	0	2012-02-22 20:02:07	
0xfffffa8000c09630	svchost.exe	504	428	16	496	0	0	2012-02-22 20:02:07	
0xfffffa8000e86690	spoolsv.exe	1976	428	12	271	0	0	2012-02-22 20:02:10	
0xfffffa8000518b30	svchost.exe	1104	428	18	307	0	0	2012-02-22 20:02:10	

Processes & listings:

• pstree: views the process listing in tree form

ame	Pid	PPid	Thds	Hnds	Time
0xfffffa80004b09e0:System	4	0	78	489	2012-02-22 19:58:2
0xfffffa8000ce97f0:smss.exe	208	4	2	29	2012-02-22 19:58:2
0xfffffa8000c006c0:csrss.exe	296	288	9	385	2012-02-22 19:58:2
0xfffffa8000c92300:wininit.exe	332	288	3	74	2012-02-22 19:58:3
0xfffffa8000c5eb30:services.exe	428	332	6	193	2012-02-22 19:58:3
. 0xfffffa8000aa0b30:SearchIndexer.	1800	428	12	757	2012-02-22 20:02:2
. 0xfffffa80007d09e0:svchost.exe	916	428	19	443	2012-02-22 19:58:4
. 0xfffffa8000a4f630:svchost.exe	1432	428	12	350	2012-02-22 20:04:1
. 0xfffffa800094d960:wlms.exe	1264	428	4	43	2012-02-22 20:02:1
. 0xfffffa8001325950:sppsvc.exe	816	428	5	154	2012-02-22 19:58:4
. 0xfffffa8000e86690:spoolsv.exe	1076	428	12	271	2012-02-22 20:02:1
. 0xfffffa8001296b30:svchost.exe	568	428	10	352	2012-02-22 19:58:3
0xfffffa8000a03b30:rundll32.exe	2016	568	3	67	2012-02-22 20:03:1

Processes & listings:

• psscan: finds processes that previously **terminated** (inactive) and processes that have been **hidden** or **unlinked** by a rootkit

Offset N	Name	PID	PPID	PDB	Time created	Time exited	
0x3e025ba8 sv	vchost.exe	1116	508	0x3ecf1220	2010-06-16 15:25:25		
0x3e04f070 sv	vchost.exe	1152	508	0x3ecf1340	2010-06-16 15:27:40		
0x3e144c08 dw	wm.exe	1540	832	0x3ecf12e0	2010-06-16 15:26:58		
0x3e145c18 TP	PA <mark>u</mark> toConnSvc.	1900	508	0x3ecf1360	2010-06-16 15:25:41		
0x3e3393f8 ls	sass.exe	516	392	0x3ecf10e0	2010-06-16 15:25:18		
0x3e35b8f8 sv	vchost.exe	628	508	0x3ecf1120	2010-06-16 15:25:19		
0x3e383770 sv	vchost.exe	832	508	0x3ecf11a0	2010-06-16 15:25:20		
0x3e3949d0 sv	vchost.exe	740	508	0x3ecf1160	2010-06-16 15:25:20		
0x3e3a5100 sv	vchost.exe	872	508	0x3ecf11c0	2010-06-16 15:25:20		Source:
0x3e3f64e8 sv	vchost.exe	992	508	0x3ecf1200	2010-06-16 15:25:24		https://github.com/yolatilityfoundation
0x3e45a530 wi	ininit.exe	392	316	0x3ecf10a0	2010-06-16 15:25:15		https://github.com/volatilityfoundation
0x3e45d928 sv	vchost.exe	1304	508	0x3ecf1260	2010-06-16 15:25:28		/volatility/wiki/Command-Reference
0x3e45f530 cs	srss.exe	400	384	0x3ecf1040	2010-06-16 15:25:15		
0x3e4d89c8 vm	mtoolsd.exe	1436	508	0x3ecf1280	2010-06-16 15:25:30		
0x3e4db030 sp	poolsv.exe	1268	508	0x3ecf1240	2010-06-16 15:25:28		
0x3e50b318 se	ervices.exe	508	392	0x3ecf1080	2010-06-16 15:25:18		
0x3e7f3d40 cs	srss.exe	352	316	0x3ecf1060	2010-06-16 15:25:12		
0x3e7f5bc0 wi	inlogon.exe	464	384	0x3ecf10c0	2010-06-16 15:25:18		
0x3eac6030 Se	earchProtocol	2448	1168	0x3ecf15c0	2010-06-16 23:30:52	2010-06-16 23:33:14	
0x3eb10030 Se	earchFilterHo	1812	1168	0x3ecf1480	2010-06-16 23:31:02	2010-06-16 23:33:14	
[snip]							

- Process & information (with -o | --offset or -p | --pid):
 - dlllist: displays **DLLs**

```
$ python vol.py -f ~/Desktop/win7 trial 64bit.raw --profile=Win7SP0x64 dlllist
wininit.exe pid:
Command line : wininit.exe
                                 Size
                                                LoadCount Path
Base
                                                   0xffff C:\Windows\system32\wininit.exe
0x00000000ff530000
                               0x23000
0x0000000076d40000
                             0x1ab000
                                                   0xffff C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll
                                                   0xffff C:\Windows\system32\kernel32.dll
0x0000000076b20000
                             0x11f000
0x000007fefcd50000
                              0x6b000
                                                   0xffff C:\Windows\system32\KERNELBASE.dll
                               0xfa000
                                                   0xffff C:\Windows\system32\USER32.dll
0x0000000076c40000
0x000007fefd7c0000
                               0x67000
                                                   0xffff C:\Windows\system32\GDI32.dll
                                                   0xffff C:\Windows\system32\LPK.dll
0x000007fefe190000
                               0xe000
                                                   0xffff C:\Windows\system32\USP10.dll
0x000007fefef80000
                               0xca000
0x000007fefd860000
                                                   0xffff C:\Windows\system32\msvcrt.dll
                               0x9f000
[snip]
```

Source: https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/volatility/wiki/Command-Reference

- Process & information (with -o | --offset or -p | --pid):
 - dlllist: displays DLLs of a specific process

```
$ python vol.py -f ~/Desktop/win7 trial 64bit.raw --profile=Win7SP0x64 dlllist -p 1892
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.4
iexplore.exe pid: 1892
Command line: "C:\Program Files (x86)\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe"
Note: use ldrmodules for listing DLLs in Wow64 processes
Base
                                 Size
                                               LoadCount Path
0x0000000000080000
                              0xa6000
                                                  0xffff C:\Program Files (x86)\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe
                             0x1ab000
                                                  0xffff C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdl1.dl1
0x0000000076d40000
                                                     0x3 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\wow64.dll
0x00000000748d0000
                              0x3f000
                                                     0x1 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\wow64win.dll
0x0000000074870000
                              0x5c000
                                                     0x1 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\wow64cpu.dll
0x0000000074940000
                               0×8000
```

Source: https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/volatility/wiki/Command-Reference

- Process & information (with -o | --offset or -p | --pid):
 - handles: displays open handles (files, registry keys, mutexes, named pipes, events, window stations, desktops, threads, ...)

Offset(V)	Pid	Handle	Access	Type	Details
0xfffffa80004b09e0	4	0x4	0x1fffff	Process	System(4)
0xfffff8a0000821a0	4	0x10	0x2001f	Key	MACHINE\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\CONTROL\
0xfffff8a00007e040	4	0x14	0xf003f	Key	MACHINE\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\CONTROL\
0xfffff8a000081fa0	4	0x18	0x2001f	Key	MACHINE\SYSTEM\SETUP
0xfffffa8000546990	4	0x1c	0x1f0001	ALPC Port	PowerMonitorPort
xfffffa800054d070	4	0x20	0x1f0001	ALPC Port	PowerPort
xfffff8a0000676a0	4	0x24	0x20019	Key	MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\SYSTEM\M
0xfffffa8000625460	4	0x28	0x1fffff	Thread	TID 160 PID 4
xfffff8a00007f400	4	0x2c	0xf003f	Key	MACHINE\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001
xfffff8a00007f200	4	0x30	0xf003f	Key	MACHINE\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\ENUM
xfffff8a000080d10	4	0x34	0xf003f	Key	MACHINE\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\CONTROL\
xfffff8a00007f500	4	0x38	0xf003f	Key	MACHINE\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES
xfffff8a0001cd990	4	0x3c	0xe	Token	
xfffff8a00007bfa0	4	0x40	0x20019	Key	MACHINE\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\CONTROL\
xfffffa8000cd52b0	4	0x44	0x120116	File	\Device\Mup
xfffffa8000ce97f0	4	0x48	0x2a	Process	smss.exe(208)
xfffffa8000df16f0	4	0x4c	0x120089	File	\Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\Syste
xfffffa8000de37f0	4	0x50	0x12019f	File	\Device\clfsTxfLog
xfffff8a000952fa0	4	0x54	0x2001f	Key	MACHINE\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\CONTROL\
xfffffa800078da20	4	0x58	0x12019f	File	\Device\Tcp
xfffff8a002e17610	4	0x5c	0x9	Key	MACHINE\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS NT
xfffff8a0008f7b00	4	0x60	0x10	Key	MACHINE\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\CONTROL\
xfffffa8000da2870	4	0x64	0x100001	File	\Device\KsecDD
0xfffffa8000da3040	4	0x68	0x0	Thread	TID 228 PID 4

Source:

https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/volatility/wiki/Command-Reference

- Process & information (with -0 | --offset or -p | --pid):
 - handles: displays open handles in a process [based on object type]

255+()()		y Framework 2.4	A	Turne	Dataila
Offset(V) 	Pid	Handle	Access	Type	Details
0xfffffa8000c92300	296	0x54	0x1fffff	Process	wininit.exe(332)
0xfffffa8000c5eb30	296	0xc4	0x1fffff	Process	services.exe(428)
0xfffffa80011c5700	296	0xd4	0x1fffff	Process	lsass.exe(444)
0xfffffa8000ea31b0	296	0xe4	0x1fffff	Process	lsm.exe(452)
0xfffffa8000c64840	296	0x140	0x1fffff	Process	svchost.exe(348)
0xfffffa8001296b30	296	0x150	0x1fffff	Process	svchost.exe(568)
0xfffffa80012c3620	296	0x18c	0x1fffff	Process	svchost.exe(628)
0xfffffa8001325950	296	0x1dc	0x1fffff	Process	sppsvc.exe(816)

Source: https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/volatility/wiki/Command-Reference

- Process & information (with -o | --offset or -p | --pid):
 - cmdscan: shows commands entered through a console shell (cmd.exe) by scanning for COMMAND_HISTORY

```
$ python vol.py -f VistaSP2x64.vmem --profile=VistaSP2x64 cmdscan
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.4
*****************
CommandProcess: csrss.exe Pid: 528
CommandHistory: 0x135ec00 Application: cmd.exe Flags: Allocated, Reset
CommandCount: 18 LastAdded: 17 LastDisplayed: 17
FirstCommand: 0 CommandCountMax: 50
ProcessHandle: 0x330
Cmd #0 @ 0x135ef10: cd \
Cmd #1 @ 0x135ef50: cd de
Cmd #2 @ 0x135ef70: cd PerfLogs
Cmd #3 @ 0x135ef90: cd ..
Cmd #4 @ 0x5c78b90: cd "Program Files"
Cmd #5 @ 0x135fae0: cd "Debugging Tools for Windows (x64)"
Cmd #6 @ 0x135efb0: livekd -w
Cmd #7 @ 0x135f010: windbg
Cmd #8 @ 0x135efd0: cd \
Cmd #9 @ 0x135fd20: rundll32 c:\apphelp.dll,ExportFunc
Cmd #10 @ 0x5c8bdb0: rundll32 c:\windows apphelp.dll,ExportFunc
Cmd #11 @ 0x5c8be10: rundll32 c:\windows_apphelp.dll
Cmd #12 @ 0x135ee30: rundll32 c:\windows_apphelp.dll,Test
Cmd #13 @ 0x135fd70: cd "Program Files"
Cmd #14 @ 0x5c8b9e0: dir
Cmd #15 @ 0x5c8be60: cd "Debugging Tools for Windows (x64)"
Cmd #16 @ 0x5c8ba00: dir
Cmd #17 @ 0x135eff0: livekd -w
[snip]
```

Source:

https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/volatility/wiki/Command-Reference

- Process & information (with -o | --offset or -p | --pid):
 - consoles: shows commands that attackers typed into cmd.exe or executed via backdoors by scanning for CONSOLE_INFORMATION

```
$ python vol.py -f xp-laptop-2005-07-04-1430.img consoles
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.4
[csrss.exe @ 0x821c11a8 pid 456 console @ 0x4e23b0]
 OriginalTitle: '%SystemRoot%\\system32\\cmd.exe'
 Title: 'C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\cmd.exe - dd if=\\\.\\PhysicalMemory of=c:\\xp-2005-07-04-1430.img conv=noerror
 HistoryBufferCount: 2
 HistoryBufferMax: 4
 CommandHistorySize: 50
[history @ 0x4e4008]
 CommandCount: 0
 CommandCountMax: 50
  Application: 'dd.exe'
[history @ 0x4e4d88]
 CommandCount: 20
 CommandCountMax: 50
 Application: 'cmd.exe'
 Cmd #0 @ 0x4e1f90: 'dd'
 Cmd #1 @ 0x4e2cb8: 'cd\\'
 Cmd #2 @ 0x4e2d18: 'dr'
 Cmd #3 @ 0x4e2d28: 'ee:'
 Cmd #4 @ 0x4e2d38: 'e;'
 Cmd #5 @ 0x4e2d48: 'e:'
 Cmd #6 @ 0x4e2d58: 'dr'
 Cmd #7 @ 0x4e2d68: 'd;'
 Cmd #8 @ 0x4e2d78: 'd:'
 Cmd #9 @ 0x4e2d88: 'dr'
 Cmd #10 @ 0x4e2d98: 'ls'
 Cmd #11 @ 0x4e2da8: 'cd Docu'
 Cmd #12 @ 0x4e2dc0: 'cd Documents and'
 Cmd #13 @ 0x4e2e58: 'dr'
 Cmd #14 @ 0x4e2e68: 'd:'
 Cmd #15 @ 0x4e2e78: 'cd dd\\'
```

Source:

https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/volatility/wiki/Command-Reference

- Process & information (with -o | --offset or -p | --pid):
 - envars: displays environment variables

id	ty Foundation Volatili Process	*	Variable	Value
	Process	BIOCK	val.table	value
296	csrss.exe	0x00000000003d1320	ComSpec	C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe
296	csrss.exe	0x00000000003d1320	FP_NO_HOST_CHECK	NO
296	csrss.exe	0x00000000003d1320	NUMBER_OF_PROCESSORS	1
296	csrss.exe	0x00000000003d1320	OS	Windows_NT
296	csrss.exe	0x00000000003d1320	Path	<pre>C:\Windows\system32;C:\Windows;C:\Wind</pre>
296	csrss.exe	0x00000000003d1320	PATHEXT	.COM;.EXE;.BAT;.CMD;.VBS;.VBE;.JS;.JSE
296	csrss.exe	0x00000000003d1320	PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE	AMD64
296	csrss.exe	0x00000000003d1320	PROCESSOR_IDENTIFIER	Intel64 Family 6 Model 2 Stepping 3, 6
296	csrss.exe	0x00000000003d1320	PROCESSOR_LEVEL	6
296	csrss.exe	0x00000000003d1320	PROCESSOR_REVISION	0203
296	csrss.exe	0x00000000003d1320	PSModulePath	<pre>C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\</pre>
296	csrss.exe	0x00000000003d1320	SystemDrive	C:
296	csrss.exe	0x00000000003d1320	SystemRoot	C:\Windows
296	csrss.exe	0x00000000003d1320	TEMP	C:\Windows\TEMP
296	csrss.exe	0x00000000003d1320	TMP	C:\Windows\TEMP
296	csrss.exe	0x00000000003d1320	USERNAME	SYSTEM
296	csrss.exe	0x00000000003d1320	windir	C:\Windows

Volatility 2.6: Some Other Commands (Windows)

Logs & histories:

- Recover event logs (XP/2003): evtlogs
- Recover IE cache/Internet history: iehistory
- Show running services: svcscan

Networking information:

- Active info (XP/2003): connections and sockets
- Scan for residual info (XP/2003): connscan and sockscan
- Network info for Vista, 2008, and 7: netscan

Kernel & objects:

• Scan for driver objects: driverscan

Volatility 2.6: Some Commands (Linux)

Processes listings:

- Basic active process listing: linux pslist
- Show processes in parent/child tree: linux pstree
- Process information (with -o|--offset or -p|--pid):
 - Display shared libraries: linux_library_list
 - Show command line arguments: linux psaux
 - Display open handles: linux_lsof
 - Display environment variables: linux_psenv and linux_bash_env

• **Networking** information:


- Active info: linux netstat
- Interface information: linux_ifconfig

Volatility: Resources

- Volatility references:
 - Uploaded Volatility cheat sheet on LumiNUS
 - Command reference: https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/volatility/wiki/Command-Reference
- Some **videos**:
 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Cl69Bj9T5s
 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1PAGcPJFwbE
- A sample interesting Volatility plugin: CryptoScan:
 - Written by Jesse Kornblum
 - Finds TrueCrypt passphrases
 - Source: https://github.com/binglot/Cryptoscan
 - Demo (interesting!): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1oEcqYZpNvs

Other Memory Analyzers: FireEye Redline

- You can also use other memory analyzer tools, e.g. (GUI-based) FireEye Redline
- FireEye used to have AuditViewer



Ref:

https://www.sans.org/blog/digitalforensics-how-to-memory-analysiswith-mandiant-memoryze/

Other Memory Analyzers: FireEye Redline

- Redline can inspect running processes and drivers from memory
- Reference: https://fireeye.market/apps/211364
- A video demo: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tCIEYCWTdk4
- See also for a comparison of Redline and Volatility + other memory analysis tools: https://soshace.com/comparative-analysis-of-free-tools-for-physical-memory-dumps-parsing/

Hex Editor for File Inspection & Analysis

- Examine and operate on data at the binary/raw level
- Various available tools:
 - Commercial: Hex Workshop (BreakPoint Software), 010 Editor,
 WinHex (X-Ways Software Technology), ...

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
- Free: various tools
- Good features of a good hex editor:
 - Open big files or the entire local drives
 - Compute a hash value
 - Search/replace byte patterns or sectored data
 - Make changes on data

Hex Editor for File Inspection & Analysis

- Perform bitwise arithmetic operations: e.g. shifting bits
- Convert number base
- Recover data
- Other disk utilities: disk backup, low-level erase, ...
- Some **forensics use cases** in your labs:
 - String searching: Lab 3 Task 2-C
 - Inspect a file with modified extension: Lab 4
- Video:
 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L3BwXbRDQM4

Further on Disk Image Acquisition & Analysis

Disk Forensics: Acquisition Challenges & Analysis



Accessing Memory Disk Image (Review)

- How can we analyze the dumped disk image?
- We have used **FTK Imager** (Lab 2):
 - Add image as evidence:
 - Allow you to browse file system, and extract/export files of interest
 - Mount image as a drive:
 - Make a disk visible to the OS
 - Allows external tools to inspect the files, e.g. anti-virus software

Challenges during Static Acquisition?


- We haven't discussed some challenges that you may face during your static acquisition on non-volatile storage media
- It is **not** always possible to do a static acquisition:
 - Size of the media (storage density) and time available
 - RAID
 - Cloud-based storage
 - SSDs
 - Anti-forensics techniques

Acquired Disk Image: How about Its Analysis??


- Analysis using forensic suites:
 - **Autopsy**: Discussed later in this lecture, Lab 3 Task 3 (file and deleted file extractions), additional tasks in the next two labs
 - Other forensics suites: Links to video demos are given in this lecture
- More specialized analysis tools:
 - **Disk** and **file analyses**: in Lecture 4 & Lab 4 (e.g. TSK tool)
 - OS forensics: Windows and Linux forensics
 - Network forensics
 - **Internet** forensics: web and email forensics
 - Application/media forensics

Forensic Software Suites

Typical user interface:



Static Acquisition & Volume+File-System Analysis



From: Brian Carrier, "File System Forensic Analysis"

Lab 3 Exercises: Preview

- Task 1: Perform a live acquisition of a Windows machine using:
 - FTK Imager Lite
 - (Optional) FireEye's Memoryze
- Task 2: Inspect and analyze a memory image file using:
 - Volatility: various commands
 - FTK Imager: string searching
 - (Optional) Hex Editor (WinHex): string searching
- Task 3: Inspect and analyse a disk image file using Autopsy

Break!

Lab 3 Exercises: Things to Do before the Lab!

During the break or while listening to the 2nd part of the lecture, you can already start doing:

- For Task 2: **Download** the given sample image file
- For Task 1-A: Run FTK Imager Lite to do a live acquisition

Static Acquisition Challenges

Potential Challenges during Static Acquisition

- Let's discuss the **potential challenges**:
 - Size of the media (storage density) and time available
 - RAID
 - Cloud-based storage
 - SSDs
 - Anti-forensics techniques

Acquisition Challenge #1: RAID

- RAID: Redundant Array of Independent Disks, originally Redundant Array of Inexpensive Disks
- Combines multiple physical disk drive components into one or more logical units: for data redundancy, performance improvement, or both
- Common **techniques**: mirroring, striping, parity
- Various RAID levels:
 - **Standard** levels: RAID 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
 - **Nested (hybrid)** levels: RAID 0+1, 1+0 (10), ...
 - See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RAID

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Understanding RAID




Figure 3-13 RAID 5: Block-level striping with distributed parity © Cengage Learning®


Handling Computer Hardware (cont.)

RAID



RAID Disk Acquisition: Hardware RAID

- Question: how should we do a **static acquisition** on **RAID disk**?
- Some **guidelines** below (Brian Carrier, "File System Forensic Analysis")
- If a hardware RAID is used:
 - The computer sees only the RAID volume and not the individual disks




From: Brian Carrier, "File System Forensic Analysis"

RAID Disk Acquisition: Hardware RAID

- First, acquire the **final RAID** *volume* as though it were a normal single disk: to be analyzed using partition & file system analysis tools
 - How? Boot the suspect system with a bootable OS
 that has drivers for the RAID controller, then use dd*/FTK Imager/...
 - **Issue**: a **large amount** of disk space (GBs to TBs) can be required to store the image?!
- Then, try to possibly acquire the contents of **each** *physical* **disk** to check any hidden data in the disk's unused sectors
- In summary: logical acquisition + (possible) physical acquisition

RAID Disk Acquisition: Software RAID

- If a software RAID is used:
 - The OS has special **drivers** that merge the individual disks
 - The OS sees the individual disks, but may show only the RAID volume to the user



From: Brian Carrier, "File System Forensic Analysis"

RAID Disk Acquisition: Software RAID

- Yet, the individual disks can typically be accessed through raw devices (UNIX system) or device objects (Microsoft Windows)
- Analysis & acquisition of software RAID is similar to a hardware RAID: acquire the RAID volume and then physical disks
- In summary: logical acquisition + physical acquisition (which can be done)
- Unlike hardware RAID, there could be **some tools** that **can merge** the individual disks together: *more possible analysis & results?*

RAID Disk Acquisition

- RAID disk acquisition can be rather challenging in practice, especially the physical acquisition
- More doable alternative techniques:
 - Logical acquisition:
 - Copies the directories and files of a logical volume
 - Pros: Faster & easier than bit-stream imaging
 - Cons: Does not capture other data that may be present on the media,
 e.g. deleted files or residual data stored in slack space
 - Sparse acquisition:
 - Logical + fragments of unallocated/deleted data blocks

Acquisition Challenge #2: Cloud-based Storage

- Various popular cloud-based storage systems: Google Drive, DropBox, OneDrive, ...
- Inaccessible underlying physical disks: completely shielded!
- *So, how?*
- Acquisition is typically limited to logical acquisition only (duh!)
- Any other possibilities??

Acquisition Challenge #3: Solid-State Drives



From: Wikipedia

Solid-State Drives (SSDs)

- SSDs store data in semiconductor cells: no moving parts!
- **Strengths**: They are more resistant to physical shock, run silently, and have quicker access time and lower latency
- **Drawbacks**: More expensive, a **limited number of writes**, and will be slower the more filled up they are
- An SSD uses a SSD controller:
 - An embedded **processor** that executes firmware-level code: one of the most important factors of SSD performance
 - It handles various **functions**, e.g. wear leveling, garbage collection (*more on these later*)

See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solid-state_drive

SSDs: Data Overwrite = Erase + Write

- Data overwrite process:
 - In magnetic tapes and disks: can write over old data
 - In SSDs: has to completely **clear each data block** before writing new data to drives
- In SSDs:
 - Data-block overwrite = erase then write the data-block
 - See also: https://datarecovery.com/rd/file-deletion-different-solid-state-drives-hard-drives/

SSDs: Wear Levelling Policy

- SSDs have constraints on **limited** number of writes on blocks
 - **Endurance rating**: number of block erasure (in cycles)
 - Question: any consequences on SSD operations?


Wear levelling policy:

- Suppose a block is erased repeatedly without writing to any other blocks: the block will wear out before all the other blocks
 → a premature ending of life
- To prevent that, SSDs distribute blocks around endurance rating limits: to ensure even wear of erasures and re-writes for all blocks
- A data-block update is done by writing into a <u>new</u> data block
- The old data block is to be erased by the SSD controller and put into free space: TRIM command and garbage collector

SSDs: TRIM Command & Garbage Collector

- **TRIM command** (enabled by default): issued by the OS to the SSD controller at the time the user deletes a file, formats the disk, or deletes a partition
- Background garbage collector:
 - Responds to TRIM command
 - Built into SSD controller to physically erases deleted blocks and put them back to free space
- The block-deletion workflow is explained in the next slide
 - See also: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vLoYduckmuo

SSDs: TRIM Command & Garbage Collector



- 1.) SSD pages contain no data
- 2.) User writes data to SSD pages
- User deletes some data. Pages are marked as 'not in use' by the host OS, but data remains on SSD.
- 4.) TRIM command tells SSD controller that pages contain invalid data. Pages with invalid data are cleaned.
- 5.) Data is written back to SSD memory cells. The invalid data has been cleaned and data is able to be written to the pages at full speed.

Acquisition Challenge #3: Solid-State Drives

Acquisition challenge:

- The TRIM command + garbage collector zeroes all deleted data blocks, whole range of a deleted file
- Most SSDs execute the TRIM function very quickly
- See also: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solid-state-drive#Data-recovery-and-secure-deletion
- In conclusion, for acquisition of SSDs:
 - Logical acquisition
 - Physical acquisition: possible, but finding residual data and performing file carving become much harder
 - → the TRIM function will eventually (even soon) zero deleted data blocks

Acquisition Challenge #4: Anti-Forensics Techniques

- Why/goal:
 - To avoid discovery of information related to a suspect's illegal activities
- How:
 - By making forensics investigations difficult, significantly more time-consuming, or impossible
- Possible different techniques:
 - Data transformation:
 - By **manipulating** data
 - E.g. encryption
 - Data hiding:
 - By **obfuscating** data
 - E.g. steganography


Other Possible Anti-Forensics Techniques

- Data destruction:
 - By **erasing** data
 - Some tools: BCWipe, Eraser, MS Sdelete, shred, Secure Empty Trash
- Data fabrication
 - By **creating** bogus data
- File-system obstruction/alteration:
 - By **blocking** data access on file systems
 - E.g. manual file-system metadata alteration

Forensic Analysis using Autopsy Forensic Suite

Forensic Analysis


- The analysis of forensics images is normally the most time-consuming task:
 - Which tools to use
 - What techniques/features to use
 - How to identify and correlate important pieces of evidence
- Forensic **software suites**:
 - They can do acquisitions, interpretation, analysis and report writing
 - While this is useful, it does **not** mean they are the only tools needed



From: http://sleuthkit.org/autopsy/docs/user-docs/4.19.2//

Supporting Specialized Software Tools

- Numerous **specialized tools** exist:
 - Drive mounters
 - Registry editors
 - Event viewers
 - Password crackers
 - Cache extractors
 - •
- Other diagnostic & analysis tools not specifically for forensics are often also used



Autopsy Forensic Suite: Some History

- 2001: First open source release
 - Interface to **The Sleuth Kit (TSK)**: powerful volume + FS analysis tools
 - Perl/HTML, Linux and OS X only
 - Usability limitations: See D.J. Bennett and P. Stephens, "A Usability Analysis of the Autopsy Forensic Browser", 2nd International Symposium on Human Aspects of Information Security & Assurance (HAISA), 2008
- 2010: Started v3 from scratch as a platform
 - Windows-based & automated
 - v3.0.0 released in September 2012
- 2015: Autopsy v4.0 was launched

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Autopsy v3+

- Targeted **features**:
 - Simple UI concepts
 - Easy to install and use
 - Several frameworks and plug-in modules
 - Extensible
 - Updated by community
 - **Free** (*yay!*)
- See:
 - Brian Carrier, "Autopsy 3.0", Basis Technology, 2013
 - Julia Keffer, "Autopsy Forensic Browser User Guide", 2013

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Autopsy v4+

- Allows for a collaboration:
 - Multiple examiners can work on the same case at the same time, and see what other examiners are doing
 - Examiners have access to real-time information via network-based services, including a central database and keyword index
 - See: https://www.autopsy.com/collaborative-autopsy-how-it-works/
- Additionally implemented **new features**:
 - See https://www.autopsy.com/blog/
- References:
 - Quick start guide (latest version): https://sleuthkit.org/autopsy/docs/user-docs/4.19.3/quick start guide.html
 - User Documentation (latest version): <u>https://sleuthkit.org/autopsy/docs/user-docs/4.19.3/</u>

Autopsy Workflow (Process Flow)




Figure 1: Autopsy Process Flow

From: Julia Keffer, "Autopsy Forensic Browser User Guide", 2013

Autopsy Workflow

1.Create a case:

• A *case* is a container for one or more data sources (one must be created)

2.Adding data sources:

• One or more *data sources* (e.g. disk images, VM files, local files) are added

3. Analyze with ingest modules:

- Selected *ingest modules* operate in the **background** to analyze the data
- Results are posted to the interface in real time and provide alerts as necessary

Autopsy Workflow


3. Manual Analysis:


- The user navigates the interface, file contents, and ingest module results for *evidence identification*
- Item tagging is possible for reporting & analysis

4.Report Generation:

• The user initiates a *final report* based on selected tags or results


Autopsy v4+: Creating a Case






From: http://sleuthkit.org/autopsy/docs/user-docs/4.19.2//


Autopsy v4+: Creating a Case






From: http://sleuthkit.org/autopsy/docs/user-docs/4.19.2//


Autopsy v4+: Adding Data Sources




Autopsy v4+: Case's "Data Source Summary"



Autopsy v4+: Interface Window




Autopsy v4+: Interface Window




- Seven main areas/sections:
 - Persons / Hosts / Data Sources
 - Views: shown aggregately from more than one data source by file type, deleted files, file size
 - Results:
 - Extracted Content: data artifacts created by running ingest, e.g. call logs and messages from communication logs
 - Analysis Results: results from running ingest, e.g. Keyword Hits, Hashset Hits
 - OS Accounts: associated with a host, and the host information is displayed
 - **Tags**: files and results that have been tagged are shown
 - Reports: Reports that have been generated







The default mode of "Persons / Hosts / Data Sources" section:



From: http://sleuthkit.org/autopsy/docs/user-docs/4.19.2//


After the "Group by Person/Host" option in the View Options is selected:





Persons are **manually created** and can be **associated** with one or more hosts

Autopsy v4+: Ingest Modules



From: http://sleuthkit.org/ autopsy/docs/userdocs/4.19.2//ingest page.html

Autopsy Ingest Modules: Common Information

Execution:

- Run automatically as a data source is added to a case
- Can also be run later by right-clicking on a data source and choosing "Run Ingest Modules"

Configuration:

 You can enable/disable each module and choose which type of files to analyze


Progress and completion information:

- Notification of ingest already run
- Completed ingests
- Ongoing ingest activity

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Autopsy v4+: Ingest Module's Configuration

File Filters panel: can be opened from the ingest module's selection panel or through the Ingest tab on the main options panel




From: http://sleuthkit.org/ autopsy/docs/userdocs/4.19.2//ingest

page.html

Autopsy v4+: Ingest Module's Configuration


Ingest Profiles



From: http://sleuthkit.org/ autopsy/docs/userdocs/4.19.2//ingest page.html


Autopsy v4+: Ingest Module's Configuration

Ingest Profiles




From: http://sleuthkit.org/ autopsy/docs/userdocs/4.19.2//ingest _page.html


Autopsy v4+: Ingest Already-Run Alert




From: http://sleuthkit.org/ autopsy/docs/userdocs/4.19.2//ingest page.html

Autopsy v4+: Ingest Progress/Completion Statuses








Some Useful Ingest Modules

Recent Activity:


- Extracts user activity as saved by web browsers (including web searches), installed programs, and OS
- Runs Regripper on the Registry hive
- Enables to see what activity has occurred in the last 7 days of usage, what web sites were visited, what the machine did, and what it connected to

Autopsy v4+ Module: Recent Activity



From: https://sleuthkit.org/autopsy/docs/user-docs/3.1/quick_start_guide.html

Autopsy v4+ Module: Recent Activity




From: http://sleuthkit.org/autopsy/docs/user-docs/4.19.2//

Some Useful Ingest Modules


Keyword Search:


- Facilitates both the ingest portion of searching,
 and also supports manual text searching after ingest has completed
- Extracts text from: files being ingested, selected reports generated by other modules, and results generated by other modules
- Techniques used: indexing, string extraction algorithm
- Built-in lists of regular expressions for searching Phone Numbers, IP addresses, URLs and E-mail addresses:
 - This can potentially take a long time to complete
 - A possibility of **false positives**

Autopsy v4+ Module: Keyword Search



Autopsy v4+ Module: Keyword Search's Options






Unique: 5

Total: 5


Sort by: Time ▼

Autopsy v4+ Module: Keyword Search's Options



From: http://sleuthkit.org/autopsy/docs/user-docs/4.19.2

Autopsy v4+ Module: Keyword Search's Results



Some Useful Ingest Modules


Hash Lookup:


- Calculates MD5 hash values for files, and looks them up in a database (existing hash set)
- Determines if the files are known good files, notable (known bad) files, included/contained in a specific set of files, or unknown files


Steps:


- Import a database/hash-set, e.g. NIST National Software Reference Library (NSRL) for known good/bad files
- Add hashes into a hash set
- Index the files (lookup processing)
- Inspect the reported hashset hits
- Create a new hash set

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


From: http://sleuthkit.org/autopsy/docs/user-docs/4.19.2//


Some Useful Ingest Modules

- File Type Identification:
 - Does *not* rely on file extensions
 - Identifies files based on their internal signatures
 - Uses the **Tika library** for its primary file detection, which can be customized with user-defined rules
- Do enable this ingest module as other modules depend on its results, including:
 - Extension Mismatch Detector module
 - Keyword Search module


Autopsy v4+ Module: File Type Identification




IFS4102




Autopsy v4+ Module: Extension Mismatch Detector







Autopsy v4+ Module: Interesting Files Identifier



Autopsy v4+ Module: Interesting Files Identifier




Autopsy v4+ Module: Picture Analyzer




From: http://sleuthkit.org/autopsy/docs/user-docs/4.19.2//

Autopsy v4+ Module: Email Parser




From: http://sleuthkit.org/autopsy/docs/user-docs/4.19.2//

Autopsy v4+ Module: Virtual Machine Extractor



Autopsy v4+ Module: Plaso


Extract **timestamps** for various file types, and create a **timeline diagram**




Some Useful Ingest Modules

- Some **other modules** to consider:
 - Embedded File Extraction: opens ZIP, RAR, other archive formats
 - YARA Analyzer: useful for malware analysis, but can be used to search for any type of files
 - Android Analyzer: analyzes SQLite and other files from an Android device
 - Android Analyzer (aLEAPP): runs aLEAPP
 (https://github.com/abrignoni/aLEAPP), and converts the results into results that can be viewed in Autopsy
- Third party add-on modules:
 - Child_Exploitation_Hashsets, Chrome_Passwords, GoogleDrive, ...
 - See: https://github.com/sleuthkit/autopsy addon modules/tree/master/IngestModules


Autopsy v4+ Feature: File Searching






From: http://sleuthkit.org/autopsy/docs/user-docs/4.19.2//


Autopsy v4+ Feature: File Extraction (See Lab 3)



From: Julia Keffer, "Autopsy Forensic Browser User Guide", 2013


Autopsy v4+ Feature: File Carving






Autopsy v4+ Feature: File Carving

To extract **unallocated space** into a **single file**:




From: http://sleuthkit.org/autopsy/docs/user-docs/4.19.2//

Autopsy v4+ Feature: Timeline Analysis




From: http://sleuthkit.org/autopsy/docs/user-docs/4.19.2//timeline_page.html

Autopsy v4+ Feature: Timeline Analysis




From: http://sleuthkit.org/autopsy/docs/user-docs/4.19.2//timeline_page.html

Autopsy v4+ Feature: Communications Visualization Tool




http://sleuthkit.org/autopsy/docs/user-docs/4.19.2/communications_page.html

Autopsy v4+ Feature: Tagging




Autopsy v4+ Feature: Tagging




http://sleuthkit.org/autopsy/docs/user-docs/4.19.2//

Autopsy v4+ Feature: Reporting



http://sleuthkit.org/autopsy/docs/user-docs/4.19.2//

Autopsy v4+ Feature: Reporting



http://sleuthkit.org/autopsy/docs/user-docs/4.19.2//

Autopsy References

References:

- History (of features implemented): http://www.sleuthkit.org/autopsy/history.php
- Autopsy User's Guide: <u>https://wiki.sleuthkit.org/index.php?title=Autopsy User%27s Guide</u>
- Video demo:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Smy4mj293GE

Wait, Why Not Just Learn Autopsy in This Module?

- This is *not* about using tools, it is about **Digital Forensics** field
- By learning and understand the underlying forensic concepts, you can:
 - Understand deeper on pieces of evidence shown in Autopsy
 - Better use **Autopsy features** on the shown evidence
 - Better understand and use other forensics suites to complement/verify your Autopsy findings
 - Use other **specialized forensic tools/utilities** to find **more findings**: more manual control and greater flexibility
- In short: deeper understanding of forensic evidence & tasks for more discovered findings!

Wait, Why Not Just Learn Autopsy in This Module?

Furthermore...

- Many people could do some of what we do with a piece of forensic software suite
- But you won't stand the test of the law of evidence, nor your peers
- Understanding more and deeper: helps prepare you as a knowledgeable and well-rounded digital forensic investigator
- Similar approach taken in SoC modules: networking, OS, security, ...

If You are Interested in Other Forensics Suites

- Other forensics suites:
 have similar interface & features with Autopsy's
- AccessData FTK's demo:
 - See e.g.: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k8QxpS8tM2I
- Guidance Software Encase's demo:
 - See e.g.: <u>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QTV_vbCoYeU&list=PLO515IcRIbAx</u> <u>G2LLHBUVsxMnv3Du5JSEU</u>
- Magnet AXIOM's demo:
 - See e.g.: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=poKw8 NZ4ps

Lab 3 Exercises

- Task 1: Perform a live acquisition of a Windows machine using:
 - FTK Imager Lite
 - (Optional) FireEye's Memoryze
- Task 2: Inspect and analyze a memory image file using:
 - Volatility: various commands
 - FTK Imager: string searching
 - (Optional) Hex Editor (WinHex): string searching
- Task 3: Inspect and analyse a disk image file using Autopsy

Questions? See you next week!

Don't forget to submit your **Graded Lab Tasks 1**via Canvas' Assignment