GLOBALIZATION

Series Editors

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"Globalization" has become *the* buzzword of our time. But what does it mean? Rather than forcing a complicated social phenomenon into a single analytical framework, this series seeks to present globalization as a multidimensional process constituted by complex, often contradictory interactions of global, regional, and local aspects of social life. Since conventional disciplinary borders and lines of demarcation are losing their old rationales in a globalizing world, authors in this series apply an interdisciplinary framework to the study of globalization. In short, the main purpose and objective of this series is to support subject-specific inquiries into the dynamics and effects of contemporary globalization and its varying impacts across, between, and within societies.

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GLOBALIZATION AND MILITARISM

FEMINISTS MAKE THE LINK

SECOND EDITION

CYNTHIA ENLOE

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Delving into the globalized and often-militarized evolution of the production politics of just one product, the sneaker, teaches us to direct our curiosities to more than simply business and government decision-makers. We need to expose how difficult it is to construct—and sustain—a kind of femininity that allows women's hard work to be cheapened, a kind of femininity that serves both corporate profit and a kind of masculinized state development strategy that depends on feminized cheapened labor. Crafting and deploying an energetic feminist curiosity will enable us to pose those questions that reveal the confusion hidden behind the patriarchy's facade of rationality, as well as the calculation and coercion that are required to get one woman to accept low wages and meager benefits in exchange for stitching one pair of globalized sneakers.

CHAPTER 4

HOW DOES "NATIONAL SECURITY" BECOME MILITARIZED?

Currently, among the most militarized regions in the world are Syria and its neighboring territories, as well as Colombia, the Kashmir-India-Pakistan region, the border regions of Russia, Afghanistan and its neighbors, the Persian Gulf, the border between North and South Korea, and the South China Sea. The myriad state officials—and their advisors and supporters—are the chief propellers of these geographically specific militarizations. To justify their militarizing actions, they usually talk in terms not of world security, but of the security of their own nations.

Because these regions have become so militarized, they also are regions in which social and political relationships have become extraordinarily masculinized. To note this does not mean that there are no women living in these regions. There are thousands of women living in each. What it means, instead, is that each of these rampant militarizing processes has had the effect of privileging certain sorts of manliness,

each has marginalized other sorts of manliness (for instance, the masculinities attached to those war-fleeing men who have become refugees and of those men who have refused to join any of the state or insurgent militaries). Simultaneously, each of these militarizing processes today has downgraded or denigrated most forms of femininity, thereby marginalizing the majority of women. Women in these highly militarized, masculinized regions have gained visibility today only insofar as they are seen as silent victims or as compliant patriots.

Against all the gendered odds, in each of these eight currently highly militarized regions women's advocacy and support groups have organized. They have a hard time being heard: few journalists report on them; no officials ask for their advice. Instead, these activist women often are the targets of masculinized violence. Yet their presence—their advocacy and humanitarian efforts, their gender analyses—make the processes of localized and globalized masculinized militarism more visible.

Thus it is important to pay close attention, for instance, to women activists in Afghanistan, Russia, Ukraine, Bosnia, and Kashmir, and to women-led humanitarian aid groups inside of Syria and among Syrian refugees. Likewise, it is valuable for any gender analyst to pay close attention to those women transgressing the North and South Korean fortified border, and to those women who have created feminist peace activist groups in Colombia. Paying attention to their actions and their ideas enables us to see when and how gender dynamics cause each militarization and with what consequences—for both women and men (Butalia 2012; Humanas Corporacion Colombia 2013; Sperling 2015; Svedberg et al. 2013; www.humanas.cl; www.wilpf.org; www.womencrossdmz.org).

Many of the actions that serve to globalize militarization—that is, to spread the rationales and activities underpinning militarism—are, surprisingly, taken not in the name of *international* security but in the pursuit of *national* security. For instance, a government that calls upon its security forces to put down a workers' protest in an export factory might not claim that the workers' organizing is jeopardizing world peace, but that it is undermining the nation's security. Similarly, a country's government may join (or take the lead in creating) an international military alliance—taking part in joint military maneuvers, standardizing weaponry and procedures, buying each other's fighter aircraft, pledging to come to each other's defense, sharing intelligence

surveillance reports—all in the name of enhancing its own national security. Nonetheless, the creation and operation of these policies serve to globalize militarism.

That is, national security and the globalization of militarization need to be considered together.

Following World War II, the study of national security became a common fixture in the curricula of many universities, military academies, and civilian schools of diplomacy around the world. "National security" was widely viewed as encompassing a government's military operations and alliances, as well as the underlying foreign policy doctrines and strategies—even if civilian officials were in charge of such matters.

Complementing this particular understanding of national security has been a widespread assumption about the sorts of people who make the most credible national security experts. It has been imagined that anyone wanting to be taken seriously in the field of national security—in government agencies, think tanks, graduate schools, on media news programs—has to be "rational." The opposite of rational has been imagined to be "emotional." Combined with this assumption is a common belief that "manly" men are the most rational beings, while less manly men and virtually all women are prone to being "emotional." This conventional gender package has made a certain kind of masculinity the entry ticket into national security discussions.

National security thinking (including taking part in often fierce debates among national security experts) has been portrayed as leaving no room for sentimentality: one has to be able to confront unpleasant facts "without blinking"; one has to be "hard nosed." Rational manly security experts must be capable of "muscular thinking"; they must never show themselves to be "soft."

Thus, in early 2015, when Sweden's new foreign minister, Margot Wallstrom, announced that Sweden would adopt a new, less militarized, approach to national security based on what she called a "feminist foreign policy," many national security commentators scoffed. How naïve! How unrealistic! And yet Wallstrom was anything but naïve. She had had more political experience than many of her critics. She already had served as a member of parliament for Sweden's Democratic Socialist Party and as a Brussels-based EU official and, most recently, as the UN Secretary General's Special Representative on Sexual

Violence in Conflict. In the latter role she was advised and supported by Swedish feminist groups such as Kvinna till Kvinna (Women to Women) (www.kvinnatillkvinna.se). As a government minister, she explained, her feminist foreign policy initiative stemmed from her conclusion that any country's genuine national security was guaranteed by crafting a foreign policy that pursued "peace, justice, human rights and human development." That combination of ambitious goals, furthermore, had the best chance for being reached if women were included in both analysis and decision-making. As she warned a Washington audience: "We won't get there without adjusting existing policies, down to their nuts and bolts, to correct the particular (and often invisible) discrimination, exclusion and violence still inflicted on the female half of us" (Rupert 2015).

How one thinks about national security, therefore, not only affects global relations but determines who is even allowed to sit at the table to take part in the security conversation. The more militarized the understanding of what national security is (and what it is not), the more likely it will be that the conversation about national security—and international security—will be a largely masculinized affair (Cohn, Ruddick, and Hill 2005; Sjoberg and Tickner 2011; Tickner 2001; Wibben 2011). Certainly, a handful of women might be allowed in now and then, but they will have to be constantly on their guard. They will have to make sure that they never appear (in the eyes of their colleagues) to be sentimental, emotional, or "soft"—that is, "feminine." And even many men will, under these restrictive conditions, have to be wary: if they betray emotion when they talk about the use of military force, they might risk forfeiting their masculine credentials, which in turn could mean their being shut out of future top-level discussions of national security.

Anything can be defined as a threat to national security, using the conventional understanding of that term, insofar as it appears to threaten the strength of the state. Thus, not just a foreign military mobilizing on the state's borders, but enemies far away believed to be planning to undermine the state by devious means may be viewed as threats to national security. Still other threats to national security can be seen close to home, posed by those inside the state. Most commonly, these people are labeled subversives. During the 1950s, in what today is looked back upon as the "McCarthy era," those Americans labeled

"subversives" included Communists, Communist sympathizers (broadly defined), and homosexuals.

In postcolonial societies in the 1960s to 1990s, threats to national (state) security also included those women who were having "too many" children. The "population control" movement became a global movement, engaging scores of economists, demographers, development experts, and pharmaceutical companies (Hartmann 1995). Women were portrayed by each of these players as being a threat. Or rather, women's "fertility," if left uncontrolled, was deemed a threat—a threat to the country's economic stability and thus, allegedly, to the state's viability. Since instability in countries such as the Philippines, Kenya, India, Bangladesh, and China was viewed as exacerbating tensions in an already-fraught Cold War world, population control programs began to merge with militarized international calculations. Population control was a surprisingly masculinized global campaign (Hartmann 1995). Although men as sexual partners were left almost undiscussed and women of childbearing age were made the prime target of these programs, it was men who did most of the official worrying, scientific research, pharmaceutical promotions, and strategizing. While millions of dollars and thousands of person-hours were spent trying to control women's fertility—to get women to have fewer children—women themselves were hardly deemed national security authorities.

Then came "Cairo." It became a turning point in the security-focused international politics of population. Cairo, Egypt, was the site for the large UN-sponsored 1994 conference on population, which brought to that city experts and government officials from dozens of countries—some delegates from the countries posing a "population problem," other delegates from countries whose officials were committed to anti-abortion and anti-contraception policies, and still other delegates from the countries providing money to and directing population control projects in those other countries with the goal of enhancing their security.

But something had changed. Women's advocates—some calling themselves specialists in "women and development," others thinking of themselves as "women's reproductive rights" activists, still others openly taking on the label "feminist"—had learned the ways of the United Nations and the development bureaucracies of their own governments.

These women's advocates had seen what happened to poor women when they were mere objects of population-control projects. The advocates had developed international alliances and networks to push for women's health, women's political empowerment, and what many activists now called "women's environmental security," as well as women's economic independence, and most innovatively, women's sexual autonomy.

These women's activists who traveled to Cairo in 1994 succeeded in persuading the United Nations and the major governments orchestrating the meeting to call this conference not a conference on "population control," but instead, for the first time, the International Conference on Population and Development. In so doing, they forced a shift from a narrow, state-centered notion of security to a broader, more human-centered notion of security. Once the conference got underway in Cairo, these women from myriad countries—some rich, many poor—persuaded a majority of governments to publicly declare their understanding that anxieties about "population control" had to take a backseat to concerns for women's and girls' health and education.

Women hereafter had to be treated as actors in the development and security-creating policy and implementation process—actors with rights over their own bodies. Since the UN Cairo conference of 1994, certain administrations in some countries (notably those of the Vatican and of the United States in the early 2000s) have tried to undercut this Cairo global consensus. Nonetheless, after the Cairo conference, the international security discourse on population changed (Eager 2004). It could no longer be easily taken for granted that women's fertility could be reduced to a security issue for states, and more women concerned about the lives of women were actively engaged in the designing of health and economic, as well as environmental and foreign policy, research, and the crafting of the policies often flowing from this research.

In recent years, particularly just after the end of the Cold War, which brought with it the termination of the great-power rivalry between the United States and its allies on the one hand and the Soviet Union and its allies on the other (with many other less powerful countries left to carve out precarious spaces somewhere in the volatile middle between the behemoths), there was a flood of fresh thinking about security.

More questions are being posed these days about whose security should be prioritized. Some are asking what the difference is between "national" and "state" security. Is "human security" a more valuable

way to conceptualize genuine security pursuits? People asking this question are suggesting that security is more likely to be realistically assessed and pursued if less emphasis is put on governments and their military capacities and more attention is paid to the needs that must be fulfilled for ordinary individuals to experience genuine security. For instance, maybe taking stronger action to stop global warming, to provide clean water worldwide, and to prevent the further spread of HIV/AIDS would move us closer to achieving meaningful global security than would investing so much energy and public money in developing fighter planes and recruiting millions of young people into state military forces (Basch 2005; Hoogensen and Stuvoy 2006).

This post–Cold War era was taking shape in the 1990s at the very same time that feminist scholarship investigating the complex workings of international affairs was beginning to make itself felt inside academia and international agencies. This development was the product of years of researching, teaching, and organizing. The reason that women are now considered important actors in measuring and pursuing alternative forms of less-militarized "security" is that this feminist work had been done.

So, as we now plunge into a discussion of national security—how it has been militarized and how it might be demilitarized—it is worth spending a bit of time here to look inside one academic organization where this development of alternative security thinking has gained prominence. Scholarly organizations—for example, the American Historical Association, the International Studies Association, the British International Studies Association, the Association for Asian Studies, the National Women's Studies Association, the American Political Science Association, the Modern Language Association, the Middle East Studies Association—may seem quite remote from the lives and studies of undergraduate students. But often, unbeknownst to students, these associations influence decisions about who earns a doctoral degree (and who is discouraged), what books and articles get published and assigned for courses, what sorts of topics are taken seriously in classrooms (and what topics get only minimal attention in a semester's syllabus), and what new interdisciplinary programs and majors are launched.

The International Studies Association is not one of the largest academic associations, yet it has been the principal forum in which both

long-standing and new ideas about how to investigate and teach global affairs are compared and tested. While English remains the dominant language of the ISA sessions and its publications and many members of the ISA are American, many other members come from Sweden, Norway, Canada, Australia, Germany, Britain, India, and Japan. In a sense, the study of international affairs is itself becoming globalized. And while previously it was mainly political scientists and economists who came to ISA's annual meetings—as if it took only political science and economics to make sense of national security, international trade, war, peacemaking, migration, diplomacy, oil, and sneakers—today when the ISA gathers, the conference rooms, hotel corridors, and coffee shops are full of historians, sociologists, and anthropologists, too.

Simultaneously, and maybe as a result, the ISA—this transnational intellectual group whose members see themselves as the crafters of political skills and knowledge—has become far less masculinized. That is, there are more women taking part in its annual sessions and in running the organization, and it is less acceptable for men, who remain the majority of the organization's members, to dismiss the idea of women as experts and to devalue the study of women as "beside the point." This demasculinization—achieved slowly and through hard work—has made the association livelier, more open, more intellectually valuable.

The women—and a few men—who achieved this partial (but not yet complete) transformation of the ISA did so through several actions:

1. Back in the mid-1980s, these women began to urge other women whose work sheds light on any dimension of international relations to attend ISA's annual meetings.
2. Women faculty urged women graduate students both to attend the ISA and to propose their own paper presentations.
3. These women devised new conference panel topics in order to stretch ISA members' sense of what constitutes "international politics." For example, they created new sessions on "Trafficking in Women," "Gendered Humanitarian Aid," "Masculinity and Weaponry," "Feminist Theories of the State," and "Women in the Revolutions of Nicaragua, Eritrea, and Algeria."
4. They began to develop an alternative "culture" for their ISA panel sessions, making those events more interactive, more encouraging and less competitive, less hierarchical.

5. They created a new section within the association's organization, naming it "Feminist Theory and Gender."
6. A few years later, they launched a new ISA caucus specifically to monitor the relative influence of men and women on the ISA's governing committees.
7. More recently, the ISA's feminist-informed women and men created a new journal, the *International Feminist Journal of Politics*.

The twenty women and men who launched the *International Feminist Journal of Politics* had long conversations before the launch about how to create a new journal that would be academically and intellectually (these are not necessarily synonymous) serious, respected, and valued, while at the same time did not reproduce some of the traits they had all come to see as hallmarks of masculinized academic-journal-editing practice—a practice that narrows and dampens the knowledge sharing required to do serious gender research on international relations. Here are a few things they together decided would be necessary if the *International Feminist Journal of Politics* were to achieve both of these ambitious goals.

First, the journal headquarters would have to be located outside the United States as often as possible. This decision came out of a recognition that in today's globalized academic world, American universities, publishers, and scholars play a disproportionate role due to the dominance of English, the size of the country, the number of its universities and colleges, the predominance of U.S. foreign policy actions throughout most regions of the world, and the economic power of U.S.-based media. Thus, while American academics serve as members of the editorial advisory board, contribute articles, and occasionally serve as one of the trio of chief editors, the headquarters was located first in Australia, then in Britain, and then in Canada. Only in its fourth round of editors was it headquartered at an American university.

Second, the journal's founding group decided that there would be three chief editors, rotating every three years, and that these editors would always come from three different geographic regions. Third, the group decided that "blind" reviewers would give suggestions and criticisms of all submitted articles in a spirit of collegial helpfulness. The founders also wanted submissions from young scholars to be encouraged. Fourth, the founders decided that the journal would welcome

potential articles from any academic field that sheds light on the ways in which international relations becomes gendered. The journal would "toss overboard" the common assumption that scholars trained in political science are the only ones who can show us how the international system works—and why.

The multinational group of founders made another important decision: this journal would not shy away from a feminist identity. "Feminist" would be printed in bold letters as part of the new journal's title. On the other hand, the journal would not adopt a static, parochial, or single definition of "feminist," because the founders all had learned how place-, time-, and culture-specific feminist analyses can be.

Finally, during these lively discussions in the mid-1990s—discussions that produced what they hoped would become a new kind of forum for the serious investigation of international politics—the journal's founders decided that every issue would contain a featured section called "Conversations," a place where alternative forms of serious intellectual discussion of "international politics" could appear—interviews, conference reports, even film reviews. That is, they recognized that globalizing politics occurs in many arenas, not just inside governments or within international agencies.

Integral to all of these intellectual endeavors by feminist scholars has been challenging the long-established, conventional concept of—and explanations for—"national security." The hunch has been that if we think outside the "state security box," if we take seriously the lives of women—their diverse understandings of security—as well as the on-the-ground workings of masculinity and femininity, we will be able to produce more meaningful and more reliable analyses of "security"—personal, national, and global (Hansen and Olsson 2004).

By employing a feminist curiosity—that is, by asking (and seeking to answer) hard questions about diverse women's relationships to men, to the nation, to the state, and to other women, as well as questions about how men's relationships to diverse notions of masculinity affect women's lives and the operations of politics—scholars and teachers are seeking to get a more realistic and less militarized understanding of what "security" means now and what it could potentially mean in the future. These scholars are discovering that ideas (and policies) about masculinity and about femininity are frequently the consequence of "national security" doctrines—for example, that the more militarized

the criteria adopted for national security, the more it is only men who are presumed to be those most trusted to handle foreign policymaking, and that anyone imagined to be "feminine" is often deemed unsuited for the "hard" thinking involved in this realm called national security.

On the other hand, ideas about masculinity and femininity might be the cause of national security choices. That is, as we saw in the case of globalized sneaker politics, when we use a feminist curiosity we can shine a searchlight not just on impacts but also on causality.

Take the ongoing investigations into why the U.S. government under several presidents pursued military solutions to political problems in the small Southeast Asian country of Vietnam so persistently. In the summer of 2004, Daniel Ellsberg was still puzzling about this. As a young man in 1971, Daniel Ellsberg was working under contract for the U.S. Defense Department. He became a hero to many and a traitor in the eyes of some when he secretly photocopied hundreds of pages of an in-house government report analyzing the policy failures of the United States in waging its war in Vietnam. President Richard Nixon failed in his attempts to convince the Supreme Court that national security necessity made it legal to stop the public release of the damning report. The report, read by millions of Americans and people around the world after it was published in the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*, became known as the *Pentagon Papers*. In 2004, more than three decades later, Daniel Ellsberg was still wondering why Nixon's predecessor, Lyndon B. Johnson, so stubbornly persisted in waging a war that even his closest advisors were telling him was unwinnable and was growing deeply unpopular among many Americans.

Ellsberg, speaking to a group of peace-activist military veterans in July 2004, wondered out loud what motivated President Johnson's refusal to back down from his failing war-waging policy. After years of thinking about this question and weighing all the alternative answers, Ellsberg told his audience that he had come to the conclusion that it was not President Johnson's anticommunist ideology and not his famous electoral calculations. Rather, Ellsberg had concluded, it was President Johnson's fear of being feminized, that is, of being "unmanly." Ellsberg had become convinced that this American president's anxiety was fueled by his imagining that if he backed away from a military engagement, he would open himself to charges of being, in American

slang, a "wimp"—of not having the masculine credentials to see a country through a war, even a failed and unpopular war.

The jury is still out regarding why presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon were so persistent in their commitment to a U.S. military engagement in Vietnam, in which over 50,000 U.S. soldiers and thousands more Vietnamese—and Cambodian and Laotian—soldiers and civilians died. But it is worth taking seriously Daniel Ellsberg's carefully considered argument. Which of the many militarized foreign policy decisions made by any senior government official in any country is affected even in part by their personal worries about not appearing "feminine"?

Gender analysts use a similar feminist curiosity to investigate the experiences of the international civilian weapons inspectors sent to Iraq by the United Nations in 2002. This was a highly masculinized team—that is, it was widely believed within the United Nations and the UN Security Council that only men had the sorts of attitudes and technical expertise appropriate to conduct this politically loaded international scientific weapons inspection. Nonetheless, despite its conformity to the conventions of masculinized international security affairs, the team, headed by Swedish diplomat Hans Blix, had its findings repeatedly challenged by the Bush administration in the months of tense UN debates leading up to the eventual U.S. preemptive military invasion of Iraq in March 2003.

Feminist scholar Carol Cohn wondered why. She decided to dig more deeply into this international politics of weapons inspection and its failure of credibility at such a critical moment in the evolving post–Cold War global politics of security. After all, the United Nations was created in 1945 to help roll back global militarization, to make wars less likely. Why had it seemingly failed in March 2003?

Cohn and her co-researchers, Felicity Hill and Sara Ruddick, were invited in 2005 to Stockholm to present their analysis of the international politics of weapons inspections to the members of the prestigious Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMDC). The audience, composed of former ambassadors, senior UN officials, and former secretaries and ministers of defense, also included Hans Blix himself. Most of the people there in the hall that day were quite new to feminist analysis (Cohn, Hill, and Ruddick 2005).

Here is what Cohn, Ruddick, and Hill reported to their rather skeptical Stockholm listeners. The internationally heated debate during 2002 and early 2003 was over whether the government of President Saddam Hussein was developing weapons of mass destruction, as President George W. Bush and his advisors were contending—and which contentions were being made the basis for developing elaborate plans for a U.S.-led military invasion of Iraq to topple the Saddam Hussein regime. The Hans Blix team reported back to the UN Security Council that its months of on-site inspections had turned up no evidence that the Iraqi government had an active program of developing weapons of mass destruction. The Bush administration, speaking to its own American legislators and citizens, as well as to its co-members of the UN Security Council, dismissed the Blix team's findings as not credible, thus justifying its own continued buildup for a military invasion and its pressure on the governments of Britain, Australia, Spain, the Ukraine, Japan, Italy, and Honduras to commit their own troops to a U.S.-led military invasion.

Credibility turned out to be the principal currency in what had become a high-stakes and potentially deadly global game. Credibility is in the eyes of the beholders. Earning credibility is almost always shaped by the workings of gender (Enloe 2013).

Carol Cohn and her co-investigators shined a feminist curiosity light on political credibility. What creates it? What undermines it? In whose eyes? They discovered that the Bush administration repeatedly cast doubt on the credibility of mere diplomats. The powerful strand of American political culture that values manly shows of overt strength over allegedly "softer" or more feminized demonstrations of patient, careful negotiations had become even more dominant in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001. Thus, in various public settings, the Bush administration portrayed the civilian UN inspectors as somehow less trustworthy and less credible because they were following a course of action that was less committed to a demonstration of physical force. The drama of the months leading up to the U.S. military invasion of Iraq was a contest between masculinities.

The largely male audience in Stockholm listening to Cohn, Hill, and Ruddick's analysis were not immediately convinced. Most of the audience had never thought it necessary to develop the skills with which to

conduct a feminist analysis of international or national security. Yet when Carol Cohn met one of the prominent members of the WMDC several months later, he went out of his way to tell her that he had continued to think about her talk and about the role that competing ideas about masculinity had played in the political contest between the UN weapons inspectors and the Bush administration. And, he admitted, he had begun to think for the first time that ideas about, and demonstrations of, masculinity may have been decisive in the final Security Council outcome.

When it came to writing their two hundred-page annual report, members of the WMDC inserted just one short paragraph indicating that gendered analysis was starting to make an impact on their collective thinking:

> Women have rightly observed that armament policies and the use of armed force have often been influenced by the misguided ideas about masculinity and strength. An understanding of and emancipation from this traditional perspective might help to remove some of the hurdles on the road to disarmament and non-proliferation. (Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission 2006, 160)

A postscript: According to one WMDC commissioner, this brief nod to gendered analysis did not get inserted by the commission into its report because of a broad consensus among the members that gender matters. Rather, this commissioner confidentially recalled, a reference to the influence of the politics of masculinity on global nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons proliferation went into the report only at the insistence of one of the few women on the commission, an experienced international civil servant. Had she not been in the room, the insights offered by Cohn, Hill, and Ruddick might never have gotten into print.

This web of experiences suggests that a brief flash of gendered understanding on the parts of men and women whose professional careers have depended on not acknowledging the impacts of femininity and masculinity will not be sustained—for instance, in ongoing international diplomatic political discussions with the governments of Iran and North Korea—if there aren't persistent institutional encouragements and affirmations to support that initial flash of understanding. Ideas matter. But ideas need to be nurtured by formal and informal social (including

institutional) dynamics. One of the reasons that ungendered explanations of militarization are so persistent is that they are the explanations that—when offered at a closed meeting or over supper or in a public debate—are treated as "rational," "serious," and "sophisticated."

Asking feminist questions in the study of national and global security, thus, includes asking the following questions about masculinity:

- Who holds what views of manliness?
- Who wields those ideas in political life?
- What are the consequences of those views and ideas?

Investigating all three questions also requires keeping a close eye on femininity: who fears it, why, and with what results.

The answers in any particular circumstance aren't preordained. Taking the questions seriously and crafting strategies to pursue them carefully will make us smarter.

As these two cases suggest, militarization of global affairs is likely to be propelled forward by masculinization and by certain players' fears of feminization. Like globalization and militarization, the processes of feminization and masculinization should be investigated as step-by-step processes. To make sense of any process—globalization, militarization, masculinization, feminization—we again need to stay alert over time, to operate like a historian, not a photographer.

Masculinization, as we have seen, often is fueled by key players' anxieties and fears of feminization. Indian policymakers, for instance, have pursued nuclear weapons acquisition in part out of the conviction that India is feminized in world affairs and that acquiring nuclear weapons will reverse that allegedly humiliating process (Oza 2006; Sitaraman 2007). Any person or group of people who think that if they are perceived to be "feminine" they will lose political influence, credibility, or respect, are likely to take steps to avoid being perceived that way: they will stay quiet about their genuine reservations; they might speak publicly about the values of strength and decisive threatening action; they will make clear that they personally are always ready to wield military might; they might even cast doubt on the manliness of those who are criticizing military solutions (diplomats, pacifists, "the French") (Conway 2012).

Masculinization can proceed part way and then be resisted and stalled. Thus, one needs to monitor—and explain—every step along the

way. This means that we need to use our feminist curiosity to explain how and why any state's notion of "national security" has become militarized or masculinized to a large degree or only to a lesser degree. But we won't uncover the answers if we ignore or trivialize the lives of women.

When I first started trying to make sense of security policy, I thought that I needed just two concepts in my analytical toolbox: "militarism" and "the military." The first—"militarism"—was a package of distinct but interdependent values and beliefs about how the world "works" and how the world ought to work. The second concept—"the military"—was meant to distinguish a particular sort of institution. According to this concept, a military was distinct from a family, a baseball team, a political party, a corporation, or a police force. I thought that, equipped with these two concepts, I could adequately shed an explanatory light on national and international security politics.

I was wrong. What I slowly began to realize was that relying on the concepts of "militarism" and "militaries" would not enable me to explain how the politics of what was defined as "national," and what was defined as "security" might change from one decade to another. In other words, with only the flashlights of "militarism" and "military" in my toolbox, I could see parts of the room but not enough of it to build a satisfactory explanation for how the world actually works. I found that I could not understand how in any given society—Nigeria, Sudan, Cambodia, Syria, Sweden, Colombia, Egypt, Israel, the United States, Argentina—militarism, that package of beliefs and values, had come to gain a foothold: How could this particular package of ideas have been weak in the past yet later become so strong that most elites and many ordinary citizens imagined that "national security" and militarism were synonymous?

"Militarism" was a useful concept, but not useful enough. It turned out to be too static. I could measure popular and elite ideas against it, but I could not explain how and why changes in either popular or elite presumptions had been transformed over a year, a decade, or a generation. I found that I wanted to explain the politics of national security—to expose its causes. Why did that person—or that political party or that agency—in an effort to achieve national security, become more dependent on militaristic strategies? Why then? Why not earlier? Why not later?

Adopting militarization as a conceptual tool, I also became curious about the broader politics of things most of my political science colleagues dismissed back then as not really "political": the politics of marriage, of fear, of workplace morale, of identity. And I then discovered that I could not adequately explore any of these political concepts unless I took diverse women seriously.

At this point in my development, I started to pay close attention to the smart research of other feminists on schemes by war planners, military juntas, and defense administrators to control women—efforts to control women's fears, women's ambitions, women's sense of belonging, women's sexuality, and women's labor. Works by feminist historians investigating World Wars I and II began to crowd out the more conventional political science books on my shelves. I also began reading a lot more works by anthropologists because they had developed tools to track cultural meanings.

I started to attend panel sessions at conferences on popular culture and on cross-cultural constructions of femininity. I changed the sort of assignments I gave students in my seminars. Now I urged each student to do an in-depth interview with any woman—of any age, any class, any nationality—to see if that woman had ever been dependent on, influenced by, or controlled by a military. The goal was not to judge that woman, but to understand her experiences. As they each tried to make sense of the life of just one woman, these attentive student researchers revealed that militarization was a subtle, nuanced, even confusing, sometimes sporadic, and often contested process.

Militarized wives: One student interviewed her sister-in-law. She chose her because she wondered what impact it had on her to be married to her own brother, who was a weapons engineer. Although both her sister-in-law and brother were civilians, this student discovered through her careful interviewing that their marriage gradually had become militarized. Her sister-in-law recalled how when they first got together, they had lively conversations about politics, including about Russia, a country she had always found fascinating. But, as their marriage progressed, she became aware that her husband was becoming uncomfortable with those sorts of conversations. Furthermore, she gradually realized that there were whole areas of his work life at the defense contracting company that were "out of bounds," that he could not discuss and that she should not ask about. Over time, a sea of

silence opened up in their marriage. They were both civilians, but their married life had become militarized. To sustain their marriage, she would have to become an un-inquisitive wife.

Civilian women who become the wives of civilian men working—often as scientists and technical specialists—in tight communities dominated by a secret weapons projects find their lives are even more intensely militarized. Three such towns have been: Livermore, California, home of nuclear weapons research facilities, Livermore Laboratories; Richland, Washington, home of the plutonium research and production facility, the Hanford plutonium plant; and Ozersk, serving Russia's Maiak plutonium plant in the Urals region of southern Russia. Livermore, Richland, and Ozersk became home to scores of families living what in each country seemed to be idealized middle-class suburban lives: good schools, good housing, good pay, and apparent security.

Each of these towns was a company town, that is, dependent on and controlled by a single employer. In the case of these three towns, the central government was the principal (in Richland and Ozersk, the sole) employer. In Richland, DuPont, a large chemical corporation, served as the U.S. government's chief contractor. Each of these profoundly militarized towns was created out of its chief employer's national security-justified racialized, ethnicized, classed, and gendered imaginings—imaginings of skill, obedience, reliability, and loyalty (Brown 2013; Gusterson 1996).

While there were women employed in all three of these weapons facilities, managers routinely hired women as lower-paid, less-influential technicians; these same managers, themselves men, made decisions that masculinized the senior scientific posts and administrative positions. For the women making their lives as civilian wives in all three of these militarized civilian towns, the national security price they were asked by their respective governments to pay in return for the seeming comforts and amenities they enjoyed in each town was the surrender of their individual judgment and curiosity. That is, these civilian wives were expected not to act and think as full-fledged citizens (Brown 2013; Gusterson 1996). To the extent that any of these women decided that it was a fair bargain—and many wives did make this choice—they became militarized. Their governments' national security strategists were counting on them to accept this marital bargain.

Military wives: Civilian women who are married to uniformed male soldiers (and now, in some countries, civilian women married to women soldiers) seem far away from the pinnacles of state power. Nevertheless, we gain a valuable insight into the workings of militarization if we pay serious attention to those women who are married to the state's soldiers and possess little political influence.

By applying a gender analysis, we reveal that masculinized government officials in many countries spend a lot of time, resources, and energy trying to socialize and control those women who have married their state's soldiers. We also learn that many women have found satisfaction and rewards in trying to live up to the government's—and their husband's—expectations. Many civilian women married to soldiers have been able to see themselves as genuine patriots for doing all that the government needs them to do:

- moving frequently
- sacrificing their own career aspirations
- volunteering for unpaid work to knit a military base community together
- enduring the loneliness of single motherhood when their soldier/husbands are deployed far away
- staying publicly cheerful while privately coping with their husband/soldiers' bouts of anger and depression after stints in tense combat zones
- not asking too many questions about the possible sexual liaisons their husbands might have engaged in when away from home
- staying stoically quiet in their grief if their husbands are killed while deployed

Some women gain in social and economic status by marrying a soldier, especially if he earns promotions, moving up through the ranks of the military's officer corps. As a bonus, some women married to soldiers like the close community they experience on a military base, and they take pride in their children's capacity to adapt to new environments (Alva 2006; Hyde 2015).

On the other hand, some women married to soldiers have refused to conform to the official expectations of how the proper military wife should behave—for instance, by encouraging their husbands not to reenlist, by speaking out about domestic violence perpetrated by

soldier-husbands and soldier-boyfriends against their wives and girlfriends, by criticizing the policies that deprive senior officers' wives of military health care and housing benefits when their husbands file for divorce, despite the years of service many of these women have contributed to the community life on military bases, or (hardest of all) by speaking out as the civilians when they disagree with their government's foreign policy.

When military wives take any of these unusual steps, officials get nervous. They try to brush domestic violence inside military families under the rug. They try to provide benefits to war widows. They publicly portray the entire military as a "family." They enlist other military wives as the chief socializers of women who have recently married soldiers. Despite all this effort, however, in many policymaking settings, military officials commonly may act as though military wives are a bother, a distraction from the military's primary mission (Alvarez 2006; Enloe 2010; Eran-Jona 2005; Harrison 2002; Harrison and Laliberte 1994; Houppert 2005; Hyde 2015; Lutz 2001; Ware 2012; Zahedi 2006).

Civilian women married to soldiers, learning to admire a militarized form of masculinity in their husbands and complying with their government's own models of militarized marriage, therefore, are integral to those governments' preferred "national security" doctrines.

When we try to explain any government official's masculinized "national security" policies, we are tempted to imagine that these women married to soldiers are a trivial concern. "Trivial" is worth pausing to think about. We tend to pay little attention to anything that can be dismissed as trivial. Behind that dismissive attitude are the beliefs that women married to soldiers scarcely wield influence with their own husbands and that women married to soldiers have no impact on ideas about technology or enemies or allies or violence. Another trivializing assumption is that women married to soldiers are of no concern to state planners because they are just women "doing what comes naturally." For anything that happens naturally—a woman going along with whatever career choices her husband made and with the daily consequences of her husband's career choice—seems unworthy of serious investigation.

No one, however, is born an obedient, flexible, loyal, patriotic woman, a woman who loves swinging back and forth between living sometimes like a grateful dependent and other times like a resourceful

single parent. A woman has to be persuaded, and sometimes is pressured, to become—and stay—a "model military wife." The design and implementation of those persuasion and pressure techniques has been an unexamined part of governments' "national security" operations.

That is, if too many women married to soldiers rebel—divorce their soldier-husbands or refuse to revert to grateful dependency after having spent months crafting the skills of independent lone parenthood, or start talking to journalists of their doubts about the government's foreign policies—many officials see those women not simply as falling short of a feminized militarized marital ideal but as threats to national security. Such women come to be seen by commanders (and sometimes other more pro-government military wives) as "problem wives," insofar as their actions might weaken the morale of soldier-husbands or might weaken popular resolve to accept the costs of the government's policies. Precisely because it is so popularly imagined that military wives are "naturally" patriotic and that their patriotism will take the form of accepting what their government's officials need from both them and their husbands, when military wives do speak out critically, their opinions attract attention—and often harsh criticism.

Researcher Monica Henry heard women married to American soldiers describe their fears about speaking out when she interviewed them during the U.S.-led war in Iraq. Many military wives told Henry that they supported the U.S. government's invasion and occupation of Iraq, explaining to her that their trust in the president, their support of the president's foreign policy in Iraq, and their loyalty to their husbands deployed to Iraq were all of a single piece. Yet those military wives who had become critical of the war said it was very risky to voice their opinions out loud: if a military wife spoke out, military commanders could hear of it and perhaps hinder her husband's career; the military wife herself might be ostracized by other military wives, on whose support she may depend during her husband's months overseas; an outspoken military wife might find her on-base job jeopardized. As one longtime military wife, who used the Internet pseudonym "Love My Tanker," told Henry, "Although it doesn't say this anywhere in any regulations, etc., if I am a problem wife, the chain of command will know about it. . . . Everything I do or do not do, say or do not say, could have an impact on my husband. . . . The military is actually a small place" (Henry 2006, 46).

Suddenly the topic of women married to soldiers no longer looks "trivial."

Trivializing tendencies when considering diverse women has made it harder to devote attention to the gendered intellectual presumptions of those engaged in the study of national and international security. It is not surprising, then, that it has been "outsiders"—researchers and teachers using a feminist curiosity—who have pushed open creaking doors, raised dusty windows, and shone new light into dimly lit rooms, and who have thereby provided a fresh alternative to the older masculinized and militarized menu of topics and questions to delve into as we seek a clearer understanding of "national security" politics.

One of the most powerful ideas that makes the militarization of national security seem "natural" (i.e., not worth questioning) is the notion that there is an allegedly "natural" relationship between the protected and the protector—inside of families, on military bases, in societies at large. It takes a feminist curiosity and gender-analysis skills to lift up these two heavy rocks of national security studies and policymaking so we can critically scrutinize what ideas lie under both of them. Conventional ideas about this protected-protector relationship appear to perpetuate the political assumption that in any community some people are naturally the protectors while others are naturally the protected.

Going against the grain of this conventional wisdom, historians studying marriage and girls' education, sociologists examining family law, activists trying to stop domestic violence, women's studies researchers investigating military conscription, and feminist labor activists together have given us an alternative understanding of the politics of the protector and protected and have revealed just how pervasive this gendered protector-protected system has become. They also have exposed the extent to which this widespread assumption can distort power relations: it is much easier to claim the authority to speak for others if one can claim to be The Protector; it is much easier to be silenced and to accept that silencing if one absorbs the self-identity of The Protected.

We have only begun to apply this critical analysis of socially constructed protection to the field of "national security." In applying this feminist knowledge to national security politics, we are rejecting the belief that our knowledge about the history of marriage, of child custody, of divorce, and of domestic violence is relevant "only" to the local arenas of public affairs. Instead, we are showing that a feminist historian of marriage (or of education or of violence against women) is indeed exactly the right "expert" to place on a panel to discuss nuclear weapons proliferation. We are demonstrating that useful, eye-opening discussions of foreign policy and military influences will result from exactly this sort of intellectual conversation.

An allegedly "natural" protector is the person who has not just the physical strength or the collective physical resources to wield definitive power, but who also—allegedly—is the person most capable of thinking in a certain useful way: more "strategically," more "rationally." The protectors are those who can see beyond the minutiae of daily life—those who have the ability to see the Big Picture. In any patriarchal society, the protectors are deemed to be the most worldly, and thus natural controllers of the feminized protected not merely because they are stronger than the protected but because they are (allegedly) smarter. They can act "for their own good." The masculinization of national security studies and of national security policymaking depends on ideas about who is feminized. This process of masculinization, therefore, flows directly out of the patriarchal belief that one has to be "manly" in order to be rational enough to be responsible for the security of "women and children."

For the protectors to wield this public superiority, there must be a certain constructed "protected." The protected is the allegedly feminized person who is not at ease in the public sphere. The protected's natural habitat is the domestic sphere—that is, the sphere of life where caring matters more than strategizing. Consequently, the protected is feminized insofar as the protected needs somebody who can think strategically and act in her (the protected's) best interests. This masculinization of the protector and its necessary feminization of the protected has far-reaching implications. First, such a process of masculinization justifies state secrecy. The most "manly" state policymakers and their academic advisors are the only ones rational enough to keep secrets. Less manly (i.e., less rational, less strategically "tough-minded") men—most (not all) elected legislators, most civil servants working in the more feminized departments of the state (e.g., health, culture, environment), most (not all) male journalists—and virtually all women can be excluded from the "top secret" inner circles of national security.

Today, with militarizing processes in so many countries in high gear, it is more urgent than ever to be curious about how this relationship between the alleged protectors and the alleged protected depends on questionable assumptions about masculinities and femininities. To put that curiosity into investigatory action, one will have to be equipped with the tools of gender analysis.

Doing that gender analysis of militarizing processes will clarify what must be done by those who want to propel effective *de*-militarization.

Those who now claim to be the nation's protectors have a stake in portraying the world as (and turning the world into) a "dangerous place." If we direct our feminist flashlights to the processes of making and justifying national security policies, we will find that state elites—with the help of media editors, academic consultants, technical experts, and husbands—invest a lot of effort in keeping afloat this artificial, unequal relationship between the masculinized protectors and the feminized protected.

But we will also discover that this politically charged relationship is frequently challenged, even if those challenging actions are ignored by most media. When peace activists women hold up signs at their vigils declaring "Not in Our Name!" they are deliberately disrupting the patriarchal masculinized protector–feminized protected dichotomy on which most "national security" systems are built.

Women in many countries who have made "Not in Our Name!" their own political declaration are proclaiming that they are not merely the narrowly imagined, feminized protected. They are citizens.

CHAPTER 5

PAYING CLOSE ATTENTION TO WOMEN *INSIDE* MILITARIES

The woman soldier. This used to be an oxymoron. Even if there were tales of women acting heroically in warfare (think of Joan of Arc, think of the Amazons), they were deemed anomalous or just fanciful. In the mid-twentieth century, women as armed combatants in insurgent forces—in China, Vietnam, Algeria, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Eritrea, and the Philippines—became more visible.

By the early years of the twenty-first century, the woman soldier seemed to have become a globalized icon of the "modern woman." She was breaking feminized taboos, entering a traditionally masculinized domain, being deployed far from home, displaying her physical strength, handling high-tech weaponry. She was defying the strictures of conventional, patriarchal femininity by proving that she could be the protector, not simply the protected—she, like a manly man, could "die for her country." To some, the woman soldier was thereby showing that a