


Question 1

A commitment scheme  $\Pi$  has the hiding property if for all PPT adversary  $A$ , there exists a *negl*, s.t.

$$\Pr[Hiding_{A,\Pi}(n) = 1] \leq \text{negl}(n) + \frac{1}{2}$$

Question 2

$h_2$  is not collision resistant. 2 messages  $m_0, m_1$  where  $m_0 = \{0, 1\}^n || 0$  and  $m_1 = \{0, 1\}^n || 0$  where  $m_0 \neq m_1$ . This would result in the same hash under  $h_2$ . When the least significant bit  $b$  is 0, then the hashes will just be  $\{0\}^{n+1}$ . Thus both messages  $m_0, m_1$  will collide with the same hash.

Question 3


Assume that  $H_1(x)$  is not collision resistant. This means that  $y = H_1(x)$  is not collision resistant. Then  $z = H_1(y)$ , which is also equivalent to  $H_1(H_1(x))$ , is also not collision resistant. However, this contradicts with  $H(x)$  being collision resistant, thus this proves that  $H_1$  is collision resistant.

Question 4

$H_1^s(x)$  is collision resistant. Considering 2 inputs  $x, x'$  and  $x \neq x'$ , their resultant hashes will be  $H_1^s(x) = Z_B || L$  and  $H_1^s(x') = Z'_B || L'$ . To find a collision, both  $Z_B = Z'_B$  and  $L = L'$  has to be the same. For  $L = L'$ , both  $x$  and  $x'$  must be of the same length. For  $Z_B = Z'_B$ , this would mean that the hashes of  $x$  and  $x'$  are equal meaning that  $x = x'$ . However this would contradict that  $x \neq x'$  proving that  $H_1^s(x)$  is collision resistant.

Question 5

## a) Fingerprinting Game



- 1) Adversary has an oracle access. The Adversary will create a file  $x_0$  and  $Put()$  the file into the Oracle. The Oracle will output  $(i, \delta)$  which of the file  $x_0$ .
  - 2) This will be stored in  $Q$  as  $(i, x, \delta)$
  - 3) The Oracle can also answer  $Get()$  queries when the adversary inputs the index  $i$ , the Oracle will then return the  $(x, \delta)$  corresponding file and fingerprint.
  - 4) The Adversary now has to create a new file  $x'$  and the corresponding fingerprint  $\delta'$  and  $Verify()$ .
  - 5) The Adversary wins ( $Verify() = 1$ ) if it is able to find a new  $(i, x', \delta')$  for a fingerprint that can match a file in the server.
- b) The  $\Pi$  is unforgeable iff for any PPT Adversary  $A$ , there is a  $negl$ , s.t.

$$Pr[Fileforge_{A, \Pi}(n) = 1] \leq negl(n)$$

## c) Definition of a Fingerprint Server:

Define  $Q$  as a storage which stores  $(i, x, \delta)$  as a tuple.

Define  $H(x)$  as a hash function which hashes the file  $x$

$Put(x)$ : With the input file  $x$ ,  $\delta := H(x)$ ,  $i$  will be the index of file  $x$  in  $Q$

$Get(i)$ : With the input index  $i$ , output  $\langle x_i, \delta_i \rangle$  from  $Q$

$Vrfy(i, x_b, \delta_b)$ : With the input  $(i, x_b, \delta_b)$ . First, verify  $H(x_b) = \delta_b$ . Next, compare  $\delta_b = \delta_i$ .

Thus  $Vrfy = 1$  or output 'ok',  $\delta_i = \delta_b = H(x_b)$ . Else  $Vrfy = 0$ .