
Task 1 (5 marks, 1 mark for each question): Answer the following questions by analyzing HW-A-1.exe using basic static analysis techniques only.

1. Upload the programs to https://www.virustotal.com and check if they match any existing antivirus definition?

VirusTotal says that 58 vendors flag this file as malicious.



2. Are there any indications that these files are packed or obfuscated? If so, what are these indicators? If the file is packed, unpack it.

The file is already packed. This can be checked by using upx on the file.

Unpacking the file.

```
C:\Users\IEUser\Desktop\A3>upx -d HW-A-1.ex_
Ultimate Packer for eXecutables
Copyright (C) 1996 - 2020

UPX 3.96w Markus Oberhumer, Laszlo Molnar & John Reiser Jan 23rd 2020

File size Ratio Format Name
32768 <- 14336 43.75% win32/pe HW-A-1.ex_

Unpacked 1 file.
```

3. When was the program compiled?

Using PEview: The progrma was compiled on 17th November 2011 17:58:55 UTC.

```
000000E8 4EC54B5F Time Date Stamp 2011/11/17 Thu 17:58:55 UTC
```

4. Do any of the imports hint at the program's functionality? If so, which imports are they, and what do they tell you?

	00000	00060B4 000068D2 Hint/Name RVA			0000	InternetClos	seHan	dle	
	00000	60B8	000068E8	Hint/Name RVA		0000	FtpPutFileA	\	
	000060BC 000060C0 000060C4		000068F6	Hint/Name RVA		0000	InternetOpenA		
			00006906 Hint/Name RVA 00006918 Hint/Name RVA			0000	InternetConnectA FtpSetCurrentDirectoryA		
						0000			
	000060C8		00000000	End of Imports	WININET.dll				
	00006000 00006004 00006008 0000600C 00006010 00006014 00006012 00006024 00006028 00006034 00006034 00006034 00006044 00006044	00006610 00006620 0000662C 0000664E 0000665E 0000666T 0000666A 000066AD 000066BC 000066BC 000066BA 000066BC 000066BC 000066BA 000066CC 000066TA 000066TA 0000670E	Hint/Name RVA	0000 FindNextFileA 0000 FindFirstFileA 0000 FindFirstFileA 0000 FlushFileBuffers 0000 GetStringTypeW 0000 GetStringTypeA 0000 LCMapStringW 0000 LCMapStringA 0000 MultiByteToWideChar 0000 SetStdHandle 0000 GetProcAddress 0000 HeapAlloc 0000 GetModuleHandleA 0000 GetStartupInfoA 0000 GetStartupInfoA 0000 GetCommandLineA 0000 GetVersion 0000 ExitProcess 0000 HeapDestroy	0000605C 00006060 00006064 00006068 0000606C 00006070 00006074 0000607C 00006084 00006084 00006080 00006080 00006090 00006094 00006098	00006768 00006776 00006788 0000679C 000067B6 000067E4 000067E4 0000682C 00006844 0000682C 00006844 0000687C 0000687C 0000687888 00006896	Hint/Name RVA	0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000	RtlUnwind WriteFile GetLastError SetFilePointer
	0000604C 00006050	00006736 00006742	Hint/Name RVA Hint/Name RVA	0000 HeapCreate 0000 VirtualFree	000060A0 000060A4	000068A6 000068B2	Hint/Name RVA Hint/Name RVA	0000	GetCPInfo GetACP
	00006054 00006058	00006750 0000675A	Hint/Name RVA Hint/Name RVA	0000 HeapFree 0000 VirtualAlloc	000060A8	000068BA	Hint/Name RVA	0000	GetOEMCP CloseHandle

WININET.dll import Windows Internet (WinINet) application programming interface (API) enables your application to interact with FTP and HTTP protocols to access Internet resources. These imports show that the program will try to connect to a FTP server, perhaps a C2 belonging to the attacker, to upload files there.

Based on the imports such as FindNextFileA and WriteFile, we can also guess that the program is trying to find files and maybe upload them to the FTP server.

Running strings on the program we can find these which could show the files being accessed.

```
.pdf
.doc
%s-%d.pdf
pdfs
%s-%d.doc
docs
C:\*
```

Thus the malware could be uploading pdf and doc files from the C drive to the FTP server.

5. What host- or network-based indicators can you use to identify these malwares on infected machines?

Running strings on the program we can also find this string,


ftp.practicalmalwarenalaysis.net. This could be a network-based indicator if the victim machine is connected to it.

```
ftp.practicalmalwarenalaysis.net
Home ftn client
```

Host based indicators could be if pdf and doc files were accessed.

Task 2 (5 marks, 1 mark for each question): Answer the following questions by analyzing HW-A-2.exe using basic static analysis techniques only.

1. Upload the programs to https://www.virustotal.com and check if they match any existing antivirus definition?



2. When was the program compiled?

000000F8 4ECB186E Time Date Stamp

2011/11/22 Tue 03:35:10 UTC

3. Do any of the imports hint at the program's functionality? If so, which imports are they, and what do they tell you?

	de they ten yeur.								
0000702C 00007030 00007034 00007038	00007ED8 00007EC4 00007EF0 00000000	Hint/Name Hint/Name Hint/Name End of Im	e RVA e RVA	0196 LookupPrivilegeValue 01F7 OpenProcessToken 001F AdjustTokenPrivilege ADVAPI32.dll	s 000	07160 07164	00007F16 00000000	Hint/Name RVA End of Imports	011E ShellExecuteA SHELL32.dll
					000070DC	000080C0	Hint/Name RVA	02EF InterlockedIncrement	
			07DA6 Hint/Name RV						
			07DBA Hint/Name RV		000070E0		Hint/Name RVA	0473 SetLastError	
			07DD0 Hint/Name RV		9 00070E4	000080E8	Hint/Name RVA	01C5 GetCurrentThreadId	
			07DDC Hint/Name RV 07DEA Hint/Name RV		000070E8	000080FE	Hint/Name RVA	02EB InterlockedDecrement	
			07DFC Hint/Name RV		000070EC	00008116	Hint/Name RVA	0264 GetStdHandle	
			107E12 Hint/Name RV		000070F0	00008126	Hint/Name RVA	0214 GetModuleFileNameW	
			07E1E Hint/Name RV		000070F4	0000813C	Hint/Name RVA	0213 GetModuleFileNameA	
		0000705C 000	107D96 Hint/Name RV	/A 0341 LoadResource	000070F8	00008152	Hint/Name RVA	0161 FreeEnvironmentStringsW	
			107E40 Hint/Name RV		000070FC	0000816C	Hint/Name RVA	0511 WideCharToMultiByte	
			107E52 Hint/Name RV		00007100	00008182	Hint/Name RVA	01DA GetEnvironmentStringsW	
			107E62 Hint/Name RV 107E72 Hint/Name RV		00007104	0000819C	Hint/Name RVA	046F SetHandleCount	
			107E86 Hint/Name RV		00007104	000081AE	Hint/Name RVA	01F3 GetFileType	
			107E94 Hint/Name RV						
			07EAA Hint/Name RV		0000710C	000081BC	Hint/Name RVA	0263 GetStartupInfoW	
			107D86 Hint/Name RV	/A 0165 FreeResource	00007110	000081CE		02CD HeapCreate	
			107D76 Hint/Name RV		00007114	000081DC	Hint/Name RVA	03A7 QueryPerformanceCounter	
			107E30 Hint/Name RV		00007118	000081F6	Hint/Name RVA	0293 GetTickCount	
			107D68 Hint/Name RV 107F32 Hint/Name RV		0000711C	00008206	Hint/Name RVA	01C1 GetCurrentProcessId	
			107F32 Hint/Name RV		00007120	0000821C	Hint/Name RVA	0279 GetSystemTimeAsFileTime	
			107F54 Hint/Name RV		00007124	00008236	Hint/Name RVA	02CF HeapFree	
			107F64 Hint/Name RV		00007128	00008242	Hint/Name RVA	04B2 Sleep	
			107F76 Hint/Name RV		0000712C	0000824A	Hint/Name RVA	0172 GetCPInfo	
			07F8C Hint/Name RV		00007130	00008256	Hint/Name RVA	0168 GetACP	
			07FB4 Hint/Name RV		00007134	00008260	Hint/Name RVA	0237 GetOEMCP	
			07FCC Hint/Name RV 07FE4 Hint/Name RV		00007138	0000826C	Hint/Name RVA	030A IsValidCodePage	
			07FFC Hint/Name RV		0000713C	0000827E	Hint/Name RVA	02D4 HeapSize	
			10800C Hint/Name RV		00007130	0000828A	Hint/Name RVA	0418 RtlUnwind	
			10801C Hint/Name RV						
			10802C Hint/Name RV		00007144	00008296	Hint/Name RVA	02CB HeapAlloc	
			008048 Hint/Name RV		00007148	000082A2	Hint/Name RVA	02D2 HeapReAlloc	
			008066 Hint/Name RV		0000714C	000082B0	Hint/Name RVA	0304 IsProcessorFeaturePresent	
			10807A Hint/Name RV 10808E Hint/Name RV		00007150	000082CC	Hint/Name RVA	032D LCMapStringW	
			10809A Hint/Name RV		00007154	000082DC	Hint/Name RVA	0367 MultiByteToWideChar	
			1080A8 Hint/Name RV		00007158	000082F2	Hint/Name RVA	0269 GetStringTypeW	
			1080B6 Hint/Name RV		0000715C	00000000	End of Imports	KERNEI 32 dil	

ShellExecuteA indicates that the malware will attempt to execute terminal commands.

AdjustTokenPrivileges indicates that the malware will attempt to change privileges of resources.

CreateFileA and WriteFile also indicate that the malware will try to create a new file.

4. What host- or network-based indicators can you use to identify the malware on infected Machines?

explorer.exe
EnumProcessModules
psapi.dll
GetModuleBaseNameA
EnumProcesses
freddy01x.dll
X64DLL
freddy01x.exe
X64
/c
cmd.exe
open

Running strings show us these file names. freddy01.dll

Some host indicators could be the existence of freddy01x.dll, freddy01.dll and

freddy01x.exe. Moreover, explorer.exe is a typical process for malware to inject themselves into thus if explorer.exe is taking too much resources when running. Maybe any unexpected shell commands in the terminal history as well.

5. The file has multiple resources in its resource section. What are their respective MD5 or SHA hashes? What are the differences between the resources? [Hint: Resources are usually in BIN format]




The differences could be resources for the different types of architecture, X86 or X64.

Task 3 (5 marks, 1 mark for each question): Answer the following questions by analyzing HW-A-3.exe using basic static and dynamic analysis techniques only.

1. What is this program's functionality and explain the basis for this guess? This could be a trojan file. This is because the exe file has the icon for an image file, to disguise its true file type.

2. What are your observations about the program using Basic Static Analysis techniques?



Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion ProductId 55274-640-2673064-23950 hTT@

SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders

This could show that the malware will try to view and change registry keys. Especially with imports such as RegSetValueExA or RegCreateKeyExA and RegCreateKeyA.

Moreover, XX--XX.txt or similar files might be created. Especially with imports such as CreateFileA, WriteFile and CreateDirectoryA.

3. What are your observations about the program through dynamic analysis?

HW-A-3 - Copy.exe	7804 1.25	7.98 kB/s 6.36 MB	MSEDGEWIN10\IEUser	
✓	3924	1.57 MB	MSEDGEWIN10\IEUser	
server32.exe	3164	224 kB	MSEDGEWIN10\IEUser	
ч.27.э <u>м</u> үтгүүлчэ чоору	/JUU 🍇 LUGU IIIIGYE	C. VIVII IUUWS Wys VV O VV	• •	шауе разе, ухору
4:27:3 🔳 HW-A-3 - Copy	7968 💐 Process Create	C:\Users\IEUser\AppD	ata\Roaming\insSUCCESS	PID: 4364, Comma
4:27:3 server32.exe	4364 Process Start		SUCCESS	Parent PID: 7968,
4:27:3 server32.exe	4364 🚉 Thread Create		SUCCESS	Thread ID: 1960

There is a creation of a process called server32.exe

4:27:3 HW-A-3 - Copy	/ 7968 🥞 Reg Set Info Key	y HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\.	SUCCESS	KeySetInformation
4:27:3 🔳 HW-A-3 - Copy	/ 7968 🌋 RegQueryKey	HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\.	SUCCESS	Query: Handle Tag
4:27:3 🔳 HW-A-3 - Copy	/ 7968 🌋 RegOpenKey	HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\.	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R
4·27·3 ■ HW-A-3 - Conv	v 7968 🕸 ReaCloseKev	HKI M\SOFTWARF\WOW6432Node\	SUCCESS	
12:12: 🖬 HW-A-3 - Copy	7804 - CreateFile C:\L	Jsers\IEUser\AppData\Local\Temp\XxX.xXx	SUCCESS	Desired Access: G
12:12: 🖬 HW-A-3 - Copy	7804 NriteFile C:\L	Jsers\IEUser\AppData\Local\Temp\XxX.xXx	SUCCESS	Offset: 0, Length: 8
12:12: 📓 HW-A-3 - Copy	7804 A.CloseFile C:\L	Jsers\IEUser\AppData\Local\Temp\XxX.xXx	SUCCESS	
12:12: 📓 HW-A-3 - Copy	7804 CreateFile C:\L	Jsers\IEUser\AppData\Local\Temp	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R
12:12: 📓 HW-A-3 - Copy		Jsers\IEUser\AppData\Local\Temp\XxX.xXx	SUCCESS	Filter: XxX.xXx, 1:
12:12: 📓 HW-A-3 - Copy	<u>=</u>	Jsers\IEUser\AppData\Local\Temp	SUCCESS	
12:12: 📓 HW-A-3 - Copy	=	Jsers\IEUser\AppData\Local\Temp\XxX.xXx	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R
12:12: 📓 HW-A-3 - Copy	7804 🔂 Query Basic InforC:\\	Jsers\IEUser\AppData\Local\Temp\XxX.xXx	SUCCESS	Creation Time: 4/13
		· ··-· · · - · · · -		

Moreover, there is a creation of the file XxX.xXx

02:20:46	www.atwushere.net
02:20:52	www.itisreal.edu
02:20:59	www.atwushere.net
02:21:05	www.itisreal.edu
02:21:13	www.atwushere.net
02:21:19	www.itisreal.edu
02:21:26	www.atwushere.net
02:21:33	www.itisreal.edu

Using apatedns, we can also see that the malware is trying to connect to the above domains.

```
Total changes: 42460
```

Using regshot to compare, there are many changes and the picture below focuses only on the keys added.

```
Keys added: 22
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\TermReason\7684
HKLM \SOFTWARE \WOW6432Node \Microsoft \Tracing \server 32\_RASAPI 32
HKU\S-1-5-21-3461203602-4096304019-2269080069-1000\\Software\\Microsoft\\Speech\_OneCore\\Isolated\\N8QQ8uXrWkuVsSWU0SWuEuISxhKqU1\\SuBare(N1)
 HKU\S-1-5-21-3461203602-4096304019-2269080069-1000\Software\Microsoft\Speech\_One\Core\Isolated\N8QQ8uXrWkuVsSWU0SWuEuISxhKqU1\Software\Microsoft\Speech\_One\Core\Speech\_One\Core\Speech\Software\Microsoft\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\Speech\
HKU\S-1-5-21-3461203602-4096304019-2269080069-1000\\Software\\Microsoft\\Speech\_OneCore\\Isolated\\N8QQ8uXrWkuVsSWU0SWuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhKqU1\\SuEuISxhXqU1\\SuEuISxhXqU1\\SuEuISxhXqU1\\SuEuISxhXqU1\\SuEuISxhXqU1\\SuEuISxhXqU1\\SuEuISxhXqU1\\SuEuISxhXqU1\\SuEuISxhXqU1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxhXqu1\\SuEuISxh
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```

4. List the potential host-based of this malware.

The existence of the file in the User\AppData\Temp\XxX.xXx.

The malware can also be running as a process, called server32.exe.

We can also find if registry keys stated above are created, or the other registry keys changed.

5. List the potential network-based indicators of this malware? To which domains does the malware possibly connect?

02:20:46	www.atwushere.net
02:20:52	www.itisreal.edu
02:20:59	www.atwushere.net
02:21:05	www.itisreal.edu
02:21:13	www.atwushere.net
02:21:19	www.itisreal.edu
02:21:26	www.atwushere.net
02:21:33	www.itisreal.edu

Connection history to these sites can be used as network indicators.

PE File Format (5 marks)

PEfile Usage Examples: https://github.com/erocarrera/pefile/blob/wiki/UsageExamples.md Task 4 (5 marks, 1 mark for each question): Write a Python program that uses the pefile API (https://code.google.com/p/pefile/). The program takes a PE file as input from the command line, and should perform the operations below. We have provided a template Python program (A3.py) that you can use to get started. Note that the template is provided as a reference and you should not rely on its implementation correctness, although we have ensured this to some extent. You may modify or completely rewrite the template if you wish. (Note: In to answering the questions below, please attach screenshots of the results in your report. Additionally, include your code in a single Python file inside your submitted zip file.)

- 1. Write a program to output the following to standard output:
- a. Identify the file type as DLL, EXE, or SYS regardless of the file's extension. [Answer to this is provided in A3.py for you to get started]
- b. The total number of imported DLLs.
- c. The total number of imported functions.
- d. The compile time.
- 2. Alert the user if the code's entry point is not in a section with the name .text, .code, CODE, or INIT. (Hint: Aforementioned usage examples may have some relevant code snippets that you can use. You can consider using pe.OPTIONAL_HEADER.AddressOfEntryPoint to get the address of the entry point. You can use section.contains_rva() for your checking.)
- 3. Use the PEiD database that comes with pefile to identify packers. Confirm that this works with UPX. Output the detection to standard output.
- 4. Calculate and output the entropy for each section. Alert the user if there is a suspicion that a section may be packed or compressed (if the section's entropy >=6).
- 5. Compare the PE Optional Header checksum with the actual checksum. Alert the user when they do not match up.

```
C:\Users\IEUser\Desktop>python A3.py HW-A-3.ex
Assignment 3: A0216695U Edward Ng
       Analysing file HW-A-3.ex
[1]
2.a]
       File type: PE
2.b]
       #DLLs: 16
[2.b]
       #FNs: 113
3]
       Compile Time: 0x2A425E19 [Fri Jun 19 22:22:17 1992 UTC]
       Entry point found in CODE
       Packer detected: None
[6]
       Entropy for sections...
         CODE: 6.41 (Packed?)
         DATA: 2.76
          BSS: 0.00
          .idata : 4.77
          .tls: 0.00
          .rdata : 0.21
          .reloc : 6.25 (Packed?)
          .rsrc : 7.96 (Packed?)
[8]
       Checksum matched: False
:\Users\IEUser\Desktop>_
```