


CS5322 Database Security




- A data owner passes a database D to a service provider
- The service provider answers queries from users
- This setting is referred to as database outsourcing




- This was the same scenario that we considered in our discussions of encrypted databases
- But now, let's assume that we do NOT aim to ensure data confidentiality against the service provider
 - Reason: encrypted databases incurs a lot of overheads
- Instead, we want to ensure that the service provider answers queries correctly



- "What do you mean by 'answering queries correctly'?"
- Possible ways to answer queries incorrectly:
 - Return only a subset of the tuples in the query result (e.g., by stopping the query early)
 - Return some fake tuples
 - Return the query result previously obtained from an outdated version of the database




- "Why would the service provider do that?"
- Possible reasons:
 - The service provider is overloaded with a lot of queries on a lot of databases, and does not have enough resource to process all queries in time
 - The service provider wants to compromise the query result for malicious purposes




Solution:

- When the service provider answers a query, it returns both the query result and a proof of the result's integrity
- i.e., the proof should let the user verify whether the result is correct and whether it is from the most updated database




- "I don't think service providers would really do that in practice."
- Amazon has done something based on a similar idea
 - https://aws.amazon.com/qldb/
- Microsoft also proposed something along a similar line
 - https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3035918.3064030




- "OK. But how?"
- Use public-key cryptography

Public-Key Cryptography




- The data owner has two keys
 - A private key sk, which she keeps to herself
 - A public key *pk*, which she distributes to the public
- Messages encrypted by pk can only be decrypted by sk
 - So anyone can use pk to send secret messages to the owner
- Messages that can be decrypted by pk must have been encrypted by sk
 - So the owner can send authenticated messages to others

Naïve Solution




- Let the owner sign each tuple in the database, i.e.,
 - She encrypts each tuple with her private key sk
 - She sends both the encrypted version and the original to the service provider
- Whenever the service provider answers a query by returning some tuples, he also returns the encrypted versions

Naïve Solution



- Whenever the service provider answers a query by returning some tuples, he also returns the encrypted versions
- For each tuple t and its encrypted version t*, the user can decrypt t* using the owner's public key, and see if the decrypted tuple is the same as t
 - This prevents the service provider from modifying or faking any tuple


Naïve Solution




Problems:

- It does not prevent the service provider from dropping any tuples
- Each tuple needs to be stored twice: encrypted and unencrypted
- We need something better...


- Let's focus on a specific type of queries: equality query on one attribute
 - i.e., SELECT * FROM TWHERE T.A = X
 - e.g., SELECT * FROM EmployeesWHERE Age = 30
- How can we outsource this type of queries and prevent the service provider from faking or dropping results?



- Idea: We let the data owner
 - Divide the tuples into groups according to their Age values
 - Encrypt each group separately using her private key sk
 - Send the encrypted groups to the service provider



- Suppose that the user issues the following query:
 - SELECT * FROM Employee WHERE Age = 21
- The service provider just returns the encrypted group of tuples for Age = 21
- The user then decrypts the tuple group using the data owner's public key pk
 - If the tuples have Age = 21, then it is guaranteed that there is no fake or missing tuples




Question:


- Suppose that there is no employee with Age = 21
- What does the data owner do?

Option 1:

- Just omit the Age = 21 group
- Only create encrypted groups for those age values that have at least one tuple
- Does this work?




- Option 1:
 - Only create encrypted groups for those age values that have at least one tuple
- Does this work?
- No
 - If we do this, then the service provider can drop any tuple group from the query result, by pretending that there is no tuple with that age value




Option 2:

- If Age = 21 does not have any tuple, then the data owner encrypts a message "Age = 21 is empty" using her private key
- Do this for every empty Age group
- If a user asks for an Age group that is empty, just return the corresponding encrypted message




- Option 2: Create an encrypted message for each empty group
- Problem: There could be too many empty groups
 - Suppose that the attribute to be queried is Salary
 - Creating an encrypted group or message for each possible Salary value is rather expensive in terms of time and space




Option 3:


- For each non-empty group, we not only encrypt the tuples, but also create an encrypted message to indicate which is the next non-empty group
- E.g., in the above example, we not only encrypt the tuple group with Age = 20, but also create an encrypted message: "After Age = 20, the next non-empty group is Age = 22"
- The total number of encrypt messages equals the total number of non-empty groups



- If the user queries a non-empty group, then returns the corresponding encrypted group
- If the user queries an empty group, return the encrypted message that can prove the empty results
 - E.g., if the user enquires "Age = 21", then return the encrypted message "After Age = 20, the next non-empty group is Age = 22"




- Any problem?
 - There could be too many non-empty groups to encrypt
 - Think about Salary
 - Only works well for equality query
 - Does not work for range queries, e.g., "Salary > 100k and Salary < 200k"




- We will introduce a solution that only require the data owner to create one encrypted "message"
 - No need to encrypt any tuple at all
 - And it can support range queries
- It is called the Merkle tree

Merkle Tree




- Invented by Ralph Merkle in 1979
- A tree structure that allows efficient verification of its content
- Key ingredient: a cryptographic hash function


Cryptographic Hash Function




- A function that maps data of arbitrary size to a bit string of a fixed size, with the following properties:
 - It is deterministic (so the same message always results in the same hash)
 - It is efficient to compute the hash value for any given message
 - It is infeasible to generate a message from its hash value except by trying all possible messages
 - A small change to a message should change the hash value so extensively that the new hash value appears uncorrelated with the old hash value
 - It is infeasible to find two different messages with the same hash value




- Suppose that we are to build a Merkle tree to support range queries on Salary
- First, sort all tuples by Salary
- Second, build a binary tree on the sorted sequence



- Third, materialize the non-leaf nodes in a bottom up manner, using a cryptographic hash function h
 - For each non-leaf v, its content equals $h(v_{left}) \parallel h(v_{right})$, where v_{left} and v_{right} are v's left and right children, respectively, and \parallel denotes concatenation




- Finally, let the data owner encrypts h(root) using her private key sk
 - In the above example, the root is v7
- Then, the data owner sends the encrypted digest to the service provider




Intuition:

The encrypted h(v7) ensures that the service provider cannot make any change to the sorted sequence t1, t2, ..., t8




Why?


- Since h(v7) is signed by the data owner, the service provider will get caught if he changes v7
- Since v7 cannot be changed, the service provider will get caught if he changes v5 or v6
- Since v5 and v6 cannot be changed, the service provider will get caught if he changes v1, v2, v3, or v4, and so on...



- In other words, the service provider can answer any query as follows:
 - Return the sorted sequence t1, t2, t3, ..., t8, along with the signed h(v7)
 - Ask the user to verify the correctness of the sorted sequence, and then answer the query herself using the sorted sequence
- Problem: this approach returns too many irrelevant tuples
- Solution: return some hash values instead of tuples




- Suppose that a user searches for "Salary = 3.5k"
- The service provider would return the following
 - t3, t4, h(v1), h(v6), and the encrypted h(v7)



- Suppose that a user searches for "Salary = 3.5k"
- The service provider would return the following
 - \Box t3, t4, h(v1), h(v6), and the encrypted h(v7)
- Why? We will explain using a simpler tree

h(v5)







- Consider the above Merkle tree
- Re-consider the query on "Salary = 3.5k"
- Option 1:
 - The service provider could return t1, t2, t3, t4, as well as the encrypted h(v5)
 - The user could then compute h(t1), h(t2), h(t3), h(t4)
 - Based on that, she computes h(v1) and h(v2)
 - Then she can compute the hash of $h(v1) \parallel h(v2)$ and verify it against the encrypted h(v5)
 - Then she can be sure that the data has only t1, t2, t3, and t4; so no "Salary = 3.5k"

h(v5)







- Option 1: The user computes
 - h(t1), h(t2), h(t3), h(t4),
 - \Box and then $h(v1) \parallel h(v2)$
 - and then verify it again h(v5)
- Question: does the user really need t1 and t2?
 - No; She only needs h(v1)
- That is, given t3, t4, and h(v1), the user can already verify the query result against h(v5)









- So the service provider could simply return t3, t4, and h(v1), as well as the encrypted h(v5)
- This is sufficient for the user to verify the answer for "Salary = 3.5k"




- Now reconsider the query on "Salary = 3.5k"
- The service provider could return the following:
 - t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7, t8, and the encrypted h(v7)
- But t5, t6, t7, t8 could be replaced by h(v6)




- Now reconsider the query on "Salary = 3.5k"
- The service provider could return the following:
 - \Box t1, t2, t3, t4, h(v6), and the encrypted h(v7)
- But t1, t2 could be replaced by h(v1)




- Now reconsider the query on "Salary = 3.5k"
- The service provider could return the following:
 - h(v1), t3, t4, h(v6), and the encrypted h(v7)
- Any more replacement?
 - No; we definitely need t3, t4, and the encrypted h(v7)




- Now reconsider the query on "Salary = 3.5k"
- Final answer: The service provider returns the following:
 - h(v1), t3, t4, h(v6), and the encrypted h(v7)




- Now consider a query on "Salary > 2.5k and Salary < 3.5k"</p>
- The service provider could return the following:
 - $\mathbf{1}$ t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7, t8, and the encrypted $h(\mathbf{v7})$
- Any replacement possible?
 - \mathbf{b} t5, t6, t7, t8 could be replaced by h(v6)



- Now consider a query on "Salary > 2.5k and Salary < 3.5k"</p>
- The service provider could return the following:
 - 11, t2, t3, t4, h(v6), and the encrypted h(v7)
- Could we replace t1, t2 with h(v1)?
 - No; otherwise, the user cannot verify whether the service provider has hidden a tuple with Salary = 2.6k




- Now consider a query on "Salary > 2.5k and Salary < 3.5k"</p>
- The service provider could return the following:
 - 1 t1, t2, t3, t4, h(v6), and the encrypted h(v7)
- Could we replace t1 with h(t1)?
 - This is OK




- Now consider a query on "Salary > 2.5k and Salary < 3.5k"</p>
- The service provider could return the following:
 - h(t1), t2, t3, t4, h(v6), and the encrypted h(v7)
- Any more replacement?
 - No; we definitely need t2, t3, t4 to prove correctness

Merkle Tree: General Algorithm


- Consider a query on T.A in [x, y]
- Among the tuples t with t.A < x, find the tuple tx whose A value is the largest
 - Identify the path from tx to the root of the Merkel tree
 - For every "left branch" on the path, collect the hash value of the branch
- Among the tuples t with t.A > y, find the tuple ty whose A value is the smallest
 - Identify the path from ty to the root of the Merkel tree
 - For every "right branch" on the path, collect the hash value of the branch
- Return tx, ty, and all tuples between them, and all hash values collected, as well as the encrypted Merkle root




- Consider a query on "Salary in [5.5k, 6.5k]"
 - i.e., A is Salary, and [x, y] = [5.5k, 6.5k]
- "Among the tuples t with t.A < x, find the tuple tx whose A value is the largest"</p>
 - tx is t5




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 - tx is t5




- Consider a query on "Salary in [5.5k, 6.5k]"
 - i.e., A is Salary, and [x, y] = [5.5k, 6.5k]
- "Identify the path from tx to the root of the Merkel tree"
 - The path from t5 to v7




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
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 - i.e., A is Salary, and [x, y] = [5.5k, 6.5k]
- "For every left branch on the path, collect the hash value of the branch"
 - Collected hash: h(v5)




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
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 - i.e., A is Salary, and [x, y] = [5.5k, 6.5k]
- "Among the tuples t with t.A > y, find the tuple ty whose A value is the smallest"
 - ty is t7




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
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 - i.e., A is Salary, and [x, y] = [5.5k, 6.5k]
- "Identify the path from ty to the root of the Merkel tree"
 - the path from t7 to v7




- Consider a query on "Salary in [5.5k, 6.5k]"
 - i.e., A is Salary, and [x, y] = [5.5k, 6.5k]
- "Identify the path from ty to the root of the Merkel tree"
 - the path from t7 to v7




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
- Consider a query on "Salary in [5.5k, 6.5k]"
 - i.e., A is Salary, and [x, y] = [5.5k, 6.5k]
- "Return tx, ty, and all tuples between them, and all hash values collected, as well as the encrypted Merkle root"
 - i.e., t5, t7, and t6, and h(v5) and h(t8), and the encrypted h(v7)




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Merkle Tree: Exercise h(v7)**v7** Owner $h(v5) \parallel h(v6)$ **v**5 **v6** $h(v1) \parallel h(v2)$ $h(v3) \parallel h(v4)$ **v2 v1 v3 v**4 *h*(t5) || *h*(t6) $h(t3) \parallel h(t4)$ $h(t1) \| h(t2)$ *h*(t7) || *h*(t8) t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 3k 4k 5k 6k 7k 8k Salary = 1k 2k


- Consider a query on "Salary = 4k"
- What should the service provider return?



- Consider a query on "Salary in (3k, 4k]"
- What should the service provider return?



- What if the tuples are updated?
 - E.g., the tuple with Salary = 6k is deleted
- Option 1:
 - The data owner reconstructs the binary tree, re-computes h(root), signs it with a timestamp, and sends it to the service provider
 - The data owner announces the timestamp to users



- Problem with Option 1:
 - Reconstructing the whole binary tree once per update is time-consuming
- Improved solution:
 - Use an update-friendly tree structure, e.g., a red-black tree
 - Any tree structure could be signed by the data owner like a Merkle tree

Extension to Multi-Dimensional Data

- The previous discussions focus on one-dimensional queries
- How about multi-dimensional queries? e.g.,
 - SELECT * FROM EmployeeWHERE Age > 30 AND Salary > 10000
- Option 1:
 - Build two Merkle trees on Age and Salary, respectively
- Problem:
 - No benefit from using two trees simultaneously
 - We need to choose either the tree on Age or the one on Salary to answer a query

Extension to Multi-Dimensional Data

- The previous discussions focus on one-dimensional queries
- How about multi-dimensional queries? e.g.,
 - SELECT * FROM EmployeeWHERE Age > 30 AND Salary > 10000
- Option 2:
 - Use multi-dimensional indices
 - E.g., an R-tree

R-tree

name	semester	credits
A	8	100
В	4	10
C	6	35
D	1	10
E	6	40
F	5	45
G	7	85
H	3	20
I	10	70
J	2	30
K	8	50
L	4	50

