Ungraded Pre-Lecture Quiz

- In a password-file stealing cybercrime, what's the role of the **extracted password file**?
- Suppose you want to create several VMs that:
 - Can talk to each other on a network segment;
 - Can access the Internet, e.g. to install software packages;
 - Do not need to talk to your host OS.

What **networking mode in VirtualBox** should you select?

IFS4102: Digital Forensics

Lecture 2:
Digital Evidence Handling,
Forensics Lab & Static Acquisition

Outline

- Digital evidence handling
- Evidence acquisition
- Digital forensics lab and tools
- Static acquisition
- Lab 2 exercises
- Offline case discussion



Digital Evidence Handling

Digital Evidence & Characteristics

- Digital evidence (in our module):
 a digital object that contains reliable information that
 either supports or refutes a hypothesis of an incident or crime
- Characteristics of digital evidence:
 - An abstraction of some digital object or event
 - Easily copied
 - Easily modified
 - Easily destroyed
 - Volatile

Type of Digital Evidence in an Investigation

- Two types of digital evidence w.r.t. a particular hypothesis
- Inculpatory evidence:
 - Tends to indicate that the suspect is guilty of the alleged crime, or had a criminal intent
 - I.e. **support/"prove"*** the allegation hypothesis
- Exculpatory evidence:
 - Tends to indicate that the suspect is innocent of the alleged crime
 - I.e. refute/"disprove"* the allegation hypothesis or fails to support it

^{*} Note: We will discuss levels of certainty later in the module

Digital Evidence Requirements

- Digital evidence needs to be *admissible* in a court of law
- Admissibility requirements:
 - Relevant: it has a direct bearing on the incidence in question
 - Authentic/integral: it hasn't been tampered with
 - Forensically sound: collected/acquired and stored in a forensically-sound manner
 - Based on the **best available evidence**
- Forensically sound: the operation adheres to established digital forensics principles, standards and processes

Caution/Issue: Evidence Dynamics

- In handling digital evidence, be mindful of evidence dynamics
- Evidence dynamics: any influence that changes, relocates, obscures, or obliterates evidence, regardless of intent, between the time evidence is transferred and the time the case is resolved
- Can be caused by:
 - Offenders
 - Victims
 - Digital evidence first responders
 - Digital evidence examiners/specialists
 - Anyone else who had access to digital evidence

Examples of Evidence Dynamics

- A first responder did not follow SOP and failed to collect important evidence
- Digital evidence examiners installed a pirated version of a forensic tool on the compromised server
- On an evidential computer, a system admin attempted to recover deleted files from a hard drive by installing software or saving recovered files onto the same drive
- [IR:] Responding to a computer intrusion, a **system admin intentionally deleted** an account that the intruder had created, and attempted to preserve digital evidence using the **standard backup** facility (e.g. cp, tar, cpio)

Yet, Supportive Aspect of Digital Evidence

- Digital evidence can be duplicated exactly:
 a copy can be examined as if it were the original
- It is very easy to determine if digital evidence has been modified or tampered with: by comparing it with an original copy using the right tools
- Digital evidence can be resistant to deletion:
 even when a file is "deleted" or a hard drive is formatted,
 digital evidence could still be recovered
- When criminals attempt to destroy digital evidence,
 copies & associated remnants can remain in places that they were not aware of



Digital Forensic Investigation's Steps

- **Most common steps** in conducting a digital investigation (Casey, 2011):
 - Preparation: Generating a plan of action to conduct an effective digital investigation, and obtaining supporting resources and materials
 - **Identification**: Finding potential sources of digital evidence (at a crime scene, within an organization, on the Internet)
 - Preservation: Preventing changes of digital evidence at the crime site
 - Collection/acquisition: Collecting evidence data
 - Examination & analysis: Searching for and interpreting trace evidence in acquired evidence data
 - **Presentation**: Reporting of findings






FIGURE 6.1 A comparison of terminology related to digital investigation process models.

Proper Digital Evidence Handling

- Goal of *proper* handling:
 - To present evidence that is admissible to the court of law
- Required procedure during the investigation steps:
 - Sufficient preparation, good identification, valid preservation, valid acquisition, valid examination & analysis, valid presentation
- Applicable guidelines:
 - Standard/best-practice/widely-accepted methodology and procedures
 - Examples:
 - Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence (SWGDE)
 https://www.swgde.org/, which act as the U.S representative of the International Organization Computer Evidence (IOCE)
 - The UK Association of Chief Police Officers, "ACPO Good Practice Guide", <u>https://www.digital-detective.net/digital-forensics-documents/ACPO Good Practice Guide for Digital Evidence v5.pdf</u>

Preparation: For Evidence Search and Seizure

- The **Fourth Amendment** to the U.S. Constitution:
 - Protects everyone's right to be secure in their person, residence, and property from search and seizure
 - Basically restricts unreasonable search and seizure
- **Search warrant** is thus required:
 - In a criminal case: can be based on an affidavit given a probable cause
- Reference on "Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal Investigations":

https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ssmanual2009.pdf

Identification & Preservation: General Handling Procedures

Identification:


- **Identify** relevant pieces of evidence
- **Tag** them

Preservation:

- During the seizure, also **bag** them: thus "**bag-and-tag**" all evidence
- Use anti-static bags if needed
- The evidence is stored in a tamper-proof manner: put mobile devices inside **signal-blocking** bags (*Why??*)
- In general, affect evidence data as little as possible

Acquiring Evidence in a Computer Forensics Lab (cont.)

Evidence Bags



Signal-Blocking Bag



https://www.idstronghold.com/

Collection/Acquisition: General Handling Procedures

Collection:

- Document/record evidence origin
- Keep track of chain-of-custody (continuity-of-possession), which accounts for who did what on the evidence where and when until that object is entered into evidence in the courtroom
- Sample chain-of-custody form: <u>http://www.nist.gov/oles/forensics/upload/Sample-Chain-of-Custody-</u> Form.docx

Acquisition:

- Valid evidence **acquisition**: do not alter the original evidence! *How??*
- Create **two forensic duplicates** whenever possible, and **validate** the duplication integrity

Sample Chain-of-Custody Form

Property	Record	Number:

Anywhere Police Department EVIDENCE CHAIN OF CUSTODY TRACKING FORM

Case Number:	Offense:	
Submitting Officer: (Name/ID#)		
Victim:		
Suspect:		
Date/Time Seized:	Location of Seizure:	

Description of Evidence			
ltem #	Quantity	Description of Item (Model, Serial #, Condition, Marks, Scratches)	
	I		

	Chain of Custody			
Item #	Date/Time	Released by (Signature & ID#)	Received by (Signature & ID#)	Comments/Location

EVIDENCE CHAIN-OF-CUSTODY TRACKING FORM (Continued)

Chain of Custody				
Item #	Date/Time	Released by (Signature & ID#)	Received by (Signature & ID#)	Comments/Location

Final Disposal Authority			
Authorization for Disposal	-		
Item(s) #: on this document pertaining to (susperis(are) no longer needed as evidence and is/are authorize	ect): ed for disposal by (check a	ppropriate disposal method]	
☐ Return to Owner ☐ Auction/Destroy/Divert			
Name & ID# of Authorizing Officer:	Signature:	Date:	
Witness to Destru	oction of Evidence		
Item(s) #: on this document were destroyed by in my presence on (date)			
in my presence on (date) Name & ID# of Witness to destruction:	Signature:	Date:	
Release to	Lawful Owner		
Item(s) #: on this document was/were released ID#: to			
NameAddress:	_ City:	State: Zip Code:	
Telephone Number: () Under penalty of law, I certify that I am the lawful owner o			
Signature:	Date:		
Copy of Government-issued photo identification is attached	ed. 🗆 Yes 🗆 No		
This Evidence Chain-of-Custody form is to be retained as	a permanent record by th	e Anywhere Police Department.	

From:

http://www.nist.gov/oles /forensics/upload/Sample -Chain-of-Custody-Form.docx

APD_Form_#PE003_v.1 (12/2012)

Page 1 of 2 pages (See back)

APD_Form_#PE003_v.1 (12/2012) Page 2 of 2 pages (See front)

	DIGITAL EV	IDENCE FORM	
Investigator's Name and Association: Eoghan Casey Knowledge Solutions		Case No.: 2003040601 Date: April 4, 2003	
Location of Computer/Media (full address)		Name of Suspect(s)/Type of Case:	
Corporation 2	K, Building 6, Redmond, CA	John Doe/Information Theft	
EVIDENTIA	RY SYSTEM		
Computer/Pro	ocessor:	Make and Model:	
Sony Vaio/C	eleron	PCG-R5050TLK (PCG-1362)	
Name and Address of System Owner: Corporation X, Main Office Redmond, CA 510-555-3465 NOTE →		It is an offense to gain unauthorized access to a computer, its software or data. Do you have authorization to undertake this backup/examination?	
Serial No.: 32	5-67545	Photographic Exhibit No.: 2003040601-3	
	nd Time: 04/06/2003, 14:30		
Actual Date and Time: 04/06/2003, 14:32 EXAMINATION SYSTEM		Software: dd and EnCase	
Computer/Processor: Dell/Intel Pentium 4 Serial No.: 35-6465466		Make and Model: Dimension 4600C CMOS Date and Time: 04/06/2003, 14:54 Actual Date and Time: 04/06/2003, 14:54	
EVIDENCE I	FILES (two independent of		
Name sony1-1.dd sony1-2.dd sony1.E01 sony1.E02	Creation Time 04/06/2003 15:02 04/06/2003 15:22 04/06/2003 15:46 04/06/2003 16:30	Size (bytes) Message Digest 601435 343e16d6551e84d35c176375728fbbf4 354676 ab487d36057d446b6a8b72091da72f23 613354 c6dd075b82677fc0bc6f88f1fb941224 454643 5d6330ca0adaa43c6639b68f6b2db48b	
Other Media: Floppy disks	inventoried on attached sheet		
Evidence Bag:	1:		
	ored in evidence room		
Comments:	ed to owner without drive		
system return	ed to owner without drive		

FIGURE 16.2 Digital evidence form.

Examination, Analysis & Reporting: General Handling Procedures

Examination:

- Always work on the **duplicates**, never on the original
- **Dual-tool verification** (more in the next few slides)

Analysis:

 Accurately perform various types of analysis (e.g. a time-line analysis, event correlation) to discover findings and draw conclusions

Reporting:

• Present the findings in a **technically correct yet understandable** manner

Dual-Tool Verification

- Bugs do exist in DF software, and can result in evidence being lost or interpreted incorrectly
- **Dual-tool verification** technique:
 - Use two tools to verify that the results are correct
 - Either by comparing the results from both tools; or by using one tool to verify that data has been interpreted/ processed correctly by another tool
- **Examples**: two tools should recover the same deleted files from a given file system, should calculate date-time stamps correctly

Additional Notes on Tool Verification

- US NIST Computer Forensic Tool Testing (CFTT) program: to establish a methodology for testing computer forensic software tools by development of general tool specifications, test procedures, test criteria, test sets, and test hardware
- Example: CFTT provides **formal requirements** for write blockers, "The Hardware Write Block (HWB) Device Specification", http://www.cftt.nist.gov/hardware_write_block.htm
 - Shall not transmit a command to a protected storage device that modifies the data on the storage device
 - Shall return the data requested by a read operation
 - ...
- US NIST's Computer Forensic Reference Data Sets (CFReDS)
 can additionally be used to validate DF software tools

Evidence Acquisition

Data Volatility: Overview

- Target system's data exists in both non-volatile and volatile states
- **Non-volatile** data: data **persists** even after a computer is powered down, e.g. a file system stored on a hard drive
- **Volatile** data: data will be **lost** after a computer is powered down, e.g. the current network connections to and from the system
- **Volatility problem**: you may **never** have access to your target system's data again: e.g. lost physical memory (RAM) content, encrypted file system
- A proper handling at the crime scene is thus needed!

Evidence Acquisition: Some Options to Choose

- Given a seized computer, what can you do?
- One question: should we disconnect it from a network?
- Live/volatile memory acquisition and live analysis:
 - The evidential computer is running the OS installed on that computer
 - An important question: Can we do data collection using the evidential computer itself?
 - **Pros**: The system potentially holds evidence that may be lost or hard to acquire if the system is shut down (e.g. encrypted disk)
 - **Cons**: Can we trust the system in generating the evidence?
- Another question: when powering-off the computer, should we do a **graceful/orderly** shutdown or a **forceful** shutdown?

Evidence Acquisition: Some Options to Choose

- Static/dead/non-volatile acquisition:
 - Utilizes an OS that is not running on the evidential machine
 - Question: where should this be done?
 - → Typically done in a forensic lab
- Question: How about the order of evidence acquisition?
 - Evidence acquisition should be done/ordered based on the Order of Volatility (OOV):
 - most volatile → least volatile → non-volatile memory

Order of Volatility (OOV)

• **OOV**:

- CPU, cache and register content
- Routing table, ARP cache, process table, kernel statistics
- Memory
- Temporary file system/swap space
- Data on hard disk
- Remotely logged data
- Data contained on archival media
- Reference: P. Henry, https://www.sans.org/blog/best-practices-in-digital-evidence-collection/

RFC 3227 "Order of Volatility"

Areas traditionally considered "volatile"

1. Registers, cache

- 2. Routing table, arp cache, process table, kernel statistics, memory
- 3. Temporary file systems
- 4. Disk
- Areas traditionally considered "non-volatile"
- 5. Remote logging and monitoring data that is relevant to the system in question
- 6. Physical configuration, network topology
- 7. Archival media

FIGURE 13.5 Order of volatility.

Data Acquisition at Crime Site

- Some widely-followed protocols at the crime site
- First, **document** the evidence:
 - Take **photos and video** of the scene and computer (including all cables)
 - Sketch the **incident scene**: diagram and label all cords
- If a computer is **off**:
 - Don't turn it on
 - A much simpler decision procedure
 - But, if the disk is encrypted, what can we do during our analysis?
 - Possible disk decryption tools, e.g. Elcomsoft Forensic Disk Decryptor
 - Any ways to recover passwords/passphrases from RAM? Cold-boot attack (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold boot attack): relies on the data remanence property of DRAM/SRAM to retrieve memory contents that remain readable in the seconds to minutes after power has been removed; Ref: Halderman, et al., "Lest we remember: Cold-boot attacks on encryption keys", Communications of the ACM. 52 (5): 91–98.

Data Acquisition at Crime Site

- If a computer is **on**:
 - Should you perform a live/volatile acquisition?
 - It is considered necessary if the suspect encrypts his hard drives
 - Question: Can we check if the disk is encrypted?
 A tool like Encrypted Disk Detector (EDD) could help check
 the local drives on a system for TrueCrypt/PGP/Bitlocker/.... encrypted volumes
 - Live acquisition steps: see Lecture 3 and Lab 3 exercise later
 - Should you additionally perform a live analysis??
 - How about a self-destruct or self-wipe machine??
 - How should you shutdown the machine?
 - Graceful/orderly shutdown vs forceful ("pull the power plug"): pros & cons?
 - Relevant adopted best shutdown procedure





FIGURE 7.7 An overview of the decision process when preserving a computer.

Guidelines for First Responders: Resources

"Electronic Crime Scene Investigation: A Guide for First Responders", U.S. Department of Justice, 2008: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/21 9941.pdf



Guidelines for First Responders: Resources

"Digital Evidence Guide for First Responders" from Massachusetts Digital Evidence Consortium, 2015: https://www.iacpcybercenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/digitalevidence-booklet-051215.pdf

Step 4 - If the system is on, proceed with CAUTION

 Do not type, click the mouse, or explore files or directories without advanced training or expert consultation

- Ask about passwords and/or encryption of the system
- Observe the screen, and look for any running programs that indicate access to internet-based accounts, open files, encryption, or the presence of files or data of potential evidentiary value
- If you see anything on the screen that concerns you or needs to be preserved, consult with an expert (if you don't know who to contact, call the number on the inside cover of this manual)
- Photograph the screen
- Once you are prepared to power down the system, pull the plug from the back of the computer system
- Remove the battery from a laptop system



Data Acquisition at Crime Site

• **Subsequent** steps:

- Unplug power cord, remove notebook's removable battery if required
- Bag up all electronic devices in evidence bags as their safe containers:
 - For magnetic media: use anti-static bags
 - For mobile devices: use **signal-blocking bags**!
- Collect all available instruction manuals, CDs, notes, etc.
- Document all pieces of collected evidence
- Perform a static/non-volatile acquisition at the forensic lab:
 - Use your forensic workstation: see **Lab 2**
 - What if you **cannot** remove the non-volatile storage devices from the suspect/evidential computers?
 - → Boot up using **forensically-safe live CD boot** (more in this slide deck)

Break!



US Dept of Defense Computer Forensic Workstation (http://www.dcfl.gov/photo.html)

Digital Forensics Lab & Tools

Digital Forensics Lab: Standard & Guidelines

- While there is **no standard** on digital forensics lab (DFL), a number of organizations look at **similar areas** to find an appropriate standard
- "ISO/IEC 17025 General requirements for the competence of testing and calibration laboratories": general requirements for the competence of testing and calibration laboratories is being used to **model** a standard for computer forensic labs
- **Guidelines** for a DFL:
 - The American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors (ASCDL) https://www.ascld.org/
 - "INTERPOL global guidelines for digital forensics laboratories", https://www.interpol.int/content/download/13501/file/INTERPOL DFL GlobalGuidelinesDigitalForensicsLaboratory.pdf (more in the next slide)


INTERPOL Global Guidelines for DFLs

- Issued by the Digital Forensics Laboratory at the INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation, Napier Road, Singapore, 2019
- Management of a digital forensics laboratory, including about:
 - Premises: location, facility, physical security, ...
 - Staff
 - Equipment: software, Hardware, Tools & accessories
 - (And also) laboratory analysis procedure
- A good recent reference for planning and managing a DFL

Acquiring Evidence in a Computer Forensics Lab (cont.)

Laboratory Requirements

Note: "evidence lockers" in a digital forensic lab (vs "evidence bags" during evidence search & seizure



Key

- A Equipment Closet
- B Evidence Locker
- C PC Workstation
- D Mac Workstation
- E Workbench

Acquiring Evidence in a Computer Forensics Lab (cont.)

Evidence Locker



Acquiring Evidence in a Computer Forensics Lab (cont.)

Computer Forensics Laboratory Sign-In

Computer Forensics Laboratory Sign-In

Date	Full Name (CAPS)	Signature	Organization	Time In	Time Out	Approval Signature
				—		
				†		
				1		
				+	_	
				-		
		-				
				-		
				-		

upervisor Signature:	
2 N	
ate:	

Determining Floor Plans for Digital Forensics Labs




Figure 2-3 Mid-size digital forensics lab ©Cengage Learning®

Digital Forensics Hardware & Other Equipment

- Forensic workstation: a powerful computer with plenty of storage
- Portable forensic workstation: a field-kit for use in the field at the crime site
- Other supporting equipment:
 - Hardware write blocker
 - Hard disk duplicator
 - Anti-static evidence bags
 - Mobile-phone signal blocker bags

•

Forensics Workstation Example

 Cellebrite forensics workstation



Source:

https://www.cellebrite.com/en/cellebrite-forensic-workstation/

Portable Forensic Workstation Example

Cellebrite UFED



Source:

https://www.scmagazine.com/review/cellebrite-ufed-series-of-tools/


Cloning a Hard Disk Drive with Disk Jockey PRO Forensic Edition





Static Acquisition


Memory Forensics



Static Acquisition


- Static acquisition: image creation of persistent storage devices (non-volatile memory), e.g. hard disk, USB drive, SD cards
- Bit-stream/bit-by-bit/forensic copy:
 - **Goal**: to create an *exact duplicate* of a storage device, including its *slack space*
 - Technique: make a bit-for-bit copy of all sectors on the media
 - Output: a bit-stream image or forensics image/copy
- Tool requirements:
 - "Data Acquisition Tool Test Assertions and Test Plan" from NIST CFTT (<u>www.cftt.nist.gov</u>)
 - Can we use tools like tar or copy? Why or why not?
- Also the importance of a write blocker!

Static Acquisition & Volume+File-System Analysis



From: Brian Carrier, "File System Forensic Analysis"

Layers of Disk & File Analysis



From: Brian Carrier, "File System Forensic Analysis"

Write Blockers

- Protect/preserve your evidence drives
- Some OSes with journaling file system may write into drives
- Types:
 - Hardware:
 - Sits between a forensics workstation and evidence drives
 - **USB connection** to the forensics workstation
 - A number of **interfaces** to evidence drives: USB, IDE, SATA, eSATA, FireWire, ...
 - **Professional grade** with various switches and indicators: e.g. hardware blockers from Tableau
 - Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7eT8KSHMGFw

Hardware Write Blocker




Source: Wikipedia

SATA Data Cable and SATA Power Cable







IDE Interface on a Hard Disk



SCSI Connector



UltraBlock Forensic Card Reader and Writer



Write Blockers

- Software:
 - OS configuration on your forensic workstation
 - Done by either a **manual OS configuration**; or a **forensics software**, e.g. FastBloc SE (Software Edition) from EnCase, SAFE Block Win8 from ForensicSoft Inc.
 - Windows-based write blocker using the Registry Editor (see Lab 2, Task 1):
 - Registry entry:

 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\StorageDe

 vicePolicies
 - Value: WriteProtect=1 (DWORD/32-bit value)
 - Linux write-blocker kernel patch:
 - Some patches are available, e.g. https://github.com/msuhanov/Linux-write-blocker/
- Which one should you use: a hardware or a software write blocker? Why?

Windows Registry: Quick Notes for Lab 2




Figure 1.4 Registry nomenclature.

From: Harlan Carvey, "Windows Registry Forensics", 2nd Edition

Static Acquisition Methods

- Disk to image (forensic container): the most common method
 - Expert Witness Format (EWF):
 used by EnCase, unofficial/de-facto industry standard, .E01 extension,
 also .Ex01 (a new variation offering encryption and compression)
 - Advanced Forensics Format (AFF): open format by Simson Garfinkel, used in TSK/Autopsy, .AFF extension
 - **AFF4**: a redesign of AFF
 - Raw/dd format
 - SMART

Disk to disk:

- Produce a disk clone
- Done is if disk-to-image method is not possible due to HW/SW issues



FIGURE 7.2 Tableau hardware duplicator used to acquire evidence from hard drives.

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More on Static Acquisition

- Benefits of **newer disk image formats** (EWF, AFF):
 - Option to **compress** the image files (using lossless compression)
 - Capability to split an image into smaller segmented files
 - Capability to store and integrate metadata into the image files, including case information
 - Due to these features, the size of the *target device* is *not* the same as the *created image file* (forensic container)
- Note: If you **don't need** to or **can't examine** the entire drive (e.g. from a very large drive):
 - Logical acquisition: captures only specific files of interest
 - Sparse acquisition: logical acquisition + collects fragments of unallocated/deleted data

Static Acquisition

- In Windows:
 - FTK Imager (Lab 2): not open source, but free to use
 - Various other forensics suites
- In **Linux**:
 - **dd** (data dump):
 - dd if=<source-drive> of=<image-file> conv=noerror, sync
 - Split image file:

```
dd if=<source-drive> conv=noerror, sync
split -b <size-in-MB>m - <image-file>
```

- **dcfldd** (forensics version of dd, from Defense Computer Forensics Laboratory):
 - dcfldd if=<source-drive> of=<image-file> hash=<hash-function> hashlog=<logfile>

Static Acquisition

- dc3dd (another forensics version of dd, from DoD Cyber Crime Centre):
 - dcfldd if=<source-drive> hof=<image-file> hash=<hash-function> log=<logfile>
- **Benefits** of dcfldd/dc3dd over dd:
 - Logging
 - Improved error handling
 - Available hashing options
 - Verification of the acquired data
 - Progress monitoring: note that forensic imaging can take many hours!
- **GUI tool**: Guymager
- Demo of dd & dcfldd: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aJp7 OVW2FA

Write output to a file/device, then hash the output bytes, and verify the hash

Copy Integrity and Hash Values

- Compare an original evidence drive and created forensics image
- Typical **hash functions** used: MD5, SHA1 (are these still "secure"?)
- Imager component a forensics suite computes and compares hash values
- Alternatively, we can compute hash values using **Linux** commands:
 - MD5: md5sum, SHA-1: sha1sum, SHA-2: sha224sum, sha256sum, sha384sum, sha512sum
 - For recursive hash calculation, use md5deep or hashdeep with -r: support MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256
- For **Windows** hashing command/tools, see Lab 2




FIGURE 1.3 Black box concept of the message digest.

Remote/Network Acquisition Tools

- It is possible to do a remote/network static acquisition
- But potential **issues**: interfering antivirus, antispyware, firewall
- Example of dd with netcat (nc), with the latter's -w **timeout option**:
 - Source# dd if=/dev/sda conv=noerror,sync | nc -w 5 < destination-IP> < destination-port>
 - Destination# nc -lp <destination-port> > <image-file>
 - Destination# nc -lp <destination-port> | dd of=<image-file>
- Also there's CryptCat, which enhances netcat with encryption
- Extra features of modern forensics software suites:
 - Encrypted data transfer
 - Better user interface

• ...




FIGURE 7.5 Remote forensic tool used to acquire digital evidence from a computer over the network.

How about *Unremovable* Storage Media?

- Sometimes a disk *cannot* be removed from the suspect's computer
- How can we perform a static acquisition on it?
- Use the *suspect's computer* (provided the following are feasible):
 - Can modify the computer's boot order
 - Can connect a USB/SATA external drive for USB or CD-ROM boot-up
 - Can run a forensically-safe live boot CD → the OS will not mount, or mount as read-only any connected storage media
 - Windows boot utility: Mini WinFE (https://github.com/bshavers/Mini-WinFE)
 - Linux live CD: Kali Linux, SIFT, DEFT Linux,
 - If there is no available port to plug a **target storage device**: do a **remote acquisition** over the network

Inspecting/Examining Forensic Image File

- Disk image file:
 - Can be inspected using FTK Imager and other forensics suites
- Accessing a forensic image using FTK Imager (Lab 2):
 - Add/access image as evidence:
 - Allow you to browse file system, and extract/export files of interest
 - FTK Imager's evidence-analysis features are limited compared to FTK forensics suite's
 - Autopsy suite can alternatively be used: to be discussed in Lecture 3 and Labs 3-5
 - Mount image as a drive:
 - Make a disk visible to the OS
 - Allows external tools to inspect the files, e.g. anti-virus software
- Deeper analysis on the image file will require further disk and file analyses (in subsequent lectures and labs!)

Lab 2 Exercises

Lab 2 Exercises

- *Task 1-A: Setting up Windows-based software write blocker
- Task 1-B & 1-C: Creating a forensic image of your target drive using Windows Forensic Workstation (with FTK Imager)
- Task 2: Accessing the created image file and export some files
- *Task 3: Mounting the acquired image file and scan for malware
- Task 4: Creating a forensic image of your target drive using Linux Forensic Workstation (with dd & dcfldd*)

*: Optional

Your Post-Lecture Self-Review

For Your Self-Review before Lecture 3

Definition

Alibi: a plea that a person charged with a crime was **somewhere else** when the crime was committed (Dictionary of Law 2007)

A Scenario:

- A computer crime was committed last Friday in the afternoon
- Was it committed by you?
- **Task**: explain the trail of digital evidence left by your activities on that day that can serve as an alibi
- Identify what elements that would be **easily faked**, and which would be **more reliable indicators** of your actual movements

Your TO-DO for Lab 3:

Get a USB thumb drive or external hard drive with free space > your notebook's RAM size

Questions? See you next week!