COMMUNITY POLICING IN SINGAPORE

by

Mark Low Jian Neng

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is devoted towards unpacking how community policing has been managed as a state discourse by the Singapore Police Force. Firstly, community policing is located within the historical context of a modernising Singapore. This begins with the need for crime prevention that was disseminated through decentralised neighbourhood police posts in the 1980s. With economic restructuring in the 1990s, community policing was rescaled to meet the changing demography of the population. Following an enhanced deployment of counter-terrorism discourse in the wake of 9/11, community policing was re-invented as part of a (re)bordering strategy to safeguard territorial sovereignty and social cohesion. Secondly, the methodology of community policing is visualised through the changing frames of the state-produced docu-drama, *Crime Watch*. As a television programme that has consistently raked in high viewership numbers for 25 years, *Crime Watch* texts deserve their fair share of critical scrutiny to reveal the means of community engagement by the state police. Thirdly, the personal networks of Volunteer Special Constables are studied for the insights that they can reveal into the work of policing one's community. Personal interviews with sixteen volunteers provide the empirical data for analysis. Volunteers have committed much time and effort into performing the work of volunteer police officers. Mediating the boundaries between the police and the public, these volunteers translate community policing into practice in complicated ways that have not been adequately documented. In summary this thesis makes three contributions to social geography: it traces the convoluted history of community policing as a state-authored discourse; it sketches the stereotypical plotlines of community policing as a tool for community engagement; and it uncovers the personal networks through which community/policing may be performed.

PREFACE

This thesis was approved by the Behavioural Research Ethics Board of the University of British Columbia, BREB Number: H11-01116.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

APF – Auxiliary Police Force
CC – Community Centre
CCTV – Closed-Circuit Television
CDC – Community Development Council
CEP – Community Engagement Programme
CISCO – Commercial and Industrial Security Operations
CLP – Community Liaison and Preparedness
CLPO – Community Liaison and Preparedness Officer
CSI – Crime Science Investigation
CSSP – Community Safety and Security Programme
FRC – Fast Response Car
GRO – Grassroots Organisation
HTA – Home Team Academy
IPPT – Individual Physical Proficiency Test
MHA – Ministry of Home Affairs
MRT – Mass Rapid Transit
NPC – Neighbourhood Police Centre
NPCC – National Police Cadet Corps
NPCO – Neighbourhood Police Centre Officer
NPP – Neighbourhood Police Post
NPPO – Neighbourhood Police Post Officer
NS – National Service
NWG – Neighbourhood Watch Group
NWZ – Neighbourhood Watch Zone
PA – People's Association
PAP – People's Action Party
PES – Physical Employment Status
PNS – Police National Service
RC – Residents' Committee
SPF – Singapore Police Force
SSWG – Safety and Security Watch Group
VSC – Volunteer Special Constabulary or Constable

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To the oft-forsaken loved ones of police officers

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Stories about Singapore's modernisation are not new. They have variously traced the evolution of the city-state from its humble beginnings as a colonial trading settlement to a thriving entrepot port of the British Crown Colony, to a modern nation-state conceived during a period of postcolonial struggle, and to the drive towards economic development and integration into the world-economy that continues to this day. This story about Singapore locates itself in the postcolonial period that witnessed an intense phase of nation-building. It traces the history of state subject-making from the constitution of law-abiding worker-citizens through a period of relaxed consumption in the 1980s that cultivated the homeowner-citizen, to a period of economic restructuring in the late 1990s that ushered in a dominant consumer-citizen. In adopting a historical approach, this story rejects the teleological impulse of most developmental narratives, electing to focus on the ambivalences, ambiguities, complexities, contradictions and surprises within *The Singapore Story*[1] (for a similar effort, see Barr and Trocki 2008, or Heng and Aljunied 2009). This methodology is fitted with the subject matter of policing in Singapore. Policing in Singapore has strangely not received the amount of recognition that it deserves in shaping the contours of modernity in the city-state. While researchers have variously underscored the importance of having a highly-disciplined Singaporean workforce in the bid to attract foreign direct investment (Coe and Kelly 2000; Rodan 2006; Koh 2009), there has been little detailed scholarship on how the boundaries of work are actually constituted. Through a focus on police work, this story hopes to be more attuned to the various processes through which work-discipline is fostered. Narratives about a type of work associated with a profession which incorporates high levels of discipline can reveal not just the everyday lives of individuals working as police officers, but it can also reveal how police work affects the wider population through its enforcement of law, cultivation of self-discipline, and statisticisation of crime-related information. At issue then is the relationship

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[1] Most frequently ascribed to the narrative of the elder statesman Lee Kuan Yew. Lee memorably wrote a two-part autobiography titled 'The Singapore Story' in the late 1990s.

between the police, police work[2] and the work of self-policing, which has been relatively un-covered by previous narrators. Since the scope of the investigation would appear immeasurably big, one way to fine-tune the research focus is to turn to the sociological nexus of the self and the collective: the community. In policing circles, community policing has gathered prominence in recent decades as a management tool to be used by police forces to better engage the public in their policing duties (see Skolnick and Bayley 1988; Goldstein 1990; Fielding 1995). Fortuitously, community policing in Singapore had been institutionalised as a formal discourse by the Singapore Police Force (SPF) in the 1980s (Quah and Quah 1987), and it has been carried out as part of the nation-building effort since then. Community policing then serves both as a platform for internal organisational restructuring by the SPF and for keeping abreast of changes in the wider socioeconomic context. Alas, the story of community policing in Singapore has surprisingly been glossed over by many scholars. This was despite the fact that community policing underwent a significant change in organisational direction in the 1990s (Singh 2000), which impacted upon the lives of many ordinary Singaporeans and frontline police officers in innumerable ways. With the mainstreaming of the counter-terrorism drive following the 9/11 attacks and subsequent terror alerts in South-East Asia, policing the domestic Homeland (Walters 2004) would assume an increased prominence in many places including Singapore. An analysis of the community policing discourse facilitates a better understanding of contemporary securitisation strategies, which have led to an expansion of the (in)security continuum (Bigo 2002). This then is a story about community policing which is also simultaneously a story about modernisation in the postcolonial national community of Singapore.

Any story about the police would bring to mind the slew of crime fiction and detective novels that have come to underpin the genre in contemporary popular culture. It is here that community policing works the ground in its most extensive fashion. Utilising the mass media to disseminate favourable images of the police and policing has become possible through the

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[2] Here it is prompt to note that the focus of this project is on the work done by the police, although where appropriate, the term 'police work' will be extended to refer to various forms of regulatory work performed by others as well. Adopting a Foucauldian definition of police work (1991; 2001) implies that the latter work is not solely that performed by law enforcement agents.

close networks that have been cultivated between the police and the media (Chibnall 1977). While relationships are contextually specific, the media's demand for newsworthiness, the popularity of the crime fiction genre, and recognition of the increased need for public relations by the police frequently assist to concoct a potent mixture for common consumption in ways that have yet to be explored fully by media or police scholars (for e.gs. see Mason 2003; Valier 2004; Carrabine 2008). The story of 'popular community policing' is told through an analysis of the text of *Crime Watch*, a television docu-drama that first aired in 1986. That *Crime Watch* has continued its broadcast for 25 years amidst a constantly evolving free-to-air television broadcasting landscape is testament to its popularity. According to collated ratings, *Crime Watch* frequently amasses over a million viewers for each episode, which is a rare feat for the small city-state of Singapore[3]. It is hoped an analysis of *Crime Watch* would reveal several strategies for entertaining the population. If community engagement is the key to the involvement of the public in community policing, *Crime Watch* is a crucial mode of disseminating the messages of the state police. Through the ability to penetrate into the respective living rooms and the reproductive spheres of individual households (Jermyn 2003), *Crime Watch* provides a convenient platform for allowing the police to govern at a distance. A historical approach is again adopted, as the evolution of *Crime Watch* texts over the decades is first carefully studied. These insights are then applied towards theorising the popularity of the *Crime Watch* series. Connections between *Crime Watch* and wider production and consumption contexts are investigated, to better locate the communications of various forms of 'community' by the state, which in turn can affect how national communities are understood and performed.

Finally, a third story on community policing which needs to be told is that of the volunteering spirit of the Volunteer Special Constabulary (VSC). These are individuals who have committed their time to serving as volunteer police officers in the SPF. Located at the intersection of the police and the population being policed, these individuals are repositories of many interesting stories of police work, civilian work, and all else in-between. As individuals who are not full-

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[3] The current population of Singapore is 5.2 million; back in 1986 it was 2.7 million (Statistics Singapore 2011).

time police officers, but yet have voluntarily submitted to the disciplinary regimes expected of police officers (Greenberg 2005; Capozzola 2008), Volunteer Special Constables are worthy of a scholarly enquiry. Through studying the work-life experiences of these individuals, it is hoped that a better understanding of the relations between the police, police work and the work of self-policing can be gleaned. An emphasis on the personal life stories of these volunteers requires the adoption of a micro-sociological theoretical approach. The experiences of individual volunteers are analysed to detail the specific processes which are involved in enrolling, and then sustaining individual participation in the VSC. 'Community' here more precisely refers to the personal networks of community. While this thesis does not set out to document the various personally-inscribed 'communities of choice' of volunteers (for e.g. see Spencer and Pahl 2006), it tackles the issue of how community policing can be practised via the personal networks of individuals, which ostensibly includes those within and without one's personal community. Similarly, the focus of this section would not be about exploring the various forms of community life within the VSC network. While the sustained scale of involvement (e.g. Wellman 2001) by volunteers helps ensure that these personal networks can qualify as spaces of community-living, and interviewees would occasionally allude to the deeper forms of social engagement that are present in the experiences of volunteering, the scope of this thesis will be restricted to understanding the processes of enrolment and reproduction of the VSC network.

These three stories are both distinct and interlocking in various ways. Separately, they allow greater specialisation through the adoption of different theoretical lenses according to the frames of the narrative. But put together, they assist to illustrate from different perspectives and with greater clarity and vivacity the story of community policing in ways that are more grounded and engaging.

Literature Review

Community policing is not a novel concept in academia. It has been studied by scholars from different disciplines, who have approached the subject from different angles. In what follows, a short discussion of the main fields of enquiry is re-presented.

Models of Community Policing

Community policing in the mainstream refers to a new philosophy of policing adopted by public police forces that includes a series of policing innovations pursued in response to the perceived failures of the traditional reactive professional model of policing[4]. Traditional policing in its reliance on maintaining the professional distance between the law enforcer-crime fighter role of the police and the ordinary citizen (Bittner 1970) was felt to have alienated the general public. Officers were sealed off from interactions with citizens as they were kept engaged by technological devices and internalised the axiomatic mandate of responding to emergencies. This disenchantment was exacerbated by the impression that the police were not capable of performing their tasks well, as studies took a dim view of the relationship between response times of frontline officers and apprehension rates, the success rates of professional criminal investigations, and the deterrence effects on crime of uniformed presence (Skolnick and Bayley 1988). The brusque nature of operationalising the Weberian monopoly of state coercion in policing the socioeconomically and racially marginalised members of the population worsened the public image of the police. While the degrees of influence exerted by the causal factors will depend on the historical context, these reasons more-or-less hold true for the average Anglo-American police force.

While there was a need for a change in policing philosophy, community policing's proponents would also gradually derive a series of management best practices to guide the day-to-day actions of police officers, especially those of frontline enforcement agents. This was important

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[4] This includes emergency response, patrol car policing, randomised patrols, visible uniformed presence, quasi-military bureaucratic structures and institutionalised criminal investigations.

to refute criticisms from fellow scholars that community policing was more rhetorical than real. Under the intellectual leadership of prominent police scholars (Skolnick and Bayley 1988; Goldstein 1990; Fielding 1995), community policing's key identifiable features gradually materialised alongside its ethos of organisational change. Key elements consolidated under the rubric of community policing included: (a) improving community partnerships to reduce the fear of crime and actual crime; (b) adopting problem solving approaches; and (c) reviewing organisational structures with a view to enhancing internal informational flows. These elements represent the three lowest common denominators of community policing models, united by the ethos of making police forces more responsive and accountable. As these are merely guiding principles and a consensus remains to be reached on the finer and final contours of a unified model, it is appropriate to refer instead to multiple models of community policing. In fact, experienced scholars, who double up as advisors to professional police forces, would argue that community policing needs to be customised to fit the local context, with what can work in a particular setting not necessarily being able to succeed when transplanted to another place (Quah and Quah 1987).

Despite this democratic gloss on models of community policing, it is with more than a tinge of irony that most scholars of community policing seldom concern themselves with theoretical definitions of either 'community' or 'policing'. Definition of these terms is treated in a cavalier manner, as scholars focus their gaze on analysing the best practices of community policing and proposing innovations to models. The result is an unfortunate impasse within much of the research on community policing, as oft-cited definitions of 'key elements' of community policing are repeated and recycled, while theoretical forays into the relationship between policing, the police and community are abandoned. This theoretically impoverished work then restricts its focus on providing strategic guidance to particular police forces seeking academic expertise in implementing the latest round of community policing reforms. In his review of policing studies, Peter Manning thus concludes that 'the driving force in both the United States and the United Kingdom is policy-based, short-term crisis funding that stimulates brief and limited research reports' (Manning 2005:39). Under these circumstances, it is little surprising

that most reviews of community policing are meant to succeed (Waddington 1999), as researchers largely belong to the branch of theoreticians who practise a sociology for the police rather than a sociology of the police (Manning 2005). Formal theoreticians engage in a management-centric mode of analysis that picks up on the areas of community policing models that need to be improved upon, rather than critiquing the very basis of the models itself. With their professional careers symbiotically linked to the 'success' of policing innovations, mainstream scholars shed their critical distance in order to become part of the sociotechnical managerial assemblage of policing, concerned with feeding data into the metrology of key performance indicators, productivity targets, crime rates, response times and customer satisfaction surveys that the police have subjected themselves to in their concerted attempts to measure the effectiveness of community policing efforts. Critical scholars have thus argued that theorisations of community policing are deliberately left ambiguous in order to facilitate a lax interpretation of formal theories by practitioners of community policing which confers liberal democratic credentials upon senior management of the police (McConville and Shepherd 1992) whilst granting more autonomy for decision-making (and abuse) to frontline officers (Waddington 1999).

I however argue that this theoretical ambiguity stems from both a failure to engage with critical sociological theorising **and** from the pre-reflexive nature of community that imbues it with an emotional and affective tactility. A failure to seriously engage with the long lineage of sociological thought on community life has resulted in theoretically impoverished conceptualisations of community, such as the following: 'those living, working or otherwise interacting in identifiable contexts' (Somerville 2009:261); and 'anyone who has a stake in the public safety problems and can bring resources to bear to assist in the development and implementation of solutions' (Scheider et al. 2009:697). These two definitions are reflective of popular theories of positivist sociology[5] and neo-communitarian thought[6], which present ready-

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[5] Positivist sociology is committed to mapping observable social phenomena in a way that can be empirically verified, and one can trace its lineage from classical thinkers such as Ferdinand Tonnies and Emile Durkheim through to 'postmodernists' such as the network sociology theorist Barry Wellman (2001). Within the positivist school, community emerged as a subject of study, whose intrinsic qualities could be teased out from within particular places. Social groups settling within defined boundaries, engaged in practices of territorialisation marked

made intellectual capital for the promotion of community policing. A failure to critique these mainstream sociological theories results in the adoption of the theoretical lenses proffered by them, which casts a restrictive net on emancipatory possibilities. Thus, it has become almost mandatory for all studies of community policing to bemoan the loss of traditional community in modern or postmodern societies. Scholars and practitioners of community policing alike frequently aspire to a past Golden Age of community policing, where densely-connected, durable, localised communities used to engage in forms of formal and informal self-policing in ways that obviated the need for professional police forces (Waddington 1999). The invocation of moral codes and the relation of historical knowledge combine to shore up claims to expertise whilst substituting for rigorous social scientific analysis and critical examination of the historical record (see Mitchell 2002).

Of close relation to this hegemonic construct of communities is the increasingly perfunctory nod to Robert Putnam's (2000) theory of social capital, wherein the objectives of police managers is to activate informal social control mechanisms embedded within the populace through reduction of the fear of crime. Enlivened community participation becomes the long-term goal of the police, having recognised the limitations of 'going it alone' that characterised the traditional policing model (Reiner 2000). Critical police scholars who have gone down this path of critique inevitably end up with the dismal view that some communities are better equipped than others to police themselves (e.g. Lyons 1999). However, over twenty years ago Pierre Bourdieu (1984) in his in-depth sociological analyses of the reproduction of

by indicators of self-sufficiency, dense networks of localised social interaction, common ties and bonds, consciousness of kind, communal values and norms and collective institutions became recognised as communities of varying degrees. Mappings of community became grafted onto rural-urban imaginaries, as social changes wrought by modernisation prompted reflections on the urban condition, refracted through the rural *Gemeinschaft* idyll (Creed 2006). Territorial groupings were identified as *potential* spaces of community and subjugated to rigorous scholarly analysis to theorise on material and symbolic processes of community formation, reproduction and disintegration in response to social changes, and the importance of locality for people's identification and organisation (Bell and Newby 1971).

[6] Neo-communitarians re-assert the value of a communitarian ethos both philosophically and pragmatically (e.g. Walzer 1983; Taylor 1989; Etzioni 1998; Tam 1998; Putnam 2000). Attributing contemporary social ills to the corrosive nature of excessive liberalism, they argue for a renewed emphasis on communal values, civic engagement and the accumulation of social capital. Community in the abstract or territorially-defined becomes the harbinger of normative claims, with emphasis placed on inculcating civic virtue and reanimating local tradition within particular social contexts.

socioeconomic class privilege had already taught us that social capital is an intensely relational resource which will be unevenly distributed according to one's socioeconomic background. Putnam's conceptualisation of social capital relies upon an ideal-typical (White bourgeois) characterisation of social capital, which places unrealistic burdens on populations already deprived of material and symbolic resources. In abstracting social capital from its relational basis, it becomes a concept attachable to the reified *homo economicus* of neoclassical economics which disavows its social twin (Polanyi 1957). Insidiously, it is capable of sending many scholars onto a wild-goose chase to measure the successes of topographically inscribed communities whilst intergenerational transfers of material advantages are concealed (Holt 2008).

The intellectual sidetrack is not complete. Having limited themselves to this naïve view of community participation, scholars researching on community policing strain their gaze upon the arbitrarily erected boundaries of social difference. The classic boundary is that between the police and the community. Identified as two disparate social organisations, each is assumed to harbour its own habitus, internally structured norms and expectations that guide everyday actions. The concept of the habitus, borrowed this time from Bourdieu (1977) himself, is easily applied to the police bureaucracy (Chan 1997). As a quasi-military organisation, the police have a host of specialised rituals that socialise recruits into the ranks of uniformed officers. Recruits are socialised to accept the widely-cherished strengths of the crime fighter persona (Reiner 2000): machismo, adventure-seeking, loyalty to one's unit, teamwork, perseverance under adversity, vigilance, distrust of authority and the feeling of being called to perform a thankless job. The powerful image of the crime fighter promotes in-group solidarity at the expense of external communications (van Maanen 1978). This necessitates the acquisition of bridging social networks in the form of increased contact points with the public. Thus a major platform of community policing has been the rolling out of neighbourhood police posts, proactive foot patrols, community liaison personnel, media outreach programmes and citizens' consultative committees to enhance informational exchanges with the public (Skolnick and Bayley 1988). Again, predictably, critical police scholars who research on the effectiveness of these

community policing interventions are likely to find themselves circumscribed by the communication platforms they have chosen. The strong internal bonding of frontline police officers guards against an open endorsement of top-driven community policing initiatives that are at times not sensitive to perspectives from the ground. Calling upon the police to tend to the population it serves not only strikes against the very mould of the crime-fighter persona, but it also confers upon the police an unfair burden of taking care of the extra-policing needs of the population (Herbert 2006). Under these circumstances, critical evaluations of community policing models end up with a dismal conclusion that neighbourhood forums inaugurated by the police fail to live up to their expectations of improving the socioeconomic well-being of the 'community' and enhancing the state of democracy through the cultivation of civil society. By delimiting their academic imagination to these communication formats (c.f. Ericson and Haggerty 1997), scholars have curtailed the expansion of their theoretical horizons and remain confined to answering questions posed on the terms of police managers. Under these circumstances, a renewed interest in policing subculture[7] has recently emerged (e.g. Waddington 1999; Reiner 2000; Marks 2005; Loftus 2010). Police scholars are forced to re-traverse the pioneering works of police studies written some 30-40 years ago[8] to re-examine how police subcultures are subverting the democratic ethos of community policing. In so doing, most tend to find themselves coming to the disappointing conclusion that not much has changed over the years[9].

However a notable exception amongst critical police scholars is the work of the geographer Steve Herbert (2006). He sets out to state his case against community policing by first reviewing how community has been conceptualised by social (the positivist school) and political (neo-communitarians) theorists, comparing them with his empirical materials to argue that the value

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[7] Original debates invoked this term to refer to the culture of insularity identified amongst frontline police officers which prohibited a full integration into wider society (Reuss-Ianni and Ianni 1983). This in my opinion remains a derogatory term grafted onto the lower ranks of the police that absolves supervisors of responsibility for their actions.

[8] If access to the police forces remains much cherished, it might not be too far-fetched to infer that scholars who have set their sights on studying the organisational cultures of rank-and-file officers are worried that continued access to the institution might not be granted if they were to shift their sights higher up the organisational ladder.

[9] Employment of Bourdieu's concept of the habitus (1977; 1984) is likely to highlight the reproduction of structures over the possibilities for transformation.

being placed on community in theory far exceeds the expectations of most people living within the neighbourhood-community. Herbert calls for a distinction to be made between the social and political attributes of community, and argues that an overly-enthusiastic embrace of grassroots' civic activism places too much burden upon individuals attempting to materialise the 'community'. Herbert reveals the uneven impacts of community policing both internally and externally on the different communities that he identifies, arguing that community policing in practice obscures social inequality whilst occluding wider scales of analyses, thereby neglecting the structural impacts of wider social forces. In terms of politics, an unresolved tension between state and society is manifest in the police's position vis-à-vis that of the society it governs. As both separate from and simultaneously generative of society, the police cannot be wholly accountable to society in the mould of the subservient model of state-society relations, which proffers a submission of the state to society. In addition, the internal dynamics of the policing organisation continue to reduce the likelihood of any successful implementation of community policing. Community policing over-burdens police forces by forcing them to listen to the community in unrealistic ways; this concurrently lets other state agencies off the hook for not contributing their fair share towards solving the entrenched social problems of the day. Herbert's analyses are compelling and nuanced, but at times he appears to stack the police up against the community. In so doing, he fails to elaborate upon the actual mechanisms through which the police are generative of society. The effect of policing on society is something not lost upon the next group of scholars.

Communities of Dissent

On the other side of the police-community barrier, habituses are multiply spread out across the landscape as community policing's territorialising impulses encompass more categories of 'community'. Minority ethnic groups, inner city neighbourhoods, gated communities, insurance companies, chambers of commerce, job placement centres, schools, churches, hospitals, families, and even online social networking sites are named as communities that must be responsible for a certain degree of self-policing. The recognition by the police that they cannot

be held solely responsible for the mandate of preserving public order and preventing crime has resulted in community groups gradually assuming responsibility for policing the conduct of their members. Nikolas Rose has identified this peculiar form of policing through communities as exemplary of the birth of neoliberal governmentality: 'New territorialisations of politics are involved in the emergence of community as an object of government...(n)ew moralising explanations of individual and collective pathologies underpin political strategies to regulate crime, enhance individual competencies, and administer security through activating the responsibilities of communities for their own well-being' (Rose 2000:1408). Technologies of government rely upon community to govern at a distance, and power is productive by working through individual freedoms of choice to produce compliant, contented and coherent subjects. Community ties individuals to an ethical conduct in a form of ethopolitics that is concordant with prevailing neoliberal discourses of responsible morality, self-control and self-advancement through legitimate consumption. Community is recognised as part of the assemblage of control technologies that govern advanced liberal societies, harnessing the warmth of community to produce complaint consumer-citizens, whilst punishing those who refuse the ethical contract.

Rose's critical theorising is emblematic of a second school of theoreticians. Taking his cue from the contraction of the social democratic welfare state and the various disjunctures accompanying a post-Fordist socioeconomic landscape, Rose attempts to theorise on the changing anthropology of the British state through a dissection of recent social policies (Rose 1999). Contrary to the micro-managers of community policing policies, Rose is theoretically bold and ambitious, relentlessly taking apart postmodern consumerist and psychologising discourses. A weakness of Rose's argument lies in his occasional universalising tendencies which do not provide space for alternatives to 'neoliberal governmentality' to emerge. His critical take on neo-communitarianism also could do better through identifying the sources of affection that are produced by these discourses. An ethical code of conduct is certainly being prescribed by neo-communitarians, but this surely varies according to different localised contexts. Understanding how communities are mobilised is then as important as understanding how individuals accept greater responsibility for their own behaviours at the personal level.

Fine-tuning of the theories of governmentality will help amplify the complicated processes at work within the individual.

Within close theoretical proximity one can locate similar critiques of the move to community policing. David Garland (2001) views community policing as part of the close-control, situational crime prevention strategies which characterise the rise of a managerialist paradigm within the police. Within a culture of control that permeates late-modern societies, the modern penal-welfare complex has been abandoned with the result that citizens now distrust the traditional medico-psychiatric-criminological expertise that helped constitute the system. Instead, neoliberal techniques of risk management undergirded by actuarial sciences are brought to the fore in the operation of the criminal justice system (Harcourt 2007). The police are called upon to prioritise crime prevention in their job description, since crime is productive of negative social externalities which disrupt the operation of free markets. This turn towards criminologies of everyday life that involve micro-managing the situational aspects of the environment to better prevent crime manifests itself in many policing strategies, of which community policing is one. Partnerships with the community will provide the necessary information to the police to help them calibrate their resources and stuff out opportunities for criminal activities. This 'soft' managerialist approach of the police is wedded onto a hard front of the state to create the impression that the state is still in control, when it has already ceded power to the market. The punitive arm of the state, which manifests itself through zero-tolerance policing and the massive increase in incarceration, is but a form of symbolic, expressive 'acting out' by the state, itself plagued by the neoliberal imperative of fiscal discipline. Garland's observations are canny and his use of empirical examples wide-ranging. These help to make up for his inadequate theorisations on the nature of the state, which from his version sometimes appears schizophrenic. His stereotyping of community policing is unfortunate too, as it distinguishes community policing from its nasty counterpart – zero-tolerance policing. This mistake is magnified if one considers how easily regressive and repressive policing tactics can easily be submerged under the rubric of community policing. Additionally, such a binary risks reproducing gendered norms that structure the meaning of police work: community policing is

the feminine role of tending to the community, while reactive policing is the purview of the masculine crime-fighter persona. Nurturing the traditional police psyche hinders the ability to institute progressive change within the police.

Loïc Wacquant (2009) issues a trenchant critique of the morphology of the state in *Punishing the Poor*. He ascribes recent social changes to the rise of neoliberalism, which he defines as a transnational political project aiming to remake the nexus of market, state, and citizenship from above, comprising four institutional logics: economic deregulation, welfare state devolution, institutionalisation of a cultural trope of individual responsibility, and an expansive proactive penal apparatus. He co-locates the rise of workfare policies and a renewed punitive penology in the re-making of the American state. This practice of statecraft is rationalised by the need to govern social insecurity spawned by a series of social disorders, to be determined by objective material insecurity for the working class poor in the last instance. The penalisation of the poor is manifold: coercion to participate in the formal economy without the accompanying benefits of a socialised wage; demonisation of welfare-seekers as a chronic form of dependency; surveillance of economic productivity and social mobility through the workfare arm of the state and containment of the socially excluded population through incarceration; and supervised paroles and court orders that re-visualise ex-offenders upon their release from prisons. Wacquant points to a disturbing trend when he compares the demographic profiles of those enrolled on workfare programmes against those housed in prisons. Their demographic isomorphism, functional equivalence and structural homology suggest the policing of a gendered division of labour at the bottom of the income hierarchy.

While Wacquant's skilful apprehension of the new penology of the state is theoretically robust and politically vigorous, it may come as a surprise that his elaboration of this new punitive penology contains little of the role of the police. Where mentions are made, it is mostly in reference to the adoption of the infamous broken windows theory which he rightly condemns as unscientific and theoretically dubious. While he attends to the policing of non-policing communities with aplomb, he has ignored the theoretical and practical developments within

the field of policing. Thus he makes a total of only two references to community policing throughout the entire text even when it has risen to become the dominant policing philosophy for American police forces, and each of these simply takes community policing to be synonymous with zero-tolerance policing, as an ideological mask for coercive state repression. Such theoretical and empirical lapses are however not atypical: scholars in this second category typically focus their intellectual energies at critiquing socially unjust policies of the state to the detriment of theoretical enquiries into the role of policing in societies. This is unfortunate, for the role that the police play in policing societies is constitutive of wider political economic structures. Linking the partitioned studies of policing with studies of communities becomes necessary for research into the policing of communities. Models of community policing can provide a convenient entry point towards this endeavour, if we begin to socialise them into practice.

In short, this brief review of academic literature has sketched out the contours of the sociotechnical managerial assemblage of community policing, which is complexly bounded up with the different models of community policing as espoused by prominent policing scholars. While more nuanced academic enquiries have recognised the need for customising the models to fit particular historical contexts, what remains missing from their accounts is a critical investigation of how these contexts have arose and how powerful interests are being served via the practice of police-centred community policing. A socialisation of the models of community policing would pay attention to how power relations are constantly working through different sites and scales to achieve the objectives of government. In addition, it can shed light on how the increasingly banal practice of community policing is intimately connected to the nurturing of individual subjectivities.

CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY

This thesis is broadly divided into three chapters that cover different aspects of community policing. Accordingly, the methods adopted for each chapter have varied and this would be reflected in the writing styles of each chapter. The three chapters respectively deal with the historical context, the popular cultural texts and the personal networks of community policing. As will be expected, each chapter draws upon different theoretical understandings of 'community' to provide guiding signposts throughout the texts. Research methods have also been influenced to a large extent by the conventional methodologies associated with each school of theory.

Historical Context

To excavate a grounded history of community policing, I have adopted a Foucauldian approach towards understanding power relations (Foucault 1991; 2001; 2007). This stresses the multiple twists and turns that history takes en route to the present, destabilising the 'facts' that mainstream historical texts tend to proclaim, in order to establish critical perspectives on the complexities of the subject matter. A Foucauldian approach also seeks to trace how power operates rather than identifying the 'who' or 'what' of power. Foucault's various exegeses of the technologies of the self provide many insights into the nature of policing power in modern societies. Understanding how power works through the self provides a crucial theoretical link between the police, police work and the work of self-policing. This facilitates a grounded approach to community policing; one learns to 'stick' closer to the ground as opposed to privileging the 'god's eye trick' that academics have occasionally been prone to practice. For the purposes of the Singaporean narrative, uncovering critical histories allows one to cover more ground over time whilst providing a more comprehensive understanding of community policing in Singapore. This is important since studies on community policing tend to ignore questions of scale in favour of pursuing managerial innovations (Herbert and Brown 2006). Having said that, this approach possesses several weak spots, as will be evident in the following chapter. It tries to make sense of a sprawling amount of historical data which may not always be amenable to

tidy representations that fit the narrative of this thesis. The scale of the endeavour, which attempts to trace the history of community policing over twenty-five years, is a huge task that would occasionally gloss over certain details. The choice of topics to focus upon is also highly selective, given the substantial theoretical ambiguity surrounding community policing (e.gs. McConville and Shepherd 1992; Waddington 1999; Herbert 2006) and the dearth of critical scholarly research on this subject matter in Singapore.

Historical research consisted of mainly archival research at the Public Affairs Department (PAD) of the Singapore Police Force (SPF). Force monthly newsletters, yearbooks, crime prevention brochures and *Crime Watch* videos served as the main staple for empirical data collection. In addition, scholarly texts on policing in Singapore and on the Singapore Police Force were read to glean more background information on the topic (e.gs. Quah and Quah 1987; Quah 1994; Ganapathy 2000; Akbur 2002; Sim 2011). Finally, an online search was made of newspaper articles, legal statutes and governmental publications on issues related to community policing in Singapore. Historical data collected through these methods tend to be unwieldy for scholarly analysis, because most of these texts are state-authored and offer little critical perspectives on issues. Fortunately, there are Singaporean scholars who have provided critical theoretical lenses on the political economy of Singapore (e.gs. Salaff 1988; Li 1989; Rodan 1989; Chua 1995; Rahim 2009), although these scholars would not all identify themselves as political economists. Reading their secondary texts was helpful for understanding certain broad issues which only partially pertain to policing work. I would then draw upon several ideas from local critical scholars to interpret the vast amount of historical data which have been studiously archived by the police over the years.

Finally, personal interviews were conducted with three officers holding senior leadership ranks within the Singapore Police Force, to better understand the perspectives from the top on how and why community policing was implemented over the years (see Appendix A2 for their profiles). Interviews were done one-on-one, face-to-face at a time and location convenient for office-holders: this meant that interviews were conducted in the personal offices of two officers, and at a meeting room in the Police Headquarters building for the third. Interview

schedules had been drawn out and passed on to candidates for their review prior to deciding on whether to be interviewed (see Appendices A and A1). When interview sessions were conducted, a tape-recorder was used to facilitate future transcription and analyses. My ability to secure these interviews was largely thanks to my position as a government scholar who would soon be joining the Singapore Police Force as a Senior Officer upon completion of my Master's Thesis. This position of privilege allowed me to secure access to an important gatekeeper within the force, who would direct me to the relevant personnel within the force who possessed various knowledge on community policing. His recognition and approval of my thesis proposal was important in granting me expedited access to my interviews and for an attachment to the Public Affairs Department for me to conduct research on the history of community policing in the SPF. This expedited access was granted on the expectation that I would be able to apply the knowledge so derived towards my future career with the force. Nonetheless, research continued to fall within certain boundaries of acceptability. For instance, I was only allowed to write on non-operationally sensitive details of police work, and my access to the police archives was only restricted to those documents that could be viewed by the general public as well.

But perhaps the fact that I would be joining the Police Force after graduation prompted a greater interest in police work that led me to write this thesis. For someone who is about to transit from being a student to being a working adult, this experience with investigating what police work is all about has been very personally fulfilling and is something that I hope to bring with me when I eventually start my job. Writing this thesis has in fact allowed me to re-trace processes that led me to sign on as a police officer and along the way, I have re/dis-covered several subtler reasons for my motivations for joining the SPF. This thesis then could more accurately be considered an autobiography of sorts as I not only re-trace my footsteps in joining the Police Force, but I've also re-examined a period in the history of community policing that fortuitously coincides with my growing up years in Singapore. Empirical materials are occasionally referenced from my undergraduate dissertation on the topic of policing the night city: these include previous experiences of frontline patrolling and interactions with VSCs on the ground. As an overseas student returning back to my home country to embark on a career, I

have taken an interest in re-looking at the various urban landscapes that had socialised me during my youth, and my footprints will pepper the finished product in more ways than usual. Bordering on the boundary between study and work has made me more attuned to the divergent scholarly work that has been done on policing. It is rather depressing for a geographer-future police officer to consume texts about the geographies of policing which consistently devalue the work of policing in the fight for economic and social justice, or in the bid to encourage a greater plurality of voices in the field. Police work certainly is responsible for its fair share of social injustices, brutal repressions and application of normalisation strategies, but it is something simultaneously more than that and a simple, broad-brush critique risks universalising generic policing traits whilst obscuring a deeper appreciation of disciplinary power. As the few geographers who have ventured into the policing field would testify, geographers have much to contribute to the sub-discipline of policing studies, whilst benefiting from and improving upon previous work done by police scholars. It is by engaging with police work that one can gain a more nuanced perspective of the subject matter of policing, which happens to be a concern of many geographers in the contemporary security climate.

Popular Cultural Texts

My visit to the Public Affairs Department also granted me access to previous episodes of *Crime Watch*. However, the collection of *Crime Watch* videos was in different recording formats and there were occasional missing entries in the archive, reflecting the evolution of video recording technologies and the changeovers of *Crime Watch* coordinators over time. Presently archaic video playback technologies such as *VHS* or *Betamax* require the use of video cassette players which were only available in limited quantities at the Public Affairs Department and in the National Library. This restricts the portability of videos as specialised equipment is needed to convert older videos into a digital format. The lack of a complete video record of past episodes also meant that the sampling technique specified below would be limited by the availability of video tapes and digital video discs.

Firstly, the compiled synopses of several seasons of *Crime Watch* were used to facilitate a quick overview for the purposes of content analysis. Again, the changing of *Crime Watch* coordinators and thus record-keeping practices meant this was not available for all past seasons of *Crime Watch*. Where synopses were not available, a screening of the teaser segment of each *Crime Watch* video would be sufficient for relating the main segments and content of that particular episode. Following that, a detailed viewing of particular sampled episodes would be carried out, applying these criteria: (i) ensuring at least one episode per year over the years is viewed where available; (ii) focusing on representations of particular crime types over time; and (iii) focusing on topics of interest, such as counter-terrorism or the usage of close-circuit television cameras. Where detailed viewing is carried out, a mixture of different viewing speeds is practised to ensure a fine balance between cognitive, emotive and affective modes of re-viewing is achieved. For instance, a close replay of texts facilitates a cognitive critical understanding of it in a way that would be dissimilar to a casual viewing of the same text as a form of entertainment. The process of screening past videos was also evenly spaced out across a period of two months, to ensure there were adequate breaks in-between for reflecting at greater lengths upon the viewing experience.

Textual analysis included looking out for the following: (i) characterisations of the police, criminal, victim, eye-witness and television audience; (ii) representations of crime; (iii) flow of each programme; (iv) representations of the different segments; (v) plotlines of re-enactments; (vi) filming and post-production editing techniques; and (vii) lists of crime prevention measures. Put together, these different components help constitute a popular cultural text through the creation of spaces of viewing pleasure. Community engagement thereby succeeds when its audience voluntarily consumes the text and by implication the state-authored message embedded in the text.

Nonetheless, the partial, over-determined process of consumption (Bhabha 1994) is more complicated than can be adequately dealt with in this thesis. Where analyses of consumption are attempted, these rely upon my informal conversations with friends and volunteer and regular police officers on whether they are viewers of *Crime Watch* and what they think of it. A

focus is however placed upon understanding the production process of *Crime Watch*. This was achieved through participant observations of the *Crime Watch* coordinator at his workplace in the PAD[10], as well as at a filming session of *Crime Watch*. Participant observations sought to reveal the various processes that constitute the production cycle of *Crime Watch* (see Appendix E); where possible, I would accompany the coordinator on his various duties in preparation for *Crime Watch*. My status as a participant observer was restricted by my lack of police knowledge on matters like police procedures and a lack of social networks within the organisation that was important in the sourcing of help for the production process. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this thesis, it was simultaneously important to maintain a critical distance from the production of *Crime Watch* to facilitate a critical analysis of the popular cultural text. For this reason, I abstained from voluntary participation in the production process, either via helping out as a liaison personnel or through acting as a police officer on *Crime Watch*. Conversely, my duty to the coordinator was to review the history of *Crime Watch* through catching up on past episodes of the series, and to provide informal feedback on the evolution of *Crime Watch* over the years. My limited theoretical expertise in critiquing popular cultural texts using the assorted tools provided by media studies, audience studies and cultural studies became a selling point; the provision of the man-hours needed to watch past episodes of *Crime Watch* was another.

Most of my participant observation sessions took place within the PAD office, where my time was split between reviewing *Crime Watch* texts and engaging in participant observation of the coordinator. I was attached to a location shoot for only one full day, as *Crime Watch* only shoots for several days each month at odd timings, which limits the opportunities for my fieldwork. The temptation to go behind-the-scenes of the production process was also necessarily limited by a prior engagement with the filming of another *Mediacorp Studios[11]* English language drama serial, and by the realisation that most production work is actually done before and after the shoot itself. Observing a shoot may thus be an informative process, but there were other considerations that constrained my involvement on-scene.

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[10] Informal interviews were held with the *Crime Watch* coordinator during these participant observation sessions. See Appendices B and B1 for the interview letter and schedule.
[11] The state-owned media production and broadcasting company in Singapore

Personal Networks

A request for interviews and participant observations with Volunteer Special Constables (VSCs) was first submitted through the gatekeeper to the SPF. This necessary procedure indicated the submission of the VSC within the SPF, in which permission for research work first needs to be sought from the higher authority. Eventually, while permission for interviews was granted, that for participant observations was stonewalled; informal sources related to me that this was due to my lack of formal training that became a safety issue, the lack of administrative manpower to formally process my request for grounded attachments with VSCs, and a lack of insurance coverage that restricts my mobility in the policing field.

Nevertheless, requests for interviews would be sent to the VSC Headquarters (see Appendix C), with my recruitment of volunteers for the interviews being controlled by the present Head of Recruitment for VSC. Reflecting the presence of a double-line reporting within the VSC, permission still needed to be sought from the VSC senior leadership before my request for interviewees could be forwarded to currently-serving VSCs. When approval was granted, I was able to make contact with the first batch of six volunteer interviewees via the Head of Recruitment. Information of my project to find out how the VSC has played a part in community policing was relayed and requests for interviews were made. VSCs would be given at least 24 hours to decide if they wanted to participate in the interviews, and those who agreed would meet up with me for an interview session held on weeknights at the VSC Headquarters. An interview schedule had also been manufactured and this was supplied to VSCs to help them in their decision-making (see Appendix C1). The schedule however mainly served as a guide, providing certain themes for discussion which could be elaborated upon in the individual sessions. Over time, the schedule would be fine-tuned according to the responses I obtained from my first batch of interviewees.

For my second batch of interviewees, I requested a change of venue for the interviews, in the bid to speak to more voices outside of VSC recruitment networks[12]. Using contacts provided to me by the Head of Recruitment, I was able to liaise with the Heads of VSC units in two Land

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[12] Most interviewees in the first batch had been involved in the recruitment campaigns of the VSC.

Divisions[13]. A similar request for interviews was made, and I was put into contact with VSCs in these Land Divisions who were considered for interviews. The primary initial consideration in the selection of interviewees was the need for a diversity of voices; this was conveyed to the Heads of the Land Divisions and recommendations for interviewees were made by them. While both the Heads drew upon their own personal networks for the selection of interviewees, only one Head tapped upon his Division's VSC Liaison Officer to coordinate the interview session with ten VSCs who agreed to be interviewed. Interviews were conducted on a weeknight at the conference room of the respective Land Division Headquarters of the VSC units, and these lasted about 30 minutes on average. Most sessions were one-on-one, although two sessions were conducted with two VSCs at a go at their request. A tape-recorder was used in most cases to record the sessions to allow for greater accuracy in transcribing interviews. However a few applicants preferred not to use the tape-recorder out of concerns for privacy, and their decisions were accepted. By far, a large majority of VSCs also waived their right to anonymity for comments made during interviews, signalling the pride that most interviewees had of their constabulary work. Based on the fine-tuned interview schedule, most questions were largely generic, touching upon the motivations and experiences of VSCs in volunteering with the SPF. Where relevant, participants could choose to talk more about their personal life stories in a non-intrusive manner; these were largely left to the participants' own discretion and no attempt was made to compel participants to discuss their private lives. The usual out-of-bounds markers of operational-sensitivity and police secrecy also apply, with sessions steering clear of such details.

Interviews were transcribed and coded for analyses according to the following broad categorisations: (i) motivations for joining the VSC; (ii) steps towards volunteering; (iii) non-work related experiences of volunteering; (iv) working experiences as a VSC; (v) routines of volunteering; (vi) external reactions to volunteering; (vii) comparison of workplace sociality (daytime job versus VSC job); (viii) evolution of the VSC scheme; (ix) obstacles to volunteering in Singapore; and (x) reflections on VSC and community policing (see Appendix D for a sample

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[13] VSCs currently serve in Land Divisions performing generalised frontline policing duties, as well as in specialised units. This thesis turns its attention to the policing work being performed at Land Divisions.

transcript). These codes were subsequently re-configured to fit the social geography-themed narrative of the chapter on 'Community Policing in Practice'.

Due to the nature of recruitment of VSCs for interviews, the final sample of sixteen volunteers will undoubtedly not be representative of currently-serving VSCs. In spite of efforts to encourage a greater diversity of voices, it is expected that there will be an over-representation of highly-experienced VSCs within my sample, partly as a result of gatekeepers preferring to select competent personnel for interview by someone not from the VSC. Consequently, there will be silences in the interview data: several individuals would simply not have been considered for interview due to their perceived lack of ground experience or a lack of prior training in managing interviews with external researchers. However, other reasons could explain why certain individuals did not make it to the interviews: a gender bias against females' ability to take questions, the presence of daytime volunteers who needed to work at night when the interview was slated to occur, and the fixed venues for interviews which would inconvenience individuals make up the list. A conscious attempt was made to reflect on these silences during analysis of the transcripts.

Finally, the fact that I introduced myself as someone who was about to join the Police Force served to orientate interview sessions in different ways. For some interviewees, this helped to assuage concerns about the potential impropriety of comments that they were making, given that as a future police officer, I could be expected to abide by an acceptable code of conduct with regards to processing the information gleaned from interviews. Several of them could have interpreted my lack of formal training as a sign to be more circumspect in what they could reveal during interviews, since I was after all, not yet a full-fledged police officer. Yet others could have taken my status as a future regular police officer to be an indication of my representation of the SPF vis-à-vis the VSC. Comments offered up would then gather around their perceptions of the regular force in contrast to the VSC. Taken together, these different considerations helped shaped the analysis of the interview process.

CHAPTER THREE: A HISTORY OF COMMUNITY POLICING

As a discourse, community policing was institutionalised in 1983 with the establishment of the first Neighbourhood Police Post (NPP) in the public housing estate of Toa Payoh. The move to plant NPPs all over the mainland was accompanied by a major organisational restructuring of the Singapore Police Force (SPF), which would henceforth be fronted by the NPP motif. The decision to adopt community policing as an underlying organisational ethos was aided by the expertise of a policing studies scholar renowned for his research on community policing, Professor David Bayley, who was invited to Singapore to provide advice on community policing. Study visits to Japan were also conducted by the force's senior management to pick up pointers on how the popular *koban* system of community policing took root in Japanese neighbourhoods. Scholars have dealt with abstract reasons for adopting community policing as a model, but these are largely centred upon the experiences of a select few American and British cities and towns (e.gs. McConville and Shepherd 1992; Fielding 1995; Lyons 1999; Miller 1999; Reiner 2000). Where the scope was broadened to include Singapore's experiences of pioneering community policing, research has adopted a managerial tack that focuses more on rationalising the success of the move to an NPP system of community policing (Quah and Quah 1987; Skolnick and Bayley 1988; Ganapathy 2000; Akbur 2002; Sim 2011), rather than taking a wider analytical perspective to locate the circumstances that gave birth to community policing. This dissertation will focus on the motivations for implementing community policing within the SPF, tracing the morphology of community policing from 1983 onwards to the present day. A historical study is undertaken to re-trace the footsteps of community policing in its twists and turns, emphasising the need to pay attention to historically-specific contexts which shape the outcome of the community policing project. And finally, to ground this study of community policing, a spatialisation of the discourse has been carried out and the evolving geographies of community policing are used to bookmark the different watersheds in this chapter.

Laying the Groundwork for Community Policing

The immediate post-independence period of Singapore was pre-occupied with rationalising the separation from the Malayan Federation. In addition to securing international support for the nascent nation-state of Singapore, the government of the day, led by a People's Action Party (PAP) helmed by Lee Kuan Yew, was consolidating its political support since its rise to power in the 1959 elections. Political legitimacy was to be sought through successful economic development (Olds and Yeung 2004). The latter would be achieved with the expertise of foreign capital, with multinational corporations wooed to set up export-oriented manufacturing plants in Singapore. Foreign investors were promised the provision of an adequate supply of land, labour and security, along with the typical bundle of tax holidays, start-up grants and special provisions for the expatriate community (Rodan 1989). Singaporeans would overtime be subjected to a strict work-disciplinary regime aimed at crafting a hardworking and docile workforce (Coe and Kelly 2000), equipped with basic literacy skills and a work ethic second to none. Basic welfare provision through heavily subsidised public housing (Salaff 2004) and education (Gopinathan 2007) was provided for, alongside exhortations of anti-natalist family planning to reduce overcrowding (Fawcett and Khoo 1980). The existence of a basic provision of welfare allowed the state to concentrate its resources on tackling the 'pertinent' economic issues of the day, whilst assuring the population that economic growth alone would provide the best social security net for their future (Kong and Yeoh 2003). Authority over land was consolidated through legislation that sanctioned compulsory purchases by the state. With effective control over the vast majority of land, enforced through the help of the police, it could be effectively subjected to the postcolonial principles of high modernist planning (Kong and Yeoh 2003). Parcels of land were set aside as industrial estates and their infrastructure would be taken care of by a statutory board. The provision of building sites as well as working infrastructures for petrochemical plants and light manufacturing factories helped facilitate foreign direct investment in Singapore. A stable political regime for investment underlay these various strategies (Quah 2010). An authoritarian government laid down the ground rules for economic survival to a young nation, spelling out the imperative of economic progress which

would have to be achieved at all costs. Amidst regional political instability that helped nurture a regional outsider-complex (Rahim 2009), Singaporeans would have to overcome the odds of survival through a fostering of national unity that prided consensus over conflict. Post-independence communal strife was blamed on the brand of communal politics being practised by regional political elites, as the racially-dictated affirmative action policies of Malaysia became a foil for the crafting of domestic policies of social control (Rahim 2009). An active compartmentalisation of the different races of the local population was thus sought to help create and sustain the PAP government's emergent[14] multiracialism and multireligiosity discourse. Multiracialism would provide the intellectual resources for the ruling party to claim moral superiority over 'backward' neighbours[15] (Rahim 2009), whilst serving as a hegemonising tool to govern socioeconomically marginalised portions of the local population (Li 1989). In opting for multiracialism as a shield to guard against 'communal strife', the leadership chose to forget its colonial beginnings as a divide-and-rule strategy to govern the colony (Turnbull 1989; Yeoh 1996). Instead, the population was to be convinced that the government knew best, and a submission to its paternalistic policies would be in the nation's best interests in the long run. Legislations of all stripes were grafted upon the postcolonial terrain to secure the compliance of state subjects, giving rise to what anthropologist Yao Souchou (2007) calls 'order and law' in Singapore. Racial and religious boundaries would be policed with utmost zeal as they were deemed to be matters of national security. The strong-handed control of these boundaries helped **privatise** and naturalise the status of 'race' and 'religion' in Singapore. Whilst ostensibly serving to preserve a space for racial and religious harmony, multiracialism and multireligiosity have provided useful intellectual and legal tools with which to police the national consensus on 'race' and 'religion'. Where individuals flouting a legal ban on the discussion of racial and religious sensitivities would be liable for **public** policing by the Internal Security Department,

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[14] It must be noted that the PAP leadership had previously campaigned for a more progressive multiracial politics after the merger with the Federation of Malaya in 1963, as a political move to win over Chinese supporters in other states.

[15] The communal politics being practiced by Malaysia, and to a lesser extent, Indonesia, has provided a fertile ground for the active championing of the PAP's multiracialism platform. When compared to the overt preferential treatment of Malays under racially-singed affirmative action policies, the PAP can easily claim the moral high ground for being 'progressive' and 'multicultural' in spite of actions which can be interpreted as Chinese chauvinism (Rahim 2009).

the nation would henceforth be inclined to repress discussions of racial and religious issues in favour of maintaining the status quo[16].

A robust legal framework also had to be in place to secure the legitimacy of investments, to ensure adequate protection and insurance of investments, and to secure the well-being of expatriates who were invited to contribute their technical expertise (Rodan 1989). The colonial legal framework had already included several draconian legislations to entrench the subservience of the colony during the colonial era. The government thus re-worked its colonial inheritance to articulate its vision for an economically prosperous nation (Yeoh 1996; Kong and Yeoh 2003; Oswin 2010). This careful recalibration of the legal apparatus sought to achieve amongst other things, the enshrinement of economic efficiency over social justice as a guiding principle for calculating wages, the laying down of standards for economic productivity (Quah 2010), the controlling of domestic consumption through the institution of a compulsory savings scheme and the regulation of public housing (Salaff 1988; 2004), the regulation of land mentioned earlier, the enhancement of deterrent penalties for major crimes like kidnapping, armed offences and drug trafficking (Quah 1994), the clamping down on corruption within the civil service (Quah 2010), and the regulation of conduct through active criminalisation of undesirable behaviours (Yao 2007). Importantly, the presence of a strongly enforced legal framework served to police the behaviours of the emergent nation, while citizens were simultaneously persuaded of the moral 'wisdoms' of engaging in a gamut of activities: involvement in formal employment, leaving personal savings to the state-owned bank for safekeeping, contributing to social security through regular payments to their Central Provident Fund, staying away from a life of crime, keeping one's hair short and tidy to upkeep a 'presentable' front, sacrificing the 'good life' in favour of toiling first, and submission to one's

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[16] For instance, it has become a norm for individuals to only address the shortcomings of their respective race or religion. Thus, with my race officially stated as 'Chinese' on my National Registration Identity Card, I can only afford to speak critically about the failings of the Chinese sub-population. To speak of the state of other races or religions risks attracting the gaze of policing authorities. With race and religion neatly compartmentalised into distinct groupings, discussions about them are reduced to those of a self-Orientalising stripe, such as the celebration of cultural diversity through cultural festivities (Bauman 2001; Zizek 2008). A lack of dialogue over racial and religious issues has also necessarily heightened the risks of maintaining racial and religious stereotypes, undermining the progressive signifier of multiracialism and multireligiosity.

superiors at the manufacturing assembly line for the betterment of the company. With the promise of social mobility through participation in the state-managed capitalist economy, the lifting of the 'colour' bar at workplaces with the displacement of colonial prejudices, and constant reminders of the trauma of political merger and separation, Singaporeans were socialised into the postcolonial model of economic developmentalism subscribed to by the ruling elites (for a range of geographical perspectives, see Kong and Yeoh 2003; Olds and Yeung 2004; Jacobs and Cairns 2008; Oswin 2010).

In the decade following independence, the government was thus involved in securing both the foreign and domestic geopolitical spheres. Both spheres were integral to the constitution of statehood, and had to be dealt with concurrently. On the international arena, the government's realist foreign policy sought out alliances with extra-regional major international powers and Singapore invested heavily in her own military force following the gradual departure of the British armed forces from 1968 (Worthington 2003; Rahim 2009). The creation of the Singapore Armed Force served to provide deterrent capabilities against potential aggressors within a hostile regional setting, whilst satisfying the pragmatic need of finding jobs for those rendered unemployed by the exit of the British military and administrative units. Internal security would be handled by the Republic of Singapore Police, which was tasked to enforce the order and law laid down by the ruling party. Capital punishment for the serious offences listed above had to be enforced by the police to ensure their deterrent utility (Akbur 2002). Accordingly, the police focused their efforts upon establishing a peaceful social order through the inevitably violent suppression of non-compliant political challengers to the PAP's rule. Trade union activists, student union leaders, communist insurgents, *Konfrontasi* terrorists, ethnically-based secret societies and clan associations who variously sought out alternative political projects were confronted with the full force of the law (Akbur 2002). Industrial strikes were banned, rioting attracted stiffer penalties, while political crimes against the state warranted top billing amongst policing duties. This enforcement of a non-political domestic space occurred alongside the politicisation of foreign policy which was geared towards the attraction of American capital and technological expertise. The Vietnam War provided an economic opportunity to secure

lucrative defence contracts with the United States Army, whilst cultivating closer political economic ties with American neoconservative elites (Rodan 1989; Rahim 2009). The rise of monetarism and a materialisation of the nascent contours of neoliberalisation allowed Singapore a stronger bargaining position in the cultivation of ties with American and Japanese capitalists, as multinational corporations actively sought out a regional headquarters location in South-east Asia to expand their market presence in the region (Rodan 1989; 2006). The demand for political and economic stability led many external investors to condone the authoritarian domestic political regime in Singapore. This unique autonomy possessed by the state was nonetheless bound up with the effectiveness of policing internal affairs in Singapore. Supported by police-friendly legislation and supplemented by the strict application of high modernist planning techniques towards governing economic development, the police were able to succeed in the tasks required of them.

As the 1980s beckoned, the declining fertility rate of the population sparked off a shift in emphasis towards higher value-added and capital-intensive manufacturing that would rely less on the low cost of labour (Hui 1997; Wong and Yeoh 2003). Steep increases in minimum wages were recommended to allocate resources away from labour-intensive industries, whilst opportunities for retraining and skills upgrading were offered to facilitate this transition. Immigration of low-skilled workers was permitted again after a decade's ban on the import of foreign workers, utilising the threat of the low-wage foreign labourer penetrating local labour markets to police an economically competitive work ethic alongside nationalist sentiments (Coe and Kelly 2000; Kong and Yeoh 2003; Yeoh 2006; Yeoh and Huang 2009). As postcolonial exigencies were partially dissipated, the political focus was gradually moved towards fostering social cohesion within the young nation (Quah 2010). The regulation of the domestic sphere acquired greater importance as Singaporean society was increasingly differentiated (Chua 1995). The physical decentralisation of residential and industrial functions also necessitated a finer topographical scale of governance (Urban Redevelopment Authority 2008). Amongst the most urgent concerns was the need to establish communal belonging within the rapidly constructed public housing estates. The displacement of the residential population from urban

villages or *kampungs*, informal squatting and formal slums within the Central Area had necessitated the adoption of various forceful techniques of resettlement, which included the calibration of suitable political economic incentives (Salaff 2004) and the repeated denigration of the moral 'backwardness' of slum-dwellers (Oswin 2010). While these policing technologies may have succeeded in renewing the city centre for further rounds of investment, within the decentralised new towns, much work had to be done to soften the hard edges of high modernist living (Jacobs and Cairns 2008). Residents' Committees (RCs) were introduced in 1978 at the neighbourhood level consisting of a cluster of flats, and they sought to provide opportunities for communal interactions that would foster social cohesion at the national level[17] (Mauzy and Milne 2002). Concurrently, an accretion of the communal facilities of new towns took place over time, as wet markets, hawker centres, convenience stores, bus interchanges, community centres, schools, places of worship, traditional Chinese medicinal halls and public polyclinics were added to the landscape. It was against this backdrop that the neighbourhood police post made its first appearance.

The state police spent the 1970s cultivating an image of professionalism through its zero tolerance policing of major crimes and political dissent (Akbur 2002), to retrofit a contemporary popular discourse. As the population was geared towards value-added manufacturing, literacy levels were improving steadily and the police needed to keep abreast of evolving societal changes in order to maintain its public authority and support (Akbur 2002). The brute application of force and the utilisation of a fear of the law would not be sufficient for the regulation of behaviours and lifestyles of the growing population (Foucault 1991). An effective deterrence against committing criminal offences had taken root thanks to the combined labour of punitive legislation targeting myriad forms of criminalised activity (Akbur 2002), the efficacious detection and prosecution work performed by law enforcement agencies (Quah 1994), and the achievable objective of upward social mobility through participation in the

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[17] This in no way attempts to negate the existence of informal social bonds at the local level prior to the stepping up of state-led efforts to bond communities. The increased state attention towards local community building is in fact an attempt to extend the regulation of communities through establishment of RCs (Worthington 2003). Where Grassroots Organisations were once used to rally for political support, by the 1980s the focus was more on building social cohesion (Lim 2006).

formal economy (Salaff 2004). However the diversification of the economy was productive of a new class of consumers and workers who would not be as easily disciplined through a direct imposition of policing work (Chua 1995). There was a need to increase the recruitment of highly educated personnel into the police force (Akbur 2002), to keep ahead of the expected challenges associated with securing political stability and economic growth through the impending demographic changes. With the tighter labour market of the late 1970s prompting the adoption of a national wage correction policy that drove up wages (Coe and Kelly 2000), the attractiveness of policing as a career was in doubt. Potential recruits had to be won over with the offer of more than an adventure-filled occupation of crime-fighting. Wage increases alongside a loosening of the rank structure to permit more promotions were recommended for the police, to attract literate members of the population to join the force whilst deterring incumbents from leaving the policing 'community' (Akbur 2002). Besides the imperative of professionalising the image of police work as a calling worthy for the job-commitment of educated university graduates, recruitment drives had to target more non-Malays[18] in order for the police to have a good ethnic mix amongst its ranks; this was especially important in the task of policing racial and religious harmony (Akbur 2002). Prior recruitment efforts targeting the Chinese in particular had floundered upon suspicions of the loyalty of recruits when the power of communist parties and secret societies had held sway[19] (Ganapathy and Lian 2002). With the battle for domestic superiority all but won, the police moved to reorganise their frontline ranks in the early 1980s in an attempt to reach out to a maturing nation.

Previously, police land divisions were highly professionalised bureaucratic units operating from divisional headquarters which were physically concentrated within a small sector of each geographical region of the mainland. This limited the ability of frontline forces to meaningfully

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[18] Recruitment of indigenous Malays into the police administration stems from a colonial practice of preferential recruitment of Malays into public administration, as a calculative move to prevent an uprising led by the dominant Chinese immigrant population. The Malays are also valued for their perceived strong sense of loyalty to their native land, as opposed to the diasporic orientations of Chinese and Indian settlers.
[19] The popular perception of police work amongst the Chinese as being physically dangerous and requiring tough manual labour also helped to limit the number of entrants into the police force.

engage the public[20]. Professionalism risked increasing the emotional distance between the public and the police in a way that was detrimental to partnerships to tackle crime (Ganapathy 2000; Akbur 2002; Sim 2011). A central objective of the NPP system was thus to project an increased police presence on the ground through the erection of an NPP within each electoral ward. The first NPP was opened in the matured public housing estate of Toa Payoh, which was at that juncture facing problems of drug abuse, hooliganism and a lack of trust in the police. These seemingly chronic neighbourhood concerns led to the installation of the first NPP in Toa Payoh, which has frequently been used as the test bed for experiments in urban planning (Urban Redevelopment Authority 2008). As the pilot police post was successfully established, the road map for planting further NPPs and a concomitant greater institutionalisation of the NPP system of policing could be effected (Quah and Quah 1987). NPPs marked an attempt at physical and organisational decentralisation by the police, serving as the outlying home base for officers from which they could easily reach out to their neighbourhood.

Community policing would be practised via round-the-clock operation of the police post, conduct of frequent foot, bicycle and scooter patrols, holding frequent crime prevention talks and road shows, visiting individual apartments to encourage participation in crime risk[21] surveys, and offering free crime prevention advice and associated services like the engraving of one's personal belongings (Quah and Quah 1987). Neighbourhood block watches were set up with the help of RCs, and a Police Boys' Club was established to take care of at-risk juveniles deemed prone to committing crimes. Operationally, the move towards NPPs was practical as it sought to educate residents on crime prevention measures they could take to enhance their own safety and well-being. This was opposed to having the police personally conduct vertical patrols in each block of flats in order to deter crime or nab suspects (Quah and Quah 1987). Hosting mini-police stations within the heart of outlying neighbourhoods also facilitated greater

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[20] One can speculate that the genealogy of centralised police forces can be traced to the colonial authorities' reliance on informal social control mechanisms through the assistance of local 'chieftains' at the level of the village, clan, or trade union.

[21] Ericson and Haggerty (1997) have attributed the embrace of community policing by Western police forces to the communication of risk within a paradigm of neoliberalism. While their argument highlights the shift in thinking towards prioritising risk management technologies, it inadvertently privileges a mode of bureaucratic rationality that obscures the affective, historically-grounded properties of community policing.

interactions between the police and the community that they served. Symbolically, the planting of NPPs over the island represented an active territorialisation of the national heartland by the police following the triumphant establishment of a safe interior space in the 1970s (Akbur 2002). Locally, NPPs could serve as important physical and metaphorical landmarks within residential neighbourhoods, providing a recognisable signpost amidst the emptiness of void decks (R. Goh 2005). Not only did it become a norm for lost newcomers to a housing estate to approach the Neighbourhood Police Post Officer (NPPO) for directions, but NPPs provided a communal moral compass to guide the lifestyles of wayward youths and opportunist criminals back onto the right track, and to arbitrate between disputing neighbours.

The NPP style of community policing was intensely bound up with the newly institutionalised crime prevention effort (Quah 1994; Ganapathy 2000). NPPOs were to serve as frontline officers spreading the message of crime prevention through their interactions with the local community. In socialising the new owners of state-subsidised public housing on the adequate procedures for safeguarding their expensively acquired property, crime prevention via community policing set out to normalise the range of acceptable behaviours for homeowner-citizens that would undergird prudent consumption in the decades to come (Kong and Yeoh 2003; Salaff 2004; R. Goh 2005). The physical home had become the dominant asset of individual Singaporean households, with the house extending beyond a matter of personal shelter and site of social reproduction to become an incubator of personal space and a tool of financial investment (Jacobs and Cairns 2008). Under these circumstances, the private self began to attach itself more closely to the house. Crime prevention was publicised via a series of preventive measures targeting the occurrences of five major preventable crimes: robbery in homes, housebreaking, snatch theft, theft of/from vehicle, and outrage of modesty (Quah 1994). These crimes were deemed preventable because a majority of such legally-defined incidents had occurred in public places, where it was thought that the presence of adequate social control mechanisms would have reduced the occurrences of crime (e.g. Clarke 1980; Sim 2011).

In its clear bias towards property crime, crime prevention sought to consolidate the boundaries of private property in ways that secured the self-interests of homeowners. Prevention advice thus stressed the sanctity of the home as something that must be protected through various security measures. The bolting off of entry points, the strengthening of access-control points through improved surveillance, and the formation of neighbourhood watches to supplement individual watchfulness signalled to the potential burglar that one's house would not be an easy target for housebreaking. Crime prevention advice would be tagged to its primary target audience of the reproducers of households: homemakers, elderly dependents, young children, low-wage foreign workers[22] and at-risk teens and unemployed persons (see Quah 1994; Sim 2011; and Chapter 4). The need to educate those who were thought to be vulnerable to crime (as both victim and perpetrator) during the work day, when dutiful working adults would be away from home, directed the tone and feel of segmented[23] crime prevention messages. But keeping one's neighbourhood safe from crime was a duty for everyone when it became important for one's future well-being (Quah 1994); as a nascent property market for the resale of public housing units took root (Salaff 2004), resale values of housing units could ostensibly be pegged unto the publicly available crime rates of a neighbourhood. Crime prevention then acquired salience as a prudent investment strategy for potential homeowner-traders. The cumulative outcome of these measures would be to socialise a new lifestyle within the domestic consumer: crime prevention sought to impose itself on the grammar of everyday life (Certeau 1984) of the homeowner-citizen[24]. From the enforcement of the legal contract, the police had expanded into servicing the state's social compact in no less visible ways. As individual households were accosted through regular house visits and foot and bicycle patrols, they were interpellated as state subjects whose obligation would be to prevent crime from

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[22] Initially this was primarily targeted at the foreign-national construction worker, vulnerable to thefts and robberies at construction sites and dormitories. This has widened over time to include the foreign domestic helper (Sim 2011).

[23] Even within a targeted risk group of the population, further categorisations are needed to ensure the message is put across with precision. For instance, elderly populations living in one or two-room public housing flats are highlighted as being more vulnerable to crime than their aged counterparts. At-risk youths also refer specifically to students from Polytechnics and Institute of Technical Education centres, who have been segregated from their 'academically-inclined' peers at an early stage of their lives.

[24] The tagline used in the 1989 prevention campaign, 'Crime Prevention – Make it a Way of Life' makes no bones about this.

taking place on their property. Property crime posed a threat to the disciplining of the work ethic in its ability to spread tales about the relative ease with which criminals can make off with illicit gains through the commission of crime. The state, in particular the police, was keen to uphold the prevailing compact of economic success through hard work and sacrifice. Criminals' capability to get away scot-free would be severely reduced through the dissemination of crime prevention awareness and the cultivation of police-public ties that would foster more reporting of criminal activities to the police (Quah and Quah 1987).

However, what was at stake was not merely the application of a situational crime prevention approach that rationalised the incidence of crime through an opportunist framework in which a criminal will strike given the opportunity to do so (Clarke 1980). Crucially, crime prevention sought to enact the very model of rational self-interested thought it espoused (Rose 1999), through sealing off opportunities for different understandings of 'self', thereby affecting the quality of one's exchanges with the environment. Self-interest prevails when preserving the self takes priority in the response to a looming emergency; when one thinks twice before opening the door to strangers, when one clutches on to her handbag tightly in the face of oncoming human and vehicular traffic, and when one is constantly on the lookout for suspicious-looking people loitering around the void decks of housing estates. Of course, crime prevention does possess many benefits in its purported ability to reduce the occurrences of crime and the fear of crime amongst vulnerable sections of society. The point here is to complicate simple analyses of the success of crime prevention measures (e.gs. Quah 1994; Sim 2011), which restrict their measurements to publicly available crime statistics produced by the police or broad-based social surveys carried out by various researchers. I argue that crime prevention was not only performative of its preventative logic with regards to crime, but it was also performative of a liberal economic rationality (Rose 1999) which served to entrench the culture of pragmatism (Kong 2000) within Singapore. Amidst the opening up of consumption channels in the 1980s, the new class of homeowners had to be reminded that their propertied success should not be taken for granted (Chua 1995; Chua and Tan 1999). Individuals and individual households were to keep a constant look-out for the criminal/economically competitive other who could always

be lurking in the shadows of one's success. Taking one's foot off the acceleration pedal in the zero-sum race for economic survival would be foolish, comparable to the failure to lock up before leaving one's apartment which results in the loss of personal artefacts. Amidst the taking off of a resale market for public housing properties in the move towards asset enhancement for homeowner-citizens, the fastening of an NPP to the neighbourhood and efforts at creating a low-crime environment could be touted as selling points by property traders.

Lastly, crime prevention also targeted a new class of consumers, as consumer products were made available to a larger proportion of the population for the first time. As households saved up adequate amounts for retirement and the education needs of their offspring and paid off the home loans for their flats, purse strings could finally be released. The installation of electronics assembly plants producing outputs aimed at both the local and export markets paved the way for electronic consumerables to hit local markets and meet pent-up consumer demand (Rodan 1989). The accessibility of consumer products like electronic devices, clothing, motor vehicles and interior designing objects provided avenues for the accumulation of personal spaces of individuality (Chua 1995), in ways rendered legible by crime prevention advisories that stress the need for taking due care of one's private belongings. However, crime prevention messages also targeted a class of youthful consumers who freely 'flaunted' their new-found material wealth on the streets. In highlighting careless acts of conspicuous consumption, crime prevention sought to reduce the visibility of an income gap which had permitted different degrees of consumption. The 'politics of envy' could be dissipated by a crime prevention warning that criminals target conspicuous consumers, assuring the nations' core constituency of working and middle class 'heartlanders' (R. Goh 2005) that those who are rich are also constantly kept on their toes (c.f. Chua and Tan 1999). Simultaneously, crime prevention was aimed at both ordinary consumers and potential offenders in light of new consumption habits. Crime prevention sought to encourage the virtues of fiscal discipline and responsible budgeting which were attainable through living within one's means. Dispelling the myth of easy money and consumption being an end in itself, Singaporeans were reminded that

sustainable economic success was achievable only through sound long-term investments and prudent expenditures.

Preventing Crime

Crime prevention provided the raison d'être of the NPP policing system, and it also served as a social ticket for conversations between police officers and residents and amongst residents. As NPPOs went about their daily patrols in the residential heartlands, residents were socialised on the technology of crime prevention, and warmed up to the presence of the police in the vicinity of their neighbourhood. This segment explores how the technology of crime prevention is used to normalise the behaviours of homeowner-citizens. In so doing, it delves into the grounded messy realities of community policing, moving beyond the broad framework provided by a political economic analysis to gain a nuanced appreciation of community policing in practice. I use the term 'technology' to refer to the 'forms of knowledge, skill, diagrams, charts, calculations and energy which makes its (crime prevention's) use possible' (Barry 2001:9). There exists a need to open up the 'black box' of crime prevention to examine the method assemblage (Law 2004) that enacts the latter.

In order for crime to be fitted into crime prevention messages, it had to undergo a series of abstractions. Crime was firstly abstracted into categories of preventable property and violent crimes, as a list of the five preventable crimes occurring in the residential heartlands was put up (Quah 1994). The act of listing categorises criminal offences as they occur, facilitating the compilation of statistics from which one can discern crime trends. Crimes are classified according to the identification of certain legalistically-inflected, stylised performances under Common Law traditions derived from the colonial authorities[25]. Through the investigation process, the criminal offence is reconstructed with a view towards apprehending and prosecuting suspects who had committed the act. When reconstructed crimes spot a similar

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[25] The process of classifying cases is nevertheless much more complicated in reality, with officers affected by the need to meet Key Performance Indicators, or the expectations of direct superiors, for instance.

pattern over a period of time, **or** when particular categories of criminal offences increase in frequency over a period of time, it is recorded as a rising crime trend that warrants attention. Crime prevention reviews the incidences of particularly-patterned crimes to identify the perceived modus operandi[26] of the offender(s), in order to formulate appropriate prevention **tactics** that seek to deter, delay and detect the onset of a particular **category** of crime (Quah 1994). However, crime prevention ambitiously seeks to pre-empt the criminal from striking first through its belief that 'prevention is better than cure' (Sim 2011). Rather than adopted as a reactive measure in the wake of a rising crime trend, a list of situational preventive **strategies** is first drawn up and widely disseminated. Thus while it may be reasonable to assume that the original list of tactics would be compiled based upon a decent historical study of crime patterns, the list gets 'black-boxed' as it is packaged into tidy crime prevention tidbits for dissemination. Transaction costs deter a re-visiting of the list when it is repeatedly summoned to raise public awareness of a crime trend. The objective of instilling a change in habits (Quah 1994) also refuses the frequent addition of new items onto the list. Significantly new developments are needed to force a change to the list: for instance, the evolution of technologies in financial instruments or computers, which give rise to new variants of crimes and criminal modus operandi. Over time, new lists or sub-lists of measures will be drawn up in accordance with social trends (Sim 2011) like the mass-production of various consumerables like clothing, synthetic drugs, alcoholic beverages, alcopops, motor vehicles, mobile phones and video camera-equipped mobile phones, or the entrance of new entertainment options like the casino which creates new risks of problem gambling and syndicated crime. But while there will be amendments to the complete toolkit of preventive measures, the overall result is still a relatively stable set of preventive measures that purportedly guard against particular ideal-typical categories of preventable crime (see Table 3.1). Little wonder then that the list of the five major preventable crimes has remained unchanged over three decades, and now constitutes several of the Key Performance Indicators of neighbourhood police officers (Personal Interview with Police Historian).

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[26] The modus operandi of a criminal refers to his/her mode of operations. Naturally, it would appear ironic that 'opportunistic' crimes can bear the imprints of carefully planned and rationalised 'modus operandi'.

Table 3.1: Snatch Theft Crime Prevention Advice over the Years

1986	2011
Avoid short cuts through alleys and dark places	Avoid short cuts through dark or deserted areas
Always keep to well-lit areas	Always keep to well-lit areas
Carry your handbag on the side away from moving traffic, and hold it close to your body	Carry your sling bag in front of you, or clasp it firmly under your arm
Always walk facing oncoming traffic	Always walk facing oncoming traffic
Carry a whistle or shrill alarm	Never leave your bag unattended, especially in crowded places
Do not flaunt cash in public view	Do not flaunt cash in public view
Avoid wearing excessive jewellery, or carrying large amounts of cash	Avoid wearing excessive jewellery, or carrying large amounts of cash
Attempt to empty the contents of the bag to frustrate the thief	Use cashless transaction such as NETS[27], credit cards, cheques, etc.
Do not put up resistance if confronted by a snatch thief	Do not put up resistance if confronted by a snatch theft

Sources: *Crime Watch* Episode 1 (1986) [Video] Singapore: Singapore Broadcasting Corporation; Public Affairs Department (2011) *Snatch Theft Crime Prevention* [Brochure], Singapore: SPF.

Crime prevention technologies are manifested as 'obligatory passage points' (Latour and Woolgar 1986) for those who seek protection from the vicissitudes of criminal activity. This splitting of crime prevention advice from the original settings of crimes and its subsequent re-attachment to the generic crime reproduces crime prevention advisories that become consolidated as 'truth spots' over time (Latour and Woolgar 1986). This process is however highly tedious and uneven, necessitating encouragements, negotiations and experimentations with the content and medium of prevention advisories over time in order to get its message across (Sim 2011). For instance, securing the participation and financial support of the private sector proved rather tricky at the outset. Pragmatic concerns over the costs of security devices (such as closed-circuit television and alarm systems) and the utility of associating one's company's brand with crime prevention messages inhibited support for the government's crime prevention campaign. This had led to the institutionalisation of the National Crime Prevention Council[28], to provide a platform for the authorities to lobby the private sector to discuss security concerns, and to fund the various crime prevention initiatives (Sim 2011).

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[27] Network for Electronic Transfers
[28] The National Crime Prevention Council is a Voluntary Welfare Organisation that does not receive any government funding for its day-to-day operations (Sim 2011).

Getting the right composition of crime prevention messages is also important, with designers using colour, design, themes and taglines to evoke the desired affect (Sim 2011). Once successful, the conferring of such an expertise to crime prevention advisories in a form of technopower (Mitchell 2002) provokes a social craving amongst anxious members of the population (see Yao 2007), playing upon the fear of crime[29] to promote a normalised way of living (Pain and Smith 2008). The effect of repetition of similar messages is reinforced by the publicity of favourable crime statistics that are attributed to the effectiveness of crime prevention campaigns. This virtuous cycle of propagation is made possible through the additional application of four techniques: (i) banalisation of crime prevention messages; (ii) aggrandisement of crime; (iii) moralisation of crime; and (iv) displacement of the resolution of crime. These will be elaborated in turn.

A basic premise necessary for crime prevention to foster a new perception in the individual is the prevalence of the message. To facilitate easy learning, the message is firstly simplified, reduced to short and catchy sound-bites that would impress upon individual memories. For instance, 'low crime doesn't mean no crime' is a common refrain heard as part of the alert that encourages vigilance amongst ordinary citizens even when crime rates have dropped; motorists are advised to 'Lock, Look, Leave' each time they park their vehicles; while 'Tis' the season to be jolly, not sorry' is part of the chorus of advisories that make up the annual year-end festive crime prevention campaign (see Sim 2011 for more examples). A popularisation of the message creates the platform for mass dissemination of crime prevention awareness. For this, the putting up of numerous anti-crime pins, stickers, posters, pamphlets and advertisements, the broadcast of *Crime Watch* (see Chapter 4) and the roping in of celebrities and politicians for routine crime prevention carnivals function as useful tools for outreach. The socialisation of young children constitutes another part of the strategy. Resources for crime prevention such as commemorative trinkets, storybooks and free engraving services that are made available to the young help stimulate interest in crime prevention, fostering a stronger awareness of crime prevention in the formative years of child development (Quah 1994).

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[29] While several prevention messages attempt to play up their 'cuteness', invoke humour, or provoke 'bold' thinking, fear remains the pervasive guiding force of crime prevention messages.

Figures 3.1 and 3.2: Split-Poster Crime Prevention Series of 2008
Source: Public Affairs Department (2008) *Crime Prevention Posters* [Poster] Singapore: SPF. (The poster on the right is an example of a 'bold' approach to prevention. It was eventually taken off public advertisement boards because it was deemed religiously insensitive by some members of the public)

The combination of these measures is the banalisation of crime prevention within the spaces of everyday life[30]. Crime prevention is serially applied to the public through different rhythms of everyday life. Daily sightings of anti-crime 'immutable mobiles' (Latour and Woolgar 1986) such as the stickers pasted on a neighbour's door frame and above a shop's cash counter, occasional patronage of crime prevention road shows, biannual house visits by NPPOs, and annual festive crime prevention campaigns interweave to strengthen the background presence of crime prevention. If the measure of effectiveness of crime prevention is located in the actual practice of prevention measures in the spaces of everyday life, the use of mnemonic aids and diagrammatic illustrations facilitate easy recall in these split-second moments (see Figures 3.1

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[30] Rather unexpectedly, the banalisation of the crime prevention message ensures the technical imprecision of the actual message in communication drives. For instance, an individual drilled on more than one lists of prevention measures may become confused as to which set of measures purportedly guards against which particular crime type. With the proliferation of crime prevention messages, the only stable outcome may in fact be a fear of crime.

and 3.2) when an individual chooses to lock the door after leaving his/her apartment, or to take the stairs when a suspicious character is spotted loitering around the waiting area for lifts. The accustoming of habits makes the task of crime prevention easier, when the little steps of prevention measures are embedded within daily routines in a non-intrusive manner.

One may speculate that it is through the cultivation of such habits of the mind that the individual develops a blasé, reserved and dispassionate stance towards the stranger in the metropolis (Simmel 1997). Alerted to the prevalence of crime in the urban jungle of modernising Singapore, individuals are geared for a conditioned response of either fight or flight in any potential encounters with a criminal. Where the situational proprieties of crime prevention sanction a criminalising gaze upon suspicious-looking strangers in public places, crime prevention technologies serve to normalise the range of acceptable public behaviours (Goffman 1963). Despite the seemingly innocuous banality of crime prevention messages, crime prevention routinely tightens the boundaries of situational proprieties in ways that discourage individuals from stepping out of line. But therein lies a central paradox of the practice of community policing when it is driven by crime prevention. Crime prevention certainly provides many triangulating spots for the fostering of social cohesion, from chatting with a neighbour in the lift or along a corridor about a recent crime trend, to experiencing a sense of togetherness at communal events that rally support for prevention measures. The establishment of Neighbourhood Watch Groups (NWGs) takes this a step further when neighbours agree to look out for one another's property, especially when a neighbour takes an extended leave of absence from his/her property. Through these measures, crime prevention helps to override traditional forms of civil inattention accorded to public places in rather complicated ways. However, while neighbours are henceforth encouraged to look out for one another under the rationale of preventing crime, members of the public are nonetheless challenged to stare at deviant others in public places. Loitering youths, persons in hoods with their faces partially concealed, strangers 'bumping' into oneself in crowded places, and unaccompanied men 'rushing' to catch an elevator are recognisable as signs of inappropriate behaviour that is associated with that of the criminal. Despite the multifarious reasons for such expressions of

public behaviour, situational crime prevention is compelled to simplify its central take-home message for those deemed vulnerable to crime: such out-of-the-ordinary behaviours are to be viewed with suspicion as markers of deviancy and ought to be reported to the police. Finally, what is more insidious is the cultivation of self-preservation amidst a rapidly urbanising world. Practised repeatedly, crime prevention is performative of an inwardly-focused defensiveness undergirded by a calculative disposition that seeks to protect one's life and well-being. The individual and the community then co-exist uneasily within the neighbourhood, affecting domestic consumption and social cohesion in complex ways.

A second technique for translating crime prevention requires the further abstraction of the different categories of crimes to form an overarching Crime as a target for interventions. The earlier tagline of 'low crime doesn't mean no crime' is an example; another would be 'crime does not pay', and 'together we can fight crime' (Sim 2011). These abstractions facilitate the blending together of an entire gamut of criminal offences into an amorphous, evasive, extremely dangerous and terrifying Crime. Crime becomes abstracted as an extraordinary event that is utterly disruptive of the routines of everyday life, damaging property and wrecking relationships in many households and communities. Crime as the bane of society and the source of great pain and suffering demands the individual take precautionary steps to prevent its emergence within a given situation (Quah 1994). This extrapolation and enlargement ad infinitum of Crime necessarily attaches itself to the banalisation of crime prevention. For it is amidst the hum-drum of everyday life in the residential heartlands that Crime shatters the peace of living. Criminal events may have decreased considerably from the tumultuous 1960s, but the public must be warned against being lulled into complacency (Akbur 2002). Thus crime prevention has to be ingrained in the activities of everyday life, to guard against the extraordinary criminal event. The position of crime would henceforth occupy a distinct niche within the buzz of everyday communications, as stories of crime gain increased prominence in conversations. The ability to bear witness to a crime deserves mention because of its rare occurrence and its serious consequences (Quah 1994), and ironically, the banalisation of crime prevention information has created a pent-up pressure for individual vindication and cathartic

release (cf. Garland 2001). A successful application of this technique clearly does not rest entirely with a conscious practice of community policing. The fall in crime rates is attributable to wider socioeconomic changes that have increasingly sought to regulate the employed work-lives of Singaporeans (e.gs. Rodan 1989; Chua 1995; Salaff 2004). Nonetheless, the diminished occurrence of crime renders it pliable for an aggrandisement of the criminal event through a play on the fear of Crime. Over the years, as the police have worked towards a greater professionalisation of their image, the extraordinariness of Crime can be easily complemented by the extraordinariness of crime-fighting as a career or hobby. This has in fact become the slogan for recruitment advertisements for the Police and the Volunteer Special Constabulary, which highlight the non-mundane aspects of the job amidst a highly regulated modern work environment (see Chapter 5).

Thirdly, crime prevention technology invokes a claim to moral authority. This is a familiar technique used to help the audience make sense of the purpose of crime prevention. In the state-authored texts of crime prevention, prevention advisories are best illustrated through stories. These stories are more akin to parables with morals that must be picked up by audiences. This technique explains the didacticism of crime prevention messages, whose common aim is to serve up learnable morals to the masses at the end of the story. Morals serve as technologies of the self (Foucault 1991), guiding behaviour in ways that can purportedly prevent crime, whilst translating abstract legal terminologies into practicable actions which shape the contours of everyday sociality of state subjects. Crime prevention however sought not merely to distinguish between Good and Evil, but it simultaneously sought to pander to the personal righteousness of state subjects through the cultivation of a self-righteous ethic that disavowed the transpiration of criminal activity (Rose 2000). Such moralising is capable of cultivating a strong sense of righteous indignation when the affective notions of justice are aligned to the criminal justice system in ways that confer legitimacy upon it whilst masking the problems wrought by various presumptions of self-righteousness. Accordingly, morality tales also allow the police to provide pastoral leadership over the population (Foucault 1991).

Perhaps this is the ultimate goal of the NPP system of community policing: to allow the police to transit from being mere agents of law enforcement and criminal detection to becoming moral guardians of order. In disseminating crime prevention advice to the public through the establishment of more contact points and the cultivation of friendly ties with neighbours, and in serving as impartial mediators between disputing parties, NPPOs sought to present a warm and familiar face of the police to the public (Quah and Quah 1987). Foot and bicycle patrols, house visits and crime prevention talks helped nurture a self-image of moral guardians within the police, as rank-and-file officers were taught the value of proactive communication over reactive confrontation (Skolnick and Bayley 1988). Holding back a brute application of force in order to communicate well-intentioned, sensible advice, the police opted for engagement over the reliance on legal powers to coerce compliance. Accordingly, they sought to invoke not only civic consciousness but personal righteousness (Rose 2000) which would be able to prompt the public to stay away from leading 'a life of crime', to provide details of criminal offences to the police, to keep a watchful eye of criminal offending in the neighbourhood, and to take care of their individual belongings. Alas, when power operates from a legal basis and harnesses self-interest to guide one's actions against the criminal Other, the risks of self-righteousness are aplenty when guilt is easily displaced onto the criminal Other[31].

The final technique for preventing crime lies in the action of prevention itself. A tagline frequently used in crime prevention advisories provides the clue to this: 'prevention is better than cure'. Crime prevention chooses to focus upon displacing the occurrence of crime rather than resolving criminogenic affairs. Although this may not be equally true for all types of crime, it bears greater resonance once the lists of preventative measures have been drawn up and are taken to be 'truth spots' (Latour and Woolgar 1986). The practice of situational crime prevention frames criminal activity as the outcome of rational decision-making, rendering crime impossible to be eradicated when it can strike so long as opportunities exist. In so doing, crime

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[31] This is perhaps most explicit in the crime prevention videos *Prison Me? No Way!* (1998) and *Girls don't go to prison* (1999). Here, the horrors of prison-living are used to frighten at-risk youths into avoiding a 'life of crime'. Police presenters are seen chastising prisoners for their crimes, whilst offenders take to the camera to deliver confessional statements professing their guilt and remorse at wrongdoing.

prevention becomes a technical issue of maintaining close control over the little things that allow criminal activities to take place (Garland 2001). An unlatched door or an unlocked window when no one is at home, a loosely-gripped handbag on approaching a physically-able stranger, displayed jewellery on defenceless bodies when the usual defenders of the weak are not around, a skimpy outfit on a female body in a confined space with male others, and valuables left unattended inside a car parked in a secluded area become targeted as objects of police intervention. The need to secure the context of criminal opportunities logically implies having to chase a moving target. Under these circumstances, the police have no choice but to rope in members of the public to take greater care of their own belongings, alongside serving as the eyes and ears of the police. Lists of preventive measures are drawn up in response to empirical patterns of criminal activity, but replace the context of context with the (re)production of generic contextual settings for the commission of crime[32]. Crime prevention outreach then socialises residents into taking small steps to change their daily routines in order to be safe, not sorry. The requirements of self-policing are extended from that of abiding by the law, to helping to police others' recalcitrant behaviours, and to prevent and detect preventable crime.

Additionally, prevention also pays attention to urban design of the environment (Sim 2011). Safety features are mounted onto the physical landscape in the hope of designing out crime. The pre-emptive logic of crime prevention is thus incorporated into the blueprints of new buildings to reduce opportunities for crime. Mini-Jacobsian sidewalk diagrams[33] are inserted into urban designs to facilitate greater social interaction alongside the deterrence of crime. Incorporating safety design features early on is preferable to retrofitting them later on. This framing of crime prevention as a technical object of enquiry inadvertently ignores the rehabilitative dimensions of criminology, content to displace criminal activity in time and space.

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[32] One could speculate that the dissemination of crime prevention information has affected how particular offences are visualised within the popular imagination, which in turn has an effect on how potential crimes are actualised.

[33] These are derived from Jane Jacobs' works on the city (e.g. Jacobs 1961). Her progressive vision of the sidewalk ballet has nonetheless been re-appropriated by many situational crime prevention proponents. These designs emphasise the integration of aesthetics with functionability in the creation of defensible spaces of everyday living.

In addition, an over-concern with the security of generic situations can also be counter-productive. Members of the public drilled on the nuts and bolts of crime prevention advice are likely to 'go through the motions' when being forced to attend a crime prevention briefing specially catered for them. Perceiving the information as being too abstract and/or too didactic to warrant their attention, audiences are likely to hear, but not listen. The overly-rationalistic situational prevention strategies may also breed an atmosphere of cynicism when individuals start to dwell upon its epistemology[34]. The real threat is when an affective equivalence is produced each time a crime prevention message is broadcast, or when individuals encounter what they believe corresponds to the generic situation that they have been alerted to (Anderson and Adey 2011). Primed for a self-preserving response to the normalised imminent danger that one is about to be exposed to, the individual assumes a defensive posture that is increasingly unsociable.

Crime prevention via community policing resonated with the residential population in various ways. The frequent visible presence of NPPOs within the vicinity of one's neighbourhood, the approachability of frontline officers for help with assorted tasks, the hospitality of police posts, the reduced occurrences of criminal activities, the (self) righteousness of relaying crime prevention messages and putting them into practice, and the calculability of criminal behaviours combined in complex ways to make NPPOs a largely welcomed presence in one's neighbourhood. The success of NPPs was perhaps most clearly reflected in the continuous addition of NPPs over the period from 1983 to 1995, and in the formation of over 10,000 NWGs in the same period (Akbur 2002). In reinforcing a strong work ethic and self-interest within the population (see Rose 1999), crime prevention also chimed well with the evolving historical context of the 1980s and thus readied the nation for challenges in the next lap[35].

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[34] One can of course trace the lineage of situational crime prevention to the birth of the school of situational interactionists (Goffman 1959; 1963). While both social theories similarly contain many flaws, a crucial difference lies in that while the latter seeks to excavate the institutionalisation of everyday social norms from the background in the service of progressive aims, the former seeks to extend and reproduce social norms through the foregrounding of generic situational contexts in order to fulfil institutional objectives.

[35] A reference to the sub-heading of the 1991 Concept Plan, a document which would guide Singapore's urban development for the next 10 years (Urban Redevelopment Authority 2008).

Rescaling Community Policing

Community policing underwent a significant change in 1997, as the Singapore Police Force took steps to restructure its organisation and urban architecture. While the NPP system of community policing was widely regarded as a success, the time had come for community policing to evolve according to changes in the wider political economy. Economic globalisation had plugged the Singaporean economy more firmly into the world-economy. The 'flying geese phenomena' of moving low-valued production to places with lower labour costs had accelerated throughout the 1980s (Fröbel et al. 1980), vindicating the government's decision to move into value-added manufacturing in the late 1970s. Nonetheless economic restructuring continued to be a painful process for many, and this was most evident in the 1985-1986 economic recession which raised unemployment figures and generated the first annual budget deficit for the Civil Service in the post-independence era (Quah 2010). This episode strengthened the government's resolve to diversify the economy through tertiarisation and the staking out of new niches within the field of biomedical sciences. As the services sector began to serve as the second engine of the national economy, urban restructuring had to take place as the physical landscape was re-made to facilitate the provision and consumption of services (Yeoh and Chang 2001; Kong and Yeoh 2003; Olds and Yeung 2004). While consumption was stimulated with the advice of prudent spending in the 1980s, the social compact had to be changed in accordance with more confident consumption (Chua 1995). An increased assertiveness of individual rights had inevitably accompanied the creation of private spaces of consumption, which had traditionally been out of bounds of state regulation. Separately, the privileging of personalised consumption stoked fears amongst the ruling elites of the rise of consumerist individualism and the demise of the community. These factors would play a part in the reorganisation of community policing within the SPF.

Economic restructuring also opened up opportunities for Singaporeans and Singaporean capital to venture abroad. The setting up of regional headquarters of multinational corporations to capitalise on the opening up of regional markets could be staffed by Singaporeans who

commanded high English language proficiency and who were disciplined by a rigorous state education system (Gopinathan 2007). The accumulation of national and private savings by the state and Singaporeans also facilitated foreign investments in neighbouring emerging markets (Sparke et al. 2004). A new-found confidence in an East Asian system of governance undergirded much of the optimistic economic outlook (e.g. Douglass 1994); pundits may well have identified the successes of community policing in Japan and Singapore as an indicator of a communitarian ethos in Asian societies. In fact, the Singaporean government had been quick to speculate on the links between the successes of the 'East Asian Tigers' of Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, and a communitarian ethic of neo-Confucian societies. In 1988, the government drew upon a widely-publicised study by economists to buttress its claim that Singapore was part of an East Asian culture that was different from the West (Chua 1995; 1998). In this, Singapore's foreign policy would no longer be articulated in terms of being an oasis of calm within a region of instability. The emerging first-world city-state would instead belong to a rising East Asian regional bloc united by the presence of shared Asian values. If geopolitics is a discourse to achieve political goals through making sense of international space (O'Tuathail et al. 1998), the region is a particular scalar construct that rationalised the location of a state in her neighbouring environment (Paasi 1991). The propagation of a shared Asian identity served many functions.

Firstly, it sought to explain the rise of the East Asian Tiger economies in culturalist terms rather than through political economic factors. Evacuated of the power relations in politicking and the inequities of capitalist development, the success of the Newly Industrialised Economies is explained through the essence of unchanging Confucian values which promote hard work, discipline, thriftiness, respect for authority and care for one's community (Chua 1998). This provided a rallying point for the patriarchal state to embark on yet another moral suasion campaign to warn its citizens of the ills of 'Western liberal individualism' which was alleged to be the source of reckless consumerism, selfish individualism and of the corruption of collective virtues. Through an inversion of the classical Orientalist discourse (Said 1978), the West was caricatured as a repository of anarchy and feckless individualism. Singaporeans were therefore

reminded of the need for fiscal planning, social discipline and political consensus, if they wanted to continue achieving economic success in the new world-economy. The ability of this discourse to resonate with the population was nonetheless to be found in the prolonged propagation of 'anti-yellow culture'[36] discourses that reflected the moral conservatism of the ruling elite (Yao 2007). Many decades' work in consolidating conservative moral values was further boosted by the dissemination of crime prevention messages that stoked greater (self) righteousness within Singaporeans. While invoking distinctly North-east Asian Confucian values gave the truth to the lie of multiracialism, the economic performances of the Chinese populace were re-rationalised as providing sufficient proof of the superiority of 'Confucian' values. Averting political disquiet amongst conservative sections of society who were uneasy with the rise of consumerism and the loosening of kinship ties in the wake of greater mobility, the ruling party turned to the promotion of Shared Asian Values to buttress its moral standing amongst large swathes of the population (Chua 1995).

Secondly, the inscription of culturalist values provided a political economic resource with which to market the city-state to foreign investors (Velayutham 2007). As opposed to explaining economic success, Asian values were performative of the very success they highlighted. The 1990s marked the beginning of a regionalisation strategy that sought to promote the internationalisation of Singaporean capital alongside the attraction of foreign capital into high-value added manufacturing and services (Kong 1999). Assuring East Asian investors of the commonality of an East Asian heritage encouraged cross-border trade and facilitated a deeper integration into the world-economy. The invocation of a New Asian identity (this time building upon the Orientalist imaginary) also laid the groundwork for an astute marketing strategy that would later promote Singapore as a choice for investment and tourism through the emphasis of it being a blend of the West and the East, a fusion of Western modernity and Eastern heritage (D. Goh 2010).

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[36] This is a translation of the Chinese phrase *huangse wenhua*, which refers to the consumption of products like pornographic articles, romance novels and crime and fantasy pulp fiction.

Thirdly, the communitarian discourse served to legitimise a responsibility among the community for its own well-being (Rose 1999). An increased economic individualism productive of individual rights had to be managed through the counter-assertion of individual responsibility for one's community. Challenging demographic trends that predicted an ageing population, falling fertility rates and increased numbers of unmarried adults would in general confer a greater burden for social reproduction onto individual Singaporeans. With the inadequacies of the prevailing social security nets contrasted against the inevitable widening of income gaps through participation in the world-economy, the state realised it faced certain limits to effective governance (Rose 1999). As shorthand for the variegated social groupings that an individual is a part of, the community would have to step in, if it had not already done so, to alleviate the expected shortfall of resources for social reproduction which would disproportionately affect certain sections of the population. The espousal of community self-help would thus feature prominently within state discourses from the 1990s onwards. Community self-help was a pragmatic response by the state in furtherance of its multiracialism discourse. With the heavy-handed policing of racial boundaries, each compartmentalised social grouping or 'race' had to do its part to help out socioeconomically disadvantaged members of the racial community. Harking back to the immigrant clan associations of colonial society which were set up to care for neglected members under the colonial regime (Turnbull 1989), ethnic self-help groups were now tasked with tending to the welfare of their respective poor, through the institutionalisation of educational bodies in charge of disbursing educational grants to needy school children from low-income families. Help rendered by the different racial communities however remained rather uneven; the 'burden' of policing racial 'fault lines' (Rahim 2009) obstructed the fostering of broad-based inter-racial social movements that could challenge the hegemonising narratives of the government and alleviate the structural causes of poverty (Li 1989). In these moves, the state began to target the newly-affluent middle class by appealing to their sensibilities to contribute back to society through participation in social programmes operated by self-help communities to reach the less fortunate (Chua 1995). The primary purpose of self-help was however to assist recipients of partial welfare to stand up on their own feet and secure gainful employment (Peck 2001). Self-help schemes were not meant

to be permanent or providing for complete welfare. This would compel recipients to maintain their work ethic through a lifelong process of learning. Retraining to upgrade their job skills to boost economic productivity or to find formal employment would become the new normal of a globalised, competitive economic landscape.

Within this new urban operating environment, the police faced new challenges to the fulfilment of their mandates. The NPP system of community policing had run its due course and discourses were mobilised to warrant a change in the organisational structure and style of community policing (Singh 2000). Discourses employed include: (i) an uneven spread of NPPs in the new urban landscape; (ii) the small scale of NPPs failing to cope with demands for policing; (iii) the performances of 'non-core policing duties' by NPPOs; (iv) a compartmentalisation of duties under the old system that obstructed the transmission of information; and (v) the lack of synergies with other state bodies. In each of these discourses, the case for rescaling community policing was evident and will be discussed. These discourses paved the way for the implementation of the Neighbourhood Police Centre (NPC) system of community policing. The first NPC was to be opened in the matured estate of Queenstown, located just outside the city centre. This would be followed in quick succession by other NPCs located within the Western region, before the system spread to encompass other regions of Singapore. The discourses for rescaling will now be covered in order.

Discourse 1: Redistribution of Resources to Achieve a More Equitable Outcome

The problem with the NPP system of policing was that the demand and supply of police resources were not in sync, with certain places experiencing a greater increase in population growth and/or a change in land use (Singh 2000; and Personal Interview with Police Historian). For instance, the new towns of Sembawang, Yishun and Pasir Ris were only fully constructed and inhabited from the early 1990s. The expansion of the residential 'heartlands' meant they had to be similarly serviced by NPPs, to ensure the equal treatment of the populace. The construction and staffing of new NPPs in response to the expansion of new and future new

towns would consume more police resources in a way that was unsustainable (Personal Interview with Historian). The provision of police resources was centred upon pre-existing residential areas, and the implementation of a new concept plan in 1991 had introduced new topics into urban planning, such as the creation of regional new towns, the expansion of Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) lines, and the setting up of new industrial clusters specialising in aerospace engineering and petrochemicals (Olds and Yeung 2004; Urban Redevelopment Authority 2008). Under the NPP system, NPPs were placed under the command of Regional Land Divisions whose headquarters had not changed since the 1970s. The relatively centralised location of regional headquarters increased commuting times for officers travelling to NPPs located at the periphery. Hence the policing architecture itself had to undergo urban restructuring.

The creation of the Neighbourhood Police Centre (NPC) de-emphasised the role of NPPs, seeking to re-direct future public contact to amalgamated police centres that were physically much larger and staffed with more officers. The introduction of NPCs represented a thorough restructuring of the command and control, training, rewards and incentives, frontline operation and administration and finance structures of the organisation (Personal Interview with Historian). Accordingly, the construction of NPCs took place alongside the construction of a new complex for the Criminal Investigation Department, the Police Headquarters, the Airport Police Division building, and a new training academy. The installation of new buildings allowed for a comprehensive modernisation of the force's infrastructure (Singapore Police Force 1997; Akbur 2002). An intensification of land use was visible too, in the co-location of different users within the same building (Urban Redevelopment Authority 2008). For instance, NPCs occasionally share the premises with Community Centres (CCs), and the new training academy is shared by the Police, Singapore Prisons Service and other Home Team departments[37].

As urban restructuring took place, the meanings attached to community policing evolved. The re-distribution of NPCs in space sought a more optimal utilisation of current and future police resources in a way that still localised NPCs within residential neighbourhoods. A commitment

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[37] Since 1997, the 'Home Team' groups together the different departments under the Ministry of Home Affairs. The creation of the Home Team concept aims to harness greater synergy amongst the various departments.

towards fostering social cohesion through greater public contact was therefore clearly still in place (Personal Interview with Historian), although the priority would now be on achieving an optimality of resource utilisation from an accumulated knowledge of the local community (see Rose 1999; Foucault 2001; 2007). Over 15 years' of ground work by the police carrying out door-to-door house visits, walking the beat around neighbourhoods, and interacting with residents on a regular basis in the police post or at crime prevention functions has enabled them to gather extensive information on everyday ecologies of the neighbourhood, as well as establish strong contacts within the community. This processed intelligence provides the basis from which optimisation strategies are called forth. Additionally, the co-location of certain NPCs with CCs also provides a new avenue for community policing (Personal Interview with Historian). Within close proximity of each other, NPCs and CCs can jointly organise more crime prevention outreaches and conduct educational visits to NPCs. The aligning of police and recreational amenities strengthens a sense of neighbourhood identity whilst making it more convenient for users. Interpersonal interactions between Neighbourhood Police Centre Officers (NPCOs) and CC staff and users also increase communication channels with the public, which can be important for securing their trust in the organisation (Putnam 2000).

Nevertheless, the establishment of NPCs did not take place in a vacuum; instead it took place besides the gradual phasing out of NPPs which carried with them a complex historical legacy. As widely regarded success stories, NPPs were the pride of many residents, who valued the services provided by the latter. From routine crime prevention talks, to the provision of miscellaneous services like the updating of residential addresses on the back of one's Identity Card, and the rendering of help by settling minor disputes between neighbours, fixing a broken electronic appliance or assisting to search for lost pets, NPPOs had cultivated friendly relationships with the neighbourhood[38]. The phasing out of NPPs, which included the winding down of services and the closing down of some posts would inevitably encounter resistance

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[38] Information gleaned from previous fieldwork for my undergraduate dissertation. I am emphasising the positive aspects of NPP-styled community policing in order to draw a contrast between the two models of community policing, underscoring how friendly relationships are cultivated through much work done by NPPOs. Naturally, the complex of relationships brokered by the NPP model is much more uneven in practice.

from the ground (Ministry of Home Affairs, 10 March 2001). The outcomes of a shift to the NPC system of policing would be more complex on the ground.

Discourse 2: Scaling Up of Resources to Achieve Economies of Scale

NPPs were physically small and staffed with about 30 men on rotating shifts. The limited manpower available at any one time necessarily restricted the amount and type of duties officers could perform. At its peak, a total of 91 NPPs had mushroomed across Singapore, and this resulted in a duplication of job functions by different NPPs. A wastage of resources ensued when officers were called to operate services in ways that could be better provided for through a scaling up of institutions to achieve economies of scale (Singh 2000). The labour-intensive work of community engagement also absorbed much of the limited manpower of each NPP, freeing up little time for officers to undergo in-service training to upkeep their professional skills (Personal Interview with Historian). Alongside a chain of command which dictated that higher order policing services would not be managed by NPPs, NPPOs were constrained in their ability to engage the public on issues which required a greater degree of specialist knowledge. The practice of community policing thus risked emphasising sociable aspects of community life at the expense of police craft (Singh 2000)[39].

The NPP had arguably succeeded in implanting the proverbial community spirit through cultivation of a small territoriality that facilitated exchanges amongst residents (Quah and Quah 1987; Quah 1994; Ganapathy 2000). Frequent contacts with the bobby-on-the-beat (Reiner 2000) and other aspects of the banalisation of crime prevention helped materialise a sense of togetherness and a place-based belonging which evoked memories of the *kampung spirit*. Whether as a possible reference to the romanticised rural idyll of pre-urbanised small villages where community was present and where relationships between members were dense and multifaceted, or the resilience of an informal sector within urban villages that assisted villagers with social reproduction, or the informal social control mechanisms within tightly-knit

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[39] The presence of such sentiments is nonetheless reflective of a failure by top management to fully appreciate the progressive ethos present in more radical models of community policing (for e.g. Waddington 1999).

settlements that removed the need for governmental oversight under colonial rule, the *kampung spirit* has assumed a special place within the popular imagination. Rapid urbanisation from the 1950s had converted much rural land into built-up areas to serve the needs of economic development. The shortage of land in Singapore had resulted in a judicious management of land from early on, diagramming measurable plots and parcelling them for various uses (Urban Redevelopment Authority 2008). As physical space was subjected to finer Cartesian abstraction and calculation, high modernist principles of planning expedited transformations of the urban landscape. The status of modernity however remained ambiguous, as uprooted slum and squatter tenants were re-housed in modernist high-rises and subsequently lost contact with friends and relatives who used to live in close proximity to them (Kong and Yeoh 2003; R. Goh 2005). Through the establishment of communal platforms for interactions within public housing estates, the state sought to promote greater sociability amongst new neighbours (Mauzy and Milne 2002). References to the *kampung spirit* sought to encourage new homeowner-citizens to make friends in the neighbourhood, whilst providing tacit acknowledgement of the displacements wrought upon the native population by the pursuit of economic development[40] (Chua 1995b). For younger Singaporeans who have not had a taste of living in an actual *kampung*, the invocation of the *kampung spirit* may well signal his/her desire for a place of refuge to weather the storms of economic competition (see Bauman 2001). Either way, the *kampung spirit* is clearly a romanticised ideal with an essence that cannot be distilled through history (Creed 2006). Its utility lies in its discursive power in performing public-spiritedness (see Chapter 4). It may be appropriate to speculate that this discourse was an important attractor for the first generation of police officers who implemented community policing. The romantic idea of a small, closely-knit community with its distinct territoriality (see Herbert 1997) might have led to the concept of the mini-police post and the conduct of foot patrols to increase social interactions between residents and the police. Community policing through NWGs, neighbourhood crime prevention talks, the NPP landmark, and having familiar officers on foot patrols was thus performed with the ultimate objective of

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[40] The term '*kampung*' can however have negative moral and racial connotations attached to it, as when it is used in the slur 'Go back to your *kampung*!'

fostering social cohesion through a place-based materialisation of the *kampung spirit*, and it succeeded in making inroads into this, albeit in complex and highly uneven ways.

Alas in what amounts to a self-fulfilling prophecy, the 'small is beautiful' concept began to be regarded as archaic, trapped by its very success of fleshing out the *kampung spirit*. Modernisation in the form of the NPC would generate greater cost savings and more efficient utilisation of manpower (Singh 2000). The narrow confines of the NPPs were also no match for the expanding egos of police officers, called upon to serve the nation in an extraordinary career. Officers increasingly found their social mobility constrained by the boundary of the NPP and the banal practice of neighbourhood policing (Personal Interview with Historian). In light of wider demographic changes that increased the mobility of many social reproducers, the police were relied less upon for information updates, casual conversations, physical assistance, and friendly points of contact within the neighbourhood. From improved public transportation networks, mainstreaming of mobile communication technologies, flexibilisation of work practices, the creation of more common spaces within public places, to governmental subsidies disbursed to working adults staying within close proximity to their parents and in-laws (Salaff 2004), a range of social changes removed the need for community-building through the efforts of localised NPPOs. Under these circumstances, police posts were viewed as increasingly out of place in a modernising environment (see Cresswell 1996).

Scaling up however did not provide an institutional fix. Some members of the public were reluctant to make do with reduced police visibility in the heartlands as less resources could be devoted towards foot and bicycle patrols (Personal Interview with Historian). The services offered by NPPs were also wound down. Scaling up thus risked re-widening the sutured gap between the police and the community as the bureaucratic distance between the civil servant and the citizen he/she served was increased to secure increasing returns to scale. Under these circumstances, remedial measures had to be in place (Personal Interview with Historian): these included having former NPPOs attend grassroots events or serve in the newly-established post

of Community Liaison and Preparedness Officer[41] (CLPOs) (Singapore Police Force 2004), continuing to host crime prevention talks and road shows, and encouraging NPCOs to engage the community in the fewer and more dispersed foot patrols that they were now allowed to perform.

Discourse 3: Remaking Boundaries of Real Police Work

The endeavour to implement community policing faced many challenges stemming from an interpretation of what police work should be about. As a new ethos of policing that encouraged community engagement over professional law enforcement (Skolnick and Bayley 1988; Fielding 1995; Singapore Police Force 1995; Waddington 1999), community policing unsettled many categories of social order within the SPF. Crime prevention through community outreach, policing for the long-term, policing as more than reactive crime-solving, and policing as more than the application of brute force to secure compliance challenged the norms of police work. These changes wrought by community policing were further influenced by wider societal transformations in the nature and meaning of work. The move towards value-added manufacturing and a tertiary sector articulated changes to the nature of work (Coe and Kelly 2000). 'Backstage' assembly-line production was gradually overshadowed by the provision of services at front desks. Manual labour was no longer the preferred choice of work for the physically fit, as white-collared 'brain' work assumed greater prestige within the emergent knowledge-based economy. The shift in economic production modes also necessitated changes to the education system that increased the competitiveness of the system through an early separation of students into different education streams and the adoption of greater rigor in assessments for mathematical and scientific subjects (Gopinathan 2007). As the state education system produced more highly-skilled graduates, job expectations of individuals changed, alongside the expectations of ordinary citizens in their routine encounters with the police (Singh 2000; Akbur 2002).

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[41] The post of CLPO was only established in 2004 as a stop-gap measure in response to the lack of dedicated officers willing and able to perform the traditional tasks of community policing.

The skilled worker would also no longer be enticed by a job description which plunges the worker into the throes of danger. An increased adoption of managerial techniques at the workplace changed the meanings associated with formal work. The employee would now seek out opportunities for self-improvement, job satisfaction becomes a criterion for personal welfare, and career progression provides a snapshot of the expected job rotations and lifetime earnings of an individual. Community policing under the NPP system had fallen in line with several of these changes: the focus on community engagement shifted the job scope of frontline officers towards that of the provision of pastoral care (Foucault 1991), whilst the technicalities of crime prevention increased administrative duties and proffered chances for social interaction and personal networking. Restructuring of the organisation in the late 1980s in the wake of the zero manpower growth policy had helped create a leaner workforce through the adoption of managerial strategies (Akbur 2002; Quah 2010). While this had proven useful for the organisation in the early 1990s, there was still a perceived need to strengthen the job offerings for police officers to ensure the SPF could remain competitive within a tight labour market. Recruiting talented workers was a priority in the face of an increasingly literate and demanding consumer-citizenry (Singapore Police Force 1995; 1997; Singh 2000).

The NPC system would increase the autonomy of NPCOs through the integration of the different tasks of investigations, crime scene management, first responder, victim counselling, and media management into the job scope of the NPCO, allowing individuals to be able to commit to a case and to take charge of a case over longer portions of its progress through the criminal justice system (Personal Interview with Historian). The move towards empowering the worker was accompanied by a move towards adopting problem-solving approaches in community policing (Personal Interview with Historian). Problem-solving approaches encouraged the frontline officer to think out of the box when responding to calls for assistance. As opposed to following through the motions of law enforcement, the officer was required to analyse if there could be larger problems that have caused the commission of the offence. Thinking through how an offence could be committed would alert the officer towards the

presence of further criminogenic factors. The result would be a more thorough attempt at crime prevention through partnerships with the community (Goldstein 1990).

Separately, the creation of NPCs formulated new ranks to be staffed by middle-management. As larger policing units than NPPs, NPCs commanded a staff of about 80 people, and possessed jurisdiction over a larger area. This enlarged responsibility helped to improve job satisfaction through the provision of new challenges, whilst providing more career pathways for officers to pursue (Singh 2000). Other managerial techniques that accompanied the change to an NPC system of policing included an increased statisticisation of criminal data which allowed for interpretation work by intelligence analysts; the adoption of performance targets to justify and regulate financial spending; the care for psychological well-being of the organisation; a renewed priority on in-service training to refresh the skills of officers; and the crafting of a Police Service Pledge that assured the public of the quality of service standards of frontline officers (Akbur 2002; Quah 2010).

In this new managerial working environment, police work could no longer be seen as that performed by a neighbourhood preacher, a door-to-door salesman, a household appliance repairman, a lift technician, or a friendly neighbourhood buddy. The job scope of a police officer must have its professional boundaries well-policed. No longer would the neighbourhood policeman be recognised as the 'rubbish collector'[42] whose job was to mop up the litany of miscellaneous complaints by homeowner-citizens that had fallen upon the deaf ears of other state organisations (see Herbert 2006). The separation of core from non-core policing duties was spelt out in Force Doctrines, with the police responsible for a list of core duties, while non-core duties were excluded from its ambit (Personal Interview with Historian). Some were parcelled out to other state and non-state organisations, some became shared responsibilities of various state agencies, while others were left in a state of limbo awaiting clarification. The

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[42] The association of police work with that of a rubbish collector stems from the relationship wedge (Goffman 1963) that has been put in place between the NPPO and his/her residential community. By opening oneself up to the member of public, the NPPO was duly obliged to hear out all sorts of complaints from the citizen-taxpayer, in return for offering the latter salient crime prevention tips.

public was repeatedly reminded of the distinction between the two: confusing duties belonging to different lists may not constitute a criminal offence, but in diverting police resources from responding to emergencies, it was a serious matter that had to be dealt with sternly[43]. Despite the legalistic prescription of real police work, the boundaries of work are always being negotiated and can never be fixed in place permanently. Officers who have performed NPP duties took time to adjust to the new nature and meaning of police work alongside the change in police work routines[44]. Experienced officers who had witnessed the benefits of keen community engagement were initially sceptical of the 'retreat' from NPPs into NPCs[45]. The greater emphasis placed on managerial aspects of work proved as alienating for those committed NPPOs as it was for hard-boiled cops trapped in the crime fighter persona[46] (for other perspectives, see Miller 1999; Reiner 2000; Herbert 2006). Work boundaries are constituted through wider social differences that penetrate the organisation in complex ways, rendering the nature and meaning of police work vulnerable to all sorts of non-police social policing.

Discourse 4: Removing Barriers to Information Flow

As the rise of the network society gained significant traction, Singapore began wiring up for broadband information and communication technologies in the mid-1990s (Coe and Yeung 1999). Restructuring of the physical landscape was a first step towards providing mainstream access to fast broadband technologies that would increase the speed of Internet browsing, file transfer and online communications. NPPs were increasingly viewed as a relic of the 1980s in their lack of broadband connectivity, and their reliance upon the pre-computerised

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[43] Information gleaned from previous fieldwork for my undergraduate dissertation.

[44] The topic of the evolving work routines of frontline police officers has been explored in-depth in my previous dissertation. While the NPP system operated under three daily shifts, the NPC system operated under two 12-hourly shifts. Working the new NPC system of compressed, rotating shift work has had numerous ramifications on the physiological, psychological and social health of frontline officers. Officers not only work longer hours, but are in fact subjected to 32-hourly cycles that are out of sync with circadian (i.e. about a day) rhythms. The increased frequency of training, special operations and event security duties increase the workload for NPCOs, overworking many of them in the process.

[45] Information gleaned from previous fieldwork for my undergraduate dissertation.

[46] Information gleaned from previous fieldwork for my undergraduate dissertation.

technologies of the pen, clip board, typewriter, physical copy of regulatory forms, station diary, paper docket, manual projector, flip chart, white board and notice board to carry out day-to-day policing functions[47]. Far from speeding up informational flow from the ground upwards, NPPs were gradually seen to be creating an additional institutional layer in the processing of organisational information (see Skolnick and Bayley 1988). Despite providing more contact points with the public, NPPs had also added another layer of bureaucracy to effective policing duties. Inputs into the bureaucratic machine via NPPs took a long time to be translated into feasible intelligence that could be supplied to decision-makers. This resulted from the fact that while NPPs may have been physically decentralised, they were not sufficiently organisationally decentralised. There was a strong centralisation of authority within the force that meant NPPs were to report to their respective Regional Land Divisions, who in turn sought advice from Headquarters where applicable. The long chain of command was deemed to have restricted the autonomy provided to NPPOs. Hence there was a need to restructure NPPs to make them more nimble in responding to changes on the ground (Singh 2000).

The transition to the NPC system of policing was in line with the move towards becoming a learning organisation (Senge et al. 1994; Singapore Police Force 2004; Personal Interview with Historian). Within a learning organisation, barriers to information flow must be removed to ensure more effective communications. Bureaucratic red tape had to be cut while new feedback channels would be opened throughout the organisation. Learning to keep ahead of the game would become prioritised, and information and communications technologies were more widely adopted to aid this process. The newly-created NPCs would serve as a one-stop total policing solutions centre (Singh 2000), taking over NPPs as an 'obligatory passage point' for the public seeking to lodge police reports. While NPPs could not provide higher-order services in the past and much time would be spent awaiting the outcome of deliberations by higher authorities, the customer would now be assured of the quality of service provision at NPCs. There would be lesser need for him/her to be referred to someone else for better advice, crime victims would be provided quicker and timely updates of their cases alongside

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[47] Information gleaned from previous fieldwork for my undergraduate dissertation.

professional counselling upon request, and NPCs provided a larger, more hospitable environment for waiting customers (Singapore Police Force 1997; Quah 2010). In re-framing the relationship between the police and the community from that of moral guardian-homeowner to one of service provider-customer, the police were moving in line with the wider trend towards managerial techniques of service provision. Service here no longer merely stands for the act of providing immaterial labour, but it has become the target of managerial interventions to secure the space for further consumption (Harvey 1989). The cultivation of the consumer-citizen required the police to cast themselves as public servants providing the essential services of safety and security to the general population (Singapore Police Force 1997; 2002). The securing of domestic consumption spaces involved at least a twofold process that is intensely bound up with the performance of community (see Joseph 2002): creating an environment that would be conducive for consumption (Salaff 1988; 2004; Rodan 1989; 2006); and nurturing the rights and responsibilities of the consumer-citizen (Chua 1995). The newly-enshrined NPC would work towards meeting the rights of the consumer-citizen to feel safe and secure. The public was to be actively serviced through the maintenance of a low crime rate, the dissemination of crime prevention technologies, and expeditious investigations into cases that lead to the successful apprehension of criminals. Quick answering of and response to public calls for emergency assistance became an utmost priority (while non-emergency cases allowed for a longer lapse time), included within the Police Service Pledge and constituted as a key performance indicator of the police (Quah 2010).

Each of these techniques could be accomplished through the NPC, which was inscribed as a mini-centre of calculation of the police. Collation and interpretation of crime statistics, research into crime prevention strategies, conduct of basic investigations and dispatch of responding units were tasks undertaken by the NPC with the decentralisation of planning functions. As NPCs attracted more consumer traffic, NPPs became less frequently patronised, skilled police officers were moved over to staff the ranks of newly-formed NPCs, and NPPs were increasingly bypassed as sites for the practice of community policing[48].

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[48] Information gleaned from previous fieldwork for my undergraduate dissertation.

The translation of community policing was nonetheless filled with ambivalence and ambiguity. As quick response to emergency calls was put back on the radar, the utilisation of Fast Response Cars (FRCs) became an imperative for NPCOs on duty. The risk of not being able to reach a scene of emergency on time was too great for officers to bear, and accordingly, neighbourhood patrols are now fronted by the motorcar[49]. Furthermore, the larger area under each NPC's jurisdiction made it more feasible to conduct motor as opposed to foot patrols. The double emphasis on service response and service provision at NPCs meant community engagement efforts would inevitably take a back seat. The majority of frontline officers would be governed by performance indicators that were apathetic towards the touchy-feely notion of community engagement (see Miller 1999; Reiner 2000; Herbert 2006). The days where most NPPOs performed their rounds on foot to better reach out to inhabitants of the neighbourhood soon became a thing of the past. Officers swapping the feel of the ground for the driver's seat in the FRC risked sealing off themselves within the domain of the vehicle (though for another view, see Sheller and Urry 2000 or Beckmann 2001), alongside having their patrols navigated by the contours of the road network. A speeding up of informational flow centred around the FRC also missed out on having the flexibility to plan one's daily engagement routines in the neighbourhood (Miller 1999), the ability to identify the various neighbourhood 'characters'[50] with a mastery of territory (Herbert 1997), the capacity to forge meaningful friendships with more members of the public, and the opportunity to establish more points of connection with individual residents in a way that goes beyond an instrumentalisation of the service provider-customer relation (Miller 1999). Speeding up narrowed the range of everyday rhythms permitted to frontline officers, which had an adverse effect on the ability of officers to appreciate an ecology of place (Thrift 1999). Walking the beat by contrast facilitated a distinctly grounded education of attention (Ingold 2004) to the rich textures of everyday life, which in turn might allow NPPOs to adopt a more nuanced approach to community policing.

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[49] Information gleaned from previous fieldwork for my undergraduate dissertation.
[50] It is common for police officers to refer to such characters as criminals, delinquents, drunkards, troublemakers, kaypohs (busybodies), informants, housewives, Ah Sohs (old aunties), Ah Peks (old men), and school children.

In order for the transition to NPCs to be successful, members of the public had to submit to the 'obligatory passage point' of NPCs in their contact with the police. Decisions against visiting NPCOs as a result of greater inconveniences and longer commuting times, the emotional distancing from a mid-sized bureaucracy, or just plain confusion over the role of NPCs vis-à-vis NPPs would cause them to leave the policing network. This would then hinder community policing's attempt at establishing working partnerships with the public to fight crime. The establishment of CLP teams within NPCs helped alleviate the situation by establishing professionalised channels of community policing in the new system (Personal Interview with Historian). Nonetheless this only targeted certain portions of the community who were represented in Grassroots Organisations (GROs), business associations, school disciplinary committees, and the National Crime Prevention Council. Professionalism adhered to certain standards that by definition excluded the participation of others. Loading the responsibility for community policing squarely onto the shoulders of specialised CLPOs also risked overworking the latter[51] whilst absolving other officers of a common responsibility (see Miller 1999; Herbert 2006). Ironically thus, the hastening of the pace of community policing bypassed previous nodes of community engagement, possibly weakening the overall governmental assemblage in the process.

Discourse 5: Coordinating Partnerships with External Agencies

NPPs' small institutional size had limited a broad engagement with non-police agencies. This occurred on several fronts. First, as noted earlier, a lack of manpower hindered the ability to engage other organisations without abandoning one's labour-intensive job scope (Singh 2000). The lack of authority and training of NPPOs similarly affected their capacity to engage external professionals. Secondly, the public response to NWGs and Crime Prevention Committees may have been heartening, but these groupings were subjected to little regulatory oversight. This

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[51] Previous fieldwork for my undergraduate dissertation had revealed that CLPOs work extremely long hours, as they are required to attend RC and Citizen Consultative Committees' meetings that are typically carried out on weekday evenings after the completion of the normal work day. The porosity of formal work boundaries within community policing (Miller 1999) means CLPOs face a stiff challenge in maintaining healthy non-work lives.

resulted in frequent duplication of resources (Singapore Police Force 1997), when for instance, separate training sessions had to be held for different NWGs. A greater concern was the nominalisation of NWGs: when residents enthusiastically signed up for neighbourhood watch only to lose interest in it after a few weeks. Not only would participation be adversely affected, but there was a risk of diluting the crime prevention message (Singh 2000). The proliferation of NWGs also hindered any plans for integrative action across different groups. Thirdly, the territorialities of NPPs were incongruent with those found in the state's concept plan; under the latter, the smallest grid for regional planning was the Developmental Guide Plan area, a spatial entity whose boundaries did not correspond with the electoral ward boundaries of NPPs (Quah 2010). This mis-match of scale limited cross-dialogue between different state agencies. Finally, the police felt that under the labour-intensive NPP system, they were taking on an unfair proportion of the workload for crime prevention (Quah 1994; Singh 2000; Personal Interview with Historian), which was unsustainable amidst a growing population of middle class homeowner-citizens. In the expected move away from NPPs, the public had to shoulder a greater responsibility for crime prevention. Moralising homeowner-citizens to take **care** of their own belongings may have been easily achieved, but making them responsible to take **charge** of localised crime prevention strategies was going to be a new challenge, impacting upon the prevailing gendered division of labour (Salaff 2004) in interesting ways[52]. In the move towards service provision and managerial techniques of governance, resources were available to help persuade other state, para-state and non-state bodies to share in the responsibility for crime prevention.

Within management speak, crime in its various guises could be targeted with greater precision only if a stakeholder approach was adopted, and the roles and duties of crime prevention were clearly identified (Quah 2010). National safety and security provided the natural foil for cooperation amongst different state ministries and state subjects. While safety and security

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[52] Encouraging social reproducers to commit more resources towards participation in grassroots community policing events may help several individuals acquire greater confidence within and without the public sphere. Nonetheless it also stokes the cultivation of a chauvinistic crime-fighter ego by motivating physically-fit bodies to volunteer their leisure time after work to take charge of neighbourhood affairs (see later chapters).

used to provide the basis for political unification in the post-independence era, they became the subject of police care and concern at a finer scale in the NPP era. The 1990s though witnessed an increasing level of responsibility of the community for maintaining a shared safety and security. The invocation of domestic safety and security represents a potential trump card against other bureaucratic concerns of different branches of the regulatory state (Bigo 2002; Walters 2004). Set against this prevailing national narrative, the role for the community was re-worked to shoulder some of the workload that had been cast off by the police (Rose 1999; 2000). A neo-communitarian ethos helped justify the decreased visibility of NPCOs within the new practice of community policing. The devolution of state responsibility for policing meant NPCs would function as facilitators of crime prevention. The police could only provide knowledge of their accumulated experience and specialised training in crime prevention; other actors had to take the lead in establishing and cultivating crime prevention networks for concerted action across space. Nonetheless this new role for the police helped preserve their authority in community engagement efforts, as they were sought after for their professional expertise.

NWGs were rationalised and re-fashioned as Neighbourhood Watch Zones (NWZs) in the shift to the NPC system (Singh 2000). Placed under the leadership of RCs, NWGs were thus integrated with the organisational structure of the state's GROs (Singapore Police Force 1997). Members of NWGs would be given customised training and timely updates of crime trends by NPCOs. However, police officers would no longer be leading neighbourhood watch teams as per the NPP system. NPCs' new territories would also dovetail with the Urban Redevelopment Authority's Developmental Guide Plan areas to ensure state agents working in different state organs would be working with the same scale (Quah 2010). This facilitates an integration of the planning functions of multiple state organs, helping clarify questions of 'ownership' issues within the state bureaucracy, and assisting in the formation of inter-ministerial working groups to tackle tricky cross-agency problems (Quah 2010). The triangulation of crime would be given a greater boost through a more far-reaching governmentalisation of the state (Foucault 2001), where branches of the state work in concert to strengthen state sovereignty, harnessing the

work-discipline of state subjects and the collation of crime statistics to help prevent crimes as defined by legal statutes. In so doing, the police would be able to govern from a distance through the dissemination of crime prevention technologies and the added responsibility of state subjects to prevent crime within their respective localities. Freed from the pressures of constantly adding new NPPs to recently established new towns; a mindset that communities needed to be small in order to be organic; the undervalued work of community engagement; the archaic methods of neighbourhood policing; and an overdependence on the police for the provision of localised safety and security, the police could proceed with a restructuring of its internal organisation to keep pace with moves towards a knowledge-based economy and its associated policing requirements.

Helping Communities Help Themselves

The emphasis of the new community policing paradigm on community self-help required mobilising the community to help themselves in areas that affected their local safety and security. As part of the plan to rationalise police resources and devolve greater responsibility to the local grassroots, the police took the initiative to draft community-focused plans with the support of Community Development Council (CDC) mayors. These plans would later provide the fodder for the implementation of the first batch of Community Safety and Security Programme (CSSP) projects in 1999. The objective of CSSP was to provide a coherent platform for the mobilisation of localised strategies to deal with the safety and security of a local population. As initiatives of the community, CSSP would be driven by various non-police bodies. Different groupings of members of the public would come together to work on particular CSSP projects that concern their own well-being. The police's role was in providing guidance on and coordination anchors for CSSP projects, and these tasks would be the responsibility of the NPCOs and later, CLPOs. As projects took off, other state and non-state agencies would chip in with efforts to mobilise the community around issues other than crime prevention, such as fire prevention, anti-drug abuse, or anti-harbouring of illegal immigrants. Nevertheless initially, the rationale for and mobilisation of participation in CSSP were disseminated through the well-

established platforms for crime prevention, such as a public education segment on *Crime Watch*, routine crime prevention road shows, and the word-of-mouth of GRO members (*Crime Watch* Epi03/1997). While these platforms are useful for generating awareness, mobilisation for action involves more than just the taking of simple precautions to guard against property crimes. Willing participants first need to come up with a project proposal. CSSP projects are conceptualised in a plan of action that is drafted by project leaders. In this, a first step would be the problematisation of issues, or a grounding of common purpose. The identification of problems that commonly affect the neighbourhood is followed by a prioritisation of concerns so that the main issues are underscored. The second step is an *interessement* of the different parties involved[53]. This comprises the identification of the parties concerned and the relative assessment of their roles and duties. The third step involves the authoring of an action plan to coordinate implementation efforts. The proposal is submitted to the authorities for vetting, and official resources will be provided if the proposal is approved (Community Safety and Security Programme 2011).

Over a period of 10 years, CSSP projects have been carried out with varying purposes, participants, participation levels and participation outcomes. Some examples of CSSPs include: (i) Safe-Drive Zones, involving primary schools, parents of school children, GROs and NPCs, to promote road safety for young children; and (ii) Workers on Watch, involving Town Councils, GROs and NPCs, to conduct surveillance of public housing estates during the day (Community Safety and Security Programme 2011). Despite the heterogeneity of projects, several common processes of the translation of CSSP projects may be gleaned. First, an enrolment of participants takes place through discourses of responsibilisation. This takes the form of one or more of the following statements by the authorities: the police are only human and cannot be everywhere to prevent crime; a little step goes a long way towards safety and security; be part of the solution rather than just complaining. The iconic *kampung* spirit could also be applied to different ends.

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[53] In Actor-Network Theory terminology

This spirit of community self-help goes way back to the *kampung* days where neighbours help look out for the safety and security of one another. The residents know their own safety and security concerns best, and they have the immediate resources available to resolve them. Hence, what we did was to set up a new network of mutual support to empower residents to address these issues jointly with the grassroots organisations, partner agencies and the Home Team agencies. (Wong Kan Seng, Minister for Home Affairs, 18 July 2007)

Source: Community Safety and Security Programme 2011

Encouraging a spirit of public responsibility would inevitably most of the time fall on deaf ears as it requires a considerable effort to be able to overcome the inertia of leaving things as they are. The effectiveness of responsibilisation varies according to the severity of individual concerns, availability of personal resources, presence and quality of motivation, the amount of guilt present from not doing anything, and individual beliefs and values, amongst other factors. A second process in the translation of CSSP is the establishment of interpersonal relationships. Formation of durable relationships with fellow participants will reduce the likelihood of an individual dropping out of the network. Conversely, the presence of strong friendships may be the reason for a newcomer to join a project in the first instance. In the case of CSSP projects involving pre-existing NWZ or Crime Prevention Committee members, the already-established working relationship amongst individuals may accelerate the first two processes of translation. Under this scenario, an overarching place-based narrative has been well-communicated, and participants know what is expected of them in CSSP. Familiarity with crime prevention technologies and CLPOs would similarly expedite the process. The third process is that of mobilising other citizens in order to allow one to act at a distance. At one level, this could refer to the entire CSSP approach towards safety and security concerns. The many years of NPP policing that helped establish a framework for crime prevention have allowed the current projects to take off by themselves (Personal Interview with Police Historian; see also Chapter 5). At another level, CSSP projects seek to provide enough training for participants on particular safety and security issues, so that when a safety or security breach actually occurs, networked action through space is legitimised, made possible, and rendered a matter of following through the plan of action. The capacities of the network coordinators to act across space are thereby increased. A fourth process involves the reproduction of networks. This is variously achieved

through training, the passing on of best practices and success stories, and the conferring of national awards for 'outstanding' CSSP projects. Replication of success stories has become a recipe for the propagation of CSSP. Successful projects are frequently broadcast and specific mention is made of the need for other grassroots communities to take up a similar project in their neighbourhood. It is here that one can witness a mainstreaming of ideas of what CSSP projects **can** be about.

A brief sketch of CSSP allows us a glimpse of the state authored vision of civic society (see Koh and Ooi 2000). In the opinion of the ruling elite, as opposed to civil society, civic society is legible only through active state intervention. It is possible to speculate that the different *imagineers* of CSSP project networks are largely composed of various state agents. While crime prevention CSSPs are authorised and assisted by NPCs, fire prevention CSSPs are likewise coordinated by the Singapore Civil Defence Force, and the Central Narcotics Bureau organises anti-drug abuse projects. Where GROs take the lead in coordination, one must remember they are not autonomous representatives of grassroots, but rather appendices of the People's Association, a statutory board within the Prime Minister's Office (Mauzy and Milne 2002; Worthington 2003). State agents are thus actively involved in recruiting, connecting, mobilising and reproducing CSSP networks in a way that casts doubt on traditional understandings of community self-help. The paternalist state (Chua 1995) cannot yet adopt a hands-off approach to the self-governance of communities, but still needs to staff its centres of calculation with 'community development officers'[54] (Rose 1999).

Creating New Political Spaces

In the nation-building phase, the government had set non-negotiable boundaries of political expression, under the resolve to maintain racial and religious harmony and to foster national unity amidst the pursuit of economic developmentalist policies. The term 'civic society' was hence conceptualised to reflect the uniqueness of Singaporean society. A civic society is distinct

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[54] This is most visible in the creation of 'community engagement' divisions within various state bureaucracies, responsible for promoting organisational interests through the community.

from the mainstream liberal conception of civil society as an autonomous space for political expression free from the influence of the state and the market. The ruling party conceived of 'civic society' as subordinated to the demands of national security and economic development (Chua 1995). Accordingly, the scope of political debates must be confined within strict boundary markers that are decided upon by the government in the nation's best interests (Koh and Ooi 2000). Civic-consciousness was nonetheless promoted, in accordance with an encouragement of community care and self-help to provide for individuals' primary social safety nets. Beginning from 1990 however, the new political leadership under Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong embarked on a drive to encourage active citizenry (Quah 2010). As the nation opened up its economic borders to embrace globalisation, Singaporeans would increasingly be exposed to external influences in ways that could not be controlled by the state (Kong 1999). The enticement of Singaporeans to regionalise their business operations or to be willing to take up regional job postings should they be made available was counter-posed with the attraction of a new class of foreign talent to jumpstart the knowledge-based economy and a continued reliance upon cheap foreign labour to plug the shortfall of workers needed for the dirty, difficult and dangerous jobs that Singaporeans shunned (Yeoh and Chang 2001; Yeoh 2006). The growth of the Internet also opened up new anonymous spaces for the exchange of ideas within a virtual metropolis. Perhaps most significantly, decades of economic individualism had nurtured citizens who had grown increasingly assertive of their individual rights in ways that simultaneously threatened to weaken the collective spirit (Chua 1995).

Under these circumstances, the government moved towards liberalising controls on political debate within a regulated civic society (Ministry of Home Affairs, 13 April 2009). To convince the public that it was committed towards this, in 2000, the government announced the opening of a Speakers' Corner, modelled after London's Hyde Park, in which political speeches could be made without applications for permit. A few years later, more political space was freed up via the sanctioning without the issuance of permits of indoor political speeches, and the adoption of a dual-track approach towards the registration of societies which exempted certain societies from the need for registration with the police. In 2006, political demonstrations were allowed if

they took place indoors, while two years later, demonstrations were allowed at the Speakers' Corner. This gradual loosening of restrictions was accompanied by a careful policing of the boundaries of political expression. In addition to the maintenance of the out-of-bounds markers, the demarcation of political spaces where speeches and demonstrations could take place consequently created safe spaces for political expression where citizens could rest assured they would not run afoul of the law. The safe spaces were however created through the splitting of forms of political expression into two categories depending on perceived threats to national security. Low-risk topics or societies would not be subjected to registration whilst high-risk counterparts would be subjected to stricter scrutiny. This manoeuvre ostensibly freed up space for political expression whilst channelling more resources towards the surveillance of politically sensitive subjects. This split representation of politics into what can and cannot be freely discussed however creates a paradox whereby political expression is allowed to take root through the denial of legitimacy to particular forms of political expression. In effect, it served to reinforce the illegality of political spaces that were not sanctioned by the law. The actions of political activists within these extra-legal spaces could then be construed as subversive in nature, posing a threat to national security that had to be dealt with judiciously by the police. Meanwhile, the repression and suppression of certain forms of political expression would re-emerge with a cynical vengeance in cyberspace as new forms of online social media proliferated.

9/11 and the Counter-Terrorism Drive

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 generated reverberations throughout many state police forces. In Singapore, the SPF immediately issued a call for calm and normality, even as security measures against terrorism gathered significant traction. Located within a realist national narrative that relied heavily upon the geopolitical muscle of the United States, Singapore quickly became an ardent supporter of its American ally in the 'Global War on Terror', vowing to do her utmost to stem out extremist activities in the region. Despite the obvious ramifications on terrorism of

lending support to an extra-regional Western power leading the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, Iraq and to a different extent Palestine, the Singaporean government opted for an approach to counter-terrorism that played upon the fears of regional insecurity, rather than reflecting on the excesses of its foreign and security policy (Rahim 2009). As counter-terrorism drives gained renewed prominence within the national imagination, the public would be repeatedly warned of the close proximity of terrorism when terrorist plots variously targeting Changi Airport, Yishun MRT station and Orchard Road were uncovered by investigators. In this return to evoking a fear of the invisible Enemy of the State in order to justify the long-held siege mentality of the ruling party, community policing as it was envisioned under the NPC system would be rudely interrupted. The genealogy of community policing has informed us that securitisation did not begin in the aftermath of 9/11; rather it can be traced through the banal methodologies of crime prevention. It is thus important to dissect the relationship between community policing and counter-terrorism more specifically. The following section will attempt to do so, underscoring the fact that the contemporary security climate is not wholly of the police's own doing, and that counter-terrorism did generate tensions within the community policing model.

Prior to engaging the prevailing counter-terrorism discourses, it is fruitful to re-visit the wider historical context. In the aftermath of the Asian financial crises, the myth of the formidable East Asian Tiger had been thoroughly exposed. While Singapore was less exposed to international scrutiny than its fellow East Asian neighbours, the local fall-out was nonetheless considerable (Yeung 2005; Rodan 2006). Economic investments in manufacturing and construction had taken a hit, resulting in more job losses on the ground. The contraction of regional economies produced multiplier effects that rippled through a partially regionally-embedded national economy. With the investment climates of the four Newly Industrialised Economies proving less than fully stable, international capitalists seized the chance to embark on a round of revanchist capitalist expansion led by deeper financial integration. In Singapore, state-owned investment firms would face greater calls for transparency in financial holdings and governance principles (Rodan 2006). Compulsory social savings contributions by employers would be scaled back as a

measure of fiscal austerity. A call for greater productivity translated into more state-subsidised retraining programmes for low-wage earners and the recently retrenched. Broad-scale economic restructuring would be accelerated via the liberalisation of the financial services sector (Yeung 2005) and the creation of economic clusters to reap agglomeration economies (Lee and Tee 2009). A premium would be put on place-based marketing strategies (Yeoh and Chang 2001) that could re-attract consumer spending in the wake of tightening household budgets. As neighbouring economies were similarly engulfed in inter-urban competitions for the anchoring of footloose capital (Harvey 1989), Singapore had to continually restructure its urban landscape to appear as an innovative, creative, exciting and safe place for living, visiting, working and playing (also see Zukin 1995).

The mandate for the police accordingly evolved to target the security climate of consumption. The cultivation of a professionalised image of the police would be of utmost importance in its ability to restore investor confidence in the political and legal stability of the city-state. Image thus conceived no longer refers to the high visibility of neighbourhood patrols in residential 'heartlands', but refers to the publicity of continuously low and falling crime rates, the glossy corporate yearbooks and videos of the SPF whose executive summaries capture its operational readiness and strategic capabilities, and a high level of demonstrated competency in the resolution of high-profile criminal cases. Securing the spaces for consumption also relied upon the banal technologies of crime prevention for targeting the normalised 'petty' crimes of shoplifting and pick-pocketing in retail outlets. The enforcement of the rule of law had already been in place since the 1960s, thus there was to need to turn to an adoption of American-styled broken-windows policing to escalate the scale of criminal threats (Herbert and Brown 2006). Nevertheless, the opening up of the night-time economy to extend the timeframe for consumption presented new challenges to policing (Hobbs et al. 2003), as the promotion of various forms of hedonism and play clashed with a respect for police authority. Efforts at regulation had to transcend the calibration of licensing regulations to grapple with the affective properties of alcohol and night club sociability (Malbon 1999; Latham and McCormack 2004; Jayne et al. 2008). Disorderly behaviours extended beyond the confines of night strips to

encroach upon other criminal spaces of drunk-driving, public rioting and noise pollution, contributing to heavier workloads for NPCOs working the night shift[55]. Beyond coming to grips with changing mass consumption patterns (Chatterton and Hollands 2003), the police had to pay attention to the productive activities of high-powered professionals, managers and executives, who held important posts within the command and control service functions of global cities (Sassen 1991). White-collared financial crime would inevitably accompany a liberalisation of the financial sector, and the police had to build up their expertise in dealing with such criminal offences. The creation of the meetings, incentive travel, conventions and exhibitions economic sector also ushered in hyper-mobile transnational capitalist class (Sklair 2001) whose movements had to be protected. As important impression-bearers of the image of the SPF, much detail had to go into securing the working environments of these esteemed visitors. A secondary effect of the security climate would be the creation of environments conducive for the high consumption lifestyles of these urbane professionals (for a glimpse, see Beaverstock 2002). Within this new climate however, there would be a greater need for police work, and the police were at risk of being overworked.

In the aftermath of 9/11, things would become more complicated. The significance of 9/11 was that it provided a new signal crime for state authorities to deal with (Innes 2003). The publicity given to the attacks on the twin towers in particular could provide a convenient and iconic landmark for easy recall by politicians, academics, policy think-tanks, the police, capitalists and ordinary members of the public alike. The flashing signal of terrorism could provide a legitimate security cover for the pursuit of securitisation strategies by respective ruling elites (Glassman 2007). While this would ostensibly benefit the state police in Singapore, counter-terrorism also significantly re-shaped the work priorities of the police and increased the amount of requisite policing work through its construction of a (in)security continuum (Bigo 2002). Counter-terrorism was of course no mere rhetoric, and mainstream realist geopolitical discourse would be able to rationalise security expenditures to combat the threat of terrorism. Accordingly, the police in Singapore would be given the lead role in securing the domestic Homeland (Walters

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[55] Information gleaned from previous fieldwork for my undergraduate dissertation.

2004), given the criminal nature of terrorism, their investigative expertise, and their established grassroots connections from the days of working the ground under the NPP system of policing. The heightened profile of terrorism allows the police to more easily enrol other state subjects into its surveillance networks, but at the same time, the police must take the lead in coordination efforts due to the gravity of national security[56]. Given that the police do have other pressing concerns at hand, counter-terrorism can only be accorded primary visibility in contingency planning, while the need to perform routine duties remains crucial. The following sections will elaborate upon the evolution of community policing in Singapore through tracing the geographical re-imaginings of a re-securitised state space.

Bordering of Territory-Networks

Terrorism was regarded as a threat to the integrity of classical geopolitical formations in its ability to undermine the legitimacy of the state via guerrilla warfare tactics. In discrediting the state's realist claim to be able to exercise sovereignty over its territory, terrorists were to be considered enemies of the state. The transnational nature of terrorism financing, planning, training and operations also cruelly exposed the weaknesses of the inter-state system in an era of deepening economic globalisation. In reaction to the baiting/attack of terrorists, the Singaporean state sought to maintain its territorial integrity through a re-securitisation of borders. The border served as a pragmatic locus of defence and a symbol of the sanctity of statehood (Andreas 2003), and had to be reaffirmed through various measures of varying visibility. While enhanced physical screenings at land, air and sea checkpoints and militarised patrol of territorial waters and public spaces constituted visible practices of securitisation, they are merely the tip of the iceberg (Bigo 2007). The processes of (re)bordering[57] do not need to be fixed in place, and they often involve the roping in of vigilant mobile bodies to help secure borders (Amoore 2006). Cooperation with foreign states on matters regarding counter-terrorism reinstates the authority of the state. Screenings by airline ticketing staff, visa

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[56] This nevertheless has not reached the state of emergency, when the military would take over command.

[57] I use the term (re)bordering to refer to the continuous process through which borders must be instituted. Bordering certainly did not begin after 9/11, and should not be restricted to the delineation of state spatiality.

application processing officers, employment agents mediating job applications, homeowner-citizens performing rental checks, educational institutions accepting new students, police officers performing routine checks at road blocks, and ordinary members of the public who spot suspicious-looking behaviours help enact the state's borders through processes of social sorting (Lyon 2007). The logic of (re)bordering implies the separation of a safe domestic space from an unsafe external environment (Walters 2004). Amidst an insecure world where flagrant acts of terrorism are being carried out, the creation of safe spaces for dwelling is a pre-requisite for a re-gaining of trust in state institutions, which allows the population to carry on their everyday lives (Amoore 2008). Surveillant technologies like biometric identification, closed-circuit television cameras and metallic scanners are thus championed for their policing capabilities, helping automate the filtering process. Analogous to computer firewalls, (re)bordering technologies need to be constantly updated through security patches, to ensure the state keeps ahead of evolving security threats (Walters 2006). Where security measures grind against the capitalist logic of expediting accumulation, the state reasserts its authority to police its subjects through an extension of the waiting zone (Bigo 2007). State subjects have to submit to the screening of their identification documents by state agents, and this may generate inconveniences amongst consumer-citizens not attuned to waiting. Sometimes the state would invoke another policing strategy to reduce waiting times: that of separating mobile subjects into different lists according to the level of threat posed. Low-risk subjects would be allowed to pass quickly, while the brunt of security checks would befall those deemed 'high-risk'. 'Low-risk' classification may of course require a submission to other forms of labour-saving surveillance technologies administered by the 'petty sovereign' (Butler 2003; Amoore 2006; Sparke 2006). In Singapore, the introduction of biometric passports belonged to this mould.

In turning towards (re)bordering strategies, the police however risked undoing the community engagement work that they had done under the NPP system. For one, more resources would be concentrated on conducting high-visibility, militarised patrols in central areas rather than having neighbourhood foot patrols within peripheral heartlands. More importantly, (re)bordering unambiguously creates a professional distance between the uniformed security

officer and the ordinary member of public. The no-nonsense approach of (re)bordering underscores the risk attached to political acts of terrorism, demanding friendships and other forms of sociality be temporarily put aside for the duration of the security check. This transformation of sociality in addition is likely to extend outwards to encroach upon other forms of police work. Thus a police officer trained in counter-terrorism operations may carry this serious disposition onto the job of routine neighbourhood policing, for instance. Furthermore, (re)bordering creates undue work for border officials[58] through its mandate for stricter screenings of mobile subjects. The lengthening of current duties and the creation of new roles increases the amount of work that needs to be performed by state agents. One could speculate that the additional duties required by (re)bordering precipitated the creation of the post of Community Liaison and Preparedness Officer, dedicated to tend to the traditional concerns of community policing. Under these circumstances, what is likely to transpire is not the proliferation of 'petty sovereigns' (Butler 2003) who are conferred greater unchecked legal powers to decide on the fate of the illegal immigrant, but that of the overworked, overstressed border official who is 'tired all the time'[59]. Ironically, the petty sovereign may precisely be the product of working long and difficult hours, when state agents become easily disgruntled and lethargic from performing under-appreciated repetitive tasks over an extended period of time.

Problems associated with overworking were occasionally publicised when frontline border officials committed security lapses. An exposition into the reasons behind these lapses revealed how workers were prone to operational fatigue within the heightened security climate.

> (The) Question has been raised if the Home Team is over-stretched. The core functions of the Home Team have not changed. But its volume and scope of work have greatly expanded, with increased population, tourist arrivals and more international events which require higher security coverage. We have a smaller Police force per 100,000 population when compared to Hong Kong and New York. But our crime rate per 100,000

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[58] While the frontline police officer's main job scope does not consist of policing immigration offences, he/she has been routinely drilled on the importance of (re)bordering work to the sanctity of the Homeland. Performing additional explicitly counter-terrorism work takes the form of training to detect and defuse bomb threats, participating in contingency exercises, and policing of racial and religious boundaries with greater zeal.
[59] Information gleaned from previous fieldwork for my undergraduate dissertation. This is a common refrain of uniformed officers as their increased workload has reduced the time for rest, leisure and recreation.

population is lower than Hong Kong's and three and a half times less than New York City's. The new security landscape post-911 has raised significant demands on the Home Team. Unlike in the past, Singapore is today a target for terrorist groups. A fundamental question which MHA (Ministry of Home Affairs) is exploring is whether we can continue to operate with the current level of resources. Our Home Team officers at the front-line are stretched and strained over a high alert that started since end of 2001. The total number of overtime hours ICA (Immigration and Checkpoints Authority) ground officers at the checkpoints have to put in every month to cope with the volume of work varies between 23,000 to 28,000 OT (overtime) hours. To consider the impact of this, the Ministry has directed that a human factor study be conducted. The study will look at issues of operational fatigue within the Home Team. The study will also look at resource and manning levels and see if there are sub-optimal areas which need urgent attention. (K. Shanmugam, Second Minister for Home Affairs, 21 July 2008)

Source: Immigration and Checkpoints Authority 2011

Such internal investigations into 'human errors' are symptomatic of the often unintended consequences of (re)bordering, which could adversely impact relations between state agencies and the public.

In addition, the overworking of law enforcement agents also produces a palpable aversion to accepting new tasks, as officers regard the receipt of new work as additional sources of burden which will adversely impact upon their non-work lives. Taken together with the fear of making mistakes that would be magnified within a highly-regimented organisation, officers learn to avoid exposures to new and unfamiliar circumstances[60]. This mode of learning inadvertently risks becoming habituated in ways that would impair the experience of learning in general.

Through its re-scaling of the security framework from one that impresses upon local communities to one that secures the national border, (re)bordering has recalibrated the scale of community policing. As the national community is once again under the spotlight, a switching of emphasis of the referent of 'community' is evident. Community ably functions as a rescaling icon (Paasi 1991) as the nation deftly assumes greater prominence over the neighbourhood. Its fundamental theoretical ambiguity renders it pliable for the operation of rescaling. This was manifest in the transition to an NPC system of policing as well: community was modified from

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[60] Information gleaned from previous fieldwork for my undergraduate dissertation.

being a tool for social cohesion at the local level, to being the intermediary for a responsibilisation of self-help (Rose 1999). In the latest twist, community would be used primarily as a tool for social cohesion along racial and religious lines, alongside a continuation of the self-help programme. Community policing in its various iterations had traditionally coalesced the political objectives of the government with the internal priorities of the SPF. Thus the latest round of politicisation of community necessitated a further tweak in the logic of community policing to better accommodate the national interest. With a more effective governmentalisation of the state in place since the late 1990s, the ruling elite was empowered to operate at a distance more effectively through the state apparatus. Community policing was now tasked to aid the state-led counter-terrorism drive (Personal Interview with Police Historian) by encouraging various forms of vigilant visualities that help sustain the fantasy of the coherent, autonomous subject (Amoore 2007); by conducting contingency exercises to equip the population with emergency preparedness; by encouraging faith-based communities to detect 'radicalised' and 'self-radicalised'[61] individuals amongst their midst and subject them to counselling; and by fostering the establishment of inter-faith dialogues to build bridges over religious divides. These jobs would be shared within the bureaucracy and amongst other state subjects, but the police would nonetheless play an important role in this re-articulation of the social compact.

Perhaps the dominant role played by the police, and which has been alluded to already, is in the re-imagining of state spatiality in the form of networked space. In line with an investigative rationality, the counter-terrorism effort is undergirded by a tracing of networked terrorist cells across national boundaries to suss out the organisational structures of terrorists; the supply chain of chemical, biological, radiological materials that can be used for the construction of explosives; the funding mechanisms for terrorist acts; the pedagogical process of the 'radicalisation' of terrorists; and the proximate social circles of terrorists. Of course, local investigative capabilities will be limited by the lack of territorial powers over foreign jurisdictions, but this intensifies the tracing of the terrorist chain within the domestic space. If

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[61] 'Self-radicalisation' allegedly refers to the process by which individuals learn of extremist ideologies through individual research, largely facilitated by the provision of self-help information on the Internet.

'(t)erritory is not the timeless and solid geographical foundation of state power it sometimes seems, but a porous, provisional, **labour-intensive** and ultimately perishable and non-material product of networked socio-technical practices' (Painter 2010:1116; emphasis my own), the spatialisation of counter-terrorism efforts helps visualise territory as territory-networks, in response to the signal **criminal network** of terrorism (cf. Innes 2003). The police have led the effort to identify possible potential targets of terrorism for protection, such as urban nodes hosting a vast amount of commuter traffic, politically symbolic landmarks, and critical infrastructures that undergird large segments of the national economy. Owners of these key installations would be mandated by law to provide adequate security for their property (Ministry of Home Affairs, 22 January 2007). Attention is also paid to the transportation, storage and sale of materials that can be used as explosive precursors. Early detection of the manufacturing of explosives is critical towards thwarting the plans of terrorists, and proper records of 'high-risk' materials are likewise mandated by law (Ministry of Home Affairs, 22 January 2007). The police have also been alert to the possibility of dual-use materials being utilised for manufacturing explosives and have been put in place measures to plug these security loopholes (Ministry of Home Affairs, 22 January 2007). Separately, a monitoring of extremist websites, foreign travel destinations of individuals and personal online communications is warranted, to identify potential terrorist suspects who have been 'self-radicalised' over the Internet (Ministry of Home Affairs, 22 January 2007). In all of the above policing work, state space is viewed through an investigative rationality that seeks out the expanding networks of threats within the territory. Nodes of networked threats are accordingly targeted for pre-emptive interventions to secure state space through processes of (re)bordering (see also Goede 2008b). Every stage of the terrorist plan of action is closely monitored for evidence of extremist intentions, and national legislation has been refined over the years to prosecute early detections of terrorism[62].

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[62] It is important to note that some of the best pre-emptive legal tools available are nonetheless not those constructed in the aftermath of 9/11; these are instead housed under the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act and the Internal Security Act, both of which are legacies of British colonial rule.

Extension of Policing Powers in Space-Time

In the prevailing political configurations, the terrorism threat and ensuing counter-terrorism drive conferred upon the police new powers and responsibilities. These increased policing powers operate through a complex assemblage that involves a 'plurality of forces circulating through and under the positional sovereignty of the official arbitrating body' (Connolly 2005:145), and is constituted by various instruments of power such as legislative powers, enhanced supervisory checks, surveillance technologies, and discourses of moral values, civic-consciousness and national safety. The increased policing powers in turn had to operate through the actions of state subjects in order for power to be effective. While this extension of power through diffusion may lead to the thinning out of resources, it need not always be so. The productive uses of power enable self-conduct in ways that can reinforce the grip of power (Foucault 1991; Rose 1999). The use of technological aids, such as the speed bump sitting in for a sleeping policeman, not only reduces the need for labour but is capable of fostering an absent presence throughout the networked capillaries of power (Latour and Woolgar 1986). Power extension across territory-networks therefore involves the enrolling of new actors into the security assemblage cultivated by the state. Methodologies of community policing come in handy here, as the police are positioned as leading authority and bestowed the responsibility of serving as *imagineers* of counter-terrorism networks in light of their expertise in criminal investigations and their established grassroots connections through neighbourhood policing.

Firstly, in a revisiting of traditional crime prevention methodologies, vigilant visualities are nurtured through banal security alerts that warn members of the public to report any suspicious-looking behaviours or objects. These are presently primarily manifest in the broadcasts of counter-terrorism videos at all MRT stations in Singapore. The extraordinariness of terrorism needs no further introduction, as popular imaginations of the ticking bomb scenario (Hannah 2006) provide illustrations of the very imminent and proximate threat of terrorism. Acts of terrorism that wreak havoc and cause great destruction are interpellated as egregious crimes against humanity that must be stopped at all costs. But counter-terrorism is

also a matter of personal safety, and once again, this perhaps provides the strongest case to allow the message to resonate deeply with Singaporeans. And lastly, counter-terrorism proscribes opportunities for the (self) 'radicalisation' of individuals, similar to situational crime prevention technologies. Enrolment processes thus draw upon the very same processes used in crime prevention, and in reference to vaguely-worded alerts that target 'suspicious-looking people', the terrorist and the criminal blend into one under the new (in)security continuum (Bigo 2002).

Secondly, counter-terrorism was subtly integrated into the pre-existing framework of CSSPs. In line with the responsibilisation strategies of community policing (Rose 2000), counter-terrorism was to be amongst the initiatives of local communities. In posing an obvious safety and security threat, terrorism fit like a hand into a glove with the governmental objectives of CSSP. It was little surprise then that CSSP projects on crime prevention would frequently draw upon counter-terrorism imagery in justifying their existence (Community Safety and Security Programme 2011). However counter-terrorism also spawned an entirely new, though certainly not novel, template for CSSP. Grouped under the title of emergency preparedness, these projects seek to train civilians in various survival skills to prepare for civil emergencies, such as first-aid safety, evacuation techniques, and having a ready-bag on standby. Youth camps during school holidays to equip the young with resilience became part of projects carried out, whilst Emergency Preparedness Days are regularly held in each constituency. Again, counter-terrorism provides another motivation for the community to mobilise through CSSP, although the outcomes of mobilisation are certainly not restricted to that of counter-terrorism narrowly and conventionally defined.

Following a deeper governmentalisation of the state, counter-terrorism was able to insert itself into the security assemblage. As noted earlier, community engagement projects had now shifted focus towards re-articulating the virtues of inter-racial and inter-religious harmony. Alongside the (re)bordering of state space, social cohesion via multiracialism and multireligiosity was reaffirmed as an important ingredient for national unity (Kong and Yeoh

2003). This was achieved through two strategies: the first targeted individual religious communities in encouraging them to propagate messages of religious tolerance and to stimulate moderate(d) intra-faith dialogues. In this, the ruling party re-visited its platform of multiracialism, which actively compartmentalised different diverse ethnic and religious groups into the well-regulated privatised spheres of civic society. Counter-terrorism was utilised as a resource to re-articulate the dormant 'existential' fears of living in a hostile region, pressing home the message of having to make do with living in an insecure regional environment (Rahim 2009). Multiracialism and multireligiosity tied to meritocracy was trumpeted as having successfully kept communal tensions under control over the decades. With the promised offer of upward social mobility to any individual based on merit and regardless of race, language or religion, the question of understanding how social differences like race and class become embodied by individuals could be sidelined indefinitely by persisting with the abstract *homo economicus* of liberal economic theory. Secondly, the government launched a new initiative to build stronger relations across inter-faith communities via the championing of state-sponsored platforms for inter-faith dialogues. This second strategy made manifest the ruling elites' latent vision for the role that religion would play in Singaporean society. Religious leaders of various stripes were compelled to participate in inter-faith dialogues under the pressures of a normalised counter-terrorism drive which privileged the concept of tolerance as a universal ideal (Zizek 2008). If 9/11 and other horrendous acts of terror were reflective of the impending Huntingtonian clash of civilisations, the government's decision to campaign on a inter-racial and inter-religious harmony platform early on could be vindicated, and it would in fact leverage upon the aggressive behaviours of the West to highlight the levels of civilisation/police (Neocleous 2011) in Singapore. Multiracialism and multireligiosity were also reaffirmed as effective governmental techniques for dealing with undying rumours of the moral backwardness of particular races and religious followers, even when it is the very act of stifling public debates alongside the frequent invocation of racial and religious 'fault lines' which has allowed these rumours to spread (Rahim 2009).

Under these circumstances, the establishment of Community Engagement Programmes (CEPs) in 2006 in response to the revelations of 'self-radicalised' individuals could thus become naturalised. CEPs, as community-level initiatives overseen by five different ministries in-charge of their respective clusters of activities, sought to strengthen community bonds through three thrusts of community engagement: engagement itself, strengthening capabilities, and improving readiness of the population.

> (T)he CEP framework was itself an enlargement of the ***'stakeholder groups'*** involved in the development of communal harmony and emergency preparedness. In the past, these were typically the domain of grassroots organizations at the constituency level, working with the People's Association and the Home Team, in particular the Police and SCDF (Singapore Civil Defence Force). The CEP has broadened this to co-opt new associated groupings or clusters to address and promote the same aims in a nationally coordinated manner. These new groups come under the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Community, Youth and Sports, Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts, and the Ministry of Manpower. However the key to the growth of the CEP over the last 2 years has really been the response from the ground. We recognised early that while Government leadership was important, in order for the CEP to be self-sustaining, it had to be ***meaningful to the people on the ground who are mobilized to respond and participate in it.*** (Wong Kan Seng, Minister for Home Affairs, 03 May 2008; emphasis in original text)
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> Source: Community Engagement Programme 2008

Whilst separated into five clusters of activities, CEPs consist of two main segments: strengthening racial and religious harmony and building up counter-terrorism capabilities. The scripting of CEPs in the language of police operations also highlighted the shift in securitisation priorities within the state. Drawing upon the crime prevention networks that had been established in the 1980s, and which were later used to mobilise participation in CSSPs, CEPs are the latest iteration of community policing where the emphasis is on a responsibilisation of stakeholders to police themselves.

Next, counter-terrorism as a discourse provided fuel for an increased securitisation of the urban environment. The growth of demand for security could no longer be met through the state police and the Commercial and Industrial Security Operations (CISCO) statutory board. As private demand for security services grew both as a result of the legal mandate for the

protection of key installations and in order to secure new spaces of consumption, the private security sector could finally take off. In 2004, the private security market was liberalised with the corporatisation of CISCO and the permitted entry of up to four other private industry players to compete with CISCO for the provision of private security services in Singapore (Ministry of Home Affairs, 15 June 2004). Private security companies would no longer be confined to operate within the legal boundaries of private properties owned by their employer, and thus could be freed up for operations anywhere along the territory-networks of the state. The opening up of a market for private security necessitated close police scrutiny to ensure the extension of policing powers would be well-regulated. An active differentiation of the policing powers of the state police from those of private security firms, now christened Auxiliary Police Forces (APFs), was necessary to define the job scopes for both parties. APFs would not be able to accept any kind of police work, but they could help relieve some of the burdens of policing work from the police themselves. A regulatory regime for APFs was published by the police, and the renewal of APF licences would be dependent upon fulfilment of these criteria (Ministry of Home Affairs, 15 June 2004). In addition, the police would be able to draw upon APFs to provide additional resources during peacetime contingency and crisis situations. Through regulation of APFs, it was hoped the police would themselves be able to govern from a distance, and this was most visible in the outsourcing of 'non-core' policing work to APFs.

However the rise of the private security industry also reflected the move towards tertiarisation of the economy. The growth of private consumption spaces required a concomitant provision of private security (Davis 1990), taking the form of installation of closed-circuit television and alarm systems, provision of security guards and bouncers (Hobbs et al. 2003), institution of a specialised company division devoted to security operations, and communication of various risk profiles (Ericson and Haggerty 1997). Private security was poised to become part of the architecture of the global command and control service functions of global cities (Boyle and Haggerty 2009), and Singapore could not be seen to be lagging behind its regional competitors on this front. In 2007, a review of the private security industry was undertaken to professionalise the sector (Ministry of Home Affairs, 27 August 2007). A sliding scale of policing

duties was drawn up according to the level of skills required for completing each duty, and security firms would be assessed on whether they had met the pre-requisites for the duties they had taken on. As efforts were made to instil greater pride in the jobs of frontline security guards who risked being caricatured as old, slow, overweight and unfit for duty, the employee profile of private security companies was revealed. Alongside the professional managers of unease (Bigo 2002) are a new crop of recently retrenched middle-aged recruits who have likely entered a new job field under extenuating circumstances. A skills training workshop for security guards was thus launched under the National Skills Recognition System to upgrade the productivity of those in the profession and to boost the self-esteem of new recruits.

Finally, an increased participation by the private security sector ushered in greater participation by the private sector-at-large. In lieu of the greater demands for securing their own premises, the private sector was compelled to participate in the formation of Safety and Security Watch Groups (SSWGs). Equivalent to the residential community-focused CSSP, SSWGs rope in industry players to form clusters of security groupings to engage in joint surveillance, tactical hardening and beefing up of building security (Safety and Security Watch Group 2011). Companies submit to a three-tiered process of threat assessment, systems auditing and operations streamlining, to ensure emergency preparedness and business continuity in the aftermath of a crisis. Through this, the 'private sector' now no longer solely refers to companies offering private security services, but also encompasses firms that are not traditionally in the business of selling security. In its enrolment of the private sector within the state's community policing networks, a complex assemblage of government has been enacted through the meshing up of traditionally public and private entities (Connolly 2005). These complex state spaces not only facilitate the sharing of commercial data between data providers, private security firms and the state police in pre-emptive security drives (Lyon 2007) that defer political decision-making in favour of consulting another (Amoore and Goede 2008), but also threaten to undermine previously-consolidated understandings of state power by opening up traditional state policing responsibilities to the rule of market forces.

The addition of more actors to the security assemblage complicates power dynamics. At times, it confers immense power upon the police, for instance during counter-terrorism contingency exercises. It also fosters the cultivation of bridging social capital between state agencies through acts of working together. However the presence of individually-differentiated performance targets limits the level of synergy being generated. And despite the presence of finely-calibrated regulative devices, APFs may be capable of challenging the authority of the police, as both the SPF and APFs may soon find themselves competing within a tighter labour market. With more outsourcing of duties to APFs and other state agencies, the police's oversight of criminal space would be reduced, although this is mitigated by the ability to govern at a distance. Lastly, the multiplication of security roles within the public may reinforce the security doxa within individuals who experience an increased routinisation of security measures in their everyday life (Boyle and Haggerty 2009). The level of general crime prevention awareness and the approachability of police officers within the new security climate however remain empirical questions to be investigated.

Scalar Amplifications of Policing at Mega-Security Events

The threat of terrorism combined with the need for securing spaces of consumption combined to frame the contemporary securitisation target: the mega-event which takes place in cities. As part of a series of prestige events showcasing the vibrancy of a locality, the mega-event becomes a must-have in the latest inter-urban competition (Harvey 1989). The ability to host a marquee event affects the symbolic economy of a locality, which impacts upon place-promoters' ability to hold down footloose capital through both direct and indirect investment (Zukin 1995). The attraction of mega-events is accorded greater significance when these events simultaneously serve as potential anchor points in an era of more widespread transnationalism, helping to instil civic pride and a sense of belonging within citizens (Ho 2009). Mega-events perform an important role in bringing together a critical mass of urbanites to evoke the traditional bright lights of city-dwelling (Benjamin 1973; Schivelbusch 1988; Schlör 1998). The temporary sense of togetherness amidst a multitude of bodies, the encounter with difference,

the marvel at the state of progress, and a delighting of the senses all provide reasons for people to attend these events (though see Yeoh 2004). Recent discourses of urban buzz, creative cities and learning regions highlight the importance of these urban socialities and entertainments in sustaining the job satisfactions and quality of life of urban professionals. Localisation of mega-events thus possesses certain knock-on effects on the migration patterns of highly-qualified workers (Kong 1999; Yeoh and Chang 2001; Yeoh 2006).

The security of mega-events hence becomes an utmost priority; security extends beyond basic security to include the security of a distinctive quality of life (Bourdieu 1984). Under this new security climate, the provision of basic security is almost taken-for-granted, as the emphasis is on staging ambient security (Loader 2006) to stimulate high consumption[63]. An ambient security that plays upon the obsessive-compulsive desire for sussing out the bits and pieces of perceived disorder is grafted onto a representation of choreographed order to assure the viewer that everything is under control (Boyle and Haggerty 2009). This tendency is highlighted as mega-events are increasingly fashioned for televisual consumption through the mass media.

At the site of the event, the threat of terrorism assumes a spectral presence within the highly-securitised sphere of consumption, through the lingering fear of reprisal attacks by those who have been excluded from lapping up the finer comforts of life. Terrorism's proximate threat, manifest so acutely in the ticking bomb scenario (Hannah 2006), may or may not be real. But it continues to issue a warning signal that the terrorist-at-large retains the ability to undermine **basic**, often taken-for-granted security, especially at high-profile mega-events. For the professionals of security control, the significance accorded to counter-terrorism in various discourses has permitted them to be judged on their success at pre-emption of and response to terrorist acts. Any observed negligence or worse, exposed failings will be scrutinised without mercy within the current security climate (Singapore Police Force 2004). The adage that 'prevention is better than cure' is therefore applied to the security professionals themselves in the governmentality of unease (Bigo 2002). In the new security climate, the promise of ambient

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[63] The distinction between basic and ambient security reflects the rise of accumulation strategies that expand upon the meanings of security in order to provide solutions for them.

security exacerbates failures to provide basic security (Loader 2006). But ambient security is simultaneously something more and less than basic security. Ambient security's insistence on image management for the viewing pleasure of its 'live' audience, for similar pleasures of consumption on the television screen and for capture and playback on the screens of the multiple recording devices in the hands of the crowd focuses the security gaze back onto the (re)presentation of security operations itself. Under the glare of the spotlight, security professionals have to pay attention to the smallest of details which might be picked up by the synopticon diagram (Mathiesen 1997). But there always remains a risk that a focus on representation may detract from the actual provision of security itself, especially the security of those who cannot afford to be present at these spectacles. As proliferations of meanings of security abound, slippages between the signifier, signified and referent objects of 'security' are obscured. The logic of security can become most elusive when it is most pervasive. Meanwhile, the coupling of ambient security with the target mega-event of securitisation ushers in a new paradigm for security operations. When threat assessments and their concomitant security operations are increasingly geared towards the topology of the mega-event, the practice of securitisation becomes focused on protecting all reasonably-scaled conceivable sources of insecurity from unfolding at the event.

Since the 1990s, Singapore has increasingly targeted the meetings, incentive travel, conventions and exhibitions sector as a worthy economic pursuit to showcase the city's urban infrastructure, generate greater tourism receipts, and cultivate civic pride amongst residents, whilst sustaining an economic niche within the services industry. These have brought in amongst other things, the International Olympic Committee's convening session to select the 2012 Summer games host, a joint summit of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank leaders, various Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation leaders' conferences, the inaugural Formula One night race and subsequent editions, the Asian Youth Olympics and the inaugural Youth Olympic Games. Besides these profiled events, there exist a slew of arts and cultural events and annualised celebration of festivities of increasing scale, such as Chinese New Year *Chingay* parades, the National Day Parade, and the New Year's Eve countdown. Within the SPF, officers

have been called up to perform security duties at events with increasing frequency in the past decade[64] (see also Chapter 5). The task of providing security coverage at an event is no longer a rare obligation, nor is it something similar in scale to securing the events of yesteryear where the provision of ambient security had not yet taken hold. An education of attention of police officers towards the mega-event has thus become the norm, in which topological folding represents the new spatial imaginary: a collapsing of sociality onto the space-time coordinates of the mega-event. The new topological imaginary has necessarily been propagated to a wider public to seek their cooperation in securing public events. This ranges from efforts at creating awareness of threats, to those that promote an appreciation of officers' securitisation efforts, and encouraging submission to and participation in security measures. While there are certainly limits to the extent of securitisation, such as manpower constraints, the need to avoid over-inconveniencing consumers, or even the unintended terrorising of consumers, community policing as performative of frequent communications with the public helps mitigate these shortcomings (see Ericson and Haggerty 1997). The topology of the security event is thus generative of more spaces of (in)security. And as the framing of self-same threat assessments has indicated that the profile of an event is a guide to the level of security threats to be expected[65], this self-same logic of threat assessments and the secrecy behind intelligence work are also productive of further spaces of (in)security (Paglen 2010).

Recombinant Policing in Response to Fluid Threats

Security at mega-events brings together different police departments under the banner of operationalising a specific function: securing the event. Mega-events are thus special because the scale of mobilisation allows more innovative experimentations with different security components, either out of necessity or flowing from greater autonomy (Boyle and Haggerty 2009). However in Singapore the situation is more of a frequent hosting of events of all scales from the regular grassroots functions that install a Member of Parliament as the guest-of-

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[64] Information gleaned from previous fieldwork for my undergraduate dissertation.
[65] The assumption goes that as a great amount of effort is put into carrying out terrorist acts, premeditated attacks tend to target landmark events to broaden the mediated impact of actions.

honour to the singular Youth Olympic Games and the annual Formula One night race. The presence of a critical mass of mega-events then normalises the mega-event, and provides firmer security architecture for hosting smaller-scale events. The frequent creation and dissolution of security communities responsible for working together for an event has resulted in a fluid space for the mobilisation of policing work. Community policing acquires a new meaning when public, private and non-governmental stakeholders are regularly called upon to provide security coverage at an event[66]. This could be in the form of hotel staff cross-checking guest lists with those of police alerts, to chauffeurs of limousines trained in defensive driving and emergency security operations, to logistics personnel liaising with police to provide the required equipment for operations, and event planners coordinating with the police on everything from the security detail of escorts to the celebratory dinners that bring the curtains down on a successful security performance. The personal contribution to securitisation socialises participants with the nuts and bolts of security operations in ways that re-work urban landscapes internationally. This familiarisation with the security assemblage goes beyond what Boyle and Haggerty refer to as a doxa of security, which 'reinforces the taken-for-granted sense that such measures are required, that they do not unduly infringe upon personal liberties, that certain dangers are pervasive – and more pressing than other risks – and that the existing constellation of security interests is inevitable' (2009:270). For direct participation in the act of securing an event confers varying degrees of self-identification with the project, increasing support for efforts to make it succeed. Where one's livelihood is at stake, security work becomes a contract to be won, not a slight inconvenience to be tolerated or a backdrop for greater consumption to occur. The priority becomes putting up a world-class performance of event security, to ensure one will be invited back for future projects. Security is enacted through the recombinant formations of project teams charged with handling various dimensions of event security. The fluidity of project work provides opportunities for individuals to get acquainted with police working procedures in ways that would have been inconceivable in the early 1980s, when the tough law enforcement image of the police held sway (Akbur

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[66] Information gleaned from previous fieldwork for my undergraduate dissertation.

2002). Knowledge of and contacts with the police have become the key ingredients for effective participation in the private security sector.

In addition to the securitisation of events, recombinant policing is also present in the formation of CSSP project teams. The technique of fostering community self-governance is primed for its networked flexibility in responding to evolving localised threats. GROs and CLPOs form working partnerships with various organisations and individuals to facilitate different types of policing work, such as crime prevention, anti-drug abuse or counter-terrorism. Recombinant policing techniques are also applied to the conduct of more frequent contingency exercises as part of the counter-terrorism drive (Singapore Police Force 2010). These exercises differ in scale but routinely involve security professionals from different agencies working together to respond to a simulated terrorist attack. Contingency plans are put into practice during the exercise, which helps to identify knowledge gaps, weakest links, black swans (Taleb 2008) and regulatory oversights for future improvements to the plans.

Recombinant strategies hence reflect the growing demands of learning within a knowledge-based economy. To push the boundaries of what is known and knowable and to anticipate future security threats, the police have set up epistemic learning communities around particular future-oriented tasks (Singapore Police Force 2008). An epistemic community is to be differentiated from the ordinary task force set up to look into a spate of crimes, and from the normal planning units that comprise fixed team members, in that it is 'purposefully organised to unleash creative energy around specific exploratory projects...the high level of independence of individual participants, together with their distributed contact networks, yield collaborative practices that spill over organisational boundaries' (Amin and Roberts 2008:361). Creative learning has become prioritised within the police as a tool to keep ahead of evolving security threats to a late-modern economy that thrives on flexible accumulation. Where risk management used to be a dominant security paradigm (c.f. Ericson and Haggerty 1997), most visibly in the distribution of crime risk surveys to households and companies and the formation

of CSSP plans of action, the uncertainty of the threat now permeates imaginative contingency planning (Goede 2008).

The exact genealogical formulation of uncertainty remains unclear, but this last section has attempted to sketch out the links between counter-terrorism, the bordering of territory-networks, the liberalisation of private police forces, the rise of the mega-event, and the formation of security project teams in fulfilling the work of policing a late-modern economy increasingly (con)fronted by consumption practices. Counter-terrorism provides a convenient discourse that undergirds the expansion of an (in)security continuum (Bigo 2002). The increased police work required of the police and the private sector eventually led to a liberalisation of the private security sector. This subsequently resulted in a greater evocation of ambient security (Loader 2006) that allowed a further commodification of security. Thinking up novel securitisation strategies becomes the new norm in a world-economy that relies heavily on the private sector for securing the multiple spaces of consumption. Within these newly re-bordered spaces, policing powers no longer reside within the state police's authority, but are disseminated through fluid spaces of community policing to become a significant part of the arsenal of capitalist strategies.

CHAPTER FOUR: *CRIME WATCH* – COMMUNITY POLICING AND POPULAR CULTURE

A crevice within academic theorisations on policing is noticeable. It lies at the intersection of community policing and representations of crime and the police in the media. Despite the plethora of scholarly writings on the topic of community policing, very little information has been generated on how popular cultural representations are constituted by, and help constitute, community policing. If community policing as a discourse needed to be diffused and translated to ordinary members of the public, it had to rely upon the mass media to reach out to a wide audience. The media, as many scholars have noted, plays an important role in the architecture of modernity, giving form and function to how communities are performed (e.g. Anderson 1983; Thompson 1995). And if community policing concerns the cultivation of communities of particular natures by the police, the media becomes a cherished institution for the communication of discourses (Ericson and Haggerty 1997). A primary objective of utilising the media would be to engage the masses in police work. Through the mass media, it is hoped the public would be more amenable to heeding the lawful instructions of the authorities, and in the process, help constitute communities of particular natures (Creed 2006).

Crime Watch

The idea of *Crime Watch* was conceived when two senior police officers from the Criminal Investigation Department learnt of the successes of *Crimestoppers* in the United States and Canada and *Crime Watch* in Hong Kong. These police-sponsored televisual productions were broadcasted on free-to-air public television networks in the respective countries with the aim of seeking public assistance in the solving of criminal cases with little or no leads. Buoyed by the popularity of these foreign programmes and needing to secure the help of the public in the prevention and solving of crimes, the leadership of the SPF actively pursued the option of starting a local variant of *Crime Watch* in Singapore.

Crime Watch did not mark the first act of cooperation between the police and the state-owned media, as previous collaborations included Mandarin drama serials covering the police

occupation to different extents, such as *First Step* (1980), depicting training in the police academy; *Seletar Robbery* (1982), highlighting police efforts at solving a major crime; and *CID* (1983), showcasing the in-house operations of the specialist detective unit. However it was historic in signifying the first police-led production that would continue through to the present-day. As a docu-drama, *Crime Watch*'s modus operandi would typically comprise the following: (a) sourcing of crimes for featuring in the next episode; (b) scripting for filming; (c) filming on scene (no sets were used); (d) post-production work involving stitching, editing and sound-editing; (e) internal reviewing; (f) re-editing work including narrating and sound-mixing; (g) external screen tests; (h) actual broadcasting on national TV; (i) manning the *Crime Watch* hotline to receive and act upon tip-offs; and (j) collating data on viewership figures for the episode screened in different languages[67]. The above elements would together constitute a production cycle, and responsibilities are split for the various tasks. While the police would handle the decision-making on the portrayal of crimes, criminals and the police in each episode, the state-owned media, currently christened Mediacorp Studios, would be in charge of script-writing, providing the film crew and conducting post-production work. To complete the roster, external (i.e. non-police) governmental officials would occasionally be involved in preview screenings, external ratings agencies like Forbes Research and AC Nielsen are responsible for providing timely statistics on viewers' demography, and funding is provided for by the National Crime Prevention Council, a Voluntary Welfare Organisation that draws upon donations by the Singapore Totalisator Board[68] to fund its crime prevention campaigns, in which *Crime Watch* is frequently the headlining act (Sim 2011). Jobs are further sub-divided within each institution, but this dissertation concerns itself with the role of the police within the production cycle.

The first section of this chapter deals with the evolving materiality of the texts of *Crime Watch*, while the second half explores how *Crime Watch* is embedded in various forms of production and consumption.

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[67] *Crime Watch* originally started off with just English and Mandarin broadcasts in 1986. This widened to include Malay (2000) and Tamil (2001) versions over time. Other non-English language broadcasts draw upon the same video footages as those originally used for the English version, but are hosted by different presenters and have their videos dubbed accordingly.
[68] The Singapore Totalisator Board is the state body that has a monopoly on providing legalised betting services in Singapore.

Opening Moves

For *Crime Watch*[69], a resident coordinator for the programme within the SPF is assigned the task of selecting and framing the crimes for portrayal on the small screen. Helmed by a presenter[70] from the Police, Crime Watch typically consists of two to three segments of the following: (a) public appeal for information; (b) crime prevention education; and (c) re-enactment of solved crimes. The first few iterations of the 20-odd minute[71] docu-drama focused exclusively on public appeal and crime prevention. Typically, a re-construction of an unsolved case would be staged by a motley cast of former and currently-serving police officers supplemented by semi-professional actors supplied by Mediacorp, and this would be followed by an emotive appeal for eye-witnesses to contact the police non-emergency line with the assurance that all identities of tipsters would be kept strictly confidential. Crime prevention segments featured basic crime prevention advisories on what were identified as the five main preventable crimes in residential areas: robbery in homes, theft of and from vehicles, snatch theft, outrage of modesty and housebreaking. These segments would be composed of a mixture of a short-length re-enactment of solved or unsolved crimes, advisories given by the on-screen presenter, interviews with members of partner organisations on crime prevention, and presentation slides highlighting crime prevention mnemonics in bullet-point form. In the beginning, a clear emphasis was placed on nudging reluctant informants to provide the police with intelligence on criminal occurrences. This ostensible reluctance stemmed from several factors, two of which are distilled below.

Firstly, rapid urbanisation under the aegis of modernist planning principles had meant a large-scale resettlement of local residents into high-rise public housing constructed by the Housing and Development Board since the early 1960s. This resetting of the scale of planning overrode

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[69] Further mentions to 'Crime Watch' in this chapter will no longer be italicised.

[70] Initially, Crime Watch started off with no on-screen presenters and with only a voiceover. This however soon changed to include as many as 3 on-screen presenters, boasting a mixture of police officers and civilians, with the voiceover for re-enactments retained. By 1994, a revamped version saw only 2 on-screen presenters (1 uniformed officer and 1 civilian) and the voiceover, while by 2003, only 1 presenter, a uniformed officer, was accompanied by the voiceover.

[71] The length of an episode is 30 minutes, but the actual docu-drama is only 20-odd minutes long thanks to advertisements.

previous attachments to place, in favour of the henceforth naturalised scale of the nation-city-state. Where place attachments were reconstructed around the imported and re-worked concept of new towns, themselves to be sub-divided into further categorisations of neighbourhoods, precincts, flats, storeys and units, alienation of residents was more than a distinct possibility that had to be guarded against. The territorialisation of Neighbourhood Police Posts under the project of community policing was thus tasked with building a community where none was thought to have existed previously. In the opinion of the political elites, the construction of the 'heartlands' needed to be undergirded by a stronger sense of communal identifications, to soften the hard edges of high modernist living (for examples see Mauzy and Milne 2002; Kong and Yeoh 2003; R. Goh 2005; Jacobs and Cairns 2008). For the police, community building was a crucial first step towards reducing the professional distance that separated them from the population they served (Quah and Quah 1987; Skolnick and Bayley 1988). In order for a localised population to recognise its membership of a community, it had to first be willing to be involved in the affairs of the community by performing the simplest of tasks: that of reporting a crime and providing information on the incidences of crime. While crime rates spotted a decrease entering the 1980s, there was still a concern that the populace was insufficiently involved in policing crime (Quah and Quah 1987; Singapore Police Force 1996). The charge of indifference was levied against the population in the pilot episode of Crime Watch (Epi01/1986).

A 20-year old Chinese out on a romantic date was abruptly, brutally and fatally physically assaulted by a group of youths at a public area next to the void deck of a public housing flat. Despite the occurrence of the crime at the coordinates of public and prime-time visuality, no witnesses had yet come forward to provide the police with workable leads on the case. This public passivity necessitated steps taken by the police to re-trace the footsteps of the victim on screen. The producers opted for a realistic reconstruction of the scenes leading up to the commission of crime, detailing with disturbing realism how a romantic landscape was fractured and transformed into a landscape of death in the space of a night. The re-enactment ended with a cut to a real-life interview with the victims' grieving parents who emotively appeal on behalf of the police for eye-witnesses to come forward. The civic outrage at witnessing this

public inaction subsequently translated to several calls to the police hotline following the broadcast of the pilot, which eventually led to the arrests of the culprits. This episode provided not only a glimpse of the potential investigative successes of an extended run of Crime Watch, but also provided a window of understanding to the authorities on the need for civic engagement. Additionally, it supplied the basic framework for the reconstruction of unsolved cases, which would be re-used for the remainder of the first phase of Crime Watch.

Besides the need to prevent alienation, the police were eager to reach out to the public to assuage any lingering concerns they might have with standing up to secret societies. As several scholars have noted, the presence of secret societies has had a profound impact on the image of the SPF in the post-independence years (Turnbull 1989; Akbur 2002; Ganapathy and Lian 2002). Betrothed to a colonial legacy of clan-based immigrant societies taking care of their own communities, the postcolonial state had to grapple with the unyielding members of societies who refused to be fully incorporated into the modern rule of law. The police, armed with the governmental stick of legislation, waged intensive battles with non-compliant members of secret societies, most prominently through the passing of a tightened Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1958 that allowed the police to detain suspected members of secret societies indefinitely for questioning. While the 1960s were remembered for the heightened state of insecurity, evidenced by a spate of high-profile kidnappings and robberies involving gangs, the unrelenting march of economic modernisation catapulted by the postcolonial exigencies of nation-building facilitated a progressive fragmentation of secret societies whilst dwindling their sources of support. By the 1970s, the police were confident enough to declare the diminished threat of secret societies (Akbur 2002), having rendered them into a near-liminal mode of existence. Secret societies assumed an ambiguous position within the state's high modernist project[72], largely neutralised of significant risks, but retaining an undying presence within the psyche of the population in ways that require constant repression (Ganapathy and Lian 2002).

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[72] Ganapathy and Lian (2002) in fact distinguish between well-established Chinese secret societies and newly-formed street corner gangs, claiming that the objective of preventing street corner gangs from gaining a foothold in the criminal underworld is actually to ensure the police are able to preserve and protect the symbiotic relationship that they have historically established with the more institutionalised Chinese secret societies.

On occasions when the latent subconscious surfaced in the materiality of extraordinarily violent crimes like those depicted in the Crime Watch pilot, the public had to be assured of their physical protection by the state, in order to coax them into providing useful intelligence to the police.

Visualising the Crime-Fighter Persona

From 1989 onwards, Crime Watch began to spot a new third segment: 'Police in Action'. This would feature re-enactments of crimes successfully solved by the police, with the aims of demonstrating police professionalism at work. The production process would be nearly identical to that of the unsolved crimes segment, featuring police officers as part of the cast. However a notable difference was that officers were now mostly called to play themselves on-screen, since the depiction of successfully solved crimes was deemed to be beneficial to the morale of the investigators involved. Asking officers to play themselves was an act of recognition for their valued contributions to the force, and reduced the likelihoods of misrepresentations of officers in action. This move towards securing the image of the police also came in the wake of concerns that the police were being portrayed as insufficiently robust law enforcers on Crime Watch (Personal Interview with Crime Watch Coordinator). Within the new political economic order, public imaging became of crucial significance to corporatised state organs, and the police would be seen as the harbingers of institutionalised image management.

Rob Mawby's work (2002) on the London Metropolitan Police remains one of the few empirical studies on how the police have increasingly sought to professionalise their image through enhanced public relations efforts. The motivations for this exercise were situated at the nexus of a reaction to the negative publicity of the police in the wake of inner-city racial riots, an animated politicisation of the police by the Thatcher government, the globalisation of the communications industry, and leadership strategies within the police. Mawby argues that the policing of images is essential towards the cultivation of institutional legitimacy by the police, defined according to Beetham's (1991) criteria of legal validity, shared values and expressed consent. In this highly mediated world, 'there is a need for the police to communicate

effectively and to construct and communicate an image appropriate to their role, as one aspect of the legitimation process'. Pre-empting the scepticism of critics, he goes on, '(i)t is also crucial for legitimacy that there is a concern not simply with appearance or with the "strategic manipulation of impressions" (Goffman 1959:90), but with substance, aligning image management with transparency and accountability' (Mawby 2002:72). Alas, much as he has extensively recorded empirical data on how the police have gradually implemented institutional changes in response to the new public service delivery model that focuses on service quality and image work, Mawby's account is emblematic of the new police management studies[73]. His emphasis on promoting a legitimacy framework for international police forces causes him to lose the critical distance needed to interpret broader societal trends. Thus he can only provide a list of management strategies for professionalised image management, whilst avoiding any ethical considerations with an encouragement of police forces to mobilise the 'structures of feeling' (Williams 1975) embedded within local populations, and playing down the fact that images are ably appropriated by individuals in different ways. And crucially, he never elaborates upon the work of the police through its location in relation to other forms of regulatory work, thereby missing out on a chance to investigate the social embeddedness of police work. This ascribed detachment of police work serves to consolidate the sovereignty of the visual, which becomes complexly bound up with the emergence of state sovereignty (Amoore 2007).

Conversely, it may be more productive to situate these presentational strategies as part of the move towards corporatisation of the state. Despite their authority as agents of law enforcement, the police are not exempted from the broader processes of economic restructuring that instil fiscal discipline upon the state through various neoliberal strategies. State institutions are re-shaped in the image of private corporations as they are taught to cast their attention towards organisational management strategies. Image management constitutes a part of this new repertoire of skills for effective communication, where effectiveness is not premised on lofty ideals of legitimacy, transparency, accountability or democracy, but rather on

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[73] This detour to consider Mawby's work is nonetheless important, for the author remains influential within policing studies, and this book has undoubtedly helped legitimise the move towards professional image management by police forces. The salience of his work is revealed in my dissertation fieldwork when I was looking up past issues of force magazines, and most poignantly in my personal interview with a police historian.

the ability to mobilise relevant stakeholders to conduct their lives in a manner that is conducive to the furtherance of organisational interests.

In the opening sequences of each episode in the first phase of Crime Watch, scenes from a call operations centre is interspersed with shots taken from a fast response car patrolling the streets, as male frontline officers are seen communicating expediently with female call operators (Epi01/1986). This professionalised image of the cordial police family is used to frame the seamlessness of computerised communications, highlighting the twinned objectives of image and informational management, even whilst reaffirming the contemporaneous gendered division of labour. The implementation of the non-emergency/ Crime Watch police hotline in anticipation of the premiere of Crime Watch is hence a means of establishing a further point of contact with the public. The flow of information through this hotline is most likely to be unidirectional from the public to the police, but it nonetheless satisfies the conditions required of the programme: of activating the member of public to take responsibility as a witness by producing a cathartic sensation through the act of reporting; and of generating more information on criminal activities. Even when an individual was not a police officer, one could do his/her part in the fight against crime.

Organisational learning (Senge et al. 1994) did not stop at receiving tip-offs on the whereabouts of suspects. The popularity of the docu-drama alerted the police to the potential of Crime Watch as a non-costly labour recruitment tool. In its upholding of the integrity of the law and characterisation of officers as bound by a strong moral compass, Crime Watch clearly resonated with popular sentiments and its perpetuation as a public engagement tool was thus secured despite vigorous cost-cutting initiatives being instituted throughout the police organisation from 1986 (Akbur 2002). That year witnessed the government mandating manpower cuts within the Civil Service in response to the economic downturn (Quah 2010). The SPF faced the dilemma of needing to follow through its roadmap for rolling out Neighbourhood Police Posts, a labour-intensive endeavour, whilst facing a manpower shortage (Singh 2000). Added to these woes was the increasingly tight labour market that meant competition for senior and junior police officers would be stiff (Coe and Kelly 2000). Keen to retain and attract candidates of a

high calibre, recruitment drives had to be scaled up. Crime Watch's image needed to be burnished through favourable depictions of officers on-the-job. Against this backdrop, the police needed to be represented not just as moral guardians dishing out crime prevention information, but also as capable and effective crime-solvers who achieved great job satisfaction. While the moral distinction between the police and the criminal had to remain clearly demarcated to facilitate easy identification with the right side of society, crime-fighting was to be seen as an intellectually-stimulating, physically and mentally adventurous job which was not dangerous to the extent that it became life-threatening. With economic prospects brightening again in the early 1990s, more resources could be devoted towards Crime Watch through an increased frequency of broadcasts (Singapore Police Force 1996). Two trends were soon observable: an increased focus on police procedures and a shift in plotlines of re-enactments towards the point of view of the police.

In 1993, Crime Watch's frequency of broadcast began to be normalised. Prior to this, viewers were often left in suspense at the end of each episode, as to when the next one would follow. In moving first to a bimonthly, then a monthly release schedule by the end of 1994, the docu-drama began to assume the regular periodicity that characterises its week-day daytime cousin: the soap. Feminist audience studies have taken pleasure with analysing the viewership dynamics of the soap, a genre often derided for its lack of artistic merit, incoherent content, debasement of cultural values and inculcation of passive femininities. The soap may thus be perceived to lie at the heart of the frustration with popular culture. Contrary to the democratisation of ideals promised by the broadening of the television medium, it is feared the public will become reduced to impressionable masses susceptible to the political machinations of media producers. The soap opera is after all defined by an excessive plot structure, a lack of narrative progress, and an indulgence in a fictional ideal-type White bourgeois family life, which together tend to produce an overwhelming sense of frustration for the viewer and viewer-critic. Feminist scholars have nonetheless remain undeterred by the mainstream critical reception, peering into the life-worlds of those who consume soaps with the hope of finding out how these viewing pleasures can be incorporated in more progressive ways (Modleski 1979).

It would appear rather odd to compare Crime Watch with the traditional soap when one considers how Crime Watch is often associated with promoting the masculine crime-fighter persona, especially following the 1989 revamp. In its preference for the conventional closed narrative, action-oriented drama with little dialogue, and a prime-time weekend monthly broadcast[74], Crime Watch appears to be the antithesis of the soap. However Crime Watch is precisely the alter-ego of the soap, in its routinisation of the crime docu-drama[75] to blend into the landscapes of popular culture in Singapore. The appeal for public feedback by the authorities, the dissemination of morally-singed information, and the promotion of heroic forefathers of the nation have become ubiquitous in modern-day Singapore, thanks in no small measure to the pioneering efforts of Crime Watch. The alter-ego as a literary trope is used to conjure up split personalities whose interpretations are only legible in the diametrically opposing relationship between the two[76]. In contrast to the soap's targeted audience of the long-suffering housewife, Crime Watch is the glamorous front of the Singapore Civil Service. The long-standing career public servant who participates in the formal economy to earn the breadwinner's wage is **not** the target audience for the show, but rather, the targeted producer given the responsibility for framing a positive but realistic portrayal of the work lives of highly-efficient frontline bureaucrats[77].

The crime-fighter persona thus reproduces the dominant set of gender relations espoused by the patriarchal state (e.gs. Graham 1995; Salaff 2004; Yeoh 2006; Yeoh and Huang 2010), legitimising the adoption of a disembodied masculine gaze constantly on the look-out for weak feminine nationals targeted for protection. In contradistinction to the passive roles of homemakers and social reproducers in the background, the crime-fighter is assured, confident and outspoken, stoutly taking charge of public affairs through the demonstration of head

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[74] This has varied over time: Crime Watch used to be shown on prime-time television in the middle of the week. Currently, different language broadcasts are scheduled at different prime-time slots to avoid inundating many free-to-air channels at one go. At present, the English, Chinese and Malay broadcasts are on the weekends, while the Tamil broadcast is on the following Monday night.

[75] The docu-drama is of course, itself a hybrid genre which gives the lie to the purity of genres (Derrida 1980).

[76] Splitting the ego into two halves is necessarily a painful process that requires a repression of the absent other.

[77] Although police officers may sometimes be represented in the attire of an Investigating Officer (polo-tee or long-sleeved office shirt and work pants), their uniformed status is never in doubt, as evident in their wearing of conservatively-coloured office attire, sporting of identification tags and carrying of investigation notebooks.

knowledge of legal doctrines and procedures. A mastery of any given situation is complete with the co-presence of physically-toned bodies suited in finely-polished and highly-decorated uniforms. As good crime-fighters are able to detect and solve crimes through the ability to command the respect and obedience of legal subjects, a lack of deference to the authority of uniformed officers, itself earned through the exceptional sacrifices rendered in public service, is likely to be viewed with much displeasure from the wounded ego (see McConville and Shepherd 1992; Waddington 1999; Reiner 2000). Motivated by a masculine drive and a heroic courage to succeed that leaves no stone unturned in the pursuit of justice, crime-fighting dismisses alternative concerns which may clash with its investigative rationality. Founded upon a routine devaluation of feminised traits, the crime-fighter persona abrades attempts to pursue progressive objectives, such as being able to empathise with and care for those at the receiving end of domestic abuse (Ganapathy 2006)[78].

Given the government's high modernist hierarchicalisation of its Civil Service (Worthington 2003), it would not be far off to subjugate the rest of the public administration to the model of the police. The police are only representing themselves on-screen in part because their quasi-military[79] attire and gear help put a gloss on advertisements for the public sector. More importantly, as a pre-eminent disciplinary institution, police institutions provide both a metaphorical (Foucault 1991) and literal[80] training ground for the cultivation of disciplinary

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[78] Crime-fighting tends to presume the presence of readily identifiable characters in any criminal incident. The roles of offender, victim, witness, alibi, accomplice and kingpin feed into a strong investigative rationality that may come up short when faced with crimes of a serendipitous nature, victimless crimes, or systemic crimes against a particular category of social difference.

[79] As opposed to the full-fledged military fatigue, the quasi-military uniform of the police is distinctly civilised in orientation, and serves as the organisational badge of the police in urban settings. Police officers are also regarded as a disciplined lot, whose daily work nonetheless keeps them in touch with the day-to-day affairs of ordinary civilians.

[80] Police National Service was formally established in 1975, providing a channel for males to fulfill their National Service obligations. While many authors have speculated on the links between the higher ranks of the military, the state bureaucracy, and the ruling party (e.g. Worthington 2003; Barr and Trocki 2008), much has been left unsaid about the socialisation of ordinary citizens within the spaces of military institutions. In addition, the attention paid to the military has to a certain extent slighted the role of the police in disciplining a large swathe of the population.

statecraft[81]. Under these circumstances, the police can stand-in for other state agencies that are tasked with regulating the conduct of the populace.

The banalisation of Crime Watch texts hence gathered tempo with its monthly periodisation[82], casting it into the taken-for-granted backdrop of national TV and sanctioning its circulation within the popular imaginations of Singaporeans.

The Police Procedural

Crime Watch started off its broadcast with a faithful reconstruction of unsolved cases that included a near real-time re-enactment of the scenes leading up to and immediately following the commission of the crime. In its later phases, the increasing emphasis placed upon representing police professionalism resulted not only in the introduction of a police-in-action segment, but also in a re-calibration of the frames of the docu-drama. Given the show's fixed half-hour format, the increased prominence of police action was accompanied by a reduced visibility for the appeals segment. The inevitable outcome was thus one of re-centering the role of the police in criminal affairs. The solved-crimes segment would typically begin with the discovery and reporting of the crime, pass into the realm of police investigations, leading to the climatic apprehension of the prime suspect. An interrogation of the suspect would then re-affirm the investigative work done by the police, whilst filling in the gaps of the criminal plot. Finally, a judgement will be passed on the criminal, putting an end to the perversion of justice and signalling the return to a safe normalcy. The superimposition of a real-life mug shot of the criminal atop the actor portraying the latter satisfies the viewer's desire to discover how the 'deviant' other really looks like (Jermyn 2003), whilst serving to remind viewers of the authenticity of Crime Watch texts. In outlining this stereotypical story arc, the producers of

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[81] Note for instance that many contemporary state regulatory agencies were originally set up with the help of police officers. Non-police regulatory authorities have increased over the years, partly in response to the need to purify the sphere of work done by the police. Examples of enforcement activities performed by other state bodies include the enforcement of environmental hygienic standards by the National Environment Agency, parking enforcement by the Land Transport Authority, and prevention of animal cruelty by the Agri-Food and Veterinary Authority. The police were amongst the pioneers of community engagement within the postcolonial nation, at a time when other state agencies were not keen on civic engagement.

[82] Crime Watch now airs 10 times each year through monthly broadcasts from March to December.

Crime Watch aspire to emulate the long lineage of detective dramas with a '*whodunit*' theme (Leishman and Mason 2003; Mason 2003; Carrabine 2008).

Nonetheless the short duration allocated for each segment means the audience does not have the luxury of time to ruminate through the details of the crime. Instead, the audience is briskly led along the investigations process by the safe and secure hands of the Investigating Officer and his team. There are many chances for the police to showcase their expertise: these range from the mundane details of producing tamper-proof warrant cards when approaching the public for information, to the roundtable conference where officers form special task forces to tackle insidious crime trends and share intelligence on case files, and the fitness for duty demonstrated in the successful stake-out, pursuit and apprehension of fugitive suspects. The quickened pace of drama however distinguishes Crime Watch from its traditional Western counterparts. Viewers are never allowed to linger on to interact and connect with the police family, and each episode presents different investigative teams to the public. Action also takes place against the backdrop of a well-regulated urban environment, in which chase sequences, unarmed combat, man-hunts and reconnaissance missions assume a constricted form that results in the expeditious arrest of the suspect over a heightened dramatisation of machismo. Dialogue in turn lacks much emotional imagination, often reduced to an instrumental fare where communication is conceived of in terms of putting across the rationality of investigations. Through these stylistic devices, Crime Watch displaces any potential emotional identification with the police in favour of maintaining the uniform(ity) of professionalism that officers are obliged to don, in the discharge of their responsibilities without fear or favour .

To differentiate the cop from the robber in order to facilitate identification with the former, the representation of the offender is often skewed towards the trope of the caricature. Ugly physical features, mentally unwell states, despotic but naïve criminal intentions and guilt-induced panicky behaviour are classic stock traits of the offender[83]. Where offenders are in cahoots with others, the relationship is depicted instrumentally, devoid of any emotional ambivalence. Offenders frequently engage in duplicitous behaviours such as lying,

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[83] An exception is when the criminals being portrayed are con artists or confidence tricksters, in which case they may be dressed more smartly and appear more presentable

backstabbing, betrayal of accomplices and in-fighting. They are also desocialised from their ecological environment, reduced to a mechanistic role of carrying out the crime. While the first phase of Crime Watch witnessed a realistic portrayal of crimes, it created an unintended risk whereby audiences could identify with offenders transgressing the boundaries of the law through performances of ordinary actions. On the flip side, producers have claimed that the realistic portrayal of offenders on screen blurs fact with fiction to such an extent that several elderly viewers believed the televisual footage to be real and mistook the actor for the actual offender (Singapore Police Force 1996)! Such moral ambiguities were hence stamped out by the framing of the stereotypical villain, a monstrosity of a creature who carried out heinous crimes against the innocent unflinchingly, and whose life of crime would eventually be put to an end by the overarching arms of legal justice. Wringed of linguistic dialects, Crime Watch now spots criminals who speak near-perfect English, issue recycled threats to victims, and confess to crimes like they were a bad party joke. In the re-centering of the police on Crime Watch, the element of criminality and its associated thrills of transgression (Ferrell et al. 2008) are defused and diffused, rendering a distinctly unrealistic, negative stereotype of the criminal[84]. This is perhaps most aptly illustrated by the fact that while police officers are called upon to play themselves on screen, offenders and their immediate friends and relatives are now strictly forbidden from partaking in any role on Crime Watch[85] (Personal Interview with Crime Watch Coordinator). The sterile operating environment of Crime Watch thus helps constitute the urban landscape of Singapore within popular culture as highly-functionalistic, orderly and sanitised (Kong and Yeoh 2003).

Nonetheless, there are times when an attempt is made to explain the criminogenic behaviour of the offender. On these occasions, the motivations for chronic criminality are put forward in simplistic formulations that tie in with a crime prevention message, such as the need to avoid dabbling in pornography and or risking addiction to gambling, or the dangers of dropping out of

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[84] Stereotyping of the criminal has resulted in the stigmatisation of criminals in Singapore. Such is the staying power of the stigma that the Singapore Prisons Service had to be compelled to initiate several rehabilitative projects in an explicit attempt to re-integrate ex-offenders back into society. Such projects however continue to be pitted against long-running genre staples like Crime Watch.
[85] In the past, Crime Watch relied upon police officers to play the roles of villains as well.

school and joining street corner societies. The stage is set for a moral guardian from the force to issue another well-timed crime advisory.

Preventing Crime

Crime prevention first gathered a significant institutional form in Singapore in 1977, with the establishment of the Crime Prevention Branch within the SPF (Akbur 2002). The unit was tasked with identifying crime risks and recommending remedial and precautionary measures to guard against crime. While the move towards crime prevention was reflective of British trends in administrative criminology (see Clarke 1980), the SPF itself invested much resource into the endeavour from the standpoint that it would be more efficient to prevent crime than to respond to it (Quah 1994; Sim 2011). The branch was elevated to a division in 1981, reflecting its contemporary salience. That same year, a separate independent body, the National Crime Prevention Council was established (Sim 2011). The objective of crime prevention began to be actively decentralised within the police in the decade from 1983 onwards, with the formal pursuit of community policing via the construction of neighbourhood police posts (NPP) (Quah and Quah 1987). The NPP became a mouthpiece of crime prevention, as residents of the neighbourhood were treated to house visits by police officers. NPP officers seized the opportunity to establish contact points with the population, impart crime prevention information to residences, and carry out crime risk surveys within households. The NPP itself became a mini-hub for the dissemination of crime prevention information, hosting the display of posters, pamphlets and videos, alongside the provision of a service counter to be manned by officers throughout the day. Against the backdrop of the rolling out of NPPs, Crime Watch hit the airwaves providing a more efficient option in the communication of crime prevention information.

From the first phase of Crime Watch, a crime prevention segment was already in place, forming an impressionable mould for subsequent episodes. As mentioned earlier, Crime Watch at its inception immediately targeted the residential population through its triangulation of the five preventable crimes within residential neighbourhoods (Singapore Police Force 1996). The televisual medium provided a warrant-free entry into the private space of homes (Jermyn 2003)

in a way that also did not require the hassle of making the rounds for house visits. Crime prevention segments started off initially sandwiched between two reconstructions of unsolved cases, occupying the middle frame of a 30-minute broadcast. Its location within each episode thus helps the transition between two story arcs[86]. In fact each reconstruction is frequently accompanied by related crime prevention information directly prior to commencement and immediately following the conclusion of a story, while stylistic forebodings and moralised warnings on crime litter its content. The central role of crime prevention is accordingly highlighted: much as the police have staked their reputation on the ability to solve the high-profiled crimes broadcast to the public, crime prevention still provides the basic premise and organising principle of Crime Watch.

The first phase of the crime prevention segment was characterised by two consecutive enactments of preventable crimes, in which the first scenario would illustrate a successful criminal operation, while the second would identify the ways in which the criminal operation could have been foiled by adopting adequate crime prevention measures. In 1993, this didactic approach towards crime prevention was replaced by a single enactment of what should have been a preventable crime, followed by the customary issuing of a crime prevention advisory by the show's presenter, interspersed with footages of personal interviews with the victim of the crime, presentation slides on mnemonic crime prevention information, and further advisories given by an executive member of the National Crime Prevention Council or a senior officer from the force. As the stock of preventable crimes became heard like a well-worn cliché, Crime Watch moved towards an expanded crime prevention segment titled 'Public Education'. In this, traditional preventable crimes are back under the spotlight in response to worrying crime trends. The latter's presence serves to justify the repeated admonitions by the police presenter of Crime Watch. However the moralised warnings issued by the bespectacled man/woman of the law can easily (col)lapse into the popular motif of the nagging mother/ mother-in-law in

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[86] One may also speculate that another reason for locating the crime prevention segment in the middle is to reduce the likelihood of disinterested viewers switching channels or turning off the TV during this less entertaining portion.

popular culture[87], when the lack of ingenuity reproduces the all-too-familial crime prevention rhetoric over the decades. The professional make-up of the presenter and his compatriots can scarcely conceal the staid crime prevention messages that are being propagated by the internationally-renowned 'nanny state'[88]. The lack of emotional engagement in re-enactments is not helped by didactic crime prevention messages, which while promoting a cognitive awareness of crime prevention, simultaneously facilitate a re-appropriation of intended meanings by the alert, sceptical viewer. Perhaps in response to this the public education segment frequently turns to other authorities[89] to moralise wayward citizens.

In conjunction with a rise in popularity of the techniques of the police procedural, Crime Watch has turned to the expertise of science and technology (Latour and Woolgar 1986) to augment its viewership. If re-enactments of solved cases were unclear in their procedural objectives, the public education segment makes it explicit what is valued. The latest technological gear of the police is routinely exhibited to project the image of a modernising force that draws upon sophisticated weaponry in the battle against crime. Technology does not merely serve as a labour-saving device or a human prosthesis, but is called upon to buttress the scientific rationality of investigations and to re-assert the objectivity of knowledge claims that 'the truth will out' (Valier 2004). Detection technologies were publicised in the areas of traffic management (the speed camera; 'smart' traffic lights; the breathalyser), uncovering of counterfeited state documents (magnifying devices; ultraviolet lighting; holographic imaging), customs inspection (police dogs; x-ray scanners; chemical testing), and intellectual property rights enforcement (bar code scanning; certification craft; microchip tagging). These were accompanied by the promotion of specialist units within the force, whereby lesser-known units or newly minted units are highlighted as elite task forces set up to combat special crimes. The professional standing of the police is attributable to their high levels of proficiency on criminal

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[87] A central storyline of most Chinese and Malay drama serials in Singapore revolves around the tension between the wife and mother-in-law (Chua 2004).

[88] According to some commentators (e.g. Tan 2001), the dominant brand of conservative national politics has resulted in the feminisation of the public sphere, burdening it with the duties of social reproduction, of which crime prevention is but one.

[89] A recent trend has been to rope in *Mediacorp* celebrities to present special crime prevention segments. Celebrities have of course been doing their part for the police for decades, in the form of guest-appearances in Crime Prevention roadshows and by starring in police-themed dramas.

matters, illustrated through various literary tropes. Casual mentions of technical (including legal) jargons litter dialogues, allusions to extensive training, performances of tactical awareness, depictions of astute practices of intelligence-gathering, exposés of the modus operandi of criminals, invocations of myriad classificatory regimes and consistent framing of the confident, composed disposition of the presenter together help secure the scene of professional crime-fighting from ordinary members of the public. Aspiring crime-fighters and civic-minded citizens are thus reminded of the professional distance that separates them and dilettantes from professionals, with the only legitimate way to pursue a career of adrenaline-pumping, crime-busting action being to join the SPF as a police officer.

Academic disciplines are also increasingly used to corroborate the truth claims of Crime Watch. Two particular fields of study are important for these claims, the first of which is forensics. Following the revamp of Crime Watch in 1994, the series has popularised the image of the fingerprint as the harbinger of non-falsifiable biometric identifiers. It has become perfunctory for the opening credits of Crime Watch to allocate to the fingerprint prominent spots within the montage of sequences. Within the showcase of investigative procedures, the dusting of fingerprints has become a priority from the mid-1990s, and proud mention is made of the force's centralised computerised fingerprint database that is gradually being realigned with regional and international standards of processing. The emergence of the forensics laboratory within narratives also took place from this period, with investigators turning to the medical verdicts of forensic pathologists and state coroners for help in solving highly-publicised murder cases. Scholars have commented upon the perceptible changes to the criminal justice system in the wake of what has been dubbed 'The CSI Effect' (Byers and Johnson 2009). When the physical evidence carries a judicial weight equivalent to the Truth, it is capable of overriding traditional expert opinion of the medico-psychiatric-criminological rehabilitative institutions, the testimonies of eye-witnesses, and the arguments of legal representatives alike. Nonetheless it is prudent to recall that the CSI effect may in fact be yet another iteration of the long lineage of media effects studies which purport unproblematically to link on-screen representations to the behaviour of audiences. It may therefore be more fruitful to trace the historical context of production and re-production, as well as the motives of proponents of these media effects

studies. In the case of Crime Watch, evidence is fetishised to the extent that it complements the professional integrity of police officers, who are depicted as team members tirelessly working the evidence trail, and to the extent that the publicity of detection technologies is believed to provide an effective deterrence to potential offenders, a claim which needs detailed examination.

In addition to forensics, a second discipline increasingly represented on Crime Watch from 1994 onwards is psychology. The latter's claim to fame is its alleged ability to explain the deviant behaviours of criminals, whilst providing psychological counselling to victims of crime. Psychologists have been called upon to provide expertise on matters ranging from why drivers speed, why youths join street corner societies and gangs and consume banned drugs, why persons become addicted to pornography, to why victims of rape and molestation do not come forward to report those crimes, why the elderly in particular fall prey to confidence tricksters, and why many incidents of domestic abuse remain silenced. This wide-ranging job description is performed through personal interviews with psychologists that are fitted within a segment on crime trends, locating the tool of academe under the command of the police. Framed as such on Crime Watch, the status of the psychologist in effect becomes reduced to the **generic** expert, as he/she becomes a mere mouthpiece of the crime prevention machine, propagating sound bites that are either already scripted or made to fit the plotlines of the segment. It is through this that we can understand how victims of rape are encouraged to place top priority on reporting the crime to the police rather than indulging in self-pity or denial, or how it is not 'cool ' to take drugs or join gangs because your friends are doing it.

Crime Watch actively psychologises viewers on the right behaviour to adopt with regards to crime as a victim, perpetrator, present eye-witness or non-present televisual witness. If the first phase of Crime Watch was mainly targeted at building up rapport with the public and at soliciting information on crimes, by the late 1990s it had started to move towards an activation of contacts to perform a greater degree of self-policing, without abandoning the traditional crime prevention goals. The latter function remains important, because it emphasises the constant need to reiterate basic crime prevention advisories not only in accordance with

changing generational dynamics, but also because advisories have increasingly fallen on deaf ears over the years. An image of the recalcitrant child refusing to heed well-intentioned parental teachings can come to mind (see Yao 2007), leading the presenter of Crime Watch, the maternal voice in contradistinction to the paternalistic field of action, to continually harp on issues of yesteryear when preventable crimes are simply not being prevented. Crime prevention advices for particular preventable crimes have thus acquired a certain longevity over the decades. Juxtaposing the list of prevention measures for a particular crime over time would reveal that it has largely remained the same (see Chapter 3). Hence while there are attempts to move forward with greater responsibilisation of the population, basic crime prevention cannot be cast off yet. Finally, it is worth noting that in lieu of the police-centric representations of crime prevention, what Crime Watch reveals is the psyche of the police and those of its future recruits. Crime Watch's impoverished depiction of criminogenic behaviour also unnecessarily restricts the imagination of police officers when they are handling real-life criminals. Rather than inviting potentially useful debates on criminogenic influences within contemporary society, its caricature of the criminal reproduces stereotypes that limit critical thinking through the re-assertion of an unchallenged claim to criminal expertise.

Entertaining the Senses

Crime Watch's greatest claim to fame undoubtedly pertains to its ability to entertain. From the pilot episode to the most recent broadcast, Crime Watch has consistently raked in strong viewership numbers. It is the desire to watch Crime Watch for various gratifications that drives viewers to tune in to the programme. With the move towards greater professionalism by the SPF in the 1990s, Mediacorp Studios had to keep abreast of changes in the entertainment industry in order to keep its client satisfied. Entertainment has thus far been shown to be scripted to nourish a masculine crime-fighter ego that burnished the reputation of the state-producer[90]. Alongside careful management of the police's on-screen persona, Crime Watch

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[90] The ability of state-producers to be entertained by watching a video of the finished production is carefully considered in a later section. For now, generic traits are identified.

underwent a series of experimental changes[91] in its post-production techniques to better accommodate an increasingly corporatised police force, and to continue to be able to attract audiences. Opening credits were gradually modified to inject a greater pace into the montage of scenes at the start of each broadcast. Technologies of policing were routinely upgraded to reflect the latest developments in the field. More diverse footages of differently geared police units in action were showcased, highlighting the various elements of the Home Team[92] working together in concert to protect Singapore. The switch to digitised fonts accompanied by slick keyboard typing tones helped impress upon the viewer the embrace of new digital media by the police.

The dual-presenter studio recording format of the 1990s, in which a female civilian celebrity was paired with a male police officer, soon gave way to a single-presenter format. A lone male or female uniformed presenter was recruited to engage the audience directly, and he/she was moved out of the studio into public places for the shoot. The presenter would no longer be seen seated snugly within a studio, but would take to public housing estates, shopping malls, public transportation hubs, community centres and the front counters of different police departments to deliver his/her anchoring statements in front of cameras. He/she would be standing to address the public and subtle on-screen movements in the way of hand signals, small paces and slight bodily gestures help ingratiate the audience into the filming world of re-enactments. This rationalisation of presentation thereby simplifies the direction of communication with the audience. In contrast to being a third party to conversations between presenters, the audience is explicitly interpellated as a subject of the state bearing certain privileges and responsibilities. Crime Watch thus helps to extend the power of the police and the state in its latest installment.

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[91] This was perhaps most obvious in the experiment with an extended opening credits from 2000-2002. The original jarring, hard-hitting soundtrack was elaborated upon with soft melodic tunes featuring the humming of a female vocalist, in what could be construed as an attempt to capture the sentimental aspects of policing. This format was soon abandoned in favour of the original shorter version.

[92] Since 1997, the 'Home Team' groups together the different departments under the Ministry of Home Affairs. The creation of the Home Team concept aims to harness greater synergy amongst the various departments.

A greater application of professionalised editing techniques graced the new Crime Watch. Overlaying of film footage with close-up shots, still images of photo evidence, screen-shots of electronic devices, interviews with key witnesses, and CCTV videos gives a thicker texture to individual episodes, increasing their textual complexity. Contemporary videos are an amalgamation of different layers of footage, diverging sharply from the early episodes of Crime Watch which were composed by fewer, continuous, long production takes. The multiply-sourced layers refract the multi-mediated representational techniques which have been harnessed by the police to detect criminal spaces. The compilation of layers serves to document a celebratory mosaic of the everyday life of police officers in policing criminality through utilising different investigative technologies and police procedures. In the process, the rich geographical imaginaries of the investigation trail are also stitched together for viewing pleasure. As investigators piece together the crime-puzzle, the viewer is encouraged to broaden his geographical imaginations through tracing the social biographies of everyday objects (Watts 1999). A section of masking tape used for wrapping up a corpse is traced to its place of origins, a luggage tag found in the dustbin links to a receipt of purchase for the luggage, and stolen jewellery passes through the deposit boxes of pawnshops before being put up for resale. Through more sophisticated techniques of post-production, Crime Watch is able to better convey the interconnections in the evidence chain. Additionally, the filmic technique of montage has been increasingly applied in re-enactments. The sequencing of montages accelerates the pace of action through a compression of the investigation chain, whilst emphasising the perseverance of officers who kept on going[93] until justice was served. Experimentation with split frames allows the viewer to get a sense of the simultaneity of action and the urgency of resolving a criminal investigation. Finally, the improved technical ability to mix different sounds, filmic speeds and vantage point shots together provide a richer repertoire of technologies for the mobilisation of affects[94].

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[93] The montage is most often used in illustrating the comprehensive, exhausting process of interviewing witnesses and passers-by for information related to a crime. Multiple responses are lined up one after another in quick succession as a reply to the posing of an opening question by the investigating officer.

[94] Perhaps the most prominent use of enhanced post-production editing technologies lies in the stitching together of footages to produce the trailer for Crime Watch. Aired approximately a week before the scheduled broadcast of

A notable shift in the format of each episode marked the increased emphasis being placed on entertaining audiences. From a distinct three-segment programmatic format that stabilised the iterations of future episodes in the decade of 1995-2004, from 2005 onwards, Crime Watch began experimenting with different formats that included: (i) lengthening the police-in-action segment to cover the air-time of two normal segments; (ii) including two separate or partially related public education segments; and (iii) diminution of the public assistance segment through its submergence under a police-in-action segment or a public education segment, or its complete removal from an episode. Hence, there has been a greater fluidity in the structure of each episode, with the overall effect being the prioritisation of the police-in-action segment, at the expense of the public assistance agenda. The trend appears to have been stabilised in 2011, when Crime Watch has ostensibly settled on a new routine of having just two segments: (i) an extended police-in-action segment that spans the first two parts of each episode; and (ii) a single public education segment that occupies the final third of each episode. The new format has the advantage of situating the re-enactment of a solved crime over a commercial break, allowing producers to serve up a mini-cliffhanger in between a story arc. The re-enactment is thus dramatically reinforced through the provision of longer air-time and the heightening of tension over the commercial break.

Despite the change in programmatic format and the constitution of craft through an advancement of post-production technologies, it is important to avoid overgeneralisations. Common to textual analyses, it is important to recognise the partial, overdetermined process by which textual meaning is produced and reproduced (Bhabha 1994). There exist many spaces for alternative meanings to be gleaned from each text, which may provide a reading that is contrary to the wishes of the docu-drama's producers. Ambiguities can persist despite the increased attention to image-making. For instance, the production process still remains distinct from post-production work. The hiring of in-house talent and semi-professional actors as cast for Crime Watch poses a certain limit to the level of acting competency and consistency. Post-production editing strikes against a ceiling in its attempts to brush off the blemishes of acting.

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each episode, the trailer has made use of dramatised representations to greater effect in creating awareness and enticing viewers to tune in.

Conversely, the use of technologies like slow-motion replays and point-of-view shots may enlarge the glare of substandard acting performances, while creating ambiguities in the plot. Similarly, the commercial break may disrupt the atmosphere of a re-enactment, induce unnecessary plot extensions that dilute the coherence of content, and provide an opportunity for restless viewers to channel their attention elsewhere. The diffusion of texts is accompanied by uneven geographies of translation.

Since 2010, the Crime Watch coordinator has actively uploaded past Crime Watch episodes online to allow casual and repeated viewings. This buttresses informal attempts to upload Crime Watch videos, and creates a nascent online archive for the most recent seasons of Crime Watch. The high number of views for the more popular videos underscores Crime Watch's popularity, while highlighting certain features of its entertainment value. Its utility as a community engagement tool stems from its short length of film (and the ability to bypass advertisements), its amateurish acting coupled with professionalised post-production packaging, its location within the genre of crime faction, its accessible plotlines and its publicity on popular online social media platforms. These factors confer Crime Watch a strategic position from which to reach out to entertainment-seeking online users who are short on time, like multi-tasking, watch videos on-the-move, and are looking for interactive experiences. With an increased online circulation, Crime Watch is primed to expand its presence within the national imagination. Nonetheless whether this will lead to a cannibalisation of TV viewership remains a moot point.

Encouraging Public Spiritedness

With the new NPC system of community policing moving centre stage from 1997 onwards, Crime Watch was quick to publicise NPCs as the new one-stop policing centres that improves on service quality to the police's customers (Epi03/1997). This re-framing of the relationship between the police and its localised community to take the form of a service provider-customer contract not only reflected the increasing corporatisation of the force, but also mandated an ability to govern at a distance. Having grown out of the NPP system and re-centralised resources at the NPC-level, the police sought to imbue a greater civic-consciousness in ordinary

members of the public. This was in line with the thinking of neo-communitarians within the political leadership of Singapore, who actively sought to instil proper shared 'Asian' values within the population from 1990 onwards (Chua 1995). The institutionalisation of Shared Values provided much pedagogic resources from which Singaporeans were reminded of the importance of 'community above self', as a counterpoint to the liberal individualism and moral decadence of the West (Yao 2007). If the 1980s was a period for building up communities within localised neighbourhoods, the 1990s saw a progressive move towards the responsibilisation of communities. Crime Watch highlighted some features of what this meant in practice.

Beginning from 1999, regular appeals for public-spiritedness became a feature of Crime Watch[95]. In these cases, public-assisted arrests were often highlighted through re-enactments, either as part of a solved crime segment or the public education segment. Members of the public were praised for their vigilance in serving as the eyes and ears of the police through such means as keeping a look-out for suspicious-looking people and objects, noting down the unique features of suspected or veritable criminals, assisting the police in the apprehension of a suspect, or even making a lawful Citizen's Arrest. Official commendations were frequently bestowed upon those who successfully contributed to an arrest, with awardees praised for embodying the traits of good state subjects. The roles of ordinary members of the public were however circumscribed by lectures on what the latter ought to do or not to do if he/she bears witness to a crime in progress (Epi09/2000), with the guiding principles being: the imperative of avoiding risks that would endanger the life of an individual; the exigency of responding quickly through thinking on one's feet; and the duty of reporting all known information to the police without fail. Through this, the fine line between vigilance and vigilantism was demarcated (Greenberg 2005), with the police asserting tight control over the state's monopoly on violence. The ultimate authority over criminal matters was to lie with the police, and members of the public could only engage in crime-busting to the degree that they were sanctioned by the

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[95] One must note that the publicity of 'public spiritedness' did not begin in 1999 on Crime Watch, but rather can be traced to as early as 1988, when the Minister for Home Affairs decided to give out an annual award for Public Spiritedness to members of the public who had helped the police detect and solve crimes.

police. Public-spiritedness then appears largely as a prosthetic limb of the state policing apparatus incapable of producing revolutionary transformations on humanity (Dittmer 2007).

The notion of public-assisted arrests is moreover of considerable interest for this thesis. Not only does it inform us of the methods through which a culture of consulting is instituted (Amoore 2008), but it also serves as a primary statistical indicator for measuring the effectiveness of community policing, and is used to calibrate future investments in the project. From the early 1990s, the police have prided themselves for successfully engaging the community through collation of empirical data on assists (e.g. Singapore Police Force 1992). The statisticisation of assistance figures confers a scientific credibility to otherwise anecdotal evidence, whilst providing a publicisable sound bite against the backdrop of secret intelligence work. In addition, the crime statistic facilitates comparative analysis over space and time, by way of an inter-city (i.e. foreign), inter-divisional (domestic), and inter-temporal periodic cross-examination of similarly-derived statistics. Naturally, the comparison of such statistics abstracts from the sociocultural contexts of their genesis, rendering many such statistical comparisons of little analytical utility. However the value of these comparative imaginaries lies in their consolidation of communal boundaries between local neighbourhood precincts, regional land divisions, and international cities in a nestled hierarchy of scale that reifies the territorial integrity of the nation-state. The logic of community policing then does not merely work upon a localised population within a given territory to garner compliance, but rather stretches across differently-scaled borders to communicate with other practitioners of community policing on best practices learnt from previous experiments with the community policing project (see Ericson and Haggerty 1997). In the process of communication with both professional law enforcement agents and the ordinary public, the popular geopolitical imagination is re-worked to confer different statuses to various communities. For instance, it is through the dissemination of the *Koban*-style of community policing that Japanese communities, very simplistically defined, have garnered a reputation for their 'internal solidarity' and 'civic-mindedness'[96]. The attribution of solidaristic unity confers upon community leaders an 'expert'

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[96] One can observe certain similarities in mainstream international media coverage of the grassroots-led response to the tsunami that devastated the north-eastern region of Japan last year.

status on the subject of community policing, which legitimises their ability to serve as advisers and consultants to aspiring community builders elsewhere (see Mitchell 2002). This nonetheless has the effect of whitewashing internal differences that exist among members of the said community (Young 1990) alongside absolving the state of its responsibilities as a regulator-provider of security (see Milligan and Conradson 2006; Staeheli 2008).

The discursive power of community policing thus rests with its ability to craft boundaries of enclosure to facilitate normalisation of the interior. Both procedures need to work together seamlessly for the project of community building to succeed. In the pursuit of public-spiritedness, Crime Watch has crafted an impression of the criminal lurking at every corner waiting for an opportunity to strike; the failure of crime prevention would be a considerable damage to or loss of property and/or limb. The protection of one's property and life from the criminal Other was the target of the earliest phase of crime prevention, as a new nation of property-owners had to be taught the adequate measures for securing their valuables. Where self-preservation had been largely successful, there was however an inherent danger in the retreat to passive, individualistic spheres of security (Bauman 2001). Alongside the continual provision of basic crime prevention information to those who had not yet heeded the message or had forgotten about it, the next batch of crime prevention advisories therefore moved towards a responsibilisation of the public to do their part in keeping the nation safe and secure. The boundaries of localised residential and commercial communities were consolidated and counter-posed against the criminal Other in the outreach to normalise a greater degree of self-community policing that would ease the burdens on a re-centering, corporatising police force. In the aftermath of 9/11 and the excavation of 'home-grown' terrorist cells, responsibilisation strategies took on a more serious note with the amplification of the terrorist threat over and above, but also simultaneously alongside conventional criminal threats. Self-community policing began underscoring the fragility of the self as a constituent part of the proximate, racial, religious and national community, and sought to mobilise vigilant visualities of the consumer-citizen to uncover hidden terrorist trails (Amoore 2007). In this iteration, crime prevention was overlaid with counter-terrorism in a complex assemblage that required the combined participation of the public and private sectors (Connolly 2005).

The New Security Climate?

In the decade following 9/11, Crime Watch stayed true to its crime prevention message by not shifting its focus to counter-terrorism. This was clear in the manner that Crime Watch did not make any explicit references to counter-terrorism activities or devote any public education segments to promoting greater awareness of counter-terrorism efforts in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Where first mention was made of counter-terrorism, it was to publicise the introduction of the Police Mass Rapid Transit Unit in 2005, and then as part of preparations for hosting a mega-event in 2006, when the public was given a glimpse of security preparations for the upcoming International Monetary Fund/ World Bank Board of Directors meet in Singapore[97]. Subsequent episodes continue this trend, only citing terrorism threats in the publicity of security operations for a mega-event, for warning against setting off false alarms or bomb hoaxes, or for profiling newly established police units that respectively deal with explosives and the protection of transportation hubs. The intention of Crime Watch producers then, was to avoid creating unnecessary panic amongst the population and to maintain public confidence in the police, even whilst physical security measures were clearly being beefed up in reality. On Crime Watch, this would be most visible in re-enactments involving the use of CCTVs.

In the 1990s, CCTVs did not feature prominently as part of the technological arsenal of the police. Where CCTVs were mentioned, they were composed as an ordinary part of the investigative procedure. Their presence was not to be taken for granted, as the considerable cost of installing and maintaining a CCTV would be rather unpractical from the point of view of the average property owner in Singapore (Sim 2011). The high cost of installing a CCTV was compounded by the poor quality of images recorded on cameras. The result was the occasional use of CCTV images in the appeal for public assistance with an unsolved case. The provision of grainy, black-and-white images captured on CCTVs provided little support for the adoption of the technology, and could be even construed as an attempt to pardon official inability to solve a case. From 2006 however, there has been a significant increase in the quantity and quality of

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[97] Quite appropriately, the National Crime Prevention Council adopted counter-terrorism as one of its strategic thrust only in 2006 (Sim 2011).

mentions of CCTVs on Crime Watch. CCTVs gradually emerged as reliable sources for detection during investigations, providing image and video playbacks of recorded scenes with greater clarity, although the resolution of images could occasionally still be problematic. The proliferation of CCTVs occurred in convenience stores, public housing estate lifts, common corridors or units targeted by loan 'sharks', transportation hubs, shopping centres and schools amongst other places, adding on to pre-existing cameras in banks, Automated Teller Machines, condominiums, jewellery shops and pawn shops. As detection technologies, they were roped in to detect not just crime, but all sorts of observable phenomena such as floodwater levels, fire outbreaks, traffic bottlenecks and human traffic conditions (see Haggerty 2006). Simultaneously, this produced a greater record of **latent** historical spaces that could be drawn upon to aid criminal investigations. By 2009, a solved crime segment could thus feature four sets of CCTV recordings, comprising those obtained from a condominium, a watch retailer, a supermarket, and an MRT station (Epi06/2009). The movement of the culprit within and between places was pieced together by investigators through the help of the CCTV trail. And in 2011, Crime Watch videos were shot using CCTV cameras, re-creating high-definitional historical space where vaguer images had existed previously (Epi07/2011). The creative use of CCTV cameras is rendered legible only through a banalisation of the technology. Concordantly, CCTVs now make regular appearances on Crime Watch, and it would not be uncommon to feature them in both segments of the newly streamlined programmes. The ubiquitous CCTV has become normalised to an extent that it appears as common sense when the police list the installation of CCTVs as a recommended crime prevention measure (Epi07/2011).

This short exposition into the re-enactments of counter-terrorism efforts on Crime Watch demonstrates that counter-terrorism drives occupied a more nuanced position within the post-9/11 period. Counter-terrorism did not simply move to the top of the security agenda, even within the state police. The banal work of crime prevention had to be continued, and this would be layered with counter-terrorism messages in ways that further complicate the security landscape. In the case of Singapore, the police were wary of stoking unnecessary anxieties within a populace which was already reeling from the effects of an economic recession (Quah 2010) and which would soon be battling the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome virus in early

2003 (Teo et al. 2008). Having an anxious and paranoid population would be counter-productive to a plan for economic resilience (see Amoore 2008). Instead of accurately spotting suspicious looking devices and people, the public might report bomb hoaxes which are a drain on police resources, or they might soon suffer from vigilance fatigue, letting their guard down. Securitisation was nevertheless certainly not mere rhetoric. The proliferation of CCTVs leading to its normalisation within the popular imagination points to hidden manoeuvres behind the scenes to strengthen the (imaginative) security architecture in more or less permanent ways (see Amoore and Goede 2008). The installation of CCTVs may have been justified under a variety of reasons of which counter-terrorism would form only a component, but regardless of the rationale it would likely require a greater amount of effort to remove them once they were in place.

Subtler Truths

A final aspect of Crime Watch worth mentioning is its recent portrayal of high-profile criminal cases. While re-enactments of cases of similar statures in earlier times were not sampled, recent cases have been dealt with in a more nuanced way than the average re-enactment of a solved case. The high-profile nature of a case is partially determined by the level of publicity accorded to the case and the public reception to the breaking of news. In dealing with these cases in a more sensitive way, Crime Watch reminds the viewer that the police had exercised great care in handling these cases. The more truthful re-enactments of the case make known their authenticity through the frequent usage of actual television news reels to triangulate re-enactments. These cases also do not permit simple caricatures of criminals, mandate a closer look at investigative procedures, including the more onerous parts, and re-present the ambiguities of the cases as they have been recorded. A brief sketch of these episodes is provided to highlight the sensitive touches by Crime Watch producers.

In the case of the murder of eight-year old Huang Na (Epi10/2006), which had sparked off a sizeable public effort to search for the missing girl prior to the suspect turning in himself and reporting on the deceased status of the victim, real search posters and news reels of the case as it unfolded are interspersed with re-enactments. Following the suspect turning in himself,

reconstructions of the alleged crime continue to serve up ambiguities for the judge and the viewer. Was the victim sexually abused before she died? Why did the suspect murder the little girl? Separately, in the case of a highly-publicised 'execution-style' killing (Epi04/2009) by a suspect who spotted a dead eye and was referred to as the 'one-eyed dragon' by the press, the suspect had escaped to Malaysia before he was captured by Malaysian police officers after he was serendipitously spotted during a separate surveillance operation. Following his extradition to Singapore, the suspect claimed he had acted in self-defence when he murdered the victim. Ballistics reconstruction presented a different picture to the suspect's testimony, but this was not enough to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the suspect had intentionally murdered the victim. Nonetheless, the suspect was hanged for an unlawful discharge of firearms, leaving the viewer unsettled by a lack of complete resolution to the case.

These two vignettes reveal a different side of Crime Watch: one which is more sensitive to representing the truth in light of the heightened publicity of cases featured. As the need to entertain is subordinated to the need for accuracy of representation, one is duly reminded of the creative energies that go into the re-enactment of each episode. While Crime Watch can claim to be '90% accurate' in terms of its depiction of solved and unsolved crimes (Personal Interview with Crime Watch Coordinator), abstractions of reality continually take place on a routine basis. Shrouded by a veil of secrecy over police work which insists that the specificity of operations cannot be fully disclosed, one has to wait for the occasional moments of greater self-disclosure by the police to be alerted to the corruptions of documentations.

The Production and Consumption of *Crime Watch*

As the provider, presenter and reviewer of content of each episode, the police wield significant influence over the entire cycle of production. This corresponds to the asymmetry of power commonly depicted in critical literature. Chibnall's (1977) distillation of the characteristics of newsworthiness makes the media appear to be the perfect 'partner-in-crime' of the police. Seeking out dramatic, simplified, personal, novel, titillating and conventional plotlines makes the media overly dependent on the police to provide the contours and the content of

representations of crime. The relationship between the media and the police is however culturally complex, mired in historically-specific entanglements between the real and the reel. Moreover, the police may have legitimate reasons to not welcome the media's partnership. Rob Reiner (2000) has pointed out the predictably conservative stances towards media engagement by the police. Anxieties over media sensationalism, censorship regimes, socialisation of criminals on police procedures, mediated immorality, and the independent watchdog role of the media all conspire to sow seeds of distrust in the media. For Crime Watch, this was evident in the early phases of the working relationship with the media. Cited fears of a socialisation of criminals on the tactics of breaking the law, a glamourisation of violence, a lack of sensitivity towards victims of crime, and of frightening the impressionable young and old with the realism of depiction (Singapore Police Force 1996) together underscore the conservatism which permeates much of the force. Such conservative stances were however assuaged through the application of the managerial technique of cost-benefit analyses to rationalise the overall utility of Crime Watch as a tool of positive community engagement (Singapore Police Force 1996). Thus while the police appear to have the upper-hand in any partnerships with the media, careful analysis of the materiality of Crime Watch reveals a more complex politics of the production cycle.

In this following section, I draw upon my informal interviews with the Crime Watch coordinator and participant observations of various stages of filming to sketch the outlines of the interwoven production and consumption processes of Crime Watch. I argue that Crime Watch occupies a unique position within popular culture in Singapore, through its official capacity as an instrument of serialised community engagement of the police (Dittmer 2007). Its utilisation of a professional crew and a semi-professional and amateur cast provides an interesting configuration, which casts real-life police officers in the role of playing themselves or their colleagues on television[98]. This is reflective of a broader trend within the Singapore Civil Service, where agents of the state are roped in to produce state texts for popular consumption (Quah 2010). While conceived of in terms of public engagement, these exercises in effect mash

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[98] Police officers used to play not only themselves, but also victims and villains on screen. In 1999, in response to a public 'outcry' over officers being called upon to play villains on Crime Watch (Personal Interview with Crime Watch Coordinator), officers can now only play the role of crime fighters on Crime Watch.

up the traditional binary of producer and consumer in complicated ways. As something the entire organisation can and must be proud of (Neumann 2007), the final text is a diluted and sanitised version of reality that is likely to be emotionally distanced from those who have not partaken in the production process. To derive a fuller appreciation of Crime Watch, one thus has to delve into the production process. In addition, what is remarkable about Crime Watch is its resilient popularity in spite of its sanitised text. I attempt to trace its popularity through different interpretations of Crime Watch. Given the lack of empirical testing with audiences, this must be understood as a speculative enquiry into the state of popular culture in Singapore.

Re-Presenting the State

In a previous section, I argued that Crime Watch belongs to a genre that is the antithesis of the soap. In its interpellation of a target producer to film Crime Watch on behalf of the organisation, the docu-drama should be read as texts that the entire organisation can be proud of. Situating the docu-drama within a genre of state-produced texts allows one to accomplish the following: (i) decode the intended effects of Crime Watch as a state-authored text; (ii) appreciate the meticulous interventions by different parts of the organisation in producing the text; and (iii) interpret other state-produced texts with the cultural resources so derived. I shall elaborate upon these uses in turn.

Firstly, recognition of Crime Watch as a unique breed of state-authored texts identifies the power relations at work. Authorship carries with it a power to inscribe, and the ability to decide upon the content of Crime Watch, as well as to police its boundaries at each step of the production process confers upon the police an unmistakable sovereignty over the production process. From the choice of crimes and informative entertainments to feature, the screening of scripts, the casting of actors, the financing of production, the acquisition of filming permits, the direction of acting performances, to the review of videos prior to broadcast on national television, the police have instituted close-control management over the texts of Crime Watch. These measures have been in place since the early phase of Crime Watch (Singapore Police Force 1996), and it is reasonable to postulate that they have been tightened in the move towards professionalised image management in the 1990s. Thus while the state-owned

Mediacorp Studios is enlisted for its scriptwriters, film crew and various expertises in post-production work, the police still possess vetting rights at each stage of the production[99]. Over time, the result is a restrictive but nonetheless creative process of choreographing the police in action, akin to a form of generative constraint (Latham and McCormack 2009) that guides the production of texts for popular consumption.

The authorship of texts is nonetheless indicative of a collaborative effort by the various departments of the police. Crime Watch may be the formal responsibility of the Crime Watch coordinator, a post attached to the Public Affairs Department, but the role of the coordinator is precisely that of aligning the capabilities of different departments within the SPF to produce the next episode of Crime Watch. This requires the embodied knowledge of routine police procedures, crime trends, information management and public relations, and the extensive personal networks of the coordinator. His work-effectiveness is supplemented by his close proximity to colleagues at the Public Affairs Department. However the act of selecting crimes for portrayal requires the inputs from the different operational and line units. The criteria for selection rests on a combination of factors: recent crime trends, availability of interesting solved and 'closed'[100] cases, having a proportional mix of crime types in representations, and extension of cooperation from the policing team whose crime or department is being featured in an upcoming episode. Alongside the identification of crime trends by intelligence units and the ascertaining of more complicated police procedures by the Operations Department, the willingness of respective line units to cooperate with the filming of Crime Watch is symptomatic of the whole-of-organisation effort in the production process. Crime Watch's efforts to engage the community necessitates the frequent rotation of the spotlight amongst different police departments. This is not only to create public consciousness of the different members of the police family, but is also reflective of practical concerns with finding the manpower for filming.

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[99] This does not negate the autonomy of Mediacorp Studios personnel. Though they are not the subject of this study, it was observed they experienced far greater joy while filming. This could have arisen from the creativity intrinsic to filming. This stands in contrast to police officers who felt underemployed on the set.

[100] Only concluded cases where the suspects have been convicted in court are featured in detail for the solved crime segment (Personal Interview with Coordinator). Unsolved or public appeal cases tend to refrain from re-enacting the contingencies of the case in favour of providing brief sketches of case facts. As has been mentioned, this segment has been phased out over the years.

Since Crime Watch draws upon existing in-house talent for playing the roles of police officers, officers selected for acting on Crime Watch are required to put aside their respective non-urgent engagements in order to attend to Crime Watch. This means that the Crime Watch coordinator cannot continue drawing upon particular units (e.g. the Special Investigation Section which is responsible for investigating homicides) for feature on the programme, in spite of the fact that the unit may be handling many highly publicised and/or potentially titillating cases[101].

In addition, officers taking time off their normal duties to act on Crime Watch enjoy no remuneration[102] other than the chance to feature on a popular docu-drama and to play their part in community service. Encouraging participation on Crime Watch can easily become a chore: officers staffed with routine work need to be persuaded that acting on Crime Watch is a personally-fulfilling experience that also constitutes a form of national/community service, or if not, at least an endeavour requiring minimal hassle[103]. The lack of training accorded to in-house acting talents means most officers appearing on Crime Watch have not been socialised on the professional norms of acting for the small screen. Ad-hoc translations of scripts become the order of the day, with actors drawing upon memory work and impressions of the self and the audiencing other, alongside the directions given by Mediacorp Studios' technicians and police supervisors, to re-enact a scene. The lack of experience in performing for a camera and the lack of time for rehearsals is however captured on screen as bad acting[104], inexpressive performances and goofy amateurism, traits which nonetheless can serve as crowd-drawers.

Completed Crime Watch videos are passed through at least three rounds of test-screenings prior to the actual national broadcast. These checks reflect the chain-of-command within the

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[101] With falling crime rates, another unintended consequence for Crime Watch is that there have been less case files to draw upon for televised re-enactments (Personal Interview with Coordinator).

[102] At present, no forms of direct remuneration are made available to officers who act on Crime Watch. No institutionalised channels exist to provide transportation for officers to and from filming locations, or to grant officers compensatory off-days or financial allowances for their involvement in Crime Watch (Personal Interview with Coordinator).

[103] This becomes all the more unlikely, when *mis-en-scène* techniques demand the shooting of Crime Watch on location at night.

[104] It must be cautioned that on the contrary, some audiences might regard the acting as highly realistic. The emphasis here is not with judging what constitutes good acting, but rather to understand how re-enactments are performed.

force, and point to the importance attached to Crime Watch as a vehicle for community outreach and public consumption. Screen tests weed out flaws previously omitted by producers but identified by the reviewing authorities, adding further layers of circumspection to the final product. Different levels of authority also strain their gaze upon different items on the agenda[105]. The final product thus bears the signature of the entire police force, presenting a public front that is the self-image aspired to by the leadership to a national audience-in-waiting.

As a state-produced text, Crime Watch bears closer resemblances to the perfunctory, highly-restrained speeches of foreign ministries of states (Neumann 2007) than traditionally conceived popular cultural texts. For one, a greater appreciation of Crime Watch stems from a close participation in the production process, not from the consumption of texts. Direct participation in the production of an episode confers different degrees of ownership of the project, making participants rather eager to stay tuned to the actual national broadcast for a glimpse of their selves on the television screen. In fact, this is something the Crime Watch coordinator is well aware of, in his efforts to publicise Crime Watch to obtain better ratings for the upcoming episode. Actors, producers, coordinators and technicians of all stripes are duly informed of the broadcast and reminded to tune in to enjoy the fruits of their labour. Word-of-mouth is thereby generated, and participants are asked to invite their friends and relatives to consume the next episode. Such methods of propaganda are given greater resonance through the amateur status of the film cast of Crime Watch. It is the relatively new experience of participation in a popular television docu-drama that evokes a sense of curiosity, excitement and anticipation amongst active participants[106]. Amateurism helps confer a degree of freshness and rawness to the text, mitigating some of the sterility present in professional packaging[107]. Audiences are drawn to catch the production in the same manner friends and family head to the local community centre to catch a theatrical performance featuring loved ones. Tuning in to Crime Watch is not akin to being a nonchalant channel surfer who happens to drop by the re-enactments, nor is it

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[105] For instance, while the Commissioner of Police would ostensibly focus on the representation of proper police procedures and the attire of police officers, the Minister of State for Home Affairs would be concerned with representations of immigration offences and other state bodies (Personal Interview with Coordinator).
[106] Regular professionals of the entertainment industry are unlikely to take great interest in such works of art.
[107] Ironically, it is the presence of professional packaging which enables the viewer to discern the genre of the production, which is important for creating comfortable spaces of consumption.

comparable to the avid fan of crime drama serials that keep track of the entire series. Conversely, it is the desire to keep in touch and abreast of the affairs of a loved one, and a commitment to providing emotional support for the performer which compels audiencing of Crime Watch.

An emphasis on active participation also highlights the subjective interpretation of one's involvement with producing Crime Watch. Participation in the myriad labouring duties required for production to take place is never uniform or homogeneous in experience. A dramaturgical metaphor may be useful here to capture the different roles being played out in production. The *calefare* is a local colloquial term referring to actors who take on minor and insignificant roles in a production, often in the hope of being talent-spotted and transitioning to bigger roles. The *calefare* is vulnerable to frequent unkind and insensitive comments on his/her status on the set, within a local culture that (over)glamourises the leading actors of productions. In these circumstances, the actor cast as a *calefare* may be subjected to feelings of insignificance and a diminution of self, as he/she is left to contemplate the value of his/her personal contributions to the project. From my brief field observation, it was discernable that several police officers participating in Crime Watch were subjected to such sentiments as well, when their acting requirements were limited to sporadic screen presences, minimal delivery of lines (if any at all), and little character development. By contrast, officers-actors had been called to the set for at least half a day (rising to a few days) of their normal duties to film a segment of an episode, and had to wait in turn for their scenes to be shot. This disjuncture between mainstream opinion on starring in a popular television drama and one's personal experience of being cast[108] as a *calefare* thereby evokes ambivalence towards the finished film product. Situated within a national narrative of the need for constant upgrading as a sign of progress (R. Goh 2005), the richness of the *calefare* experience risks being devalued through a rationalisation that views it as the necessary struggle prior to attaining mainstream success[109].

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[108] This ambivalence may be extended to non-acting participants of Crime Watch, such as the technical crew or the errands-'boy' tasked to prepare minor set logistics.
[109] It must be noted that non-police officers acting on Crime Watch often take up roles in the docu-drama in order to get noticed by casting personnel and advance their acting careers elsewhere. From my casual conversations

Crime Watch however targets police officers as both producers and consumers. As co-producers of the docu-drama, officers are uniquely placed to draw upon the cultural resources offered up by Crime Watch texts in various ways. Firstly, Crime Watch serves as a community engagement tool, providing basic descriptions of the job scope of police officers, introducing the public to different units with the force, and illustrating simplified police procedures to facilitate easy comprehension. This provides ready-made tools with which police officers can engage various members of the community. Community development officers can screen past selected episodes of Crime Watch as part of crime prevention efforts. The didactic nature of Crime Watch simplifies messages for the audience, making it easier to communicate ideas.

But if Crime Watch is mainly consumed in the living room of individual households, then it is also used by police officers to ingratiate their families and loved ones to their working environment. Crime Watch provides reassurances to officers' families and loved ones that while the line of duty may be dangerous, officers will be well-trained and equipped to ensure their own safety and well-being. On screen, officers are depicted as never taking unnecessary risks that may endanger their lives and those of fellow workers, and operations are always carried out in teams, with calls for back-up a common measure prior to any confrontations with criminals. Additionally, Crime Watch reminds viewers that the call of duty to serve as a police officer is a noble one, as it replaces selfish ambition with a concern for the greater national good. Family and friends of officers are consequently called upon to empathise with the need for officers to put in long and odd working hours in order to nab a suspect or solve a case. The extraordinary nature of a police career demands considerable sacrifices from new recruits, and family and friends accustomed to working normal office hours must be willing to accommodate the irregular work-hours of police officers and provide adequate support for the Men in Blue[110]. Officers **may** utilise the cultural resources provided by Crime Watch to further elaborate upon

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with non-police cast members, Crime Watch was thus frequently referred to as a 'stepping stone' towards greater things.

[110] Information gleaned from previous fieldwork for my undergraduate dissertation.

what their job entails, avoiding the charge of divulging operationally sensitive materials without legal authorisation[111].

In addition, as a simplified frame of police procedures, Crime Watch by itself is unable to quench the thirst for more knowledge on police work. Crime Watch may not be in the mould of the classical detective drama, but it draws upon the latter genre to provide tiny, measured samplings of what is in store for the life of a police detective. Non-participant viewers of Crime Watch can pick up bits and pieces of what an Investigation Officer does on screen, but they are explicitly denied a full view of what the police really do behind the (crime) scenes. If titillation is present on Crime Watch, it is not primarily with regards to the portrayal of heinous crimes, but rather stems from the element of secrecy obliquely referenced to in texts. Crime Watch thus succeeds as a community engagement tool when police-centred witnessing becomes a fantasy of proximity (Parks 2001), when potential recruits are enticed to join the force to uncover what lies behind the clean-cut image of Crime Watch. Meanwhile, experienced officers can boast that they know what **really** happens behind the police cordon, and the 'superficial' content of Crime Watch may be expertly prised apart through detailed analyses by informed participant observers[112].

Where those involved in watching Crime Watch are all 'in the know', Crime Watch assumes other uses. In these cases, Crime Watch is likely to be consumed in the bases of police departments[113]. Here the audience is composed of officers who are taking a break from duties, preparing for duties, or resting after duties. In these informal 'back stages' of the police station (Fyfe 1992), officers can officially let their guard down and are likely to engage in 'role release' through light jesting, simple banter and cross-checks on what fellow officers have been up to. Such practices of canteen sociality (Waddington 1999) can take place against a backdrop of

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[111] Information gleaned from previous fieldwork for my undergraduate dissertation. Through the professional code of ethics, the strict demarcation of the work-life boundary of policing prevents officers from freely mixing their personal and work lives.

[112] Information gleaned from previous fieldwork for my undergraduate dissertation, and from my participant observation with the Public Affairs Department.

[113] Information gleaned from previous fieldwork for my undergraduate dissertation. Crime Watch videos are in fact screened in the waiting areas of several NPCs in an attempt to create comfortable spaces for customers. When no customers are present, these may be consumed by the customer attendants themselves.

light-hearted televisual entertainment, of which Crime Watch is but one of many available. Officers are unlikely to dissect Crime Watch analytically, but are more poised to make fleeting glances and comments on the screen content of Crime Watch. From the eye candy embodied by the female Crime Watch presenter, to the flaccid action sequences performed by actors, to the spoofing or correcting of misrepresented police procedures on screen, to the recognition of familiar faces of colleagues on screen, Crime Watch may be occasionally summoned from the backdrop to provide conversational topics and to reinforce the informal sociality on offer in the canteen.

Crime Watch is also increasingly being circulated online and through digital soft copies which facilitate individualised or group consumption on screens smaller than those of the television. The flexibilisation of consumption allows users to view Crime Watch at their own leisure. This may take place in the work place during times when a break from the job is needed, or when boredom on-the-job requires entertainment to stimulate the senses[114]. Crime Watch would then be summoned again to provide easily accessible viewing pleasure without taking one's mind off police work entirely.

And here one may elaborate upon the generative constraint being served up (Latham and McCormack 2009) by the production of Crime Watch. Scripting and enacting Crime Watch offers a chance for police officers to break free from the routines of working in a disciplinary organisation. From the selection of stories to the representation of police procedures and the demonstration of police professionalism in the mould of the crime-fighter, while Crime Watch seemingly reproduces the same, old narrative for each new episode, participating in the production of the popular text can be rather cathartic in different ways. The intrinsically creative process of re-enactments provides a platform for state producers to re-produce otherwise staid narratives with a view towards entertaining the masses. Thus the Crime Watch coordinator can take joy in selecting what he feels are 'interesting' cases for feature on an upcoming episode; a Media Relations Officer may take pride in encoding police procedures in

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[114] In a previous research for my undergraduate dissertation, I found that police officers working the night shift in NPCs frequently turn to Crime Watch to stay awake in the wee hours of the morning just before dawn. Consumption of Crime Watch is thus dependent on the time of day: an officer is more likely to tune in to Crime Watch for light-hearted entertainment when he/she has time to kill.

the text in a way that does not compromise police operations; and screen actors may relish the chance of 'acting out' by playing a crime-fighting protagonist in stereotypically dramatised fashion. Community engagement then actively works both ways, serving up new opportunities for police officers to be (re)interested in police work.

Having explored a variety of possible consumption scenarios, it is presently appropriate to theorise about the wider fold of state-produced texts. Since 1990, the new government led by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong has been actively promoting public sector reforms that emphasise greater public consultation in decision-making (Quah 2010). State agencies have embraced community engagement as the means to cultivate active citizenry, in a move to responsibilise citizens to do more to look after themselves and their communities. While the nature of consultation remains very uneven in terms of the discussion topics sanctioned, the kinds of people allowed into focus groups, and the power relations which transcend roundtables, the move towards greater consultation is reflective of an evolving state-citizen compact (e.gs. Koh and Ooi 2000; Chong 2005). This review of the texts of Crime Watch has revealed certain specifications of state-produced texts, which may be drawn upon by other scholars to interpret the wider genre.

Firstly, through the hiring of in-house talent for the production of Crime Watch, what one is witnessing is the practical resourcefulness spurred by devolution of state powers to ministries, statutory boards, government-linked companies and voluntary welfare organisations. Crime Watch is not only funded through the donations received by the National Crime Prevention Council, a state-endorsed Voluntary Welfare Organisation, but is enacted through informal coordination mechanisms put together by various actors. From the sourcing of props to the casting of police officers and the securing of filming locations, Crime Watch is marked by the presence of extensive backstage work that cobbles together available resources to put up a staged performance. Formally, there exists only one Crime Watch coordinator, but the sole position belies the enormity of tasks required for the set. Colleagues are thus frequently roped in for certain favours (which nonetheless may become institutionalised over time) such as the contribution of required props, the granting of permission for filming at a location, help with

research into a particular police procedure, and most crucially, volunteering to act on Crime Watch. The act of filming is of course traditionally well-primed to make the most of limited resources, using technologies like cropping and zooming to circumvent the physical limitations of filming. However, Crime Watch is not the mainstream mediated spectacle in its simplified choice of actors, props and set locations. Professionalised filming technologies are minimally applied as finishing touches to an otherwise informal, localised production. In an age of increasing fiscal restraint, state managers seeking the production of community engagement texts must make do with whatever resources they have (Quah 2010; Sim 2011). The presence of a sympathetic state-owned mass media is important for making the most out of limited resources.

Following this, one can theorise a second effect of state-produced texts. Such products will vary according to the spatiotemporal contexts of production. In stark contrast to undifferentiated arguments of both the end of history and the production of simulacra camps, what is being generated is an increasingly differentiated state-authored space. Productions like Crime Watch are better appreciated through an involvement with the project, with the result being increased variations in the consumption of the state texts by the nation. If the reproduction of state-effects (Painter 2006) is related to the productive consumption of state texts, an increasingly uneven consumption experience produces more uneven state-as-effects.

Finally, the consumption of state-produced texts leads to a hybridisation of the traditional roles of producer and consumer. While mass media researchers have increasingly stressed the importance of studying the messy connections between production and consumption and how these relate to producers and consumers (e.gs. Leishman and Mason 2003; Brunsdon and Spigel 2008; Carrabine 2008), what can be gleaned from this research is how a category of producer-consumer for mass productions may be **instituted** through harnessing the latter's creative energies. The production of popular state-texts does not negate the presence of distinct producers and consumers, but rather fosters the emergence of new forms of productive consumption. Conventional media studies tend to restrict its analysis to the imagined unilateral transmission of state-produced texts by the media, or how the media is used to muzzle dissent

through the dissemination of hegemonising discourses (see Hall et al. 1978). However, as personnel involved in producing the text are privy to certain forms of 'insider' knowledge of production in ways that enable them to rework the cultural resources visualised in the mass diffusion of representations, coerced or voluntary participation in the filming project either as a primary or secondary[115] producer can be productive of renewed interest in the genre. Thus despite frequent acknowledgements of the shortcomings of Crime Watch both as a factual documentary and a fictional dramatisation[116], police officers continue to derive various pleasures from consumption of the text, which helps perpetuate this state-produced popular culture.

Although this ostensibly thickens the boundaries between inside and outside, the effects of consumption are plenty and varied, denying simple generalisations. Involvement as a producer-consumer does not automatically inculcate a sense of ownership, organisational belonging or civic pride, as mainstream social theorists would have it (e.g. Putnam 2000). The dramaturgical motif of the *calefare* insists that one pays attention to the unevenness of valuation work stemming from the unequal division of labour that is present in production work, and wider cultural perceptions of differentiated individual contributions to the social project.

Other Forms of Consumption

This final section of the chapter attempts to synthesise the consumption experiences of consumers who are not involved in the production of Crime Watch. Since no formalised audience research was carried out, the opinions are representative of my own, and may reasonably be viewed with a degree of scepticism. However I argue the portraits of consumption painted here hint at the level of fine-grained empirical analyses that must be carried out to study the consumption of such state-authored texts like Crime Watch. This is obviously a task not suitable to the random sampling of social surveys, a random cobbling together of people from different walks of life for a focus group discussion, or a tracking of

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[115] While non-participating police officers can be mentioned as examples of secondary producers, the term may be conceivably extended to include Police National Servicemen, retired and auxiliary police officers, kin of police officers and other state bureaucrats performing police-related work.

[116] Information gleaned from previous fieldwork for my undergraduate dissertation, and from my participant observation with the Public Affairs Department.

online discussion forums. What this analysis aspires is to provide a framework for future researchers into popular culture to contemplate and to verify through grounded investigations.

Mediating Ontological Insecurity

Cindi Katz (2008) has written about the production of ontological insecurity in the retreat of the welfare state. Ontological insecurity exists due to stagnating wages that do not outpace inflation, a volatile financial market whose turbulence knows no boundaries, structural unemployment in the wake of economic restructuring, and the casualisation of jobs and job benefits. While ontological insecurity manifests itself in everyday symptoms such as the presumed need for increased surveillance of one's children and the desire for gated communities, it is reflective of deeper structural problems that remain unresolved. In Singapore's context, ontological insecurity has actively been harnessed as a state discursive strategy to highlight the geopolitical economic vulnerabilities of the postcolonial nation. Rather than necessarily representative of a reality out there, ontological insecurity has become a text for mediating regional foreign relations and economic developmentalism[117](Kong and Yeoh 2003; Olds and Yeung 2004; Rahim 2009). Amidst the presence of larger, 'hostile' neighbouring Malay states, and the need for attracting foreign direct investment to expand the domestic economy, the ruling party has long maintained that Singapore, with her small geographical size, puny domestic market and limited natural resources, could not afford to take her survival for granted. In the race to maintain the city-state's competitive economic edge and in consideration of the need to deter 'jealous' neighbours from undermining the territorial integrity of the nation-state, Singaporeans have been drilled on the imperatives of geopolitical economic survival since the post-independence years. It is in these troubled waters that Crime Watch first surfaces[118] and has gradually been serialised. Crime Watch has become a medium

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[117] While these provide the overarching narrative structures for the nation-state/ developmental city-state (Olds and Yeung 2004) of Singapore, other ontological insecurities that are mediated by popular texts include fire and flood hazards, transnational boundary haze, global warming, influenza pandemics, and assorted physical and mental illnesses.

[118] As noted earlier, the first episode of Crime Watch was broadcast in the wake of the 1985-1986 economic recession, which triggered stronger calls for economic restructuring.

for inscribing insecurity through the framing of crime as largely opportunist by nature (Clarke 1980), and as particularly targeting vulnerable social reproducers (Sim 2011).

Firstly, the framing of crime as opportunist relates directly to the governmentality of unease being practised by state producers of (in)security (Bigo 2002). Criminal acts of opportunism are potentially pervasive, capable of springing up anywhere should citizens become negligent. Crime prevention's basic tenets are that opportunistic crimes are preventable through personal acts of responsibility to ensure the well-being of oneself and one's community. Crime prevention targets a change in the grammar of everyday life (Certeau 1984), and towards that end, Crime Watch has repeatedly reminded its viewers of the potential consequences of a failure to comply. Simplified to reach out to the masses, crime prevention advisories are meant to convey heavily moralised messages for audiences to take away. The light-hearted nature of entertainment may not help the individual to recall specific case facts, criminal statistics and orderings of police procedures, but it strengthens the popular impression of the duties of cops, criminals and public-minded citizens. A normalisation of the message places it beyond the pale of critique whilst serving to marginalise non-conforming behaviours and stigmatising the criminal other (Sibley 1995; Cresswell 1996). Not taking the necessary measures to prevent crime becomes a recipe for victimisation by criminals. Crime Watch illustrates the latter move with particular aplomb. The serialised reproduction of didactic advisories has rendered crime prevention to a large extent common-sensical, in a way that inadvertently casts blame upon victims of crime in what amounts to additional rounds of victimisation. As the audience is reminded of past crime prevention messages which had already identified the adequate steps one has to take to prevent crime, the disobedience of the person who has been successfully targeted by Crime is highlighted. Responsibilisation of the victim demands that he/she live with the regret from not heeding the proper guidance of the police, and ordinary members of public are yet again warned of the undesirable consequences of falling prey to preventable crimes. In this way, viewers are exposed to the 'hard truths' of the criminal mentality which materialises when opportunity presents itself. The Hobbesian state of nature becomes a universal fact of life and precautionary measures must be taken in the fight against Crime.

A second way that Crime Watch inscribes insecurity is through the cultivation of dependency amongst sectors of the population that have been identified as vulnerable. As compiled crime statistics indicate the particular vulnerability of certain sub-populations to specific crimes, the weakest links of the national heartland are attended to with greater care to pre-empt criminals from preying on the weak. Crime Watch has directly addressed social groupings such as the elderly, children, youths and housewives, reminding them of their status as dependents, which places them on the radar of criminals' schemes. Interpellated as such, dependents are warned of the dangers that they could be exposed to if proper crime prevention advisories are not heeded. Crime prevention becomes a priority for these groups of people, and they have had entire segments of crime prevention/ public education segments repeatedly devoted to them. The rationalisation that the weak need more focused guidance justifies provision of the didactic staple of crime prevention messages, alongside the coordination of various community self-help initiatives to specially keep watch on the activities of the vulnerable. The latter include safe-drive zones around primary schools to promote road safety amongst young children, school talks and hosting educational visits to Neighbourhood Police Centres and prisons for at-risk youths, and senior citizens' crime prevention talks and skits to raise awareness of scams, robberies and snatch theft. Such efforts certainly deserve commendation to the extent that they do provide new communication channels to reach out to previously isolated groups like single elders living alone or teens turning to street-corner gangs as a rebellion against the strictures and routines of an overly-competitive education system. Letting members of these groups acquire crime prevention tips may also boost their self-confidence via learning new things, meeting new friends and interacting with others of a similar background. These help them to regain the confidence to venture out into the public without a fear of crime or a lack of self-esteem.

Nevertheless, Crime Watch's modus operandi of targeting the weak in order to encourage a cultivation of the crime-fighter persona is rather problematic. In emphasising the vulnerabilities of those groups, Crime Watch risks normalising diverse individualities that make up the

assigned groups in the bid to prop up the national narrative of the day[119]. The short length of Crime Watch and the bite-sized information provided in crime prevention messages seldom pay attention to the complexities of individual cases, with the promulgation of one-size-fits-all prevention advice lacking sensitivity to the nuances of victimisation or offending. Additionally, while such focused crime prevention advisories may end up nurturing youthful chauvinism, while essentialising weaknesses within 'vulnerable' groups. Performances of weaknesses may be encouraged if the dominant national narrative already portrays particular individuals as such. In these circumstances, a reduction, not gain in self-confidence is likely to follow. Finally, prioritising crime prevention risks obscuring the social contexts that have produced the alleged vulnerabilities of the weak. This may be the most important factor in assessing the outcomes of crime prevention outreaches, and much empirical work remains to be done here. Hence a delicate calibration needs to be made in the targeted interventions of crime prevention, which takes into account the particular contexts of care-giving. Crime prevention messages can certainly serve as a social ticket for conversations with vulnerable individuals of society, but they should not be an end in themselves. Limited to a generic variety, crime prevention advice is likely to fall upon deaf ears, when individuals do not see how the message is relevant to them or practical in their daily lives. Conversely, it is through the elaboration of these messages that one can begin to apprehend the banal, inhibitive technologies of crime prevention and uncover the paradoxical ethics/aesthetics of acquiring strength through a **vulnerable** openness to difference (see Maffesoli 1996).

Fostering Cynicism

Crime Watch as a popular cultural text certainly does not appeal to everyone. Typical of popular cultural referents, Crime Watch is easily viewed as anti-intellectual: most writings on Crime Watch are journalistic in nature and trivial in their pursuits, focusing on Crime Watch presenters as mini-celebrities or inviting the reader on a behind-the-scenes look at the production of Crime Watch. The lack of intellectual engagement with the texts is regrettable,

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[119] For instance, at a function to promote active ageing in Singapore, crime prevention advice could ostensibly be tailored to demonstrate the care for the elderly shown by the ruling party, despite the inadequacies of social safety nets for the poor. By contrast, at a school talk on the perils of joining gangs, crime prevention could be used to buttress the institution of meritocracy.

for it readily obscures the important role that Crime Watch has played in gathering support for the Singapore Police Force, as well as the complex socialities that are performed both for the screen and in front of the screen. Its position as state-authored text however renders it doubly susceptible to criticisms of being nothing more than crass propaganda. Such is the simmering disdain for the ruling party held by a fraction of the local population that any forms of overt political intervention into their lives are readily dismissed as a ploy to keep the political elites in power (Cunha, 09 September 2011). Crime Watch's didacticism and its overdetermined state authorship become a lightning rod for political cynicism, as the 'alert' opposing viewer is quick to discern that its content is fully authored by the police, the watch dog of the political elites. The state-owned media could in fact be explicitly boycotted for similar reasons, and the fact that it broadcasts Crime Watch is surely evidence of its lack of independence. It would be safe to assume that this group of political dissidents would hardly ever watch Crime Watch, as it is anathema to their perceived political awareness. On those rare occasions where they do happen to tune in, poor acting becomes an easy target for cynics. The inexpressive performances of police officers are representative of the unimaginativeness of 'government men'. This rare publicity of flawed performances by the state becomes an occasion for lampooning, as these viewers release pent-up frustrations through laughter. Political energies may accordingly be dissipated through self-indulgent forms of mockery. One may in fact push this speculation a little further. If there is a group of people who extract pleasure from the ability to criticise the government, it would not be far-fetched to suggest that these individuals may tune in to Crime Watch on a routine basis to engage in nit-picking or error-spotting. That may have been on the minds of Crime Watch producers, in their decision to subject each video to a multiple-layered scrutiny prior to the national broadcast.

The presence of such political cynicism casts new light on theories of resistance within academia. As individuals who are ingrained in particular worldviews, dissidents clearly articulate an agenda of resistance by choosing for example, to boycott Crime Watch or to mock it for its mistakes. But in so doing, they are not allowing their opinions to be challenged, have closed off potential spaces for learning about police work, and do not empathise with the plight of those susceptible to crime. This stubborn spirit may have been produced as a result of the

perceived political and social injustices wrought by the ruling party. However by choosing not to engage or by choosing to indulge in captious critiques of state-produced texts, cynics risk conferring upon the government a greater coherence than what it has actually achieved. They continue walling themselves off from those not like-minded to them, whilst becoming insensitive to how they may be imperceptibly taking after their personal enemy, and how their behaviours are complicit in the production of power (Rose 1999; Joseph 2002; Connolly 2005). The greatest threat to resistance may thus lie within the conscious act of resistance itself when resistance revels in its cynical vengeance.

Crime Watch also fosters the traditional brand of cynicism associated with the police. Looking at the world through an emergency-bound policing lens inevitably brings into focus a world rife with all kinds of criminal opportunists, trouble-makers, criminal syndicates, criminal hot spots, lurking sexual predators and cunning imposters. While Crime Watch takes care to avoid over-sensationalising crime through a rotation of featured crime types for example, the overall tone of Crime Watch, from the presenter's delivery to re-enactments of crimes and the dissemination of crime prevention advice is unambiguously about criminal activities. In assuming a paternalistic attitude towards weaker members of the population (Chua 1995), Crime Watch's pedantic approach provides little room for debates on the proportionality or implications of crime prevention advice. The simplification and condensation of criminal stories inadvertently risks mainstreaming a form of televisually-mediated criminalising gaze popularly associated with the police (Reiner 2000). The pursuit of preventing crime becomes bound up with distrusting the stranger when generic lists of crime prevention measures are drawn up. A loyalty to the generic formula in turn restrains producers from elaborating upon crime prevention advisories in ways that would make them more focused and nuanced. The stereotype is instead opted for as it aids in the communication of sound bites to producer-audiences and generic audiences seeking to be entertained. Reproducing stereotypes helps to consolidate the boundaries of policing work, shutting out alternative voices that do not chime with the chorus. Thus male bodies loitering around the void decks of public housing estates, male persons accosting young female subjects for help, unsolicited house visits by individuals seeking out hospitality, and groups of youths hanging out in public places especially after

nightfall are all likely to be rapped on Crime Watch as signs of deviant behaviour. Crime Watch prides itself for being able to pronounce guilty verdicts, protect the weak, rescue the distressed, expose lies and deceptions, unmask quacks, bust criminal syndicates and locate criminal nests with such consistent frequency that the viewer might be inclined to extrapolate its criminal representations onto the real world. Extraneous connections between empirical observations and individual perceptions of the Truth are made; the viewer is socialised to connect the dots between observed empirical phenomena by relying upon his/her judgement of the underlying structures of criminality. Therein lies the risk of fostering a brand of cynicism commonly attributed to the police's criminalising gaze in popular representations of police work[120].

Alas true to its stereotypical tradition, Crime Watch's greatest contribution to cynicism may be more insidious. In its acquiescence to a tried-and-tested formula for drawing audiences, Crime Watch subjects itself to the tyranny of the serial (Dittmer 2007). Crime Watch formulates its plotlines with a view towards retaining the loyalty of its core supporters, who while certainly not in the league of science-fiction fanatics, are nevertheless enthusiastic followers of the monthly production. Programmatic formats are re-used with minimal changes to the structure of each episode; it is thus remarkable that with the exception of stylistic elements and changes to the prioritisations of component segments, Crime Watch has remained largely similar over 25 years of national broadcasting. The comfort of watching a familiar production is generative of viewing pleasures for long-time consumers of Crime Watch. The turn to a monthly broadcast was thus significant in strengthening a discernible rhythm amongst its viewers by ensuring the time lapse between two consecutive broadcasts would not be too long. Viewing pleasures may also be derived from the structure of the narrative itself. The predictable storyline of police in action that ends with the resolution of a case and the apprehension of the criminal provides a calming influence that justice will ultimately be served and crime does not pay. Identification with the police allows the viewer to temporarily partake in a police investigation and operation,

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[120] There may be some truths to these popular representations: for instance, from my previous fieldwork, some police officers have been known to distrust in the goodness of humanity having been exposed to a gamut of criminal wrongdoings. This perception of the evil that lies within men's hearts is also traceable to reflections by police officers on the sad fact of life that each society will always have its fair share of crime and crime can never be completely eradicated. Such sharing by police officers however must be contextualised: these are frequently inscribed by officers who have chosen to simplify their worldviews for the sake of brevity.

with all the accompanying camaraderie and action-oriented adventure that that involves (Herbert 1997), within the safety of the living room and in a compressed sequence. The dishing out of routine crime prevention advice informs the consumer-citizen of his or her duties, which can be easily fulfilled through carrying out simple tasks in everyday life. The maintenance of this generic tradition thus preserves an entertainment space for frequent viewers of Crime Watch. In the provision of personal spaces for pleasurable remote/controlled consumption (Parks 2001) however, Crime Watch helps constitute different forms of cynicism.

One such cynicism may stem from the very spaces of comfort that Crime Watch crafts for its audiences. Through the disavowal of plotlines which would challenge the beliefs and values held by its mainstream viewers, Crime Watch inadvertently encourages them to hold on to their cherished views (see Jermyn 2003 for a take on *Crime Watch* in the United Kingdom), including many stereotypes of other urban dwellers. The result of this repeated accommodation of viewers may be to produce viewers who are steeped in their particular worldviews, with a corresponding disinclination for accepting challenges to their perceptions. The viewer, who is accustomed to believing that he/she is right, is not nudged towards learning about and embracing new perspectives. Conversely, he/she begins to take for granted his/her own positionality, rendering it invisible and possibly unconsciously imposing it upon others in the belief that such views are universally held and beyond reproach. To illustrate how Crime Watch achieves this, I turn to two different types of crimes that are featured on the programme. The first type of crimes involves the active participation of the individual in order for the crime to successfully take place. An example of this would be crimes committed by confidence tricksters. Here the audience is frequently told that these criminals prey upon the greed and fear of their victims to induce them to part with their money. Scams vary in forms, such as lottery scams, job benefits scams, investment scams, and inheritance scams. While particular circumstances would differ from case to case, the modus operandi of scammers is depicted as remaining strikingly consistent over the years. Victims who fall prey are deemed gullible to believe that they could have made off with an easy fortune by transferring a small sum of money to the culprits in exchange for a vastly larger reward that would await them. When the promised fortune fails to materialise, the victims find out that they have been duped and start bemoaning

their foolishness. Personal interviews with victims affirm their regret as they proceed to warn others not to follow in their footsteps. As the video cuts back to the presenter, crime prevention tips are reiterated through pointers such as 'if it is too good to be true, it probably is', leaving no doubt in the viewers' minds that the victim of the scam deserved exactly what he/she got. In these cases, an overwhelming affect is the cultivation of a righteous indignation within the viewer. The average viewer knows well in advance how the plot will play out and what tricks scammers have up their sleeves, and they know this so well that the actual unfolding of the re-enactment merely serves to consolidate their knowledge alongside their sense of right and wrong. What is meant as a tool for generating awareness of crime prevention amongst vulnerable individuals becomes an emotionally-distancing device for cynics, who are instead desensitised from the plight of the victim. The latter has been rendered so utterly foolish as to be unworthy of empathy or even pity. His/her greed through self-interest is abstracted and magnified ad infinitum, whilst the viewer's own self-interest remains concealed and unchecked.

The second type of crime featured is traditional preventable crimes, differentiated from the first in its emphasis on the criminal motive over the victim's complicity in the commission of the crime. Crimes like housebreaking or outrage of modesty are certainly not attributable to the victims' own wrongdoing, although the heeding of crime prevention advice could have helped. The cultivation of one's crime prevention self through the changing of one's daily habits instead becomes the focus. An earlier section had already suggested how the indoctrination of crime prevention requires a normalisation of behaviours that inadvertently re-victimises the victim of crime. Here, I want to explore other cynical implications of normalised crime prevention selves. In its targeting of homeowners and other property owners, crime prevention advice treats self-interest as common sense and therefore something that must be acted upon. Small simple steps of prevention can prevent much pain and suffering that would take place when crimes are actualised. The framing of crime as opportunist by nature and something that is always looming

on the horizon nourishes a didacticism that not only dovetails with Crime Watch's narrative, but also the dominant national narrative[121].

Authored by the political leadership, *The Singapore Story* has been heard a countless number of times by the average Singaporean: its central message of economic survival amidst regional chaos and an emerging global labour market demands a strong work-ethic, economic competitiveness and sustained vigilance, not quite unlike the dedication shown by investigators in solving crimes within the shortest time possible. What Crime Watch achieves corroborates and resonates with this national narrative, reinforcing the ostensibly fundamental dictum that success is attainable only through strong personal discipline; that there are no short cuts to success in life; that gainful employment and hard work are the pre-requisites to success; and that crime certainly does not pay[122]. If Singaporean viewers are already well-socialised on what it takes to succeed in life within the national community, Crime Watch confirms what they already know, restricting public discussions to those which respond to the pedantic texts of a paternalistic government (Chua 1995), whilst sealing off room for considering alternative discourses. Without a materially conducive space for exploring alternatives, the individual is forced to rely upon commonly-rehearsed narratives[123], which can nonetheless be creatively re-interpreted by individuals to make sense of their worlds. What geographer Lily Kong (2000) terms an ideology of pragmatism, does not only refer to the staid and overly-instrumental state-led attempts to enliven the creative industries sector, but is also a reflection of how

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[121] It is nonetheless important to note that there exist many sets of national narratives which can be drawn upon as discourses, and these do not necessarily all fit nicely into a single, coherent, overarching narrative. An overarching narrative only arises to the extent that the individual decides to condense his worldview into a simplified version for the purposes of communication under various circumstances. A focus on narratives as discursive devices is more in the Foucauldian sense in that one should not ignore the fact that narratives are constantly imbricated in contextually-specific historical materialisms.

[122] This prevention slogan itself is a clear indication of the economistic tendency in the police's criminology: property criminal offences are often simply attributed to materialistic greed.

[123] Singaporeans have a long tradition of embracing slapstick comedies[123] that enframe a social Darwinist logic on screen. These local productions range from locally produced fare on schooling within a competitive education system (*I Not Stupid*), to the struggles at work places (*Money Not Enough*; *Can I Help You?*; *Phua Chu Kang*; *I Not Stupid*; *Just Follow Law*; *Pay Day*). These texts taken together help foster cynicism within the Singaporean population, when they profess to be truthful in their depictions of the world as an urban jungle made up of competitive socio-biological beings who ultimately will have to participate in the race to accumulate greater material possessions. The eugenicist beliefs of hard-talking elder statesman Lee Kuan Yew only serve to strengthen claims to these 'hard truths'.

Singaporeans have learnt to view themselves. Practicality becomes a favoured response to queries by social researchers on the state of Singaporean culture, even as it is subtly reproduced in everyday life, binding the population to various forms of regulation via an effective governmentalisation of the state (Foucault 2001). When the hegemonising discourses of political elites are naturalised as practical common sense, power is able to operate through individual bodies and the national collective. The boundaries of the psychological and the social become intensely interwoven into each other, producing many different affective resonances whose culturally similar traits risk being mistakenly simplified to a racially-inflected pragmatism which reinforces the hegemonic order (Gramsci 2010).

The genius of the national narrative is that since political independence it has simultaneously, consistently and habitually propounded a liberal economic rationality[124] which all too frequently collapses into a socio-biological motif. Socially ugly behaviours like *kiasu*-ism[125] or mean-spiritedness can be condoned within economistic thinking, and in fact may even be viewed with some civic pride and humour for their purportedly unique, strategically advantageous Singaporean cultural traits. When everyone else is engaging in such practices either overtly (such as taking the more expensive dishes at buffets or not demonstrating situational proprieties at queues in public places) or covertly (resorting to *guanxi*[126] to snatch a business deal or to manoeuvre office politics), choosing to exercise self-restraint becomes a voluntary act of well-policed individuals, who are prone to be perceived as weak or even foolish in their adherence to impractically high standards of morality. When these individuals are charged with allegations of wrongdoing, cynics can claim to have known all along that it was only a matter of time before hypocritical behaviours be brought to light. As economistic thinking is seemingly corroborated by intellectual resources such as modernisation theory, multiracialism, meritocracy, situational crime prevention and realist international relations, a

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[124] One may of course object to this by pointing out that the PAP was a member of the Socialist International until 1976. However, much historical work has been done to expose the principle considerations of the ruling party since the 1960s (e.gs. Chan 1971; Chua 1995; Kong and Yeoh 2003).

[125] Literally translated as 'being afraid to lose', but it is also extended to cover misogynistic behaviour such as hiding books in the library so that no one else can find them, sending children to attend multiple tuition classes, and queuing up to make discounted purchases or to collect freebies.

[126] A mandarin term which refers to the preferences of the Chinese to conduct business with culturally similar others (Yeung 2007)

naturalisation of the state of affairs obscures recognition of the extensive state practices that go into the constitution of the nation and the national economy. Moreover, the banalisation of state regulative practices, of which crime prevention is but one, makes pervasive if imprecise the presence of the state-as-effects (Painter 2006). This has in turn produced a feeling of jadedness amongst individuals, when the deepening statisation of everyday life leaves little room for surprises. From the registration of births, granting of childcare subsidies, and mandating of pre-school educative programmes, to the promotion of active ageing health campaigns, construction of studio apartments for the elderly, and the issuing of death certificates, the governing of the biological life of the population has increasingly left little room to chance. Such is the penetrative depth of regulative mechanisms in the developmental city-state as the national economy has progressively been inserted into the world-economy, that some individuals have become forcefully entrenched[127] in the model of liberal economic rationality espoused by the ruling party. This model of economic thinking privileges competitive behaviours that seek out material advancement for oneself under the guise of meritocracy.

While it would appear almost ridiculous to credit a small production like Crime Watch with an ability to impact significantly upon everyday sociality, what Crime Watch has done, either intentionally or otherwise, is to provide further supporting evidence of the opportunistic behaviours of the criminal/ economically competitive other. In so doing, it links up with the prevalent national narrative of the day to strengthen the claims for the existence of a broad, overarching, meta-national, economistic narrative. With the consolidated, coherent policing of moralised legal boundaries, what is additionally allowed is the displacement of guilt unto victims and criminals whose self-interests have run afoul of the law. The cynic is not challenged but is fooled into believing that as someone who upholds the law, is cognisant of crime prevention measures and who probably habitually puts them into practice, he/she does not need to listen to the opinions of others, since there is nothing new under the sun. In so doing, he/she becomes not open to surprises (Agnew 2006).

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[127] Enforcing a particular mindset upon any individual is of course an extremely painful and merciless process. While this process can never be expected to fully succeed, its effects can be surprisingly pervasive and durable, scarring the lives of individuals forced to put up with it.

CHAPTER FIVE: COMMUNITY POLICING IN PRACTICE

This chapter explores the practices surrounding community policing through looking at a case study of the Volunteer Special Constabulary (VSC) within the Singapore Police Force (SPF). In so doing, it attempts to fill a void within academic literature in its insistence on broadening conceptualisations of community policing beyond their contemporary mutations as a communitarian philosophy, a management technique or an external critique. While the historical context shapes the official discourse on community policing, as a form of voluntary association, community policing in practice is performative of actions that constantly exceed, reinforce, support, negotiate, challenge, resist and subvert the intended power relations attached to formal discourses. This chapter attempts to draft a new script for community policing that approaches the topic from a diverse/community perspective (see Gibson-Graham 2006). It attends to the question of how community policing is practised by analysing the reasons why a selected group of volunteers decided to participate in a VSC scheme that was designed to rope in volunteer police officers to supplement the professional police force.

Understanding the motivations and experiences of these volunteers can help one better appreciate the ways that community policing is translated from a policy statement, a crime prevention advice, or a community engagement tool into an active policing of one's community. Policing socialities are diverse and wide-ranging, complexly bound up with ethical conduct (Rose 1999) and affective notions of community (see Williams 1975) in ways that exceed attempts at rationalising community policing. This chapter thus seeks not to critique the success or failure of official community policing, but rather to begin to appreciate the complicated processes by which individuals subject themselves to serving as volunteers who police their own communities, and thereby extend the network of community/policing over time. For this, I have adopted a performative approach to community which emphasises the pre-reflexive, pre-discursive and irreducible aspects of community (see Arendt 1958; Studdert 2005). Since communities are constantly enacted within spatial limits (Staeheli 2008), one can theorise that communities are policed with every performance that brings it into being. As

such, a functional equivalence exists between policing and community, making it logical to extend the discourse of community policing to other traditionally non-policing fields (Rose 1999), like the capitalist economy (Joseph 2002), or in the Singaporean context, public health (Teo et al. 2008), racial and religious harmony (Kong and Yeoh 2003) and civics and moral education (Tan and Chew 2004).

In taking its cue from the reflections of volunteer police officers, this chapter is committed towards providing a grounded perspective of community policing which focuses on how individuals enrol into, submit to and reproduce the VSC network. In order to re-appropriate the discourse of community policing, interviews were approached with a certain degree of openness which would allow interviewees' responses to be taken at face value. The transcribed texts are nonetheless indicative of the varying proximities that were enacted during scheduled interview sessions with volunteers, thereby revealing in finer detail the contours of the local volunteering culture which had permitted the sessions to take place, even whilst intimate experiences of volunteering remain concealed from my knowledge. The write-up is drawn from personal interviews with sixteen Volunteer Special Constables over the space of two months. It is divided into three portions with the front two dealing with the enrolment in and reproduction of the policing network, and the final one harnessing this knowledge towards understanding how community/policing is practised through the personal networks of individuals. A short review of the VSC is first offered.

The VSC is a volunteer policing scheme that has a long history in Singapore, starting out as early as 1938 with the formation of a Police Volunteer Reserve in response to the need for policing political and labour unrest (Lim et al. 1998). Following the end of the Japanese Occupation, the British colonial powers re-organised the Reserve into a Volunteer Special Constabulary unit that was in-charge of performing foot, radio and jeep patrols to support the regular force at Police Land Divisions. Volunteers were recruited to buttress the weakened police force through the provision of additional manpower for policing duties. After the completion of basic training at Central Police Station, volunteers would serve in three capacities: full-time; during emergency

work; or at their places of employment. The VSC played a prominent role in establishing law and order through the policing of many riots that peppered the 1950s and 1960s. The prevailing restive political scene elicited the contributions of many volunteers, whose ranks rose from 60 in 1947 to over 2,000 in the 1950s. The absence of financial remuneration was partially compensated with the establishment of welfare associations that provided financial assistance, amenities and sporting equipment to volunteers. Social evenings, shooting competitions and award ceremonies were similarly set up to acknowledge the contributions of the Volunteer Special Constables (henceforth referred to as VSC as well).

Two years after political independence in 1967, the VSC was re-located to the Special Constabulary unit of the police, sharing the department with conscripts under the newly-institutionalised Part-time Police National Service (PNS)[128]. The volunteer scheme was further consolidated through the establishment of a clubhouse, a dental clinic, a Constabulary magazine, and a specialised Training Unit for volunteers. Despite these attempts at greater institutionalisation, the number of volunteers decreased considerably, falling back to slightly over 600 by 1981. Rapid industrialisation and demoralised volunteers sparked yet another round of re-organisation that year. Part-time National Service was abolished, and volunteers were fronted by a separate Volunteer Special Constabulary unit. The post of VSC Commander was introduced, the ranks of VSCs were re-organised into Operations and Headquarters, and VSCs were allowed to serve within specialist units such as the Central Narcotics Bureau, Secret Societies Branch and Anti-Vice Enforcement Unit. Recruitment drives for VSC took off in the 1980s, as more volunteers were sought to fulfil various tasks such as neighbourhood patrols, crime prevention house visits and service in the Police Boys' Club.

In the 1990s, steps towards a deeper integration with the regular force of the SPF were underway, seeking 'to restructure VSC…in line with SPF's restructured staff-line concept', and 'to develop the VSC into a professional unit and creditable establishment…under the ambit of the SPF' (Lim et al. 1998:105). Deeper integration with the police force necessitated greater

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[128] The housing of volunteers alongside conscripts under the Special Constabulary unit demoralised many volunteers who were unhappy that they were grouped together with police conscripts.

professionalisation of VSC, in terms of training, operations, deployment and planning. Greater professionalisation meant volunteers had to meet stringent selection criteria to successfully apply as a VSC, undergo an extended 9-months training in police school (consisting of two 4-hourly sessions each week for 9 months), and serve a mandated monthly minimum of 16 hours for Junior Officers and 32 hours for Senior Officers as VSCs. The voluntary nature of the job is however still reflected in the standard allowance offered to VSCs of S$3.60/hour, an amount which is barely enough to purchase a meal in present-day Singapore. Compared to regular officers of the police force, upon completion of their basic training, volunteers are not bonded to the VSC in any way, other than the requirement to provide a minimum of one month's notice before resignation. VSCs looking to stay in the force would need to fulfil their respective hours of duty. A warning would be issued to volunteers who fail to meet their quota each month. After three warnings, volunteers will be called up to provide explanations. Counselling may also be given, before officers who continue to be unable to clock the necessary hours are forced to part ways with the VSC. Nonetheless officers do have the option of re-joining as a VSC, and they are exempted from training if they re-join within a period of three years from the date of resignation.

Clearly then, volunteering in the VSC is increasingly restricted to a highly-formalised and professional form of volunteering. The demands being made of volunteers are considerable and sustained, differentiating this service from other informalised or less formalised voluntary associations. Volunteering is better understood when one looks into the context of civic voluntarism: extricating the various constraints and motivators in the acts of volunteering become key. It is here that one encounters the volunteer's decision-making in enrolling into the policing network.

Enrolment Processes

The decision to enrol as a VSC is the product of many different processes, comprising: (i) desire; (ii) motivations for volunteering; (iii) awareness of opportunities for volunteering; (iv) capacities for volunteering; (v) eases of applying, heading down for screenings and training; and (vi) actual experiences of volunteering. This compartmentalisation of the enrolment process here serves an analytical function. In reality, processes are frequently condensed into one another in all sorts of ways that refuse easy categorisations.

Desire

Certain desires could be satisfied through volunteering with the VSC. While desires can never be fully articulated through discourse, the active process of self-reflection provides a way for individuals to locate their desire.

> Mark (myself): What made you volunteer as a VSC?
>
> Colin: Well, firstly, it is a main interest in police work. Probably as a legacy of wanting to join the police force as a regular...
>
> James: I think the interest is the most important factor...meaning an interest in policing work.
>
> Azlan: I'd say it's my passion...I can take the bikes which nobody can ride actually. I'd say these are the things that I like.

The statement of interest in police work in response to a question on their reasons for volunteering is indicative of strong feelings towards volunteering as a police officer. Personal interest in police work covers the following: a passion for the broad scope of law enforcement duties being performed by police officers; patriotism for ensuring the safety and security of Singapore; the belief in sticking to the right side of the law and helping others do the same; the challenge of preventing, detecting, and solving crime; and the ability to operate the

professional equipment being used by the police. Interest in police work is cultivated through different means, such as watching popular crime dramas on television and in the cinema.

> Lindy: It has been my ambition since young to become a police officer...perhaps it's from all those years (of) watching *Crime Watch* on television! (Laughs)

> Chee Woon: When I was young, my ambition was always to become a police officer... Maybe (I) see too much of TVB/ Hong Kong (drama serials). You know? They are kind of inspiring us to become police (officers). So maybe it's because (I've) watched too much of these police movies and those action-packed movies. So one thing is it encouraged me lah.

For others, it was the involvement in the National Police Cadet Corps[129] (NPCC) when they were in secondary school, which socialised them in the ropes of police work during their youth. The presence of role models within personal communities ingratiated them into the world of policing.

> Mark C.: I actually started donning the blue when I was in secondary school as an NPCC cadet. So from there, I started to have passion and interest in the police force. In fact, my dad was also a former retired VSC officer...so probably he inspired me to join the VSC as well lah.

The idea of police work being a childhood ambition has been recognised as an important attractor by the current Head of Recruitment for VSCs.

> Mern Ney: (F)or police, it is a very unique case because they attract people who already wanted to be a policeman since they are a little boy. So this is an avenue: they don't have to join as a regular, and they get to do police work. So, the attraction is there. There'd still be a small group of people who belong to this group. No matter how busy they are, they'd still want to join.

For some recruits, desire expressed itself as a curiosity for finding out more about what it is that the police really do. The lustre of the blue uniform, the secrecy of detective work, and the forbidden spaces behind the police tape at crime scenes provide a psychic thrust for exploration that led volunteers to the VSC.

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[129] The National Police Cadet Corps (NPCC) is a uniformed group that secondary school students can join as an extra-curricular activity. It was first established in 1958, and has since become a regular fixture in most secondary schools in Singapore.

In addition to personal interests, there were needs which could be met through meeting others whilst volunteering as a police officer. Steven discusses the opportunities for interacting with people from different socioeconomic backgrounds through volunteering as an important consideration.

> Steven L.: I think one of the reasons was there were many varieties of service in VSC...I get to meet people from all walks of life in my duties and this is something not available elsewhere.

Chatting with and befriending other volunteers serving in the different police departments allowed him to learn about their job experiences in different workplaces, from that of a taxi driver to those of a proprietor of a small and medium-sized enterprise, and this helped him to 'enlarge his circle of friendship'. For Jimmy, the sterile workplace of his dental clinic stirred up a greater interest in volunteering.

> Jimmy: (E)very day when I see my patient, whatever I tell the patient, the patient takes it lah. Because I'm the authority. Whenever I see them for a dental appointment, I tell them...And then it's a very small clinic. (For) all the staff there...I'm actually the boss of them and the clinic. So it's only one-way (communication). And then when I join the police force, I actually went through rank-and-file, from corporal to what I'm actually today lah. And I've actually worked in environments where there are bosses and there are different departments, and I'd enjoy working in this kind of bigger organisations.

Yet other VSCs spoke of a passion to contribute (something) back to society. This was in line with the official governmental discourse on volunteering, in which volunteering is explicitly framed as participation in formal voluntary welfare organisations and grassroots organisations, spurred by a sentimental compassion towards the needy members of society (Chua 1995). A few interviewees nonetheless took the effort to flesh out their civic-mindedness.

> Sani: Passion is the way you can pay back to the society; the way you provide a safe environment to society. This is in line with the police mission and goal lah! I think we have always dared to go in, to maintain law and order, security and safety...

For Sani, the alignment of the SPF's mission statement to personal beliefs made his principled contributions back to society as a VSC a matter of common-sense. In fact, his enthusiasm for community work had already directed him to his daytime job in the social services arm of the state. Working for a Community Development Council (CDC), Sani is responsible for administering social benefits to residents of his region under the government's recently-installed social safety net programmes. Coincidentally, the other interviewee who spoke at length about giving back to society also possessed prior working experience in the social services sector. In his case, Mark S. was actually working with the People's Association (PA) when he first interacted with police officers sitting in at a grassroots event organised by the PA.

> Mark S.: I used to be in (the) People's Association. That's why I work in (the) constituency office. So I deal a lot with the police. Sad to say, police is the only agency to attend the grassroots meetings. Which would become a collection point – which is totally unfair. Because you see, if all the agencies don't attend, everyone will tell you all their problems. But at the end, more than 90% of the issues did not come under the police's duties. But sad to say, you are the only one (present). So you become the collection point. So you'd go and collect, collect. Then you'd have to revert back to other agencies. Then the other agencies would take it that you're giving (them) problems...But this is not the police's jurisdiction, so they cannot do anything. So how to go and tell the grassroots committee? So I got to work quite closely with them on some project. Then thereafter, I find it (police) quite interesting. I thought 'How come you all do things like that?' Then I come across...this volunteer police. So I went to find out more. Then (I) end(ed) up filling up the application form.

A need to solve his constituency's problems fed the collaboration with police officers performing community policing in their neighbourhood. This in turn led him to apply to become a VSC in order to learn more about police work and to help them better meet the community's needs.

And for Larry, a wish to contribute something back to society was not an initial driving force for him to become a VSC. However it was through volunteering as a VSC that he caught a glimpse of the landscapes of poverty in Singapore and this sensitised him to his formerly invisible privileges in life.

Larry: Because in our daily life, we would not be able to see how some people live... You'd not be able to see certain things...that only as a uniformed officer, you can see. Things like when you attend to a case, then you really realise how poor people are. And that makes you feel fortunate. And at the same time, sometimes you manage to stop a crime, or arrest someone, you feel like you've done a little bit lah, in making Singapore a safer place.

The nurturing of 'civic values that imply participation will be accompanied by the psychic gratification of having fulfilled a duty' (Ogilvie 2004:89) has been experienced by Larry, so much so that he now believes that he will continue helping out as a volunteer elsewhere, once he has retired from the VSC.

Motivation

Motivation clearly overlaps with desire in complicated ways. The focus of this section is on the impetus for volunteering which is analytically distinct from desire. While desire connotes a lack of something that drives an individual forward, motivation points more sharply to factors that trigger the act of participation whilst affecting the kind of involvement in policing. Given the large amount of interest shown in police work by VSCs, a common decision made by interviewees would involve the rejection of the opportunity to join as a regular police officer. For some interviewees, this was not a decision they could make. Instead, they were thrust with rejection letters from the SPF's Manpower Department.

Azlan: I've been wanting to join the police force since childhood. To be frank to you, I was rejected actually during the army. I was rejected because they don't want me to disrupt the army. After NS (National Service), I tried. But (I) was rejected three times. Three times! (Laughs)... I was disappointed, but I still got the passion for the police force. That's when I heard of the VSC.

Chee Woon: At first, I tried to join the Singapore Police Force as (a) regular. Actually I had a job. Working in IT also. At the job fair I tried enrolling into SPF but I was rejected. (Laughs) But for no reason lah. I'd submitted my resume but was rejected. But my friends said 'Eh! You cannot lose hope. There's another way – you can join VSC!'

For both Azlan and Chee Woon, the possibility of joining the police as a regular was closed off to them for reasons that may or may not be known to them. Nonetheless, friendly contacts

alerted them to the openings of volunteer policing, and they seized the opportunity to perform police work, albeit on a part-time basis. The presence of friendly encouragement was also crucial in cultivating their interest in specific aspects of police work. While Azlan had his friends and uncle to thank for inciting in him a passion for riding Traffic Police motorbikes, Chee Woon was motivated by the shooting lessons he had to undertake as part of the training to become a VSC. Shooting was a hobby that he and his friend shared as a pastime.

Others decided on volunteering over regular service due to a host of personal circumstances.

> Steven L.: Actually I wanted to join as a regular. But back then, the pay was too low ah (Laughs). The regular pay was so low!

> Colin: I wanted to join the Police Force as a regular officer – that was in the year 2000. So I went through the interview process, selection process...however my girlfriend wasn't supportive. So after the letter of acceptance, I wasn't able to take up the letter of acceptance for training. But then again that's why I'm here as a VSC, volunteering. It's a slightly different scope of work as compared to a regular officer, but it's still very good...

> Mark C.: Er...the thing is...if you are working outside, you still can have a taste of private life, private sector. Whereas if I join a uniformed group, that means I'll be so-called stuck in a group...in the police force or a uniformed organisation. So now...with joining the VSC, I can actually have the best of both worlds lah! I can see both the outside world as well as the uniform organisation.

> Steven T.: Actually my intention was to sign on. But subsequently I think that...because if I sign on, I've got too many... Because I'm also a private coach. So if I continue as a full-time police officer, I cannot do any more (coaching)...yah. So that's why I choose to join as (a) volunteer, so I can still continue and do my things...my job.

> Christopher: Yes, we have thought of joining the police force as (a) regular. Joining the police force is also to see what the police force is (like) before I commit... But we're aware that (if) you come in as a JO (Junior Officer), you'd learn the groundwork, and it contributes to your life as a senior officer as well. Because you can never be on the ground as a senior officer. So this is an opportunity.

Bread-and-butter issues, family concerns, the attractions of working in the private sector, the reluctance to part with a pre-existing income stream, and an inclination for better ground sensing prior to committing to a regular, full-time service guided interviewees towards the

volunteering arm of the police. For interviewees who had experience recruiting for the VSC, it was the latter reason that would be regarded in favourable light.

> Mark S.: (For) those taking it as a stepping stone, (to) try out, find out is it suitable for me, I think there's nothing wrong. Because some people don't want the 2 year (training) bond (of a regular). So if I try this VSC and see something, that I want to take it as a career and really embark on it, then it's fine.

The utilisation of VSC as a 'stepping stone', or a 'spring board' towards a regular career with the police was refractive of the social norm of according great importance towards one's career in Singapore. With low starting salaries of a job with the SPF no longer a concern for potential recruits, the issue is now framed in terms of job satisfaction, career prospects and work commitment. The pursuit of full-time employment during one's youthful days was a time-consuming task that should be taken seriously, since it affected one's social mobility. An individual's job also acquired increased significance as a source of self-identification.

For interviewees joining the VSC in the bid to be socialised into police work, another significant motivation was the ability to learn about day-to-day police work, police procedures, Criminal Law and self-defence tactics.

> Colin: I am always interested in law enforcement issues. In fact at this current point I am contemplating a law post-graduate degree at SMU (Singapore Management University). So components of the law have always been interesting to me.

> Jimmy: (A)t that point in time, in 1984, the police force itself was a bit different from now...Now's it's very...so-called customer-orientated. And then...at that time, the police were more aggressive. And I remember that...because I drove in the UK, and in the UK we tend to drive at higher speeds lah. So here there was an incident that I didn't signal. So I was stopped at a highway by a patrol car. But the police officer who stopped me...the way he came across was very aggressive, very rude. So I told myself, I should go into the police force to find out for myself what is basically their thinking lah!

> Christopher: Yes it (the decision) was hard, and it took us about 2 years to decide whether to join the police force or not. Because once you joined, you'd have to stick by it lah.
> Mark (myself): So what helped you decide?

Christopher: Erm...partly because of the job to understand the police force better. Because before that there was no reason because we were doing Ministry of Defence work. Yes we wanted to join the VSC, but there was no push factor. So, you'd need a push and a pull. The push was not great enough... But when we wanted to go into the police force, to understand their operations... the push was greater at that point. So that's the reason why we joined.

Motivations for learning span the generic, the intimate and the practical. Based on their respective motivations, individuals would adopt different perspectives towards volunteering as a VSC. And this would in turn produce different learning outcomes. Motivations must also be continually reproduced through the practice of volunteering itself, for an individual to be committed towards fulfilling the entry and training requirements, and to stay within the policing network.

In addition, while interviewees cited various personal motivations for volunteering, when they were asked to cite the motivations of others, the presence of wrong motives was alluded to.

Jimmy: I think...a handful, not the majority...it's to have a warrant card... Initially lah, it's power. But with the number of years and people that I've seen, somehow this number of people has mellowed down. They'd realise that the warrant card does not mean a lot. Especially in the present context, you know? Police officers are no more like 20 years ago. And, those people who come in with the objective of power, (as it) end(s) up, they cannot last long. Because they would get into cases or whatever. But even as I say this, I must quantify that not all of them are like this. Overall, Singapore Police Force is quite a reputable police force internationally.

Larry: It (The VSC scheme) is not a cup of tea for everyone. They must really believe in serving. I think that's the key thing. Because some join for the wrong reason. Sometimes people may think...they'd look at Hong Kong shows ah...too many Hong Kong shows and they'll think that police is all powerful. But you'll realise that you'll have to be very careful ah. Because as a volunteer, when you go out, people don't know that you are a volunteer. And to upkeep the image of the police force is very important.

Clearly motivations were filtered through normative lenses. Some were to be valued above others, while some were viewed with outright disapproval.

Awareness

While desire and motivations provide crucial driving forces behind volunteering, the need for generating awareness should not be obviated. Indeed much of the above-mentioned passions had included within them a source that directed individuals to volunteering as a VSC. From a well-intentioned friend, to a proximate kin who used to serve in the force as a regular or volunteer, to uniformed groups that publicise the VSC scheme and to contacts working in the force, recruitment of new members thrived through word-of-mouth. Individuals had been successfully persuaded to join the VSC through positive endorsements given by close friends, family members, respectable youth institutions and serving police officers. Trust in these social and biological kin not only created awareness of the existence of the VSC within the SPF, but also guided individuals towards an active participation in the policing network. On the occasion that individuals found themselves striving for a non-regular service with the force, VSC provided a handy option that could fulfil their various needs.

However where awareness is not forthcoming, there have to be platforms for disseminating information on VSCs. These include newspaper recruitment advertisements, media reports on VSC, online recruitment websites, information booths at various police front desks and the front desks of partner agencies of the police, and recruitment fairs held at public places at regular intervals throughout the year. The distribution technologies of the different media must be well understood in order for them to be harnessed with greater purpose and sensitivity. Mark S., who has experience in helping out with recruitment, notes the challenges associated with printing newspaper advertisements.

> Mark S.: (T)his year, we even put up advertisements in the newspapers. Well, I mean that's quite expensive... (But) How well is the response? Well, I mean, (we have) yet to know. Though (for the) newspaper everyone can read, but after read(ing), they might just throw (it) away. What's the follow-up? What's the returns? So all these will need to follow up.

In contrast to the other modes of reaching out, hosting recruitment road shows is perhaps the most time-consuming. Logistical preparations to set up a recruitment booth may involve partnerships with grassroots organisations to hitchhike on their communal bonding events.

> Sani: (S)ometimes they'd ask the RC (Residents' Committee) to do community programmes, so we'd let them set up stalls at (our) functions. We'd do the promotion of CSSPs...

Recruitment road shows involve the transportation, assembly and disassembly of numerous police gadgets which together project an image of a professionalised force that is earnest about recruiting new participants into its network.

> Mark S.: You can see some of the posters at the back (see Figures 5.1-5.3). In fact, last time, there was a lot there and even got those stand-up banners also. Quite a lot got spoilt because of all these wear and tear. Because we run a lot of those recruitment drives and so forth. And all these help to so-called live up the image, and this creates awareness. As you know, before everything moves up, the awareness must come in first. Once people get to aware, then they will notice something.

Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3: Attractions of Joining the VSC
Source: Volunteer Special Constabulary (2010) *Publicity Posters of the VSC* [Posters] Singapore: SPF.

Image projection surfaces the professional opportunities for volunteering with the SPF. Formalised training, specialist expertise, the discipline associated with a uniform organisation, operation of specialised equipment, deployment for frontline duties and homo-social activities associated with team bonding are listed as some of the attractions for joining the police force as a volunteer. VSC thus avidly attaches itself to the uniform of the SPF in recruitment processes. The sense of danger and adventure is translated via the language of management speak to highlight the different ways that volunteering can help advance personal development. Through this, the viewer is assured of a safe and structured outlet for participation. The aestheticisation of the police organisation also reaffirms its organisational identities in ways that the viewer can easily relate to. A professional volunteering experience is highlighted, as serving VSCs are called upon to don their uniform to man the recruitment booths.

Azlan: Basically when they see Traffic Police, this is what I realise. They will always come to me first. That's why when we have road shows, those who are in Traffic Police must wear white. So we have the (line and staff) department(s) and division(s): they'd have to wear blue...Transcomm (Transport Command), they wear their own uniform. I realise that many of them actually go to Transcomm or Traffic Police. I'm not sure why, but maybe they like the different uniforms.

Beyond creating awareness, road shows offer a chance for members of the public to personally interact with currently-serving VSCs.

Azlan: Normally, I'd ask them whether they have passion there. When they talk to us, I'd say, 'Why do you want to join? For example, we have this equipment... We have one day, (when) you can actually come over, there will be a talk. Listen up, open up your mind and listen to what they can actually offer you.'

Colin: Ideally, we want the form completed as and when...on the spot. So at least we can have the statistics being tabulated. Nevertheless, we give people the flexibility because this is volunteering – it's not under the Enlistment Act, which is a separate matter by itself. We do give them the flexibility to think about it, to consult their family members. Of course we'll pass them the form, we'll pass them a card, where there is a linkage back to the organisation, and it facilitates their subsequent signing up if they are interested. So it's a two-way street: we give them the flexibility because we want them to sign on as well. So one of the means of getting them to sign on sooner rather than later is that we tell them to submit their application (first). It takes a couple of weeks for it to be processed. In the meantime, should you change your mind, you have the liberty and flexibility to withdraw your application.

Christopher: I talk more about why I want to join the VSC, how much fun we have...to entice them lah. But I will not approach them saying 'Do you want to join the VSC?' Because why? Once they get their buy-in on their own, they will tend to ask you to get a form to fill (in). And such officers tend to last longer in the force. Versus you convincing them on the spot. It's just like buying something...and then when you go back you find that you have no use for it, you know? (Laughs) But then it's a lot of money to actually train an officer. And a lot of officers actually drop out halfway through the course...because of commitment, because of time. So I tend to take a different stance: to have them come to us rather than we go to them.

Interviewees took different approaches in handling the difficulties of recruitment at road shows. In their opinion, volunteering with the VSC was not a simple decision to make, but required considerable thought and commitment. The priority would thus be to generate awareness rather than sealing the deal.

Mern Ney: We have tried going to malls, but I think people who sign on the spot, it's just a spark of...people who just want to try. But most of the time, they will not come forward when we ask them to come, because we do have different processes. They have to pass a psychometric test, they have to pass an interview, then physical check, and medical. These are the four things. So when people from the mall sign up...the attendance will not be so big. It's not so good. Maybe it's just like, erm, they sign for fun and after that they think that it is not suitable. So the only suitable way is through awareness... Then throughout their life, they will decide, when they want to sign up online. So that one is more reliable. So this is a better way: let them have the choice.

Capacity

Volunteering to be a VSC commands a lot of resources ranging from time, money and energy, to physical, emotional and psychological capabilities. All the interviewees had a main job in addition to serving as a volunteer[130]. The existence of separate employment meant volunteers had at least one other external income stream and did not have to rely on the token allowance proffered under the VSC scheme for subsistence. While financial concerns were rendered invisible in conversations, the normalisation of professional attitudes towards work was prominent. Discussants almost always spoke about time management when asked about their capacity for volunteering (see next section). Having sufficient rest in order to handle the physical exertions of multiple jobs was another concern, albeit for fewer participants. These mentions suggest that for most VSCs, desire and a motivation to serve was more significant than a consideration of personal capacities to do so. Management techniques to optimise personal resources could be applied once a decision had been made to volunteer. By implication, other individuals holding similar occupations who did not volunteer would ostensibly use the lack of time as an a priori justification for their lack of civic involvement.

Mark (myself): What do you think are some of the obstacles to volunteering?
Mern Ney: I think time. It's always (about) time management. Especially people with families, people with children. But I have known a lot VSCs with family, with kids. They

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[130] It is important to note that there are several VSCs who do not have a main job, having left their original job to become homemakers (Interviews with Colin and Mern Ney).

are ladies, they are mothers. But I think they are able to contribute very healthy hours. So, I think it boils down to your own time management.

As all the interviewees had successfully applied to enter the VSC, an explicit recognition of the requisite capabilities for volunteering may have been obscured. Nevertheless, the level of commitment required for professional volunteering did produce in some individuals a level of self-awareness.

> Colin: (W)hen I sat down years ago and thought about volunteering, certain areas of volunteering I did not see myself contributing well. For example I do not relate well to old people, like volunteering at an old aged home. With regards to children, I am not proficient in dealing with young children in a home context. So merging all my respective needs, my expectations of myself, self-assessed strengths, I think the VSC context was the best one then and it still is now.

Working as a VSC in fact allowed individuals to continually assess their own skills and weaknesses. For some, this led to the nurturing of self-confidence, when they could actively help out the police in their various duties.

> Mern Ney: Every new incident we come across is a learning experience. It also makes us calmer. You know that ladies are more inclined to be too emotional? So I think it's a good experience for ladies. To calm yourself, to... At least we are trained in PDT (Police Defence Tactics)...things like that. So all these additional... it adds to our confidence. These are actually quite extreme cases; I think if you are a normal lady, you'd be, erm, shocked!

> Shaun: Because for my job...I'm a specialist in piping. During my police job, I'm in the gambling squad. Then there's a lot of gambling dens. There they'd play the *pai gat ong* (a traditional Chinese gambling game). Then when the police come and raid, they'd flush away all the dominoes. Then how to get the evidence? You'd need (a) specialist lah! I know how the flush (system) works, how the whole thing goes. Now I'm able to break them down and catch them red-handed. Very useful lah, in my work.

For others, the capacity to volunteer was acutely tied up to the support by one's nuclear family. Here's an exchange between Sani and Shaun.

> Sani: It's important for family support. I agree with Shaun. Family is... My wife has no problem. Because my father-in-law was a policeman before. (Laughs) So no problem... But my wife said: 'Part-time policeman – okay, but not full-time!' (Laughs again)

> Shaun: Yah, because sometimes your family must support you, if not otherwise... (Voice trails off)

However due to the dominant conceptualisations of volunteering in Singapore, most respondents did not stress the importance of family support as an important consideration in their capacity to volunteer. Where family members were mentioned, they were commonly cast as familial dependents who took a back seat in the decision-making process. Wives, children and parents were often only informed of the decision after it had already been made. Some would need convincing that their decision to volunteer was wise and that it would not endanger or disrupt their lives or livelihoods.

Convenience

Functionally conjoined to volunteering capacity, this category nonetheless deserves to be singled out in order to parse the different rituals of purification that new VSC recruits have to undergo. There are several steps that an individual needs to take once he/she has decided to participate in the VSC. These are: (i) filling up the application form; (ii) meeting the various entry criteria for VSCs; (iii) passing through the four recruitment gatekeepers of a psychometric test, an interview, a medical examination and a background check; and (iv) commuting to the police training academy.

Before application forms could be downloaded from the Internet, they had to be retrieved from recruitment fairs and the front counters of police departments. This might have incurred greater expenses for potential volunteers, but it serendipitously motivated several interviewees to participate in the scheme.

> Shaun: (A)ctually I don't know anything about police work. During my NS, my brother signed up as a VSC. Then he also put my name in. Then (it) end(ed) up that he could not get in because he had not completed his NS yet. For me, when I go for interview, then I know more about VSC and about police work. Then after that I go for training, and from there, I loved police work!

Mern Ney: (I)t's really by chance for myself, because my brother is actually also a VSC. So when he signed up, then he told me to sign up. 'Since your training is so boring, why not you join me?' Because I think for ladies, we have not been to NS, so we have no idea...what's uniformed organisation all about.

Partaking in the VSC with a friend can also serve many different functions, such as enabling siblings to extend their repertoire of shared experiences, or learning more about a spouse's personality. Volunteering provides a greater variety of social encounters for friends that can provide a test of relationships, helping to hopefully strengthen bonds over time. In these situations, the slight inconveniences volunteers have to put up with pale in significance to the potential experiential value to be gained.

With online application forms now available, interested recruits can take their time to consider the implications of volunteering as a VSC before signing up. Nevertheless, entry requirements have become stricter over the years. In addition to the usual indicators of physical health, cognitive abilities and criminal records, recruits now have to be in possession of an adequate Physical Examination Status (PES), pass an institutionalised physical fitness test, the Individual Physical Proficiency Test (IPPT), and manoeuvre a psychometric test in order to proceed to join the ranks of a VSC.

Stephen: In the past we didn't used to have any certification of fitness levels. The requirement for PES A or B (for male recruits) is a new criterion which has made it tougher for people to join VSC... (B)ecause there are always good and bad apples within each crop of applicants, we have to make sure that...there is a streaming of the bad from the good. That's the purpose of having a psychometric test. It has already been used on people applying to join the police as regulars, so it's only natural that we extend it to VSCs. We want to exclude people with the wrong motivations, especially those who can't join as regulars and want to try out as VSCs. Our message is that VSCs' (entry) will not be any easier.

Interviews with a panel of police officers also became more professionalised.

Mark S.: For every panel, now we'd get one regular to sit in. In the past, (during) my time, when you go for (the) interview, because they are all VSCs, so if you know someone, you can arrange for him to sit in and interview you. Nowadays, if try to do

that, you'd get into trouble because the regulars will know, 'Eh? How come you two (are) talk(ing) funny?'

With the advent of higher entry standards, recruitment of new volunteers has inevitably become more challenging. Volunteering has become professionalised to the extent that some now regard its entry requirements as on par with those of full-time regulars. Fortunately, for individuals drawn to an image of professional volunteering, the stringent entry requirements could be rationalised by the need to qualify to enter into an elite force. However, recruiters on the ground would have to confront a new limiting factor, in the form of the recently introduced psychometric test.

> Sani: Another thing is the psychometric test...If (we) submit 100 (applicants for testing), do you know how many (would) pass? Make a guess. (Pauses and looks at me) 20. So a casualty of 80, you know? Very high, I feel! But sometimes a person's passion can be slowly developed. A psychometric test – I don't know how accurate it is...

> Jimmy: When the psychometric test came in...Before that there wasn't any psychometric test. So when 100 come in, maybe 80% get in. Now 100 come in, 20% get in. So now we have to do more recruitment drives. And in order to achieve 250, 300 recruits so-called coming in, going through the training, we need to have like 1500, in order to get the 300. So we have to spend a lot of time doing the recruitment drives. And luckily our staff – our VSCs are very enthusiastic about that lah.

Regardless of the fact that the results of psychometric testing can never be fully replicated, or the analytical issue of how accurately it can test for motives, or the dubious philosophical argument that assumes motives are fixed and discernable, the psychometric test has remained in place so far.

Candidates who met the entry criteria and had successfully passed through the gatekeepers would then have to travel to the Home Team Academy (HTA), located on the outskirts of the satellite town of Choa Chu Kang for training. While commuting would not be an issue for those who own a motor vehicle or live near the area, it was close to a chore for individuals who had to commute long distances and relied upon public transportation. Chee Woon, who had just graduated from the training academy, retained a vivid memory of his weekly journeys.

Chee Woon: I'm a systems administrator. My daytime job starts from 9-5.30. I work at this PSA (Port of Singapore Authority) Building. In one of the insurances brokers company... My working days are from Monday to Friday. (...) For me, because training at HTA starts at 6.30, till 10.30, that's about 4 hours. Sometimes when my work ends at 5.30, I have to rush. To take a bus. Let me relate. Because I say I work at PSA, in order to travel to Choa Chu Kang, there's a long...way! First of all, I leave at 5.30 to take a bus to the MRT station. Then from the MRT station, I'd take to Jurong East (MRT Interchange) and change to another train to get to Choa Chu Kang. Then from Choa Chu Kang, I have to take a (feeder) bus to get to HTA. So that's at least 1 hour 15 minutes – the fastest. The longest is one hour and a half.

Getting back from HTA proved easier for him, as he could catch a lift from fellow trainees who had driven there.

The question of the accessibility of training facilities has in fact reached the ears of higher management, who are considering creating more proximate (a)venues for training.

Jimmy: I think training was one part of it (the obstacles to people coming forward). Because you have to spend nine months and it's at HTA. You'd have to go to HTA to train. To me, the economy of the country has got to play a part. Whenever the economy is strong, lesser people will want to go all the way to HTA to do it... When the economy is down, I find that more people have more time to do VSC work. And I think now even on the training side...the training Commandant and the VSC Commandant, they are working with recruitment and looking at bringing back training nearer to town. Whether it's old PA (Police Academy), or PCC (Police Cantonment Complex). And I think you'd know from university that we can go by modules. You can go online. Certain things you can go online to do the studying. Whereas of course, (for) the shooting and all that, we'd need to go to the HTA. So we are looking at ways that we can shorten it, so we can get more officers coming in.

Training itself of course comprised yet another set of rigorous examinations that have been increasingly professionalised over time. In addition to the basic requirement of 85% attendance for training sessions, trainees have to pass the various compulsory tests prior to graduating from training school and becoming eligible for frontline duties. Upon passing out, the newly-instated VSCs serve at any one of the six Land Divisions or six specialist units that have been opened to VSCs. Job postings depend on demand and supply, with individuals allowed to state their job location preferences and to rotate between jobs after a specific time period has elapsed.

Reproduction Processes

Once volunteers had successfully enrolled into the VSC network, they would face a continuous challenge to stay within the network. Professional volunteering meant there were many rules that volunteers had to abide by, such as maintaining the work-discipline standards of a uniformed organisation and clocking a minimum of 16 or 32 hours of service each month. Repeated failures to adhere to the mandated boundaries of police work would result in them being expelled from the network. But beyond fulfilling the basic requirements of the volunteering job, keeping within the network required individuals to be subjected to various social reproduction processes. This section looks at the different processes volunteers had to undergo in order to reproduce themselves within the VSC network.

Time Management

In the high modernist, post-industrial city of Singapore, economic rationality strongly dictates that productivity standards are measured against the linearity of clock time. Abstracted time is amenable to calculation techniques which are used for comparison, aggregation, distribution, assessment and improvement of how an individual makes use of time. Inevitably, individuals have learnt to apply these techniques to themselves. The self-same logic of higher productivity translates to an individual successfully accomplishing a greater amount of things within a specified timeframe. Time management is then firstly applied to increase the amount of work that individuals can perform every day.

> Larry: Multitasking is part and parcel of my daily life. So ultimately the maxim is 'live life to the fullest'. (Laughs) We are in this transient state...so we try to maximise lah! Whatever we can help or contribute, we just do our little part.

Most often however, it is used as a coping strategy for individuals struggling with or anticipating a struggle with the added workload of volunteering. Colin succinctly defines the scope of this management strategy.

Colin: (B)eing focused on important things, not getting deviated by minor tasks, and of course, enjoying what you do... (I)n terms of time management, the important thing is you settle the important things first, which is your employment scope, your employment job, settle your family commitments, or your girlfriend or boyfriend commitments, then come to the VSC. If you were to be diligent and disciplined in it, I think you should be able to cough up about 30 hours or more...

Time management involves individuals coming up with an agenda of tasks that need to be performed, and grading them according to their importance and urgency. An individual's waking hours become a repository of his/her time budget, and time-resources are accordingly allocated across the different duties that take time to carry out. For VSCs, the legal mandate to fulfil a minimum number of hours would bear upon some individuals more than others.

Steven T.: I think most people would be worried about the hours. They're afraid 'I can't hit the minimum of 16 hours'. I think that's the most of the concerns. Because we do recruitment road shows...then they'd ask: 'For example, if I can't hit the minimum 16-hours requirement, then what will happen?' So we'll tell them...They'd be concerned, what if they cannot hit continuously for a few months? What will happen to them?

Azlan: Why I can do it this way is because I know that I have to clock 16 hours minimum. So I will actually plan what I need to do. I need to actually clock at least 8 hours in the first week: this is what I plan first. So, if I don't meet it in the first week, I meet it in the second week. Then in the meantime, if I manage to clock 8 hours in the first week, then I try to plan another 8 hours in the second week. That's where I can actually get the 16 hours. That 16, is actually the minimum. If I can get another 8 hours, that is 24 hours. That's why I plan. What I realise is...those people who actually didn't manage to join the VSC, some of them actually applied and they got in...graduate...but first week – they resigned. Why? They said they got no time.

Thus in the same breath, time management is used to penalise those who cannot afford the time to volunteer. One can discern that the concept of time management is actually more elastic in practice. Here is Colin again, continuing from where he left off in his previous quote.

Colin: Then again I think it depends on the personal individual. Because I've seen some people would have always some difficulty in managing, and some people would always do not have difficulty managing. So the spectrum (of different types of people) is there again.

Similarly, the minimum quota of 16 or 32 hours can be easily raised through peer pressure.

Mark C.: Some people join because of interest lah. But some people join for motive lah. Some people want the warrant card...to tell people that they are somebody. But of course we do have people who are really true volunteers. So they will really put in the effort and the commitment. You see, I have 2 groups of people: one group of people would come very regularly; some people once they hit their minimum requirement they'd just put a stop. So you'll have 2 kinds of people in VSC... 16 hours is just the minimum lah. Most of them would do around 30-plus, 40? And even outstanding officers, who are committed and dedicated, they are doing over 100 hours or so!

Desires can clearly spawn various excesses (see Gidwani 2008). Committing so many man-hours to one's VSC duties of course does not say anything about the quality of work performed, but this is sufficient to cause several participants to realise that there are trade-offs involved in time management.

Sani: Time management is important. I start a family, I'm doing a part-time Masters programme, I have a day-time job, my family...Yea time management! But of course, you'd have to forego certain things like overseas travelling...Like for the past few years, I've hardly gone for any! There's some sacrifices (to be made), but ultimately it's the love...(a question of) which do you prefer lah!

Mark S.: I always tell those newbies who come in. Because some people tend to be very eager, want to go all out. Well, they'd get burnt. VSC is really unique. You got a job to *jia gar* (take care), a family to take care, and you've got this volunteer (work) to take care. For the volunteer police, it is quite demanding. Because like it or not, you're in a disciplinary uniformed organisation. So sometimes the management says 'Well this one the Commander tells me – must support. I've already pledged myself to support, and I expect you all to support...a long list of things'. Then a lot (of people) at different levels in VSC will think, 'If I say no, the impression might not be so good. It might affect my performance grading, my promotion...' So a lot people would somehow go and sacrifice their family than lose a job. Yes, once a while, it is fine. But if you do it often, it will definitely affect your full-time job and your family. So I do come across some of the guys who are like that. Then I'll always tell them 'You must see what's your priority. I mean, VSC, at the end of the day, it is just a volunteer job. And you're doing it out of passion and with your own time and commitment. But is this your current priority? Is this your first priority? You must think. If you lose your job, lose your family, you're left with the VSC – is it worthwhile? You have to go and manage it.'

Time management is then largely an adaptive tactic to cope with the pressures of everyday living. Over and above the management principles of this disciplinary technique, it is important to consider the social values attached to time, and one's personal sense of time. Even when

abstract, linear time is seemingly the preferred representation of nearly all the interviewees, and even when time management has attained the status of a doxa for many individuals, the reality is much more complex than a simple application of management principles.

Compartmentalisation

Of close relation to time management is the technique of compartmentalisation. As can be seen, interviewees frequently responded to their volunteering duties by making a list of the things that needed to be done. The latter could be grouped under broad headings organised according to the type of work to be performed. Colin's personal introduction is a prime example.

> Colin: Briefly, about my day-time job, I teach in a public polytechnic, in the academic field of organisational behaviour scope of learning. So that's one hat I'm wearing. I'm also managing my family business. Of course, the third hat, what we're concerned with now is the VSC hat. So in the VSC context, I am a Team Leader in Clementi NPC, that's my primary role. I am also in charge of recruitment in Clementi Division...

This following exchange between Sani and Shaun illustrates the point well.

> Sani: You need to be able to wear different hats. That's right. I'm doing social service. When I see my clients, I definitely cannot use the police tone to treat my clients. Correct or not? In my interview (with clients) and my police interview: (it's) different...so you must know how to change hats...
> Shaun: Because the people we deal with are totally different...Behaviours are different...
> Sani: Role changing!
> Shaun: Body language is different. You cannot always give commands and all that...

The idea of individuals wearing different hats at different times provides a mental image for individuals to cope with the complexities of living in an urban environment. To prevent oneself from feeling overwhelmed by the assorted nature of urbanised work, individuals learn to sort through their activities in order to create, maintain and modify the cultural boundaries of an environment in constant flux. These performances of 'boundary work' (NIppert-Eng 1996)[131]

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[131] Nippert-Eng defines boundary work as 'the strategies, principles, and practices we use to create, maintain, and modify cultural categories' (1996:7). 'Boundary work is rooted in...cognitive distinctions (between the public and

are important for making sense of one's environment and also for articulations of identity. VSCs therefore differentiate between the different spaces they inhabit.

>Mark C.: Community policing is...you engage the community. In fact, I'm not sure whether you know? Last time we used to have the neighbourhood police post. That was before the NPC system. So...last time there was no NPC, so all the neighbourhood police officers would report to the neighbourhood police post, then they would have bicycle patrols, scooter patrols, or even foot patrols. So most of the residents they'd know the officers lah. So it's actually a very good way to reach out to the community and...you'd get more sensing of the precinct lah. You'd know what is happening, who are the neighbourhood characters: who are the criminals there, who are the drunkards, who are the troublemakers there...so it is very good lah. But because nowadays the NPC...they patrol a larger area now, and nowadays they don't mix so much with the residents. So they'd only sit in the patrol car when they patrol... (Voice trails off)

>Stephen: In the case of volunteering, I think it should be the case of you actually joining by yourself. No one should be forcing you to join. And so you are obliged to perform your best as a VSC, to become good officers, to contribute to society. There shouldn't be any forms of complaining if you've chosen to volunteer. I'd say to those who want to join, 'Don't contribute your problems to the team. Whatever problems you have at home or at work, do not bring it to VSC. And at the same time, whatever you do as a VSC, you learn to leave it here and don't take your problems back there.'

Boundary work then serves to preserve the sanctity of particular spaces.

>Steven L.: For me, family time is sacred! I always will make time for my family...on weekends, certain evenings, holidays... Family time is needed, if you ask me. It's an adjustment we have to make, because your family is important.

Other than 'family time', one could add 'rest time' or 'recreation time' to the list of spaces that need to be protected from defilement by work (Sibley 1995). But compartmentalisation also performs further functions. For several individuals, distinguishing between family, close friends, acquaintances and strangers helped them relate to different individuals appropriately.

>Lindy: For friends, I only let my close friends know that I'm volunteering. I don't tell everyone about my job, but it's not because I'm not proud of it. I am proud of my job. It's because due to the type of work I'm doing, it can be quite sensitive lah. Although it's

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private), but these are further enacted and enhanced through a striking collection of visible, practical activities' (Nippert-Eng 2010:10). This concept is particularly pertinent to police work, which has historically drawn a clear line between the public and the private (see Herbert 1997; Miller 1999; Reiner 2000).

not that sensitive as compared to (the) regulars, but it still is. So I don't tell all my friends but only the closer ones. And they'd then be quite excited about it…

Mark C.: I would say some of my friends don't know I'm a VSC lah. Because I don't really go around telling people. So those who know are actually VSCs themselves lah. So I would say they are okay. Those who know I'm VSC, they'd actually (be) like 'Wah! Can actually do so much things ah? Besides your own work, you can actually go and volunteer!'

Sani: Initially, I think we try to conceal…our identity. Because we also don't want to… Because our role (may) victimise our families. Because we are not full-time (officers) per se. So initially, we'd quite keep to ourselves. But as time goes by, we know that Singapore is not like other countries lah! So it's still quite safe lah! But then again, we don't tell the whole world! Because your whole block…(there'd be) people who expect you to help him. Then you'd be in deep trouble. So most of us would try to avoid the divisions near to your house… But now it's okay lah…but we still draw a line. Not totally open up.

Mark (myself): Do you feel VSC is a part of community policing?
Larry: Yes, I would say. But it is community policing with a lot of responsibilities lah. Because we are armed. I think that places a lot of responsibility. And it is important, because we want to expand the force, to get the right people in…with the right frame of mind, the right attitude. So that's very important.

Compartmentalisation helps to sustain the fantasy of living a double life. In the mould of the undercover detective, VSCs regard their identity as a secret which must be withheld from certain individuals who have not been allowed into their inner circle of trust[132]. Having trained hard to pass out as a VSC, individuals have successfully crossed the police tape to enter into the real world of policing. Their newly-acquired police power is something that they have worked hard for and feel responsible for. But this may be the ultimate appeal of wearing many hats: a physically confined and metaphorically constrained office worker[133] by day, and a liberated, empowered cop by night. Switching between uniforms is no longer the prerogative of the comic

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[132] There may be deviations from this norm, as in the case of individuals who explicitly choose not to inform their close kin of their secret identity, but who instead confide in distant friends or even acquaintances and strangers. The production of secret spaces here is best understood as a constrained voluntary action, since VSCs have to abide by a professional code of conduct that demarcates their work and personal lives clearly.
[133] Or one may replace this with the devalued blue-collared manual worker by day who transforms into an empowered blue-collared uniformed cop by night.

book superhero, but is something that volunteers can routinely perform in their everyday lives to great satisfaction.

Routines

Adaptation to VSC work could be facilitated through performing activities of a repetitive and predictable nature. Most commonly, this translates to having a stable daytime job that runs from 9-5 on weekdays, without having to work overtime or on weekends and public holidays. The ability to knock off work sharply was a prized possession for individuals seeking to contribute their VSC hours after work.

> Azlan: I am a manager, working in a trading firm in a bank. Basically from 9-5pm, I am in the trading firm. After 5pm, twice a week, I will be doing VSC.

> Steven L: I don't have that much difficulty coping with VSC work. But that's because I'm working as a commercial manager in a shipyard, you see? On most days, I'm free from 4pm onwards...I'd finish work by 4/4 plus, and then the rest of the time is mine. So I can prepare for VSC duties.

Having a stable routine allows these individuals to fit VSC duties into their schedule with greater ease. The prevailing work pattern of the population has in fact spawned a customised shift for working professionals.

> James: In the past duties were longer and more rigid lah. But overtime they have created these specialised duties for VSCs – what we call 7-11 duties. It's basically a shorter tour of duty (from 7pm to 11pm), so you don't have to go for the whole shift, but you can choose a shorter one.

The 7-11 routine had been conceived with the mainstream routines of the population in mind. These individuals constitute the bulk of the labour force, and much of the urban infrastructure has accordingly been geared towards synchronising productive activities during the day and reproductive activities after nightfall (see Roberts and Eldridge 2009). The routines of VSCs are assumed to fall within the mainstream norms of the population: training regimes and voluntary duties are scheduled after nightfall, on weekends or on public holidays. While such scheduling

is meant to facilitate participation by the mainstream population, it inadvertently marginalises participation by individuals working shifts or irregular hours, moonlighting to make both ends meet, taking night classes to upgrade one's skills, or providing care as homemakers[134]. Where the schedules of volunteering and external activities do not align, participants are forced to forego one or the other, putting them in an unenviable position.

> Mark C.: For me...it's okay lah. Because I'm working office hours. So I knock off at 6, I can do my volunteer work anytime, and I don't work on weekends. But for some of the volunteers, they work on shifts, so they may need to make arrangements. Let's say they are activated for any duties or for major events, or any operations, then they have to adjust their timing.

The prevailing urban rhythms were also responsible for the arrangement of night training classes for VSCs during the enrolment process. This logic extends beyond enrolment to encompass in-service training and professional development courses for serving VSCs.

> Mern Ney: Much as SPF has opened a lot of courses to us, but these are daytime courses. If you have a job, how can you go for these courses? The struggle is always the timing. Like our instructors, for them to be able to teach people, they have to go through a 5-day course. So they have to take leave from their work, just to complete this course, so that they can become a police instructor. But who is willing to do that?

Nevertheless, it is possible for volunteers not working the normal office hours to participate more actively in VSC. For these individuals, the abundance of free time during the day in fact provides the perfect outlet for their volunteer service, as they can learn the ropes of policing quicker.

> Steven T.: I'm a full-time swimming instructor. So during the daytime I'm quite free lah, quite flexible for... My working hours are quite flexible... So during the day, most of the time I'm quite free lah. So that's when I do my VSC duties... I join the regulars.

> Lindy: I used to volunteer much more when I was in ITE (Institute of Technical Education). That was when I first joined VSC and I was still schooling. It was easy to achieve over 100 hours back then...

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[134] It is common for homemakers to schedule their daily activities around the working and schooling hours of those they care for. In the typical household, homemakers would set aside the evenings, weekends, and school and public holidays to spend with their loved ones.

Routines however are never static despite their ability to structure lifestyles. Individuals' routines change over time in response to major life events like starting a career or starting a family.

> Lindy: When I started work at my previous employer's, it was still okay because it was a small company. It's only recently when I moved to this bigger law firm that it's become less flexible.

> Christopher: It's actually harder now than in the past. Because of the kids… Yeah you keep juggling (duties). It's a never-ending process, at different stages of your life.

> Stephen: In the 1980s, those were hard times for me because there were many ops. So back then, my wife was not quite happy with my (VSC) job. But now things have improved, my children have grown up, and she's gotten used to it. She can understand my passion… Now I'd say I have more time compared to the past. But in VSC, there's never a free day lah!

For recruiters though, a change to the routines of volunteers can become a concern.

> Mern Ney: I do realise that those below 20s, because of their… Their career switches is much more than those in the older ages. So like (for) example, they will be posted overseas, (or) they might want to further their studies. So this is you know, during their early 20s or below 30s. These are the common things that will happen to them. So the attrition rate is definitely higher.

> Mark S.: For a person who can tell you a thousand and one things, but if he is not suitable… Let's say, this person is doing a regional job that requires him to travel as and when. He can meet all the requirement, super fit, everything (is) best. But, (though) he can tell you a thousand and one promises, (it) is all question mark… We cannot expect people to whole life attach to here. But at least for 3-5 years, it must at least be more certain. (…) We do have quite a number of so-called young people that join, not that young, 30-plus or so. So the years of service with us might not be that long. As you know, JO or PO (Junior Officers), retire at 50. Maybe if they are good enough, they cross over (and) become SO (Senior Officer) – 5 more years. So the time they will be there is about 10-15 years. But these groups of people which they have already so-called reached a certain stage of their career in their lives, and they are usually all married. And they are usually quite stable. So they found that, it's time for them to so-call contribute back to society. Then they come across this, 'Wah…quite meaningful', so they won't mind to pick up some family time to contribute. These type of people are usually quite committed.

When routines change, the newly-discordant rhythms which are normally taken for granted become exposed, prompting greater reflection by various individuals.

Familial Support

While interviewees typically did not frame their act of volunteering around the support given by family members, the biological family nonetheless remains important to many individuals for different reasons. In the simplest instance, individuals would incorporate into their routines the act of informing their immediate kin about their involvement in policing.

> Steven T.: My parents they… My parents actually didn't say anything. Because when I joined, they also don't know what's called VSC. (Laughs) They only know that when I was in NS, already police already, so to them, it's nothing new! (Laughs)
> Mark (myself): Oh! They thought it's reservist?
> Steven T.: Yah. They thought it's reservist. Because my parents don't know what is VSC. For my wife…because she'd already known my NS (vocation was in the police). I'd already joined VSC before I got to know her, so I'm fixed already. So even she knows I join VSC, she'd know that I'm already here for NS already, so (it's) nothing new to her lah!

The family was also a source of moral support for individuals who had enrolled as VSCs. Where family members were uncertain of what the job entailed, volunteers had to assuage those concerns. Seeking familial approval was also important for reassuring individuals that they were doing the right thing.

> Chee Woon: At first they (his parents) said 'Why you join VSC? VSC is like wasting time! You don't get anything, you know? You're not getting anything…You're just serving the government for… Why not utilise the time for other benefit?' I said 'No. This is my passion, from when I was small. I like VSC and I like guns and I like activities.' So slowly, slowly they try to accept it lah. Although they feel like the police job is very dangerous, but I don't think so lah! Singapore police is still very safe. (Laughs) So my family will not be too keen on me joining VSC lah. But in the end, they saw me happy…and they reluctantly say 'Okay lah. Just go ahead.'

> Lindy: I was actually impressed by my dad because he knew about my passion for policing. So because you know mothers tend to be worried for their children's

safety...(so) when my mum voiced her doubts, I was impressed when my dad told her, 'Don't you know your daughter has always liked police work?'

Colin: Oh, it takes time (to convince his girlfriend to let him join VSC)! Firstly, I mean I'm not a full-time officer. I put in about 50 to 60 hours a month in volunteering. So firstly, there's time management, there's flexibility. Then of course there's also doing social good, which is I mean... I managed to convince her. It takes time naturally. But she's now convinced that it's okay.

Stephen: And of course I think it's important to let your family know where you are. So as long as my wife knows where I'm at, when I'm doing duties, I think it's okay. Because you see, it's not as if I'm going to some nightclub or disco, you know? Like some men would do to hang out, meet new women, go for drinks... I am after all volunteering with the police. So I think my wife accepted that eventually. But I'd say no doubt I missed a lot of things over the years, and it's been a balancing act...

For some, the family was a refuge that they could turn to to prevent overworking.

Christopher: (My f)amily was also very supportive, but in different ways lah. And yes, there are sometimes when you can be too engrossed. That you can forget your family! And you keep doing duties. Because you want to learn more and more. So supportive in a way that the family also tries to pull you back in, to have a balanced life.

Other individuals spoke of their attempts to introduce family members to their VSC work.

Azlan: So during the training, I will never get her involved...I will not talk about the police. Nothing. But during the Mondays and Thursdays, I just tell her that I am going for courses. She knows, but she won't say a thing. Then toward the end of the course, during the graduation, because I am one of those who are actually involved in the preparation, so I told her that there's something to look forward for. On that day, I brought her here, to the auditorium. And she saw one of those (things) that I enjoy. Okay, I mix IT with the Police force. I made a presentation using all these graphics, all the videos with Star War themes all inside. Then I said, 'This is what I did: I mixed police force and my job.' My son was actually excited because he knew I had done these at home before, doing editing and all these. So I got my colleagues and the ladies to speak to her. So after that, she's okay. And after that, every time there is a gathering, I'll get her involved too. Now, she is okay.

As an established institution, the VSC is poised to organise various family outreach events to let close kin of volunteers meet and greet the extended policing family.

Mern Ney: In-house, we have a welfare committee. We organise Family Days, we organise sports, so every division will take charge to organise certain events like bowling... We have soccer, or any other thing that they would like to er, propose lah... We just want to make sure that Family Day is an important thing. Because we feel that the family does support the VSC. So for a lot of events, we prefer to involve families, if possible.

Through these platforms, it is hoped that the loved ones of volunteers would be socialised into the norms of police work: spouses would learn to accept the vagaries of security operations and deployments which necessitate the frequent departures of VSCs from their presence[135], while children could learn to respect the laws of the country by adopting police officers as their role models. In practice though, things are likely to deviate from the ideal.

Integration

From 1995, the VSC was re-organised to facilitate greater integration with the regular police force. Integration of VSC sought to 'complement the SPF; ensure...more effective use...of VSC resources; and develop the VSC into a professional unit...under the ambit of the SPF' (Lim et al. 1998:105). On the ground, integration served to professionalise training standards so that the experience of volunteering could be enhanced.

Mark S.: My time it was still the old system. Then when I joined after a while, then they converted to new system. So all the training get extended. Last time, the training was only four months. It's all their own materials, not the same as the regular ones. It's derived on their own... When I started the course, they were still using that manual from the '70s. It was very *terok* (in a bad state). Photocopy until all dispersed already. Sometimes, you are guessing 'What's the word...' Half-way through the course, because they want to be in line with normal setting, so suddenly they gave out a new manual and the exam became the same as the regulars. Wah, then the exam became tougher. Because last time it was set by the old VSC, so it was very easy. Then, you don't know, the instructor will come and tell you. But now, it is set by a regular, so you don't know what is the question. Which I say is better.

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[135] Information gleaned from my previous fieldwork for my undergraduate dissertation. Frontline police work under the NPC system is characterised by long, odd working hours that rob families of many intimate moments that could have been spent with loved ones. Even when police officers are co-present with their families during 'family time', it is difficult to not be distracted by the occasional text message or phone call from someone demanding an urgent response.

In addition, volunteers' training could be aligned with regulars' to instil a similar level of discipline.

> Stephen: VSC was alone by itself initially in the early 1980s... Now I thought this was not right because if we were going out with regulars side-by-side, the regulars had to be able to trust us. They had to know that we were well-trained and equipped to follow them. When they turn to us for support, we would be able to help them out... I felt that there was a need for greater integration on the training part especially, so that when we go out with regulars, they'll have the confidence knowing that we have gone through the same training. It gives the regulars more comfort to know that VSCs have the same training as them.

Training together helped yield a greater sense of belonging to the SPF. For recruits who went through the revised training, they could consider themselves part of an operationally-ready volunteer force serving as back-up to the regulars.

> Mark (myself): What work have you done as a VSC?

> Larry: The whole spectrum of policing...from operations, uniform, community outreach, etc. At the same time, we also support other staff functions...things like auditing. We also provide, organise activities, things like Green Walk lah... Anything that needs extra manpower.

> Steven T.: Whatever normal duties they do, I'd also do lah! NPCO duties...whatever regulars do, we also follow lah. Like sometimes they need us to do crime prevention... Whatever help they need us (for), as long as we are free, we'll help out lah.

In light of the heightened security climate, the policing workload had increased. VSCs could contribute towards these deployments in a way that provided opportunities for sustained team-bonding.

> Mark C.: (W)e work very closely with the regular counterparts...and also the National Servicemen. So In Alpha culture, we always work together. Even like major events, we have volunteers, NS men and also regulars all deployed at the same ground operations.

> Mern Ney: In Singapore, for us it is more like we are helping them out. The officers here work very long hours – our regulars. After 12-hour shifts, they have to prepare reports and things like that? That'd be like 15 hours: it is too long for them. That's the main reason why.

Larry: You have to be involved in many activities. So for example, things like HQ events...they need help, all these...you should also volunteer lah. So at least you'll know people from other divisions. You attend courses...know more people...

Chee Woon: Yes I met a lot of friends when I was in the academy that time. They are not only my friends – they are my buddies as well. You know? When you're in the academy, you have strong bonding. That's why, until now, sometimes we hang out together, sometimes we have a chit-chat on Facebook, er..all these things. We'll still stick together. So this is the real deal.

Stephen: I'd say now the SPF needs the VSC as much as VSC needs SPF! There has been a greater demand for security deployments at major events, like public holidays...such as Hari Raya... Then there's the General Elections, the F1 (Formula One) night race, NDP (National Day Parade)... So now VSC complements or supports the SPF: we have become partners instead.

Nevertheless, the relationship between regulars and VSCs is much more uneven than can be represented through words. Integration as a catch-all word fails to do justice to the myriad forms of association that VSCs have formed and re-formed with the police organisation over time. On paper, it would appear that assimilation is the desired outcome of 'integration', since VSCs have been re-aligned to fit the organisational structure of the SPF. Platitudes like those listed below reinforce this opinion.

Jimmy: So to me, Alpha Division is a regular (Land) Division, so when we come in, we are just only helping. To be accepted, you must contribute. You must proactively make an effort to give, to make ourselves available to Alpha Division. Whenever they need manpower, we are there to help out. So our manpower is always available. And because of that, the Alpha regulars also reciprocate. So we have a very good relationship. So much so that (for) any of the key (regular) officers, we can just give (them) a call, and then talk to them.

Shaun: We can interact really well. We work as a family. Like my team, there's no difference whether you are regular or VSC. We go to the ground, we respect each other, we work together...it's totally equal and we work together.
Sani: VSC...we have gained our respect and the confidence from the regular police officer. The important role is (for) the various head or commander in the regular side...they can think of VSC as a very supportive and useful force. So they'd give us a lot of recognitions. So now, we'd have no problem.

However it is prudent to put these comments into perspective. Jimmy, Shaun and Sani are very experienced VSCs with over 25 years' of service in the force. Having stayed within the policing network for much longer than even most regulars, it should come as little surprise that they view assimilation in such positive terms.

> Mern Ney: (W)e have very, very experienced officers. In fact, most of the time, the problem is that, as you'd know, VSCs do serve very long. But our younger regulars, they are always switching jobs. So they come and go, you know? On the other hand, we are the long lasting ones...in fact, we, we always lead the young regular officers. Yah, because, we are always there. But for them, it is always a changing of jobs, resulting in a number of changes. So yah, it works the other way. You know? When you become the constant, you lead the fast-changing younger officers who are regulars.

Assimilation then perhaps more aptly applies to the policing network rather than the organisation per se. Furthermore, assimilation as a process has impacted upon the network rather unevenly. For new members like Chee Woon, assimilation requires sticking with the same team for duties.

> Chee Woon: So this is my second month on duty... Your team would be scheduled for duty on a weeknight and you'll have to follow the team. It's just like you follow your VSC team. Or alternatively, they'd give you a week. You can come on Wednesday evening...actually you can come on any day. But preferably if you want to stick with your VSC team, you have to come on certain weekdays which they are available.

Being able to follow the same group of people first requires individuals have harmonious routines. This is a tall order given that most working professionals operate from 9 to 5 on weekdays.

> Mern Ney: (T)he minimum (duty) is a 4 hour-slot, so we can do a 7pm-11pm. So that is the shortest you can have... But if you do shorter, you'd have to come in more often. So it's a compromise. Most people would just do one whole shot. And also you'd learn more. Because probably within the 4 hours, nothing may happen, so there isn't really much for you to learn. But over 12 hours, there's definitely a few messages, and you'd be able to learn more things.

A typical 12-hour shift lasts from 8pm-8am the following morning. The energy pre-requisite is daunting for young recruits.

Chee Woon: (T)he most I give is one week once or one week twice lah. Because due to my work, I can only commit half-shifts. Which is 5 hours the most. Which is after work from 6 or 7.30-12.30 lah. Because due to the commitment to my work...you can't perform full shift lah. But you can only take it on Fridays. If not the next day, how you adjust your time? It's really difficult, you know! If you say I'm working freelance or whatever, then okay lah! But because I'm working as a systems administrator, I need to be...I cannot have not enough sleep.

Routines also prevent VSCs from assuming a greater variety of tasks.

Larry: I won't say it's fully integrated, in part because of our work commitments ah...so certain jobs they cannot assign to us. But when we go support duties...National Day or anything, we need to work together with regulars. I think we're treated no worse off.

Colin: Certain innate differentiations may arise in terms of familiarity with investigation work, for example. (Due to) ability of commitment. For example, a volunteer can only come in the evening time, whilst a regular may be compelled to come as and when it is required by the superiors. So I think we are still moving towards greater integration in terms of deployment, in terms of er, training. For example, certain aspects of training are not fully accorded to the VSC, such as investigations training, or even in the usage of the Taser, or the stun-gun. So it is an on-going process, as both organisations (SPF and VSC) move, perhaps, the degree of synergy can be improved. The SPF itself, of course, the professional component is moving at a very fast rate in-line with societal expectations. The VSC, because it is a volunteering context, it tends to move a little bit slower, but it is still catching up.

On other occasions, a restriction of duties stems from the resistance of regulars towards greater integration by VSCs.

Sani: (S)ometimes I feel they (regulars) are a bit conservative: 'Oh, it's a secret! This and that.' You think about it? It's a bit reserved lah...

Lindy: Some regulars are not in favour of integration... But I enjoy working in my division. Most regulars in my division are appreciative of the work we do. They value VSCs as a legitimate source of help.

According to historian Martin Greenberg (2005), this stems from the suspicion that some regulars would have of volunteers who are willing to perform police work for a token allowance. In these situations, there is a greater propensity for VSCs to be allocated menial tasks.

Sani: I believe that passion can be cultivated. Like a man falling in love with a girl. At first sight, you may not like, but after slowly talking (with her), you'll like, and then you'll get married with her! (Laughs) There's never a dull moment when you go to the VSC. Slowly, you'll fall in love. This is what I believe.

Shaun: It's more important that you must put the officer at the correct place lah. If you've an interest there, then definitely he'll work. If you put in the wrong place, somewhere he has no interest, subsequently they'll die off naturally. They'll become phantom, disappear, and be absent and all these. It's most important to put them at the place they love to work with. This is what I understand...

Sani: Sometimes they (regulars) will say: 'VSC har...you go and do sentry duty or crowd control.' But every time do the same duty, (will be) very monotonous lah!

Steven L.: VSCs used to be on their own, in their own FRCs. So back then we were given some training, then we could go out on our own to patrol. Now we are deployed together with regulars for patrol...

James: Yah! Third-man crew... (Laughs)

The 'third-man crew' is a term that refers to a scenario where there are three police officers in a patrol car. As normal arrangements allow for only two patrol officers per car, the third man is relatively superfluous in practice. This may lead the volunteer to feel underemployed and undervalued, a feeling of being in the team but not really contributing to the team. In fact, this feeling of being a 'second-class policeman' was precisely the reason behind the integration drive: it is hoped that volunteers would feel more 'empowered' if they donned the same uniform and were called upon to perform the same tasks as regulars.

Shaun: I think in the old days, the VSCs were something like a second-class policeman. Because for regulars, they can do things that VSCs are not allowed to do...like (for) vehicles, they would get the best vehicles, for equipment, they'd get the best equipment. So VSCs would get equipment that sometimes does not work. Then when got no vehicle, we'd have to go on foot patrols, do you know? Then after 1995, after the integration of the VSCs and the regulars, there's some changes. Throughout the years, it's been getting better and better...

Mern Ney: Because in the past, our collar is a 'V', as you can see here (pointing to a display set of uniform). That was until 1999, when CP (Commissioner of Police) said 'Better don't distinguish.' Because if not, then the public will think, 'Aiyah, you second-class...' So we all changed to the same uniform, so that also meant same responsibility... I think it is a kind of mindset: people always think that if you are 'V' then you might not

know as much. Which is the wrong perception because we go through the same training.

Mark C.: In the past we used to wear a 'V' collar badge. Then in 1999, the Commissioner decided to integrate the VSC. So we actually don the same collar badge as the regulars now. So members of public cannot actually differentiate... Especially the Traffic police lah. Some people would give comments like 'You're only a volunteer what...why you work so hard? Why you summon me?' So with the integration, I think it's good lah. So everyone is on par...so nobody will actually look down on VSC.

Christopher: I think there are a lot of people who are not aware of VSCs today. Because in the past, you'd have a 'V' on the collar. The integration of the VSCs and the regular force has in a way helped a lot lah. And I don't think the public views us as different. Because they can never see the difference, as long as you are professional about it... In the past, when the public sees a 'V', they'd say 'You know you're just a volunteer...' Everybody wants to get away with things, you know? That's human nature. But having said that, because you have a 'V', sometimes it's more difficult to execute what you're supposed to do... In the past, they'd tell you things like 'You're just a volunteer, you don't have to be so serious about your job. Why don't you give a chance?' Misconceptions lah. So with the 'V', you execute your job...on top of your job or duty, you'd have to convince them that 'Look, we are all the same. We are bound by the same regulations, we cannot give in. This is the vision of the police force.' So it made things difficult in the past. And you'd get comments like 'Why are you so free? Join police force? Blah blah blah lah.' The views were more negative and they'd expect the VSCs to be more lenient in their duties, compared to the regular force.

Stephen: The 'V' on our collar has been removed, and it is now replaced with the crest dot. In the past people would tend to view VSCs differently from regulars, because of the 'V'. Because people would think that if it's not your livelihood, then you don't have to be so professional about it... But what I hope for the police force is that one day the 'V' will be forgotten. That's my so-called 'VSC-free' aspiration...

While the change in uniform may have reduced the external visibility of VSCs, integration concerned more than just the blending of physical appearances to encompass a transformation of mindsets. The change of perceptions thus far appears to be more uneven internally. Full physical integration is difficult against the backdrop of multiple urban rhythms and the persistence of internal differentiation.

Joys of Volunteering

As many interviewees have related, it was not uncommon for family, friends and members of public to make snide comments about volunteers when they first learn about their VSC status. In what amounts to a Freudian slip of tongue, reactions range from the practical show of concern (warning VSCs against wasting their time), to side-jokes lampooning the absurdity of volunteering in a pragmatic culture (Kong 2000), to suspicions on the true motives of VSCs in an economically competitive landscape.

> Mark (myself): Do most of your friends know that you're volunteering?
> Larry: Oh yah...they do they do. And I think ah...I'm the subject of ridicule! (Laughs)
> Mark (myself): Why?
> Larry: I mean...basically they'd say why am I wasting my time? So sometimes I'd also think why am I wasting my time. But sometimes once you go out to the field, you'll feel okay. You'd feel recharged.

> Jimmy: (L)et's say for example you go and tell them 'I'm a VSC'...the public, including my friends, they'd say 'Why you so free, ah?' (Laughs) This is the thing lah. And some of them would say 'What benefit can I get from VSC?' They think that we join the VSC because of some kind of...you know? Maybe if you drive fast, speed fast, and then you can actually get away with it! (Laughs) With summons and all that. Which is totally not true. So these are the common perceptions: that we join the VSCs either for power, because of affiliation with the police force, which is totally untrue lah, or they'd think that we really have nothing to do lah, that's why we go volunteer.

But as Larry has noted, volunteering one's time, expertise and energy produces certain rewards of both tangible and intangible varieties. Some of these have been covered in previous sections, including the renewal of self, the cultivation of passion, the demonstration of personal capacities in terms of technical expertise or emotional self-control, the experience of psychic gratification through contributions to society, the experience of pride through reflections on one's ability at time management, the chance to fulfil the fantasy of leading double lives, and the feeling of togetherness experienced in team-bonding. This final section draws upon other sources of pleasure that help sustain the commitment and motivation of volunteers.

One such pleasure derives from the informal sociality that is available outside one's daytime (pre)occupation.

> Lindy: I would say it's more relaxing with VSC than when I'm working during the day!

> Jimmy: (W)hen I work as a dentist, it's basically everyday seeing patients, which I enjoy... But taking that after finishing my work, I'd go for police work, (I thought that) it would be rather stressful. But (as it) end(s) up, every day I'd feel the same. After work, I'd feel very stressed. But the moment I drive to the police force and go for operations, it becomes anti-stress! (Laughs) Because it switches my mind off from dentistry all together, and then to be able to go into something else.

> Larry: Although it is a rank-based...but in VSC, we are all playing different roles, on the same pay...so it's not that regimented as the regulars lah. Because for regulars, in a disciplinary organisation, you'd have to respect your higher rank and all these. Whereas VSC is more or less flat. (Pause) You go to the ground, you'd know who is the leader and so on. But ultimately you'll treat each other as your peer.

> Colin: For the regulars, if you don't do the IPPT (Individual Physical Proficiency Test), you won't get your promotion, you won't get your progression. In the volunteer context, it's broadly the same, except that you can't compel a person who doesn't want to be promoted.

As the pressures of engaging in wage-labour are temporarily lifted, volunteering provides opportunities for recreation and leisure even within a uniformed organisation. In fact, it is the existence of clear boundaries within a uniformed organisation which proffers a safe space from which individuals can engage in recreational pursuits without fear of running afoul of the law or of transgressing moral proprieties. Participation in policing does not always lead to the conformance of behaviours; rather it can be an outlet for self-expression and self-satisfaction. In a high modernist society like Singapore, the context of volunteering suits a professional organisation like the VSC. Volunteers are provided a clear mission, given adequate training, obtain the necessary certifications, don proper uniforms, operate specialised gadgets, hold different ranks, have clear-cut performance indicators[136] and render their services to a well-reputed force. While these provide the stable groundwork for volunteering, they do not provide an overly rigid structure that would stultify autonomous action. The freedom to patrol

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[136] These include the number of joint arrests made and the number of hours of volunteer service (Lim et al. 1998).

the streets, the adrenaline of conducting security operations, the challenge of encountering new situations, and the respect accorded to them by most Singaporeans are reflective of the autonomy granted to frontline units in the police, which is unique for a highly-hierarchical organisation. From the lax supervision of ground deployments, volunteers are paradoxically empowered and allowed greater exposure to the extraordinary aspects of everyday lives.

> Mark S.: In police work, you've got a very good opportunity to see and work out the problem. How often...or maybe even your whole life, you can only see in the Hong Kong movie or Taiwan movie. But in the real life, what organisation gives you this opportunity? I think besides police force maybe only those crisis negotiators. Besides these two (groups of) people, you've got no chance to see such situations. So I mean if you ask myself what are the benefits...I mean all these years, I really gain a lot. In terms of exposure, in terms of knowledge. And also definitely, I meet a lot of friends, in the volunteer, as well as in the regular... I treasure their friendship... To me it is a type of experience that I can work with some people who work well. I mean they are really good, and have made it there. But so you think back, then, having worked with these particular persons – what have you learnt? Because all these will help your own personality. And the same for police force exposure: the exposure you have is something that no one can take away. That's why I am still around. Because it a lifelong learning thing.

> Mark (myself): What's most enjoyable as a volunteer?
> Steven T.: I get to meet more people, I get to network... Then when I do something with regulars, like some arrests which normally we can't do it by ourselves...like good arrests. I mean it's a team work which we do with regulars like how they do investigations on the scene, how they use their skills and knowledge to interpret...to ask questions to distinguish between a criminal...how they use their skills to find out things lah.

> Jimmy: We should see more people doing volunteering work. I really think that when we do this, then the country can also become more gracious. Because when we go out and volunteer, we'd start to learn... Like for example my work ah, if I don't go out and volunteer to do VSC work, I'd never be able to understand what the other levels of people are (like). Or interacting with people on the street. So with this, you'd tend to understand. And then now, you'd become street-wise...

> Mark (myself): What new insights on policing have you gained as a result?
> Mern Ney: I think quite a few. I think the slightly emotional parts (are for) example, when we are called to the scene, like it may be a supermarket. We have seen mothers, they have no money to buy milk. They have to steal milk. So this is the er, softer side, that we have seen, that sometimes, people commit crimes out of no choice. These are the sad cases of people who are still young. I have actually arrested one 14 years old boy

molesting ladies. Very young! So to us we don't think more like a police, we think more like how a civilian sees a civilian...how a civilian has to go to that extent...or like husband and wife fighting each other. Family violence...the sad part. Maid abuse...I have actually come across a maid where she had to escape the family... So (it's) more like the (com)passionate side of it...you see the human side.

Empowerment is clearly not limited to the ability to harness one's police powers for selfish reasons, but is more related to an increased sociability that is capable of transforming individual dispositions.

Steven T.: For VSCs, it's something that you can do together... Different kinds of style. Some people have higher education, some have mid-level education... So this is the time that we get to bond together and to mingle together.
Mark (myself): And this is not something you'd get elsewhere...
Steven T.: Very hard lah. Because if you're mid-level education, your friends would be all mid-level... If you're high-level, you're something like a uni(versity) grad, or a Prof or...then all your friends would be of the same level. So for VSCs, it's people with kinds of lives, different lifestyles...

Christopher: Apart from passion (for policing), it is also an opportunity to mix with different types of people. It can range from very educated persons, to people who are selling...setting up stalls. You'd tend to want to understand what is their way of life. Compared to you. I mean, there are businessmen, and also civil servants, private sector employees...so everybody has a different mindset... I think one of the joys is the opportunity to be able to mix with the younger generation. And also to share with them the experiences of life. As you can see, a lot of junior officers start from the age of 18, 19... every duty we have, we take the opportunity to talk about...er, life. And what we've gone through. And the junior officers are also very good to question. They'd try to have a different perspective on life. Because they are stuck in a uniformed organisation, they haven't seen what's happening outside. Most of them have actually served their NS in the police force. The ladies join the police force straight after completing their education. So VSC also gives them an opportunity to understand life in a different...eye or view.

While the urban way of living has encouraged the compartmentalisation of people into different walks of life based on their socioeconomic background and main occupation, volunteering provides an avenue for individuals to venture beyond economic classifications to socialise with the erstwhile stranger in the metropolis (Simmel 1997). The status accorded to a 'volunteer' frees him from the normal routines of formal employment while granting him a 'licence' to share. In the specific context of the VSC, participants also enrol within the policing

network as Corporals regardless of one's education level. The relative lack of attention given to one's rank and the disbursement of a uniform allowance across the board confer legitimacy upon the VSC as a meritocratic institution that allows the 'human side' of participants to flourish.

> Mern Ney: When we all started off, except if you were ex-PNS, (in which case) you will retain your last rank, for all of us, from SAF or ladies, we start from Corporal, when we pass out. So regardless of your education. I think it is a good thing. Because in one sense, it brings you back to reality, you start from the bottom. But on the other hand it's a good thing you start from bottom because it is a totally different set of skills that you don't get it outside.

The discussion of meritocracy amongst several VSCs points to the existing weaknesses found within the institution of meritocracy in Singapore. Long held as a pillar of economic growth, meritocracy has provided the framework for the development of human capital since the post-independence era (Kong and Yeoh 2003). The government has prided meritocracy for being able to provide fair and equal opportunities for Singaporeans from all walks of life to achieve social mobility. Nonetheless, in a highly competitive economic environment, meritocracy has made way for early educational streaming, identification of talented individuals for government scholarships, and fast-track promotions within the Civil Service for the Administrative Service elite (Worthington 2003) in ways that are socially unjust. Elsewhere, the emphasis on educational qualifications and training certifications has hastened the race for these formalised 'merits' in a way that marginalises those who do not possess them. Amidst more frequent economic restructuring of late, VSC provides a safe space for volunteers to take refuge from the competitive landscape of formal employment. Ironically, this is not because competition does not exist within the VSC, but it is due to the fact that all trainees are given a level footing to perform within the VSC. While 'starting from the bottom' may provide new insights on police work and new perspectives on life, one can be quickly caught up in the race for promotions both internally and externally.

> Mern Ney: At present, we have a lot of graduates! In the past it is not so easy to get (those) highly-educated (to join). Nowadays, it seems like anybody can come in with a PhD! (Laughs) Then they come in (as a) Corporal and they don't like (it) ah! In VSC, we

practise (a starting rank of) all go Corporal. But we practise...you can go up to Senior officers like through your hours, if you are a good performer, you know your work. Because our next step...for instance if you are a Corporal, you are promoted to Sergeant. If your head thinks you are good, he'd recommend you go for (the) Senior Officer interview. You can jump. For us you can jump (ranks) to SO (Senior Officer). But the interview board is held by regulars as well. So that means the regulars will ask you questions, and you'd better know how to answer – your course of work, have you manage the incident before, things like that. So for you to pass that interview, then you can go and become an Inspector... But (you do) not (pass in) straight (as a) Senior Officer. For us it is a bit different. I think it is a good thing: it is probably the one system that does not see your education as a sure criteria. Because it is also (about) commitment and your knowledge. If you don't have them, don't forget that if you hold the rank of Inspector, then all the junior regulars must also listen to you. So you must know your work. So it is a double-sided sword, not that rank holds...but rank is a responsibility now, because (of the) same uniform. (...) Because I think a lot of people want their résumé to look good. Well, yah. You can wear uniform. Most of the people who can start as Corporal – they are people who genuinely want it. Those who want ranks, they only want the rank. It is quite obvious.

A Social Praxis of Community/Policing

Having detailed the various processes involved in the enrolment in and reproduction of the VSC network, this final section attempts to transpose this knowledge onto the practice of community policing. The latter is commonly referred to as a philosophy to nurture community engagements by the police (e.g. Skolnick and Bayley 1988); a management strategy to build community partnerships (e.g. Goldstein 1990); or an inequitable solution to the problems facing localities that favours selected groups (e.g. Herbert 2006). If one moves beyond understanding community policing as a discourse, the task becomes that of establishing the micro-sociological processes that lead to the extension, thickening and strengthening of the network of community/policing across space-time.

Working for Less

If community/policing via volunteering is often delineated by an absence of financial remunerations, the VSC could arguably fit the bill. Volunteers are only paid a token allowance that by itself is unable to secure even a minimal level of subsistence in Singapore.

> Christopher: Basically the police force is not giving a salary. They are basically only giving an allowance which doesn't contribute much. So you must have passion before you join! Many people have a misconception that this is a supplementary income! (Laughs) Which is not likely har.

This allowance is in contrast to the monthly salaries that regular officers draw, which includes a component for hardship allowance for working in a uniformed organisation. While both VSCs and regulars are covered by basic insurance schemes, regulars enjoy the greater social security benefits associated with formal employment in the Civil Service (Quah 2010). The lack of financial incentives pre-empts volunteers from joining the VSC for the 'wrong' motives.

> Mern Ney: I think it (the allowance) is purposely set very low, because I think CP (Commissioner of Police) doesn't want it to be like Hong Kong – for people to come just for the money. Then there will be two scenarios: everyone will clock a lot of hours; then on the other hand, the budget will not be enough. So it's a thing they'll have to weigh. So they said: 'No, we don't want to over-pay you.' So the money is not an issue in your mind and you don't come just for the money. But they do give us other non-monetary awards...that's why they do give us badges, recognition awards, CP recognition, paper awards, or promotion.

Nevertheless, the expenses associated with training, equipping and operationalising a professional volunteer police officer still incur a significant cost.

> Mark S.: You put in a lot of resources (for) 9 months. Because I get to know, for one trainee to pass out, the number of resources is a lot! We just don't feel it, we don't see it. But if you try to equate it to dollars and cents and the so-called time value, it's a lot, you know? Plus the processing and the administration costs, the opportunity costs...

The absence of a training bond means trained volunteers can walk away by simply tendering one month's notice. The 'no strings attached' idea of volunteering cautions against an embrace of the seductive idea of volunteers working for close to nothing. Volunteers can learn the ropes

of policing only through the various efforts put in by course instructors, law teachers, martial arts instructors, field training officers and administrative and liaison personnel to train them. Of course several of these job functions have been performed by VSC themselves, which helps reduce the monetary expenditures on training.

Volunteering as a VSC helps to remove explicit monetary considerations from decisions to participate in community/policing. While this does not mean that money does not matter in these personal networks, volunteering allows individuals to expand their perceptions of money to include more extra-exchange value considerations. Indeed, it is a weakening of the self-interest through participation in acts of unequal exchange that is crucial to the extension of community/policing.

Providing Support for Duties

As the reserve ranks of the police force, the VSC supplements regulars in the performance of all sorts of community/policing duties. Its flexibility in providing manpower support is highly valuable for coping with the vagaries of emergency response, security operations, anti-crime rounds and other ad-hoc events.

> Steven L.: I'd say what we have now is a form of integration that is partial. And this is good in many ways. By partial I mean complete physical integration is not necessary. VSCs are the spare reserves of the police; there should be flexible deployment (of VSCs). So we should not be fully integrated with the regulars. VSCs provide an extra pool (of labour) to supplement police manpower when there's a need. As a group, VSC needs regulars to deploy them: guidance is needed. VSCs have to respect the regulars who are fully trained...

With an increased demand for security coverage at mega-events, there has been a concurrent increase in the demand for officers to provide 'police presence' on the ground.

> Steven L.: Following the change to the NPC (system of policing), VSCs are not involved with the entire investigation process (like regular NPCOs). Our job scope is more focused on providing police presence on the ground.

However, an increased deployment of VSCs for these duties can mean that they are restricted to performing menial and repetitive tasks such as crowd control, traffic control, sentry duties and security escort. While there is nothing intrinsically belittling about these tasks and fair assessments can only be made when specific contexts are known, volunteers are vulnerable to the normalisation of these duties as less important police work. Such characterisations of work would in turn affect the way volunteers experience their work; when volunteers feel they are treated as 'second-class policemen', they are likely to be less motivated to perform well. Social values of police work and volunteer work help shape the expectations and experiences of participation in the VSC.

Acts of support re-centre attention away from the self towards others in an extension of community/policing. Reduced self-recognition allows individuals to acknowledge the limitations of their capabilities, which in turn can heighten an awareness of one's positionality.

Learning from Experts

One of the greatest motivations for joining and remaining in the policing network is the opportunity to learn from the best in the game, so to speak. Observing how experienced regulars detect crime, secure a crime scene, engage in the pursuit of suspects, take down suspects, conduct security operations, and conduct investigations into criminal cases is the stuff of crime fiction that volunteers hope to be exposed to through volunteering. And as mentioned above, for several interviewees, it appears their thirst for acquiring police expertise had been duly met.

But consider the following statement from Steven T., who briefly speaks of his NS days.

> Mark (myself): What made you decide to enrol as a VSC in the first place?
> Steven T.: It started in my NS lah. Because I was in the NS police, then...I thought because (during) my NS police, I didn't really learn much things lah. So okay join VSC lah...and learn more things lor...

Citing his acquaintance with police work during his Police National Service days as a factor that led him to the VSC, Steven hints at his underemployment during his NS stint. Again, this could stem from the preconceptions of the kind of work that is performed by VSCs and Police National Service (Full-Time) personnel. Regardless of the existence of such preconceptions, it is however clear that learning from accompanying experienced officers in action is not something that is guaranteed for every volunteer. The contingent circumstances will determine if and how an individual learns from regular professionals. For instance, baldly speaking, the occurrence of crime and the choice of one's shift-work partner will have an important bearing on learning outcomes. How an individual manages his/her expectations of police work will then affect the durability of his/her involvement in policing.

Ambition helps individuals submit to training in order to learn the rules and tactics of community/policing work. The demand for self-improvement provides an unquenchable thirst for learning that cultivates an education of attention towards re-moulding oneself in the image of leaders.

Providing Fresh Perspectives

Volunteers from different occupational backgrounds bring with them their life experiences when they participate in the VSC network. The sharing of personal life stories by volunteers injects new dynamism into workplace sociality, when the introduction of non-regulars to the team forces it to open up (Reiner 2000). Volunteers can provide useful second opinions on various issues, flagging up areas in community/policing work that need improving.

> Mern Ney: SPF is short of community liaison officers. (When) They need us to go to communities or to go to schools to give talks, they can always tap on us. We can always do the job for them, so that they can deploy their officers on the ground or (for) more important functions. So community policing...in the past, we used to have VSCs to take care of the boys' home. It is meant for delinquent youths; they'd come together. So we manned the whole Boys' Club by ourselves, us VSCs. So in some sense, we can contribute in counselling, because we don't talk like officers. We are more like civilians.

But on the other hand, we do have police knowledge. So that is how we can help the community in that sense.

Colin: I think in the VSC scope of contribution, that's where we have a value-add in terms of community-related policing, because I have seen officers excelling in their duties with regards to engaging delinquents, in say...problem teens, or giving talks. And I think that in time to come, we would be able to give more value-added contributions, because the basis of it is VSCs are a wider form of the community outreach plan.

At a more prosaic level, new volunteers provide fresh faces for the conduct of ground operations, serving as decoys for anti-crime rounds, for example. Youthful enthusiasm for police work can reinvigorate older bodies as they are motivated to impart their knowledge and skills to younger recruits.

However freshness is a concept that itself needs constant renewal. Recruitment of new volunteers is one pre-requisite to the provision of fresh perspectives. This faces challenges from the increased recreational options available to the masses, and the stringent enrolment criteria for the VSC. 'Freshness' also assumes the presence of a certain distinct trait within volunteers that cannot be found within the regular force. But in a highly governmentalised state such as Singapore, it is debatable how unique the perspectives of volunteers can actually be. Entrained within the stability of personal routines, volunteers are likely to travel less often, meet the same groups of people, and share conservative views on different subject matters. Freshness is also in doubt when volunteering becomes more professionalised. Informal settings that spur a greater creativity of exchanges are likely to be reduced in favour of cultivating greater professionalism.

Contributing Personal Skills

As volunteers come from different occupational backgrounds, they have cultivated different skill sets and talents that may not be found within the SPF. The participation of volunteers via the VSC allows the force to tap upon the diverse capabilities of volunteers to extend the reach of policing power. United by the goal of preserving peace and maintaining law and order,

volunteers will strive to contribute their respective expertise to the organisational body, or the policing family. Team work is privileged over and above individual interests when the whole is conceived to be greater than the sum of individual parts. It is through this that the feeling of togetherness, and the related esprit de corps, materialises in the perceptions of individuals.

> Azlan: In Traffic Police, we have engineers, HR people, teachers...and like me, I'm doing IT. Those people who actually want to repair their PCs will actually come to me. If I need someone's advice, if it's a good time to sell my house, we have an agent, ERA agent. Everybody we have! We have a businessman, who is actually selling computer notebooks' covers. I will ask them. So from there I will get contacts from here and there. We have a contractor...yeah right outside. We have one pilot here! He actually resigned and joined the VSC.

> Shaun: I started off in the uniform, then I was given a chance to do plain clothes as well. Because I'm specialised in something, so they tag along with my speciality. Then from there, I felt that if I were to help the regular to succeed in a raid, I would feel very happy and would feel proud, you know? Then the regular, they'd also be quite proud (to have me)...
> Sani: Back to the regular side, I think if you're able to identify the right person, especially VSC, (since) they come from all walks of life...If they are able to pick them and put them in the right place, I'm sure it's something wonderful. Develop human capital...it's unlimited, I tell you... My ex-boss is a structural engineer...when it comes to building a house or an NPC, you'd put him in the committee...
> Shaun: Ah! Because now we've got this upcoming NPC, we put him there to take charge of this project!

On some occasions, the reasons for recruiting civilian volunteers are delineated from a manager's perspective.

> Jimmy: And then we actually have those retirees... we are actually looking to bringing them back as VSC alumni. And then if they can, we can then put them back into some civilian post. And then some of those who want to join VSC...they don't want to be on the ground. We can put them into Honorary VSC. So people like, for example, some of them are accountants, we can put them as auditors. IT – can put them as IT things and then do the computer and all that. You know? Make use of their so-called... And then the lawyers can make use of their legal matters. So I think we can tap into these sources.

> Sani: (M)y officer was called up to help out with the community policing programme. To help out (in) schools, the events. Like some of my VSCs are prisons officers. They'd go and share with them their experience. So this is how we gel with them... In fact they'd

keep on asking one of my prisons officers to give talks to school children, which they have found is very useful. To give message to those potential juvenile (delinquents)...I think it is good.

Nevertheless, the following quote hints at the limitations of 'tapping upon' participant's varied skills.

> Chee Woon: Different backgrounds. There are some teachers, some lawyers, some engineers, some property agents...some of them are working in IT as well. There are some students as well... But we don't speak much about their jobs lah, because it's...unless necessary lah.

Therein lies a potential conflict. Individuals seeking to refresh themselves after a gruelling day of work may not be the most keen to perform the same duties that they had been doing all day long. If part of their motivations for joining the VSC is to re-create themselves and to meet people from other walks of life, then participants would be disinclined to stick to their own 'professional expertise' while volunteering, much as that legitimises their participant status in the community/policing network.

The chance to offer different perspectives on work encourages lively participation in community/policing. Recognition of the potential value of one's contributions compels one to volunteer one's services towards a greater cause. Teamwork is productive of certain energies that help galvanise community/policing.

Recruiting Others into the Network

Participants who had acquired a certain level of familiarity with the job could help out in the recruitment process as VSC recruiters. These range from having a permanent post within the Recruitment Division at the VSC Headquarters, to helping out with coordination of and coming down for recruitment fairs, to serving as panellists on the Board of Interviewers for applicants. Through this work, VSCs help disseminate information about the community/policing **program** (see Deleuze 1992), to create awareness of opportunities for volunteering. But participants are

not mere mouthpieces of the VSC. Even during recruitment road shows, an active process of filtering through applicants is already in place.

> Colin: As a front-end recruiting officer, our main job is getting the numbers. Numbers being duly completed application forms. And of course we follow the basic criteria of for example, not getting an 80 year old person to sign up, because that will make the application process redundant also. So we broadly look for people whom we think fulfil the basic criteria such as age. Through speaking with them, we ask them what's their PES status. If they are eligible, we ask them to fill in the form accordingly. We are also most importantly looking for people who are able and passionate about serving in the police force. So when we recruit people, when we answer queries from various members of public, within the 2 to 3 minutes time of interacting with them, we are able to gauge broadly their receptiveness towards volunteering.

This becomes explicit in the interviewing of applicants.

> Mark S.: I always set my own base line. I am one of those who always sit in for the panel. So for every panel, sure got people *kanna chopped* one (who will be disqualified), and they'd always make noise with me, like 'Why you go and *chop* people, it's very difficult to recruit people.' So I told them, 'You see, put it that way. If you want to recruit people, you need to get the correct people. And we don't want to waste resources.'

> Jimmy: I've actually interviewed a lot of applicants, because before this, I was actually under recruitment. Because every time when you recruit people to join VSCs…the first thing is they'd have an agenda, right? Some is…they'd go for power. I remember one guy saying, after he joins the VSC 'I wanna go to the Traffic Police.' And the panel interviewers – we have three interviewers on it. So we asked him 'Why do you want to go to the Traffic Police?' He said 'I'm in the traction control club.' So I think he was driving some cars. And he said he wants to fine people (for) speeding, he wants to be in the so-called patrol car. To me, I think it's more likely that…I don't know…he wants to speed or something like that. So I remember that guy didn't fare well in the interview lah. So this is only one example. I think everybody who wants to join the police force would always have a certain agenda. So I think…we must pick those who want to join the VSCs that are… Of course, it cannot be so noble lah! But at least, it must be to help the society, or to have the core values of the SPF lah. Then I think that that is okay. But if it's too personal, then I'd think a lot less (likely to succeed) lah. And anyway I think the panel interviewees would have the same ideas, so we'd normally fail them because of their motivations and the objectives for joining the VSC.

As gatekeepers of the policing network, recruiters take it upon themselves to let in only those with the correct motives and operating on concordant routines. These rigid criteria assume that

motives are readable and fixed, and thus bear striking resemblances to the function of psychometric testing. However these assumptions would appear rather out of place when one considers the following.

> Larry: Police was the only volunteer work at that point that I knew of. Then later when I joined, I realise that 'Eh, Civil Defence they also got...Prisons (too)...' But then nevertheless, since I'd already spent time with police, so I just stick with police lah. Maybe when I retire from police, then I may go and volunteer with some other organisation as well.

> Sani: A lot of people they (initially) don't like (becoming) policemen, but after a while, they find that it's better than they'd thought...

As Sani would later articulate, passion is something that can be cultivated, not something one either has or does not have. Limiting one's field of vision to those who 'have' it risks excluding other applicants who have less of it, whilst obscuring the more important tasks of cultivating and sustaining it. This also applies to the recruitment of participants through word-of-mouth. Targeting those with 'passion' obscures the larger pool of people who could potentially become involved. And while the 'right' passion and 'correct' motives can be learnt, there is also the risk that correct traits can be lost. Motivation is put into reverse gear when volunteers become disheartened due to a host of reasons.

Although it is surely legitimate to 'weed out' incorrect motives for joining, this must be done in a tacit and contextually-specific manner. This greater sensitivity to detail and circumstance is something that psychometric-styled interviews are unlikely to possess. It is highly probable that the outcomes of such interviews parallel those of psychometric tests: more applicants are excluded than is really needed as a precautionary measure. What such gatekeeping actually achieves then is to normalise the motivations for joining the VSC. At a most basic level, it does not require much for an individual to memorise and regurgitate the 'correct' motivations for joining, regardless of his/her actual circumstances. But more insidious is the silent re-shaping of cognitive and emotional faculties: when an individual thinks and feels in a certain way in order to enhance his/her chances of success of enrolling into the network. Alternative voices are suppressed in favour of the 'correct' motive; the horizon of possibilities is greatly reduced.

Personal Networks of Community Engagement

Recruitment of newcomers for community/policing can be for other purposes, such as participation in projects like Neighbourhood Watch Zones (NWZ) or Community Safety and Security Programme (CSSP). The fact that these projects tend to require lesser commitments is nonetheless not sufficient for recruitment efforts to succeed.

> Mark S.: (A)fter a while, the NPC that so-call takes care of my constituency, they went 'Eh, you are from the force? Then they'd every time look for you, because you (are) easy to talk (to). Because there are old people here (in my constituency) and you have the rapport (with them). So it helped to iron out a lot of things with them. Because (for) certain things, as the staff that manages the grassroots or the committee, we can explain to them, (and in so doing) indirectly helping the police. It helps to... Because sometimes the police can say a thousand things, but to the grassroots, they'd try to push it away. But the fact is that they (the police) can't do anything. Because it is not under their purview, or their jurisdiction. So it will help out a lot. And then also for certain projects, for example, like those COP (Citizens On Patrol), CSSP and so forth, which in my previous (work)place, technically every RC (Residents' Committee) would have it. Because it's quite easy for me to explain to them, then they'd comprehend and then they would enrol. Because to the grassroots, it's a bit like 'Since the staff is also telling us about the so-called pros and cons...what are the advantages or benefits to the whole community and so forth...' Then their acceptance level is higher, as compared to (when) the police (explain it themselves) – sometimes the part that they deliver is also a bit hard lah. Maybe the police would say like 'Eh this one is good...', but others would say 'You'd definitely say your product is good.' But for a third party to say it, it's different. So it helps in a way.

Community policing in practice requires the actions of volunteer police officers to vouch for the integrity of the projects on offer. The task of encouraging Grassroots Organisations (GROs) to implement projects like CSSP is made easier when VSCs are themselves working in the GROs.

Another way that community/policing engagement occurs is via the organisation of Family Days, awards night, sports and recreational activities and other events that aim to ingratiate the close kin of VSCs into the extended policing family as community. Given the personal difficulties

many police officers encounter in the boundary work of maintaining a healthy non-work life[137], the VSC has instituted several remedial measures to win over the support of family members of serving volunteers. The success of such attempts is however is likely to be very uneven[138], and perhaps more importantly depends on the ability of the policing organisation to avoid overloading its staff with work. In this case, prioritising the welfare of officers over the 'imperatives' of work would become a necessary endeavour. The tending to one's personal networks nonetheless represents an important avenue for any community/policing engagement. As is evident from the personal reflections of interviewees, future generations of VSC and regular recruits are socialised within these proximate spaces of personal community[139] (see Spencer and Pahl 2006).

Effective recruitment is thus essential for the propagation of community/policing. Recruiters seek to convince non-participants of the virtues of enrolment; this is best achieved through the demonstration of exemplary conduct, rather than a modulation of entry requirements.

Anchoring the Network

When participants have been involved in the VSC for many years, they acquire much knowledge of VSC work having been exposed to more facets of the job. This rich experience is achievable only through a sustained learning on-the-job. Participation in communities of practice allows VSCs to master the skilled art of policing in a form of knowledge in action (Amin and Roberts

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[137] Information gleaned from previous fieldwork for my undergraduate dissertation. While the job scope of VSCs certainly differs from that of regular officers, the information presented in this chapter suggests VSCs are similarly prone to being overworked by committing too much time and energies into policing as a hobby.

[138] From my previous fieldwork, some kin may feel adequately compensated for the missed 'family time' that they have had to put up with in response to the unpredictable nature of policing and the frequent long and odd hours that officers put in, feeling that the call of duty justifies the absence of a loved one. Others may grudgingly accept the explanation on offer, but would continue to face a routine struggle in coping with the burden of social reproduction. Conversely, certain kin would not even be present at these family functions for a variety of reasons, including their own work and family commitments, a continued distrust of the 'dangerous' working environment of police officers, or a complete disdain for police work because it has robbed the family of many intimate moments together.

[139] The imbrication of family with community is an example of the mobilisation of community to serve organisational interests. Given the oppressive structures that may be present within certain families, this promotional strategy may well back-fire if the signification of family is frowned upon by the individual.

2008). This knowledge cannot be codified into formal textbooks but requires an active participation, usually under the guidance of experienced practitioners, in order for one to learn. They include for instance, the ability to spot subtle criminal activity amidst a typical 'buzzing' urban landscape, the ability to think on one's feet and to act calmly to secure a crime scene, and the proficiency in interviewing suspects to elicit a confession. VSCs may not be serving as full-time police officers, but their ability to commit the minimum of 16 or 32 hours a month ensures they are constantly kept on their toes when it comes to volunteering. This stability of routines then has produced many officers who have accumulated over 20 years of ground experience in ways that even most regulars would find tough to emulate. From a trainee to a novice, then a 'regular', a professional and an expert, a handful of VSCs have progressed through the rites of practice to be able to serve as experienced mentors to youthful recruits. Against a backdrop of higher attrition of young regular officers for various reasons, VSCs are crucial in anchoring the community/policing network. It is important to pass on practical knowledge in order to keep it in circulation after VSCs eventually retire from the force. Experienced VSCs thus act as repositories of practical knowledge within the SPF, transmitting them to younger regular and VSC counterparts in a most invaluable way.

Alas, the mandatory retirement age for uniformed officers covers VSCs as well, putting an age ceiling to their involvements in policing. There have been occasions that experienced VSCs are 'forced' into retirement even when they feel that their bodies are fit for performing duties.

> Sani: I feel the police force shouldn't use the age to gauge the VSC... For those experienced VSCs, they should allow them to extend the service beyond the current mandated retirement age of 50 for junior officers and 55 for senior officers.
> Shaun: Now people are living longer and getting healthier. I think we should let them serve as and when as they please as long as they are medically fit.
> Sani: Even in terms of cost, there's more (incurred) for regulars. If you employ a VSC, versus a regular, which is more cost-effective? Then (for) VSCs, we are very energetic to do something new.
> Shaun: Because some of the officers, they are very experienced and knowledgeable in ground work...they are an asset to the police force. To call them to retire too early, it's a waste. To train an officer costs a lot.

Larry: Because now POs (Junior Officers) have to retire at 50. So some people can still contribute. You'd have people who are really qualified...full of experience. So now the only thing you can do is to join as an Honorary VSC. But (for) Honorary, (the thing) is not only you'd get no money, but I think it's a scheme that doesn't normally accept a lot of people. So I think these people can still contribute in other means. Because some have organisational skills...some have secretarial staff skills... So we can encourage them. No doubt, you may think that these old people may not be fit enough to go to the ground, but logistics we'll still need support... and recruitment...

The loss of knowledge repositories, experienced mentors and a likely source of role models is a heavy price to pay in the bid to minimise the risks to the organisation of being unable to secure adequate insurance coverage for frontline officers (Ericson and Haggerty 1997).

However, like many other workplaces, an anchoring of the community/policing network also presents opportunities for an unhealthy accumulation of power within network nodes. Anonymous sources have indicated that the quasi-professional organisational structure of the VSC, especially in the earlier years, had allowed certain individuals to amass for themselves sizeable spheres of influence within the VSC (and possibly the SPF). Compared to regulars, the promotions of VSCs remain more fluid, and officers do not need to be frequently rotated amongst the different police departments. While these rumours of politicking and abuse of power must surely be taken with a pinch of salt since they are mere hearsay, they warn against an over-celebratory account of the selfless contributions of VSCs.

The presence of network anchors helps consolidate the successes of community/policing by serving as mentors to younger members and providing a pillar of strength during troubled times.

Embodiment of Police Knowledge-in-Action

Acquisition of police knowledge-in-action can be highly coveted for various reasons that go beyond the ability to perform one's VSC duties well. At a prosaic level, such knowledge

encompasses a familiarisation with Criminal Law and proper police procedures which are useful to the conduct of everyday life in a more democratic manner.

> Steven T.: Under the VSC I've learnt some new skills lor...like management...how to manage your staff, how to do event management. So, many things that you ask VSCs to do...you can practise it. Now whatever things you practise in the VSC, sometimes you can use it outside in the world. Because no matter what, VSC is part of the police force. So no matter what, some things we need to go step-by-step and according to rules and regulations.

> Christopher: Sometimes the more you understand about the law, it may not be good. Because you'll start to question... But sometimes it's good. The case in point being the processing of traffic wardens. As a police officer, you know the procedures, you know the regulations. And when they first outsourced the traffic wardens, you'd realise that it was not (a) complete transition. And traffic wardens were summoning based on what they understand about the law. And that's when you start questioning whether such outsourcing is applicable...or how it can be improved. Okay, but if you remain as the public, you'd never understand. You get summoned – you don't know why. So it's also a means of improving the country.

Management skills are also highly valued in contemporary workplaces.

> Mark C.: In these 15 years I have learnt a lot of things. I have seen a lot of things as well. I think VSC is almost as good as regular officer...they have seen a lot of things that a normal member of public would not have seen. You know? When attending to cases...because every case is different. There's different scenario. So it actually helps you to improve your own thinking skills and problem solving skills. If you work outside, I don't think you'll need to settle any dispute case, or rape case, or apprehend a criminal.

> Colin: (I)n my days off, I am teaching Polytechnic students: young adults, coming from different walks of life. Some being very diligent; some being at the other end of the 'being diligent' spectrum. In the VSC, I see different types of officers: motivated officers; officers who need motivation at the other end of spectrum as well. I also deal with members of the public, be it in the form of recruitment activities, or doing checks on them on the street, or dealing with a host of regular officers of different ranks and seniority. So there is some linkage: mainly in the form of people management, communicating with people, and dealing with difficult situations as and when the need arises.

> Jimmy: Because when we go out and volunteer, we'd start to learn... Like for example my work ah, if I don't go out and volunteer to do VSC work, I'd never be able to understand what the other levels of people are (like). Or interacting with people on the

> street. So with this, you'd tend to understand. And then now, you'd become street-wise. Like when I go back, sometimes I'd share with my family. I'd tell them 'if this thing happens, you should handle it this way...'

But here one can smell a rat: managing police work may bear many similarities to managing non-police work in everyday life, but a simple transfer of policing dispositions onto the wider spheres of everyday life is problematic. Managing one's students will certainly not be like managing one's VSC team, or worse, managing criminals. Being 'street-wise' is certainly a positive attribute to the extent that it warns against an over-reliance upon textbook knowledge, but it also implies a certain level of distrust in one's risky environment. The circumstances faced are not unique to these individuals, but will be experienced by other VSCs as well in their attempts to 'juggle' different responsibilities. The ability to compartmentalise may certainly be of help here, as individuals learn to separate their ordinary work-lives and reproduction processes from their extraordinary career as a part-time policeman. Alas, in the pursuit of everyday justice, compartmentalisation requires a superhuman strength from willing individuals. Humans are not machines that switch between codes effortlessly: traces of community/policing work will linger on and permeate the other spheres of everyday life. Likewise, the criminalising gaze and policing ennui can both easily seep through performances of boundary work unconsciously. The limitations to boundary work highlight the need for volunteers to be willing to expose themselves to new forms of sociality, to guard against a simplistic faith in one's own ability to take charge of one's affairs (and others' as well). Boundary work is not merely something which needs constant reinforcements, but rather it is something that can be adequately reinforced only through openness to external support and a due recognition of its social constitution.

In more straightforward ways, working as a VSC also helps volunteers appreciate the work being done by police officers, building upon their encounters with the latter in their daytime occupation.

> Larry: I work very long hours. In the IT line, basically you're on call 24x7. (Laughs) When things spoil, people still need to use. So you'll have to manage (your different responsibilities)... And basically some of my sites: they are sensitive sites – MHA

(Ministry of Home Affairs)...police is one of them. So we just go and support. And you know – police work, SCDF (Singapore Civil Defence Force), Home Team – all these are 24x7. So...when people escalate events to you, you're also on standby.

For others, securing contacts within the force can be of immense help to their daytime careers.

Steven T.: Because I have contacts in the police force, so whenever I... It helps me build up my swimming things also lah! (Laughs) Like for example, someone says 'My son wants to learn swimming', so they'd approach me... So it's also good for my business lah. It's also good for my career. I can also exchange more business (contacts) lah. Like (for) example they need help... Every year we have this PSA (Police Sports Association) swimming competition. So the regular will ask me if I'm free to help. So most of the time I'll help them lah...like maybe do some training... A bit coaching and training, so that from there, I get to know them, they get to know me...so that if anybody wants to learn swimming, they can approach me lah. That's one thing which helps me lah...with my career! (Laughs)

Mark C.: I'm working with the Singapore Grand Prix – the organisers for the F1 (Formula One). So I've been there for four years... In fact we've just finished another season last weekend. For me I'm involved in the traffic management...the road closures as well as deployment of Auxiliary Police Officers to direct the traffic. Basically our work is only once a year, during the Grand Prix season. Of course, we have planning lah...we start (as) early as January, you know? All the agencies, like SPF, SCDF (Singapore Civil Defence Force), LTA (Land Transport Authority)...and other contingency forces lah (...) Because my job also requires me to have a lot of liaison with the government agencies, so I would say with my VSC experience and my background knowledge in policing, it actually helps me do my job and carry it out smoothly lah. And because a lot of them know that I'm a VSC, especially from the police force right, so at least (there's) common understanding and we know each other's style of working. So it actually helps in a way... Because we actually deal a lot with regulars...HQ (Headquarters), Ops (Operations) Department, then Land Divisions... Things get easier lah...actually sometimes they say this type of thing cannot be done, but they know that you're in the force, so you can handle this, so they can let you do it...something like that lah.

From Mark's interview snippets, it is clear that knowledge of the Police Force becomes important when individuals frequently liaise with the authorities on security-related matters. The recent importation of mega-events like the Formula One night race brings with it an associated demand for logistical and security operations. Security expertise acquired through work as a VSC comes in handy for individuals seeking employment opportunities in the burgeoning field of security provision.

Yet other VSCs explicitly tie up community/policing work with their daytime occupations, creating an integrative synergy which puts aside the concerns for compartmentalisation cited above.

> Christopher: I'm currently running a company on my own. The focus on the company is to provide products and solutions, as well as services to government agencies in Singapore. (...) And we joined the VSC because we wanted to break into...we wanted to understand how the police force works from an insider's perspective. Because as a solutions provider, you are always looking for solutions that may not be in line with what they are doing operationally. So by joining the VSC, you'll have a small picture...not an entire picture...but a small picture of it, of what they are doing. So it was for that reason, and then it became a so-called passion. But until today, we are still trying to make use of our knowledge and our experiences outside to try and improve police force as a whole – both VSC and the regular force.

> Stephen: I am a consultant trainer for government statutory boards. As a consultant trainer, I work with law enforcement agencies on different issues... My priority is to provide the mental and physical training required for law enforcement agents, so that they will know how to stay alive. So part of my job includes providing scenario-based training to enforcement officers. These are repetitive based training that teaches officers how to perform the duties that they need to do. For example, when you arrest someone, you'd need to go through a series of steps to ensure you perform your job well. Like you need to carry out body searches, handcuffing techniques... So what scenario-based training does is it is situation-focused, and procedures-focused. It allows individuals to put into practice what they have learnt. Because you know, people would often miss out certain steps in real-life when they say, handcuff a person. So I think this training is important to prepare officers for the real work that they'd be carrying out there. (...) I was responsible for introducing the T-baton into the police force...Because I saw the need and I proposed to them the T-baton. The T-baton is handy and practical for officers here, as compared to the previous baton that we had. Because our officers are Asian-built, meaning they are smaller in physique than Western counterparts, so I thought they'd need a baton that's more suitable for them. The T-baton is Asian-built... It serves as an extension of the officer's arm when used, helping officers to perform their duties efficiently. Because for policing, the focus is on control and restraint, so the T-baton is able to assist them in that area. It also provides officers with greater confidence to confront suspects and carry out their duties. And it reduces the danger associated with the job. That I think is the most important thing for police officers – you need to learn to stay alive. And that's why we have mind training for them. (...) So I've been to many police forces in America and in Europe, watching them train and seeing what we can take from them. In my travels abroad, I am exposed to the different practices that other law enforcement forces adopt, and I'd see what is relevant for the

local context in Singapore. Because not everything you see there can be applied here...Like for the Police Defensive Tactics, I was serving as the consultant to the police force. I helped to come up with a formal syllabus because previously there was none. And I'm able to do this because I have a martial arts background. So I felt that the training could be improved on. In fact, my main motivation for joining the VSC was to serve as a martial arts instructor. (...) I was the one who introduced the psychometric test for VSCs...because there are always good and bad apples within each crop of applicants, we have to make sure that...there is a streaming of the bad from the good. That's the purpose of having a psychometric test. It has already been used on people applying to join the police as regulars, so it's only natural that we extend it to VSCs. We want to exclude people with the wrong motivations, especially those who can't join as regulars and want to try out as VSCs. Our message is that VSCs' (entry) will not be any easier.

These examples show how an interest in community/policing meshes nicely with one's daytime occupation, where community work provides the routine fodder for the pursuit of capitalist accumulation strategies (see Joseph 2002). Unlike mainstream routines that demarcate clear boundaries between daytime work and after-work volunteering, the boundaries of work and volunteer service are interlocked in more complex ways for these individuals. While one could be inclined to view this as a simple integration of volunteering drives into an overarching rent-seeking behaviour, the reality is more nuanced as these cases show. In Christopher's case, he distinguishes between volunteer work in the VSC and meeting the needs of the customer-client of the SPF. While providing solutions to the SPF necessitates a frequent reference to the larger organisational picture, volunteering itself is productive of certain 'passions' that would include being able to mix with people from different walks of life, and being able to share his experiences of life with the younger generation. Conversely in Stephen's case, an anchoring of the community/policing network has produced a self-identification with police work. Stephen's values would be nearly identical to those of the organisation; but unlike a simple managerial translation of mission and vision statements, he has strongly internalised the core values of the force, and is determined to seek out ways to better the well-being of individual police officers on the ground. He thus demands complete dedication by VSCs to the task of community/policing when they are on-the-job, whilst resolutely speaking about the need for police officers to 'stay alive'. And he would relate with pride the set of personal artefacts that he had contributed towards the setting up of a VSC Heritage Centre at the VSC Headquarters.

Stephen: Yes I actually contributed my personal collection to help them set up a display gallery. Did you see the old VSC uniform with the 'V' on the collar on display when you visited it? That was mine! And those shields and batons that you see, those are also from me. (Laughs) So it's kind of good to be able to give these items. I mean there's no point in me keeping this stuff with me. It's better to showcase them for future generations to see and recollect. And when I bring my children there, they'd feel proud to find out that those were mine...

Giving of his time, effort, expertise and personal artefacts to the VSC allows Stephen, and by association, the organisation of SPF, to preserve their legacy of service. It also becomes a way for Stephen to relieve himself of some of his overaccumulation through time and thereby to repay his debt to society.

In summary, this chapter has explored the myriad processes through which volunteers enrol in, submit to and reproduce the VSC network. Providing a grounded perspective of how individuals become motivated to police their communities helps reveal the ways in which community/policing is embodied in practice. The reasons for joining and remaining within the VSC are not just reflective of specific individual experiences of participating in formal policing work, but are also refractive of social processes through which individuals actively police their personal communities. Volunteering to work for less, providing support for duties, learning from experts, providing new perspectives to further a cause, contributing skills towards the team, recruiting others into the network, engaging one's personal community, anchoring the network to increase its resilience, and embodying communal values are several ways through which community is policed. Rather than being restricted by the argument that community policing serves to invoke the presence of communities to police different subjectivities (Rose 1999), it may be more fruitful to conceive of the diverse ways in which communities are being performed through the myriad policing socialities of different individuals. Putting aside the layers of official discourse and attempts at formal techniques of community engagement, one is drawn into the personal life stories of how individuals experience community/policing in ways that complicate the policy briefs of governmental actors and the stereotypes present in popular cultural texts.

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

The previous chapters have looked at the subject of community policing from different vantage points which have yielded different knowledge of the subject. This concluding chapter can do no more than summarise some of the more salient points.

Community policing in academic theory provides a guiding philosophy for greater and more effective community engagement efforts by the police. Mainstream police scholars have prescribed management strategies to implement the vision that had been proposed by community policing intellectuals. Under the guidance of prominent scholars in the field, community policing has been consolidated as an institutionalised best practice for situated application by various police forces around the world. While subsequent scholarly enquiry has mostly focused on evaluating the effectiveness of localised community policing initiatives, critical scholars have begun questioning the raison d'être of community policing as the benefits of community policing projects are unevenly shared. Given the looseness of the theoretical concept, there is a need to ground any research on community policing, even while one tries to avoid the managerial impulse to assess the impacts of community policing.

The Singapore Story has shown how community policing as a police-authored discourse dovetailed with the governmental objective to bond the local residential population at a finer scale. While the first two decades post-independence helped set the stage for economic development through the cultivation of a law-abiding worker-citizen, the rise of homeowner-citizens residing in public housing estates provided an impetus for community policing to take place. In this conceptualisation, community policing was the platform for the dissemination of banal crime prevention messages to warn homeowners and more importantly, their familial dependents who kept watch over households during the day while breadwinners were out working, about the dangers of falling prey to crime, and the requisite steps one had to take in order to protect oneself and one's household from preventable crime. Crime prevention however exceeded its mandate to prevent crime, as it simultaneously fostered a liberal

economic rationality that would be underpinned by a policing psyche which was constantly on the look-out for deviant behaviours within their midst. Situational crime prevention technologies drew upon liberal economic theory to craft lists of crime prevention measures, and in so doing, were performative of an economic rationality which dictated that criminals would strike wherever temptations were present and the opportunities for exploitation were ripe. With the police taking on the role of moral guardians at a time before other state bodies recognised the value of tending to the community (Quah and Quah 1987; Quah 1994; 2010), police work became morally inflected as affective notions of justice were grafted onto the legal system. This facilitated the displacement of guilt onto the criminal other by the mainstream population, even while self-interest fuelled the drive towards greater accumulation of propertied wealth. Self-policing would be extended to include the reporting of crimes and criminal intelligence to the police, alongside the prosaic duty of working hard to earn a living, investing in a child's education, saving enough for retirement and having excess for discretionary spending. The boundaries of economic competition and criminal wrongdoing however could easily overlap, when an economically competitive other is deemed to engage in unfair practices in the bid to secure his/her own economic well-being, or when a criminal re-invests ill-gotten gains within the formal economy. These personal experiences are likely to affect individual perceptions of the legitimacy of the criminal justice system.

Community policing became imbued with a neo-communitarian ethos from the 1990s, in response to economic restructuring and the concomitant cultivation of a consumer-citizen state subject (Chua 1995). Consumers willing to loosen their purse strings would inevitably become more assertive of individual rights, and communitarian discourses served to remind individuals of their duties to the community and the nation. The government actively encouraged greater participation by civic society to provide feedback to help improve the work of civil servants, as well as to care for the needs of the less fortunate in society. With economic restructuring eroding the livelihoods of more sections of Singaporean society, the lack of a social safety net was becoming more glaring (Lim 2006). Persuading the economical self to care for others on behalf of the state would prove to be a tall order in a culture of pragmatism. Meanwhile,

community policing had become too labour-intensive over the years (Singh 2000). This eventually led to a difficult call for a rescaling of community policing units within the police. The exercise of rescaling helped to surface some of the tensions within the original community policing model, even while the act of rescaling further complicated the landscape of policing in Singapore. As police work was increasingly professionalised, the police would no longer be readily seen working the ground for support; instead they could afford to act at a distance through the mobilisation of techniques of self-policing (Rose 1999; 2000). One such new technique helmed by the police was the CSSP, which built upon the grassroots contacts the police had established under the NPP system. While ingratiating oneself into the routines of reproducers of households was undoubtedly hard work, it was still an achievable task for NPPOs. Comparatively, even minor modifications to the decades-old national narrative of economic progress through hard work would prove far more challenging for both NPCOs and other state-led community development officers to accomplish.

The national narrative has been sustained through many works of popular culture. Of concern here is the state-authored text of *Crime Watch*, which has preserved a predictable entertainment routine for its viewers over the years (Singapore Police Force 1996; Sim 2011). *Crime Watch* thrives upon the structures, meanings and pleasures afforded by visual records of criminals, victims (Jermyn 2003), witnesses and crime-fighters. While *Crime Watch*'s target audience is ostensibly the social reproducers of the work force who are vulnerable to criminal attacks when left alone, it has also helped constitute the national psyche through the dissemination of crime prevention messages in a popularised format. What started off as a community engagement tool by the police has gradually grown to become a part of popular culture. As a cultural text which resonates with the liberal economic logic sponsored by the nation-state, *Crime Watch* seals off alternative spaces for discussion by pandering to the self-righteousness of the viewer-in-comfort. Ironically, the very liberal economic logic that viewers are comfortable with is anything but comfortable. Viewers are consistently abandoned by *Crime Watch* and left to police their own behaviours in the social Darwinist jungle of economic survival: self-policing becomes a voluntary task that the 'gracious' individual voluntarily submits

him/herself to. It is here that the contours of 'volunteering' in Singapore are revealed in sharper detail. 'Volunteering' when defined in the liberal economic logic of voluntary individual actions undertaken without any financial remuneration is readily applied to the work of self-policing which individuals voluntarily subscribe to. Caring for one's community and the less fortunate of society are comparable to the self-restraint that one voluntarily exercises when confronted with the morally questionable behaviours of fellow workers seeking to gain an economically strategic advantage in the workplace. Self-policing becomes the arbiter of individual morality in the economically competitive landscape. Refusing to engage in underhanded competition such as backstabbing, gossip or currying favours from superiors is a testament to individual self-righteousness, which the well-policed individual can take pride in. The work of self-policing is nevertheless a tiring endeavour that leaves viewers feeling jaded from the bruising, competitive encounters with the economic/criminal other. Policing ennui sets in when individuals feel overwhelmed by the enormity of the task of self-policing, when unscrupulous others can seemingly get away with unfair competitive practices.

The coupling of professionalised post-production work with amateurish acting by both regular and volunteer police officers helps evoke a sense of raw realism. While plotlines are not realistic, the real of the acting helps sustain the fantasy of fighting for justice and overcoming Evil; the performances by officers playing themselves against a local backdrop more than makes up for the lack of emotional engagement of plotlines, as it activates a cognitive awareness of reality whilst masking psychical undercurrents. Caricatures of criminals facilitate the communication of light-hearted sound bites, rendering the work of filming *Crime Watch* playful and enjoyable for producers and producer-consumers. This is nonetheless achieved through the casting of offenders as despicable villains worthy of condemnation. Left without a voice on the programme, the criminal is prone to suffer from social stigmatisation in ways which outlive the duration of his/her judiciary indictments. On the other hand, joining the police force becomes a way to apprehend the real behind-the-scenes as opposed to the reel on the screen. For insiders already participating in police work, viewing *Crime Watch* becomes an occasion for relaxation;

for communicating one's secretive job scope to family members and loved ones; and for nurturing the crime-fighter ego that prepares officers for the call of duty.

The call of duty has been answered by VSCs who have voluntarily enrolled into the policing network. As highly-committed individuals who have given of their time, energies and capabilities towards police work, VSCs have demonstrated the discipline needed to defy the logic of pragmatism (Kong 2000). While individuals had decided to participate in community/policing for a variety of interconnected reasons that may not be easily abstracted or explained by their social class, their retention within the network is possible through the release of productive energies by the lax supervision of disciplinary power. This is a power unique to the police to the extent that the credentials of police work have been burnished by the strong moral authority of the SPF and a host of popular cultural referents that serve as intertexts to the image of policing held by individuals. An empowerment through self-discipline nevertheless brushes up against the socially-assisted forms of social reproduction that VSCs are beholden to. The crime-fighter persona has a tendency to refuse to acknowledge the help rendered by familial dependents which in the first place had permitted him/her to venture outside and draw upon his/her police power. This may have been expected, on the account that the crime-fighter relies upon a performance of vulnerability by the public to justify his/her presence on the ground. However in so doing, it not only reproduces the stereotype of the long-suffering familial dependent who must put up with the erratic schedules of a loved one, but it also creates a situation whereby committed individuals over-rely on their individual capabilities for performing boundary work (cf. Nippert-Eng 1996). A blind faith in one's own ability to self-police is likely to result in overworking. In addition, it also allows for an unconscious transplantation of the criminalising gaze and policing ennui onto other spheres of everyday life, in an insidious way that duly extends the (in)security continuum.

The (in)security continuum (Bigo 2002) has been produced through an extension of the networks of community policing following a resurgence of the counter-terrorism discourse and a liberalisation of the private security sector. Counter-terrorism discourse actively plays upon

the fear of a proximate, dangerous threat which sanctions (re)bordering efforts by state agents in response to the signal criminal network of terrorism. Police work is re-articulated as that of (re)bordering, in a way which erects a strictly professional distance between the law enforcement agent and the public. Not only is there an increased risk that the police and other policing state agents would become overworked from performing extraneous, reactive tasks, but for the police, the recently revised project of community policing that was conceived of to reduce the workload of the police has in effect been re-commandeered by the government to focus more on counter-terrorism and community engagement along racial and religious lines. As the governmentalised state tapped upon pre-existing community policing networks to disseminate its counter-terrorism and social cohesion messages, an extension of policing powers could take place, under the supervision of the state police. But with the concurrent rise in demand for private security as a result of the need to secure spaces for/of consumption (Davis 1990), counter-terrorism discourse helped tip the scales in favour of a greater liberalisation of private police forces. Counter-terrorism requires the submission of the private sector to the needs of (re)bordering; however the release of market forces into the previously tightly regulated sphere of police work has further commodified security in ways that pander to the craving for ambient security (Loader 2006). Ambient security manifests itself most clearly in the security deployments for mega-events, where the representation of perfect control is increasingly likely to make unreasonable demands of the police. Ambient security then extends the (in)security continuum in most visible ways whilst simultaneously proliferating the meanings of 'security' in inequitable ways. As the police increasingly work with the private sector to stage well-choreographed security operations (Boyle and Haggerty 2009), a fluid space for policing is in the works. This envisages the cross-fertilisation of workplace skills, as the private sector is conferred greater policing powers to police mega-events and civil emergencies, while the police take to private sector modes of learning to keep ahead of evolving security threats to the world-economy.

This thesis has expanded upon generic theorisations of community policing to recover the grounded experiences of community policing, whether from formal discourses, mediations by

popular texts, or through personal networks. In so doing, it has avoided both the management-centric framework that predominates discussions of community policing and also the critical impulse that portrays community policing as a monolith of state agency. As geographers turn towards a deeper engagement with the geographies of policing, it is inevitable that the connections between the police, police work and the work of self-policing are closely investigated for their myriad historical configurations. This helps to avoid simplistic generalisations on the genealogies of current securitisation strategies whilst allowing for theoretical explorations and experimentations with how securitisation works out at different scales across time and space.

In addition, this thesis has identified a source of social concern for Singaporeans. Situated within a decades-old national narrative of economic development and lifelong learning, a sustained liberal economic rationality is productive of various forms of cynicism that will affect the perceptions of many Singaporeans. Contrary to mainstream interpretations of 'political cynicism' that are attributed to an irrational distrust in the ruling party (Cai, 15 September 2011), this thesis has hinted that 'political cynicism' reveals repressed political expressions, which have been policed with utmost fervour by the state police in the first few post-independence decades. With the nurturing of the consumer-citizen as state subject and the availability of online social media to provide avenues for political expression and association, previously repressed feelings can now be broadcast with a revanchist fury. Cynicism as a terminology may accurately describe the non-negotiable stances of several calloused political viewpoints, but it includes forms of political sentiments that have been unjustifiably labelled as 'cynicism'. From a distrust in the presentational strategies of politicians, crime prevention officers and corporate branders, to the fatigue resulting from overworking which causes one to lose an appetite for learning, to the fear of falling afoul of the law which leads one to tread carefully on the lines of political correctness, to the nurturing of the crime-fighter ego which seeks to take charge of affairs and will not be seen as being weak and incapable, cynicism is generated from different contingent circumstances. Perhaps more poignantly, a wide-ranging variant of cynicism can be traced to the most rational source of neoclassical economics. Such

cynicism can explain certain wide-ranging forms of behaviour associated with '*kiasu*-ism'[140] in Singapore. Rather than take pride in the unique 'quirks' of Singaporean behaviour, it is important to recognise the pervasive, socially corrosive affect of cynicisms which are grounded within the historical-materialisms of late-modern capitalism. Once it is allowed to take root in a given situation, cynicism inhibits the conditions of possibility (see Stewart 2011). The task becomes that of re-animating the life-worlds of Singaporeans to open up more diverse sociabilities within the urban environment.

Lastly on a personal note, the work of self-policing is an issue worthy of further refinement in theory and practice. Frequently derided for its dystopic associations with what Nikolas Rose (1999) has termed neoliberal governmentality, self-policing has become a shorthand for the normalising technologies of the self. However this thesis has shown that self-policing can exceed the boundaries expected of it in unpredictable ways. While a certain degree of normalisation of self would accompany an expansion of disciplinary power, self-policing can elaborate upon understandings of 'self' in ways that (re)appropriate the intended meanings of power. Taking into account the reservations associated with extrapolating from what some scholars have characterised as typically middle class sentiments (e.g. Chua 1995), the personal experiences of VSCs highlighted here nonetheless suggest that individuals can benefit from volunteering in ways that transcend typical class boundaries (see Gibson-Graham 2006). Moreover, while they ostensibly provide a source of flexible reserve labour for the increasingly overworked regular force to draw upon, VSCs certainly do not submit to the policing network as cultural dopes unwittingly providing menial labour to the SPF. More empirical investigations are needed to uncover the complicated processes through which volunteers who submit to various forms of self-policing can actually become radically self-empowered in ways that overflow the bounded containers of social norms and regulations.

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[140] Literally translated as 'being afraid to lose'.

While this thesis was not originally intended as an autobiography, it has retrospectively come to resemble one in several ways. Firstly, writing this thesis has allowed me to finally come up with a response to the most prosaic of questions that have greeted me on numerous social occasions: 'How is studying geography relevant to policing?' I hope this thesis has made some headway in convincing the reader that geography and policing are most intimately related. From the politicisation of terrain and the territorialising work carried out through an investigative rationality, to the cultural signification of the crime-fighter and the socialisation of public/private space, what this thesis has done is to uncover the myriad geographical imaginations complexly bound up within contemporary police work.

Secondly, it has allowed me to further an earlier research interest into the work-lives of police officers. For my undergraduate thesis, I had peered into the everyday rhythms of frontline police officers working the night shift in NPCs. This brief encounter allowed me a glimpse into the fascinating temporality of the urban, enabled me to experience the routines of a night-shift worker, and highlighted the various social injustices that continue to harm the physiological, social and psychological health of many social reproducers. A lack of concern for the welfare of night-shift workers appears more egregious given the renewed emphasis on rejuvenating inner cities through a promotion of the evening and night-time economy. For this thesis, I am privileged to have had the chance to elaborate upon how the policing psyche operates across different sites and scales through juxtapositions of different methods of researching and writing.

Thirdly, it should be clear by now that the topic of 'community policing' has proven pliable enough for me to pursue my critical research interests without offending the sensibilities of regular and volunteer police officers. Community policing as a discourse has served many functions throughout its stay in Singapore; it is appropriate that I continued in that tradition to secure access to valuable sources of information within the force. By adopting such a method, it

is also hoped that the reader will be more attuned to the banality of everyday life, thereby experiencing the rich possibilities within these proximate spaces of living.

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Appendix A: Interview Request Letter for Police Historian

Title: Community Policing in Singapore

Dear Sir/Madam,

I am currently pursuing a Masters of the Arts degree in Human Geography at the University of British Columbia. As part of my degree requirements, I am writing a thesis on the topic of community policing in Singapore. My project seeks to study how community policing is practised in everyday life in Singapore, and I will be examining the topic through multiple field sites. A study of community policing helps advance theoretical and practical understandings of both community and policing, moving beyond compartmentalised understandings of both.

Having personally experienced the implementation of community policing within the Singapore Police Force, I am confident that you have deep knowledge of the community policing model as it was carried out in Singapore, and I hope that you would be able to share your expertise with me. I am seeking a one-hour long interview with you in order to discuss the historical legacy of community policing within the Singapore Police Force. The interview would be conducted face-to-face, at a time and location that is convenient for you. Should you agree to be interviewed, I would be willing to email you the interview schedule in advance of our interview.

Your decision to participate in this project is entirely free, informed, and voluntary, and you may refuse to participate or withdraw from the study at any time. If you choose, you also may remain anonymous. If you volunteer to participate in this study, please contact me by mobile phone at +65xxxxxxxx or by email at mark.low@geog.ubc.ca. Details of the study and your commitment are on the attached information sheet. Please bring a signed copy to the interview and keep a copy for your own records.

If you have any questions or concerns on the project, my thesis supervisor Dr. David Ley would be happy to discuss them with you. You may reach him at david.ley@geog.ubc.ca. Additionally, if you have any concerns about your treatment or rights as a research subject, you may contact the Research Subject Information Line in the UBC Office of Research Services at RSIL@ors.ubc.ca.

Your involvement in this project would be greatly appreciated.

Yours Sincerely,

_____

Mark Low
MA Candidate
Department of Geography
University of British Columbia

Information Sheet and Consent Form for Historians

Thesis Title: Community Policing in Singapore

Principal Investigator: David Ley, Professor of Geography, Department of Geography, University of British Columbia (Tel: +1xxxxxxxxxx; Email: david.ley@geog.ubc.ca)

Co-Investigator: Mark Low, MA Student, Department of Geography, University of British Columbia (Tel: +65xxxxxxxx; Email: mark.low@geog.ubc.ca)
This research is part of the Masters Thesis that is a requirement for graduation from the programme.

Purpose: This study seeks to study how community policing is practised in everyday life in Singapore. A study of community policing helps advance theoretical and practical understandings of both community and policing, and locates community policing within the context of wider social change in Singapore.

Study Procedures: This study involves data collection through interviews with key informants involved in community policing. Police historians will be interviewed for their deep knowledge of the ways community policing was carried out by the Singapore Police Force, and the historical legacy of community policing in Singapore. Interviews will be audiotaped and transcribed to facilitate analysis.

Risks: There are minimal risks to you in participating in this research project. However, should you feel discomfort in the course of this research, you have the right to withdraw at any time.

Confidentiality: As this is a key informant interview, we ask for your consent to use your name in our study, unless you wish to remain anonymous (as below). Any other identifying information that is obtained during this study will be kept confidential unless specific consent for attributable statements is granted in advance of any public dissemination; however, given the public nature of government policy, it may be possible to identify you from the context of your responses. Recordings from interviews will be kept in a locked filing cabinet and be computer password protected in electronic format.

Contact for information about the study: Please feel free to contact me by mobile phone at +65xxxxxxxx or by email at mark.low@geog.ubc.ca if you have any questions or desire further information with respect to this study.

Contact for concerns about the rights of research subjects: If you have any concerns about your treatment or rights as a research subject, you may contact the Research Subject Information Line in the UBC Office of Research Services at RSIL@ors.ubc.ca.

Consent: Your participation in this study is free, informed, and voluntary. You may refuse to participate or withdraw from the study at any time. Your signature below indicates that you

have received a copy of this consent form prior to the set-up of the interview. You also have received a copy of this form for your own records. Your signature indicates that you consent to participate in this study.

_____   _____
   Subject Signature and Date   Name of Subject

☐ I would like to remain anonymous.

Appendix A1: Interview Schedule for Police Historian
Interviews are semi-structured, revolving around certain themes that have been bolded.

Background to Community Policing Model
Community policing is a notoriously difficult concept to pin down? How would you personally define community policing?

Birth of Community Policing Model
In what ways were the historical context conducive for the implementation of community policing?

Scholars have noted that Singapore's police force has benefited from positive public opinion and public relations prior to the inception of community policing. Why in this case was there still a need for community policing?

What challenges did management face in transmitting this concept to frontline officers?

Since a core component of community policing remains theoretically ambiguous, how do you ensure the job scope for officers remains concise?

How were resistances to community policing by external members of the public overcome?

Criticisms of community policing in the West often concern the disproportionate attention being paid to socioeconomically better off communities as a result of community policing. How do you ensure that community self-help will not be restricted to those who already have more resources?

How was the image of the force changed in response to community policing?

Changes to Community Policing Model
The NPP system remains a key model of policing even to this day. Amidst popular support for it, what led the organisation to decide to formally abandon the NPP model of community policing as the model to follow?

How is the NPC system better suited to meet the needs of the community?

Legacy of Community Policing Model
What was the response from frontline officers to the decision to move away from the NPP system of community policing?

How did the police persuade the community that it was not abandoning them in the move to NPCs?

This change in organisational structure has resulted in an ambivalent attitude towards community policing. How is community policing conceived of by and within the organisation nowadays? What changes are in store for community policing in the Singaporean context?

Community policing has now become a component of a transnational police regime that seeks to foster democratic institutional building. But back in the late 1980s, several foreign police forces had already visited Singapore to learn more about our model of community policing? How has SPF sought to lend its expertise in community policing to other police forces?

Have there been any attempts at enlarging the concept of community to include non-territorial subjects? What is your view of community policing at a global/ transnational level?

Appendix A2: Profile of Historian Interviewees

Historian 1
A senior police officer of the Singapore Police Force, he forms part of the leadership group of the organisation. He has experience in community policing from the 1990s, when he led a team of officers in overseeing the transition from the Neighbourhood Police Post system of frontline policing to the current Neighbourhood Police Centre system.

Historian 2
A senior police officer of the Singapore Police Force, he forms part of the leadership group of the organisation. He is currently leading efforts to evaluate the success of the Neighbourhood Police Centre system of frontline policing.

Historian 3
A senior police officer of the Singapore Police Force, he forms part of the leadership group of the organisation. He has extensive knowledge of manpower issues within the organisation.

Appendix B: Interview Request Letter for *Crime Watch* Coordinator

Title: Community Policing in Singapore

Dear Sir/Madam,

I am currently pursuing a Masters of the Arts degree in Human Geography at the University of British Columbia. As part of my degree requirements, I am writing a thesis on the topic of community policing in Singapore. My project seeks to study how community policing is practised in everyday life in Singapore, and I will be examining the topic through multiple field sites. A study of community policing helps advance theoretical and practical understandings of both community and policing, moving beyond compartmentalised understandings of both.

Crimewatch is a television programme that serves as a vehicle through which community policing is carried out. As such, I am interested in exploring how community is conceived by the producers of the series, how community is performed for the public, and how policing is conceptualised for the audience. As someone who has deep knowledge of the production process of Crimewatch, your contribution towards my project would be highly valued. I am thus seeking a one-hour long interview with you in order to discuss your involvement in Crimewatch. The interview would be conducted face-to-face, at a time and location that is convenient for you. Should you agree to be interviewed, I would be willing to email you the interview schedule in advance of the interview.

Your decision to participate in this project is entirely free, informed, and voluntary, and you may refuse to participate or withdraw from the study at any time. If you choose, you also may remain anonymous. If you volunteer to participate in this study, please contact me by mobile phone at +65xxxxxxxx or by email at mark.low@geog.ubc.ca. Details of the study and your commitment are on the attached information sheet. Please bring a signed copy to the interview and keep a copy for your own records.

If you have any questions or concerns on the project, my thesis supervisor Dr. David Ley would be happy to discuss them with you. You may reach him at david.ley@geog.ubc.ca. Additionally, if you have any concerns about your treatment or rights as a research subject, you may contact the Research Subject Information Line in the UBC Office of Research Services at RSIL@ors.ubc.ca.

Your involvement in this project would be greatly appreciated.

Yours Sincerely,

_____

Mark Low
MA Candidate
Department of Geography
University of British Columbia

Information Sheet and Consent Form for *Crime Watch* Coordinator

Thesis Title: Community Policing in Singapore

Principal Investigator: David Ley, Professor of Geography, Department of Geography, University of British Columbia (Tel: +1xxxxxxxxxx; Email: david.ley@geog.ubc.ca)

Co-Investigator: Mark Low, MA Student, Department of Geography, University of British Columbia (Tel: +65xxxxxxxx; Email: mark.low@geog.ubc.ca)
This research is part of the Masters Thesis that is a requirement for graduation from the programme.

Purpose: This study seeks to study how community policing is practised in everyday life in Singapore. A study of community policing helps advance theoretical and practical understandings of both community and policing, and locates community policing within the context of wider social change in Singapore.

Study Procedures: This study involves data collection through semi-structured interviews with key informants involved in community policing. Producers of Crimewatch are interviewed for a discussion of the production process of Crimewatch, in order to shed light on how community is conceived, how community is performed, and how policing is conceptualised for audiences.

Risks: There are minimal risks to you in participating in this research project. However, should you feel discomfort in the course of this research, you have the right to withdraw at any time.

Confidentiality: As this is a key informant interview, we ask for your consent to use your name in our study, unless you wish to remain anonymous (as below). Any other identifying information that is obtained during this study will be kept confidential unless specific consent for attributable statements is granted in advance of any public dissemination; however, given the public nature of government policy, it may be possible to identify you from the context of your responses. Recordings from interviews will be kept in a locked filing cabinet and be computer password protected in electronic format.

Contact for information about the study: Please feel free to contact me by mobile phone at +65xxxxxxxx or by email at mark.low@geog.ubc.ca if you have any questions or desire further information with respect to this study.

Contact for concerns about the rights of research subjects: If you have any concerns about your treatment or rights as a research subject, you may contact the Research Subject Information Line in the UBC Office of Research Services at RSIL@ors.ubc.ca.

Consent: Your participation in this study is free, informed, and voluntary. You may refuse to participate or withdraw from the study at any time. Your signature below indicates that you have received a copy of this consent form prior to the set-up of the interview. You also have received a copy of this form for your own records. Your signature indicates that you consent to participate in this study.

_____   _____
  Subject Signature and Date   Name of Subject

☐ I would like to remain anonymous.

Appendix B1: Interview Schedule for *Crime Watch* Coordinator

Interviews are semi-structured, revolving around certain themes that have been bolded. Questions in italics are central questions around which additional prompts may be provided, in the form of the non-italicised questions that follow.

Background to Crimewatch

How would you introduce Crimewatch to viewers?
What are the aims of Crimewatch?
How was Crimewatch introduced into Singapore?
What media platforms does Crimewatch utilise to reach out to viewers?
Who are the viewers of Crimewatch?
How do you keep track of viewers?
How do you attract your targeted audience?
How is Crimewatch different from other crime-centred television programmes being produced?

Pre-Production Phase

Could you take me through the production process from pre-production through to post-production?
Who decides on the content of Crimewatch for the coming season? For the coming episode?
How is the content for each episode conceptualised by producers and screenplay writers?
Who is part of the production team for Crimewatch?
What preparations need to be done before production commences?
Who decides what is permissible content for Crimewatch?
Are there typical out-of-bound markers that you have to be conscious of in the production process?
What does the term 'community' mean to you?
Does this have any bearing on how you produce Crimewatch?
What images of policing are you trying to document in Crimewatch?
What role should Crimewatch play in society?
What role should policing play in society?
What are some central themes of Crimewatch?
How have these evolved over time?
How do you continue to generate interest in some recurring themes of Crimewatch?
Are there any stylistic narratives that the production team subscribes to in the framing of each episode?
What stylistic influences (from films/ TV shows/ arts in general) would you say have had an impact on your work over the years?
What challenges do you face in framing these narratives?
Do you face any creative constraints on your work?
Who are Crimewatch's financial sponsors?
Would you say you are satisfied with the production budget that has been made available to you?
How do you make the most of the limited budget?

Production Phase

How do you recruit actors for Crimewatch?
How do actors prepare for their roles?
Is there training given to these actors?
How long does filming for one episode of Crimewatch take?
What challenges do you face while filming?
Is filming pleasurable?
Which part of the production process do you find most enjoyable?

Post-Production Phase

What do you have to do in the post-production phase to make sure the film is ready for broadcast?
Are there any pre-release test screenings?
What is the time lapse between the completion of filming and the broadcast of Crimewatch on public television?
What happens when you do not meet production datelines?
How do you gather feedback after each episode has been released?
Do you think there is room for improving feedback channels from the audience to the production team?
How does audience feedback affect the production process?
Would you say that Crimewatch has been effective in reaching out to the public?
How important is it for the public to tune in to Crimewatch?
Can you recall any instances when important information has been forwarded to the police as a result of the airing of Crimewatch?
Have there been any surprising feedback that you have received about Crimewatch?
How do you think Crimewatch can be improved upon in the future?
What challenges do you think need to be tackled by Crimewatch?
Do you think Crimewatch has played an important role in community policing?

Production Phase for Narrators

Why did you accept the job offer to be a narrator on Crimewatch?
How do you juggle your policing duties with being a narrator on Crimewatch?
What mental image of the audience do you have when you deliver your lines?
What directions on narrating do you receive from producers?
How do you perceive your role on Crimewatch?
How do you differentiate yourself from other/ previous presenters of Crimewatch?
How has being on Crimewatch affected your policing career? Your public life in general?
Are you satisfied with the way you have been portrayed on TV?
Are you satisfied with your performance on Crimewatch?
Have you received any interesting feedback on your on-air performance from friends, family members or colleagues?
Given the opportunity, is there anything you would do to improve the delivery of Crimewatch to viewers?
In your opinion, what is the future of Crimewatch?

Appendix C: Interview Request Letter for Volunteer Special Constable

Title: Community Policing in Singapore

Dear Sir/Madam,

I am currently pursuing a Masters of the Arts degree in Human Geography at the University of British Columbia. As part of my degree requirements, I am writing a thesis on the topic of community policing in Singapore. My project seeks to study how community policing is practised in everyday life in Singapore, and I will be examining the topic through multiple field sites. A study of community policing helps advance theoretical and practical understandings of both community and policing, moving beyond compartmentalised understandings of both.

The Volunteer Special Constabulary (VSC) unit within the Singapore Police Force is one site through which community policing can be explored. As volunteers who supplement the police workforce, VSCs are exemplary of the spirit of community policing, and have invested significant resources towards helping the police organisation. I am seeking a one-hour long interview with you in order to discuss your motivations for becoming a VSC and your experiences as a VSC. The interview would be conducted face-to-face, at a time and location that is convenient for you. Should you agree to be interviewed, I would be willing to email you the interview schedule in advance of the interview.

Your decision to participate in this project is entirely free, informed, and voluntary, and you may refuse to participate or withdraw from the study at any time. If you choose, you also may remain anonymous. If you volunteer to participate in this study, please contact me by mobile phone at +65xxxxxxxx or by email at mark.low@geog.ubc.ca. Details of the study and your commitment are on the attached information sheet. Please bring a signed copy to the interview and keep a copy for your own records.

If you have any questions or concerns on the project, my thesis supervisor Dr. David Ley would be happy to discuss them with you. You may reach him at david.ley@geog.ubc.ca. Additionally, if you have any concerns about your treatment or rights as a research subject, you may contact the Research Subject Information Line in the UBC Office of Research Services at RSIL@ors.ubc.ca.

Your involvement in this project would be greatly appreciated.

Yours Sincerely,

_____
Mark Low
MA Candidate
Department of Geography
University of British Columbia

Information Sheet and Consent Form for VSCs

Thesis Title: Community Policing in Singapore

Principal Investigator: David Ley, Professor of Geography, Department of Geography, University of British Columbia (Tel: +1xxxxxxxxxx; Email: david.ley@geog.ubc.ca)

Co-Investigator: Mark Low, MA Student, Department of Geography, University of British Columbia (Tel: +65xxxxxxxx; Email: mark.low@geog.ubc.ca)
This research is part of the Masters Thesis that is a requirement for graduation from the programme.

Purpose: This study seeks to study how community policing is practised in everyday life in Singapore. A study of community policing helps advance theoretical and practical understandings of both community and policing, and locates community policing within the context of wider social change in Singapore.

Study Procedures: This study involves data collection through interviews with key informants involved in community policing. Volunteer Special Constables are interviewed to gain insights into their motivations for volunteering and their experiences on-the-job as a VSC. Participant observations will also be carried out with VSCs to derive a deeper understanding of their work experience. This helps ground an understanding of community policing in practice.

Risks: There are minimal risks to you in participating in this research project. However, should you feel discomfort in the course of this research, you have the right to withdraw at any time.

Confidentiality: If this is a key informant interview, we ask for your consent to use your name in our study, unless you wish to remain anonymous (as below). Any other identifying information that is obtained during this study will be kept confidential unless specific consent for attributable statements is granted; however, given the public nature of government policy, it may be possible to identify you from the context of your responses. Participant observations will only be carried out with the mutual consensus of researcher and subject. Data from both interviews and participant observations will be kept in a locked filing cabinet or be computer password-protected in electronic format.

Contact for information about the study: Please feel free to contact me by mobile phone at +65xxxxxxxx or by email at mark.low@geog.ubc.ca if you have any questions or desire further information with respect to this study.

Contact for concerns about the rights of research subjects: If you have any concerns about your treatment or rights as a research subject, you may contact the Research Subject Information Line in the UBC Office of Research Services at RSIL@ors.ubc.ca.

Consent: This research is carried out by the co-investigator and is independent of the Singapore Police Force. Your participation in this study is free, informed, and voluntary. You may refuse to participate or withdraw from the study at any time. Your signature below indicates that you have received a copy of this consent form prior to the set-up of the interview. You also have received a copy of this form for your own records. Your signature indicates that you consent to participate in this study.

_____   _____
  Subject Signature and Date   Name of Subject

☐ I would like to remain anonymous.

Appendix C1: Interview Schedule for Volunteer Special Constable
Interviews are semi-structured, revolving around certain themes that have been bolded.

Background of Interviewee
Could you briefly tell me about your daytime/main occupation?

What tasks are you required to perform as a VSC?

Motivations
What made you want to enrol as a VSC?

Have your expectations been met so far?

Why did you choose to be a VSC over becoming a full-time police officer?

Why did you choose to be a VSC over volunteering for other activities?

Why do other people join the police force as a VSC?

What do you understand by the term 'community policing'?

Do you feel you are part of the policing community as a VSC?

Experiences
How did you cope with the requirements of being a VSC in addition to your daytime/main job?

Have you gained any new insights from being a VSC?

How have your friends and family members reacted to your work as a VSC?

How does the public view VSCs?

What are some of the obstacles to volunteering?

What is the state of volunteering in Singapore?

In your opinion, how would the VSC scheme develop in the future?

Transcript VSC 6 (V08)

VSC: I'm currently running a company on my own. The focus on the company is to provide products and solutions, as well as services to government agencies in Singapore, i.e. Mindef, SPF, and SCDF as well. We basically sell systems... The company is customer-centric, rather than product-centric.

Mark: What tasks are you required to do as a VSC?

[Phone rings]

VSC: As a VSC, we are required to supplement the operational duties of the regular force. So basically, there are 2 types of duties: plain clothes and uniform. As well as major events. So these are the 3 main types. Some officers will also supplement themselves as part of the management team...That's about all lah...

Mark: What made you want to enrol as a VSC?

VSC: Okay...I think everybody has a different agenda huh. Some people say they want to join the VSC because they want to contribute to the community... Prior to my setting up of the company, I was from Singapore Technologies. So I've been dealing a lot with systems and solutions. And we joined the VSC because we wanted to break into...we wanted to understand how the police force works from an insider's perspective. Because as a solutions provider, you are always looking for solutions that may not be in line with what they are doing operationally. So by joining the VSC, you'll have a small picture...not an entire picture...but a small picture of it, of what they are doing. So it was for that reason, and then it became a so-called passion. But until today, we are still trying to make use of our knowledge and our experiences outside to try and improve police force as a whole – both VSC and the regular force.

Mark: So did you join the VSCs with other colleagues from your company?

VSC: Ahhh... We try lah. We try to convince them. Erm, but I think it's more important that a person...we can only do so much to convince. I think at the end of the day, some will join because of pressure. Most important is how the volunteers actually set up recruitment drives lah, to entice them to join, because they have a passion for it. And if they're going to enjoy, I think they will last longer in the VSC.

Mark: What do you mean by passion for VSC?

VSC: Err... Basically the police force is not giving a salary. They are basically only giving an allowance which doesn't contribute much. So you must have passion before you join! Many people have a misconception that this is a supplementary income! (Laughs) Which is not likely huh. So passion meaning when you come to the police force, you learn more about policing. You learn about what the other side of the fence is thinking. Versus the public . You contribute in terms of the manpower shortage, if necessary. So... It doesn't really answer the passion part, right?

Mark: Nope. If you feel so, it's valid...

VSC: Yah, it's the contribution lah. And it's also to understand what the other side is thinking. And also to understand…Sometimes the more you understand about the law, it may not be good. Because you start to question. Okay? The case in point…but sometimes it's good. The case in point being the processing of traffic wardens. As a police officer, you know the procedures, you know the regulations. And when they first outsourced the traffic wardens, you'd realise that it was not (a) complete transition. And traffic wardens were summoning based on what they understand about the law. And that's when you start questioning whether such outsourcing is applicable…or how it can be improved. Okay, but if you remain as the public, you'd never understand. You get summon – you don't know why. So it's also a means of improving the country.

Mark: If I were to re-phrase my question: would you say you have made many friends in VSC?

VSC: Yes. Apart from passion, it is also an opportunity to mix with different types of people. It can range from very educated persons, to people who are selling…setting up stalls. You'd tend to want to understand what is their way of life. Compared to you. I mean, there are businessmen, and also civil servants, private sector employees… So everybody has a different mindset.

Mark: What are some of the joys of being a VSC?

VSC: (Pause) I think one of the joys is the opportunity to be able to mix with the younger generation. And also to share with them the experiences of life. As you can see, a lot of junior officers start from the age of 18, 19… every duty we have, we take the opportunity to talk about…erm…life. And what we've gone through. And the junior officers are also very good to question. They try to have a different perspective on life. From the conversations. Because they are stuck in a uniformed organisation, they haven't seen what's happening outside. Most of them have actually served their NS in the police force. The ladies join the police force straight after completing their education. So VSC also gives them an opportunity to understand life in a different…eye. Or view.

[Phone rings]

Mark: Do you volunteer for anything outside VSC?

VSC: Er…no. Because as a businessman, you'll have a time constraint. I started VSC as an employee. As we started our business, there was no means to consider other volunteering job. So we stuck with just VSC lah. We're also aware that there are different other volunteer services.

Mark: Did you have to think hard before committing to VSC?

VSC: Er…yes. I think the next question you'd ask is why didn't you join as a regular. So I'll tie down two questions together! (Laughs) Yes, we have thought of joining the police force as regular. Joining the police force is also to see what is the police force before I commit… But we're aware that you come in as a JO, you'd only learn the groundwork, and it contributes to your life as a senior officer as well. Because you can never be on the ground as a senior officer. So this is an opportunity. And the next question is even if I want to join the police force, will the police force want to select you or not?

Mark: Was it hard when you started volunteering? Because you also had a day-time job...

VSC: Yes it was hard... Because you also have to go for courses. I think at that time it was 3 months. Now it has stretched up to 4.5...or something like that. It's increasing in frequency. Yes because you'd have to have a regime in your time management. And you'd have to juggle between attending the courses and not attending the courses. Yes it was hard, and it took us about 2 years to decide whether to join the police force or not. Because once you join, you'll have to stick by it lah.

Mark: So what helped you decide?

VSC: Erm...partly because of the job to understand the police force better. Because before that there was no reason because we were doing Ministry of Defence work. Yes we wanted to join the VSC, but there was no push factor. So, you'd need a push and a pull. The push was not great enough... But when we wanted to go into the police force, to understand their operations to suggest more solutions to them, the push was greater at that point. So that's the reason why we joined.

Mark: What were your friends and family's reaction to you joining the VSC?

VSC: They are very supportive... Erm... A lot of friends... The family is very supportive. The friends they have a misconception that once you join the police force, you'd be able to help them in many ways! (Laughs) But it's also a good opportunity to also sell the police force. As a clean force. And people don't realise that it is unlike other countries, where you pay money, and you'd get your licence waived... And so it depends on how you talk to them, and tell them that you are not able to help. However there are certain means of appealing, which is the most that you can get. So it's good to also educate the outsiders as well. So yes they are very supportive. Family was also very supportive, but in different ways lah. And yes, there are sometimes when you can be too engrossed. That you can forget your family! And you keep doing duties. Because you want to learn more, and more. So supportive in a way that the family also tries to pull you back in, to have a balanced life.

Mark: How have you sought to juggle both your daytime job and the VSC?

VSC: Yes...

Mark: Is it easier now than in the past?

VSC: It's actually harder now than in the past. Because of the kids... Yeah you keep juggling. It's a never-ending process, at different stages of your life.

Mark: What does the public think of VSCs?

VSC: Er... I think there are a lot of people who are not aware of VSCs today. Because in the past, you'd have a 'V' on the collar. The integration of the VSCs and the regular force has in a way helped a lot lah. And I don't think the public views us as different. Because they can never see the difference, as long as you are professional about it... In the past, when the public sees a 'V', they'd say 'you know you're just a volunteer...' Everybody wants to get away with things, you know? That's human nature. But having said

that, because you have a 'V', sometimes it's more difficult to execute what you're supposed to do... In recent years, the police force has also ensured that there's full integration...there's more integration where the volunteers and the regulars move out together. It's unlike in the past when the regulars and the VSCs move out separately. So yea, the public only knows that the police force has VSCs, but they won't know who are the VSCs.

Mark: What do you mean when you referred to VSCs feeling constrained by the 'V'?

VSC: In the past, they'd tell you things like 'You're just a volunteer, you don't have to be so serious about your job. Why don't you give a chance?' Misconceptions lah. So with the 'V', you execute your job...on top of your job or duty, you'd have to convince them that 'Look, we are all the same. We are bound by the same regulations, we cannot give in, this is the vision of the police force.' So it made things difficult in the past. And you'd get comments like 'Why are you so free? Join police force?...' Blah blah blah lah. The views were more negative and they'd expect the VSCs to be more lenient in their duties, compared to the regular force.

Mark: Would you advise others to join VSC?

VSC: As long as you have the passion... But for me I take a different stance. I talk more about why I want to join the VSC, how much fun we have...to entice them lah. But I will not approach them saying 'do you want to join the VSC?' Because why? Once they get their buy-in on their own, they will tend to ask you to get a form to fill (in). And such officers tend to last longer. In the force. Versus you convincing them on the spot. It's just like buying something like in Isetan, and then when you go back you find that you have no use for it, you know? (Laughs) But then it's a lot of money to actually train an officer. And a lot of officers actually drop out halfway through the course...because of commitment, because of time. So I tend to take a different stance: to have them come to us rather than we go to them.

Mark: What is the state of volunteering in Singapore?

VSC: Different people volunteer for different things. It's where your passion is. I think there are a lot of volunteers in different organisations. And VSC is more regimental. You have to clock a minimum of 16 hours. But I think that Singaporeans volunteer. And I think that the volunteering spirit has actually grown over the years.

Mark: Do you feel VSC is a part of community policing?

VSC: In a small extent, yes. Community policing is...Usually we do our duties at night, not during the day. But we try to practise community policing as much as possible lah. Like for example, when you go on the ground, you'd try to have conversations with the public to understand how is the situation there; when you go on messages and the message is finished, you talk to them 'You know what's happening in the surroundings, it's okay. If you spot certain things, do call the police.' So in small ways, we do. Unlike in the regular force where they'd do in a big way, where they'd have units to do such CSSP programmes, to bring the public closer to us.

Mark: How is the VSC scheme going to evolve in the future?

VSC: That – I'm not sure! (Laughs) I haven't thought of it yet!

Appendix E: Guide to Participant Observation of *Crime Watch* Production Process

Office Work:
- What are the typical duties of the Crime Watch coordinator?
- How does he perform them?
- What forms of office working sociality are present?
- Who else is involved in producing Crime Watch?
- What are the normal working hours of the coordinator? And his helpers?
- What are the guiding principles in the scripting of Crime Watch?
- What are some of the more challenging aspects of the job?
- What motivates the coordinator to perform his job well?

Filming Work:
- Who are the actors involved? (broadly referred to)
- What preparations are needed before shooting a scene?
- Where are the shooting locations normally held? And at what time?
- Who directs each scene?
- What is the role of the Crime Watch coordinator during filming?
- How does he communicate with other police officers? And with the Mediacorp Studios personnel?
- What forms of sociality are present during filming? During breaks?
- How do actors learn how to act?
- What work do police officer-actors have to put aside in order to act?
- How is each scene visualised by the producers before it is acted and captured on camera?
- What is the level of acting professionalism demonstrated by police officers during a shoot?