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What is School Violence? An Integrated Definition of the Problem

By STUART HENRY

ABSTRACT: In the analysis of school violence, there is a tendency for commentators to narrowly define the scope of the problem. Typically they focus on interpersonal violence: among students toward each other, or by students toward their teachers. In this article I argue that not only does the complexity of this issue defy such a simplistic framing, but dealing with the problem at this level does not go far enough. It fails to address the wider context of school violence, the wider forms of violence in schools, and the important interactive and causal effects arising from the confluence of these forces. What is demanded is an integrated, multi-level definition of the problem that will lead to a multi-level causal analysis and a comprehensive policy response, that takes account of the full range of constitutive elements. Here I outline the first stage of such an approach with regard to defining the nature and scope of the problem.

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> the origins of lethal violence lie in a complex set of influences. . . no single factor. . . can provide the answer to the question of why kids kill. (Garbarino 1999, 13)

It is standard wisdom in the airline industry that crashes are rarely the result of a single cause. Rather they are the result of a confluence of factors, such as poor weather, poor visibility, mechanical failure, electrical failure, human error, stress, etc. These factors come together in a specific space and time to produce a disaster. So it is with social problems, such as school violence. Public analysis of social problems tends to be framed very narrowly. Violence is visible and manifest among school students, so it is assumed that they constitute the scope of the problem. Yet, like airline crashes, any analysis of school violence that simply looks at one factor, such as human fallibility, gun availability or cultural toxicity, is in grave danger of missing the point, and risks failing to prevent future disasters. Moreover, while each of several causes plays a part in producing and shaping an event, analyzed independently we lose the importance of their interactive and cumulative effects. Consider the following finding from a recent government victimization study:

> One important finding. . . was that more students were exposed to certain problems at school in 1995 than in 1989. . .A second key finding was that various types of problems tended to co-exist. For instance, student reports of drug availability, street gang presence, and gun presence at school were all related to student reports of having experienced violent victimization at school (Bureau of Justice 1998b, 1).

What this does not consider is how far these acts are also related to the type of school organization, the social processes that are encouraged within the schools, and the forms of abuse and violence to which we subject our youth under the auspices of education. In what follows I criticize our myopic definition of the problem and suggest a more expansive and inclusive approach.

A LIMITED UNDERSTANDING OF SCHOOL VIOLENCE?

Violence is generally defined as the use of force toward another that results in harm. Simplistic versions of this definition limit the concept of violence to "extreme physical force" (Champion 1997, 128), as in the "force which is employed against common right, against law, and against public property" (Rush 1994, 54). At best this narrow definition includes intimidation by the threat of force as in the Justice Department's definition of "violent victimization" which includes "physical attacks or taking property from the student directly by force, weapons, or threats" (Bureau of Justice, 1998b). However, this kind of definition omits several critical elements of harm. First it excludes the emotional and psychological pain that result from domination of some over others. Second, it tends to focus on the visible, intentional interpersonal harms between individuals, but excludes harms by institutions, or agencies on individuals. Third, it ignores the violence of social processes that produces a systemic social injury, such as that

perpetuated through institutionalized racism and sexism. Fourth it excludes the "symbolic violence" of domination that, "gentle, invisible form of violence, which is never recognized as such, and is not so much undergone as chosen, the violence of credit, confidence, obligation, personal loyalty, hospitality, gifts, gratitude, piety" (Bourdieu 1977, 192). This is a subtle form of violence that brings coercion through the power exercised in hierarchical relationships.

In the school context, violence typically refers to student-on-student and student-on-teacher acts of physical harm. For example, contributors to a recent major work on violence in schools agreed on the following definition: "Violence refers to the threat or use of physical force with the intention of causing physical injury, damage, or intimidation of another person" (Elliott, Hamburg, and Williams 1998: 13). They further state, "we are concerned with interpersonal forms of violence. . . homicide, aggravated assault, armed robbery, and forcible rape. . . shoving, pinching, hitting, and throwing objects when the intent is to harm or intimidate another human being. Verbal and psychological abuse are not included in our definition of violence" (1998: 13-14).[1]

As a result, conventional approaches to school violence, ignore what some consider to be the equally important hidden crimes of the structurally powerful in society (Henry and Lanier 1998), and the symbolic social harms that deny humanity through violating human rights (Henry and Milovanovic 1996). In the school context these crimes of the powerful include harms committed by teachers to students, and by school administrators to both students and teachers. They also includes the organization of schooling where this creates harm to both student creativity and the educational process. Conventional definitions of school violence also neglect harmful institutionalized social and educational practices, including acts and processes of institutionalized racism/sexism, discrimination, labeling and tracking (See Yogan's article in this volume), authoritarian discipline (see Adam's article in this volume), militaristic approaches to school security (See Thompkins and Pepinsky's articles in this volume), sexual harassment and predation. For example, gender discrimination has been shown to create harmful effects on female students' learning experience. When teachers favor male students over females, because of their seemingly extroverted classroom participation, they disadvantage females and oppress their potential development, which can lead to feelings of inadequacy, anger, and long-term depression. Such practices are not defined as violence but they are symbolically violent with long-term harmful consequences.[2] Similarly, consider the impact of the "sensitive" teacher who, when issues of race and ethnicity arise in classroom discussion, calls on the one or two minorities in a class to speak for "blacks" or "Hispanics," as if these students are somehow ambassadors for a whole race or ethnic group. Imagine the symbolic violence that assumes African Americans or Hispanics have one view, while white students have many different voices. Alternatively, consider a school administration that exercises arbitrary, authoritarian discipline. Nor should we forget teachers who "get by" without their best effort and who lack commitment to their students' education, using their first inner-city job as a means to a "more desirable" position in the suburbs with "good" students. And think about the message conveyed to students about "trust," and "freedom" of educational thought when we deploy metal detectors, video cameras, identity tags, drug sniffing dogs, and guards to "secure" that freedom. Indeed, driven by security and liability fears, as Thompkins (this volume) points out, schools are becoming more like prisons than places of learning. Each of these kinds of insidious harms can be seen as part of what has long been referred to as "the hidden curriculum" (Overly 1970; Giroux and Purpel 1983). They can have a significant negative impact on students' moral and social development (Yogan and Henry 1999). Such hidden crimes would even extend to inequitable school funding, such that one school will receive better funding due to its location in a wealthy area, compared to a school located in a poverty stricken urban setting. Finally, consider the harm created by celebrating competitive success while condemning academic failure; is it any wonder that "children who do poorly in school, lack educational motivation, and feel alienated are the most likely to engage in criminal acts"? Indeed, it is no shock to learn that:

> all children who fail in school offend more frequently, commit more serious and violent offenses, and persist in their offending into adulthood. . . Schools help contribute to criminality when they label problem youths, setting them apart from conventional society. . .It is not surprising that the U.S. school system has been the subject of criticism concerning its methods, goals, and objectives. (Siegel 1998, 197-98)

And this does not even begin to address how competitive success corrupts the morality of the successful, driving them to win at all costs, regardless of the harm they cause to others in the process (See Nicholson's article in this volume).

TOWARD AN EXPANSIVE INTEGRATED DEFINITION

Because of the omission of these broader dimensions of school violence we are missing much of the content and causes of violence in schools. We are blind to the part played by this wider context of violence in shaping the more visible forms of physical violence manifest by students. Therefore, I believe that a more inclusive integrated definition of school violence is necessary.

We may begin such a definition by replacing the term "force" with that of "power," and by suggesting that violence is the use of power to harm another, whatever form that takes (Henry and Milovanovic 1996; Henry and Lanier 1998). So what is harm? Harm, when narrowly conceived, is physical pain and suffering. But an expansive view says harm can also occur along many other dimensions beyond the physical, to include psychological/emotional, material/economic, social/identity, moral/ethical, etc. On each dimension the harm can be of two kinds: "harms of reduction" and "harms of repression" (Henry and Milovanovic 1996, 103). Harms of reduction remove something from a person's existing standing as a human being. For example, physical harms of reduction produce bodily pain or loss (of blood, organs, limbs, physical functioning). Material harms of reduction remove some of the person's economic standing (property, wealth, money). Psychological harms of reduction have destructive effects on the human mind and weaken a person's emotional or mental functioning (such as in post-traumatic stress syndrome). Social and symbolic harms of reduction lower a person's social status in society (violating their human rights, sexuality, social identity). Moral/ethical harms of reduction corrupt standards of concern for the well-being of others (as in hate, pressure to cheat, etc.).[3]

In contrast, harms of repression reveal how the exercise of power acts to systematically limit another person's capability of achieving higher levels of accomplishment along any of these dimensions; of preventing them from "being all they can be." Some would refer to this more generally as oppression. Acts of violence, then, are acts that make others powerless to maintain or express their humanity i.e. denying them their ability to make a difference (Henry and Milovanovic 1996, 116).

With regard to the perpetrators of harm, the concept for those who exercise the power to deny others, conventionally described as "offenders," (what Milovanovic and I have called "excessive investors" in power), is limiting since it assumes that only individuals offend. Yet the manifestation of power that denies people their humanity can operate at many levels from individual to organization or corporation (as in pollution, fraud or corruption), community and society to nation state (violation of privacy, genocide). Further, the exercise of the power to harm, as mentioned earlier, can also be accomplished by processes (such as sexism, ageism, racism), not just the individual acts of people; though individuals may each contribute to the process, it is the collective and cumulative repetition of actions by different people that creates harm to others. In the context of school violence this can include, not just teachers and administrators as individuals, but the practices and policies of the school, or what Wayne Welsh (see his article in this volume) calls "school climate." It can include the policies and practices of school boards and their detrimental effects on school districts, and the local politics of communities. At a broader level, the collective actors can operate on the state and national level to include educational policy. An example, would be the decision to expand prison building programs at the expense of school building, to hire corrections officers rather than school teachers, and even to submit to the apparent "economy of scale" that leads to building large schools over small ones, when all the evidence suggests that these are more alienating and more criminogenic.[4] While these collective and policy decisions may seem distant from the day-to-day activities of the school, their shadow and effects reach long into the classroom, and constitute part of the formative context for violence that is played out there. (See for example, Kramer's article in this volume on the role of poverty and inequality in shaping school violence).

The exercise of power to deny others their humanity by some agency or process, also takes place in a spatial social context. Even though the term "school violence" implies that the spatial location is the "school building, on the school grounds or on a school bus" (Bureau of Justice, 1998b), such a limited definition denies the interconnections between the school context and the wider society of which it is apart. It ignores the ways in which these acts of violence permeate social and geographical space. As a result, it fails to recognize that what may appear as an outburst in the school is merely one manifestation of more systemic societal problems. These may begin in, or be modified by, activities in other spacial locations such as households, public streets, local neighborhoods, communities, private corporations, public organizations, national political arenas, global marketplace, or the wider political economy. As such, the social and institutional space of the school is merely one forum for the appearance of a more general systemic problem of societal violence.

According to this more expansive definition, school violence is the exercise of power over others in school-related settings by some individual, agency or social process, that denies those subject to it their humanity to make a difference, either by reducing them from what they are, or by limiting them from becoming what they might be. From this general definition we can begin to analyze the constitutive elements of school violence and begin to explore the different types and their interactive effects.

THE DIMENSIONS OF SCHOOL VIOLENCE

John Hagan (1979; 1985) has developed an insightful integrated approach to crime and deviance, which he calls the "pyramid of crime" that can usefully be applied to school violence, and can be used to build a more comprehensive basis for analysis of the problem. Hagan defined crime as "a kind of deviance, which in turn consists of variation from a social norm that is proscribed by criminal law" (Hagan 1985, 49). He argues that rule breaking varies from minor deviance from accepted standards of behavior, such as strange dress or appearance, skipping class, cheating on homework, to highly offensive acts that involve serious harm, such as physical violence using weapons, or school yard massacres. He argues that such violations can be considered on three measures of seriousness, each ranging from low/weak to high/strong.

Hagan's first dimension is the relative seriousness of crime based on the harm it has caused. He argued that some acts, like drug use and truancy, are victimless crimes in that they only harm the participants. Many other acts, such as violence, harm others and some of these, such as the recent high profile shootings in schools, harm more than one person at a time and that pain can extend to the victims relatives, friends and even their community (See Nicholson's article in this volume).

Second, drawing on the moral tradition in defining crime (Durkheim, 1897; Collins 1994) is the degree of consensus or agreement. This is the degree to which people accept an act as right or wrong. Hagan says that the degree of consensus or agreement about the wrongfulness of an act "can range from confusion and apathy, through levels of disagreement, to conditions of general agreement" (Hagan 1985, 49). Thus while not desirable, few people consider a 16 year-old skipping school seriously wrong (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1983). Similarly, with drug use, while there is consensus that drugs should not be in schools, the consensus is much greater against heroin and cocaine, than marijuana, and against all three compared to alcohol and cigarettes (See the article in this volume by Venturelli on drugs in schools). The third dimension of Hagan's approach, drawing on the legal tradition (Michael and Adler 1933; Tappan 1949) is the severity of society's formal response. Severity may range from social ostracism by school peers toward their fellow students, through informal reprimands by teachers, official warnings, expulsion and exclusion from school, prosecution, imprisonment or ultimately to the death penalty.[5] Hagan argues that "the more severe the penalty prescribed, and the more extensive the support for this sanction, the more serious is the societal evaluation of the act" (1985, 49).

Importantly, from the integrational perspective Hagan claims,

> the three measures of seriousness are closely associated . . . the more serious acts of deviance, which are most likely to be called "criminal," are likely to involve (1) broad agreement about the wrongfulness of such acts, (2) a severe social response, and (3) an evaluation of being very harmful. However, the correlation between these three dimensions certainly is not perfect, and . . . in regard to many acts that are defined as crimes, there is disagreement as to their wrongfulness, an equivocal social response, and uncertainty in perceptions of their harmfulness. (Hagan 1985, 50)

Elsewhere (Henry and Lanier 1998; Lanier and Henry 1998) we have argued that as a result of failing to consider the significance of power relations in the definitional process,[6] Hagan's pyramid of crime neglects: (1) the visibility of crime, (2) the extensiveness of crime, and (3) the selectivity of society's response to crime. For example, omitting the visibility dimension ignores the social construction of school victimization. As we have seen, school violence takes many forms, all of which involve harm, but not all of those harmed necessarily realize they have been victimized. For example, it is difficult to see the negative effects of tracking that identifies some students as college-bound and others as academic underachievers or potential dropouts. Yet the "track system" has been shown to reinforce class and racial segregation and over time this practice operates as a crime of repression, limiting the intellectual, social and moral development of those subject to it (See Oakes 1985; Lawrence 1998; and Yogan in this volume). The harmful effects of this practice are obscure, and may take a long time to appear (in lowered expectations for self, poor self-esteem., etc). Visibility of harm, in this case of some aspects of school violence, is an important dimension because it is partly a reflection of the force of existing legal definitions, themselves shaped by powerful economic, political and class interests:

> These interests, in turn, partly reflect the commercial interests of the mass media; which limit their framing of the crime question. . . In part, too, they reflect the popular culture's trivialization and sensationalization of direct interpersonal "true crimes" in preference to complex, diffuse social harms and injuries that have become institutionalized, compartmentalized, privatized and justified via the legitimate goals of the organization. . . Thus, we argue that . . . crime can range from being "obvious" or "readily apparent," as a result of its prominence in the popular culture, mass-mediated news and tabloid journalism . . . to being "relatively hidden" and finally, to being so "obscure" that it is accepted by many as normal, even though it harms its victims.

(Henry and Lanier 1998, 619-20)

A second missing, though implied, part of Hagan's "pyramid of crime" is the extensiveness of victimization, which is an integral component of the public perception of a crime's seriousness. It seems that where only one person is injured or killed by an act of violence this is tragic and serious but somehow qualitatively different from acts of violence that affect many people (compare the high school massacre in Edinboro, Pennsylvania where in April 1998 one teacher was killed by a student, to Littleton, Colorado where in April 1999, 15 died including the two students who killed the others). As we have argued "deeper analysis shows that extensiveness is a more complex dimension. Although the number of persons injured influences public perceptions of seriousness, this dimension is itself shaped by the differential value placed on human lives" (Henry and Lanier 1998, 620). Without a conception of the social hierarchy of power relationships and dimensions of class, race, and gender, an understanding of the dimension of seriousness is difficult to establish. This is because perceptions of seriousness depend on who is the victim which, in turn, has to do with "differences in importance attached to human life, based on people's social and political status in a hierarchically ordered society, and on the social distance and divisions that complex societies create between human beings. In short, it has to do with socially constructed differences created between those we can identify with and `others' whom we cannot" (Henry and Lanier 1998, 620). Indeed, as Garbarino (1999) says when the perpetrators of lethal school violence are middle-class, white teenagers from small towns or suburbs, their crimes make national and international news, but,

> Most of us never heard about the adolescents who shot and killed other kids in the inner city neighborhoods of Houston, Chicago, New York, Los Angeles and Detroit. They remained mostly anonymous. . . Rarely do cases like these make the national news, and when they do, the perpetrators are usually described in dehumanized terms ("cold-blooded," remorseless," "vicious") that lead us to speculate on whether or not these kids are even human. Rarely do we hear inquiries into their emotional lives or efforts to make sense of their acts. . . Is it because the high-visibility cases all involved white kids from the small towns and suburbs of the American heartland while the anonymous killers were poor kids, predominantly African American and Hispanic living in inner-city neighborhoods? Is it easier for the media and the general public to forget or demonize the low-income minority kids who kill? (Garbarino 1999, 3)

Garbarino argues that this difference in the way we respond to youth violence is structured by race and class. Issues of race, class and gender affect not only how we react to the extensiveness of social problems, such as school violence, but how selective we are with regard to the severity of our response.

A third dimension missing from Hagan's approach is the "selectivity of response" which refers to "the probability or likelihood that an offender will receive a serious official response to harmful offenses, even though the law may set such a penalty. . . crimes of the powerless are far more likely to receive the full weight of the law than are crimes of the powerful" (Henry and Lanier 1998, 621). So what does this mean in terms of school violence? As in the wider society, those who are in positions of structural power in the school are least likely to have the harms that they produce criminalized. This might be obvious when looking at the harms against teachers and students produced by school administrators, who have considerable autonomy in exercising power over school personnel. Administrators' harmful practices are only rarely called to account by school boards, and even then the harm is not seen as criminal but "inappropriate action" or some other euphemism. Similarly classroom action by teachers toward students is not criminalized as harm, except in the most extreme cases such as sexual predation or racial discrimination. But more serious and more pervasive are the subtle forms of institutionalized harm such as the disrespect by teachers toward students, labeling students as "stupid," or "not amounting to anything," or the application by teachers and administrators of inconsistent disciplinary practices. Indeed, it is just such harm perpetrated by the structurally powerful in schools that is correlated with high levels of incidence of violence by students. Welsh (in this volume), for example, in a study of Philadelphia middle schools, found that the two factors that had the strongest effect on offending and student misconduct were "fairness of rules" and "respect for students"; where these were low, violence was high, and vice versa.

Finally, it is worth considering that the differential disciplinary response to student misconduct (likely to be perceived as unfair) which is harmful in itself, is also structured according to the inequalities of class, race and gender. Chambliss (1973) in his study of "the saints" and "the roughnecks" showed that while youth from different class backgrounds commit similar kinds of crimes, the consequences for those of lower class backgrounds (roughnecks) are far more severe than for their middle-class counterparts (saints). Whereas the roughnecks would likely go to juvenile court, the saints would more likely be released into the custody of their parents and their offenses were more likely to remain secret because of their demeanor, family or community connections.

How does the acknowledgement of these six dimensions of defining school violence (degree of harm, visibility

of harm, extent of harm, moral consensus, severity of response, and selectivity of response), affect our analysis of school violence. First, this expansive integrated approach to the definition of school violence allows us to better identify different types of school violence. Second, it allows us to identify the multiple and interrelated causes of such violence. Third, it provides for a more comprehensive approach to policy that reaches deeper into the roots of systemic violence than superficial quick-fix responses. Finally, it allows us to see the interconnections between different types of school violence and develop integrated policies designed to respond to them (See the article by Cohn and Hinkle, in this volume). By way of conclusion I will briefly discuss each of these issues.

CONCLUSION

In light of the discussion and analysis of this article an expansive integrated definition allows us to reframe our analysis of types of school violence, causes and policy.

Types of School Violence

Types of school violence can be distinguished by the level of their perpetrators within the social structure. Five levels are identified, though the accuracy of the distinction between levels is less important than that the range of levels be addresses:

Level 1 Violence: Student-on-student; student-on-teacher; student-on-school.

Level 2 Violence: Teacher-on-student; administrator-on-student; administrator-on-teacher; teacher/administrator on-parents; parent on teacher/administrator.

Level 3 Violence: School board-on-school/parent; school district-on-school/parents; community-on-school/parent; local political decisions-on-school and on parent.

Level 4 Violence: State and national educational policy on-school; state and national juvenile justice policy on-student; media and popular culture on student and on administrator; corporate exploitation on students; national and state policies on guns and drugs.

Level 5 Violence: Harmful social processes and practices that pervade each of the above 4 levels. Here social processes are the patterns of interaction that overtime take on the appearance of a natural order or social reality existing above the individuals whose actions constitute that structure.

Discussion on school violence tends to be restricted to Level 1 and some aspects of level 4. Even within level 1, some important distinctions can be made. For example, Kramer (in this volume) distinguishes between three types of student violence: (1) predatory economic crimes, which involves the pursuit of material goals by any means, including violence, (2) drug industry crimes, which involve violent gang turf wars, and (3) social relationship violence from powerless angry youths who use acts of violence to resolve issues of humiliation from their alienation (See articles in this volume by Staples and Cintron).

In addition, as we have argued elsewhere (Yogan and Henry 1999), not all school students respond in the same way to the conditions that generate violence, even within level one. This has much to do with the influence of class, race and gender:

> Structurally oppressed and ecologically insulated, alienated minority male youth focus their anger and frustration on each other in their neighborhoods. They act collectively through gangs and justify their victimization of others in relation to harms caused to themselves, either historically, institutionally or interpersonally. Their school violence is more stable and controlled as they are more subject to surveillance. White males, in contrast, who have historically come to expect a relatively privileged life, but who are also socialized to "do their gender" through individual acts of violence. . . react alone or in pairs. Their violence tends to be extreme, homicidal or suicidal and is taken out on the system or on those who seem to succeed where they have failed. Finally, female alienated youth, through both socialization and control internalize their anger on themselves. This is manifest through acts of self-destruction through food, smoking and drugs to lose weight, and depression. (Yogan and Henry 1999, 27-28)

In contrast to the excessive discussion of level 1 and some of 4, there has been virtually no discussion of levels 2, 3, and 5 which, given the interrelations between these types, represents a glaring deficiency.

Causes of school violence

The definitional framework outlined above suggests that we need to take a much broader approach to examining the causes of school violence. Rather than operating simply on the individual or micro-level of analysis which looks to psychological and situational explanations for why students act violently, we need to address the context of students lives; their families, race, ethnicity, gender, and social class. We need to explore how these dimensions interconnect through social processes to shape and structure human thinking, moral development and individual choices. We need

to examine how these social forces shape school curriculum, teaching practices and educational policy. Thus, at the meso-level (mid-level analysis) we should be concerned to identify the way parents and schools themselves harm the lives of students, and the way they shape the content of young people's lives. Finally, at the macro-level we need to examine the ways the culture, and the economic, social and political structure of American society is both reproduced and how it reproduces harmful processes. Although it may seem that this level has been addressed through the discussions, analysis and attempt to legislate against "toxic culture," this is an inadequate approach to macro-level analysis. Discussion of cultural causes of school violence has focused on the role of violence in the media B in movies, in videos, video games, and on the internet B and on gun culture. The argument is that cultural violence amplifies young male aggressive tendencies. It devalues humans into symbolic object images of hate or derision, trains youth to use violent skills, celebrates death and destruction as positive values, and provides exciting and colorful role models, who use violence as the solution to problems, glorifying the most powerful and destructive performances via news media infotainment. While this may be true it is not enough to simply blame toxic culture for poisoning kid's minds without also looking at the ways in which corporate America invests in the exploitation of violence for profit that feeds this cultural industry. This would be tantamount to an analysis of smoking that blamed the "culture of smoking" but left out the tobacco industry's incentive to: advertize to young and vulnerable kids to get them addicted early; develop and sell cigarettes with a higher addictive component; invest in research institutes to generate evidence that undermined independent research on smoking and health; and to fund lobbyists and politicians to weaken legislation designed to protect the public against the dangers of tobacco. A macro-analysis of "culture," therefore, has to connect that culture to the political economy of the society in which it is generated.

Policy Responses

Finally, an adequate policy response must be comprehensive, dealing simultaneously with each of the causes identified at each of the levels of definition. It must penetrate the built-in protections of systems that conceal their own practice from analysis and change. It must be reflexive enough to recognize that policy itself can be part of the problem rather than the solution; policy should be self-critical and self-correcting. While this article does not allow us to expand on the immensity of the policy question called for by such an analysis, the question of "dispute resolution" can be indicative in illustrating how a restrictive verses an expansive definition of school violence would operate (See articles by Adams, Pepinsky, Caulfield and Nicholson in this volume). A narrow approach to school violence prevention policy would begin by assuming a level 1 definition of the problem. For example, kids are violent in schools because they are taught to use violence to solve their problems or, at best, they are not taught non-violent ways of dealing with conflict. The simplistic restrictive policy response would suggest that dispute resolution training in techniques of non-violent problem solving would be appropriate.

In contrast, an expansive definition and an integrated causal analysis would tie the use of violence by students to the use of symbolic and other forms of violence by adults, whether these are parents, teachers, administrators, or politicians. Instead of just implementing such training for students, it would argue for all school personnel, at every level, to undergo and practice non-violent problem solving. Further (as argued in the articles by Pepinsky, Caulfield in this volume), the school organization, curriculum and educational processes would be subject to the same "violence cleansing" scrutiny to be replaced by what Pepinsky (in this volume) calls "educating for peace" rather than "educating about peace."

In short, then, as the contributors to this volume demonstrate, the issue of school violence is not just about kids in schools; it is about the total coproduction of our society by each of its constituent elements. To approach school violence another way, is not merely short-sighted, it is to do more violence to those who have already suffered so much pain.

Notes

1. Even at the level of individual violence this restrictive approach ignores student acts of damage and destruction toward a school or the educational and learning process, as in the examples of vandalism or drug taking.
2. Similar exclusionary practices have recently been argued to be contributing to male violence in schools (See Pollack 1998; Yogan and Henry 1999).
3. This is an indicative rather than exhaustive list of dimensions, and these are often overlapping, rather than discrete. For example, being bullied can produce physical harm as in cuts and bruises, psychological harm as in fear, trauma, lowered self-esteem, social injury, as the victim may be looked down on as weak by others, and moral harm as the beaten may lose respect for others, in turn beating those weaker than themselves.
4. The evidence from recent victimization data shows that whereas violent crime in larger public schools increased

by 25 percent between 1989 and 1995, it actually declined in small private schools by 20 percent. Indeed, only 2.3 percent of students at private schools reported violent victimization in 1995, compared with 4.4 percent in public schools, and gang presence in public schools is five times as great as that reported in private schools (Bureau of Justice 1998b).

5. Increasingly children are being tried as adults, juvenile court cases are being waived to criminal court, and in some states such as Illinois they are now eligible for the death penalty for acts committing mass murder in schools. In 1996 10,000 juvenile court cases were waived to criminal court compared with 6,800 in 1987 and 15% of those involved youth under 16 years old, compared with 7% in 1987 (Office of Justice Programs, 1999, 1)

6. These are reflected in the critical conflict tradition in defining crime (Schwendinger and Schwendinger 1970; Michalowski 1985; Tifft 1995), and more recent postmodern perspectives (Henry and Milovanovic 1996).

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