

## Engineering Secure Software Systems All Exercise Tasks

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### Exercise 1.1, git Account (1 Points)

Register for a *git*-account at <https://git.informatik.uni-kiel.de> and send your account name to Henning Schnoor. You will need the git account during the lecture both for handing in your answers to exercise questions. Using this account to hand in solutions to exercises is mandatory.

Usually, you should have such an account from your Bachelor's studies. If you did not obtain your Bachelor in Kiel or do not have such an account for some other reason, see <http://www.inf.uni-kiel.de/de/service/technik-service/accounts> for details on how to obtain such an account.

### Exercise 1.2, simple example protocol (10 Points)

We consider the following simple authentication protocol:

- Alice sends a message  $M$  to Bob, together with her name  $A$ ,
- Bob answers with a Nonce  $N_b$ ,
- Alice answers with the term  $sig_{k_A}([M, B, N_b])$ .

Please answer the following questions:

1. What are the security properties guaranteed by the protocol?
2. What is the purpose of the nonce  $N_b$ ? What happens if we omit the nonce?
3. What happens if the  $B$  is removed from Alice's last message?

### Exercise 2.1, Formal Representation of the Woo Lam Protocol (10 Points)

Study the authentication protocol by Woo and Lam (see slide 7 of the lecture from November 7).

1. Specify the protocol as sequence of receive/send actions, once in the intended execution between Alice and Bob, and once in a form that allows to model the attack introduced in the lecture.
2. (*solvable after the lecture from November 14, 2017*) Specify the attack on the protocol formally.
3. How can we modify the protocol in order to prevent this attack?

### Solution

1. The following is the protocol as r/s actions in the intended setting. We therefore have three instances: Alice, Bob, and the server.

#### Alice

1.  $\epsilon \rightarrow A$
2.  $x \rightarrow \text{enc}_{k_{AS}}^s(x)$

#### Bob

1.  $A \rightarrow N_B$
2.  $y \rightarrow \text{enc}_{k_{BS}}^s(A, y)$

**Server**

1.  $\text{enc}_{k_{BS}}^s \left( A, \text{enc}_{k_{AS}}^s(z) \right) \rightarrow \text{enc}_{k_{BS}}^s(z)$
2. The protocol setup containing all instances that are present in the attack presented in the lecture is as follows:
- $C$  is controlled by the adversary, hence the initial adversary knowledge is  $I = \{k_{CS}, \text{BREAK}\}$
  - There are two protocol instances modeling sessions by honest Bob. Bob acts as responder in both of these instances (i.e., runs the “Bob” program from above). In one instance, Bob expects messages from Alice (we denote this instance with  $\text{Bob}_{\text{Alice}}$ ), in the second instance (denoted with  $\text{Bob}_{\text{Charlie}}$ ) he expects messages from Charlie.
  - Similarly, there are two instances modeling the two sessions of the server. In both of these, the server expects Bob in the responder role of the protocol. In one instance (denoted  $\text{Server}_{\text{Alice}}$ ), the server expects Alice as the initiator, in the second one (denoted  $\text{Server}_{\text{Charlie}}$ ), he expects Charlie.
  - We do not model a protocol instance containing Alice’s rules, since in the attack scenario, no honest participant performs the initiator role.

The attack is against the instance  $\text{Bob}_{\text{Alice}}$ , since Alice is assumed to be honest (the adversary knowledge does not contain any of Alice’s keys): If the protocol run completes, then Bob assumes that Alice in fact participated in the protocol run. Therefore, the FAIL-rule must also be part of the instance  $\text{Bob}_{\text{Alice}}$ : When the instance  $\text{Bob}_{\text{Alice}}$  receives the final message, the protocol is broken.

**Bob<sub>Alice</sub>**

1.  $A \rightarrow N_B$
2.  $y \rightarrow \text{enc}_{k_{BS}}^s(A, y)$
3.  $\text{enc}_{k_{BS}}^s(N_B) \rightarrow \text{FAIL}$

**Bob<sub>Charlie</sub>**

1.  $C \rightarrow N'_B$
2.  $y' \rightarrow \text{enc}_{k_{BS}}^s(C, y')$

**Server<sub>Alice</sub>**

1.  $\text{enc}_{k_{BS}}^s \left( A, \text{enc}_{k_{AS}}^s(z) \right) \rightarrow \text{enc}_{k_{BS}}^s(z)$

**Server<sub>Charlie</sub>**

1.  $\text{enc}_{k_{BS}}^s \left( C, \text{enc}_{k_{CS}}^s(z') \right) \rightarrow \text{enc}_{k_{BS}}^s(z')$

Note that the different instances of Bob use different nonces and variables. Also note that our modeling does not include the message containing the “trash” symbol from the lecture slides, since this clearly cannot be expressed in the formal model (adding a rule involving a trash symbol to the server’s program would be very unnatural and would also require a case distinction in the server’s modeling). However, modeling this message is not required, since the adversary can simply leave out the corresponding receive/send action from the server instance  $\text{Server}_{\text{Alice}}$ .

3. The attack on the protocol consists of the execution order and the substitution:
- The execution order is as follows (the last step is for triggering the FAIL-rule):
    - a)  $\text{Bob}_{\text{Alice}}$
    - b)  $\text{Bob}_{\text{Charlie}}$
    - c)  $\text{Bob}_{\text{Alice}}$
    - d)  $\text{Bob}_{\text{Charlie}}$
    - e)  $\text{Server}_{\text{Charlie}}$
    - f)  $\text{Bob}_{\text{Alice}}$

4. The substitution is easily obtained from the above formalization of the instances and the attack as presented in the lecture:
- $\sigma(y) = \sigma(y') = \text{enc}_{k_{CS}}^s(N_B)$ ,
  - $\sigma(z') = N_B$ .
5. To why Charlie can derive the messages he sends, we list the actually appearing terms in the receive/send actions that are performed by the attack—the terms are obtained by simply replacing the variables appearing in the instances above with their values assigned by  $\sigma$

| step / instance              | receive   | send  |
|------------------------------|---|---|
| 1. Bob <sub>Alice</sub>      | $A$   | $\rightarrow N_B$   |
| 1. Bob <sub>Charlie</sub>    | $C$   | $\rightarrow N'_B$  |
| 2. Bob <sub>Alice</sub>      | $\text{enc}_{k_{CS}}^s(N_B)$                                      | $\rightarrow \text{enc}_{k_{BS}}^s\left(A, \text{enc}_{k_{CS}}^s(N_B)\right)$ |
| 2. Bob <sub>Charlie</sub>    | $\text{enc}_{k_{CS}}^s(N_B)$                                      | $\rightarrow \text{enc}_{k_{BS}}^s\left(C, \text{enc}_{k_{CS}}^s(N_B)\right)$ |
| 1. Server <sub>Charlie</sub> | $\text{enc}_{k_{BS}}^s\left(C, \text{enc}_{k_{CS}}^s(N_B)\right)$ | $\rightarrow \text{enc}_{k_{BS}}^s(N_B)$                                      |
| 3. Bob <sub>Alice</sub>      | $\text{enc}_{k_{BS}}^s(N_B)$                                      | $\rightarrow \text{FAIL}$   |

## Exercise 2.2, Fixing Broken Authentication Protocols (10 Points)

Consider the two authentication protocols presented in the first exercise class:

- a)
1.  $A \rightarrow B \quad (A, \text{enc}_{k_B}^a(N_A))$
  2.  $B \rightarrow A \quad (B, \text{enc}_{k_A}^a(N_A))$
- b)
1.  $A \rightarrow B \quad (\text{enc}_{k_B}^a(N_A), \text{enc}_{k_B}^a(A))$
  2.  $B \rightarrow A \quad (\text{enc}_{k_A}^a(N_A, N_B), \text{enc}_{k_A}^a(B))$

For both of these protocols, we discussed attacks in the exercise class. Suggest changes to the protocols that address these problems, and argue why you think your revised versions of the protocols are secure. Be explicit in what “secure” means in this case.

### Solution

- a) The problem with the protocol is that the identity of the sender is not cryptographically secured. Informally, the protocol can be changed to

1.  $A \rightarrow B \quad (\text{enc}_{k_B}^a(A, N_A))$
2.  $B \rightarrow A \quad (\text{enc}_{k_A}^a(B, N_A))$

Written as formal instances, the protocol looks as follows:

#### Alice

1.  $\epsilon \rightarrow \text{enc}_{k_B}^a(A, N_A)$

#### Bob

1.  $\text{enc}_{k_B}^a(A, x) \rightarrow \text{enc}_{k_A}^a(B, x)$

To prove security of the protocol, we need to be precise about the intended security property. We also want to cover attacks that use different sessions between honest and dishonest participants. We assume the following setup:

- Clearly, the protocol only provides security for Alice (i.e., the initiator role), as she gets the guarantee that Bob was active during the protocol run. Bob does not obtain any guarantee. We formalize security as requiring that the adversary does not learn the value  $N_A$ .

- Alice and Bob are honest, Charlie is the adversary
- Alice starts protocol sessions  $A_B$  and  $A_C$  with both Bob and Charlie (as initiator).
- Bob starts protocol sessions  $B_A$  and  $B_C$  with both Alice and Charlie (as responder).
- (To be complete, we would also need to consider sessions where Alice is the responder and Bob is the initiator. We leave these to the reader.)
- The “secure” session is  $A_B$ , we therefore add a corresponding BREAK-rule to this instance.

We therefore get the following formalization:

$$A_B \quad \begin{array}{ll} 1. & \epsilon \rightarrow \text{enc}_{k_B}^a(A, N_A) \\ 2. & [\text{BREAK}, N_A] \rightarrow \text{FAIL} \end{array}$$

$$A_C \quad 1. \quad \epsilon \rightarrow \text{enc}_{k_C}^a(A, N'_A)$$

$$B_A \quad 1. \quad \text{enc}_{k_B}^a(A, x) \rightarrow \text{enc}_{k_A}^a(B, x)$$

$$B_C \quad 1. \quad \text{enc}_{k_B}^a(C, x') \rightarrow \text{enc}_{k_C}^a(B, x')$$

At attack now is an execution order and a substitution. First, note that the instance  $A_C$  is actually not required, since the nonce  $N'_A$  does not appear in any relevant instance, and therefore the adversary can simply generate the term sent by  $A_C$  on its own. Also, we can without loss of generality assume that the adversary triggers the FAIL-action of  $A_B$  as last action in the attack. Therefore, the execution order is defined by a permutation of the three first steps of the instances  $A_B$ ,  $B_A$ , and  $B_C$ . Since the adversary's goal involves opening the decryption  $\text{enc}_{k_B}^a(A, N_A)$ , and only the instance  $B_A$  can do this, we know that  $A_B$  must be activated before  $B_A$ . It is also clear that the instance  $B_C$  does not help the adversary, since this instance expects a term of the form  $\text{enc}_{k_B}^a(C, x')$ . Since we already eliminated the instance  $A_C$  above, we know that the term that  $B_C$  waits for is generated by the adversary herself. Therefore, she also knows the plaintext and therefore does not need the instance  $B_C$ . Hence, only the instances  $A_B$  and  $B_A$  are relevant, and their order is fixed. Therefore, the execution order is

- $A_B$ ,
- $B_A$ .

This also fixes the first message sent by  $A_B$ , since the adversary must deliver  $\epsilon$ . To “open” the encryption, the adversary has no other option than to deliver this message to Bob, and from the resulting term she cannot learn the value  $N_A$ . Therefore, the protocol indeed guarantees security in the above sense.

### Exercise 3.1, Otway Rees Protocol (10 Points)

Consider the following protocol (Otway-Rees-Protocol):

1.  $A \rightarrow B \quad [M, A, B, \text{enc}_{k_{AS}}^s([N_a, M, A, B])]$
2.  $B \rightarrow S \quad [M, A, B, \text{enc}_{k_{AS}}^s([N_a, M, A, B]), \text{enc}_{k_{BS}}^s([N_b, M, A, B])]$
3.  $S \rightarrow B \quad [M, \text{enc}_{k_{AS}}^s([N_a, k_{AB}]), \text{enc}_{k_{BS}}^s([N_b, k_{AB}])]$
4.  $B \rightarrow A \quad [M, \text{enc}_{k_{AS}}^s([N_a, k_{AB}])]$
5.  $A \rightarrow B \quad \text{enc}_{k_{AB}}^s(\text{FAIL})$

1. Why are the subterms  $M$ ,  $A$ , and  $B$  in the second message sent both encrypted and as plaintext?
2. Why is the nonce  $N_b$  encrypted in message 2?

3. Is the protocol secure? (You do not need to give a formal proof of security or insecurity.)

### Exercise 3.2, DY closure and derivations (10 Points)

In the lecture, the following lemma was stated (without proof):

If  $S$  is a set with  $\text{IDs} \cup \{k_a \mid a \in \text{IDs}\} \cup \{e\} \subseteq S$  and  $t \in \text{DY}(S)$ , then there is a derivation of  $t$  from  $S$ :  $S = S_0 \rightarrow_{L_0} S_1 \rightarrow_{L_1} \dots S_{n-1} \rightarrow_{L_{n-1}} S_n$  with  $t \in S_n$ .

1. Prove the above lemma.
2. State and prove an appropriate converse of the lemma.

*Note:* You can assume that both  $S$  and  $t$  do not contain applications of hash functions, message authentication codes (MACs), or signatures.

**Solution** With  $D(S)$ , we denote the closure of a set  $S$  of terms under the application of all rules  $L_d(t)$  and  $L_c(t)$  as defined in the lecture. For a closure operator  $O \in \{\text{DY}(\cdot), D(\cdot)\}$ , we say a set of terms  $S$  is *O-closed*, if  $O(S) = S$ . Clearly,  $O(S)$  is the smallest  $O$ -closed set of terms containing  $S$ . To prove the claim, we therefore only need to show that a set is  $\text{DY}(\cdot)$ -closed if and only if it is  $D(\cdot)$ -closed. This follows trivially from the definitions, since each rule from the definition of  $\text{DY}(\cdot)$  can be translated into a  $L_d$  or  $L_c$  rule, and vice versa.

Therefore, the smallest  $D(\cdot)$ -closed set containing  $S$  and the smallest  $\text{DY}(\cdot)$ -closed set containing  $S$  are one and the same, and hence  $\text{DY}(S) = D(S)$ .

1. This follows since, due to the above,  $\text{DY}(S) \subseteq D(S)$ .
2. This can be formalized as the converse, i.e.,  $D(S) \subseteq \text{DY}(S)$ , and also follows from the above.

### Exercise 3.3, exponential attack size (10 Points)

For  $i \in \mathbb{N}$ , the protocol  $P_i$  is defined as follows:

- There are two instances:
  1.  $\mathcal{J}_1$  has a single receive/send action  $[x_1, \dots, x_i] \rightarrow \text{enc}_k^S([t_1, t_2])$ , with
 
$$\begin{aligned} t_1 &= [x_1, [x_2, [x_3, [x_4, [\dots, [x_{i-1}, [x_i, 0]] \dots]]]] \\ t_2 &= [[[[[ \dots [[0, x_i], x_{i-1}], \dots], x_4], x_3], x_2], x_1]. \end{aligned}$$
  2.  $\mathcal{J}_2$  has a single receive/send action  $\text{enc}_k^S(y, y) \rightarrow \text{FAIL}$ .
- The initial adversary knowledge is the set  $\{0, 1\}$ .

Show that each protocol  $P_i$  is insecure, but a successful attack requires terms of exponential length. How can you use DAGs to obtain a shorter representation of the involved terms?

**Solution** In order to derive  $\text{FAIL}$ , the adversary must be able to derive a term of the form  $\text{enc}_k^S(t, t)$  for some term  $t$ . The only way to generate any term encrypted with the secret key  $k$  for the adversary is to supply, via a substitution  $\sigma$ , values for the variables  $x_1, \dots, x_i$  to  $\mathcal{J}_1$ . As a reply, the adversary receives the term  $\text{enc}_k^S([t_1\sigma, t_2\sigma])$ . Therefore, a successful attack consists of a substitution  $\sigma$  that satisfies  $t_1\sigma = t_2\sigma$  (the execution order consists of the two obvious steps). We denote the subterms of  $t_1$  and  $t_2$  as follows:

- with  $t_1^{j \rightarrow}$ , denote the term  $[x_j, [x_{j+1}, \dots, [x_{i-1}, [x_i, 0]] \dots]]$ ,
- with  $t_2^{j \rightarrow}$ , denote the term  $[[\dots [[0, x_i], x_{i-1}], \dots, x_{j+1}], x_j]$ .

By construction,  $t_1 = t_1^{1 \rightarrow}$  and  $t_2 = t_2^{1 \rightarrow}$ , further:

- $t_1^{j \rightarrow} = [x_j, t_1^{j+1 \rightarrow}]$  and
- $t_2^{j \rightarrow} = [t_2^{j+1 \rightarrow}, x_j]$ .

Assume that  $\sigma$  is a substitution with  $t_1\sigma = t_2\sigma$ . We show inductively that for all  $j$ , we have that  $t_1^{j \rightarrow}\sigma = t_2^{j \rightarrow}\sigma$ . For  $j = 1$ , the claim follows since  $t_a = t_a^{1 \rightarrow}$ . Now assume the claim is true for  $j$ , i.e.,  $t_1^{j \rightarrow}\sigma = t_2^{j \rightarrow}\sigma$ . By the above, we have

$$t_1^{j \rightarrow} = [x_j, t_1^{j+1 \rightarrow}] \text{ and } t_2^{j \rightarrow} = [t_2^{j+1 \rightarrow}, x_j].$$

By applying  $\sigma$  to both components of the terms, we obtain

- $\sigma(x_j) = \sigma(t_2^{j+1 \rightarrow})$  (left-hand side of the pair), and
- $\sigma(x_j) = \sigma(t_1^{j+1 \rightarrow})$  as claimed.

This additionally establishes that for all  $j$ ,  $\sigma(x_j) = \sigma(t_1^{j+1 \rightarrow}) = \sigma(t_2^{j+1 \rightarrow})$ .

We now show inductively that  $|\sigma(x_j)|$  is at least  $2^{i-j}$ . For  $j = 1$ , this completes the proof. The induction start  $j = i$  is clear, as  $\sigma(x_i) = 0$ . For the induction step, assume that  $|\sigma(x_j)| \geq 2^{i-j}$ , we show the claim for  $j - 1$ . By the above, we have that

$$\sigma(x_{j-1}) = \sigma(t_1^{j \rightarrow}) = \sigma(t_2^{j \rightarrow}).$$

By the definition of  $t^{j \rightarrow}$ , we get

$$\sigma(x_{j-1}) = \sigma([x_j, t_1^{j+1 \rightarrow}]) = [t_2^{j+1 \rightarrow}, x_j].$$

Therefore,  $\sigma(x_{j-1}) = [\sigma(x_j), \sigma(x_j)]$ , and in particular,  $|\sigma(x_{j-1})| \geq 2 \cdot |\sigma(x_j)| \geq 2 \cdot 2^{i-j} = 2^{i-(j-1)}$ , as claimed.

### Exercise 3.4, DY algorithm correctness (10 Points)

Prove that the algorithm for computing the DY closure (in its decisional variant DERIVE) as stated in the lecture is correct. As in the lecture, restrict yourself to terms without applications of hash functions, signatures, or message authentication codes (MACs).

**Solution** By the construction of the algorithm, it is obvious that if the algorithm accepts an input  $(S, t)$ , then  $t \in \text{DY}(S)$  holds. We prove the converse. Hence let  $t \in \text{DY}(S)$ . Then there is a minimal derivation  $S = S_0 \rightarrow_{L_0} S_1 \rightarrow_{L_1} S_2 \rightarrow_{L_2} \dots \rightarrow_{L_{n-1}} S_n$  with  $t \in S_n$ . Due to the lemma from the lecture about minimal derivations, we know that each decomposition step in this derivation is a decomposition of a subterm of a term in  $S$  or a composition of a subterm of  $S \cup \{t\}$ . Therefore, the algorithm considers all derivation rules relevant for deriving  $t$ , and is thus correct.

The algorithm runs in polynomial time since the number of qualifying terms  $t'$  is bound by the input size, and each step clearly can be performed in polynomial time.

**Remark:** The intuition that one can speed up the algorithm by first performing all decomposition steps and then all composition steps is false. As an example, consider the following instance:

- $S = \{\text{enc}_{[k_A, k_B]}^S(N_A), k_A, k_B\}$
- $t = N_A$

In this case, in order to obtain the term  $N_A$ , the algorithm first needs to perform the composition step  $L_c([k_A, k_B])$ , which adds the pair  $[k_A, k_B]$  to the set  $S$ . After this, the decomposition step  $L_d(\text{enc}_{[k_A, k_B]}^S(N_A))$  can be performed, which yields the target  $N_A$ .

### Exercise 4.1, minimal derivation properties (10 Points)

In the lecture, we proved a lemma characterizing the shortest derivations (slide 20 of the lecture from November 14, 2017). Can you generalize this lemma to also handle signatures, MACs, and hash functions? In general, which properties does the modeling of cryptographic primitives have to satisfy for an analog of this lemma to hold?

### Exercise 4.2, applying the Rusinowitch Turuani Theorem (10 Points)

In the lecture, we discussed how to model the Needham-Schroeder protocol formally as an input to INSECURE such that the attack can be detected. Can you come up with a general mechanism translating a natural representation of a protocol (for example, as the list of “intended instances” for a single session) into an instance that can be used as input for INSECURE? If not, why not?

### Exercise 5.1, unbounded instances formalization (10 Points)

Specify the Needham-Schroeder protocol as an instance of the decision problem UNBOUNDED-INSECURE, and show that it is insecure in this formalization. Discuss the differences between expressing the protocol using this formalism compared to the earlier formalization using the decision problem INSECURE.

**Solution** We repeat the specification of the protocol:

$$\begin{aligned} A \rightarrow B & \quad \text{enc}_{k_B}^a(A, N_a) \\ B \rightarrow A & \quad \text{enc}_{k_A}^a(N_a, N_b) \\ A \rightarrow B & \quad \text{enc}_{k_B}^a(N_b) \end{aligned}$$

An input to UNBOUNDED-INSECURE needs to contain the following:

- the specification of a “target session” that contains the FAIL-constant,
- the specification of (replicable) sessions for Alice and Bob.

We first specify Bob’s session, the one under analysis. This is the same as Bob’s usual specification, with the FAIL-rule added. Note that we can assume, without loss of generality, that Bob in this session is interacting with honest Alice.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{enc}_{k_B}^a(A, x) & \rightarrow \text{enc}_{k_A}^a(x, N_B) \\ [\text{BREAK}, x, N_B] & \rightarrow \text{FAIL} \end{aligned}$$

We now specify “replicable” sessions for Alice and Bob. Note that we can assume, without loss of generality, that Alice and Bob are the only honest principals, as this is a maximally pessimistic assumption. We define a “pattern” for an initializer session:

**parameters** public key  $k_{init}$  of the identity running this session, name  $id_{init}$  matching to the public key, public key  $k_{resp}$  of the instance that this initializer wants to connect to. Note that we can assume that  $k_{init}$  is Alice’s or Bob’s key, as the adversary can run Charlie-controlled sessions himself, running number  $i$

**session**

$$\begin{aligned} \epsilon & \rightarrow \text{enc}_{k_{resp}}^a(id_{init}, N_{init}^i) \\ \text{enc}_{k_{init}}^a(N_{init}^i, y^i) & \rightarrow \text{enc}_{k_{resp}}^a(y^i) \end{aligned}$$

Similarly, we define a “replicable” responder session:

**parameters** public key  $k_{resp}$  of the identity running this session, name  $id_{init}$  and key  $k_{init}$  of the corresponding communication partner, running number  $i$

**session**  $\text{enc}_{k_{resp}}^a(id_{init}, x^i) \rightarrow \text{enc}_{k_{init}}^a(x^i, N_{resp}^i)$

The attack can now easily be represented in this formalization:

- The attacker starts one instance of the initiator session, using parameters  $k_{init} = k_A$ ,  $id_{init} = A$ ,  $k_{resp} = k_C$  and  $i = 1$ .
- The attacker also interacts with Bob's (explicit) session.
- The attacker can now deliver the messages analogous to the standard representation of the protocol.

The main difference between this formalization and the one as input to INSECURE is that in this version, we do not build any information about the attack into the input, but let the adversary start arbitrarily many sessions.

## Exercise 5.2, abstractions I (10 Points)

Develop an abstraction of the Needham-Schroeder protocol (analogously to the treatment of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol in the lecture), and demonstrate how the attack on the protocol can be shown using the abstraction.

**Solution** To recall, this is the Needham-Schroeder protocol:

$$\begin{aligned} A \rightarrow B & \quad \text{enc}_{k_B}^a(A, N_a) \\ B \rightarrow A & \quad \text{enc}_{k_A}^a(N_a, N_b) \\ A \rightarrow B & \quad \text{enc}_{k_B}^a(N_b) \end{aligned}$$

Recall that the attack on the protocol is an attack against Bob (the responder), since Alice (the initiator) willingly interacted with dishonest Charlie and therefore the protocol cannot guarantee any security properties. Bob, on the other hand, only was willing to interact with honest Alice. In particular, the nonce that is supposed to remain secret is the nonce  $N_B$ .

Since the protocol uses the same number of Nonces as the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol, we can follow the abstraction given for the latter protocol in the lecture. In particular, we use a partitioning of nonces into the sets

- $N_B$ , a singleton set containing only Bob's nonce,
- $\text{Nonce}^{\text{Init}}$ , nonces used by initiators (including Alice),
- $\text{Nonce}^{\text{Resp}}$ , nonces by responders (including the nonce of the Bob in different sessions that the one under analysis).

**First Message** The first message sent (by honest Alice or any other initiator) is  $\text{enc}_{k_b}^a([a, n])$ , where

- $b$  is some identity for which a responder instance is modeled (this can be either an honest instance in the real protocol run, an instance “played” by the adversary in the real protocol run, or an instance present only in the over-approximation),
- $a$  is some identity for which an initiator instance is modeled (this can be Alice or other identities).
- $n$  is some nonce from  $\text{Nonce}^{\text{Init}}$ .

We therefore add all terms of this form to the initial adversary knowledge.

**Second Message** The second message (sent by a responder) is  $\text{enc}_{k_a}^a(x, n_2)$ , which is sent in response to a message of the form  $\text{enc}_{k_b}^a(a, x)$ . We therefore obtain the derivation rule  $\text{enc}_{k_b}^a([a, x]) \rightarrow \text{enc}_{k_a}^a(x, n_2)$  for

- any term  $x$ ,
- arbitrary identities  $a$  and  $b$  (we even allow  $a = b$ , since this is not precluded by the protocol),
- any nonce  $n_2 \in \text{Nonce}^{\text{Resp}}$ , but not the nonce  $N_B$  (the nonce  $N_B$  is unique to the one remaining session that is modeled).



**Third Message** The third message (sent by an initiator again) is  $\text{enc}_{k_b}^a(y)$ , sent as a reply to  $\text{enc}_{k_a}^a(n_1, y)$ , where  $n_1 \in \text{Nonce}^{\text{Init}}$ , and  $y$  is an arbitrary term.

**Renaming** We use the same renaming as in the lecture. In particular, we only use the three identities  $A, B$ , and  $C$ , where the adversary only has access to  $C$ 's private key. As nonces, we use  $N_B, N_1$  (representing all nonces from  $\text{Nonce}^{\text{Init}}$ ), and  $N_2$  (representing all nonces from  $\text{Nonce}^{\text{Resp}}$ ).

The result of the renaming applied to the above derivation rules is as follows:

- *first message*:  $I$  contains the messages  $\text{enc}_{k_b}^a([a, N_1])$  for  $a, b \in \{A, B, C\}$ .
- *second message*: we obtain the derivation rule  $\text{enc}_{k_b}^a([a, x]) \rightarrow \text{enc}_{k_a}^a(x, N_2)$  for  $a, b \in \{A, B, C\}$  and any term  $x$
- *third message*: we get the rule  $\text{enc}_{k_a}^a(N_1, y) \rightarrow \text{enc}_{k_b}^a(y)$  for  $a, b \in \{A, B, C\}$  and any term  $y$ .

**Honest Instance** Bob's instance, which the adversary can access as usual, is specified as before as the following receive/send rule:

$$\text{enc}_{k_B}^a(A, x) \rightarrow \text{enc}_{k_A}^a(x, N_B)$$

**Identifying Attack** We can now map the attack on the protocol as demonstrated in the lecture to rules from the abstraction:

- 1 The adversary has the message  $\text{enc}_{k_B}^a(A, N_1)$  in the initial knowledge.
- 1'/2' The adversary can deliver the message  $\text{enc}_{k_B}^a(A, N_1)$  to Bob's instance, and, as a result, obtains (using the substitution  $\sigma(x) = N_1$ ) the message  $\text{enc}_{k_A}^a(N_1, N_B)$
- 2/3 Using the derivation rule  $\text{enc}_{k_a}^a(N_1, y) \rightarrow \text{enc}_{k_b}^a(y)$ , instantiated with
  - $a = A$ ,
  - $b = C$
  - $y = N_B$ ,

since the adversary has the message  $\text{enc}_{k_A}^a(N_1, N_B)$ , the adversary obtains the message  $\text{enc}_{k_C}^a(N_B)$ . Since the adversary has access to  $\hat{k}_C$ , this implies that he obtains the nonce  $N_B$ .

Similarly, we now analyze the NSL protocol from Bob's point of view, i.e., we prove security for Bob. We mainly follow the above arguments. Recall that the NSL protocol is as follows:

1.  $A \rightarrow B$   $\text{enc}_{k_B}^a([A, N_A])$
2.  $B \rightarrow A$   $\text{enc}_{k_A}^a([B, N_A, N_B])$
3.  $A \rightarrow B$   $\text{enc}_{k_B}^a(N_B)$

The only change is the second message, hence the derivation steps corresponding to the second and third messages are changed (the latter is affected since it needs a different message as prerequisite). Since no new nonce is introduced, we can keep the above renaming.

- *first message*: as before,  $I$  contains the messages  $\text{enc}_{k_b}^a([a, N_1])$  for  $a, b \in \{A, B, C\}$ .
- *second message*: we obtain the derivation rule  $\text{enc}_{k_{i_1}}^a([i_2, x]) \rightarrow \text{enc}_{k_{i_2}}^a(i_1, x, N_2)$  for  $i_1, i_2 \in \{A, B, C\}$  and any term  $x$
- *third message*: we get the rule  $\text{enc}_{k_{i_2}}^a(i_1, N_1, y) \rightarrow \text{enc}_{k_{i_1}}^a(y)$  for  $i_1, i_2 \in \{A, B, C\}$  and any term  $y$ .

One can now verify that the adversary does not obtain  $N_B$  by starting with the initial adversary knowledge (unchanged from the case for the Needham Schroeder protocol, as the first message of the protocol is not changed) and applying the new derivation rules (in combination with the Dolev Yao rules). Note that we still have Bob's original instance running with the receive/send rules

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{enc}_{k_B}^a(A, x) & \rightarrow \text{enc}_{k_A}^a(B, x, N_B) \\ N_B & \rightarrow \text{FAIL.} \end{array}$$

If the protocol was insecure, the adversary would be able to derive FAIL. This is obly possible by deriving  $N_B$  before. Therefore, the adversary must activate Bob's first protocol rule (the only one explicitly containing  $N_B$ ). This allows the adversary to derive the term  $\text{enc}_{k_A}^a(B, \sigma(x), N_B)$  for some value  $\sigma(x)$ . To access  $N_B$ , the adversary needs to use some derivation rule whose prerequisite rule matches  $\text{enc}_{k_A}^a(B, \sigma(x), N_B)$ . The third, applied with  $i_2 = A$  and  $i_1 = B$  is the only possible rule. This generates the term  $\text{enc}_{k_B}^a(N_B)$ . However, there is no matching rule that the adversary can apply, hence he cannot derive  $N_B$ . This shows that the protocol is secure.

### Exercise 6.1, ProVerif examples (10 Points)

Choose a cryptographic protocol and use ProVerif to analyze its security properties, that is:

1. Specify the protocol in ProVerif (including the required cryptographic primitives),
2. specify the security property in ProVerif,
3. run ProVerif to search for attacks. Does the result match with your expectations?

The following is a list of suggestions for protocols to analyse:

- the (broken) authentication protocols presented in the first exercise class
- the repaired versions of the above protocols
- the repaired version of the handshake-protocol from the ProVerif tutorial (the broken version was discussed in the lecture)
- the Needham-Schroeder protocol
- the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol

### Exercise 6.2, abstractions II (10 Points)

Recall the abstraction of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe (NSL) protocol from the lecture (see lecture from November 28). State an example for an alternative choice of  $\varphi$  that results in attacks on the abstract model that do not exist in the detailed model. In other words, give an example for a function  $\varphi$  that results in an insecure abstraction model ABS.

*Hint:* Applying the function  $\varphi$  leads to a simplified protocol, in which some of the checks present in the original are not performed anymore. Choose a function  $\varphi$  that leads to a loss of the check that was introduced in the NSL protocol to fix the original NS protocol.

#### Solution

We analyze the protocol from Bob's point of view, i.e., state an "attack" against Bob (an attack that is present in the abstraction, but does not apply to the real protocol). First, the derivation rules (and initial knowledge) is as follows:

- The adversary knows all possible "initialization messages" potentially sent by an initializer, i.e., all messages of the form  $\text{enc}_{k_b}^a([a, n])$ , where

- $b$  is some identity for which a responder instance is modeled (this can be either Bob, who has a responder instance in the protocol run, an instance “played” by the adversary in the real protocol run, or an instance present only in the over-approximation),
- $a$  is some identity for which an initiator instance is modeled (this can be Alice or other identities),
- The second message results in the derivation rule  $\text{enc}_{k_b}^a([a, x]) \rightarrow \text{enc}_{k_a}^a(x, n_2)$ , for
  - any term  $x$ ,
  - arbitrary identities  $a$  and  $b$  (we even allow  $a = b$ , since this is not precluded by the protocol),
  - any nonce  $n_2 \in \text{Nonce}^{\text{Resp}}$ , but not the nonce  $N_B$  (the nonce  $N_B$  is unique to the one remaining session that is modeled).
- The third message results in the derivation rule  $\text{enc}_{k_a}^a(n_1, y) \rightarrow \text{enc}_{k_b}^a(y)$ , where  $n_1 \in \text{Nonce}^{\text{Init}}$ , and  $y$  is an arbitrary term.

**Renaming** The simplest renaming is to map all nonces to a single one, say  $N$ . Using this renaming, we obtain the following attack: Recall that Bob’s single honest instance is still running with the receive/send rules

- $\text{enc}_{k_B}^a([A, x]) \rightarrow \text{enc}_{k_A}^a(B, x, N_B)$ ,
- $\text{enc}_{k_B}^a(N_B) \rightarrow \text{FAIL}$ .

A receive/send rule is similar to a derivation rule in the abstraction, but it may be used only once, and only when previous rules in the same instance have been activated.

Using the abstraction’s renaming, the second rule in Bob’s instance simply becomes  $\text{enc}_{k_B}^a(N) \rightarrow \text{FAIL}$ , which clearly leads to a completely insecure protocol.

A renaming that explicitly disables the check introduced in the NSL protocol is one that maps Bob (the honest identity running the responder instance) and Charlie to the same identity, therefore rendering the additional inclusion of Bob’s name in his message useless.

## Exercise 7.1, ProVerif example (10 Points)

Consider the following protocol:

1.  $A \rightarrow B \quad \text{enc}_{k_{AB}}^s(N_A)$
2.  $B \rightarrow A \quad [\text{enc}_{k_{AB}}^s(N_B), N_A]$
3.  $A \rightarrow B \quad N_B$

Here,  $k_{AB}$  is a long-term symmetric key shared by Alice and Bob. Is the protocol secure in the sense, that it can only be completed correctly if both Alice and Bob participate in the protocol run? Analyse the protocol “by hand” and using ProVerif.

**Solution** First we need to clarify what it means that “both Alice and Bob” participate in the protocol run. Given that the protocol only uses symmetric keys, and identities do not appear in the protocol, this question is not formally well-defined. In particular, if we model this protocol formally, there is not even a notion of an identity that runs the protocol. Therefore, the security property under discussion should be formalized as follows:

- an honest protocol session is one in which the value  $k_{AB}$  appears
- we say the protocol is secure if for every honest responder (initiator) session, there is also an honest initiator (responder) session
- more precisely: we define the following two instances, using receive/send rules:

$$\begin{array}{ll}
\text{initiator}^i & \\
\epsilon & \rightarrow \text{enc}_{k_{AB}}^s(N_A^i) \\
(\text{enc}_{k_{AB}}^s(y^i), N_A^i) & \rightarrow y^i \\
\\
\text{responder}^i & \\
\text{enc}_{k_{AB}}^s(x^i) & \rightarrow (\text{enc}_{k_{AB}}^s(N_B^i), x^i) \\
N_B^i & \rightarrow \epsilon
\end{array}$$

We say that an initiator or responder instance is *active* in a protocol run if it completes its second (first) step. The security property then can be formalized as follows: If the responder (initiator) session finishes, then the initiator (responder) session was active as well. This security property is obviously satisfied, since the adversary cannot generate terms of the form  $\text{enc}_{k_{AB}}^s(t)$  itself:

- If the initiator instance finishes, then some other instance must have decrypted  $N_A^i$ , as this value is received in the second step. In the case that only one instance is running, this “other instance” can only be a responder instance.
- If the responder instance finishes, then some instance must have generated the term received in the first step, which the adversary cannot do. In the case that only one responder instance is running, this must have been an initiator instance.

However, this analysis only considers the case where there is only one initiator and one responder session. A stronger security requirement would be the following: In a protocol with some finite number of initiator and responder sessions (parametrized with different values of  $i$ ), for every responder (initiator) session that finishes, there is a **unique** initiator (responder) session that is active.

This security property does not hold, as the responder can essentially be used as a “decryption oracle.” Therefore, an attack can be performed as follows, using a single initiator instance ( $A$ ) and three responder instances ( $B_1$ ,  $B_2$ , and  $B_3$ ):

$$A: \epsilon \rightarrow \text{enc}_{k_{AB}}^s(N_A)$$

$$B_1: \text{enc}_{k_{AB}}^s(N_A) \rightarrow (\text{enc}_{k_{AB}}^s(N_{B_1}), N_A)$$

at this point, the attacker simply uses the instance  $B_2$  to decrypt  $N_{B_1}$ :

$$B_2: \text{enc}_{k_{AB}}^s(N_{B_1}) \rightarrow (\text{enc}_{k_{AB}}^s(N_{B_2}), N_{B_1})$$

this allows the attacker to complete the session  $B_1$ :

$$B_1: N_{B_1} \rightarrow \epsilon.$$

To finish the session  $B_2$ , the adversary needs the nonce  $N_{B_2}$ . For this, he can simply use the session  $B_3$  in a similar way.

## Exercise 7.2, indistinguishability (10 Points)

Prove that Boolean combinations of  $I$ -tests are not necessary. Formally: Show that if messages  $m$  and  $m'$  are  $I$ -distinguishable, then they are distinguishable via an atomic test.

**Solution** We prove that if  $m$  and  $m'$  are messages that can be distinguished by a test involving Boolean combinations, then they can also be distinguished using an atomic test. Hence, let  $\varphi$  be a formula that distinguishes  $m$  and  $m'$ , where  $\varphi$  is a (nested) Boolean combinatino of atomic tests. We choose a minimal distinguishing  $\varphi$  with respect to number of occurring Boolean operators. Without loss of generality, assume that  $\varphi(m)$  evaluated to true, and  $\varphi(m')$  evaluates to false. If  $\varphi$  does not involve any Boolean operators, we are done. Therefore, consider the outmost Boolean operator appearing in  $\varphi$ . We make a case distinction.

- Assume that the operator is negation, i.e.,  $\varphi = \neg\psi$ . Then  $\psi(m) = \text{false}$ , and  $\psi(m') = \text{true}$ . Hence  $\psi$  is a contradiction to the minimality of  $\varphi$ .

- Assume that the operator is conjunction, i.e.,  $\varphi = \psi \wedge \chi$ . Due to minimality, it follows that  $\psi(m) = \psi(m')$  and  $\chi(m) = \chi(m')$ . Therefore,  $\varphi(m) = \varphi(m')$ , a contradiction.
- The disjunction case follows with the same argument as the conjunction case.

### Exercise 8.1, injective events (10 Points)

Use **inj-event** to analyze the security of a protocol for authenticated message exchange. Proceed as follows:

1. Consider a naive protocol for message exchange that only verifies whether messages come from the intended source.
2. Use **event** to verify the authentication property.
3. Which attacks are possible on the protocol? Use **inj-event** to discover the attack in ProVerif.
4. Correct the protocol and verify its correctness in ProVerif.

**Solution** A protocol for authenticated message exchange ensures the initiator and the receiver to exchange messages such that the receiver is assured that, if the protocol run is finished correctly, that the message indeed comes from the initiator. In order to be able to obtain assurances about identities, we assume, as usual, that a PKI is in place. As usual, we assume that Alice is the sender and Bob is the receiver, we denote the message that Alice wants to send to Bob with  $m$ .

A first approach for such a protocol could be the following:

$$A \rightarrow B \quad \text{sig}_{k_A}(m)$$

The protocol is trivially secure in the sense that if Bob completes the protocol run successfully, then Alice did indeed send the message  $m$ . Using **event**, this is easily confirmed with ProVerif.

However, the protocol is clearly vulnerable against replay-attacks. Hence if we use **inj-event**, ProVerif should be able to determine the protocol's insecurity. As noted by ProVerif, we then also need to place the events under replication in order for the analysis to be non-trivial. After doing this, ProVerif, as expected, finds the error.

To avoid replay-attacks, as usual we let Bob send a challenge nonce to Alice which she then also signs. Hence the new protocol is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} A &\rightarrow B \quad \text{sig}_{k_B}(m) \\ B &\rightarrow A \quad N_B \\ A &\rightarrow B \quad \text{sig}_{k_B}(N_B) \end{aligned}$$

Clearly, this protocol is also vulnerable to replay-attacks. It is also important to ensure that in ProVerif, a new nonce is in fact generated in every session, in particular,  $N_B$  should not be a global variable. However, this protocol makes another crucial mistake: It lets Alice act as a “signature oracle,” which lets the protocol be insecure even with respect to the non-injective event property.

The issue in the protocol is that, in the last step, Alice simply signs anything that Bob sends to her. This obviously needs to be restricted, Alice's signature of  $N_B$  must be tied to the message  $m$ . A simple approach is to simply let Alice mention the message  $m$  again in her last step (Bob then of course needs to verify that the message in the last step is indeed the same as the one from the first step):

$$\begin{aligned} A &\rightarrow B \quad \text{sig}_{k_B}(m) \\ B &\rightarrow A \quad N_B \\ A &\rightarrow B \quad \text{sig}_{k_B}(N_B, m) \end{aligned}$$

This protocol successfully verifies in ProVerif. Clearly, sending the message  $m$  in the first step is not required, the first step can be replaced by Alice simply opening a session with Bob:

$$\begin{array}{lll}
A & \rightarrow & B \quad k_A \\
B & \rightarrow & A \quad N_B \\
A & \rightarrow & B \quad \text{sig}_{k_B}(N_B, m)
\end{array}$$

## Exercise 8.2, ProVerif modeling of Needham Schroeder (10 Points)

Study the modeling of the Needham Schroeder protocol given in the ProVerif distribution (various models of the protocol can be found in `examples/pitype/secr-auth/`). Which additional properties were modeled compared to our models from the lecture and exercise class?

(Our modeling of the protocol can be found in the folder `proverif-examples/2017_12_14_exercise_07` of the git repository **esss-ws2017-common**.)

## Exercise 9.1, blind signatures (10 Points)

As noted in the lecture, the given equational theory for blind signatures is no subterm theory, which leads to difficulties in automatic protocol analysis. Is there a way to rewrite protocols using blind signatures using only standard cryptographic primitives? Does such a rewrite give the same security guarantees as intended by the primitive?

**Solution** Assume we have commitment available (recall that on our level of abstraction, commitment has the same equational theory as symmetric encryption and we can therefore assume that it is available). We can then use the following construction for a (very weak) version of blind signatures:

**signature** Assume that Alice wants Bob to (blindly) sign the message  $m$ . As expected, we use the commitment scheme:

- Alice chooses a new commitment key  $k_m$  explicitly for the message  $m$ ,
- Alice computes the commitment  $c_m = \text{commit}_{k_m}^s(m)$ ,
- Bob computes  $s_m = \text{sig}_{k_B}(c_m)$ .

The idea is to let  $s_m$  be “accepted” as a valid signature for the message  $m$ :

**verification** Assume that Charlie received Bob’s “blind signature” of a message  $m$  in the above form. To verify the signature, we proceed as follows:

- Alice sends  $m$ ,  $s_m$ , and  $k_m$  to Charlie
- Charlie verifies that  $s_m$  contains Bob’s signature and opens the commitment  $c_m$  using  $k_m$ , verifying that the result is in fact  $m$ .

This scheme does not offer the full security of a real blind signature scheme. In particular, if Bob learns the value  $k_m$ , he can determine the message he has (“blindly”) signed. The scheme therefore relies on Charlie not revealing the value  $k_m$  to Bob, and clearly Alice should use encryption when sending the values to Charlie. (Note that we need to assume some kind of honesty on Charlie’s part in any case, since Charlie will always have enough information to prove to Bob that the latter in fact signed the message  $m$ ).

However, if Bob only learns the message  $m$ , but not the commitment key  $k_m$ , he cannot determine whether one of his signatures was indeed for  $m$ . This is an advantage of the proposed scheme over the more obvious one where we simply let Bob sign hash values of  $m$  instead of the messages themselves.

Also note that the scheme is secure against forgery, since the commitment’s binding property fixes Alice’s message. What would happen if we were to use encryption instead of a commitment scheme? (These primitives behave equivalently in our term modeling, but there are significant differences in real implementations.)

## Exercise 9.2, voting protocols (10 Points)

In the lecture, several security properties for voting protocols were discussed. Design a simple voting protocol that satisfies at least one of these properties. Use ProVerif to show that the property is in fact satisfied.

**Solution** If privacy is not a concern at all, then a very simple property is **verifiability**: Alice wants to be sure that her vote was collected and counted correctly. We can achieve verifiability in a voting protocol as follows:

- We assume, as usual, a PKI in place, such that the election chair Charlie knows the public keys of all registered voters.
- We denote the candidates (i.e., items that the voters can vote for) with  $C = \{c_1, \dots, c_n\}$ .
- The protocol runs as follows:
  - Alice sends her vote  $c_i$  to Charlie, signed with her private key:

$$A \rightarrow C \quad \text{sig}_{k_A}(k_A, c_i)$$

Charlie simply broadcasts every vote in the network. Hence Charlie consists of the following receive/-send rule (executed under replication):

$$\text{sig}_{k_A}(x) \rightarrow A \quad \text{sig}_{k_C}(k_A, x)$$

This modeling works in our single-session model, a ProVerif model of course extracts the public key from the signed message.

A straight-forward modeling of the security property is then that if Alice receives the confirmation of her vote, then she accepts. However, this modeling would also deem a protocol as secure where Alice waits for a confirmation that can never arrive, we therefore also need to express that it is possible that Alice in fact receives the confirmation.

In the ProVerif modeling, we have the following steps:

**version-01** Version that verifies as secure, but only since the verification event is never reached.

**version-02** additional query testing whether the verification event is never reached. Since this query verifies true, the verification is in fact never reached, hence there is a bug in the protocol.

**version-03** verification fixed, so that it is actually performed, the protocol is secure.

**version-04** better modeling with more than one session and random strings as votes.

## Exercise 10.1, insecure composition (10 Points)

Specify (either in our formal protocol model or in ProVerif) two cryptographic protocols such that

- each protocol on its own is secure,
- their composition (i.e., a protocol that contains both individual protocols) is insecure.

Can you suggest some design guidelines for protocols to reduce the risk of such “insecure composition?”

**Solution** A “pathological” example in the formal model is the protocol used in the lecture as an example for ProVerif’s incompleteness: The protocol merely contains two instances, each with a single receive/send rule.

$$\mathcal{J}_0 : \epsilon \rightarrow \text{enc}_{k_{AB}}^s \left( \text{enc}_{k_{AB}}^s (\text{FAIL}) \right)$$

$$\mathcal{J}_1 : \text{enc}_{k_{AB}}^s (x) \rightarrow x$$

As discussed in the lecture, a protocol containing each instance once (i.e., the protocol  $P_1 = (\mathcal{I}_0, \mathcal{I}_1)$  with appropriate initial adversary knowledge) is secure, while the protocol composed with itself  $P_2 = (\mathcal{I}_0, \mathcal{I}_1, \mathcal{I}_0, \mathcal{I}_1)$ , is not. (The example is in fact a little less pathological than it possibly seems, since self-composition is in fact a key issue in compositional security.) Another example for self-composition leading to security issues is the original Needham-Schroeder protocol, which is secure when only a single session of the protocol is run, but, as discussed in detail in the lecture, cannot be composed safely with itself (depending on the involved identities).

A possibly more convincing, but still pathological example, is the following: Assume that we have two protocols,  $P_1$  and  $P_2$ , which each perform some useful function (say, authentication, or electronic voting). Assume that the protocols share a symmetric key  $k_{AB}$  and are secure on their own, but each protocol also contains a bug. The bugs in the protocols are harmless on their own, but in combination, the protocols become insecure. In the following model, we omit the actual function of the protocols (imagine some additional receive/send rules in the protocols that do something useful) and only specify the rules that lead to the bug. In the following, let  $t$  be a term that does not appear in the protocol description otherwise, say  $t$  is a constant that is otherwise unused.

The rules are then as follows:

$$r_0 : c \rightarrow \text{enc}_{k_{AB}}^s(t)$$

$$r_1 : \text{enc}_{k_{AB}}^s(t) \rightarrow \text{FAIL}$$

Adding these rules to any instances of a secure protocol will clearly lead to an insecure protocol (as long as the rules are added at some “reachable” position in the original protocol). This example also works when the original protocols are secure under self-composition (i.e., the replication operator in ProVerif).

A design rule that reduces the risk of such attacks is to add, to each application of a cryptographic primitive, a tag that references the protocol name as well as the message in the protocol. Clearly, this is difficult to realize in practice due to the amount of coordination required between designers of different protocols.

## Exercise 10.2, Bitcoin mining (10 Points)

When a Bitcoin miner constructs a new block, there are several computationally expensive operations required.

1. Describe each of these operations and rank the computational cost involved.
2. Who verifies that these tasks have been performed correctly?
3. What happens if a miner skips some of these tasks?

### Solution

1. The miner has to decide on which block to build. In particular, this means verifying the candidate block's correctness, which involves the following steps:
  - checking the block's internal correctness (hash pointers inside the block)
  - verifying all signatures occurring inside the block,
  - verifying that coins spent inside the block are valid, i.e.,
    - a) the references refer to transactions creating the coins of matching value, and
    - b) the spent coins have not been spent previously, either in a previous block (working backwards from the block under evaluation), or in a previous<sup>1</sup> transaction inside the current block.

the latter operation is particularly expensive, since it requires examining a potentially large number of past blocks. Note that it does not suffice to check only the last block, since there is no guarantee that the previous block has been verified by other nodes in the network.

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<sup>1</sup>For this, it is not required to agree on a “fixed” order of transactions inside the block, any enumeration will suffice: In the event of a double-spend, the entire block and not only one transaction is invalid.



- The miner must create a new block, which must satisfy the same correctness criteria as the old block. This operation is potentially a bit less expensive than the previous one, since only one block needs to be checked.
  - Finally, the miner must find nonces to ensure that the hash value of the newly created block is below the current target. This is clearly the most expensive of the operations.
2. This is verified by miners for following blocks, since they perform the exact same steps on the newly generated block as discussed above.
  3. If this does not lead to generating, or building on, an incorrect block, then there are no negative effects. However, as long as a majority of the network performs the required checks, a miner building on or producing incorrect blocks risks having her blocks rejected by the network.

### Exercise 11.1, uniqueness of unwindings (10 Points)

Show that P-unwindings are not unique, but that minimal P-unwindings are, that is:

1. give an example for a system  $M$  and a policy  $\succrightarrow$  such that there are (at least) two different P-unwindings for  $M$  and  $\succrightarrow$ ,
2. show that if  $M$  is P-secure with respect to a policy  $\succrightarrow$ , then there is a P-unwinding for  $M$  and  $\succrightarrow$  that is contained (via set inclusion) in all P-unwindings for  $M$  and  $\succrightarrow$ .

#### Solution

1. Simply choose any non-trivial P-secure system  $M$  with a correspondings policy  $\succrightarrow$ , and a corresponding unwinding  $(\sim)_{u \in D}$ . Then modify the system  $M$  such that all observations are identical in all states. We immediately obtain two unwindings for the new system  $M'$  and  $\succrightarrow$ :
  - the unwinding for  $M$  clearly still is an unwinding for  $M'$ ,
  - since in  $M'$ , all agents have the same observations in all states, the universal relation  $S \times S$  is trivially an unwinding.
2. We prove the following fact:

Let  $I$  be a non-empty set, and for each  $i \in I$ , let  $\sim_i = (\sim_u^i)_{u \in D}$  be a P-unwinding for  $M$  and  $\succrightarrow$ . Then the family  $(\sim_u)_{u \in D}$  defined as  $\sim_u = \cap_{i \in I} \sim_u^i$  also is a P-unwinding for  $M$  and  $\succrightarrow$ .

This obviously completes the proof, since the minimal unwinding is then simply the intersection of all unwindings. Except for output consistence, the proof is an easy consequence of the fact that closure properties are invariant under intersection. Let  $u \in D$ , and let  $\sim_u$  be defined as in the lemma. We prove that  $\sim_u$  in fact satisfies all required properties: That  $\sim_u$  is an equivalence relation (i.e., reflexive, symmetric, and transitive), and that  $\sim_u$  satisfies output consistency, step consistency, and left respect (in their respective P-security versions).

- *Reflexivity.* Since each  $\sim_u^i$  is reflexive, we have that, for each  $s \in S$ ,  $(s, s) \in \sim_u^i$ , hence  $(s, s) \in \cap_{i \in I} \sim_u^i = \sim_u$ .
- *Symmetry.* Let  $s \sim_u t$ . By definition, then  $(s, t) \in \cap_{i \in I} \sim_u^i$ , i.e.,  $s \sim_u^i t$  for each  $i \in I$ . Since each  $\sim_u^i$  is symmetric, it follows that  $t \sim_u^i s$  for each  $i \in I$ , therefore,  $(t, s) \in \cap_{i \in I} \sim_u^i = \sim_u$ .
- *Transitivity.* Let  $s \sim_u t$  and  $t \sim_u r$ . As above, we then have  $s \sim_u^i t$  and  $t \sim_u^i r$  for each  $i \in I$ , the transitivity of each  $\sim_u^i$  then implies that  $s \sim_u^i r$  for each  $i$ , and thus  $s \sim_u r$ .
- *Output Consistency.* Let  $s \sim_u t$ . Since  $i \neq \emptyset$ , there is some  $i \in I$ . By definition of  $\sim_u$ , it follows that  $s \sim_u^i t$ . Since  $\sim_u^i$  satisfies output consistency, it follows that  $\text{obs}_u(s) = \text{obs}_u(t)$  as required.
- *Step Consistency.* Let  $s \sim_u t$ , and let  $a \in A$ . Since each  $\sim_u^i$  satisfies step consistency, we have that  $s \cdot a \sim_u^i t \cdot a$  for each  $i \in I$ , i.e.,  $(s \cdot a, t \cdot a) \in \cap_{i \in I} \sim_u^i$ , therefore,  $s \cdot a \sim_u t \cdot a$ .

- Left Respect. Let  $\text{dom}(a) \not\rightarrow u$ , and let  $s \in S$ . Since each  $\sim_u^i$  satisfies left respect, it follows that  $s \sim_u^i s \cdot a$  for all  $i \in I$ , and hence again,  $s \sim_u s \cdot a$ .

### Exercise 11.2, characterization of NDI (10 Points)

Prove that a deterministic system  $M$  satisfies NDI if and only if the following is true: If  $r_1$  and  $r_2$  are runs such that  $L$  performs the same actions in  $r_1$  and  $r_2$ , then  $\text{view}_L(r_1) = \text{view}_L(r_2)$ . (For this, you first need to formalize the former condition.)

**Solution** We first formalize what it means for  $L$  to perform the same actions in both runs. For a run  $r = s_0 \xrightarrow{a_1} s_1 \xrightarrow{a_2} s_2 \xrightarrow{a_3} \dots \xrightarrow{a_n} s_n$ , with  $\text{Act}_L(r)$  we denote the sequence  $a_1^L a_2^L a_3^L \dots a_n^L$ , where for an action  $a = (a_H, a_L)$ ,  $a^L$  is defined as  $a_L$  (i.e., the superscript  $L$  denotes the projection of the joint action to  $L$ 's component). Analogously we define  $\text{Act}_H(r)$  as the sequence of  $H$  actions in a run  $r$ . The claim is thus formalized as: The following conditions are equivalent:

1. the machine  $M$  satisfies NDI,
2. for all runs  $r_1$  and  $r_2$  of  $M$  with  $\text{Act}_L(r_1) = \text{Act}_L(r_2)$ , we have that  $\text{view}_L(r_1) = \text{view}_L(r_2)$ .

First assume that  $M$  satisfies NDI, and let  $r_1$  and  $r_2$  be runs with  $\text{Act}_L(r_1) = \text{Act}_L(r_2)$ . Let  $v_1 = \text{view}_L(r_1)$  and  $v_2 = \text{view}_L(r_2)$ . Clearly, both are possible  $L$ -views. Let  $\alpha_1 = \text{Act}_H(r_1)$ , and  $\alpha_2 = \text{Act}_H(r_2)$ . We apply the NDI-property to the  $L$ -view  $v_1$  and the  $H$  action sequence  $\alpha_2$ . From the NDI property it follows that there is a run  $r$  with

- $\text{Act}_H(r) = \alpha_2$ ,
- $\text{view}_L(r) = v_1$ .

Since  $\text{view}_L(r)$  in particular contains the actions performed by  $L$  (and these are the same in  $r_1$  and  $r_2$ ), it follows that the joint actions performed in  $r$  are the same as the actions performed in  $r_2$ . Since the system is deterministic, it follows that the run  $r$  is in fact identical to  $r_2$ . It hence follows that  $\text{view}_L(r_2) = \text{view}_L(r) = v_1 = \text{view}_L(r_1)$ . This proves the first implication of the equivalence.

For the converse, assume that for all runs  $r_1$  and  $r_2$  of  $M$  with  $\text{Act}_L(r_1) = \text{Act}_L(r_2)$ , we have that  $\text{view}_L(r_1) = \text{view}_L(r_2)$ . To show that the system satisfies NDI, let  $v$  be an  $L$ -view, i.e.,  $v = \text{view}_L(r_0)$  for some run  $r_0$ , and let  $\alpha$  be a  $H$  action sequence of corresponding length. We need to prove that there is some run  $r$  with

- $\text{Act}_H(r) = \alpha$ ,
- $\text{view}_L(r) = v$ .

Let  $r$  be the run where  $L$  performs the same actions as in  $r_0$ , and  $H$  performs the sequence  $\alpha$ . By construction, we have that  $\text{Act}_L(r) = \text{Act}_L(r_0)$ . The condition therefore implies that  $\text{view}_L(r) = \text{view}_L(r_0) = v$ . Hence  $r$  satisfies the required conditions.

### Exercise 11.3, implications between security properties (10 Points)

In the lecture, some implications between security definitions were stated without proof. Choose and prove one of the following (in the following,  $M$  is a system and  $\rightarrow$  a policy).

1. If  $M$  is TA-secure with respect to  $\rightarrow$ , then  $M$  is also IP-secure with respect to  $\rightarrow$ .
2. If  $M$  is P-secure with respect to  $\rightarrow$ , then  $M$  is also TA-secure with respect to  $\rightarrow$ .
3. If  $M$  is P-secure with respect to  $\rightarrow$ , then  $M$  is also IP-secure with respect to  $\rightarrow$ .

**Solution**

1. The proof is from the full version of [Mey07]. Assume that  $M$  is TA-secure with respect to  $\rightarrow$ , we show that IP-security holds as well. Hence let  $s$  be a state, let  $u$  be an agent, and let  $\alpha_1, \alpha_2$  be action sequences with  $\text{ipurge}_u(\alpha_1) = \text{ipurge}_u(\alpha_2)$ . To show that  $\text{obs}_u(s \cdot \alpha_1) = \text{obs}_u(s \cdot \alpha_2)$ , it suffices to prove that  $\text{ta}_u(\alpha_1) = \text{ta}_u(\alpha_2)$ , then TA-security of the system implies that both have the same observations. To show this, it suffices to prove that, for all  $X \subseteq D$  with  $u \in X$ , we have that  $\text{ta}_u(\alpha) = \text{ta}_u(\text{ipurge}_X(\alpha))$ . We show the claim by induction on  $\alpha$ . If  $\alpha = \epsilon$ , the claim is trivial. Hence assume the claim is true for  $\alpha$ , we consider  $\alpha a$  for some action  $a \in A$ . As usual, we consider two cases:

- If  $\text{dom}(a) \not\rightarrow u$ , then, by definition,  $\text{ta}_u(\alpha a) = \text{ta}_u(\alpha)$ . We consider two subcases, writing  $v \rightarrow X$  is  $v \rightarrow w$  for some  $w \in X$ .

- case 1:  $\text{dom}(a) \not\rightarrow X$ . Then  $\text{ipurge}_X(\alpha a) = \text{ipurge}_X(\alpha)$ . Hence

$$\begin{aligned} \text{ta}_u(\text{ipurge}_X(\alpha a)) &= \text{ta}_u(\text{ipurge}_X(\alpha)) \\ &= \text{ta}_u(\alpha) \text{ (by induction) } \text{ as required.} \\ &= \text{ta}_u(\alpha a), \end{aligned}$$

- case 2:  $\text{dom}(a) \rightarrow X$ . Then  $\text{ipurge}_X(\alpha a) = \text{ipurge}_{X \cup \{\text{dom}(a)\}}(\alpha) \cdot a$ . Hence, it follows that

$$\begin{aligned} \text{ta}_u(\text{ipurge}_X(\alpha a)) &= \text{ta}_u(\text{ipurge}_{X \cup \{\text{dom}(a)\}}(\alpha) \cdot a) \\ &= \text{ta}_u(\text{ipurge}_{X \cup \{\text{dom}(a)\}}(\alpha)) \text{ (recall that } \text{dom}(a) \not\rightarrow u) \\ &= \text{ta}_u(\alpha) \text{ (by induction)} \\ &= \text{ta}_u(\alpha a). \end{aligned}$$

- if  $\text{dom}(a) \rightarrow u$ , then  $\text{ipurge}_X(\alpha a) = \text{ipurge}_{X \cup \{\text{dom}(a)\}}(\alpha) \cdot a$ . Thus

$$\begin{aligned} \text{ta}_u(\text{ipurge}(\alpha a)) &= \text{ta}_u(\text{ipurge}_{X \cup \{\text{dom}(a)\}}(\alpha) \cdot a) \\ &= (\text{ta}_u(\text{ipurge}_{X \cup \{\text{dom}(a)\}}(\alpha)), \text{ta}_{\text{dom}(a)}(\text{ipurge}_{X \cup \{\text{dom}(a)\}}(\alpha)), a) \text{ as required.} \\ &= (\text{ta}_u(\alpha), \text{ta}_{\text{dom}(a)}(\alpha), a) \text{ (by induction)} \\ &= \text{ta}_u(\alpha a), \end{aligned}$$

A more intuitive, but less formal, argument is as follows: As above, it suffices to show that if  $\text{ipurge}_u(\alpha_1) = \text{ipurge}_u(\alpha_2)$ , then  $\text{ta}_u(\alpha_1) = \text{ta}_u(\alpha_2)$ . To see this, consider each action  $a$  appearing in the sequence  $\alpha$ , i.e., let  $\alpha = \beta a \gamma$  that is removed by  $\text{ipurge}_u$ . This happens when there is no “downgrading chain” from  $\text{dom}(a)$  to  $u$  in the sequence  $a\gamma$ . In this case, the event  $a$  is also not “forwarded” to  $u$  in the application of the  $\text{ta}$ -function. Therefore, the event  $a$  is not relevant to the computation of  $\text{ta}_u(\alpha)$ , and the value  $\text{ta}_u(\alpha)$  does not change when we remove  $a$  from the sequence, i.e., we have that  $\text{ta}_u(\alpha) = \text{ta}_u(\beta\gamma)$ . Inductively, this shows that  $\text{ta}_u(\alpha_1) = \text{ta}_u(\alpha_2)$ .

2. Assume that  $M$  is P-secure, and let  $\alpha_1, \alpha_2$  be sequences with  $\text{ta}_u(\alpha_1) = \text{ta}_u(\alpha_2)$ . Clearly,  $\text{ta}_u(\alpha)$  contains at least as much information about  $\alpha$  as  $\text{purge}_u(\alpha)$  does. In particular,  $\text{purge}_u(\alpha_1) = \text{purge}_u(\alpha_2)$ , and from P security it follows that  $\text{obs}_u(s \cdot \alpha_1) = \text{obs}_u(s \cdot \alpha_2)$ .
3. This proof was done in the lecture.

### Exercise 11.4, strong secrecy and non-interference (10 Points)

As suggested by the ProVerif keyword **noninterf**, strong secrecy of cryptographic protocols and non-interference (in the information-flow sense) are related. In this exercise, we will make this relationship more precise. For this, use a simple cryptographic protocol and construct a system  $M$  such that strong secrecy of the protocol directly corresponds to P-security of the system  $M$ .

*Note:* Depending on the protocol you choose to model, a finite state system might require a mechanism to limit the possible number of terms and thus the state space. To avoid this, you may use systems with an infinite state space to solve this task.

**Solution** The idea is to let  $H$  send a value (say, 0 or 1) using strong, randomized encryption. Since in the P-security model,  $L$  must be unable to detect whether  $H$  performed any action at all, we cannot simply let  $H$  perform a “send action” as in a natural modeling of the protocol. Instead, some value must be sent regardless of what  $H$

does (if anything), but  $H$  can influence that value by sending some special message to the participant sending the ciphertext.

Then the system can be modeled as  $L$ 's observations being modulo the equational theory (i.e., indistinguishability).