

# The Plato

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The philosophy of Plato is best known as theory of ideas or theory of forms. It is the metaphysics of Plato. According to it, what is truly real is not the object we encounter in sensory experience, but rather forms or ideas which can be grasped only intellectually. Hence, according to Plato, over and above the world of sense perceptions, there is transcendent world of ideas or forms. By idea or form, he meant the essence of perceptual object.


For example, cow is perceptual object, but the idea of cow is cowness without which no cow would have been cow.

Ideas are model and ideal entities and objects are their faithful copies. In other words, idea is a universal concept found in all objects of same class.

According to Plato, transcendent world of ideas is more real and as a matter of fact, just as moonlight is derivative of sunlight, the world of sense objects is derivative of the transcendent world of ideas. The reality of the sensuous object is directly proportionate to their being faithful copies of the transcendent world which consists of ideas or forms of beings.

Plato takes the help of metaphors to explain the theory of ideas. He says that ideas are patterns and things just imitate them or simply sensible things participate in their corresponding ideas.

## Cave analogy



Imagine some people living in an underground cave sitting with their back to the mouth of the cave, their hands and feet are bound in such a way that they can only look at the back wall of the cave. Behind them, there are many human like creatures standing on top of wall.

Because there is fire behind these people, it casts flickering shadow on the back wall of the cave. So, the only thing that the cave dwellers can see is the shadow play thinking these shadows to be real because they are sitting since birth.

Now, imagine one of the cave dwellers manages to free himself. Immediately he asks himself that from where all these shadows on wall are coming. He comes out and gets dazzled by the sharp sunlight and clarity of real figures. He manages to climb wall and sees beyond fire he is even more dazzled. He will see colours, animals, plants, flowers, shapes, etc. He realizes that shadow in the cave is merely reflection of the real thing. He will see sun in the sky and realizes that this is what gives life to these plants, flowers, animals, etc. just as fire made the shadows visible.

He goes back and tries to convince cave—dwellers that these are merely reflection of real things. But, these prisoners do not agree with him. Instead they kill him.

The cave represents the world we see and experience with our senses and the world of sunlight represents the realm of ideas or forms. The prisoners represent the ordinary people who take the world to be real and are condemned to darkness, error, ignorance and illusion. The escaped prisoner represents the philosopher who has seen life, truth, beauty, knowledge and true reality.

The philosopher who returns to cave is considered as mad by the prisoners. This difficulty is sometimes faced by those who have seen the truth and decided to tell others about it.

## **Plato-Basic**

Plato's theory of ideas is based on the reflection on the world of sense observations. In the practical world of sense observation, there is nothing which is absolute or immutable, that is, all is flux. Under the influence of growth and decay, the things exhibit many varying and contradictory properties. For example, food which nourishes today may kill tomorrow because of the decaying. From these reflections on the nature of practical reality, Plato concluded that there could be no definite knowledge based on sense observation. Hence, the sensuous world or the world of appearance cannot be the object of knowledge.

From this fact it follows that there must be another world other than and independent of the sensuous world which is the object of knowledge. This world must be transcendent ideally and apprehensible by reason alone. This is the transcendent world of ideas or forms.

Thus, Plato establishes dichotomy of existence or two-realm concept. That is the world exists at two levels. The properties of the two levels are diverse. Whereas the sensuous world is transient, mortal, temporal, etc. the transcendental world is immutable, immortal and non-temporal. This Platonic dualism was incorporated into the Christianity and transmitted-to the ages to our thoughts today.

According to Plato, it is the rational insight which gives us knowledge of ideas and forms. It is not subject to sensory knowledge and it is unhindered by sensory perception. It does not give us knowledge of things. It is not knowledge of particulars, but knowledge of universal. So far as each object participates in a certain universal, the knowledge of universal gives some knowledge of object. This rational insight is -the basis of Plato's theory of ideas or forms.

## **Validity or justification**

Plato further tries to establish validity and rationality of the existence of the transcendent world. In the practical world, if we wish to know the meaning of the concepts like beauty, sweet, justice, etc. we can only point to certain particular objects which illustrate these concepts. Since such concepts are found only exemplified in the actual world and are not found as such in spatial-temporal existence, these must exist in the world which is beyond space and time. For example, circularity is not found as such in the physical world. What we find are the things which approach perfect circularity. But, they themselves are not perfect circulars. That is, circularity is an example of form or idea.

## **Arguments In Favor of Theory of Ideas**

Plato has advanced various arguments to establish his Theory of ideas. Aristotle considered five of these as the chief. They are as follows:

1. The argument from Science;
2. The argument of one over many;
3. The argument from the knowledge of things that are no more;
4. The argument from relations;
5. The argument implying the fallacy of the third man.

### **1. The argument from Science**

According to the reasoning of this argument, knowledge and science must be definite and real. They must enjoy unambiguous ontological status. But in our practical world we find nothing which is definite, permanent and immutable. All worldly things are subject to change and therefore variable in character. Therefore, these cannot be objects of knowledge.

The knowledge therefore, can only be transcendent. The objects of knowledge can only be those which are immutable and absolute and these must be transcendent. Plato believed that concepts or forms are immutable, permanent and real. Plato has called these immutable and absolute objects 'Ideas' or 'Forms'. For example, mathematics is a science, but in the practical applications of mathematics, the number, the straight lines and point etc. only exemplify them. We do not have an object which corresponds to the idea of a point or straight line.

The ideal definition of a straight line is that of the shortest distance between two points and that of the point that it has position but no magnitude. Now, we cannot possibly imagine anything in space and time which has position and no magnitude. This consideration alone leads us to believe that the objects of the world are but imperfect copies of an ideal and perfect form. Therefore, the objects of mathematical knowledge are not, to be found in our day-to-day- world but in the transcendent world which is apprehensible not by any sense but by reason alone.

## **2. The argument of One over Many**

The reasoning of this argument is that the various particulars in the practical world have certain similarities with each other due to which they are considered of one class and subsumed under a single concept or idea. For example, there are men, animals, plants, stones etc. in this world.

All particular men are called so because in all of them, there is a quality of 'manliness.' Now this quality or idea of manliness must exist somewhere. It cannot exist in particulars because if it exists in a particular it must also exist in another particular and then there will be many concepts of the same type. But this is illogical, therefore the concept must be singular and it cannot exist in our spatiotemporal world.

## **3. The Argument from the knowledge of things that are no more**

The reasoning of this argument is that while particular things are born and die, the form or the concept of which they are copies or illustrations ever remains. For example, men keep being born and dying but the idea or concept of 'manliness' is permanent and preserves through all changes. It is neither born nor dies: but is immortal.

## **4. The argument from relations**

All things classified under a concept are not uniformly equal; but are more or less different from each other yet they are known by the same name. This is because they follow more or less perfectly the ideal form or concept. Only the concept is wholly perfect.

## 5. The argument implying the fallacy of the third man

The reasoning of this argument is that a set of particulars is called by a single name because all the particulars of the set have some common features. But, however, none of these has these features perfectly. For example, Ram, Shyam, Sohan are all men, because in all of them the characteristic of manhood is found, that is, all have the qualities of rationality and animality. But no particular man is perfectly rational and animal.

However, the idea of a perfect rational creature is indispensable; otherwise we cannot recognize a rational animal. As there can be no copy without an original, there can be no particular rational creature without a universal rational creature. Therefore, Ideas or concepts must exist outside of particulars.

## Characteristics of ideas

Plato advances many arguments to establish his theory of ideas. For Plato, the realm of ideas is the realm of reality and of being while that of percepts is the realm of becoming.

1. The substance is that which is “in itself and for itself” and does not require the existence of anything else for itself reality. For Plato, idea is “in itself and for itself”. In philosophy, substance is defined as a substratum which persists through changes; is unaffected by them; is immutable and eternal. The ‘ideas’, as we have seen earlier possess these qualities. In fact, nothing other than ‘ideas’ have these qualities. Therefore, ideas are according to Plato, substances.
2. Ideas are universal Such as cowness, beauty, etc. Particular things only imitate and copy an idea. For example, beautiful things imitate the idea of beauty.

According to Plato, ideas are already there in the intellect of man in dormant stage. Sensible things only participate in ideas and serve as provocative agencies for evoking the reminiscence of ideas when man once experienced them in their pristine glorious existence.

According to Plato, soul is immortal and in its pristine existence, it enjoys the pure experience. But, at present, the soul is in bondage and continues in bondage till it regains its pristine glorious existence through proper philosophical knowledge through meditation on the idea of Good. As long as soul does not regain its release, it passes endless cycle of rebirth. Thus, learning of ideas is really recollection (recollection theory or reminiscence theory)

3. Ideas are eternal .They are eternal in the sense that they are timeless. Time was created by God along with the world, but ideas pre-exist the creation of the world and would remain even when the world would be destroyed. For example, even if all cows die, the cowness will remain.

4. Ideas are immutable, non-composite, pure and simple.
5. Ideas are non-sensible or supersensible. They are not objects of sense-perception, but are apprehensible by reason alone. They can only be thought of.
6. Each idea is one, unique and indivisible. Of course, idea of beauty is one, but it is imitated or copied by many beautiful things.
7. Each idea in its own kind is absolute. As ideas are absolute, they are invariable and constant. For example, a child grows into adolescent, youth, old and then dies. But, with this change idea of manliness remains same.
8. Ideas are essence of things in the sense that they are real and sensible things are their imitation.
9. Ideas are beyond space and time. For example, cow could be described in space and time, but the idea of cow, that is, cowness is transcendental and hence, beyond space and time.
10. Plato is pluralist. He believes in the independent existence of all ideas, but all ideas do not enjoy equal role and importance in the transcendental world. As a matter of fact, there is a hierarchical order of ideas in the transcendental world. Ideas representing material objects are at the lowest, followed by ideas which possess quality and so on. In other words, ideas which are more inclusive are of higher order and which are less inclusive are of lower order. For example, idea of color and idea of blue.

In this hierarchy, the idea of Good is the highest idea. According to Plato, the world of ideas is the system of ideas in which various ideas perform their respective role. But, all the roles are subordinate to the role played by the Good.

## Idea of Good

According to Plato, the idea of Good is the ultimate reality. It is the highest idea. It is the substratum of the universe. It occupies the same place as that of substance in the philosophy of Spinoza or Brahman in the philosophy of Shankaracharya.

It is the highest knowledge, highest value and supreme existence. It is absolutely free, self-existent and perfect. It is the truth, good and beautiful. It is the '**summon bonum**' of human life. It is the aim of all desires, activities and excellence. All human beings and other creatures and even gods aim at its attainment. It is the only extent of participation of the idea of Good which makes anything useful or good. Metaphysically, it is the cause of universe.

The physical world is only appearance. Just as light is due to sun, not sun itself, similarly the world of existence is due to idea of Good, but is not the idea of Good itself.

Idea of good, the ultimate reality, is indescribable. It is beyond finite, speech and thoughts; beyond senses, language and worldly experiences and therefore, can be best described just as Brahman is described in the Upanishads as “neti neti ...”

## To know is to be

Knowledge is true ultimately because it is knowledge of what is. Plato believed that it is not enough to know the truth; rather a person must also become the truth. This is where Plato's theory of knowledge, that is epistemology, becomes metaphysics or theory of being. For Plato to know is to be. The more you know, the more you are and the better you are.

The myth of the cave shows how and why human beings are in the dark about the truth of things. What allows human beings eventually to come into light regarding the truth of things is the form or idea. Each individual has in his-or her immortal soul a perfect set of forms and ideas that can be remembered and only that constitutes true knowledge. To remember the forms is to know the absolute truth and simultaneously becoming just and wise.

Plato believed in two radically separate spheres. These are realms of shadows or imperfect changing beings and the realm of perfect, eternal and unchangeable forms. The problem is how we get out of the cave to the perfect world .of forms. In this regard, Plato postulates the notion of love as the way in which a person can go from the state of imperfection and ignorance to the state of perfection and true knowledge. He defined love as longingness and a striving to attain the object of longing.

For Plato, love is meant to be the force that brings all things together and makes them beautiful. It is the way by which all beings, especially human beings, can ascend to higher stages of self-realization and perfection. It is this intellectual and spiritual love that begins the ascent which may eventually lead to permanent possession of absolute beauty or goodness. Thus, for Plato love is the ultimate way of knowing and realizing the absolute and ultimate truth.

## Four Types of Knowledge

In his magnum opus The Republic Plato has presented his views concerning epistemology. Here he discussed the following four types of knowledge-Conjectural, Practical or Sensuous, Hypothetical and finally Rational.

## **1. Conjectural Knowledge**

Conjectural knowledge is the lowest type of knowledge. In fact it is not knowledge but a mere appearance of it. It includes illusions, hallucinations, dreams and pathological experience etc. Thus the knowledge of a snake in a rope, silver in nacre and the double moon in the sky, the mirage in the desert etc. and the words like hare's horn and son of a barren woman corner within conjecture} knowledge. Thus it deals with illusory experiences and ideas. It is always erroneous. It is never actual but always possible though it influences people.

## **2. Practical or Sensuous knowledge**

While conjectural knowledge of Plato can be compared to Pratibhasika knowledge of Samkara Vedanta, the practical or sensuous knowledge may be compared with Samkara's Vyavaharika knowledge. As is clear from its title it is the knowledge of the world, the knowledge received through various sense organs. Thus our knowledge of things is practical knowledge.

This knowledge, though considered to be final by man of common sense, has been demonstrated as only a possible knowledge by the philosophers. Things are not as they appear to us. What they are in reality, we do not know but we know that our knowledge concerning things is conditioned by our mental mechanism. As Kant pointed out in tradition with Plato's epistemology, man's knowledge is a result of a synthesis between percept and concepts.

## **Is Knowledge Perception?**

While discussing the idea of Protagoras that knowledge is perception Plato has pointed out that this is an opinion and not knowledge. According to Protagoras and Sophist thinkers, knowledge achieved through sense organs is the true knowledge. Such a view, however, is falsified by our everyday experiences. No reliable predictions can be made on the basis of such knowledge. As David Hume pointed out, in tradition with Plato's epistemology, the sensory experiences lead to ideas which are possible but not necessary.

Again, our perceptual knowledge at times is self-contradictory. An object near to us appears to be bigger than the same object at a far distance. In comparison to a heavy thing something may appear as lighter but in comparison to a lighter thing the same thing may appear heavier. Thus as Gestalt psychologists later on pointed out, in tradition with Plato, an object is influenced by its field. All perceptions are in a certain background and this background influences our sensory experiences. The same object in a White, red or black background appears to be having different colors. Similar is the case with geometrical and other forms.

Now, which of these contradictory experiences may be considered as representing the actual object? It is clear that none of these experiences represents the object but only a facet of it which is related to space-time. Sensory experiences do not give us universal and eternal knowledge. They are temporary and fallible though useful for practical purposes. However true they may be considered in the field of practical life, the scientists agree with the philosophers that they are possible and not necessary.

If we accept with Protagoras that knowledge is perception it will result in the impossibility of all education, discourse\_and validity. If all the perceptions are equally true, then there is hardly any distinction between the perception of an untrained and trained persons. The educator therefore will have nothing to teach to the educand. Similarly a discourse generally consists of two opposite sides, both of which are based upon certain experiences. If experiences alone were sufficient to guarantee the validity of knowledge, both the sides of a discourse may be equally true which leads to the contradictory position that contraries are equally true.

Similarly contradictory theories of validity will be equally valid which will make assessment of validity impossible. One will have to accept that while his own perceptions are valid for himself, other's perceptions are valid for others. Using this reasoning known as turning the tables, Democritus has criticized the above mentioned theory advanced by Protagoras.

If perceptions were knowledge, one must admit all objects of perception. Man, however, is not the only perceiver. The animals and birds of different varieties have sense organs-which perceive in a way different from that of human beings. Protagoras has not explained whether the perceptions of human beings alone are valid or equal validity may be granted to perceptions of the animals. Thus his dictum that knowledge is perception is self-contradictory. According to it truth is what appears to be true. If it is so there is hardly any question of the validity of truth.

The theory advanced by Protagoras will eliminate objectivity from the field of knowledge. It is against objectivity of truth and fails to distinguish between tenth and falsehood. Nothing can be true and untrue at the same time. It can be true for one and untrue for another, but not both for the same person. It may be admitted that while what I perceive is true for me other's perceptions may be true for them, but if the same thing is perceived differently by different persons, we must have a criteria of assessing the objectivity of truth.

Besides, there are some phenomena which are not subject to perception. For example, universals are not subject to perception. We may perceive human beings but not humanity, the universal found among human beings. Similarly, Words such as equality, liberty, fraternity and all values are not subject to perception and yet they have not been accepted as false. The processes of classification, comparison, imagination and reasoning include a wide variety of phenomenon which are not subject to perception. In the perception of a white piece of paper the perceptions of

whiteness and paper etc. require classification as well as comparison, which however are not sensory processes. Each sensation, as distinct from another sensation, involves comparison by the human mind.

Kant rightly pointed out that without the subsumption of forms of intuition under categories of ideas and finally their synthesis in a unity of apperception knowledge is not possible. All these processes, as Kant rightly pointed out, are A-priori i.e., not subject to perception. All knowledge involves a double cognition. While on the one hand my perception of a piece of paper shows the existence of an object outside me, it also proves the existence of a perceptual mechanism in my mind. Therefore, the dictum that knowledge is perception is oversimplified and unscientific.

### **3. Hypothetical knowledge.**

This knowledge, as is clear by its title, is not final but hypothetical. It is similarly not sensory or practical. It includes the knowledge of numbers and forms as found in different branches of mathematics. As David Hume pointed out, in Platonic traditions, all mathematical knowledge is exact but not actual since whatever is necessary is not factual.

In hypothetical knowledge we arrive at certain conclusions through the processes of inductive generalizations and logical deductions, the truth of these generalizations and deductions is hypothetical as it depends upon the validity of sensory knowledge. In mathematics the basic definitions as those of point, line etc. are taken as axioms. They are not derived from such sensory perceptions but defined as such. Deductions made on the basis of these definitions therefore are not real though necessary. In Platonic epistemology hypothetical knowledge is the mediator between the practical sensuous Knowledge and the rational insight. In Other Words, it establishes a relation between the world of things.

### **4. Rational insight**

In platonic epistemology rational insight is the highest form of knowledge. Thus Plato can be called the forerunner of rationalist philosophy in the West. The rational insight gives us knowledge of forms, concepts or ideas. It is achieved through a dialectical process unhindered by sensory perceptions. It is not subject to sensory knowledge.

## **Knowledge is not opinion**

Besides rejecting the theory of Protagoras that knowledge is perception, Plato has also rejected another current ~ theory of his time knowledge is the opinion. According to Plato, Knowledge is not opinion, neither right opinion nor wrong opinion. For example, if a person declares that the Government will resign next Saturday, this is not knowledge even if it comes out to be true accidentally. Right opinion again, is mostly a blind guess and therefore cannot be called knowledge proper. For Example, if our

conscience intuitively or instinctively believes in a certain thing and cannot lay-down reasons for such a belief, it cannot be called knowledge of the reasons why it is so.

## **Knowledge is not instinctive belief but complete understanding.**

It is rational comprehension. Thus it is not based on faith, but on reason. An orator utilizing the sentiments of the audience can make them believe in his opinion but he cannot create knowledge. An opinion can be changed by arousing emotions and sentiments and therefore it is unstable and indefinite. Knowledge, on the other hand, cannot be changed like this. One who knows cannot be be-fooled by verbal jugglery.

## **While knowledge is always true**

Opinions both right and wrong, are always false. Distinguishing between knowledge and right opinion Plato has advanced the argument that instruction can implant knowledge. While this is not true about right opinion, knowledge and true reason are invariably related and found together. Right I opinion, knowledge and true reason are invariably related and found together. Right opinion is irrational. It i can be changed by stimuli and motivation. It can be divided among participants. This however, is not true about knowledge which can be shared only by rational human beings. Comparing the role of opinion and knowledge is pure being, opinion lies in between Being and non - Being. In other words, opinion is in between knowledge and ignorance.

## **Theory of Divided Line**

Explaining the world in which we live has been the essential pursuit of Philosophy since the beginning. Many have accounted for the world in different ways; from what substance everything is made being the usual quest. Plato's "Divided Line" is one of the most studied and famous explanations of the world. It not only explains its essence, but the theory of knowledge according to Plato. It represents the synthetic viewpoint of Plato's epistemology and metaphysics. .


This ideology is demonstrated through a line, which separates four metaphysical models of knowledge and the world. These models are not completely separate, but more of ladder in which man must realize the next step of clarity by building off the last; the journey from ignorance to true knowledge.

Let us define the four different parts of the Divided Line. The line divides the world into two main fields;

1. Opinion / visible: The visible world is perceived by the senses and subject to change. Opinion is divided into
  - i. conjectural (or illusion) and
  - ii. perceptual/practical world

2. Knowledge, or intelligible world :The intelligible world cannot be perceived by the senses, but only known and understood. This world is not subject to change, but rather is eternal and within it holds universal ideals. Knowledge, or the intelligible world, is divided into
- hypothetical and
  - Rational insight

### PLATO'S FIGURE OF THE DIVIDED PLANE



Plato's Metaphor of the line

### CRITICAL COMMENT ON PLATO'S THEORY OF IDEA

- According to Aristotle, no essence of anything can be outside of it, but for Plato, ideas are in the intelligible world, away from the things which belongs to the world of becoming. Acc to Aristotle, it is absurd because idea or the essence must be in the thing of which it is essence.
- How can ideas explain-the world of particular things? How can the idea of whiteness explain the particular white things? If we could show that white cows, white flowers; etc. logically follows from whiteness, then alone we could say that idea of whiteness explains the white things of the world. But acc. to Aristotle, there is no logical relation between them.

Even if we say, that white is the common element in all the things called white, the change or movement in white things does not get explained thereby.

Plato's view is static, as we find later in the philosophy of Spinoza. However, Aristotle point of view is dynamic as we find later in the philosophy of Leibnitz.

3. Aristotle says, idea as causes are mere double the things to be explained. Ideas are as many as are the particular which they want to explain.
4. Acc. to Plato, idea is a substance which can exist in the intelligible world without being instantiated. However, according to Aristotle, idea must exist only in particular i.e individuals. Hence, substance is a concrete individual. Acc. to Aristotle, a substance has three elements.
  - i) Universal
  - ii) Qualities, relation, etc.
  - iii) An unknown substratum called matter by itself.

Acc. to Aristotle an universal without qualities and substratum does not exist. Therefore, according to Aristotle the idea of Plato is not substance because ideas exist apart from individuals, without qualities and unknown substratum.

5. Aristotle points out that Plato's theory of ideas cannot establish, any logical relationship between ideas and particular things; If the sensible is like the non-sensible idea, then, the idea too will be like the sensible. That case, we require another pattern, which will explain the likeness between both of them. It leads to the fallacy of third man.

An idea is the common element which is found in many particulars.

Eg. The idea of man is found in many individual man, but there is also an element, which is common to individual man and idea man, this requires a third man to illustrate a common element in individual man and the idea man. This again would require another idea to show the common element between it and the idea man. Hence, it would lead to the fallacy of infinite regression.

6. Plato held that each idea is one and indivisible and non- sensuous. But here question arises, do individual horses participate in one indivisible horseness or in the whole of horseness idea.

If so then the idea will be in as many places as there are the individual horses and the idea of horsemanship gets divided. If only a part of idea of horsemanship participates in each of them, then again, the idea gets divided. Hence, there can be no idea as one indivisible.

7. Acc. to Plato idea is the pattern which individual things copy. However, it leads to contradiction. Eg. Man is the pattern [of men, but itself becomes a copy in relation to its genus called animals.

# Aristotle

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Metaphysics, according to Aristotle, is the first philosophy and substance is its key-concept. Thus metaphysics is a science which investigates the Nature of being or substance. For Plato, substance was the universal, for Aristotle, it is the concrete individual.

Aristotle is most seriously concerned with the explanation of change and movement. Plato's ideas are static and immobile and failed to affect any change in the things belonging to the realm of becoming. So, he attempts to explain all movement, becoming and development in the whole world in the man, organism or nature. He also attempts to solve the problem of being and becoming.

Plato also attempted but his view was mythological, poetic and metaphorical. For Plato, there is the idea of Good which draws all things towards itself and all things participate in the idea and want to become as perfect as ideas are. However, according to Aristotle, the end is in the universe, not outside.

Aristotle aimed at teleological explanation of the universe. He reconciles teleology with mechanistic explanation with the mechanistic explanation given by science through his conception of form and matter. Concepts of form and matter have been deduced by the analysis of theory of causation.

## Theory of causation

Aristotle finds that inhuman production, there are four causes. He assumes that human and cosmic production is of the same nature. So, according to him there are four causes:

1. The Material Cause. The matter required for the coming into being of anything or event is the material cause of the things. Thus milk is the material cause of the curd. Wood, marble etc. are the material cause of table.
2. The Efficient Cause. The agency, which provides movement and is responsible for change is the efficient cause. Thus, carpenter is the efficient cause of the table or chair and "souring of milk" is the efficient cause of the curd.
3. The Formal Cause. The idea or form in the mind of somebody according to which it assumes a particular form is the formal cause of a thing. Thus, the blue print of a house is its formal cause.
4. The Final Cause. The purpose for which a change takes place is the final cause of a thing. This point is so obvious that it needs no emphasis or elaboration.

For example, in making a chair, wood may be considered as material cause, skill and instrument as efficient cause, shape and design as formal cause, the purpose for which the chair has to be made is final cause.

The conception of causation is not scientific in modern sense because

1. All the four types of causes are simultaneously present and work together.
2. Science does not talk of teleological explanation of factual events.
3. Modern science does not seek explanation of the world as a whole, but only of particular type of events.
4. The very meaning of material cause is not the same as physical matter.

Thus, Aristotle's view of causation is metaphysical as he is in search of first and final cause of the universe. Aristotle combines all the four causes into a consistent form for philosophical explanation of the world. He reduces the four causes into form and matter for conveniently explaining the whole world.

### **Form and Matter — Actuality and Potentiality**

Form is the universal aspect found in all the things of the same class such as cowness, redness, greenness. Form by itself does not exist. What exists is a cow or a red thing or a green thing. Form is the real thing about anything in the world.

By matter, Aristotle understands that which has no shape, no quality. It appears as good as nothing, but it cannot be nothing. After all, it is something which has to be moulded by the form into nature, organism, man, that is physical matter, life and consciousness. For example, a lump of clay is without any form, but it is not so. Rather it has no definite form. It can be moulded into pot, statue, etc.

Form by itself is nothing. Similarly, matter without form does not exist. What exists is formed matter. Hence, form and matter are inseparable. We can distinguish them only in our thoughts. Form and matter are relative, what is matter in one relation becomes form in other. Hence, form and matter are fluid. For example, wood is matter in relation to chair which is form of it. The same chair becomes matter in relation to furniture.

➤ Thus: "What becomes is matter What it becomes is form."

Matter by itself has no form. It is lawless, formless and purposeless. But, it has the potentiality of becoming anything. Thus, Aristotle calls potentiality. What makes matter actual is the form. So, form is the principle of actualization. Matter is the potentiality and form is the actualization of this potentiality.

Form or universal exist only in particular. However, according to Plato, there is transcendent world of ideas or forms which exist over and above perceptual objects. Aristotle says that form is prior to actualization of implicit potentiality. Actuality is

prior to potentiality. Everything that comes to be moves towards the principle, that is, end or purpose. Actuality is the end. So, actuality is prior to potentiality.

According to Aristotle, all things in this world can be arranged in a hierarchical order. In this order, one class may be matter in relation to higher order which is its form. . In this hierarchical order, at the top is matter less form. It is without any matter or potentiality. Aristotle calls it God. God is all-perfect and has nothing which He wishes to realize. It is said to be its own end. It is the prime mover - the unmoved mover. It moves everything, but itself is not moved.

At the bottom is pure potentiality. It is formless matter. It is nothing definite. It is wholly indeterminate. However, under the influence of prime mover, it progressively gets actualized from lower order to higher order till it reaches to the highest order. Plato held that idea of Good draws all things itself and all things strive after the ideas which they wish to become. This Platonic explanation of becoming is teleological. However, Aristotle holds that such Platonic explanation as mythological and unclear.

Aristotle advances doctrine of unfoldment. All things are caught up in development from less developed to higher. It is the form that leads to unfoldment. Aristotle supported his doctrine by the presence of form in organism. So, unfoldment is wholly teleological. Aristotle's conception can 'compared with Samkhyan's conception of prakriti. Thus, according to Aristotle, there are only two things form and matter which can explain all movement, becoming and development in this whole world.

# Rationalism

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- ⊕ Rationalism is the theory of knowledge according to which reason or intellect is the main source of knowledge.
- ⊕ Rationalism rejects all knowledge derived from sense experience. Socrates and Plato are the earliest rationalist philosophers. According to them, true knowledge originates from reason.
- ⊕ The Rationalism that was advocated by these two philosophers became articulate in the philosophy of Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz.
- ⊕ However, the rationalist philosophers differ among themselves regarding how much importance should be given to experience in yielding knowledge. Some rationalists regard experience as wholly misleading while others attach some values to it. They say that the knowledge given by experience is confused knowledge. But in spite of their differences they all agree that reason alone can give us certain and perfect knowledge.
- ⊕ Rationalism is also called a priori theory of knowledge as according to this theory, knowledge is prior or independent of experience.

## Descartes

Descartes philosophy shows the characteristics of modern philosophy mentioned earlier. It was he who first to rid philosophy of all subjective prejudices and to place it on the same plane as a science which was as objective as mathematics. Like Bacon, he too "stressed the practical aspects of knowledge and attached great importance to philosophy being useful from the practical standpoint.

He wrote, "Philosophy is a perfect knowledge of all that man can know as well as for the conduct of his life as for preservation of his health and the discovery of all the arts." Descartes was impressed with science and mathematics and wanted philosophy to be no less practical and exact, and it was this that led him to adopt a mathematical methodology in his solution of philosophical problems.

He decided to employ only proved and probable means and looked down with contempt on the medieval philosopher's thinking which clearly showed the stamp of faith. It was only natural that he should have accepted reason as the final criterion in the field of philosophy. Since reason is subjective the process of thinking must also be said to depend upon individual effort.

Thus Descartes system of thought exhibits all the characteristics of modern western philosophy-naturalism, scientific orientation and freedom of thought, and it is for this reason that he was known as the father of modern western philosophy.

The tendencies which his system of thought gave rise to, later on developed and flowered in the hands of the thinkers who ‘followed him. They are:

1. **Rationalism.** The rationalistic tendency which first appeared in Descrates' thought developed in Spinoza's philosophy and reached its zenith in the philosophy of Leibnitz.
2. **Mathematical Method.** Descartes was the first to adopt the mathematical method in his philosophy, but it latter evolved into the geometric method of Spinoza. Leibnitz adopted and modified it in a scientific manner.
3. **Scientific approach.** Descartes looked at philosophy from the stand-point of the scientist, and by defining the boundaries between the material and the mental he freed science from religion and spiritualism. The philosophy of Leibnitz and Spinoza were obvious attempts at putting Descartes scientific philosophy into practical shape.
4. **Practicability.** Descartes looked upon philosophy not merely as mental gymnastics but as something which could guide a person in his practical life. A similar practical attitude is to be found in the philosophies of Spinoza and Leibnitz.
5. **Philosophical problems.** The problems that Descartes had considered the relation between mind and body, the form and content of nature, etc., were later to become the subject matter of all later philosophical preoccupations.

## Cartesian method

Cartesian method propounded by Descartes, a rationalist philosopher, is a mathematical method of philosophy to obtain the certitude in knowledge. In this method, Descartes laid down that knowledge to be obtained must be certain, necessary and universal.

To him, such certainty and universality was exhibited only by mathematics since no one doubts the axioms of it. He tried to analyze and find out the universal and real elements of the subjects which raised it beyond doubt through this analysis; he arrived at mathematical method and applied it to the philosophy.

In this method, one proceeds from self-evident axioms that are accepted without question. Through this, one proceeds to some implied propositions through deductions which are also certain.

As a result of his enquiry, he led down four broad rules for his self-guidance. These are:

1. Never to accept anything as true unless it is clearly known as such.
2. Divide each of the difficulty into as many parts as possible.
3. Commence with the simplest object and ascend step-by step to more complex.
4. In every case, enumeration should so complete that nothing is omitted.

## **Method of doubt**

He believes that single, certain truth can be systematically sort by universal and deliberate doubting. When the process of doubt is pushed to its farthest limit, it will reveal something which is indubitable and clearly perceived.

For example:

1. Sense-testimony can be doubted, that is, things of daily life like chair, table, etc...
2. Dreaming state can be doubted (dream conjecture)
3. Truth of science can be doubted. There might be a demon who tricks or deceives in falsehood.  $2+2 = 4$  may be doubted and it may be  $2+2 = 5$  (evil-demon conjecture)

Descartes say that I may doubt anything, but I cannot doubt that I am doubting whether it may be a dream or waking consciousness, I must exist as a doubting or thinking being. Let there a demon to deceive but then I must exist as a thinking being to be deceived. So, just as running is not possible without runner. Similarly thinking is not possible without thinker.

But the "doubt" in Descartes is the starting point of his philosophy not its conclusion. He actually starts from doubt in order to achieve truths that are beyond doubt. The foregoing account of the method of doubt appears to prove finally that only doubt is the real existent since without it there can be no doubter. It is from this point that Descartes starts his search for inviolable truths. Once the existence of doubt has been established the next question to be answered is what is this doubt?

Doubt is thought and therefore the existence of thought cannot be doubted since such a thought which entertains doubt in the existence of thought would itself be a thought and if thought is not accepted it would lose meaning.

Doubt or thought can exist only if there is someone to doubt or to think, hence the need for a thinker. Descartes thus comes to the conclusion that doubt implies thought and this in turn implies the presence of self.

Thus,

- ⊕ I doubt, therefore I exist or,
- ⊕ I think, therefore, I am
- ⊕ i.e. Cogito ergo sum.

It is one certain truth which may be taken as the foundation of Descartes philosophy. There are certain implicit points in this dictum such as:

1. What Descartes tries to establish is not an inference or deduction, but a simple fact of self-evident axiom. In this dictum, “therefore” means relation of necessary connection.
2. Certainty of the cogito is clear and distinct and nothing else could be pursued or intuited with such certainty.
3. “Cogito ergo sum” means that my consciousness is zed means of revealing myself as something existing. It is my consciousness which carries with it the existence of myself. No other function apart from conscious function can guarantee the existence of self.
4. In cogito, “I know that I am, but I do not know I am” The content or that which constitutes theself is not known. Hence, we cannot say that my body is myself or not
5. That which thinks is a substance.

Cogito occupies the strategic position in the philosophy of Descartes. It supplies its own evidence of clearness and distinctness. It is not deduced, but it is intuitively induced.

## Deductions

It is deductive as all other elements of this philosophy gradually follow from this simple truth, that is, cogito. The major deductions are:

1. God exists (for elaboration, see proofs of God)
2. External world Descartes finds that he knows for certain that God will not deceive thethinking mind. Hence, extremely world exists.
3. Body-mind dualism. According to Descartes, beyond God, there are two separate and distinctsubstances and reality has a dual nature. On one hand is a material substance whose essentialattribute is extension while on the other hand is mind whose essential attribute is thought.

## **Descartes' approaches**

His approach to metaphysical truth is epistemological. It is so because he tried to discover the metaphysical truth about “what is” through epistemological enquiry about what can be known.

## **Critical comments**

1. **Absence of reasoning to prove the self a substance.** Though Descartes gives arguments to prove the existence of soul his arguments do not prove that the soul is substance because we do not experience it “I think” means “I exist” but not that “I am a substance”. Thus, Descartes does not give any reasoning to prove that the soul is a substance.
2. **Epistemological difficulty.** The greatest difficulty in Descartes’ conception of self is epistemological. As the German philosopher Kant has pointed out, the self is the knower and cannot be the known, otherwise it becomes a mere object among other objects. Descartes prove that the existence of the self is demonstrated by the activity of thinking substance.
3. **The difficulty of soul-body relationship.** Descartes considers soul and body to be absolutely different substances. It is difficult to understand here as to how the two will be inter-related. Descartes fails to explain this relation because no dualism can relate two ultimate realities.
4. **Empirical difficulty.** The empiricist philosopher David Hume has criticized Descartes’ conception of self. He points out that whenever we look within ourselves we find ideas coming and going and no self besides this stream of ideas. Hence experience does not prove the existence of any non-physical, indivisible and eternal substances. Therefore, the existence of such a substance cannot be accepted. If there is any self it is this changing thought. Besides it there is no unchanging soul substance.
5. Later on existentialist thinkers have reversed Descartes’ position and had justified that “I exist therefore I think.”
6. Logical difficulty in dualism. Descartes has admitted the soul and matter as two independent substances. The relation among them can be physical or non-physical. If it is physical, it cannot be applied to non-physical self. On the Other hand, if it is non-physical it cannot be applied to the physical matter.
7. Difficulty in the dualistic explanation of the universe—Descartes establishes dualism without explaining the cause of the creation of the two. If they are self-caused; what is the relation between them? If their cause is something else, is it one or two? If the causes are two; there is again the difficulty of dualism.

## **Cartesian Dualism**

Experience of two distinct elements is part of our realization of the world around us—the conscious and the material. Objects that surround us are material and possess characteristics that the living things do not have. On the other hand, living objects exhibit qualities which one does find in the material bodies. Physical objects do not have consciousness, desire, will, knowledge, motive or motion while all these qualities characterize the living bodies.

Obviously, there are two distinct types of creation in the world. This dichotomy is evident even in our own mind and body, since both possess contradictory attributes. Mental exercise is not limited by time and space while the body is fixed within a specific order of space and time. Mind is subtle, the body is gross. Mind is not

Visible while the body is. Man, therefore, appears to be a conglomerate of two diametrically opposed though complementary attributes belonging to two differing elements.

Experience shows parallel duplicity in every element of nature and this has led many thinkers to conclude that the two elements exist in nature—the material and conscious. The philosophic theory based on this conception is known as dualism and accepts as fundamental the distinction between mind and body, the conscious and the unconscious.

The Aristotelian dualism has been part of Western philosophy in one form or the other ever since it was expounded, but Descartes was the first dualist in the modern era; According to Descartes, substance is that, which is independent and self-centered and which does not depend upon anything else for its existence. Substance, therefore, is its own base and it is self-evident.

Two such substances are found to exist in the world—matter which is not sentient and mind which is conscious. Extension is the characteristic of the first and thought of the second. Because it is extended, matter covers space, but mind does not cover space because it is of the nature of thought, omnipresent and all-pervading.

Man possesses both mind and matter, and although both interact upon each other, they are independent. Matter or the body is divisible and can be separated into parts, but mind cannot be so treated. Matter is without any consciousness, while the mind is conscious.

It is only natural that one should inquire how the two elements interact if they are as independent as they are made out to be. Descartes' view explaining this is known as Interactions.

Interactions' is a philosophical view of Descartes to explain the interaction between two distinct and independent substance mind and body.

But, main question regarding this dualism is that if they are of diametrically opposite nature, then how they manage to interact. For example,

1. When we act in a particular way on account of desire, it becomes obvious that "mind influences the body."
2. On seeing a snake, sensation or shivering arises in the body.

Descartes explain this interaction by his theory of interactionism. His explanation is physiological in nature. He argues that, in fact, body does not affect the mind. It is the pineal gland which is responsible for mutual and interconnected activity of mind and body. The pineal gland is situated in the four parts of the brain and it is here that the conjugation between the two takes place. Descartes considered God to be the motivating force behind this conjugation of activity.

Dualism is supported by the following arguments:

### **1. Support by common language**

In common language the terms mind and body denote two distinct elements. As Patrick has remarked, we do not use terms denoting extension, division or addition when we are talking of love, hope, thought and similar subjects. We do not say that love is many square yards, hope is so much in weight or that thought is so many inches in extension. We do use these terms when referring to the rivers, mountains, stones, stars and atoms, because these are unconscious objects. On the other hand, these terms are not used for conscious beings. Thus, we use distinctly different terms in everyday language when referring to matter and mind.

### **2. Support of experience**

It is part of our normal experience that we find completely distinct characteristics and qualities in the mental and material elements. Mental activity bears no resemblance to physical activity. Things behave in the world of imagination in a way which is not possible for them in the physical world. Similarly, other activities of the mind such as memory and thinking have no counterpart in the physical world or even in the biological activities.

### **3. Mind and matter cannot change into each other**

Many philosophers and scientists have been engaged in trying to explain the activity of mind through that of matter, or vice versa, but they have not succeeded. Duality of the two elements is established.

## **4. Dualism is supported by commonsense**

We see in our daily lives that the world around us is composed of two distinct elements. On the onehand are the object, which exhibit the quality of matter since they are extended and cover space, are divisible ‘and devoid of consciousness and on the other is the consciousness which is notextended and is not divisible.

### **Objections to dualism**

Although the mind-body dualism is upheld by everyday language and experience, it is objected to in thephilosophical sphere on many grounds. The main arguments against it are the following;

1. Difficulty of establishing relationship between mutually contradictory elements. Dualism treatsmind and matter as being possessed of distinct qualifies that are contradictory, but no philosopher has managed to explain satisfactorily how these contradictory elements cooperate in the creation of the universe.
2. How do the mind and body interact? If the mind and the body possess distinct characteristicshow can the two react to each other? But that the two do interact is a fact which cannot be denied.Descartes’ explanation that this interaction takes place through the pineal gland situated in the forepart of the brain is open to the following objections:
  - i. If the mind is not extended in space, how can it be limited to the pineal gland?
  - ii. Whenever some physiological change takes place, how does the mind know that there shouldbe some mental reaction to it?
  - iii. Certain functions of the body produce no reactions in the brain. For example, the flowing of blood creates no reaction in the mind.
  - iv. If the mind and body are independent of each other, then why does not one body harboring infinity of mind or one mind function in innumerable bodies?
  - v. As in the case of human beings, mind and body are also found in animals, and they are also found to possess the pineal gland. Is there any difference between the minds of animals and those of human beings? What is the difference in these qualities? If not then why is it that we see no humankind in an animal body or an animal mind in a human body'? Descartes explains this by saying that animals do not have souls or the power of thought but then how do their bodies perform different functions?

### **3. Violation of the theory of conservation of energy**

Modern science accepts the theory of conservation of energy. Descartes accepts the view that matter is not born that it cannot be destroyed or reduced. But the fact of interaction between the mind and the body has been accepted then does it not become necessary to accept substantial change in matter? For, sometimes the smallest change in the body produces remarkable changes in the mind and at times the most minute change in the mind results in comprehensive changes in the body in these changes mental energy is converted to physiological energy and vice versa. But Descartes cannot agree to the non-dual form of energy and therefore his theory migrates against the principle of conservation of energy.

### **4. Epistemological difficulties**

According to Descartes real concepts are copies of actual objects, but if this is so then the copies should be the same as the original objects. On the other hand Descartes propounds complete dichotomy between mind and matter. How, then, can the nature of a mental concept and a material object be the same? How can the mental concept be said to copy the material object? Descartes' theory, therefore, appears to harbor contradictory notions. Obviously if mind and matter are completely contradictory then thought and object cannot be considered similar or identical to each other.

### **5. Difficulty of postulating a mutual relationship**

If mind and matter are completely independent of each other and inert, then what is the relation between the two? Such a relationship can either be mental or physical, and when it is either, it will become part of the mind or of the matter. In such a case, there are only two possibilities. One is that these two elements will not remain independent 'and the other that no relation will be established. If the relationship is a third concept even then mind and matter become one and the duality of the two is destroyed. And in fact, unless one of the two elements is believed to have two forms, it is impossible to establish any relationship between two mutually contradictory and exclusive elements.

### **6. Metaphysical difficulties**

Any other difficulties are created if the universe is believed to be composed of two fundamental elements-mind and matter.

One of the obvious questions would be, which of these two existed prior to the other? If both were present from the very beginning, then what caused them or

were they self-caused? What was the relation between the two? Was this relation a physical one, something other than physical or one of neutrality?

Actually, the only way of solving all these difficulties is by accepting these two primary elements as two, forms of one ultimate or primary reality, as otherwise relation between the two can be reasonably postulated. Descartes reasons that there is a God who created the universe, a God who is distinct from both mind and matter. But if this God is the creator of these two elements then the dualism of Descartes' theory becomes farcical and turns into a non-dualism. Both mind and matter are identified in God

## 7. **Difficulties of mind and body.**

All those who accept the dualist standpoint fail to prove any relation between the mind and the body because both these are believed to be possessed of characteristics that are exclusive. No satisfactory theory has so far been suggested which can maintain dualism in the face of these objections and inevitably the dualist theory has turned to non-dualism

## Evaluation of dualism

It is obvious from the above objections aimed at dualism that this theory cannot provide a satisfying explanation of the universe. It is a part of man's nature that he searches for unity in diversity, dualism in unity and that he can never be content without pursuing these goals. But dualism does not satisfy as long as it is not resolved into a monism, inspite of the fact that duality is everywhere a part of man's everyday experience. Besides, neither monism nor dualism taken by itself manages to provide complete satisfaction, and if philosophical contentment is to be achieved it is essential to establish duality in a monism and a monism in a dualism.

## Proofs for the Existence of god

By his method of doubt 'Descartes reaches the conclusion that one cannot doubt the existence of doubt. Doubt is the function of thinking and for it to occur there must be a thinker. Thus, I doubt therefore I am. Having established the existence of soul, Descartes conches himself with proving the reality of God, in the absence of knowledge of God there is no possibility of actual knowledge of any object because it is only by accepting the existence of God that it can be proved that what we believe to be true is not an illusion.

Descartes divides ideas into three kinds:

- Adventitious ideas are imposed on the mind from without. They are not clear and distinct.
- Factitious ideas are/created by the mind by the conjunction of ideas. These are created by imagination. They are also not clear and distinct.

- But innate ideas are clear and distinct. They are implanted in the mind by God at the time of birth.
- Descartes' arguments to prove God are the following.

## **1. Causal argument**

It tries-to prove the existence of God from the existence of a concept of Horn since only God's own" existence can cause the concept. Descartes argues that had man himself been the cause of this ideaof God he would have been perfect since the idea of God is perfect. We observe on the contrarythat he is not infinite because bad he been infinite be would have become immortal and that he is not.

Descartes' causal argument differs from St. Ansell's ontological argument. Two points in thisconnection are worth noting. First, the causal argument does not start from the concept of God as an essencebut starts from the actual idea of God existing in man's mind. Second, the existence of God follows upon theexistence of a concept of God, and not upon the essence of God. Hence this argument should not be called ontological.

## **2. Argument from clear and distinct idea**

Descartes believes that a concept which is absolutely clear and distinct among other conceptsshould. Be accepted as true. This belief he uses as his criterion for deciding which concept is trueand which false. The concept of God stands this test fairly. God creates this distinct and clearconcept, in man's mind, and man can do nothing about changing it. God is perfect, therefore hecannot be accused of trying to confuse man by introducing defective and illusory concepts in hismind. It follows that since God has created in man's mind the conception of an existent which ispermanent, unchanging, perfect, omnipresent, omniscient, infinite, then such a being must exist.

## **3. Cosmological argument**

Having established the existence of God to his satisfaction Descartes goes on to prove the existenceof the universe. Having proved that, he uses this proof to further prove the existence of God. Theremust be some creator of all objects and living beings in the universe and maxi obviously cannot even create himself. Had I been my own creator, I would have made myself perfect and would have-given birth to my self because as a creator I would have existed prior to my own birth. But myexistence before my birth is a contradictory idea and hence it is impossible. Therefore, I am not myown creator. If it be argued that my parents are my creators then it would imply fiat they would have perfect power to

protect me, which they do not have. It is proved thus that my parents also are imperfect and they also must have some cause. Passing through all the links of cause and effect in the objects of the universe we arrive at the notion of God. We cannot but agree that it is God who is the first cause of the universe and it is He alone who has the power to create the objects of the universe.

#### **4. Ontological argument**

It was St. Anslem who provided the ontological argument to prove the existence of God. In this variety of evidence, the existence is proved from the fact or form. According to Descartes a God without existence is beyond the pale of man's imagination because existence of a perfect God is inevitable since if this were not true God would remain imperfect. That there should be a perfect God without existence is a contradictory idea. Therefore, the existence of God is proved by the concept of Him. Here Descartes' argument resembles the arguments of St. Anslem and St. Augustine. God is the highest being and in Him idea and fact are- not distinguished. His existence does not depend upon our idea of Him. On the other hand, our idea of God is part of His perfection and reality.

### **Theory of the External World**

After proving the existence of the soul and God, Descartes turns to the contemplation of the external world and its existence. He is faced with three difficulties. How do we, in the first place know that external objects do exist? What proof have we those external objects are real? Secondly, why do we doubt the knowledge of the external world? Finally, having answered these questions what conclusion can we reach?

#### **External world is real**

The mere experience of objects, desires, tendencies and sensations cannot be taken as adequate proof of the reality of external objects. But, man has an intuitive belief in such a reality. It is God who has created this faith or belief in man. Hence, if the existence of the external world is doubted then this belief is falsified and creator God is established a deceiver.

Naturally, one is inclined to ask that if God is doing the job of creating only real knowledge then why does man have false perception through his senses? Descartes argues that while God has admitted the possibility of the senses perceiving man, he has equipped man with the mind with which he can steer clear of such inconsistencies and recognize the true thing when he sees it. Therefore, God cannot be blamed merely on account of the failure of senses. Obviously, God leads and he does not mislead. Therefore, sensations created in us by God have been caused by external objects present in the world around us.

Compared to other objects, the body is the most nearly related to the soul. Body and soul cannot be separated although their respective qualities differ. An obvious question at this stage would be, if the body and soul are different then how is it that there is mental recognition of physiological changes?

Answering this question Descartes suggests that nature provides just such an education. It is nature which engenders in us a faith in the knowledge provided by sensations and perceptions, even before mental analysis takes place yet, sensory knowledge is subject to illusion which is caused by various factors. These factors are:

1. In moral perception one sees certain forms of the objects that are real.
2. One sees in a dream everything that one observes in one's waking state, but subject of a dream is not concerned with the external world.
3. It is possible that man may have been made to believe true that which is innately false, and this thought is caused by the fact that nature forces us to believe many things which the mind rejects. Another possibility is that we may have within us a force which generates sensations and since we are not aware of such a force we attribute these sensations to God. Descartes now indicates incomplete contradiction of the doubts mentioned above, that since our sensory perceptions are distinct and unquestionably clear, these doubts are unnecessary. It is in man's nature to have ideas.

Concepts which are clear and distinct should not be doubted. One such concept is that the soul does exist, another that to every soul is attached a body, yet another that extension is a quality of this body, a fourth that although this body is attached to the soul the two differ in their respective qualities, and fifth that the soul can exist even when the body does not. In the absence of a soul substance it is not possible to experience the different stages of thinking, but experience of the soul substance is possible even without thinking. This is true because knowledge of the substance does not depend upon knowledge of the thought of it, but knowledge of distortions depends upon the knowledge of the substance.

Defining substance, Descartes points out that substance is that thing which does not have to depend upon anything else for its existence. In its objective form there is only one such substance and that is God. In this manner, Descartes believes in the existence of one unrelated individual absolute substance, God and two relative substances, mind and body.

Mind and body are independent of each other, but both depend upon God, and are known by their attributes. Extension is the fundamental attribute of the body and thought that of the mind or soul. The existence of the attribute depends upon the substance, and later on this attribute is expressed through numerous modes. Both substance and the attributes can find expression even without the modes but the modes or the varieties cannot exist without the substance. Substance cannot change its own attributes, but it can change the modes. For example, the body must necessarily be extended, but its form keeps on changing.

According to Descartes, in order to find the attributes of a substance, one should think of those qualities, which are obvious and unquestionably unique. From this point of view, examinations of the body will show that the only quality which is unique in it is that of extension. Sound, color, taste, smell, heat and cold and other such qualities cannot be said to belong to the body because any experience of them is not apparently unique.

From this Descartes concludes that body and extension are identical. Extension involves length, breadth and thickness. Wherever there is space, there must be extension for no space can be without extension. Because space can be divided into innumerable small fragments; therefore, the material substance can also be broken up. Hence, Descartes does not believe the atoms to be indivisible because the material substance is itself capable of division.

In this manner, Descartes arrives at a form of materialistic theory. Our external world is a kind of infinite extension and all functions of the universe are different modes of this substance extension. This extension also permits of infinite division, the whole being divided into 'parts and the parts combined into a unified whole. Through this disintegration and integration the material substance assumes different shapes.

This process of integration and disintegration is brought about by motion, a force by means of which a body travels from one point of space to another. It is a quality of moving bodies. All occurrences of nature can be traced to motion which changes its place. Such an explanation of the functioning of the universe can only be called mechanistic. Because the body is one form of extension it cannot possess motion of its own accord, affect which is time of all material substance. It is natural to inquire into the source of this force or motion into the universe.

At the beginning of creation, God created the substance along with motion and inertia, the power of motion being kept constant at a particular level by him. Descartes' conception of God as the prime mover resembles Aristotle's conception. Besides, his theory that motion is maintained at constant level is also similar to the theory of conservation of energy enunciated by modern science. It follows, according to Descartes, that all objects of nature move and change according to the laws of nature elaborated by God himself. Natural laws are the laws of motion.

Bodies differ as do the relations of the different parts of the respective bodies. It is because of this difference that we distinguish between gas and solid substances.

Finally, Descartes proves the existence of the world by relating it to the existence of God. Descartes is a realist. The universe is real. We have distinct experience of the world and our distinct experiences are natural in as much that they have been created by God. In this manner Descartes' philosophy seems to evince a faith in the moral order in the universe because it is the creation of God. He is the creator, destroyer, sustainer and protector.

## Criticism

The following arguments have been suggested for criticism of Descartes' theory of the universe

1. **Dualism.** Descartes' theory of the universe evinces all the difficulties of any dualistic theory. In fact, this difficulty is fundamental to his philosophy as a whole. On the one hand, Descartes believes God and nature to be distinct and independent entities and on the other he strives to relate the two. Naturally, if they are related then they can hardly be treated as independent, and equally naturally, if they are two, it is essential to explain the relation between them. If God and nature are independent, then God cannot possibly imprint conceptions upon man's mind just as much as man can have no way of knowing God. Actually, God and nature cannot be treated as one until one assumes the presence of an ultimate element that can relate the two and render them one.

2. **Difficulty concerning movement.** Another difficulty in Descartes' cosmology theory concerns his notion of movement. God is pure soul and hence possessed of qualities differing in every way from those of material substance. How, then, does he grant the quality of motion to substance? At times Descartes indicates that the dichotomy between mind and body is different from the dichotomy between nature and God, because God is the sole real substance upon which all objects depend, or by which they are all caused. Later on Spinoza attempted the solution of the puzzle of dualism his theistic doctrine, similar to the efforts made by Descartes. Despite this, the gulf between man and nature, nature and God, which is obvious in Descartes' theory, remains unabridged.

3. **Difficulties of mechanistic theory.** Descartes believes that man is different from animals, inasmuch that the bodily functions of the animals are purely mechanical. He believes that man is endowed with the power of volition, but the obvious question is how does man differ from animals? Descartes does not mention any such difference, and there is no reason why man's actions should also not be explained on the basis of this mechanistic principle.

**4. Mutually contradictory assumptions.** The truth of - the matter is that Descartes has made an unsuccessful attempt to synthesize science and religion, determination and free will, and all the difficulties of his theory arise from this fundamental task. His successors made many and various attempts to solve the puzzle of dualism, and in this attempt every one of them has shed at least one of the three substances believed real by Descartes-God, mind and body. Malebranche established complete spiritualism. French materialists denied the unsupported existence of the mind or soul and thus established a materialistic theory. Spinoza conceived of both body and mind as modes of one substance, that is, God, and thus established monism. Each one of these solutions to the dualistic problem is attended by difficulties peculiar to itself and none of them can be said to be superior to Descartes' system. Not the rationalist movement in modern Western philosophy, but even the empiricist movement progressed by considering the questions that had been raised by Descartes in his system of philosophy. Descartes' epistemological theory is not organized and developed, for despite of his obvious skepticism he had complete faith in the power of reason. In his role of a realist, he accepted the existence of the universe, but this was not borne out by his intellectual discoveries. Although he was a rationalist, he could not deny the importance of experience and thus was forced into many assumptions which contradicted each other.

# Spinoza

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- ⊕ Spinoza gave a developed form to the rationalism initiated by Descartes in modern western philosophy.
- ⊕ Like Descartes, Spinoza had immense faith in reason. Like a true rationalist Spinoza holds that we can know truth through reason. Reason can give us knowledge of reality because reality itself is rational in nature.
- ⊕ According to Spinoza, God himself creates the world rationally and intuition is the realization of true knowledge. It is intuition by which one knows the necessary relations between different phenomena.
- ⊕ According to Spinoza, the goal of philosophy is to get complete knowledge of things. He holds that this is possible only by clear and distinct thinking. Like Descartes he believed that if we start with self-evident principles and prove the steps involved in the argument then we will be able to reach certain and universal knowledge.
- ⊕ Spinoza uses geometrical method to philosophy to arrive at certain truths. His method is geometrical because he lays down certain definitions, axioms and postulates and from these principles he deduces propositions with proofs. Spinoza starts with the innate principle or idea of God or Substance.

## Substance

Spinoza has the vision of unity of all things. For this, he starts with such an axiom from which everything can be shown to follow necessarily. According to Spinoza, this axiom is substance, that which is in itself and conceived through itself, that is, conception of which does not need conception of another thing in order to its formation. Hence, Spinoza proved that there are no multiple substances as Descartes had thought, but only one infinite substance.

This definition has two components.

- i. First, a substance is what exists in itself. This is to say that it is an **ultimate metaphysical subject**. While other things may exist as features of a substance, substance does not exist as a feature of anything else.
- ii. Second, a substance is what is conceived through itself. This is to say that the idea of a substance does not involve the idea of any other thing. Substances are both ontologically and conceptually independent.

Based on this definition of substance, he deduces following conclusion:

- A. There can be only one substance. If there were more than one, then they would limit each other.
- B. Substance is infinite and unlimited.
- C. Substance is uniquely individual because substance is self-determined and can be conceived only in itself. This insistence on uniqueness prevents it from having any qualification. To impose any quality is to limit it. But, it is unlimited. Further, every determination is negation. So, it can only be described through negative terms such as “neti, neti ...” (not this, not this ...) just as Brahman is described in the Upanishads. In that way, substance becomes most positive without any limitation.
- D. Substance is self-determined and self-contained and nothing can affect or modify it.
- E. It is causa sui. By this Spinoza meant that reality is self-explanatory, self-caused, all-inclusive, interrelated whole. Everything flows from substance in the same way as the sum of all angles of triangle is equal to 180 degree flow from the very definition of triangle.
- F. Substance is eternal. It follows from the very essence of substance that it is.

## Implications of definitions of substance

- 1. Spinoza calls substance as one, infinite, self-caused, self-explanatory, self-contained, eternal reality from which all things necessarily follows. But, in theology such description is of God. For this reason, Spinoza calls substance as God. But, his concept is different as held in Western theology. Hence, he denies the concept of creator God. God is no longer the transcendent creator of the universe who rules it via providence, but Nature itself, understood as an infinite, necessary, and fully deterministic system of which humans are a part. Human's find happiness only through a rational understanding of this system and their place within it.
- 2. Spinoza has a version of the ontological argument that takes place in the first eleven propositions of his Ethics, by which he purports to establish the necessary existence of an absolutely infinite substance. This version of the argument differs somewhat from that of Anselm. The most significant difference is that it is not a straightforward move from conceivability of ‘the being that which no greater can be conceived’ to the existence of the Christian God, but

rather, it is a deductive argument from the definition of God as an absolutely infinite substance to the fact that such a substance must necessarily exist.

3. According to him, God or substance is an all-inclusive whole outside of which lies nothing. So, nature conceived as a whole is identical with God. Hence, God and nature are one. Such view leads to the philosophy of pantheism, that is, God is everything and everything is God. It also leads to impersonalistic notion of God. Spinoza's God is simply basic substance, it is the sum total of everything that is.
4. God and nature being identical. Nature being governed by eternal laws, so according to Spinoza, everything is strictly determined. It leads to divine determinism.
5. Nature by itself is fully intelligent. There is no necessity for appealing to a transcendent God.
6. All objects of nature have a permanent relationship with God in the same manner in which mathematical result is inevitable result of accepted principle. The entire world of nature is believed to be tied together in a long chain of cause and effect.
7. Just as every step proceeds inevitably from the preceding step, in the same manner every event in nature is inevitably result of the preceding event. In this manner, Spin attains to a deterministic theory by use of mathematical methods. His determinism fails to recognize any purpose because there is no purpose in mathematics.
8. In his philosophy, substance and God have been viewed in two distinct forms. Spinoza distinguishes between Nature taken in its active or productive aspect, which he identifies with God or the divine attributes, and Nature taken in its derivative or produced aspect, which he identifies with the system of modes. The former he calls Natura naturans (literally: Nature naturing) and the latter he calls Natura naturata (literally: Natura natured). Spinoza's use of these formulas is revealing in two respects:
  - i. First, his double employment of 'Natura' signals the ontological unity that exists between God and the system of modes. Each mode within the system is a modification of nothing other than the very substance that is God.
  - ii. Second, his employment of the active 'naturans' in the first and the passive 'naturata' in the second signals a causal relation between God

and the modal system. God is not merely the subject of modes; he is an active power that produces and sustains them.

## Doctrines of attributes

There can be no substance without, attributes. By attributes, he meant that which intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance.

As substance is self-contained and infinite, it has infinite number of attributes. Each of these infinite attributes expresses the essence of the substance infinitely. But, human intellect can perceive only two, that is, extension and thought because humans are embodied spirit. These attributes are the languages in terms of which we can speak and think about reality or substance.

These attributes are quite independent of each other and as such do not limit each other. Each of them is infinite in its own kind and each is capable of expressing God infinitely in its own way. That is, God is infinitely extended and infinitely thinking. He regarded body and mind, extension and thought as two of the many inseparable aspects of single, all-inclusive reality. Being co-existent attributes of the substance, they cannot interact, but run parallel to each other.

These two are inseparable aspects of same thing like convex-concave of lens, two sides of a coin, two spokes of a wheel, and two rays of a Sun. To every mode of extension, there corresponds a mode of thought in the same order or series.

## Critical comments

- 1) When there are infinite attributes, then why only are apprehended.
- 2) Why the indeterminate substance which has no determination should have any attribute at all. Hence, substance with infinite attributes appears to be highly a-priori.
- 3) Mind-body parallelism excludes materialism and idealism because matter cannot explain mind nor mind can explain matter. (Idealism — a philosophical view according to which this external world is not independently existing; its existence depends on mind. Materialism - this external world exists independently. Plato was an idealist philosopher, but he also accepts materialism. Plato's philosophy has both rationalism and empiricism.)
- 4) Substance is simply an aggregate and not an organized whole of attributes. Such an attribute can never give us the true identity which was the real aim of Spinoza.
- 5) Substance cannot be both extended and un-extended.

## Doctrine of modes


The attributes even when they belong to substance do not explain the finite things of human experience because they are infinite. Hence, in his doctrine of modes, Spinoza hopes to explain the world of finite and individual things.

Modes are affections or modifications of substance or that which is in another through which it is also conceived. The modes are individual things of finite experience. They are to the substance as waves are to the sea. They can never exist without substance, though, substance can exist without them.

God's attributes are expressed in various modes. A mode must necessarily belong to a thing. For this reason, extension and thought are modes which taken together make up the object. In this manner, Spinoza reasons that different minds and bodies in the universe are modes of conscious and material attributes of God.

Spinoza sought to reconcile finite and infinite because ultimately world of finite things has to be explained in terms of absolute reality. Hence, through the doctrine of infinite modes he hopes to bridge this gulf. He hopes to bridge this gulf. As modes, they belong to the finite things and as infinite they belong to the order of substance as well. Thus, each mode is real when it participates in the nature of God and is unreal though actual when it seems to be determined by infinite multiplicity of all other finite things.

Spinoza has the vision of unity of all things. He seeks to realize this through his philosophy of substance and doctrine of attributes and modes.



## **Descartes and Spinoza**

Cogito ergo sum shows two things. First, the ultimate guarantee of any truth is “lumen natural”, that is, the natural light of clear intuition. Second, cogito led to the criteria of clearness and distinctness.

According to Descartes, an idea is true if it is clear and distinct. But, then we can affirm its existence, but we cannot trace out its connection with other ideas.

However, without any connection between ideas, there can be no real and rational system of knowledge.

Descartes show that there can be no passage from one idea to another and yet, he demanded that his method should lead to the construction of a system in such a way that one idea should lead to the next in a chain of necessary connection. At this stage, Descartes looked upon God for supplying the necessary principle for connecting and conserving the system of thoughts.

However, Spinoza starts with a different assumption altogether. He begins with the unity of all that exists. A thing in order to be real must follow from the whole reality. God is considered to be the sole conserving cause of the universe, but then the God of Spinoza is infinite, immutable and eternal intellect. A principle is eternal, not because God wills it, but He understands it and by understanding, He creates it.

Thus, the universe remains thoroughly rational and intellectual. This insistence on the rational nature alone justifies the possibility of real connection in things and knowledge. Thus, these assumptions give rise to the absolute monotheism or pantheism.

## **Spinoza's Geometrical method**

Spinoza has cast the whole world in the form of a geometrical method. He treats human passions and actions as if they were lines, planes and solids. He seems to have directly derived the geometrical methods from Descartes. According to him, it is the best method of reaching the truth as well as an inconvenient order of presenting his philosophy. He chose it as a methodology because

1. Spinoza had a vision of unity of all things. This pre-supposes the method in which everything may be shown to follow orderly. It requires an axiom or self-evident truth based on which everything could be deducted.
2. Mathematics does not allow personal views to distort the truth because of its impersonal, exact and disinterested nature.

### **Implications:**

1. It is indirectly responsible for his pantheism. In geometry, there is only one presupposition of the single reality. Similarly, according to Spinoza that is God or substance. All other things are merely modifications of that reality.
2. In geometry, there is no movement. Since Spinoza cast the world in geometrical form, he made it static. Thus, he denies any freedom of will as a consequence of geometrical reasoning.
3. The use of geometrical method led to the denial of personality of God.

### **Critical comments**

- 1) Any philosophy must explain all the varied experience of life. But, the truth of geometry ignores actual state of affairs. The a-priori nature of geometry cannot disclose empirical truth, but in philosophy, we cannot ignore concrete reality. Hence, the geometrical method with its inevitable abstraction cannot be thrust upon in philosophy. If we use without caring for the limitations of mathematics, then we will get partial and one-sided conclusion.
- 2) Spinoza treats man as if he were pure intellect without any feeling.
- 3) By using mathematical method in philosophy, Spinoza has identified a part with the whole, something abstract with the concrete.
- 4) Even in establishing axiom we cannot ignore the moving and pulsating interest of humans which is denied in Spinoza's philosophy.

### **Mind Body Parallelism**

Spinoza's theory explaining the mind-body relation is known as parallelism. The Cartesian system provided a kind of mechanical explanation of his relation but it was rejected by Spinoza, who turned to earlier philosophers for an explanation and inspiration.

He believed the body to be a complete and self-existent entity. According to him, cogitation and extension were two qualities of one substance. Mind is the form of cogitation while the body is one form of extension. Mind and body are two forms of the same substance, both related to God, both forms of the extension and cogitation of the substance that is God.

Since each is one form of a common substance it is only natural that the two should exist in close proximity, although in their functional forms the two appear to be

distinct. The body is continuously subject to external influences and it constantly shows new forms, of each one of which the mind is always aware. In fact, the very term is used to indicate this group of awareness. The mind can know the external elements only in the form in which they influence the body it cannot know them in their true form. This proves that the mind does not influence the body, nor the body the mind.

Mental and bodily changes are related to one substance God. In the relation between mind and body Spinoza accepts no dualism while Descartes tends towards the theory of duality. In his book he has said that the human mind is only a form of God's infinite wisdom and mind, so that when we say that our mind comprehends a particular idea we say nothing more or less than that the particular idea is implicit in God. In this manner God is the universal substance. Neither the mind nor the body can influence the other since both are aspects of the same reality.

Spinoza believes that it is not within the control of the body to persuade the mind to think, nor is it possible for the mind to control the body in any of its states awake, asleep, at rest or in motion. Man cannot indulge in any activity through the guidance of his mind, his volition is not free. Whatever activity the mind takes up is predetermined by some cause. Every human action is predetermined in the opinion of Spinoza. He accepts rebirth and determinism.

Explaining the predetermined nature of man's thought and action, he has said that mind is a determined and basic form of thought and for this reason it cannot be the cause of its own actions, it cannot possess the power of absolute volition or selection of alternative. In the case of one particular volition, whatever it may be, the mind is determined by cause, a cause which is itself caused by some other cause, and so on.

The following three objections are directed at Spinoza's theory:

**1. Failure to explain instantaneous experience**

It sometimes happens that when we are engaged in some particular mental work we are disturbed by a sudden and unanticipated noise with the result that our concentration is broken. This is an example of physiological interruption in mental activity. Parallelism fails to explain such a phenomenon.

**2. Disregard of mind as part of biological development**

According to the theory of parallelism mental development should leave no influence upon physical behavior although in the theory of evolution there is clear indication of the increasing significance and importance of the mind. The parallelist theory refuses to impute any importance to the mind, so far as the biological aspect is concerned.

### **3. Panpsychism**

If the theory of parallelism is accepted then every physical activity should be accompanied by a parallel mental activity, whatever its level. If we argue in this manner then we are forced to accept that behind every physical activity there must be parallel mental activity, whether the physical activity belongs to human organism or not. And this would mean that we would ultimately arrive at the theory that there is mind in everything, everywhere, or in other words, the notion of Panpsychism. But this is not a fact.

### **What is Intellectual love of God?**

In a corollary to the 2nd proposition of the fifth part of his book Ethics, Spinoza writes that inevitable love of God rises from third kind of knowledge because this knowledge leads to pleasure arising from the realization that God is the cause, meaning that the love of God resides not in the belief that he is omnipresent but in the fact that we believe Him to be eternal. This is what Spinoza means by intellectual love of God.

Further on he writes that the intellectual love of God which arises from the third form of knowledge is permanent. In this manner the intellectual love of God is also without any beginning. It is complete love; in it is the perfection of mind. It also follows from this that any love other than intellectual love is not permanent. Spinoza writes that God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love. In other words, the infinite nature of God who is himself infinite enjoys an infinite happiness and contentment.

In the 36th proposition it is stated that the intellectual love of the mind for God is the same love with which God loves himself. In other words, the mind's intellectual love of God is part of that infinite love by which man's mind becomes divine in its intellectual love of God and intellectual love becomes divine. Thus, in loving God man takes part in God's love of Himself. It follows from this, Spinoza argues, that in loving himself God loves man and consequently, God's love for man and man's intellectual love of God are identical things.

In this manner, Spinoza points out, man's desire for freedom and for salvation consists in a permanent and stable love of God. The quality of this love has been considered at length in religious texts, it provides man with his one element of complete contentment. The essence of man's mind is in knowledge the basis of which is God. The nature of the mind is determined by the nature of God. In the 37th proposition it is said that there is nothing in creation which conflicts with intellectual love or can do away with it. Love for God is the inevitable outcome of the nature of man's mind. Mind itself is a reality evolved out of the nature of God. And, intellectual love is its natural expression. Obviously, anything that contradicts this love contradicts the truth and is for that reason false, meaning that there is no such thing.

## **Consequences of the Intellectual love of God**

The intellectual love of God not only provides man with peace but also frees him from the fear of death. . Spinoza believes that this love of God amounts to self-contentment. According to the 42nd proposition, self-contentment is not the outcome of good conduct, but is good conduct itself. We should not consider it to be good since it combats the sex drive but, on the contrary, since we find it good we can combat our sex drive.

The greater a man's intellectual love for God, the greater is the degree of his self-contentment and of his control over his emotions and drives. In this manner he is not controlled by his animal drives and he can control them. It must be remembered that love of God is intellectual and it has the power to combat drives because only the intellect can achieve such control.

In this manner, through his intellectual love for God man gains control over his mind and thus become free like God. Obviously, he is more powerful and progressive than the ignorant individuals who are moved like puppets by animal forces. He is never subjected to the turmoil of the soul. He has definite knowledge of himself, God and substances; he never comes to an end and enjoys the fruits of his mental perfection. Spinoza was aware of the difficulty of such divine love for God and for that reason he has written at the end of his book that even if the path that I have shown leading to the ultimate is very complex it can be discovered. And obviously this path is found by the rare individual. It should be difficult because had it been easy why should the majority have been indifferent to it? Because when a supreme object is not available to everyone it is correspondingly difficult to obtain.

## **Issue of FREEDOM: Spinoza**

One of the main themes in Spinoza's Ethics is the issue of human freedom: What does it consist in and how may it be attained? Spinoza's ethical theory, where how to live well is equaled with how to live freely, is closely intertwined with his metaphysical theory. His metaphysics provide the cognitive foundation upon which his ethical views are built. This close connection is crucial because it provides the solution to two problematic aspects of Spinoza's view on human freedom:

- i. firstly, how can we accommodate human freedom within Spinoza's necessitarianism—in the context of which Spinoza rejects the notion of a free will?
- ii. Secondly, how can humans as finite beings genuinely attain freedom?

It is necessary to have the idea of adequate knowledge through reason and how that leads to some degree of human freedom. Essential herein is the notion of conatus, i.e. each individual's inner drive to persevere in his/her being. This part of Spinoza's ethical theory is very naturalistic: He gives a detailed account of how human nature works emotionally. He exposes the laws of human nature and how a proper understanding of these clears the path to freedom. Through intuitive knowledge we may attain blessedness. By becoming blessed one reaches the pinnacle of human existence; ultimate freedom (comparable with the notion of freedom of Sartre).

It will be known that how an accurate understanding of Spinoza's thesis of intuitive knowledge and blessedness will shed light on the puzzles concerning human freedom. We will come to see that the human mind is twofold. It is argued that human freedom, both through reason and blessedness, is best explained by appeal to this twofold. This explanation simultaneously allows for human freedom within Spinoza's deterministic universe.

### A Necessitarian Context without Free Will

How does Spinoza manage to defend both a necessitarian outlook on the universe and allow for human freedom? Why does he reject the notion of free will, and how can it be irrelevant to human freedom?

Spinoza's necessitarianism is most clearly stated as:

*There must follow, from the necessity of the divine nature, infinite things in infinite ways [...]. [...] I have shown with sufficient clarity that from the supreme power of God, or, from his infinite nature, infinite things in infinite ways (that is, all things) have necessarily flowed or always follow with the same necessity [...].*

Spinoza contends that there necessarily exists one unique substance, and he calls it God or Nature. God is necessarily infinite, i.e. is unlimited in any possible way. Besides substance/God, Spinoza recognizes attributes and modes in his ontology. Attributes are ways in which our intellect perceives of substance. We may, for example, perceive substance through the attribute of extension (i.e. by perceiving three-dimensional bodies in space), or we may perceive substance through the attribute of thought by thinking. Modes for Spinoza are "determinate expressions" of the attributes: "Particular things are nothing other than the affections, i.e. modes, of the attributes of God, by which the attributes of God are expressed in a certain and determinate way." Thus, all things that we encounter as ordinary objects in daily life are modes of the one unique substance. A human body so understood is a determinate expression or affection of God's attribute of extension.

In contrast to substance, Spinoza claims that modes are finite. They depend on God for their existence, and, as such, they are not self-sufficient. They only exist for a limited amount of time and have limited powers and possibilities. The dependency of finite modes on substance is stressed by Spinoza's claim that finite modes exist "in"

God: 'Whatever exists, exists in God, and 'nothing can exist or be conceived without God. Insight into the nature of the relationship between modes and substance, into the meaning of this "existing in,"- is of key importance.

In the above statement of Spinoza's necessitarianism, we see that from God's infinite nature all that follows necessarily. Thus there is only one true cause in the universe: God. God alone is a free cause: "God acts from the laws of his nature alone, and is compelled by no one." Everything else is determined by God.

In this necessitarian context the rejection of a free will is only a logical consequence: "There is in the mind no absolute, i.e. no free will, but the mind is determined to will this or that by a cause, which is again determined by another [...] and so on to infinity.

The will is understood as un-free as it is never uncaused, i.e. it is never a cause solely dependent upon itself. Being finite beings, we are necessarily in touch -with other people and things. We are part of an "infinite chain of causes" and our will is always influenced by external causes: it cannot be free. Spinoza explains free in terms of necessity hon'e': own nature and causal power: only that which exists and acts from the necessity of its own nature alone is free. The common notion of a free decree of will simply does not apply. A free will is sheer illusion, caused by ignorance:

Men are deceived in that they think themselves free, an opinion which consists simply in the fact that they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes by which those actions are determined. [...] The decrees of the mind are simply the appetites themselves [...]. [...] So the decrees of the mind arise in the mind with the same necessity as the ideas of things that actually exist. Therefore, those people who believe that they [...] do anything by a free decree of the mind, dream with their eyes open.

## Conatus, Reason and Freedom

To every individual Spinoza ascribes a conatus: the inner drive of every being to persevere in its existence. As finite beings, however, we humans are necessarily limited by other finite beings. We are always subjected to external causes: other people and things affected us. Insofar as we are affected positively, our conatus is supported. Insofar as we are affected negatively, our conatus is hindered.

Spinoza explicates this thesis through the notions of passions (both positive/negative affections supporting/hindering our conatus) and actions (positive processes (not affections) whereby we act from our own nature) which are based on "inadequate" and "adequate" ideas, respectively. In daily life, we are affected by many external influences, which cause emotions in us. These emotions often lead to confused ideas, i.e. inadequate ideas. Proceeding from inadequate ideas, we are necessarily passive, as the external causes have a hold on our state of being.

Spinoza believes that this is how most of us operate most of the time. We go through life being swept away on currents of pleasure and pain and feel powerless in the face of the challenges that life presents. However, he presents us with a way of overcoming the passions, resulting in at least a certain degree of freedom.

It is through adequate ideas generated by "adequate causes" that freedom can be attained. For us, an adequate cause follows from our inner nature alone, and is not influenced by external circumstances. Because "reason demands nothing contrary to Nature," Spinoza believes that our inner human nature and power lies in. Therefore, the ideas based on reason will lead us to a more stable state of being, in which we are less affected by the passions. It is not rationality itself that overpowers the passions because emotions can only be overcome by other emotions. Passions may only be transformed by reason generated emotions.

Reason also provides the primary basis for ethical actions or virtue. How does Spinoza establish this connection between reason and virtue? Virtue, for Spinoza, is simply that in which our nature and essence consist. As such virtue equals acting in accordance with reason. Thus, via reason, we gain an accurate understanding of the nature of God and of the necessity of the universe. With clarity of mind we are able to understand particular situations better and deal with them more virtuously. Through adequate ideas our passions are transformed into actions, and our conatus succeeds on the bedrock of solid insights. Reason provides a steady beacon amongst the/unavoidable whirlwinds of life.

Subtly but surely Spinoza's views on freedom have now shifted. Earlier on we noted that freedom was defined both in terms of causal power and acting from the necessity of one's own nature. Initially, Spinoza claimed that only substance/God had free causal power. However, through-reason human beings are also granted genuine causal power, even if only to a lesser degree. How can this be: is Spinoza not contradicting himself ?

## Blessedness

At this stage, we are able to deal with the passions: guided by reason and truthful to our nature, we may act in all circumstances with wisdom and courage. But is that really all that our freedom amounts to: being able to remain relatively composed in the flux of life, keeping up faith in the bad times as well as in the good? Is being free indeed confined to a negation, to a "free from" definition? As one would perhaps expect from Spinoza, the answer is: no. Nothing less than pure blessedness will do.

Through his thesis of blessedness, Spinoza reveals his conception of ultimate freedom. For our discussion, this thesis is of key importance as it will give us the clues to the answers we are looking for.

When one reasons through adequate knowledge, one achieves greater clarity of mind and is able to discern the true nature of things clearly and distinctly. Clear and distinct knowledge through reason might even give rise to the highest form of knowledge possible for us, i.e. intuitive knowledge. According to Spinoza, we can consider particular things/modes in two ways: either we consider them related to time, or understand them *sub specie aeternitatis*.

Understanding modes in this second manner, i.e. under a "species of eternity," is what Spinoza describes as having intuitive knowledge. It means that we do not understand particulars in relation to duration. We do not conceive of them as entities existent in time, but we discern as it were their most fundamental features which are timeless. We come to understand the true essence of modes and see that it is eternal and unchanging: "The essences of singular, changeable things [...] are to be sought only from the fixed and eternal things [...]." Through this kind of understanding we gain insight into how particular essences relate to substance. We will see shortly how an understanding of this relationship will give us a crucial lead in solving the problems concerning freedom.

The result of intuitive knowledge is a deepened knowledge of God, which leads in turn to an "intellectual love of God." According to Spinoza we will come to understand the fundamental nature of the world we live in. This leads to a sense of contentment that is deeper than any emotion that can arise from the passions, and it is in this state of loving God that blessedness consists, the highest endeavor of our mind is fulfilled — ultimate freedom is attained.

It has been claimed that the state of blessedness is set as an example at which we can only aim, but which is in practice unattainable. Spinoza agrees that we fluctuate between degrees of freedom, as "we live in a state of continuous variation," but the wise man may nourish himself through reason' and intuitive knowledge, reaching a state in which he "always possesses true contentment of mind," i.e. blessedness. The purpose of the Ethics is to convince us of what our true happiness consists in and to guide us on the path towards genuine freedom. If blessedness would be impossible, his purpose seems defeated: why would we bother? Spinoza does admit that "the way [towards it is] very arduous," but believes that "yet it can be discovered."

No matter how promising blessedness sounds, at this point we are still left with Spinoza's seemingly contradictory statements: on the one hand, only God can be a free cause, on the other hand, freedom, both through reason and blessedness, is possible for finite human beings. In addition Spinoza contends that genuine human freedom is possible in his deterministic universe. How can Spinoza endorse these outwardly opposing claims?

It is argued that these tensions can be resolved by acknowledging a twofold in the nature of human beings. God is the only substance that exists and human beings are finite modes of God. However, when we know things through intuitive knowledge, we view the world from under a species of eternity and gain an adequate understanding of the essence of particulars. We come to know the fundamental nature of modes: their essence is eternal.

It is claimed through Spinoza's thesis of intuitive knowledge we see that the ultimate reality of anything that exists is nothing less than eternal substance itself. The eternity of the essence of particulars can only be a case of instantiation of substance, as "eternity belongs to the nature of substance." We can interpret the existing in relationship between modes and substance as follows: for a mode to exist in God means that its essence instantiates substance.

When we now apply this thesis to human beings, the following story unfolds. Considering ourselves under a species of eternity, we discover that there is an eternal element even within our own minds. We come to understand that the true essence of our own minds is substance/God: the essence of our minds instantiates God. We thus have a twofold nature: we are finite and our existence is in time, but simultaneously our essence instantiates timeless substance. It is this twofold that finally resolves the persisting problems that we have been faced with.

Let's first see how finite beings can have genuine free causal power. Insofar as we are finite we are limited and necessarily influenced by other finite beings. But insofar as our essence is substance/God, we directly express the divine nature and instantiate God. Genuine human action is possible, because insofar as we instantiate God, we have the powers that God has, including free causal power. The more we act through our eternal mind, i.e. the mind that instantiates God/substance, the more we act from our inner nature and the more causal power we manifest. In acting through reason and intuitive knowledge, we proceed from our eternal essence, and we are necessarily free from external causes. Thus, freedom is possible for finite beings.

Secondly, how can Spinoza account for free action in a deterministic universe? Human freedom fits into Spinoza's necessitarian framework in two ways. Firstly, even if we as finite beings occasionally display true causal power, the course of the universe can still be determined by necessity. Our action is genuinely determined by us, but that it is determined by us, can be so of necessity. There is nothing logically inconsistent in that, keeping Spinoza's definition of free as self-determined (which is not undetermined) in mind.

Another perspective presents itself as follows: because the essence of the human mind instantiates God's nature, our free human actions constitute the necessary course of events. Our eternal human essence even determines the necessary course of the

universe. God / substance is understood as timeless, and, therefore, the cause by which all things flow should likewise not be understood within a time-framework.

When we think of determinism, we ordinarily think of a series of events with a beginning in time from which all subsequent events follow with necessity. We perhaps imagine Spinoza's universe in a similar fashion with God at the very beginning of this series of events. But this is incorrect. God's nature and the necessity of the universe are not to be understood in such a time—framework.

As Spinoza says; "[...] all these [eternal] things [i.e. God] are at once." Even though we ordinarily experience the universe and its unfolding events in time, God's nature and its necessary consequences are a timeless given, something that simply obtains. Self-determined human action does not then consist in a change of a pre—determined course of events. Instead, free action originates directly from the nature of substance, and it instantiates the necessary course of events. Free human action is not in opposition to necessitarianism. Our eternal 'essence shapes the necessary course of events and our actions constitute it.

Thus we see that this twofold in the nature of the human mind plays a crucial explanatory role in resolving the issues concerning human freedom. Although Spinoza does not explicitly appeal to this twofold to explain human freedom, it is referred to in many of his metaphysical claims. There is strong textual support for believing that Spinoza would assert this twofold in human minds.

Firstly, Spinoza explicitly states that the human mind is part of the mind of God:

[...] the human mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God. Therefore, when we say that the human mind perceives this or that, we are simply saying that God—not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as » he is explained through the nature of the human mind, or, insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human mind —has this or that idea.

It is an explicit statement that God constitutes the essence of the human mind. As Spinoza is otherwise adamant that we are finite beings and not infinite substance, we must be twofold.

Spinoza also holds that both adequate and inadequate ideas necessarily make up the human mind and that they depend on different causes. We see this idea reflected in Spinoza's claim that we act through one part of the mind, while through another we are acted upon, clearly suggesting a twofold: "For the eternal part of the mind is the intellect, through which alone we are said to act. But the part which we have shown to perish is the imagination, through which alone we are said to be acted on.

More support for this thesis is found in Spinoza's treatment of the intellectual love of God, i.e. blessedness. Spinoza claims that that our intellectual love for God is God's love for himself.

The intellectual love of the mind for God is the love by which God loves himself. [ . ] It is an action by which God, insofar as he can be explained through the human mind, contemplates himself with the accompaniment of the idea of himself. [.] the love of God for men, and the intellectual love of the mind for God, is one and the same.

We can only make sense of this claim if human minds do indeed instantiate God directly.

The clearest indication of the twofold is perhaps found in: The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the human body, but there remains of it something that is eternal." Spinoza unquestionably distinguishes a part of the mind that perishes and a part of the mind that cannot be destroyed.

The textual evidence that human minds are twofold is plenty and present throughout the whole of Spinoza's Ethics. Appeal to this twofold in the nature of human minds provides a plausible and effective solution to the problems concerning human freedom. As finite beings we are necessarily acted upon by external causes, and therefore we cannot solely proceed from our own nature. But insofar as our— eternal minds instantiate substance/God, we can be said to genuinely have free causal power. Our free actions are self-determined and constitute the necessary course of the universe.

## Conclusion

Spinoza's metaphysics fundamentally determines his ethical system. He defines freedom in terms of necessity by one's own nature and causal power: only that which exists and acts from the necessity of its own nature alone is free. By that definition, only substance/God is a- free being, and humans as finite beings are necessarily unfree. However, Spinoza does claim that a certain degree of human freedom is possible through reason and that we may even attain ultimate freedom: blessedness is achievable. These seemingly contradictory statements are explained through Spinoza's metaphysics. The human mind is twofold. Because the essence of the human mind instantiates God, we have the powers that God has, including free causal power. When proceeding purely from our essence, we genuinely act freely. The twofold also explains how Spinoza can account for human freedom in his deterministic universe. Even though our free actions may not be undetermined, they are self—determined, -thus free. Furthermore, because our essence instantiates God's eternal nature, we directly determine the course of the universe: our free actions constitute the necessary course of events.

Finite in infinity, we may be free.

## **Mathematical Mysticism**

Spinoza's philosophy can be described as mathematical mysticism. He employed the mathematical method to establish a mystic outlook. He used the mathematical technique not only in a general way but in a specific manner.

The secret of the universe has been treated and solved like a geometrical problem. Just as all geometrical principles are evolved from axiomatic statements, in the same manner the nature of the universe has been elaborated upon by direct reference to the nature of God. All objects of nature have a permanent relationship with God in the same manner in which mathematical results are the inevitable results of accepted principles.

A Spinoza does not make any distinction between the real and intellectual, for thought and substance or existence are identified. The entire world of nature is believed to be tied together in a long chain of cause and effect. Just as every step in a logical order is connected with the preceding and following steps inevitably, just as one step proceeds inevitably from the preceding, in the same manner every event in nature is the inevitable result of some preceding event. In this manner Spinoza attains to a deterministic theory by using the mathematical method. His determinism fails to recognize any purpose because there is no purpose in mathematics.

The notion of purpose is a distortion of thinking, and thought is one quality of God. It is the attribute which depends upon the substance and not the substance which depends upon the attribute and therefore it is incorrect to believe that there is a purpose in God. Spinoza bases his thinking on the methodology of geometry and starts with a definition of substance to arrive at a logical deduction of the nature of God. From the notion of substance he proceeds to attributes and he establishes the relation between God and the universe and by defining the modes of attributes he proceeds to explain the relation between mind and body. In his philosophy God is the basis or origin of all attributes and their modes, all natural and mental events. It is for this 'reason that his philosophy is called pantheism or mysticism.

Spinoza's faith in the mathematical method is based on his appreciation of the power of reason or intellect. Spinoza conceives of God as a mathematician who has created the universe in the manner of a mathematician writing a treatise on mathematics based upon the axiomatic truths relevant to his science. He believed that there is no element on earth or in the universe which cannot be grasped by the mind.

# LEIBNITZ

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Leibniz was a famous mathematician. He held that the world has logical and mathematical order Laws that govern this world order are rational. Therefore, the world can only be comprehended by reason.

Leibnitz was greatly impressed by the unity which Spinoza had emphasized in his philosophy. But Spinoza did so at the cost of variety and the individuality of things.

**Spinoza gives us the whole or the blank universal from which parts have disappeared.** But Leibniz begins with the reality of parts, the extreme multiplicity of finite experience and tries to determine their nature in order to discover the real parts of the real whole. Thus, he **begins with the opposite thesis of pluralism**

Now, parts in order to be real must be as real as the whole. The insistence on the reality of the individual "things made him believe in pluralism.

Thus, we find that substance of Spinoza has been broken into bits and each bit becomes as eternal and real as the one substance of Spinoza

## Monadology.

According to Leibniz, monads are the ultimate substance and spiritual atoms. Monads are only real and actual metaphysical points without which nothing can be real. Monads are metaphysical units of all living and non-living things. Monads are self-dependent, self-created and self-existent. Monads are infinite, simple and undistributed force. According to Leibniz, this whole universe is an orderly and harmonious arrangement of such monads.

Like Jiva of Jainism, Purusha of Samkhya and Self of Ramanuja, monads of Leibniz are qualitatively alike but quantitatively differ only in degrees.

## Monads are following characteristics.

1. Indivisibility. Monads are simplest, have no form, occupy no space. In creation and dissolution of objects and living beings, they integrate and disintegrate, but monads are not themselves influenced.
2. Monads are eternal in the sense that they are timeless.
3. Monads are substance of which only cogito, that is, consciousness is the attribute. Hence, monad' is that which is unextended.
4. All monads are active. Logically, it could be deduced that dualism between matter and mind or body and mind is ended since monads are un-extended.

5. Monads are self-contained and self-determined.
6. They are infinitely small and infinite in number.
7. Monads are windowless. Being independent, self-contained, self-determined, they are immune to external influence. Whatever changes take place occurs within the monad itself. This self-mobility is called appetation by Leibniz and it is this which causes monads to evolve. That is, no force can activate it from outside.  
Hence, each monad contains the whole infinity of existence. It is the whole universe itself potentially. Each monad is a world in a miniature. Macrocosm is in microcosm. As an all-inclusive whole, it mirrors the world. Every activity is reflected either in vague or clear form. It contains within itself the possibility of everything which happens to it.

#### **8. Each monad is unique, unparalleled and independent.**

### **Types of monads**

According to Leibniz, all monads do not represent the universe equally. According to quantitative distinctions, the monads are of five types.

1. In the first place, there are material monads in which consciousness is at the lowest level.
2. Then there are monads of the vegetable kingdom in which the consciousness is in a dreamlike state.
3. The third group of monads is that of animal beings.
4. The fourth class includes human beings who are self-conscious.
5. The fifth type is monasmonadum the God. God is perfect and omniscient.

Just as God is the soul of the innumerable monads in the universe, similarly in every living being there is a self-conscious soul governing the innumerable monads. Each monad is independent of other monads. All ideas, according to Leibnitz, are innate. Therefore, all our knowledge is self development. There is no inter-communication between different monads because monads are windowless.

### **Principle of continuity**

According to Leibniz, monads are found in a continuous series and a hierarchical order of existence. Each monad imperceptibly leads to others. There is no abrupt change, just as number systems are arranged in a continuous series. In this continuity, consciousness increases with every stage. The higher a particular monad is, the greater will be its activity, power of perception, mobility and force. Higher level of monads possesses all the qualities of lower levels besides possessing certain unique quality.

According to law of continuity, Leibniz believes that "possibility of future is inherent in the present. Every present condition of monad is inevitable result of its past state. In this way, its present is full of future.

Each monad is unique and within it, theory of continuity works. Different events and occurrences within the monad are bound in a continuous change. Thus, Leibniz sees continuity everywhere in action and inaction, good and bad, clarity and confusion, plants and animals, animals and human beings, etc.

By postulating this theory, Leibniz manages to bridge the gap between monads and without this, his pluralistic theory would be incomplete. It is this principle which establishes some order between individual existences.

### Activities of monads

According to Leibniz, monad is an active substance exhibiting two kinds of activities.

1. **First, perception.** It implies each monad represents or reflects the entire universe. It is the living mirror of the substance. But, the representation of each monad is individual and distinct

Each monad presents its own individual view of the universe and thus, universe is represented differently by different monads. From it emerges the law of identity of discernible. It implies that things between which there is no difference are one and things which are not identical are not one. Since monads differ from each other in respect of their stage in order of continuity and their respective position in space and time, there can be no identity between them. So, no two monads in the universe are alike. In that way, this law forms the basis of Leibniz's philosophy.

2. Second, appetation. It is the self-mobility or the force by virtue of which monads evolve and tends to become whole. By virtue of appetation, each monad tends to pass from obscure to clear perception. If action is done from very obscure perception, then it is known as impulse and if done from clear perception, then it is will. Thus, activity of lower monads is purely random and impulsive and in higher monads, activities are promoted by will and desire.

### Problem of relation between monads

Since monads are independent, self-contained, self-determined, self-existent and windowless, the problem of relations between monads arises. Leibniz seeks to solve this problem with his philosophy of pre-established harmony (PEI)

Leibniz assumed that harmony between monads has been established by God. He has so arranged the series of monads in their hierarchical order that change in one is preceded and followed in other monads harmoniously. To the perceiver; it appears that change in A is the cause of the change in B. But, in reality, monads being windowless cannot interact with one another. It means that whatever happens in one monad is

synchronized with its reflection pre-established by God in other monads at the time of creation only.

Thus, monads work independently of all other monads according to their own inner urge. But, this inner urge or inner plan coincides with the realization of one master plan in the mind of the creator. Because each monad tries to realize same final end in the mind of the creator, therefore a harmony is reached in their working.

It seeks to introduce unity in diversity. It also seeks to solve the problem of body and mind. But, in strict sense, there is no body because there is nothing dead in Leibniz's philosophy. Body is merely an aggregate of bare monads. It is an organism of which every part is a living force.

In this aggregate of bare monads, there is queen monad which mirrors the activity of surrounding monads and through the aggregate, mirrors the change of all other monads of the universe more clearly than others. This queen monad by virtue of its superiority in the aggregate may be termed as soul.

Thus, according to the doctrine of pre-established harmony, "bodies act as if there were no souls and souls act as if there were no bodies and both act as if each influences the other".

## Theory f Substane (Rationalism)

### Descartes

According to Descartes substance is that which has an independent existence and need not depend upon any other thing. A supreme substance of this kind can be only one and that is God. However, beside God, Descartes also believed that there are two relative substances-Mind & Body. Both of them independent of each other, but they depend upon God for their existence.

### Spinoza

According to Spinoza, substance is the ultimate element. He accepted the Cartesian notion of a spiritual ultimate substance, but he proceeded to give a better explanation of it. Descartes belief that mind and body are relative substance was not justifiable because substance cannot be relative because of his very nature.

Spinoza had defined substance as something which is independent and self-created. Substance is the absolute, ultimate entity. Descartes has also defined substance in similar manner, but according to Spinoza, existence of another substance is not possible. Thus, Spinoza assumes that extension and cogitation are attributes of God and substance.

He transcended Descartes's dualism and arrived at a monistic theory. According to him, everything that exists in the world is nothing more than the modification of the attributes of God, which are innumerable.

Our own knowledge of these attributes is limited to thought and extension. All objects of the world are modifications of these two attributes. These attributes do not have any interaction, but exist in a parallel state in God and because God is the sole substance, everything that occurs in the world is caused by him.

It is clear from this discussion that Spinoza's concept is more acceptable than Descartes's concept but Spinoza's theory deprives man of this individuality and freedom because God is believed to be the only absolute substance and bodies of individual are modifications of his attribute of matter. In this way, Spinoza established divine determinism.

He does not make any distinction between divine laws, natural laws and moral principles. What if man is not free, then his morality and religious consciousness can hardly be believed to exist. It is for this reason that many philosophers have described Spinoza's theistic doctrine as a dark night in which nothing appears to be visible.

### Leibnitz

Like other rationalist, Leibnitz also believed substance to be a concept but he wanted to maintain the freedom of man. Yet he accepted the theory that substance is self-

existent. However, he believed that universe is composed of infinity of such substances called monads.

Substances are self dependant, there is no exchange between nomads and hence they are windowless. Whatever development takes place within them is internal. As he wanted to establish the freedom of man, Leibnitz arrived at, a pluralistic doctrine. Descartes also believed that individual objects are in finite and only in this sense he was pluralist but by accepting objects as the modifications of matter and consciousness, he arrived at a dualistic theory.

But once it has been established that there are numerous substances in the universe, it becomes impossible to establish unity of the world. Consequently, Leibnitz attempted an explanation of unity and oneness of the universe while maintaining that monads are in dependant entity.

He thus introduces the principles of pre-established Harmony. The creator has created the monads in such a manner that each monad reflects the entire universe. It is because of this harmony created by God that we observe a synthesis between mind and body and individuals an object. While introducing this theory, Leibnitz destroyed the freedom of the monad and his pluralistic theory is replaced by monistic theory.

## Critical analysis

The fundamental difference in the philosophies of Descartes, Spinoza and Leibnitz appears to be the problem of resolving the contradiction of one and many in relation to the absolute element. In act unity and diversity, mutual exchange and freedom are all part of our experience and without explaining both the aspect one cannot arrive at man's moral and religious value. Hence, the only philosophy that can satisfy is the one which can really explain the contradiction of unity and diversity in the ultimate substance and established a synthesis between the two.

From this point of view, Spinoza's philosophy appears to be more satisfied. Spinoza places adequate emphasis on moral and religious values. Hence, one cannot accept that he would be unaware of man's freedom.

But, when he postulates that everything is god and everything is determined by God, apparently it involves contradiction of man's independence, although, in fact it does not.

Independence, in fact means self control rather than absence control. From this point of view, God is even independent only in as much as he is controlled by his own will. He acts according to his own laws but much does not violate them. If man is controlled by the laws of God, who makes up the fundamental substance of man, then he can only be said to be independent. Interpreted in this manner, Divine Determinism does not deprive man of his freedom.

However, in spite of this a more careful study will reveal that even the later philosophical systems and doctrines have failed to find a solution to the problem of dissolving unity and diversity.



## 4. Empiricism

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It is a type of philosophical theory which attempts to explain knowledge in terms of sense experience. Instead of seeking absolute knowledge about real world, they have tried to discover from where we actually get information and what degree of reliability it actually possesses. These philosophers have begun with our sense—experience as the source and basis of what we know and have tried to construct an account of knowledge in terms of sense experience.

**It is a reaction against rationalism.** In direct opposition to rationalism, empiricism holds that knowledge is derived from sense experience. The empiricists hold that the so-called a priori rational principles are actually derived from experience. As contrasted with rationalism, empiricism is called a posteriori theory of knowledge because according to this theory, knowledge is posterior or dependent on experience.

### John Locke

#### Rejection of innate ideas critique of Nativism

Empiricism is the philosophy which considers empirical experience to be the sole source of knowledge. Empiricists are against the theory of innate ideas. Locke presents a critique of nativism, the doctrine that some ideas are innate in the human mind, rather than received in experience; Locke attacks previous schools of philosophy, such as those of Plato and Descartes that maintain a belief in a priori, or innate, knowledge.

British philosopher, John Locke, the father of modern empiricism, considers child's mind as tabula rasa or blank sheet, that is, mind is blank sheet on which sensations leave the impression. Thus, matter of knowledge comes from outside the mind.

According to the theory of innate ideas, when man is born, he inherits -a set of ideas that has been impressed upon his soul before his birth. The nativist view which Locke attacks holds that human beings have mental content which is innate in the mind. This means that there are certain ideas (units of mental content) which were neither acquired via experience nor constructed by the mind out of ideas received in experience. The most popular version of this position holds that there are certain ideas which God planted in all minds at the moment of their creation.

However, Locke does not accept the theory of innate ideas because

1. Had ideas been innate, they should have been known to children as well as to the insane people.
2. Secondly, people who believe that ideas are innate are normally lazy because they want to avoid the efforts of searching the causes for the ideas and for that reason like to presume that they are innate.

3. Once it has been established that ideas are innate, it becomes impossible to analyze them and as they cannot be analyzed, it becomes possible for some people to dominate others by not answering any question.
4. If there are some innate ideas, then by implication they should be prior to any acquired knowledge. On the other hand, it has been seen that the ideas that are said to be innate normally follow or come after considerable knowledge.
5. Some people hold that ethical and moral or religious concepts are innate and try to use them as examples in order to prove the theory of innate ideas. But, Locke has demonstrated that no religious or ethical ideas can be said to be universal. Religious and ethical concepts are influenced by space and time.

Thus, in order to disprove the theory of innate ideas, Locke tried to establish the fact that man can possess all undeniable knowledge by the application of his normal, natural powers and no innate ideas are required to assist the process. All experience is gained through senses.

### Theory of knowledge

Locke is an empiricist philosopher. According to him, experience is the ultimate source of knowledge. Mind can operate further, but cannot make any ideas on its own. Hence, he rejects the theory of innate ideas and gives the theory of tabula rasa.

Having eliminated the possibility of innate knowledge, Locke seeks to demonstrate where knowledge comes from. He proposes that knowledge is built up from ideas, either simple or complex. Simple ideas combine in various ways to form complex ideas. Therefore, the most basic units of knowledge are simple ideas, which come exclusively through experience. Simple ideas are passively received by mind whereas complex ideas are formed by mind actively by its operation on simple ideas.

There are two types of experience that allow a simple idea to form in the human mind: sensation, or when the mind experiences the world outside the body through the five senses, and reflection, or when the mind turns inward, recognizing ideas about its own functions, such as thinking, willing, believing, and doubting.

### Simple ideas

These are the ideas that are received by the mind in the form of sensory or sensitive knowledge. They are of four types:

1. Ideas originating in a single sense. For example, ideas of color, taste, etc.
2. Ideas originating in more than one sense. For example, shape, size, space, time, motion, etc.

3. Ideas originating in reflection. In reflection, mind examines its own action upon various ideas presented to it. In such an examination, it discovers the presence of such memory function as remembering etc.
  
4. Ideas originating in sensation and reflection. Some simple ideas are created by "these common functioning. For example, pleasure, pain, etc.

All our knowledge is based on these simple ideas. Just as entire literature is fundamentally made up of letters of alphabets in the same way knowledge is composed of simple ideas. Sensations are internal as well as external and they serve as the window through which the light of knowledge illuminates the darkness of mind.

### **Complex ideas**

When simple ideas are put together or arranged according to certain combination, complex ideas are formed. Complex ideas are created through three methods: combination, comparison, and abstraction. They are of three kinds:

1. Ideas of modes. These are complex ideas that are not capable of existing on their own, but must be supported by their substance.

It may be simple mode, that is, only one simple idea may be involved. That is one idea is repeated in different combinations. For example, gross, dozen, etc.

It may be complex mode which is formed by the combination of numerous simple ideas. For example, ideas of beauty, running, fighting, etc.

2. **Ideas of relation.** For example, father, bigger, similarity, dissimilarity, etc.

3. **Idea of substance**

Locke envisaged complex idea of substance and states that it is formed by the mind by combining simple ideas. As soon as mind passively receives simple ideas, it immediately combines them actively into complex ideas. For example, we have simple ideas of redness, roundness, softness, sweetness, certain order. These are joined together and complex idea of apple is formed. Thing called apple is supposed to be the support of colour, taste, shape, etc. because apple is not directly perceived.

Thus, Locke defined substance as the "supposed support of qualities." He admits that mind has no simple idea of substance, yet one cannot do away with substance because he argues that he cannot think that qualities can exist without support. Thinking compels him to accept the support. But, so "called support of qualities that is substance is never experienced. Therefore, he speaks of substance as the "supposed support of qualities". About support, he says, "I know not what".

Ideas of substances are ideas of things which are thought to exist independently. Ordinary objects like desks, sheep, and mountains fall into this group. But there are also ideas of collective substances, which consist of

individual substances considered as forming a whole. A group of individual buildings might be considered a town. And a group of individual men and women might be considered together as an army.

In addition to describing the way we think about individual substances, Locke also has an interesting discussion of substance-in-general. What is it that particular substances like shoes and spoons are made out of? We could suggest that they are made out of leather and metal. But the question could be repeated, what is leather and metal made of? We might respond that they are made of matter. But even here, Locke thinks we can ask what matter is made of. What gives rise to the properties of matter? Locke claims that we don't have a very clear idea here.

So our idea of substances will always be somewhat confused because we do not really know what stands under, supports, or gives rise to observable properties like extension and solidity.

### Primary and secondary qualities

He makes distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Primary qualities like weight, solidity, extension, etc. belongs to the things themselves. But, secondary qualities, colour, sound, touch, etc., are simple effects produced in mind by things by virtue of their primary qualities.

Locke tells us that there is a crucial difference between two kinds of simple ideas we receive from sensation. Some of the ideas we receive resemble their causes out in the world, while others do not. The ideas which resemble their causes are the ideas of primary qualities: texture, number, size, shape, motion. The ideas which do not resemble their causes are the ideas of secondary qualities: color, sound, taste, and odor.

The best way to understand the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is in terms of explanation. Whenever you have the sensation of a square shape book, the cause of that sensation is some sort of shape out in the world (though not necessarily squareness, since there may be some optical illusion, because distance, for instance, forcing you to perceive the shape incorrectly), so the explanation for sensation of shape is shape in the external world. Whenever you have a sensation of blue, on the other hand, the cause is not blueness out in the world. The cause is some specific arrangement of the insensible parts of matter. Explanations for secondary qualities refer only to primary qualities.

Sensations of color, odor, taste, and sound are caused by the primary qualities of arrangements of matter. (Locke refers to these arrangements as the "powers" of objects to cause sensation.) Given that we are able to explain everything we need to explain by positing the existence only of primary qualities, he reasons, we have no reason to think that secondary qualities have any real basis in the world.

For example: consider an almond that is being pounded with a pestle. As it gets broken up into smaller and smaller pieces, the color changes from a pure white to a dirtier hue, and the taste goes from sweet to oily. Yet all that was altered was the

texture of the nut. Clearly, he concludes, they secondary qualities depend on the primary qualities.

Finally, he takes the example of a flame. If we put our hand in the flame we have a sensation of pain. If we look at the flame we have a sensation of color. No one would claim that pain is in the flame itself, he points out, so why do we suppose that the color is.?

## Types of knowledge

Locke distinguishes between three grades or degrees of knowledge:

1. **Intuitive.** In this, mind perceives the relation between ideas without taking assistance of other ideas, that is that strikes immediately. Such knowledge is immediate, complete and definite. For example, any object cannot be blue and non-blue at the same time.
2. **Demonstrative.** Sometimes, we do not observe the relation or difference between two ideas and indirectly establish relation between two. But, such a process requires the intervention of other ideas which requires some sort of proof. It is in fact knowledge by deduction.
3. **Sensitive.** Knowledge derived from senses. Knowledge of this kind differs from the knowledge gained through dreams, illusions and hallucinations.

## Limitations of knowledge

Locke further states that there are limitations to our knowledge due to limited power of our sensibility. There are large areas of our experience where self-evident truths are unobtainable. Secondly, we do not see any connection among various simple ideas. Finally, our knowledge is confined to ideas present in the mind. Ideas in my mind are only representation of things and not things themselves. Mind can never reach out to the things in the external world. Nevertheless, he accepts the existence of the world of material things to which our ideas refer.

## Is Locke a consistent philosopher?

Locke, though an empiricist, has deviated from the philosophy of empiricism at various points by holding views which are not empirically justifiable. Hence, he becomes inconsistent. Following are the arguments that show his inconsistencies:

1. By admitting the existence of substance, he becomes inconsistent. According to him, substance is the "supposed support of quality". Here, the basis is supposed support because in reality, he is not experiencing. According to him, substance is a complex idea and about support, he says, "I know not what".

Here; he admits the existence of substance on rational basis because supposition is an act of thinking. As an empiricist, he should not have accepted

anything that is not based on experience. But, Locke admits substance by the compulsion of thought rather than compulsion of experience.

2. **Distinction between primary and secondary qualities is not empirically justifiable.** According to him, primary qualities belong to object while secondary qualities are simple effects produced in mind by things by virtue of their primary qualities. But, both these qualities are experienced simultaneously and their experience is overlapping. Moreover, our cognition of primary qualities depends on our cognition of secondary qualities. Extension can be perceived only by perceiving colour. This distinction between them is not based on experience.
3. There is no empirical justification for admitting the existence of external things. On Locke's own admission, all our knowledge is confined to the ideas present in our mind and it never reaches out to things. If so, then he is admitting the existence of such entities to which mind has no access and thus no experience.

He holds that there is correspondence between our ideas and the things in the external world. But, there is no justification because in his own view, external things are never experienced and it is impossible to verify this statement.

His concept that we know the things as they are is not consistent with empiricism because he says that ideas in mind are only representative of things and things themselves. But, we cannot verify the faithfulness of representation because our mind cannot reach out to things.

4. According to Locke, knowledge is of three kinds: intuitive, demonstrative and sensitive. But, as an empiricist, he should not have accepted any knowledge except that based on experience, that is, sensitive.
5. Locke admits the existence of God on rational ground, but on empirical ground.

Thus, it is apparent from above discussion that his theory reflects many ideas that strictly belongs to the domain of rationalists. These deviations make him inconsistent.

## Analysis

As the first explicit formulation of an empiricist philosophy, the Locke's work *Essay "Concerning Human Understanding"* had a profound effect upon the intellectual climate of the late 17th century, which until then was wholly dominated by two warring camps, the established Aristotelians on the one hand and the upstart Cartesian \*rationalists\* on the other. Locke, with his thoroughgoing, but rational, empiricism, cut a middle road through these two extreme positions, and offered an alternative view of the world and our access to it, which proved enticing to many thinkers.

Roughly contemporary empiricists such as George Berkeley, and slightly later ones such David Hume, built their philosophies on the foundation Locke had laid out. Kant, seeking to reconcile empiricism with rationalism in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century, drew heavily from Locke's work, in large part giving precise and novel formulation to ideas which

stemmed originally from the Essay. Even in the 20th century, empiricists such as Rudolph Carnap, G.E. Moore, and W.V. Quine, explicitly expressed their debt to Locke's writings.

Locke's contribution to empiricism can hardly be overstated; not only did he give us one of the most detailed and plausible accounts of the position to date, but, in a sense, he spurred the entire movement with his innovative ideas.

# Berkeley

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## Esse Est Percipi

It is the famous dictum of Berkeley. Literally, it means “to be is to be perceived”. According to it, existence implies being perceived. When the word existence is used in connection with an object, it implies nothing more than perception. Hence, whatever is asserted of physical objects is useless unless it is in the context of perception of such object. To say that a thing exists but it is not being perceived would be a contradiction. It is impossible to accept a thing existing which is not perceived by anyone.

His purpose in propounding such theory was to establish a direct and simple relation between our knowledge and known world. Berkeley claims that this strange theory being a consistent empirical philosophy was the only theory of knowledge that was in agreement with ordinary common sense belief. Berkeley's view combines the best elements of philosophical reasoning and common sense.

Philosophers like Descartes and Locke had concluded that things immediately perceived are ideas which exist only in mind. On the other hand, ordinary people believe that things they immediately perceive are the real things. Berkeley insisted that his theory and only his theory was an agreement with both the philosophers and ordinary people.

The following fundamental elements are implicit in Berkeley's theory of Esse Est Percipi:

1. Our ideas, feelings and images have no existence apart from our mind.
2. Ideas independent of the knower have no existence.
3. Percipi is not personal. Esse Est Percipi simply means that a thing which is not perceived cannot exist irrespective of the individuals. Hence, this theory avoids the fallacy of solipsism (philosophy) the philosophical theory that the self is all that you know to exist).
4. Perception is not limited to present, but to any point of time. If a particular object is not being perceived at the moment, it may have been perceived in the past or it may be in the future.
5. Ultimate perception is of God. If a thing exists without being perceived by any human soul, then it must necessarily be perceived by God.

6. **Theory of notions.** Berkeley insisted that in addition to ideas in our mind, there are also other items called notions. The basic notion is awareness of our self. We do not see our self as we perceive chairs and tables as series of sensory qualities.

Berkeley claimed what we are aware of is that we are active agents who think, will and act. This conception or awareness of the active spirit, called myself, gives us our primary notion. We also develop notion of God as the omnipresent spirit who thinks and perceives all the ideas.

It is through notions that we learn about the structure of the world. This accounts for all our ordinary information and explains how we get our knowledge about the World of experience and why it is true.

7. **Object confirms knowledge and knowledge confirms object.** Berkeley does not accept any difference between object and knowledge of it since object does not exist outside knowledge of it. Knowledge also determines its nature and quality. Besides he does not deny that objects are independent of knowledge of them.

But, he does not interpret this to mean the existence of material world. The only thing that can be deduced is that objects cannot fail to exist because it continues to exist in the infinite mind. This concept saves Berkeley from the difficulty of explaining how a certain object not known to anybody in the present becomes known later on. The object existed even before there was knowledge of it.

## Development of Berkeley's theory

Berkeley's theory of Esse Est Percipi is deduced from Locke's conception of the idea of substance. Locke points out that body or any object possess solidity, extension, etc. which forms the part of primary qualities while color, touch, sound, smell, etc. are secondary qualities which are perceived because of the presence of one who perceives.

John Locke states that we define an object by its **primary and secondary qualities**. He takes heat as an example of a secondary quality. If you put one hand in a bucket of cold water, and the other hand in a bucket of warm water, then put both hands in a bucket of lukewarm water, one of your hands is going to tell you that the water is cold and the other that the water is hot. Locke says that since two different objects (both your hands) perceive the water to be hot and cold, then the heat is not a quality of the water.

While Locke used this argument to distinguish primary from secondary qualities, Berkeley extends it to cover primary qualities in the same way. For example, he says

that size is not a quality of an object because the size of the object depends on the distance between the observer and the object, or the size of the observer. Since an object is a different size to different observers, then size is not a quality of the object. Berkeley rejects shape with a similar argument and then asks: if neither primary qualities nor secondary qualities are of the object, then how can we say that there is anything more than the qualities 'we observe?'

Hence, Berkeley says that there is no distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Ideas of extension and solidity are the result of colour and touch respectively. Hence, even primary qualities cannot be known without secondary a quality which implies that they too are subjective.

- ⊕ Further, Berkeley says that,
- ⊕ Objects are nothing but qualities.
- ⊕ Qualities are nothing but perception.
- ⊕ Therefore, objects are nothing but perception. i.e. (Esse Est Percipi)

According to Locke, matter is inactive. It is only too obvious that a matter which has a quality of being inactive cannot cause an idea to arise in our mind. Berkeley raises the objection that if matter can create idea, then it can hardly be called inactive. Therefore, Berkeley contends that idea arises not from inactive matter, but from active soul. It is the activity of mind which is the source of all ideas.

## Doubts anticipated by Berkeley

Theory of Esse Est Percipi raises some doubts since it differs from and tends to violate common sense. Berkeley himself anticipated some doubts which he tried to answer.

1. **If objects failed to exist without being perceived, then how it retains its existence on not being perceived.** Berkeley says that when the object is not perceived by us, it may be perceived by another mind or God.
2. **If perception is of object, then what is the difference between real objects and images?** According to Berkeley, images are the products of our mind, while real objects are the products of infinite mind. Moreover, images depend upon individual volition, while real objects are conditioned by will of God.
3. **Do we eat and drink ideas?** According to Berkeley, use of word idea is not in ordinary sense. Idea implies our knowledge complete in itself, of any particular object; But, we cannot say that what the object really is apart from our knowledge of it. Hence, every object that is experienced is only an idea and has no existence outside the mind.

Berkeley says that there is nothing wrong in such conclusion except for psychological difficulty. It is because of this he suggests that one should think with the philosophers and talk with the common persons.

## Implications of the theory

### 1. Refutation of materialism

- a. Primary qualities too are subjective.
- b. Berkeley rejects Locke's definition of Substance.
- c. Inactive matter cannot give rise to ideas.
- d. Materialism contradicts religion. If one agrees with Locke and accepts the existence of independent substance in universe then one must accept the existence of two independent entities, that is, matter and God. But, according to Berkeley, such independent entities would limit God.

According to Berkeley, an object has real being as long as it is perceived by a mind. God, being omniscient perceives everything perceptible, thus all real beings exist in the mind of God. However, it is also evident that each of us has free will and understanding upon self-reflection, and our senses and ideas suggest that other people also possess these qualities as well.

According to Berkeley there is no material universe, in fact he has "absolutely no idea what that could possibly mean. To theorize about a universe that is composed of insensible matter is not a sensible thing to do. This matters because there is absolutely no positive account for a material universe, only speculation about things that are by fiat outside of our minds.

### 2. Subjective idealism

Berkeley holds -that nature is merely projection of mind and has no existence of its own. Thus, Berkeley laid down the foundation of system of subjective idealism by having belief in finite mind and 'infinite mind, their ideas, images and real objects.

His system of thought is subjective because he believes all objects of knowledge are subjective, that is, dependent on the mind. It is an idealist theory because on ultimate analysis, the sole existent in this universe are either minds or ideas belonging to them. Such theory leads to subjective idealism.

Subjective idealism, or, empirical idealism, is the monistic metaphysical doctrine that only minds and mental contents exist. It entails and is generally identified or associated with immaterialism, the doctrine that material things do not exist. Subjective idealism rejects dualism, neutral monism, and materialism; indeed, it is the contrary of eliminative materialism, the doctrine that only material things, and no mental things, exist.

Subjective idealism is a fusion of phenomenism or empiricism, which confers special status upon the immediately perceived, with idealism, which confers special status upon the mental. Idealism denies the knowability or existence of the non-mental, while phenomenism serves to restrict the mental to the empirical.

Subjective idealism thus identifies its mental reality with the world of ordinary experience, rather than appealing to the unitary world—spirit of pantheism or absolute idealism. This form of idealism is "subjective" not because it denies that there is an objective reality, but because it asserts that this reality is completely dependent upon the minds of the subjects that perceive it.

The earliest thinkers identifiable as subjective idealists were certain members of the Yogacara school of Buddhism, who reduced the world of experience to a stream of subjective perceptions. Subjective idealism made its mark in Europe in the 18th-century writings of George Berkeley, who argued that the idea of mind-independent reality is incoherent, concluding that the world consists of the minds of humans and of God.

Subsequent writers have continuously grappled with Berkeley's skeptical arguments. Immanuel Kant responded by rejecting Berkeley's immaterialism and replacing it with transcendental idealism, which views the mind-independent world as existent but in-cognizable in itself.

### **3. Establishment of theism.**

Berkeley's "theory of Esse Est Percipi and his subjective idealism aims at establishing theism that holds God as the fundamental cause of reality and order in the universe.

Critical comments Realist: Moore (systematically criticizes all idealist philosophers)

# Hume

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Hume is widely regarded as the third and most radical of the British empiricists, after John Locke and George Berkeley. Like Locke and Berkeley, Hume argued that all knowledge results from our experiences and is not received from God or innate to our minds. This kind of empiricism led to today's "scientific method" which holds that knowledge should be based on observations rather than intuition or faith. Radical empiricism went further, arguing that our knowledge is nothing more than the sum of our experiences. Unlike Locke and Berkeley, Hume removed God from the equation completely and argued forcefully against the possibility of his existence as his contemporaries envisioned it.

Hume begins by noting the difference between impressions and ideas.

- i. Impressions come through our senses, emotions, and other mental phenomena. Impressions are the direct, vivid, and forceful products of immediate experience.
- ii. Ideas are merely feeble copies of these original impressions. Ideas are thoughts, beliefs, or memories that we connect to our impressions. Thus, for example, the background color of the screen at which- I am now looking is an impression, while my memory of the color of my mother's hair is merely an idea. Since every idea must be derived from an antecedent impression, Hume supposed, it always makes sense to inquire into the origins of our ideas by asking from which impressions they are derived.

According to Hume each of our ideas and impressions is entirely separable from every other. The apparent connection of one idea to another is invariably the result of an association that we manufacture ourselves. We use our mental operations to link ideas to each other in one of three ways: **resemblance, contiguity, or cause and effect.**

For example: This animal looks like that animal; this book is on that table; moving this switch turns off the light. Experience provides us with both the ideas themselves and our awareness of their association. All human beliefs (including those we regard as cases of knowledge) result from - repeated applications of these simple associations.

Next, Hume distinguishes between relations of ideas and matters of fact.

- i. Relations of ideas are usually mathematical truths, so we cannot negate them without creating a contradiction. Relations of ideas are beliefs

- grounded wholly on associations formed within the mind; they are capable of demonstration because they have no external referent.
- ii. Matters of fact are the more common truths we learn through our experiences. We understand matters of fact according to causation, or cause and effect, such that our experience of one event leads us to assume an unobserved cause. But Hume argues that assumptions of cause and effect between two events are not necessarily real or true. It is possible to deny causal connections without contradiction because causal connections are assumptions not subject to reason.

Matters of fact are beliefs that claim to report the nature of existing things; they are always contingent. (This is Hume's version of the a priori /a posteriori distinction as given by Kant later on)

Mathematical and logical knowledge relies upon relations of ideas; it is uncontroversial but uninformative. The interesting but problematic propositions of natural science depend upon matters of fact. Abstract metaphysics mistakenly (and fruitlessly) tries to achieve the certainty of the former with the content of the latter.

## Personal identity/self

The arguments that Berkeley has used to refute the existence of material substance are deduced by Hume in disproving the existence of self. In Hume's philosophy, we find the highest reach of empiricism. As a true empiricist, he refuses to accept anything which is not given in and through experience. Hence, he denies self.

Locke on the basis of common belief had argued in favour of some fundamental substance even though he does not have experience of it. He defined it as supposed support of quality and about support he says I know not what. But, Berkeley rejected Locke's view and used Locke's own empirical outlook to disprove the notion of matter. He stated that a true empiricist can accept the existence of substance only when it can be subject of perception. But, at the same time, he went against his own theory by accepting the existence of self.

It is here that Hume carries this half-way empiricism to its own logical combination. Hume argues that just as we cannot experience the existence of any fundamental substance, we cannot accept any self which is believed to exist within us. He says that philosophers who claimed to have experienced self should explain whether this experience belongs to the category of self-perception or through meditation, whether there is pleasure-seeking or objective, whether this is absolute or subject to continuous evolution.

Hume says whenever I see into my so-called self, I always come up against individual perception such as heat, cold, light, love, hate, pain, etc. He fails to comprehend any self apart from these fleeting individual sensations and in this way; he demonstrates that self is not absolute. He even refuses its existence in the absence of any self-consciousness so much so that when he is sleeping he fails or ceases to have any existence and so does his self as he is not aware of it. Hume pointed out that we do not have an impression of the self. No matter how closely I attend to my own experience, no matter how fully I notice the mental operations presently occurring "in my mind," I am never directly aware of "I". What I do experience is a succession of separate and individual ideas, associated with each other by relations of resemblance and causality. Although these relations may be extended through time by memory, there is no evidence of any substantial ground for their coherence. The persistent self and the immortal soul are philosophical fictions.

### **Self-according to Hume**

Hume says that self is nothing more than a bundle of sensations that follow each other with thought defined rapidity, sensations which change in never ending stream. Hence, he continues to argue against any indivisible and indestructible self.

He argues that self is in fact a collection of mental functions and as these functions change, self 'also changes accordingly. Separate thoughts have no relation and it is only delusion which compels us to consider them as One and give them the name of self.

### **Why is the illusion of unity?**

Hume says that it is only natural to sense continuity in any rapid and uninterrupted flow. Steady flow creates the illusion of continuity. For example, modern cinema and flowing river,

Arguments to refute self,

1. **Self is not subject of perception.** Various elements in our mind are distinct and independent of each other. Though we definitely experience these elements, yet we do not sense the presence of element that unites them.
2. **Self is not absolute.** Our mind is like a stage or theatre in which thoughts and ideas come in procession. All these are transitory and momentary. It is only rapidity which causes an illusion.
3. **Thought experiences itself.** Hence, no soul is required for any such purpose.

## Critical comments

1. Hume's theory concretizes the psychological feelings. However, on careful analysis it is revealed that pleasure, pain, love, hate, etc. have no identity other than experience and experience cannot occur in the absence of consciousness. And self is nothing more than this consciousness.
2. Self cannot be known as object. In fact, knowledge has dual aspects. First, it reveals what is known and second, it establishes the existence of knower. There is no knowledge in the absence of either. Hume is in fact confused between knower and known. The self is knower. Its existence is proved by every function or activity involving knowing. He himself states that whenever he looks into his self, he finds various thoughts coming and going. But, he conveniently forgets that this itself constitutes self, the knower, the subject and not the object.
3. Memory cannot be explained in the absence of permanent self. Memory is part of common experience and everyone recollects past events. Memory is an adequate proof of this existence of self. If the knower himself has changed, then how can he recognize this?
4. Even the association of ideas cannot be explained in absence of any unifying principle. He in fact explains order in thoughts and feelings on the basis of association of ideas which takes place on the account of proximity, similarity, contrast, etc. But, if there is no soul, then who or what possesses the awareness of proximity, similarity, contrast etc. and which causes associations?
5. This theory of self fails to explain homogeneity and proximity in experience. The experience of consistency and uniformity cannot be said to depend upon the body since it is changeable and subject to development. Hence, the only alternative is to accept the existence of permanent and immutable self.
6. Hume's theory cannot explain the process of knowing. The process of knowing involves acceptance, classification, synthesis, discrimination, assimilation, etc. of sensations. These mental functions cannot occur in the absence of permanent mental force or capacity to perform. That is, it cannot occur in the absence of self.

## Causality

Hume was an empiricist philosopher and in his philosophy, we find climax of empiricism. He does not accept anything which is not within the domain of experience such that he refuses self, God and invariable relation between cause and effect.

According to scientists, the relation between cause and effect is only possibility. But, according to philosophers, relation is invariable. Hume criticizes this philosophical theory of causality.

While analyzing the relation of causality, he discovers following possible alternatives:

1. **A-priori reasoning.** But, Hume did not find it a sound alternative because before actual experience, a person would not be able to deduce effect. For example, a fire has a capacity to burn. No amount of reasoning, no amount of argument can establish relation. Similarly, relation cannot be derived from deductions. It is the subject of inductions and only on the basis of experience, we can arrive at causal relationship.
2. **Demonstrations.** Hume says that the relation of causality cannot be demonstrated. For example, no one can demonstrate that food invariably provides nutrition. It is only in the sphere of mathematics that different ideas are invariably related to each other. Hence, law of non-contradiction can function only in the sphere of mathematics. There is no contradiction that food may not provide nutrition.
3. **Observation and experience.** The notion of causality is derived from experience. As a part of our common experience, we note that certain things and events bear the relation of antecedent-consequent to each other.

Hume analyzes the invariable relationship of cause and effect and draws following conclusions:

1. Sensory experience does not establish the invariability of causal relation. When we observe facts, we do not find any evidence of a force in the cause which has the capacity to invariably produce the effect. It is nothing more than relation of antecedent and consequent. When we observe the objects for the first time, it is impossible for us to say which particular effect it can give.
2. Invariability is not proved by internal experience also. Whenever I see into my so-called self, I see nothing more than various ideas that arrive, associate and get dissociated, but even among them, there is no invariability.
3. He accepts that volition does cause motor activity in different parts of the body. But, our awareness is limited to either act of volition or to the actual movement of the body. However, we do not come across the presence of force or even how volition causes activity. It should be noted that Hume does not question the fact of activity being caused by volition. He simply proves that there is no invariable relationship between volition and activity.

4. Basis of causality is habit and custom. Mind has the habit of expecting another incident on the occurrence of some event. It has no logical force behind it because no amount of reasoning can establish between two things. So, belief in causal relationship is psychological necessity.
5. The relation between cause and effect is one of succession, not that of necessity. So, correct analysis of causal proposition ‘a causes b’ is that “b is followed by a”, but not that “b necessarily follows a”.
6. Causal relation is a **factual relation** and not a logical relation because it can be denied without any contradiction.
7. As causal relation is factual, the relation between cause and effect is contingent, not necessary.
8. He explains the relation of causality on the basis of law of association. Frequent observation of cause and effect in succession leads to conjugation of ideas of cause and effect in our mind. As a result, when there is an impression of cause, it recalls to our mind the idea of effect. Thus, expectation of effect on the occurrence of cause is due to the habit of mind and not due to any necessary connection between cause and effect. It is because of this relation; Hume asserts that, “Necessity exists in our mind and not in nature.”

Hume observes that while we may perceive two events that seem to occur in conjunction, there is no way for us to know the nature of their connection. Based on this observation, Hume argues against the very concept of causation, or cause and effect. We often assume that one thing causes another, but it is just as possible that one thing does not cause the other.

Hume claims that causation is a habit of association, a belief that is unfounded and meaningless. Still, he notes that when we repeatedly observe one event following another, our assumption that we are witnessing cause and effect seems logical to us. Hume holds that we have an instinctive belief in causality, rooted in our own biological habits, and that we can neither prove nor discount this belief. However, if we accept our limitations, we can still function without abandoning our assumptions about cause and effect.

Religion suggests that the world operates on cause and effect and that there must therefore be a First Cause, namely God. In Hume’s worldview, causation is assumed but ultimately unknowable. We do not know there is a First Cause or a place for God.

9. All judgments of causality are synthetic, that is, predicate is not invariably assimilated in the subject. It implies that effect is not inherent in cause in such a manner that effect could be deduced from the cause.

Kant has postulated that causality is nothing more than a category of thought. Whatever is experienced is passed through category of causality and only then perceived by the mind.

If empiricist states that they see nothing more than antecedent-consequent incidents, then they only exposes the limitations of empiricism. Categories of thoughts are not the subjects of experience, but the basis of experience. Thus, by exposing the limitation of empiricism, Kant demonstrates that effort to provide empirical proof of causal relation -is useless and futile.

## The Problem of Induction

Induction is the practice of drawing general conclusions based on particular experiences. Although this method is essential to empiricism and the scientific method, there is always something inherently uncertain about it, because we may acquire new data that are different and that disprove our previous conclusions.

Essentially, the principle of induction teaches us that we can predict the future based on what has happened in the past, which we cannot. Hume argues that in the absence of real knowledge of the nature of the connection between events, we cannot adequately justify inductive assumptions. Hume suggests two possible justifications and rejects them both.

- i. The first justification is functional: It is only logical that the future must resemble the past. Hume - pointed out that we can just as easily imagine a world of chaos, so logic cannot guarantee our inductions.
- ii. The second justification is that we can assume that something will continue to happen because it has always happened before. To Hume, this kind of reasoning is circular and lacks a foundation in reason.

Despite the efforts of John Stuart Mill and others, some might argue that the problem of induction has never been adequately resolved. Hume left the discussion with the opinion that we have an instinctual belief in induction, rooted in our own biological habits that we cannot shake and yet cannot prove. Hume allows that we can still use induction, like causation, to function on a daily basis as long as we recognize the limitations of our knowledge.

We cannot justify our assumptions about the future based on past experience unless there is a law that the future will always resemble the past. No such law exists. We can deny the relationship without contradiction and we cannot justify it with experience. Therefore, we have no rational support for believing in causation.

Hume suggests that our assumptions are based on habit, not reason, and that, ultimately, our assumptions about matters of fact are based on improbability. If experience teaches us that two events occur together repeatedly, we will assume a link between them. So, Hume explains, we must be able to reduce all meaningful concepts to the simple impressions on which they are built. Since no simple impression of causation or necessary connection exists, these concepts might appear meaningless. Rather than dismiss these assumed connections entirely, however, Hume acknowledges their usefulness and limits them to being nothing more than simple observations of repeated conjunction between two events. Further, he concludes that if there is no cause and effect, then our actions are not predetermined, and we enjoy true free will.

## IDEA OF GOD

### Locke's conception of God

Locke, Berkeley and Hume constitute the modern school of British empiricism. Their different conceptions of God have this in common that each one is based on an empirical view of life. Locke opined that we do not know the real nature of God. The very concept of God is formed in our minds by imagining the ideal conditions of existence, infinity, knowledge, power, pleasure and happiness, "and then by formulating a complex idea out of these individual simple ideas. This explains the manner in which the idea of God is formed in our minds.

Locke then attempts proof of the existence of God, and for this he introduces the causal and Ideological arguments. Man cannot 'deny his own existence, be believes in it. It is further accepted that man has not brought about his own existence. Hence, whatever has caused the existence of man is God. In the same manner, any purpose that exists in creation is the work of God.

### Berkeley's conception of God

Berkeley was the only really religious empiricist in this trio of philosophers. In fact, the chief object of his philosophizing was to destroy or to counter the atheistic trends set in motion by Locke's empiricism. Berkeley does not accept Locke's idea of God as an abstract idea because he reasons that abstract idea bears no relation to reality or existence. Yet, it must be admitted that Berkeley's attempt to prove God on empirical grounds is no more successful than Locke's efforts'.

Berkeley concludes that ideas of sensations have been created by God, which accounts for their being more ordered and definite. Objects continue to exist even when they are not being perceived either by me or by other people. It is God who has created them, but they are essentially ideas. It, therefore, becomes necessary to imagine the existence of a divine mind in which such ideas have their existence. Berkeley thus posits the existence of God by postulating Him as the essential substratum of nature. Later on, Hume was to use Berkeley's arguments disproving the existence of substance to disprove the existence of God as the substratum of nature.

### **Hume's conception of God**

Of these three thinkers, Hume alone was a consistent empiricist, for he alone completely accepted the basic premise of empiricism. He demonstrated that the existence of God cannot be proved on the basis of experience. He refuted every argument made in favour of such existence by pointing out that experience does not bear out whatever is contended as God. God in Hume's opinion is the subject of belief and faith. In the actual world one cannot go on without God and for that reason alone it becomes necessary to believe in Him, but to attempt to prove His existence on the basis of experience is a futile effort.

### **God is not subject of reason**

Hume argues that just as we cannot prove the immortality of the external world and the soul substance, we also cannot prove anything concerning the nature, attributes, purposes of God. Rational cosmology and rational psychology are impossible. Rational religion is no less impossible.

Man's mind is not capable of solving the riddle of divine problems, for its scope is finite and limited. It fails even to explain the nature and composition of stones, it cannot contend with the mystery of cosmology. When the reason cannot indicate whence the smallest things in the universe have come, can it possibly make any acceptable guesses concerning the origin and purposes of the world?

The origin of the world is lost in the infinite past and its future is equally out of the reach of our infinite minds. Our mind knows nothing more than the present and the immediate past. Things lost in the past and indistinct in the far future are out of its grasp. Obviously, the human mind cannot even be expected to make any rational conclusions concerning the omnipotent, omniscient, infinite and unqualified God.

## Refutation of arguments concerning God

In order to lend force to his point of view Hume refutes all the traditional arguments proving the existence of God. He argues as follows:

1. Refutation of teleological argument. In the teleological argument the existence, intelligence, and goodness of God is argued from the organization and system in universe, its beauty and goodness. Hume argues against this.

- (i) **The argument from analogy is unjustified.** The creation of the universe cannot be compared to the creation of buildings, ships, furniture and other such articles, because although the two acts of creation appear to be similar they differ in very great respects. While some of the processes of nature reflect the functioning of reason, many of the other processes contradict such an impression. If any thought or purpose has guided the creation of the universe then such things as heat, cold, gravitation, etc. cannot be explained on the basis of thought or reason.

The laws of human life differ from the laws of animal life, those of animal life from those of vegetable life, and those of vegetable life bear little resemblance to those of rocks and other material things. Hence, the purpose one 'discovers' in human life cannot be imposed upon other forms of life and existence. There is little parallel between the creation of human life and the creation of the rest of the universe.

Hence it is unwarranted to conclude that just as we can deduce the existence of human intelligence from the nature of things created by it, we can deduce the existence of God from the fact of universal existence. The creator of the universe cannot be compared to man as creator.

- (ii) The whole cannot be decided on the basis of the part. It is clear from the argument already made that thought, reason and purpose are only part of creation. Hence, they cannot be used to analyse the entire creation. Nothing in the human world can rival the natural world, and the two differ to such a great extent that one cannot be used as a basis for making deductions concerning the other.
- (iii) God does not resemble the human mind. To conceive of God as being similar to the human mind or to trace any similarity between man and God is fallacious because there are fundamental differences between them. Man's mind, for example, is subject to incessant change, but a perfect God cannot be believed to be guided by every passing whim and fancy.

- (iv) Deducing the nature of God from the nature of creation. The nature of the universe is different from the nature of God. Creation is not perfect and hence the logical conclusion would be that God, too, is imperfect, should one use creation as the basis. But one cannot believe in an imperfect God. Even if God is believed to be perfect, there is no reason to believe that the creator possesses the qualities he has infused into his creation.

The structure of the universe shows evidence of considerable failure, wasted effort, dis-organization and an extremely slow rate of development which has led to the creation of the world as it is at present, only after thousands of years have passed.

2. **Refutation of the conception of a God as the soul of the universe.** Some people believe that the universe is like an organism and God is the soul of this living being. According to them the universe should be considered analogous to some living organism than to some mechanical instrument like a watch. Hence, God can be conceived to be the soul of the universe.

Hume's only comment to all such conception as or flight of imagination is that we cannot prove the accuracy of such beliefs on the basis of our experience because our experience is limited and imperfect, incapable of suggesting anything perfect. Nevertheless, Hume points out that it is better to conceive of God as the soul of a; universe which is a living being than imagining God as the creator of a mechanical' instrument because the structure of nature is similar to a vegetable or biological entity than to a mechanical one.

3. **Refutation of the moral argument.** Some philosophers believe God to be the cause of morality in the world. Hume points out that such a belief is not supported by experience, and it cannot be assumed that God is an entity possessing moral qualities similar to man's moral tendencies.

If one examines this aspect carefully one will discover that the purpose of nature in all cases is the preservation and propagation of all species, not their individual happiness. There is more pain than pleasure in the world. The existence of so much pain and suffering in the world would suggest that the creator of the world is not benevolent or that he is not omnipotent. Physical and moral suffering, sins and pains, do not warrant the assumption of God as being good.

#### **4. Refutation of the ontological argument.**

Another famous argument used to prove the existence of God is based on the fact that there is a contradiction in terms in saying that there is a perfect God who does not exist. If he does not exist He cannot be perfect. Hence the existence of God is the inevitable outcome of His very nature, which is perfection.

Hume argues that when we do not know the nature of God how can we argue about His existence on the basis of His nature? Practice, not reason is the basis of religion.

Hume refutes every argument given to prove the existence of God on the basis of intellectual reasoning and proves that the faith in God is more a matter of fear of possible pain in human life, fear of death, the desire for happiness, the tendency to fulfill all kinds of physical and psychological needs. Hume argues that the belief in God arises out of man's physical and psychological needs.

Man believes in God because he finds something lacking in his life and likes to hope that this shortcoming will be removed by some agent. From this point of view polytheism or idol worship is the oldest religion in the world.

As has been indicated earlier, Hume himself is not an atheist. He recognizes the need for a faith in the existence of God. He agrees that we feel that there is a purpose in everything and for this reason we should believe that there is purpose in nature. Yet there is -no need whatsoever to justify this feeling on rational grounds. Some historians have found contradiction in Hume's views on God and on religion. He apparently believes in the existence of God at one moment and appears to be contradicting all arguments proving it, at another. But in actual fact there is no contradiction.

His sole purpose in attacking the traditional arguments in favor of the existence of God is to point out that the conception of God is not based on the human reason or on experience, but upon the requirements of human life. Hence, it is futile to try to prove reality of God. The faith in God is based on man's psychological and volitional aspects. Religion is based on human emotion and Will. Like the other spheres of human knowledge, religion, too, shows signs of evolution and development. Hence religion should be analyzed not from the rational standpoint but from the historic and genetic viewpoint.

## Skepticism

Skepticism is the philosophy, according to which the knowledge of ultimate reality is impossible. It rejects the claim of absolute knowledge, i.e. no knowledge can be declared to be universal and necessary. Hence, all knowledge is probable and particular. It criticises the existence of knowledge, rather than proving it.

Hume's pure empiricism results into skepticism in the philosophy. There are various reasons due to which he was known as skeptic but at the same time, he cannot be called as total skeptic, because total skepticism is self-contradictory.

According to Locke, all our knowledge is gained through experience, there is nothing prior to experience. But he accepts the existence of substance as the "supposed support of qualities" without any experience of it.

Hence the seed of skepticism is found in the Locke's philosophy, which logically culminates into skepticism of Hume.

The existence of this substance is not verified by experience and hence Berkeley rejects it. But Berkeley accepts mind as the basis of ideas a part from it. He also accepts God.

It is here that David Hume, a British empiricist carries this half way empiricism to its logical limit. As a pure empiricist, he accepts only those things which are based on experience. Hence he refuses to accept God, Mind, matter (soul), just a figment of imagination. Thus, Hume's philosophy accepts that skepticism is the logical conclusion of empiricism. As a true empiricist, he admits the reality of impressions and ideas only.

## Why Hume Skeptic?

Hume is known as skeptic, because he presents negative and skeptical conclusions regarding the capacity of human mind in the field of philosophy.

1. According to Hume, only definite and no-factual knowledge of mathematics and indefinite and yet factual knowledge of science is possible. The knowledge of mathematics is a priori and science factual because they are based on experience.

Philosophy claims to present prepositions which are factual as well as a priori. According to Hume this is impossible and hence, knowledge of philosophy is not impossible.

2. By the criticism of law of causality, Hume shows that the basis of our faith in cause or effect is not an inviolable law of causality but our everyday experience. e.g. Sun has been rising in the east since ages, but in spite of this, we cannot say that it will invariably rise in the east in the future also.

3. Just as we cannot experience, the existence of fundamental substance, are cannot experience any self which is believed to exists within us. Hence, self is nothing more than the bundle of different perception. Thus, rational psychology is not possible.
4. We can never hope to attain any satisfactory knowledge with regard to origin of our impressions or the ultimate constitution of the universe, behind our impression and ideas. Thus, rational cosmology is not possible.
5. Similarly rational theology is not possible.

Thus, Hume due to following reasons has been interpreted as skeptic-

- A. Critical and negative elements are so in widespread throughout the discussion, that one gets impression that he is merely negative and destructive.
- B. He makes skepticism the background of his own philosophy. It provides with him a convenient weapon of attack against rationalism By Dogmatism.
- C. From rationalistic point of view, His philosophy is really skeptical because he maintains that reason is not capable of making our knowledge intelligible.
- D. His constructive philosophy is weak and powerless to deal adequately with the doubts he himself ha raise.

### **Not Skeptic**

Though, there are various grounds for treating' Hume as skeptic, but really he is not one. He had a constructive philosophy of empiricism with the following principles.

**1. Doctrine of impressions and ideas.** Impressions must be admitted by skeptics also, Hume regards them to be the basic touch stone knowledge.

**2. The law of association-** with the help of this he shows that in causation, there is no logical but h psychological necessity in objects but one really in subjects. According to him, the law as the law of gravitation explains the phenomenal World.

**3. Imagination-** Hume takes the help of imagination for constructing knowledge. No rational ground can be given to explain the connectedness of impression in knowledge. The real ground lies in the power of imagination to fill up a gap.

### **4. Theory of Relation.**

Thus, Hume is not total skeptic his philosophy is skeptical with regard to dogmatism and rationalism but not so in relation to skepticism itself.

# Immanuel Kant

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Kant's three major volumes are entitled critiques, and his entire philosophy focuses on applying his critical method to philosophical problems. The correct method in philosophy, according to Kant, is not to speculate on the nature of the world around us but to perform a critique of our mental faculties, investigating what we can know, defining the limits of knowledge, and determining how the mental processes by which we make sense of the world affect what we know. This change in method represents what Kant calls a Copernican revolution in philosophy.

Just as Copernicus turned astronomy on its head in the sixteenth century by arguing that the sun, not the earth, is the center of the solar system, Kant turns philosophy on its head by arguing that

- i. We will find the answers to our philosophical problems in an examination of our mental faculties rather than in metaphysical speculation about the universe around us.
- ii. One part of this revolution is the suggestion that the mind is not a passive receptor but that it actively shapes our perception of reality.
- iii. Another is a general shift, which remains to this day, from metaphysics toward epistemology. That is, the question of what reality actually consists of has become less central than the question of what we can know about reality and how we can know it.

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant achieves a synthesis between the competing traditions of rationalism and empiricism. From rationalism, he draws the idea that pure reason is capable of significant knowledge but rejects the idea that pure reason can tell us anything about things-in-themselves. From empiricism, he draws the idea that knowledge is essentially knowledge from experience but rejects the idea that we can infer no necessary and universal truths from experience, which is Hume's conclusion.

As a result, he avoids the metaphysical speculations of the rationalists, for which any definite proof seems unattainable but maintains the rationalist's ambitious agenda, which attempts to give some answer to the sorts of questions that inevitably occur when we think philosophically.

By locating the answers to metaphysical questions not in the external world but in a critique of human reason, Kant provides clear boundaries for metaphysical speculation and maintains a sensible, empirical approach to "our knowledge of the external world

## Kant's Problem and its Solution

Like other moderners, viz., Descartes and Locke, Kant answered that knowledge means certain knowledge. Such knowledge according to him is found in mathematics and physics. Both of these sciences were making good progress. So skepticism appeared to him to be unwarranted. If, therefore, empiricism and rationalism had failed to explain knowledge, then their failure would not be reflecting any actual state of affairs in the world of science. Their failure would be entirely the consequence of their improper analysis of knowledge.

### The failure of empiricism---

Kant agreed with Hume and the preceding classical empiricists in holding that the manifold of sense data or the sense-impressions are passing events. However, knowledge proper is obtained by ordering, connecting and synthesizing them into some system. Ordinarily, we systematize the discrete sensory data with the help of the categories of substance, causality etc.

However, following the hints of skepticism concerning 'substance' made by Locke and Berkeley, Hume had come to the conclusion that there could be no intelligible account of substance, either material or spiritual. In the long run, the notion of substance, according to Hume, was an idle figment of imagination and of the association of ideas. In the same strain, Hume demonstrated that no intelligible account of universality and necessity involved in causality would be given on the basis of 'impressions and their ideas. Like substance, therefore, 'causality' according to Hume, was a figment of imaginations

Now if substance and causality, not to speak of other lesser categories, were mere fictions then certainly there could be no intelligible way in which the discrete and passing manifold of sense—impressions could be ordered. Without the order, there could be no knowledge. Therefore, skepticism is a necessary outcome 'of classical empiricism, according to Kant.

Again, as noted earlier, on the basis of experience, strict universality and necessity cannot be obtained. So empiricism can never guarantee universal and necessary elements in empirical propositions. And, for Kant, knowledge proper must have universal and necessary factors along with factuality. So, on the very face of it, according to Kant, empiricism cannot explain knowledge as is found in mathematics and physics.

### The failure of rationalism...

According to rationalism there is a universal faculty of reason by virtue of which each individual has certain innate ideas. Knowledge proper, according to it, is exclusively constituted of such ideas. This theory successfully explains universality and necessity, according to Kant.

All men have the same innate ideas because of their possessing a common faculty of reason. Naturally, being constituted of them cognitive proposition must be the same for all men. Again, all persons cannot but perceive the truth as their rational faculty

directs them. Hence, cognitive propositions constituted by innate ideas must be necessary as a result of inner compulsion or constraint.

But the difficulty of rationalism lies in another direction. Innate ideas are subjective, being in the mind of human knowers. What is the guarantee that they will also be true Of facts? Here Descartes and Leibnitz take recourse to deus ex machina. According to Descartes, God's veracity is the ultimate guarantee for the factual truth of clear and distinct ideas. Quite obviously, clear and distinct ideas by themselves do not explain their factual guarantee. This is most patent with regard to Descartes' explanation of our knowledge of the external world.

But if clearness and distinctness of ideas by themselves cannot explain factual propositions, then the magic term 'God' cannot do this miracle. Similarly, according to Leibnitz, all ideas are innate. He has, therefore, to answer the question concerning their factuality. Here he takes recourse to the doctrine of Pre-established Harmony. According to Leibnitz, God has so created the monads that the order and development in one is reflected in those of all other monads.

As such a thought of a table in a soul-monad called Ram is actually reflected in a bate monad called 'table'. But, how can Ram verify this correspondence? Obviously, he cannot, since being a windowless monad; he can never put himself outside his own cocoon-like monadic existence. Therefore, the doctrine of pre-established harmony is a prion' assumption, which ordinarily cannot explain actual states of affairs. Hence, the doctrine of pre-established harmony remains an unverifiable and a fictional explanation of knowledge proper.

There is yet another difficulty of rationalism. Rationalism starts from certain clear and distinct concepts, and proceeds to other ideas systematically and gradually as a result of deductions from them. Thus, Descartes started with a definition of substance as that which is in itself and conceived through itself without depending on anything else for its existence. Of course, Descartes inconsistently enough had accepted the reality of mind and body as two relative substances.

Spinoza tried to correct this inconsistency of Descartes. Spinoza through his rigorous logic concluded that there could be only one substance. Other things of our daily experience, including the thinker himself. According to Spinoza, are mere modes 'which never are'. As such plurality stands negated, and, yet this has to be included in any philosophy; Leibnitz saw this inconsistency of Spinoza. He, therefore, began with the plurality of monads. His difficulty lay in not reaching any unity in plurality, to which reference has already been made

Thus, rationalism has given rise to the two contrasted systems of Spinoza and Leibnitz. Both of them have the same starting point, namely, a self-evident definition of substance as appeared to them. Yet their conclusions taken singly 'are highly unsatisfactory, and, taken together are mutually contradictory.

The upshot of the review is that reason, unaided by experience, can build castle in the air only, and, by no stretch of imagination can it lay claim to actuality. gTherefo1'e, Kant rejected rationalism on the ground that it dealt with airy structures without correspondence with facts.

## Copernican Revolution

According to Kant, empiricism and rationalism both had failed to explain knowledge because both of them were based on a common assumption concerning the status of objects. According to both of them, things as objects of knowledge exist external to the mind. The mind therefore, has to approach them in order to know them. But on this assumption concerning the status of objects, how can knowledge be explained?

If objects be external to mind, then we can know them only by having experience of them. On the basis of experience alone we can never be certain concerning the objects. All that we can say about them is that such objects are such and such, and, we can never say that these are all the objects which must be such and such. In other words, if objects be external to the human mind which it has to approach to know, then universal and necessary propositions concerning objects are not possible.

Seeing the failure of rationalism and empiricism concerning objects, one requires a bold step. This situation of philosophy reminded Kant of Ptolemy and Copernicus. Copernicus affected a revolution by reversing geocentric view to the heliocentric view. With this astronomy since then has registered advance by leaps and bounds.

A similar reversal in the ordinary standpoint' concerning the status of objects would make philosophy progressive, according to Kant. Accordingly, Kant stated that instead of the mind approaching objects, we have to assume that the objects must approach the mind to be known at all. 'Reason must approach nature not as a pupil but as a judge.

We have to assume that the mind lays down the conditions for the objects to become objects for knowledge. Unless objects conform to these preconditions, they will not be objects for human knowing. Later on, we shall find that these preconditions for objects are the two forms of sensibility (space and time) and twelve categories of the understanding (substance, causality etc.). Suppose there are a number of holes of various shapes and sizes in a surface of a table. Similarly, suppose that there are number of pebbles of various shapes and sizes. Let these pebbles roll down the surface. Only those pebbles will be caught up that fit into their holes.

In the same way the mind lays down the conditions for the objects to be known. Only those objects which fit into these conditions are known; those which do not fit are not known at all. Only on this basis of Copernican revolution regarding the status of objects in relation to the knowing process, we can explain knowledge. Because the conditions which the mind puts forth for objects are the common properties of all minds, therefore, all minds as knowers will view objects under these very conditions. This would explain uniformity and universality in cognitive propositions concerning any objects whatsoever.

Besides, these conditions are not the conditions under which the mind knows objects, but are those conditions under which the mind as mind must know them. The mind cannot help seeing things but in accordance with its own native constitution. The most important thing for Kant, therefore, is to show that there are certain a priori forms as preconditions for knowing any objects. Without this the Copernican revolution which Kant sought to introduce in philosophy could have not been affected.

Many critics of Kant have raised objections against the use of the terms ‘Copernican revolution’. It is pointed out that instead of establishing a heliocentric standpoint; Kant has really tried to reestablish a Ptolemaic way of thinking. We shall find that it is a fact that Kant sought to show that the mind ‘maketh nature’ or is a law giver to all objects.

Thus, instead of showing the unimportance of the earth and its dwellers (men), Kant has sought to enhance the worth of man. However, Kant, by the phrase ‘Copernican revolution’, is not seeking to emphasize the dethronement of man or to wound the Narcissism of man, as Freud termed it, but is simply emphasizing a proposal for a revolution in human thinking as was done by Copernicus.

## **Relation of Criticism with Empiricism and Rationalism**

Kant’s philosophy is known as reconciliation between empiricism and rationalism. The points of difference and similarity between them can be stated in the following manner.

S. No	Empiricism	Rationalism	Transcendentalism
1	The mind at birth, according to Empiricism, is a clean slate or a tabula rasa. All the characters of knowledge are inscribed on it by experience only. Thus knowledge begins with and ends in experience.	According to it, mind is active and creative. As soon as we begin to reflect, we become conscious of certain innate ideas. Knowledge is constituted exclusively of innate ideas.	Knowledge begins with experience but experience stirs mind to become creative as well. Hence, in knowledge sense- experience is at - one moulded and transformed by the a priori elements contributed by the mind.
2	Empiricism over estimates sense and underestimates reason. The intellect, according to Locke, can function only after simple ideas have been supplied to it. Similarly, according to Hume, intellect cannot create one single simple idea of sense. The place of intellect is at most secondary.	Real knowledge, according to rationalism, consists in clear and distinct ideas which are given by reason alone. Sense-experience can neither constitute knowledge nor can it ever confirm-disconfirm proposition given by reason. Sense pro—vides only with an occasion for thinking about innate ideas.	Knowledge proper is a joint product of sense and understanding. The material is supplied by the sense are ordered and synthesized into cognitive statements by the a priori from of the mind.

3	Empiricism holds that sense and understanding differ in degree only. This is at least very clear in sensation-ism according to which thinking is perceiving or imagining.	Rationalism too did not make any sharp distinction between sensing and thinking. According to Descartes, and clear ideas and clear perception (e.g. of the external world) have the same status. But it was Leibnitz who regarded the distinction between sensations and thought as of degree only.	Kant makes a sharp distinction between sensing and thinking or under-standing. Sensing is passive', understanding is active or spontaneous. Sense supplies the matter and understanding connects the discrete data into-judgments.
4	Empiricism holds that the data supplied by experience are discrete, distinct and unconnected. Any connection is introduced by the process of association and imagination. As these connecting processes are considered to be purely relative and subjective, so knowledge based on them is taken to be lacking in certainty.	Rationalism starts with clear and distinct ideas and connects them with the help of logical rules. But, innate ideas by themselves have no correspondence with facts therefore, knowledge, according to rationalism, becomes purely conceptual and airy nothing.	True, data by themselves are discrete. 'But the connection introduced into them by a priori forms is the same for all persons. Hence, though the connection depends on the subjective constitution of the human mind, yet it is valid for all, for all human knowers have the same constitution. But of course, knowledge is confined to phenomena only.
5	Empiricism is dogmatic, for it is uncritically assumes the constitutive role of experience, without reference to a priori elements. In the end it sets no limit to ignorance which finally terminates in skepticism.	Rationalism is also dogmatic since it confines knowledge to innate ideas only, ignoring the claims of sense experience. In the end, it terminates in the inconsistent systems of Spinoza and Leibnitz.	Transcendentalism points out the importance of a priori elements in knowledge. However, i it points out that without sense-materials, they alone cannot constitute knowledge. It successfully reconciles the rival claims of empiricism and rationalism and maintains a golden mean between the exaggerated skepticism and excessive claims of knowledge.

## Possibilities of synthetic a priori judgments

The real problem of Kant was to explain scientific knowledge. According to him, knowledge must have at least-3 elements:

1. Necessity
2. Universality-
3. Newness or novelty

Kant criticizes rationalist and empiricist views about knowledge. Rationalist overemphasizes on reason and accepts knowledge as universal and necessary ( $2 + 2 = 4$ ). On the contrary, empiricists over-emphasize newness in knowledge. Kant says that both are right in what they are saying, but wrong in what they are denying. So, Kant reconciles their opposing claims by defining knowledge.

According to him, knowledge is judgment (Judgments, for Kant, are simply statements, or assertions) and judgments are of two types:

### 1. Synthetic judgments

These judgments are those in which predicate gives new knowledge that which is already contained in the subject. They are augmentative because they add something to the notion of subject. For example, all bodies are heavy. Here, idea of heavy is not contained in the idea of body. Hence, such judgments are characterized by newness or novelty.

### 2. Analytic judgments

Such judgments are those in which predicate does not add anything new to the subject. They are explicative, because predicate is already contained implicitly in the subject. So, analytic statements really tell us nothing new about the world: they simply assert of something a predicate that is already "contained" in the subject as part of its meaning. They are "analytic" in the sense that the predicate can be found by analyzing the meaning of the subject. They merely "explicate" or "clarify" information that is already contained in our concepts of things.

For example, all bodies are extended. Here idea of extension is already contained in the idea of body. Hence, knowledge cannot be analytic judgment because they are merely tautologies. For example, unmarried male is bachelor.

***Kant makes further distinction between a posteriori and a priori.***

1. A-posteriori, that is, when the connection between subject and predicate 'is factual or contingent given only in and through experience, then synthetic a-posteriori judgment is obtained. But, such judgment could not form knowledge in spite of having newness through synthetic elements as it lacks necessity and universality. Whatever is based on contingency and facts cannot be universal and necessary.

2. A-priori, that is, when the connection between subject and predicate is universal and necessary and experience has no relevance.

Both Leibniz and Hume had made just one distinction, between matters of fact based on sensory experience and the uninformative truths of pure reason. In fact, Kant held, the two distinctions are not entirely coextensive; we need at least to consider all four of their logically possible combinations:

1. Analytic a posteriori judgment cannot arise, since there is never any need to appeal to experience in support of a purely explicative assertion.
2. Synthetic a posteriori judgments are the relatively uncontroversial matters of fact we come to know by means of our sensory experience
3. Analytic a priori judgments, everyone agrees, include all merely logical truths and straightforward matters of definition; they are necessarily true.
4. Synthetic a priori judgments are the crucial case, since only they could provide new information that is necessarily true. But neither Leibniz nor Hume considered the possibility of any such case

Unlike his predecessors, Kant maintained that synthetic a priori judgments not only are possible but actually provide the basis for significant portions of human knowledge. In fact, he supposed that –arithmetic and geometry comprise such judgments and that natural science depends on them for its power to explain and predict events.

Thus, Kant says that such judgments are proper knowledge because it contains all the three elements necessary for knowledge. Newness or novelty is provided by synthetic judgment and at the same time, necessity and universality are provided by a priori elements. Hence, according to Kant, knowledge is a system of synthetic a-priori judgment. For example:

1.  $7 + 5 = 12$ . Kant argues that notion of 12 is not already contained in  $7 + 5$ . Hence, it is synthetic judgment. The judgment is a priori because connection between  $7 + 5$  and 12 is universal and necessary. Hence, this is synthetic a priori judgment.
2. **Everything that happens has a cause.** This is synthetic judgment because idea of cause is not contained in the idea of something happening. Also, the connection between cause and effect is universal and necessary because we know a priori that every fact must have a cause. Hence, it is synthetic a priori judgment.

In this way, Kant gives the most satisfactory definition of knowledge. At the same time, he succeeds in synthesizing the opposing claims of rationalist and empiricist philosophy. Elements of necessity and universality are the products of reason (rationalism) where experience has no relevance. On the other hand, newness is given by experience (empiricism).

### Critical comments

It can be argued that synthetic a priori judgment is not possible.

If knowledge is synthetic, then it cannot be a priori as synthetic judgments are based on experience and facts and hence, contingent. So, whatever is factual can never be necessary and universal. Similarly, it is a priori, it cannot be synthetic.

So, either synthetic a posteriori judgment or analytic a priori judgment is possible.

For example,  $7 + 5 = 12$ . This is not synthetic, but analytic. Because if one logically thinks, then idea of 12 necessary follows from the idea of 7, 5 and + operation, that is, 12 is already contained in  $7 + 5$

Kant in fact is confused between psychological thinking and logical thinking. He is not thinking logically. So, above mentioned example is analytic a priori judgment.

### Formation of knowledge

“All our knowledge begins with senses, proceeds to understanding and ends with reason.”

Kant reconciles the opposite claims of rationalism and empiricism by

1. Defining knowledge - Synthetic a priori judgment
2. By showing the formation of knowledge.

The proper view, according to Kant is “knowledge begins with experience, but does not necessarily originate from it.” As soon as sense-experience registers its impressions on the mind, the mind at once is stirred into its own activity and contributes its own ordering activity into discrete impressions. The ordering activity is discharged by a priori elements. Knowledge proper is a joint venture of sense and understanding.

But the mind does not remain satisfied with scientific knowledge of the phenomena only. It also tries to know the supersensible, and, this is not possible. Apart from sense and understanding there is reason which uselessly tries to constitute knowledge. However, the Ideas of reason are not constitutive but regulative principles of knowledge. Hence, according to Kant; knowledge begins with sense, proceeds thence to understanding and ends in reason.

Kant says that knowledge necessarily contains two elements, that is, matter from experience and form from reason. According to Kant, in the acquisition of knowledge, faculties operate at two levels

#### 1. Level of sensibility

At this level, we get impressions or sensations by way of experience. These sensations are unrelated, unorganized and discrete. However, it forms the material ingredient of knowledge.

But, sensibility receives these matters of knowledge through the framework of two a priori forms, that is, space and time. They act as moulds for discrete data. They are like two gateways or glasses. Space and time categories are inherent in mind and not realities in themselves. They are just way of perceiving objects.

So, at the level of sensibilities, we find two elements, discrete data land a priori forms of space and time. Discrete data through experience is received through a priori forms of space and time. But, the percepts, that is, sensations which are spaced and timed are still unorganized and unrelated. Hence, they do not form knowledge.

Knowledge is judgment and judgment would be impossible without relating or organizing various percepts or arranging them according to certain concepts. This is carried out at the second level. That is the level of understanding. However, there is beginning of knowledge through experience.

Kant says that even at the first level, that is, level of sensibility, both reason and experience (rationalism and empiricism) play equal role.

## **2. Level of understanding**

It forms judgments by applying a priori concepts to the percepts which are presented to it. These concepts are inbuilt in reason and it is only through these that understanding activates. There are as many concepts or categories as there are possible-judgments. Since there are 12 judgments, so there are 12 categories.

These categories could not be obtained through experience because it contained elements of universality and necessity. Hence, they are a priori forms. Through these categories, unorganized and unrelated percepts are organized and related to get proper knowledge. Hence, it is in this context, Kant says that understanding makes the nature.

Judgments arrived at have two elements which show the reconciliation and synthesis of rationalism and empiricism. These are:

1. Experiential elements in the form of percepts.
2. a priori elements consisting of 12 categories.

Thus, we see that knowledge is obtained with combined role of sensations and understandings, that is, empiricism and rationalism. If materials of knowledge are not available, then whom understanding will organize and then how can knowledge be formed? Similarly, if no “a priori concepts”, then discrete sensations could not be organized and related. Subsequently, no judgment could be formed and hence, no knowledge - “Percepts without concepts are blind and concepts without percepts are empty.” For example, clay (percepts) and mould (concepts).

### **3. Level of reason (limits of knowledge)**

Knowledge thus obtained at the level of understanding is confined to the phenomena only. It does not give the knowledge of things in itself or noumena.

For knowledge, first experiences are passed through space and time and then, these are organized and assimilated by 12 a priori forms. In this process, no object can remain in its true form. It simply undergoes modifications. First modifications have occurred at the level of sensibilities and second at the level of understanding. Hence, whenever we see anything, a thing in itself is not known. Noumena are unknown and unknowable.

But, our mind does not remain confined to the phenomena. It seeks to know the transcendental realities. As it trespasses its limits, it will get simply pseudo-knowledge. Kant referred this pseudo knowledge as transcendental illusions

Hence, Kant has called his epistemological enquiry Transcendental. There are three modes in which the mind proceeds for ordering any empirical knowledge. In the first instance, discrete sensations have to be organized into space and time to give rise to percepts. These percepts have to be organized further still by the twelve categories of the understanding in order to give rise to judgments. Percepts and concepts joined together yield empirical knowledge proper.

A further process of synthesis is affected a priori by the three ideas of reason, namely, the world, soul and God. However, these ideas are regulative only and concerning them no knowledge is possible. This conclusion of Kant, concerning supersensible and metaphysical entities is known as Agnosticism

### **Critical comments**

1. According to Kant, proper knowledge is universal, necessary and new. Such knowledge is to be found in mathematics and physics. But, physics is a dynamic and progressive science. Even here, conclusions change.
2. Kant says that we get sensations in unorganized and unrelated forms, but this is against modern psychology.
3. Unknowable is that about which we cannot say anything and we do not have any knowledge about it. But, when we say that it is unknown and unknowable, then in that way, we at least know that this is unknown and unknowable. Here, Kant's unknown becomes known.
4. Kant on one hand says things in itself as source of sensations while on the other hand proves itself to be unknowable. It produces contradiction as same object cannot be both.

5. Though he reconciles rationalism and empiricism, but divides world into two, that is, phenomenal and noumenal. Thus, he cannot be termed as complete reconciliator.
  
6. Role of a priori element is significant. However, Kant fails to answer how we get knowledge of it.

## **Space and time**

According to Kant, space and time are a priori forms of sensibility. Everything to be perceived must be spaced and timed. It is the very condition-of any perception. Space and time are entrenched in human constitution itself. So human mind cannot help perceiving objects except spaced and timed.

Space and time are two glasses through which we can perceive the world of objects. If we do not use them, then we cannot perceive at all. They are simply like two doors or moulds between sense perception and understanding category. It is through these doors sense perception passes to reach the category for knowledge proper.

Space is an a priori form of all outer perception and time is an a priori form of all perceptions whether outer or inner

Kant explains space and time through two expositions:

### **1. Metaphysical exposition.**

- a) Space and time are not concepts but are percepts. They are not empirical percepts, but are a priori percepts.
  
- b) Concepts are formed by comparing various instances and by concentrating on common and essential qualities. If space and time were concepts then it would be also be reached by having instances of them. But, there are no instances as we have the instances of cow or man. Hence, space and time are one and have no instances. Therefore, it can only be percept or one particular or individual entity.
  
- c) Concept subsumes number of instances under it, but all these instances cannot be clubbed together to form one concept. For example, all cows can be clubbed to form one gigantic cow. But, then it would not be a concept of cow.
  
- d) But, in case of space and time, all these so called instances of space and time come within it and go on to make or constitute it. Hence, space and time are not concepts but percepts which are constituted by number of its parts.
  
- e) Space and time are not empirical percepts. If they are derived empirically, then it could be imagined to be non-existing as in the case of color, smell, etc. Yet, we can never think of an object not to have spatial or temporal character at all. Therefore, they are a priori percepts.

## **2. Transcendental exposition.**

- a) Kant through this shows that without accepting the a priori character of space and time, the universality and necessity of mathematical statements cannot be explained. If space is not a priori then it can be derived from experience. But, then empirical notion of space and time cannot have strict universality and necessity. Thus, space and time cannot be derived empirically. Therefore, it is prior to experience.
- b) Kant says that, we are not in space and time, but space and time are within us. It means that space and time are the subjective forms of perceiving any object for all human beings. Because they are subjective in the same way for all human beings, they are truly objective for Kant. By objective, he meant that which is same for all. Space and time are objective as they are.
- c) However, space and time can yield knowledge of phenomena only, whatever we perceive we colour them, modify them and transform them by spacing and timing them. But, whatever is beyond us we cannot know, them. Further, Kant says that if we trespass the limits of our knowledge, we fall into transcendental illusions

Reason is the faculty which leads human intellect to the unconditioned totality or the whole of knowledge. Just as the understanding unifies the sensation, so the reason instead of unifying the object unifies the operation of understanding itself. We infer with reason just we think with understanding.

As there are three kinds of inferences, so corresponding to them, there are three ideas. These are:

1. Soul
2. World
3. God

Reason unifies the understanding with these three ideas in the same Way in which understanding unifies the object with the help of 12 categories. But, corresponding to these 3 ideas of reason, there is nothing in reality. They do not constitute knowledge, but regulate it by presenting us a kind of ideal knowledge.

If we treat the regulative ideas of reason for the constitutive elements of knowledge, then we fall into many illusions known as paralogism, antinomies and "Ideal of pure reason". Kant calls these as transcendental illusions because knowing them to be illusory we cannot shake them off. They arise from the very nature of reason. Ultimately, they show the farthest limit of knowledge and prepare room for faith.

### **1. Paralogism:**

Psychology may be empirical or rational. An empirical psychology deals with the process of feelings, emotions, etc. which are given to us in our introspection. But, all these are phenomena within the limits of categories of understanding. Empirical psychology cannot give us any knowledge of rational self.

But, human mind does not rest with limited knowledge of phenomenal self. It wants to know permanent, free, eternal and essential self. So, rational

psychology seeks to know soul with the help of pure reason alone. As a result of this attempt to know supra-sensible self, invalid conclusions are produced and we fall into transcendental illusions known as-paralogism.

As we think according to quantity, quality, relation and modality, so transcendently there are 4 kinds of illusory statements concerning self-such as:

1. Soul is substance.
2. It is simple.
3. Self continues to be same identical unity through different times in which it exists.
4. Self alone is immediately given in our consciousness

## **2. Antinomies**

Just as immortal soul cannot be known, so the world as a whole or as an ultimate reality being supra-sensible is not known. But, mind attempts to know all the objects comprising nature and world as the ultimate reality. It implies that human understanding trespasses its limitations and ventures beyond the unknowable since our knowledge is confined to the phenomena only. As a result of this trespassing the limits of knowledge, transcendental illusions known as antinomies occur.

There are four antinomies according to quantity, quality, relation and modality which respectively refer to the four-fold problems of composition, division, origination and dependence of existence.

1. Quantity
  - A. Thesis: The world is limited in space and time.
  - B. Antithesis: The world has no beginning and is not limited in space.
2. Quality
  - A. Thesis: Nothing exists but the simple.
  - B. Antithesis: There exists nowhere in the world anything simple. .
3. Relation
  - A. Thesis: There is a free cause and everything is not determined.
  - B. Antithesis: There is no free cause and everything is determined.
4. Modality
  - A. Thesis: There is a necessary being in this world.
  - B. Antithesis: There is no necessary being in this world.

In antimonies, there is no formal fallacy, yet there is opposition between them. Both thesis and antithesis are formally valid and can be proved with equal show of reason. However, they are opposed and inconsistent with each other.

### **Functions of cosmological ideas**

Though we cannot decide in favor of either side, but these have some regulative functions such as:

1. It has importance for guarding, sustaining and furthering the practical interest of man.
2. These further speculative interest.'
3. They offer psychological comfort and religious consolation.

### **3. Ideal of pure reason**

It is not mere idea but ideal. This ideal refers to an individual known as personal God. Transcendental ideals seek to prove the existence of God.

### **Functions of three ideas of reason**

Transcendental illusions have shown that there is nothing real corresponding to ideas of reason. Kant in his work "transcendental dialectic" has shown the impossibility of knowing the three regulative ideas of soul, world and God. But, they serve certain functions such as.

1. They are limiting concepts beyond which we should not venture.
2. They point out the modal knowledge and they guide understanding to wider knowledge.
3. They regulate the understanding by pointing out the ideal knowledge. Sense and understanding can guarantee the actual, that is, "what is", whereas reason points to "what ought to be".
4. Ideas pave the way for faith in morality and religion.

## **Categories**

Sensing is through the senses which receive the impact of the external world. This is the source of the information for which we have to wait involuntarily and passively. In other words in sensing, we are helplessly dependent on the senses. Sense impressions "generate corresponding ideas. Hume was right in holding this position. But Hume was wrong in thinking that an organization of ideas is equally valid. Unless discrete percepts are synthesized, they will remain isolated bits of shapeless mass, which will be as good as useless so far as knowledge is concerned.

This synthesis, according to Kant, does not take place arbitrarily in the individual mind but objectively in all minds alike. Our minds cannot know except through certain synthesizing framework natural to the mind, just as sensory impressions cannot be received except through space and time, which are n priori forms of sensibility or intuition.

These natural ways of understanding, Kant called 'categories'. These categories supply the conceptual structure to all that is reported by the senses. They are constructive and constitutive. The categories supply the form of our knowledge while

the sensibility supplies the content of that knowledge. Kant declared that “conceptions without perceptions are empty while perceptions without conceptions are blind”.

These categories are a priori, innate. These categories actively form judgments out of the reports of sensibility. Four categories are distinguished; each category containing three or more kinds. The main four categories are: (1) Quantity, (2) Quality, (3) Relation and (4) Modality.

We can arrange them conveniently as follows:

Judgments	Categories
1. Quantity (a) Universal (b) Particular (c) Singular	1. Quantity (a) Unity (b) Plurality (c) Totality
2. Quality (a) Affirmative (b) Negative (c) Infinite	2. Quality (a) Reality (b) Negation (c) Limitation Relation
3. Relation (a) Categorical (b) Hypothetical (c) Disjunctive	3. Relation (a) Inherence and Subsistence (b) Causality and Dependence (c) Community Modality
4. Modality (a) Problematic (b) Assertoric (a) (c) Apodictic	Modality (a) Possibility-Impossibility. (b) Existence-Non-existence. (c) (c) Necessity-Contingency.

Examples with the name of the judgment:

1. Quantity (Unity, Plurality and Totality)
  - a. All metals are elements. (Universal)
  - b. Some plants are poisonous. (Particular)
  - c. Raja was a Chola Emperor. (Singular)
2. Quality (Reality, Negation and Limitation) .
  - (a) Heat is a form of motion. (Affirmative)
  - (b) Mind is not material. (Negative)
  - (c) Mind is extended. (Infinite)
3. Relation (Inherence and Subsistence, cause and effect, Community)
  - (a) The day is warm. (Categorical)
  - (b) If there is rain, the engagement will be cancelled. (Hypothetical)
  - (c) It is either raining or not raining outside. (Disjunctive)

4. Modality (Possibility-Impossibility, Existence-Non-existence, Necessity-Contingency)
  - (a) It may rain. (Problematic)
  - (b) It rains. (Assertor)
  - (c) Every effect must have a cause. (Apodictic)

All Our knowledge is imprinted in this categorical scheme. The proof for the existence of such categories, Kant calls “transcendental deduction”. This means that without assuming these categories, our experience will be impossible.

The problem arises, what rights have we to apply these forms of the mind to things? What is the ground of their objective validity? We read the categories, which are independent of experience in the sense of not being derived from experience, into experience into the world of objects. How is that possible? What have we to do it? Jurists call the proof rights and claims in a legal process the deduction. We need here a proof or justification, or deduction, a transcendental deduction of categories.

Kant's proof of these consists in showing that without them intelligible experience would be impossible. There could be no knowledge, no connected world of experience, without such original a priori concepts of thought, without a unified and unifying consciousness or self-consciousness or the synthetic unity of apperception, as Kant calls it, which operates with these categories. Categories serve to make experience possible; that is their sole justification.

## Criticism of the proofs for the existence of God

### Ontological argument critical comments

1. God is called necessary being, but this is self-contradictory phrase because there is transgression of linguistic usage.

Necessary can be legitimately used with regard to stipulated definitions of symbols only or is used with reference to propositions, not with reference to things or beings. Hence, it is a-priori. Again, any existing thing can be contingent only and of anything existing, we can always imagine it to be otherwise than what it is and even a possibility of it not existing at all.

Thus, if God exists then he can also be imagined not to be existing at any time. If he is necessary, then he is not being and if he is being, he is not necessary. To say that God is a necessary being is as self- contradictory as a square circle is.

2. A proposition is necessary if its predicate cannot be denied without involving us in self-contradiction. For example, a triangle is bounded by three straight lines;

On the other hand, a synthetic proposition is that whose predicate can be denied without contradiction. This is true of any empirical proposition.

So, if existence is a predicate of God in an empirical proposition, we can always imagine it to be different from what it is.

3. Existence is not a real predicate. The word 'God is' adds no new thing. So the words "God is" and "God exists" do not add anything.
4. By mere thought on concept, we cannot bring anything into existence. If it is so, all would be kings. Thus, the concept God remains a concept no matter how hard we think about it.

### Cosmological argument critical comments

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Thus, if God exists then he can also be imagined not to be existing at any time. If he is necessary, then he is not being and if he is being, he is not necessary. To say that God is a necessary being is as self- contradictory as a square circle is.

2. This proof emphasizes on only one characteristic of the world, that is, contingency. Even this aspect, it is not seriously concerned. If the sole aim is to conclude the existence of necessary being.
3. Contingency is shown with the help of principle of causality. However, the principle has no meaning to be supersensible world. The concept of first cause cannot be explained in terms of causality at all.
4. From the contingency, we can infer only contingency and not its opposite, that is, necessary being.

### Teleological argument: critical comments

1. This proof is analogical. It is based on the analogy of mechanic in relation to its machines or a pot in relation to a potter. Therefore, it has no force of demonstration. In religion, we value freedom of will, moral worth and spiritual creativeness, but mechanism is quite opposed to all these. Moreover, analogy is

highly anthropomorphic because we are thinking of the whole of reality in terms of human needs and ends. But, in fact, there is much more than this.

2. It fails to explain physical, mental or moral evil. There is so much disharmony and chaos in nature, but theologians have one-sidedly emphasized upon the facts of combination, selection and gradation.
3. This proof at the most shows that there is an author of the world, but does not show that there is a creator of universe. An architect is one who shapes and moulds something out of pre-existing material. For example, potter creates pot out of clay. Therefore, even an infinite architect pre-supposes the reality of matter which are fashioned into orderly universe. This means that God becomes limited by matter. However, God must be infinite and must create matter out of Himself.

# Hegel

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## Absolute idealism

Hegel's philosophy is known as absolute idealism. According to him, ultimate reality is the absolute, the pure consciousness, the supreme spirit and the aim of philosophy is to discover and locate this absolute reality. It is a kind of idealism since according to him, idea is everything and everything is idea. Reality in its ultimate nature is spiritual and mental. All that exists is the manifestation of reason, the absolute idea.

However, Hegel's view is different from Berkeley's subjective idealism because Hegel believes that ideas are objective. Hence, his philosophy is also known as objective idealism.

According to absolute idealism of Hegel, there is only one reality which is all-inclusive, self-consistent whole. This monism could be either abstract or concrete. However, Hegel believes in the concrete reality.

## Criticism of Plato, Spinoza and Leibniz

According to Hegel, Spinoza's monism will be called abstract monism. That is, according to Spinoza, reality is one without many. In his philosophy, manyness disappears. All things, including human beings, are mere passing waves that never are. Therefore, Hegel has called Spinoza's philosophy as a black night in which all cows are equally black. His substance is like Lion's den to which all footprints point but from which nothing returns. Reality instead of swallowing the things to be explained somehow must conserve them in it. Hence, abstract monism of Spinoza has to be rejected as it emphasizes oneness at the cost of manyness.

In the same way, philosophical system of Leibniz has to be rejected because it accepts many at the cost of one.

According to Hegel, reality is one of which many are its integral parts, that reality is one, organic whole consisting of many. It was explicitly hinted by Plato. Hegel agrees with Plato regarding the absolute reality as the system of ideas, but he tries to advance upon Plato both by further analyzing the notion of idea and by clarifying the notion of interrelations between the ideas. Hegel criticizes the hierarchical system of ideas presented by Plato and thereby, prepares ground for his own system:

1. Plato's hierarchical system does not tell us why the idea of Good is at apex. Plato has dogmatically assumed that idea of Good is the highest idea.
2. According to Hegel, there should be rational relation between ideas themselves. So far as Plato is concerned, he has not logically related ideas amongst themselves nor has he rationally related ideas with the things. It is not clear

how white things follow from the idea of white or how the idea of white or red follows from the idea of colour.

3. It appears from various dialogues from Plato that he thought along with ideas, there is also matter. However, according to Hegel, there is no matter at all. There is sole reality of ideas.
4. Plato has not succeeded in showing that reality is one organic whole because he has not shown how particular things follow from their corresponding ideas. In fact, ideas of Plato are abstract ideas.

Thus, the idea which constitutes this reality should be concrete and not abstract. A concrete idea is a whole which includes all particular instances under it as its essential part. For example, a cycle is a mechanical whole which includes spokes, reams, wheel, handle, etc. as its essential part. Therefore, a concrete idea is not reached by excluding but including details or parts.

## Hegel's absolute idea

Thus, in Hegel's view, the ultimate reality, that is, concrete reality is the supreme spirit which is consciousness in itself and in-and-for itself. This ultimate reality is the absolute idea. It is one, all-inclusive, infinite and indivisible whole. It resolves within itself the distinction between knower, known and knowledge.

All substances and objects found in this world are merely manifestations of absolute idea. Nothing exists when separated from the whole. It is the unity in diversity.

Therefore, distinction between soul and nature, phenomena and noumena, knowledge and existence, idea and object comes to an end since all are elements of this absolute consciousness or reason.

According to Hegel, ultimate reality, the reason is dynamic. It is continuously unfolding itself, continuously becoming something. The absolute idea first exists as abstract idea in which form it is pure and without differentiation. Since it is the power, it needs some subject to know. For this, it evolves and through this evolution, external idea is formed when this creation renders the absolute, concrete, it becomes a concrete idea.

Absolute idea is subject to dialectical evolution in this evolution, the principle of negation or contradiction holds a very special place. According to Hegel, it is the negation which is the basis of all motion, progress, development and growth. Negation is the very life of this universe. It is only by negation of negation that existence of any object is established.

## Dialectical method

It is a philosophical method to explain dynamic and evolving world according to some rational plan. It explains this world of change and evolution in terms of unchangeable ideas. According to Hegel, this method is more appropriate than deductive method as that of Descartes' Cartesian method. It is because deductive method has certain inherent defects as it does not explain the dynamic and evolving world.

According to Hegel, dialectic evolution of absolute idea is in the form of triad. The reason manifests itself in some positive state of affairs, known as thesis. In this only one aspect of an object can be known but without the contradiction of this aspect, there can be no progress. It follows that whenever there is progress, evolution, development and growth, there must be contradiction of this thesis.

This negation for contradiction of thesis is known as anti-thesis. Further, this is also only a part of reason. So, it is also incomplete. Consequently, a contradiction in the form of antithesis occurs. Both thesis and anti-thesis are relative to each other since thesis is proved to exist only if there is an anti-thesis. Yet this contradiction is incomplete. When both meet, a synthesis is created, a synthesis which includes and completes both. Synthesis occurs to achieve a higher state again a contradiction develops in synthesis which now acts as thesis and anti-thesis is obtained and finally synthesis and so on.

Knowledge of any kind can progress only through this kind of dialectical process. Such dialectical process in the form of triad keeps on going to achieve higher and higher stage till reason realizes itself as absolute idea, that is, self-realization of reason is the goal of dialectical movement.

Dialectical evolution is a rational process. Hence, it is necessary. There is no place for contingency or accidental occurrence. This process is automatic, that is, there is no external factor influencing the process. Categories, that is, dynamic stages of evolution deduce themselves by inherent necessity. Since process is merely unfolding, beginning contains end in implicit form and end contains beginning in explicit form.

Dialectical movement is universal. Through this method, Hegel explains everything such as society, polity, economy, history, religion, etc. Hegel has demonstrated the presence of this dialectical process in every aspect of universe. For example, according to Hegel, our knowledge progresses dialectically which appears to function at three levels.

1. First level is the level of general knowledge, in which knowledge is obtained in sensory perception which results in seeing the objects in the world as distinct.
2. Second level of knowledge is the ideational knowledge in which we do not ponder over the differences between objects, but try to trace the existence of any general law amongst them.

3. Final level is the philosophical level at which objects are seen as expression of complete ideas. It is at the philosophical level that by the use of reason, we can know the ultimate reality.

Even with Hegel's own philosophical system, it is possible to trace three stages of dialectical process.

It appears from Hegelian philosophy that for him, absolute idea is the final step in all evolution. Since it is incomplete, it is not subject to any further development. In absolute idea, all dualism between knower and known, living being and material world, subject and object are resolved in final synthesis. The universe in its entirety is the body of this absolute idea and the relation between the two is similar to the relation between organism and organism, part and whole, etc. All objects of the universe are manifestation of absolute idea which is also responsible for all movement, motion, progress and activity that take place in the universe. In this context, absolute idea is living and dynamic, comprehending all motion within itself, although it is without motion itself. It is absolute idea which illuminates every object that forms the universe. It does not itself stand in need of any external illumination since it is itself in the nature of light.

## Dialectical method & Kant

In this dialectical method, Hegel got substantial hint from Kant because Kant has used triple division throughout his philosophical system such as.

1. Kant divided mind into three faculties of pure reason, practical reason and judgments. Corresponding to these faculties, he wrote three critiques of pure reason, practical reason and judgment. Judgment may be taken as synthesis.
2. Even the critique of pure reason has three subdivisions which are transcendental aesthetic (space and time), transcendental analytic (categories of understanding) and transcendental dialectic (three ideas of reason: soul, world and God). Transcendental dialectic appears to reconcile earlier two.

# Moore

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## Refutation of idealism

Moore was a realist and common sense philosopher. According to him, existence of object is real and what our commonsense says is true. Hence, in an article “Refutation of idealism”, Moore tries to condemn and refute idealism and proves that existence of the objects in the external world does not depend in anyway upon human perception.

However, in this essay, Moore does not examine the basic tenets of idealist philosophy, that is, reality is fundamentally spiritual. However, Moore argues that if it can be shown that proposition “Esse Est Percipi” is not true, then the citadel of idealist philosophy would be destroyed because whole of idealism hinge upon fundamental thesis “to be is to be perceived”, that is, existence implies perception or existence of external world cannot be without perception. Moore takes Percipi in wider terms to mean thought so that whole of idealist philosophy is covered.

To condemn “Esse Est Percipi”, Moore employs various methods like analytic or logical and metaphysical:

1. Logical or analytic method. Using analytic method, Moore examines various alternative meaning of expressions “Esse Est Percipi” and found that in each of the alternative meanings, the proposition does not hold true. In the proposition, the crucial word is “Percipi”. It normally means sensations or sense-perception. But, as already mentioned above, Moore takes it in wider terms to mean thought in order to refute whole of idealist philosophy.

The conjoining word “Est” has at least 3 meaning:

- a. Identity
- b. Partial identity
- c. Inference

Therefore, proposition “Esse Est Percipi” may mean

1. That existence of a thing is its sense perception.

Synonymy:

- A. The words ‘esse’ and ‘percipi’ have precisely the same meaning.
- B. Analogous to “Bachelors are unmarried adult human males”.
- C. Under this interpretation the claim is certainly false.

If statement is taken in second sense i.e. partial identity, then it results in Analytic Containment that is

- a. The meaning of 'percipi' is part but not all of the meaning of 'esse'.
- b. Analogous to "Bachelors are male".
- c. Under this interpretation, the claim is as trivial as claiming that B follows from (A and B).

In the first case, Esse and Percipi are synonyms and identical in meaning. In second case, Esse and Percipi, though not identical, are so related that percipi is essentially part of meaning of esse.

Therefore, either in the sense of identity or in the sense of partial identity, Esse and Percipi are co-existent. For example, to say that X is a chair is to imply that X is being perceived. Thus, in the first two sense, the proposition is merely tautology. Therefore, it maintains the necessary relation between Esse and Percipi. As bachelor is necessarily related to unmarried male, but, at the same time, removes all distinctions between the two and make them synonyms. Thus, proposition becomes sterile and non-productive as far as knowledge is concerned.

### **3 That existence is inferred from the fact of perception.**

In this third alternative, where Esse is inferred from Percipi, the distinction between them can be maintained because as a smoke and fire, though related, are not identical. But, such propositions are synthetic and a-synthetic proposition is never a necessity. They are sometimes true and sometimes false. "It is never self-evident". For example, "all crows are black" may turn false if we discover a white crow.

Therefore, it can be logically affirmed that if we see something, it must be" and if it is, then it "must be" perceived by someone provided that "must" is not equivalent to logically necessary, but means very likely to be the case. So, just as a single white crow has invalidated the synthetic proposition "all crows are black", similarly a single instance in which Esse is not Percipi would invalidate the idealist position.

"Thus, Moore on the basis of strict logical analysis shows that idealist position is not self-evident and that externality of the objects of the world is not disproved. Further, Esse Est Percipi is not self-evident proposition.

Moore also concludes that if "Esse Est Percipi" is analytic, then it is

not about any state of affairs. If it is synthetic, then it is contingent and non-necessary position. It cannot be both analytic and synthetic.

## 2. Metaphysical arguments

Besides analytic arguments, Moore supports himself with more arguments which are metaphysical such as;

- a) Moore says that existence of X is different from the awareness of X. It is our commonsense knowledge that sensation of blue is different from sensation of green. This distinction is not due to our sensations because visual mechanism of seeing is same. Therefore this distinction can only be due to difference between blue and green objects. Hence it is followed that awareness and content of awareness are different. But idealists are confused and have taken them as identical. So our consciousness has two elements
  - 1. First consciousness which is responsible for all awareness.
  - 2. Content of awareness due to which one-awareness is different from the other.
- b) According to idealists, even if some distinction is made between awareness and its content they cannot be separated hence they are distinguishable but not separable.

But, Moore disregards such arguments. We know from our experience that when we see red or blue things our vision or awareness does not become red or blue it means that a red or blue object does not belong to awareness. Thus it is philosophically justifiable to say that rose is red than to say our consciousness is red.

- c) Suppose that all knowledge is mental projection, but how can this fact be known? To know there should be something to know but if knowledge is only mental then it means mind knows mind but this in principle is impossible.
- d) There is significant difference between mental images and objective facts. It can be known by the fact that visual image of ferocious wild animals do not excite terror which is produced in us when we actually see these in forests. If there is no difference between mental images and actual object, then why there is a difference in our reaction?

## Defence of common sense

The role of common sense in philosophical enquiry has been very debatable since ancient times. When the father of philosophy Thales declared water to be the ultimate substance and Heraclites substituted with fire, they deviated from common sense. The Eclectics had a special disaster for common sense. Permenides looked contemptuously at the way of belief which is common sense level of knowing

Socrates often refuted some of the common sensually held beliefs e.g. life is preferable to death with the help of his dialectical method. Plato discredited both the common man and the common sense world and instead declared the reality of world of ideals revealed, in his opinion, to the philosopher. It was not until Aristotle that faith in some of the common sense beliefs was restored.

Aristotle was truly the first common sense philosopher. He criticized Plato for duplicate in the world and end of the world accessible to common man.

In modern philosophy the picture is very different here we know not that the most philosophers will argue in for or against any theory, feel prone to appeal to common sense as their ultimate judge. Contradictory hypotheses have been maintained by these philosophers by appealing to common sense to prove his thesis.

- Descartes begins his Discourse on Method by glorifying commonsense in these words: "Good sense is, of all things among men, the most equally distributed." He often appeals to commonsense for rejecting commonsense beliefs.
- This is ironical Locke endorses Descartes faith in commonsense, and appeals to it frequently.
- Berkeley especially appeals to commonsense while rejecting the commonsense world

In the contemporary Philosophy, G.E. Moore, an ordinary language philosopher is the strongest advocate of commonsense philosophy. He was very amused over the fact that how philosophers could talk about those super-sensible and super-natural things or ideas on which ordinary people generally do not believe. Moore in his article "A defence of common sense" strongly supported and defended commonsense belief over speculative ideas.

Common sense beliefs are those beliefs in which every person believes. These are not opinion of majority. We live our life according to common sense. Doubt on commonsense expresses doubt on person's mental health. There is no contradiction in commonsense and we come to know about common sense through acquaintance or directly.

Philosophers have asserted many things which we believe are not justifiable. Moore was shocked by certain arguments of idealist metaphysicists which were beyond the grasp of commonsense. These metaphysical theories appear perfect. But, at the same

time, these arguments are irrelevant to our common life. Hence Moore thought it is necessary to defend commonsense. And in his defence, he showed that lofty metaphysics is irrelevant to our common life, Moore took some of the statements of common sense as undoubtedly true. Reason for acceptance is that it is in accordance to commonsense and reason for rejecting it is that it conflicts with common sense. There is no need to give logic to prove them.

Moore's defence of common sense can be seen under two sections:

## Section I

1. Ordinarily by commonsense is meant a body of beliefs held in common by all men as true, including those who repudiate it. In his "Defence of Common Sense" Moore alludes to number of propositions which every one of us knows with certainty. A few such propositions are the following:

- There are a number of human bodies existing which are like my body.
- My body is at a distance from that mantle piece,"
- The Earth has existed for several years in the past, and its inhabitants had been in contact with each other."

Moore argues that these propositions are believed to be true even by those philosophers who are out to refute them. These are some basic truisms which no philosopher can refute without absurdity. Philosophers frequently use such phrases as "we or "us" while arguing for their theses. This shows that they already have a firm belief in their own existence and the existence of other people

Moore shows the absurdity involved in such assertions of a philosopher, as "No human being has ever known of the existence of other human beings with certainty." (Moore points out that this will amount to saying that, "There have been many other human beings besides myself and none of them (including myself) has ever known of the existence of other human beings. Indicating the absurdity to the above and similar assertions Moore tries to show that no philosopher can ever sincerely doubt these commonsense beliefs, though he might pretend to do so.

2. By commonsense is sometimes meant acceptance of some beliefs that are commonly held though not universally held. Some examples of commonsense beliefs of this class are, belief in the existence of God, belief in immortality of soul, and so forth. These beliefs can be appropriately classified as a common

man's beliefs. Moore does not plead for some such beliefs that a common man may hold. Moore is not interested in establishing or refuting them. He argues for those beliefs only which are held to be true by all men without exception. They are assumed even by those who reject, and question them.

3. Commonsense is many times referred to as a way of knowing such that it requires no evidence or proof to hold certain propositions. When some propositions are known indubitably and without any mental effort, they are said to be known by commonsense. Commonsense is often identified with intuition. It is sometimes understood to be a faculty of primary truths. Philosophers have sometimes meant by it an intuitively-based common consent. Moore accords to commonsense in this sense also.

He draws a number of propositions about which he is confident that they are known with certainty and no extra effort of mind is required to understand them. They are ordinary truths that are known in the ordinary way. But the fact that such truths are ordinary and are known in the ordinary way does not disqualify them for being truths. Moore's defense of commonsense is a defense of such ordinary truths which hardly deserve any mention, but disregard of which has caused a lot of misunderstanding and confusion about the nature of knowledge.

Such ordinary truths as "I have a body," or "my body is at a distance from that mantle piece," and a number of similar truths about material objects are known with certainty to every one of us. They should not be ignored or disregarded simply because they are labeled as commonsensical. Moore sees no reason to disregard them. Nor does he think that he needs to draw any sophisticated logical arguments to refute those who disregard such simple unsophisticated truths.

4. By commonsense is often meant certain truths which cannot be made evident by deductive proof, but there is always absurdity in holding opinion contrary to them. Moore defends such truths when he defends commonsense. He shows the absurdity involved in some philosophers' claim that we cannot know with certainty that we exist or other people exist. Moore points out that if this is true, then all philosophical discussions and controversies should come to an end, because; it would imply that no one has ever held any views about these matters, as no one has ever lived.

It would imply that since Moore's fellow philosophers are never known with certainty to have lived, Moore can safely disregard what they supposedly have said. This is a very interesting conclusion which Moore shows to follow without

any laborious reasoning. Moore's philosophical opponents might feel irritated by such a reply. They might think that Moore is not serious.

But Moore certainly does not want to make fun, and he is very serious. He wants the idealists, and his other philosophical opponents to realize that their views are queer and that commonsense -view is not funny and stupid.

5. By commonsense is sometimes meant some propensities to believe in certain ways. Sometimes when definite reasons are lacking in favour of or against a certain proposition and when there is a state of indecision as far as arguments go, we have a propensity to believe in a certain way about a certain matter. Our belief in free will would be an example of it. Whatever may be the arguments in favour of or against free will, but, that we all have a propensity to believe that we are free to some degree, can hardly be denied.

In "The Status of Sense Data", Moore examines the question, whether sensible exist when they are not perceived? He writes:

"I think perhaps a certain amount of weight ought to be attached to our instinctive belief that certain kinds of sensible do exist when unperceived."

## Section II

'Moore's defence of common sense has another interpretation also. Moore's defense of commonsense is, infact, a defense of ordinary language i.e. Moore regards philosophical paradoxes as the result of rejection of ordinary language. When philosophers reject certain propositions such as "there are material things," or "there are bodies," they intend to imply that these propositions mean something different from what they are ordinarily, understood to mean. In doing this they are rejecting ordinary language.

Moore is interested in pointing out that the above or similar propositions should not be taken to mean anything different from what they assert. There is no sophisticated meaning behind the ordinary meaning. Ordinary language is the correct language. To philosophers assertion "no material things exist unperceived," Moore would reply "What you are saying is absurd, for no one perceived my bedroom while I was fast asleep last night and yet it certainly did not cease to exist".

To the philosophers statement "we do not know for certain the truth of any statement about material things," Moore's reply would be, "Both of us know for certain that there are chairs in this room and how absurd it would be to say that we do not know but only believe it and that, perhaps it is not the case--how absurd it would be to say that it is highly probable and not certain.

Moore is simply saying that in ordinary language when we use such words as "material things", we mean such objects as tables and chairs. In ordinary language "knowing" means knowing with certainty and not simply believing. Moore's argument is that, it would be absurd to say that a person who is sitting on a chair is only believing that he is sitting and not really knowing it with certainty.

Ordinary language does not misrepresent facts: whereas philosophers distort facts by employing sophisticated language in interpreting ordinary language statements.

Moore's argument is that Philosophical paradoxes arise when some ordinary language statement is misinterpreted. When Berkeley argues for "esse est percipi" he actually misinterprets ordinary language in which "there is an apple" means "an apple is physically present whether I take notice of it or not. Most philosophical controversies are the result of attempt to find some hidden or sophisticated meaning behind the simple meaning of statements. When Moore defends commonsense he defends ordinary language as satisfactory medium of representing facts.

However, it might be asked of Moore, if ordinary language is suitable to express facts, then, what is the task of a philosopher? Is all philosophical activity fruitless?

No. Moore thinks that the philosopher is still needed. His task consists in analyzing the meaning of the ordinary language statements. In "Some Judgments of Perception", and "The Status of Sense Data," Moore himself undertakes an analysis of ordinary judgments such as "I see a table" or "I see a chair." Here he attempts to explicate the meaning of such ordinary statements and comes up with his theory of sense data according to which what we immediately see when we see an object is "part of the surface of the object," and the rest we infer.

If it is right, and if philosophical task consists in analysis, then, in analyzing the meaning of ordinary statements, Moore is committing the same error for which he condemns the philosophers; viz., trying to find new and sophisticated meaning in ordinary statements.

Ryle rightly points out that when we see an object we never see the sense data but the object itself. We see tables and chairs and not "part of the surface of tables," or "part of the surface of the chair". We do not see "patches of color," or "glimpses of horse races." No deep analysis required to understand what we mean by seeing "robins" or horse races.

It is abundantly clear that we see "robins" and "horse races" and not their glimpses when we say that we see "robins" or "horse races". It is interesting to note that Ryle is also a defender of ordinary language. He is interested in eliminating all such theories or myths from our philosophical vocabulary which have no use in ordinary language. The theory of sense data is also the philosopher's myth. In ordinary language we never say that we "observe" sense data. We never say that we observe "patches of color" or

“glimpses of things”. If there were such things as sense data, there would have been common expressions appropriate to them.

Though Moore does not doubt the truth of the statements of ordinary language, he thinks it appropriate to analyze their meaning. But when he undertakes an analysis of statements such as “I see a table,” or “I see a chair,” he ends up with the same sophistication and deviation from commonsense for which he charges his opponents.

It may be argued against him that his opponent, Berkeley, was also undertaking an analysis and interpretation of our commonsense notion of matter found in ordinary language when he asserted “esse est Percipi”. In what way, then, is Moore different from his opponents?

Berkeley, in his analysis of material things such as an apple, constantly appeals to commonsense. What is an apple? A jumble of qualities. It has some color, some shape, some size, some taste, and it feels hard. What is a color or a size? It is a sensation that I have when I see an object. What is taste? A sensation that I feel when I eat it. What is smell? An olfactory sensation. What are these sensations? Ideas in the mind. Thus, concludes Berkeley, an apple is nothing but a jumble of qualities or ideas in the mind.

Berkeley's analysis of apple leads him to deny the physical reality of an apple independent of the mind. Moore's analysis leads him to deny that the observer sees the table or the inkstand. Moore may be right in his analysis and Berkeley may be wrong. But the whole question is, is commonsense approach to reality perfectly satisfactory, or do we need a philosopher to tell us, with the help of his tools of analysis, what the world is like?

If Moore thinks that we have a perfect access to reality through commonsense, which is represented by ordinary language, then we do not see how can he justify his sense-data theory which is another sophistication in philosophy and a deviation from ordinary language. If Moore is an ordinary language philosopher who does not allow any sophisticated meaning of ordinary statements, then, philosophical analysis becomes an illegitimate task.

Hence , as summarized Moore s defence :

1. Common sense worldview is universally accepted.
2. There is some kind of compulsion felt by us in acceptance of common sense worldview.
3. Various kinds of inconsistencies will flow from the denial of common sense belief.
4. To say that there is common sense view of the world is to say that it is true.
5. One can see by inspection that commonsense is self-evident.

Although there are good reasons for accepting commonsense statements as true, however‘, Moore says that common sense belief may be false. By using clever

arguments we can grove common sense beliefs false. But, it is more reasonable to hold them true.

### Critical comments

Though Moore tries to reduce philosophical complexity and contradictions, he is criticized on many grounds such as:

1. He never defines or enlists commonsense beliefs.
2. He said that common sense beliefs are self-evident. Then, why does he give argument to prove them? Further, many of these arguments are overlapping.
3. Many of these beliefs are based on superstitions or dogmas which have been or are liable to be rejected on scientific knowledge. So, there is always chance for refutation in future.

# Early Wittgenstein

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Wittgenstein in his work "Tractatus Logico Philosophus" gives the picture theory. Early word denotes an object. There is the picture of the object in that word. To say something is to show it. We can give the answer only through directions or pointing towards the objects or things. We use the Word this or that.

For example, this is white. That is a tree, etc.

Thus, we are saying and showing the objects. Language is used to give picture of a word. It is a combination of words that asserts something. It essentially consists of names. Meanings of these names consist in their having reference to various objects.

Pictures are the actual state of affairs. Proposition is true if it corresponds to the picture of the actual state of affairs. It is one-to-one theory. For example, cat is on mat. Here, cat is one object and mat is another object and "is on" refers to a spatial relation between the two. The epistemology and metaphysics of early Wittgenstein can be summarized as follows:

1. The world is all that is the case.
2. What is the case? A fact which is the existence of the state of affairs.
3. A logical picture of facts is a thought.
4. A thought is a proposition with a sense.
5. A proposition is a truthful function of elementary proposition, that is, if the elementary propositions making the proposition are true, then the proposition is true.
6. What we can't speak about, we must pass over in silence.

Every word denotes a name and objects and has meaning. Sentences are the combination of such names. So, early Wittgenstein claims that "if I know the words, then philosophy is not required." With his picture theory, he claims to have solved all the problems of philosophy.

This theory has been subjected to various criticisms such as:

1. It presupposes a fixed setting of the world. But, to acquire meaning, any word has to be seen in the whole context.
2. There are many words which denote nothing, but have genuine and well-established usage. For example, "hello".

3. Our language is not static and words are not used in one sense only. For example, the word *please* can mean experience of pleasure or the permission or request.
4. New words are added. For example, computer language like bits, bytes, mouse, etc. and old words become redundant. Language is a dynamic and evolutionary process. Its richness is lost when one makes it static.
5. A proposition is meaningful only if it names an existing object. Following this many sentences would become meaningless. For example, Mr. Allen is dead.
6. How can we determine the essence of a word in case of proper names? For example, Mr. Ashoka rouses so many people in our mind.
7. Picture theory does not apply to negative propositions, conditional propositions, etc. Further, the use of phrases like something, everything, etc. have to be discarded.

However, in spite of these criticisms, this theory enables us to understand easily the organic unity that exists between language and the word.

# Logical Atomism

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It is a philosophical method of discovering the fundamental elements of universe and thereby postulating the reality of universe and the facts therein. Russell employs technique of logical analysis which is a method of discovery.

It is not a physical or chemical analysis, but logical analysis of language. Russell firmly believe in the efficiency of logical analysis to reveal reality and according to him, it is the most appropriate means of discovery.

The basic thesis of logical atomism is that if one could construct an ideal language, that language would be isomorphic to the structure of reality or we could adequately describe the real structure of the world with it, The ideal language will not be vague like ordinary language but precise.

In this analysis, atom is that point where no further analysis is possible. It is logical atom which is irreducible element of logical analysis. According to Russell, fundamental task before philosophers is discovery of basic elements of universe and according to him; this is possible through analysis of gross objects.

Russell's methodology is different from Hume's analytic method which was psychological analysis. However, Russell's methodology is logical analysis of concepts and propositions Russell's philosophy of logical atomism has three major characteristics:

1. It is a metaphysical theory whose aim is metaphysical description or explanation of the world. Another words, its aim is to find answer of question "what can be known about the world?"
2. It believes in the plurality of reality. There are many elements, objects existing independently in the world.
3. Its aim is to find simplest unit or atom which can be helpful and essential to give information about the world.

Russell philosophy is an attempt to describe the various kinds of facts, that is he attempts to make an inventory of facts just as zoology describes various kinds of animals. Russell believed that language is the mirror of the world. Through logical atomism, he wanted to explain the world in terms of logical atom. One can understand the structure of the world through structure of language. Therefore, logical atomism has two aspects:

1. Metaphysical or actual aspects.
2. Logical or linguistic aspects.

## Russell and Hegelian

Such methodology is criticized by Hegelian philosophers. According to them, objects upon analysis cease to be what it originally was, that is, it is transformed into something else. Things can be understood as unity and apart from this unity, they are not real, but merely appearance.

Russell initially started with Hegelian monistic idealism which holds that world is essentially mental and apparently independent facts cannot be understood in isolation; rather, they can be understood only in relation to the whole of reality.

But, Russell rejected monistic idealism not only because it undermines mathematics but also because Russell was fully convinced that propositions were true since they correspond to individual facts alone. Moreover, monistic idealism also makes any philosophical analysis into intelligible, simple or atomic entities impossible because one cannot understand the constituent element in isolation, but only after one sees how they fit into the world. Thus, finally Russell held pluralistic realism according to which world consists of plurality of independent elements.

## Facts

Fact is a sort of thing that is expressed by a whole sentence, not by a single name. According to Russell, there is distinction between a fact and a particular object. Fact is not a particular person or object, but something connected with the person or object.

Facts are required to determine truth value of propositions. If there is a fact corresponding to a particular, then it is true, otherwise false.

Facts could be broadly classified as:

1. Positive/Negative facts. ,
  - a. Positive fact. It determines truth value of positive propositions. For example, “Mr. X be in the college” is affirmative or positive which makes the proposition “Mr. X is in the college” true,
  - b. Negative fact. It is used to verify truth functions of negative propositions. As the negative fact, “Mr. A not being in the home” makes the proposition that “Mr. A is not in the home” true.

Many philosophers like Wittgenstein have criticized Russell for the notion of negative facts. Wittgenstein says that facts are combination of different objects and as objects cannot be negative, negative facts are also not possible. We can explain or verify negative proposition son the basis of positive facts. For example, a negative proposition “This wall is not white” can be verified by the positive fact that this wall is green.

Here, Russell replies, “Even if we verify so in this manner, both these statements do not menthe same. Moreover, the propositions like Socrates is not alive cannot be verified with the help of positive facts.” So for the proper

explanation of the world we have to accept negative facts. Further Russell says that their denial is more irrational than their acceptance.

2. Particular/General facts.

- a. Particular facts. Facts like rose is red are particular facts. Truth of particular propositions depends upon particular facts.
- b. Universal or general facts. Truth of universal proposition depends on universal facts. For example, all men are mortal.
3. Mental/Intentional facts. For example, I think that X is Y. Here, truthiness or falsity of this proposition does not depend upon the truth and falsity of X and Y.
4. Simplest and atomic facts.

- a. Simplest facts. There is only one particular and there are in it no relation. For example, this is red rose.
- b. Atomic facts. In this there are more than one particular which are related by some quality in all these. For example, all men are mortal.

According to Russell, there are three elements in atomic facts: particular, quality and relation. Quality and relation together constitute a category known as universal. Hence, all facts are exhausted between particular and universal facts.

Besides particular and universal, language also includes some other symbols which are constituent elements of a meaningful sentence. According to Russell, symbols can be:

1. **Complex symbols.** A proposition is a complex symbol. It is composed of words which are symbols and sentence itself is also a symbol. Hence, it is a complex symbol. Complex symbol on logical analysis gives the basic elements of universe.
2. **Incomplete symbols.** It is an " expression which has no meaning in isolation, but which may occur as a constituent part in and contribute to the meaning of an expression which does have a meaning. It also appears to indicate and name some object or things, but infect, they are not names. These incomplete symbols are descriptive phrases. According to Russell, descriptive phrases are of two types:
  - a. Indefinite descriptive phrase. They are vague and ambitious. They do not refer to any definite individual, but indirectly to any individual. For example, a man, A an author, a river, etc.
  - b. Definite descriptive phrase. These have definite objects of reference. These must not be applied to more than one. There is no ambiguity on

what they stand for or refer to. For example, Prime Minister of India, Author of Waverley. Russell says that logically these definite descriptive phrase are not names, it is only a description. For example, the author of Waverley is Scot Here, DDP is' the author of Waverley. But, this is, not name, if it were name, then original sentence will become "Scot is Scot" which is not at all conveying any meaning which the original sentence is conveying. In fact, it has changed the meaning of original sentence. Therefore, DDP is merely a description which may or may not exist. It is only by chance that description is applicable to Scot. If a definite descriptive phrase is applicable; the proposition is true, otherwise false.

But, it can be argued that why there is confusion of descriptive phrase as name. Russell says it is because these phrases function as grammatical subject and we confuse it with name of which some predicate is given. For example, the presenting of France is bald. Here, phrase present king of France functions as grammatical subject of which predicate that is bald is given.

He further says that in the sentence where such phrases function as grammatical subjects are meaningful. However, sentence may be true or false. But, phrases by themselves do not mean anything. In logical proposition, they can be easily eliminated without the loss of meaning. Thus, in the proposition "The author of Waverley is a Scott", application of theory of description can be shown as follows.

1. Here, DDP, that is, "The author of Waverley" is only a description and not name.
2. It functions as grammatical subject of which predicate is Scot We confuses it with name.
3. It is not meaningful in itself though whole sentence is meaningful.
4. It is incomplete symbol.
5. In logical equivalence, they can be removed without any loss of meaning of original sentence. Thus, on logical analysis we get"
  - a. At least one person wrote Waverley.
  - b. At most one person wrote Waverley.
  - c. Whoever wrote Waverley is a Scot

But, in the logical equivalence, DDP has disappeared without changing meaning of original sentence. If it were name, then it would have not disappeared. Hence, Russell says in ordinary sense, we mix logical thinking with psychological thinking. As a result, confusion arises. According to Russell, theory of description holds true even in false propositions. For example, the present king of France is bald.

## Propositions

According to Russell, propositions can be of two types:

1. **Atomic proposition.** There is only one proposition consisting of subject and predicate. This is unanalyzable. If further analysis is possible, then it is complex and not simple. Atomic propositions are verified by atomic facts. Structure of atomic propositions is logically same as that of atomic facts. For example, cat is on mat.
2. **Molecular proposition.** It consists of two or more atomic propositions. Molecular proposition son logical analysis give atomic propositions and atomic propositions are verified by the atomic facts. Thus, truth of a molecular proposition is determined by truth of its constituents. Thus, molecular propositions are truthful functions of atomic facts. According to Russell, there are no molecular facts. Molecular propositions can be verified only if they are logically reduced.

Apart from these two propositions, Russell also accepts belief propositions. Such propositions are neither atomic nor molecular because they contain one or more propositions nor molecular propositions because their truthsity or falsity is not determined by constituent propositions.

## Logical Construction:

Logical construction is the important part of Russell's philosophy of logical atomism. With this he tried to explain the nature of the perceptual object of the world;

Knowledge of a thing can be secured in 2 ways~

- 1) **Knowledge by Description:** Knowledge by description is based on some previous knowledge or truth.
- 2) **Knowledge by Acquisition.** This is a result of direct confrontation with the object. It is the immediate apprehension of the object. In other words, they are sense data, introspective data; data of memory, etc. According to Russell knowledge of sense data is most important for our purpose. There is no possibility of any doubt regarding them. Even in illusions, hallucination and dreams sense data is accepted as it is.

The sense data are called as hard data because they are beyond doubt, but anything else, such as physical object are only soft data. We can know immediately and with certainty only hard data. But all other constructions are only made of hard data.

Different attempted were made to find the existence of physical objects. In fact this has been a persistent problem in the history of philosophy. Acc. to one theory, the physical objects were taken to be the cause of sense data. While, according to another theory, physical objects were explained by inference from the sense data (Locke, Barley & Hume).

However, both of these were rejected by Russell. Acc. to Russell, external objects are logical constructions of sense data.

Acc. to logical construction, an object is a series of sense data. During this time, Russell was also influenced by Leibnitz theory of perspective. The same object, may be an object of experience by different persons from different perspective suppose, two persons are looking at the same thing, from two different perspectives we can also imagine a third person between the two. Russell calls the sense data of third personas possible sense data or sense Billia.

So, there can be actual sense data or possible sense data, related to an object. If an object is viewed from all possible perspectives and all such data is arranged in sequence, we can have the physical objecting this sense physical object is the sequence of all actual and possible sense data. Sometimes, he uses the expression 'logical fiction' but it is to be noted that it does not means that objects do not exist. All that Russell means that objects state can be translated into sense data objects. Hence, Russell says that a statement regarding things can be reduced to sense data.

# Logical Positivism

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Theory of Meaning; Rejection of Metaphysics; Linguistic Theory of Necessary Propositions

Logical positivism is often thought to have been initiated by a remark of Wittgenstein in the tractatus that “philosophy is not a theory but an activity”. Logical positivism was the philosophical movement initiated by a group of thinkers who lived in Vienna in the 1920s. (This group later became famous under the name of the Vienna Circle).

The elimination of metaphysics can be traced back to the philosophy of Hume and Kant. However, it was the logical positivists who led an organized revolt against metaphysics. It is one of the recent trends. In it we find two aspects:

1. On the positive side, the aim was to make foundation of science, to rid it of pseudo-concepts of metaphysics and to lay its foundation on strictly empirical principles.
2. On the negative side, the aim was to prove the futility and barrenness of traditional philosophies and condemn metaphysics as meaningless, invalid and misleading.

Thus, according to logical positivists, it is sheer waste of time and energy to indulge in speculation as that which transcends experience has no meaning, no sense. Only those theories and principles have meaning and relevance which are about something within our experience and which can be validated or invalidated by reference to the facts of experience.

Since theories and principles of metaphysics are not based on experience, they are meaningless. Metaphysics which literally means after-experience is concerned with something that transcends experience. Hence, these are non-sensical. However, they do not mean foolish or folly, but simply non-experiential.

The proper function of philosophy is to analyze statements asserted by scientists, study their kinds and relations. Herbert Feigl's witty remark about the nature of philosophy, practiced in the traditional way, beautifully epitomizes the outlook of this school of philosophers. “Philosophy,” he remarked, “is the disease of which it should be the cure.”

Philosophy is to science what grammar is to language. As grammar equips us with rules, similarly philosophy frames the rules whereby it can be determined if a particular scientific assertion is correct or incorrect.

## The Verification Principle & Elimination of Metaphysics

In order to understand the powerful attack that logical positivism made upon traditional philosophical systems, including logical atomism, it is necessary to analyze two of their basic tenets: first, a distinction that they adhered to between what are called “analytic” and “synthetic” proposition, and secondly, their criterion for determining when a proposition is cognitively meaningful, sometimes called the “verification principle.” Let us explain first the distinction between analytical and synthetic propositions.

Consider, by way of introducing the distinction, the following two propositions; (a) All husbands have head and (b) All husbands are married.

Now both of these propositions are similar in being true; yet they differ in the way they are true.

Proposition (a) happens to be true of every husband. We never see a husband without a head. But, and this is the important point, it would be possible to imagine a husband who had no head. Imagine a man born without a head, who lived, who was fed through tubes, who married. This man would be exactly like other men except that he would lack a head. But because he would have married someone, he would be a husband.

On the other hand, proposition(b) is not merely true as a matter of fact; but it is impossible to imagine or conceive of any circumstances whatever in which somebody could be a husband and yet not be married. It does not merely happen to be the case that all husbands are married; it follows from the very meaning of the word “husband” that anyone who is a husband necessarily is married.

We can thus see that if anyone were in doubt about the truth of these propositions, he would establish them in quite different ways. In order to prove the first proposition true, he would actually have to observe every single husband. This would require, as we say, empirical investigation: some sort of actual survey of existing husbands.

But one does not have to conduct any investigation to prove that the proposition “All husbands are married” is true. He merely has to understand the meaning of the words that make up the proposition. Once he understands these words, he can see that it is part of the meaning of the word “husband” that all husbands are married - for “husband” means the same as “married male.” Thus the proposition-can be seen to be true without any sort of empirical investigation at all.

Propositions that require some sort of empirical investigation for their confirmation are termed “synthetic” while those whose truth follows from their meaning are called “analytic.” It is the contention of logical positivism that every significant proposition must be either analytic or synthetic, but none can be both. Broadly speaking, all analytic propositions belong to formal logic they are true by virtue of their formal structure; while all synthetic propositions are like the propositions of science they require empirical investigation before their truth can be established.

To put it differently, analytic propositions are so called because, since their predicate is contained in the definition of the subject term, all that the proposition is doing is to assert something of the subject that is obtained by analysis of the subject term (e.g., "All husbands [i.e., married males] are married"). Hence we verify such propositions by examining the words they contain.

Synthetic proposition: on the other hand, are so called because they are the result of joining together, i.e., making a synthesis of, two logically unrelated things (e.g., "This desk is brown"). Hence, they can be verified only by observation and empirical investigation of whether in fact this relation is true.

One further consequence of this distinction must be mentioned. Analytic propositions, it was held, do not refer to the world in the way in which synthetic propositions do. From the truth of an analytic proposition, we cannot infer that the items mentioned by the terms in the proposition exist. Thus, from the analytic truth that "All giants are giants," we cannot infer that there are any giants. On the other hand, if such a proposition as "This desk is brown" is true, we can infer that the world contains at least one desk.

The logical positivists described the difference between the two types of proposition by saying that analytical propositions are "trivial," whereas synthetic propositions are "informative." The former are trivial in the sense that although they appear to be talking about items in the world, upon analysis it can be seen that they make no claim about the world; this was put by saying that they are true merely in virtue of their logical form, or by definition (i.e. the definition of a "husband" is that husbands are married males), or by saying that they are assertions about words. On the other hand, a synthetic proposition is "informative" in the sense that it purports to make some claim about reality, and when true, in fact does make such a claim.

Now it is easy, through the mathematical and logical techniques developed by Russell and Whitehead, to tell whether a proposition is analytic or not. But how can we tell when a synthetic proposition, or one which purports to be about the world, is significant?

Is such a proposition as "God exists in a heavenly place" significant? It purports to be about the world» but is it?

In order to answer this question, the positivists developed a test for the significance of synthetic propositions : the famous verifiability criterion of meaning.

Any proposition that passed this test was held to be significant in a factual sense. If it failed to pass the test, it must either be analytic (and hence not about the world) or non-significant, i.e., nonsensical. All propositions that therefore aim to express genuine knowledge about the world must pass the test of being empirically verifiable before they can be admitted to be significant.

## What, then, is the verifiability criterion?

This criterion has been formulated in various ways by different philosophers. Schlick, in a famous paper called “Realism and Positivism,” formulates the principle in at least five different ways. One of its most famous statements is to be found in a book by A. J. Ayer, published in 1936, called Language, Truth, and Logic.

According to Ayer, a sentence will be factually (i.e. not analytically) significant to a given person if, and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition that it purports to express; that is, if he knows what observations would lead him under certain conditions to accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as being false.

The important word in the above formulation is the word “observation.” The point of the principle is that it must be possible to describe what sorts of observations would have to be made in order to determine whether proposition is true or false. If some observation can be described that would be relevant in determining the truth or falsity of a proposition, then the proposition will be significant; if not, it will be meaningless.

Schlick produced a striking example to illustrate the use of this principle

e.g Suppose somebody asserted, “The universe is shrinking uniformly.” Suppose further that by “uniformly” he meant that everything else; all our measuring sticks would shrink at the same rate; all people would grow smaller proportionately; and thus there would be no discernible or measurable difference between things before it had. Would it then make sense to say that the universe had shrunk? Obviously not, since no possible observation could prove that it had shrunk. ‘Since the word “universe” denotes everything that exists,

no one - even in principle - could get outside of it; thus no one could measure any such shrinkage; and thus to assert such a set of words is to assent something nonsensical.

Philosophical theories, according to Schlick, make just such assertions. To say “We never directly perceive physical objects” is either to utter a triviality or to make a remark that is, if significant false.

But if a philosopher holds that it is neither trivially analytic or false, then, accordingly to Schlick, since it cannot be verified, it will be nonsensical, since no possible observation can be described that will determine it to be either true or false.

in explaining the variability criterion, a further distinction must be made. It is necessary to distinguish between propositions that are verified and those that are verifiable, or to put it in other words, between practical verifiability and variability in principle.

Consider the following proposition: “**There is extraterrestrial life**”.

Now this proposition has never been verified by anyone; yet it is a proposition that is verifiable. We can describe the steps we must take in order to verify it. We must first find some means of getting to other parts of the universe and then looking to see if there is life there. If there is determined to be such life there, then the proposition will be true; if not, it will be false.

Now consider by way of contrast such a proposition as “God exists in a heavenly place.” What conditions would reveal this proposition to be true? What steps could we possibly take in order to show it to be verifiable, even in principle? There is no relevant observation we could make that would show the proposition either to be true or false (to argue that if we died, we could then determine which it was, is simply another way of stating that no observation, in the present sense of that word, would be relevant). Since no conceivable way of verifying the proposition, even in principle, exists, this sentence expresses no propositions- it is not a cognitively significant utterance.

## **Wittgenstein**

Logical positivism is often thought to have been initiated by a remark of Wittgenstein in the Tractatus (early Wittgenstein) that “philosophy is not a theory but an activity”.. According to him, philosophy is nothing but analysis and discussion of language. The language is nothing, but a symbolic expression of facts of experience. Entire fabric of language can be analyzed in compound statement which in turn could be analyzed in simple statements. Simple proposition is mirror or reflection of reality. If proposition is correspondent to facts, it is true, otherwise false. For example

1. “Ripe mango is sweet” is true as it corresponds to fact.
2. “King of Nepal is Muslim” is false.

Thus, it follows from logical analysis of language that each linguistic expression is directly or indirectly connected with some or other facts of experience. It implies that if any linguistic expression fails to show any connection with any fact, then it is pseudo-proposition. It is not merely connected with any fact, but it is impossible to think that it can be so connected.

For example, God exists. It is neither true nor false. It is pseudo proposition.

According to Wittgenstein, metaphysical language is confusing and problems unreal. These problems are due to conscious or unconscious abuse of language. Hence, it is the business of philosophy to remove the veil of secrecy and to show that metaphysical problems are unreal. Wittgenstein refuses to consider metaphysical statements as propositions because they by definition transcend experience. Hence, they cannot be verified and hence, they must be rejected as meaningless.

Metaphysicians claim that these are not based upon any external experience, rather are based on internal experience. However, Wittgenstein does not recognize this. He says that they cannot be known unless they are expressed. Once expressed, these should be linked with some objective reality and therefore verifiable. But, metaphysical statements are unverifiable. Therefore, they cannot be claimed to be based upon any experience.

On the basis of verification theory, Wittgenstein claims that metaphysical statements are deprived ‘of objective referent and therefore are unverifiable.

## Rudolph Carnap

Whereas Wittgenstein rejects and condemns metaphysics due to lack of objective referent, Car nap rejects it because linguistic analysis of metaphysical statements show them to be devoid of any meaning or sense. According to him, metaphysical statements are sterile. They may have literal meaning, but on closer analysis, they are senseless.

As to determine the meaning of an expression, Car nap led down following criteria. Elementary sentences must serve four purposes:

- a. From what sentences elementary sentences are derived and what types of sentences are produced by these elementary sentences?
- b. Under what circumstances, elementary sentences are true or false?
- c. How can we verify elementary sentences?
- d. What is the meaning of elementary sentences?

On the application of these rules to metaphysical expression, we find that they do not satisfy any of these criteria. For example, consider God. According to some, he is person whereas according to some other, he is personal. For some, he is outside the world, while others, within the world. For some beyond experience, while for others within the reach.

Hence, all these are contradictory, in metaphysics; many expressions like this are used. When we say that “all reality is mental”, it is incomprehensible as to what we mean by all. We can experience this or that, but there is no experience of all. Therefore, it can be concluded that metaphysical expressions are utterly devoid of meaning, so they are unverifiable. Sometimes, metaphysicians make use of meaningful words, but syntax is such that sentence as a whole becomes meaningless though all individual words used are meaningful. Car nap calls such statements as pseudo-concepts.

Metaphysicians claim that assertion of metaphysics is not based upon experience of ordinary man, rather they are based upon experience of highly spiritual and elevated persons who have developed extraordinary powers of intuitive knowledge and these cannot be evaluated by ordinary rational standards. For example, if a blind man rejects color report of a normal person as he is not having experience of it, then it would simply mean running away from fact. The same is true of metaphysics.

However, Car nap rejects this argument. According to him, no statement can earn the title of meaningful until and unless it is fully supported by empirical evidence which may validate or invalidate.

## A. J. Ayer

He made a distinction between philosophy and metaphysics. Though philosophy and science are closely related, but metaphysics has no relation with philosophy because metaphysics is related to those realms which has no connection with observable facts and none of metaphysical statements are scientifically verifiable. Thus, these are not only distinct, but mutually exclusive. Hence, metaphysical statements should be rejected as meaningless and senseless.

For example, concept of God cannot be empirically verified. Metaphysicians claim that God can be known through intuition. However, it can be argued that intuition cannot be verified scientifically. Infact, there is no criteria to distinguish between intuitive knowledge and hallucination.

According to him, existence is of two types:

1. Empirical which is experientiable through sense-organs and hence, verifiable.
2. Transcendental. That which is beyond experience and hence, is not verifiable.

Through the principle of verification; a particular fact can be verified. Any statement which is neither true nor false and beyond the scope of verification is meaningless. Such propositions are pseudo-statements.

For example, God is in heaven. It has no meaning because it is beyond experience. On the basis of the principle of verification; Ayer has classified propositions in three categories:

1. Verifiable.
2. Not verifiable, but given suitable apparatus, they can be verified.
3. Those statements which are impossible to verify

Further, he makes distinction:

1. Strong verifiability. That is which practically verifiable.
2. Weak verifiability. That is not directly or practically verifiable, but possible in future. For example, life on Mars.

Thus, according to Ayer, a proposition is meaningful if we can discover some practical and demonstrable instances. However, if we follow such criteria, then it may make many historical and scientific statements as meaningless. So, in order to avoid such situation, A. J. Ayer has given modified version of principle of verifiability, that is, "a proposition is meaningful only if it is possible in principle or in practice to have sense perception which can directly or indirectly show that it is true or false or at least more or less probable.

### **Critical comments: Logical Positivism**

- 1) They have deprived philosophy of its traditional functions of being surveyors of knowledge and determiner of what constitutes valid knowledge and to reveal to man the hidden laws of universe.
- 2) They have restricted philosophy to a narrow and technical function of evaluating scientific assertions.
- 3) They have overvalued science and failed to recognize that philosophy is science of sciences.
- 4) Principle of verification is grossly exaggerated. There are many beliefs which are so fundamental that without them life is meaningless, but they are unverifiable. Moreover, verification principle is itself unverifiable.
- 5) Their conception of knowledge is too mechanical. They are mistaken in rejecting value and importance of imagination and creativity.
- 6) Concepts like God, soul, other-worldliness, etc. have great pragmatic value and give some kind of religious consolation and satisfies practical interest of man.

# Later Wittgenstein

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## Meaning and use

Wittgenstein in his work “philosophical investigation” says that meaning of a word is not fixed, but it acquires meaning through use. The whole enterprise of finding a common fixed essence of language is faulty. The term language does not stand for a single phenomenon. There is no single or fundamental use of language, but lot of diversity and multiplicity.

The same word has multiple usages. He says that just that instrument in tool box has various functions; the words too have various functions. Further, we can compare different parts of speech in a sentence with the lines on a map which have different functions such as frontiers, boundaries, meridian, etc. A un-instructed person sees a mass of lines without knowing their meaning. Words are like pieces on the game of chess.

Many traditional disputes in the philosophy such as about the nature of universe, mind, etc. arises from the futile attempt to assimilate the varied use of linguistic expression to those of proper nouns. Hence, according to Wittgenstein, we need to look for different uses in different contexts instead of looking for a fixed meaning.

## Language-games

Wittgenstein was interested in language in order to understand the nature of philosophy. The philosophical task is not to correct, but to understand propositions. All philosophical problems are language generated. So, we need to understand the logic of language in order to demolish the problem.

According to Wittgenstein, surface grammar impresses upon us the meaning of word immediately, while depth grammar is application of words. For example,

1. All roses have thorns.
2. All roads have length.

Surface grammar of both is similar. The difference is in depth grammar. In the questions “Do roses have thorns?” and “Do roads have length?” we can imagine roses without thorns, but not roads without length. Hence, surface grammar confuses, but depth confusion shows the reality.

Language is not a uniform thing, but constituted of many divergent activities such as describing, reporting, informing, etc. But, it is futile to try to discover some hidden unity among them. Language is a part of life. Language game may be helpful to gain deeper understanding of language. The concept of game can be understood only on terms of rules. In terms of rules, Wittgenstein shows how a name becomes meaningful. Naming and describing are not same. Naming is a preparation for describing or description. It is like putting the pieces on the chessboard:-There is no single theory by which phenomenon of language can be explained. Each language game is governed

by its own rules and if the rules of one are applied to another, philosophical problems arise.

He also referred to family resemblance. Just as the family members of a family resemble one another, linguistic activity also resembles one another. They form a family. There is no single essence or common feature.

He realizes that ideal language is not possible and hence becomes interested in ordinary language. He realizes that language is not static, but dynamic and evolutionary like an ancient city always growing. It is a continuous process. Meaning changes in the form of life and to explain this, it takes the help of language game. Change of context changes the meaning of word. So life is the best book to understand language.

### **Wittgenstein and Religion**

Ludwig Wittgenstein took religion very seriously, even to the point of considering the priesthood. Nevertheless, he was opposed to natural theology, the attempt to demonstrate the existence of God from evidence in the natural world, and to the development of religious doctrines. He was more interested in religious symbol and ritual.

In his later works Wittgenstein understood language to be not a fixed structure directly corresponding to the way things actually are, but rather to be a human activity susceptible to the vicissitudes of human life and practice. Language does not offer 'a picture of reality, he argued, but rather it is a set of activities which he described as "language games." The concept of a language game was "to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of life." Wittgenstein uses the example of a builder to make the point:

"The language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B. A is building with building-stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stones, in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words "block," "pillar," "slab," "beam." A calls them out; - B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call.

In teaching language, one needs to be able to respond to words in certain contexts; speech and action work together. In many cases, then, the meaning of a word is its use in the language. For Wittgenstein, this is true in religious discourse as it is elsewhere. Thus in speaking of God or Brahman or\_ nirvana or the dao, the meanings of such words have more to do with their use than with their denotation. The language games of the\_1-religions reflect the practices and forms\of life of the various religious adherents, and so religious claims should not be taken as providing literal pictures of reality which somehow lie beyond these activities.

## Critic of Private Language Argument

### Private Language?

"If someone were to behave as if they understood a language which no-one else can make sense of, we might call this an example of a private language". However, it is not sufficient here.

The Private Language Argument is a philosophical argument introduced by Ludwig Wittgenstein, in whose Sense, a private language must be in principle incapable of translation into an ordinary language, for example it were to describe those inner experiences supposed to be inaccessible to others. The private language mentioned is not one that in fact can be understood by one person, but a language that in principle can only be understood by one person. A private language must be un learnable and un translatable.

There are a series debates or discussions on the Private Language Argument. For examples:

- **The Sensation S**

It is a thought experiment set up by Wittgenstein, in which someone is imagined to associate some recurrent sensation with a symbol by writing S when the sensation occurs. In Wittgenstein's sense, such a case can be regarded as an example of Private Language.

- **Memory skepticism**

There exists possibility that one might misremember the sensation, and therefore one does not have any firm criterion for using S in each time feeling the sensation. In other words, when you trying to use a symbol to represent a sensation, when next time another sensation comes, you are not sure whether it is the same sensation you feel previously. Thus the symbol used is not firm.

- **Meaning Skepticism**

The problem with a private ostensive definition is also unable to lead to a meaningful statement. Since the symbol S the person use to represent that sensation is a part of private language, it is impossible to provide an explicit definition of S. In other Words, there is no way to check the meaning of S.

- **The Beetle in a Box.**

This is another thought experiment presented by Wittgenstein. Imagine a community in which everyone has a box containing a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. It is entirely possible that each person has a completely different beetle in his or her box, but they all use word, "beetle" to represent it. It is an analogy to pain, science pain can only be felt by individuals themselves, so any name of pain is possible that in everyone's own World, means different pain in indeed.

- For example, when we are talking about something is "red", is the color sensed by each individual the same? Different from "pain" described in The Beetle in a Box experiment, there is an object with "Red" ' color we can justify the term "red" by saying "the color of that object is Red". However, it does not change the fact that the color we actually perceive may vary between individuals. So the "Red" I am saying, may not be the same "Red" in another person's world.
- Similarly, if we ask people to put hands into hot water, they can feel the pain. We can symbolize this pain as "Pain H", and say "the pain you feel when you put hands into hot water is "Pain H". Still, different people feel different "Pain H". For example, it is possible to have someone who actually does not feel any pain but comfort after putting their hand into hot water, then "Pain H" means comfort to them in this scenario.

Moreover, if we have an object with a specific color, called "Color Number 30". A normal person highly possibly will be unable to remember the exact color afterwards, and the same Memory Skepticism like private language occurs.

Wittgenstein, in the Philosophical Investigations, argued that it was impossible to have what is termed a private language. In other words, if you grew up alone on a desert island — I know there would be logistical difficulties — you would not develop an internal language because you have no one to develop an external one with.

This point is an important one. Consider the meaning of everyday words — "red", "bus", "clever" ~ how do we learn what they mean? Wittgenstein would argue that it is through being part of a society of language users. Now, if I refer to myself and my experiences in words that I have learnt through conversation with others, my personal experiences are, in some way, largely public.

For example, if I find something funny, I laugh. When I do so, I am using a form of language. My understanding that something is funny, the reactions of others that I call "laughing", my own laughter, are all part of a public language. So, even when I find something funny and no one else does, I am using a public language to express my behavior.

## **What is the Main Issue then?**

In my view, the Private Language Argument falls into the fundamental philosophical debates and discussion on Metaphysics. It is actually about which one, "soul" or "body", is the dominating part of our world.

If we think "soul" is the dominating part, then we can explain Private Language Argument by saying since the "world" will not even exist if the "soul" vanish, then all the symbols, no matter from public or private language, that I learned during my life time are totally private. The argument starts from that my "world" is not your "world" and different from anyone else'. Everyone has his or her own "world" and that world vanish when his or her "soul" vanish, like passed away. It sounds quite untrue, but it

is a claim you cannot prove it wrong. How to prove the world you see and feel right now will still continue after you were dead?

Let me put it in another way. Imagine your whole "world" is simulated by a giant computer from the beginning, so everything in that "world" is actually virtual and the languages, no matter in the sense of public or private, are all your private language. Thus when game is over, the whole world will vanish. There does not even exist the argument between public and private language at all.

On the other side, if we believe "body" is the dominating part, which our "soul", or thoughts are just reflection of our "body" actions, like the brain activity is the source of any thought. Then the Private Language Argument becomes invalid since we assume the "world" I have is the same "world" everyone else has. In which sense, we can have assumptions such as "the body structure of you is similar to my body structure, so the 'Red' you perceive, is the "Red" I perceive too". Under such assumptions, for the sensation S example, since the sensation is just one of the millions (or more, but limited) of the brain states, eventually you can express it by that state if our technology is advanced enough to sense the state of the brain thoroughly. Thus, the sensation S can be explicitly expressed by the state codes, which makes it, belong to a non-private language.

So, I would-like to argue the private language argument is there, and it also stems from the very fundamental philosophical problem about our world.

# **11. Phenomenology -E.HUSSERL**

It is a philosophical method for investigating the phenomenon, that is, true nature of things. It is a-priori and intuitive investigation of phenomenon. According to Husserl, it involves descriptive analysis of subjective process

Phenomenology is different from phenomenism which is a type of theory according to which all objects of knowledge are collection of experience.

- ⊕ Hume says objects are collection of sense experience.
- ⊕ According to logical positivists, object statements can be translated into sense data statements. However, phenomenology deals with essences, but not with sense experience.
- ⊕ Kant takes phenomenon in the sense of sense experience and makes distinction between noumenon and phenomenon. However, this distinction is rejected by Husserl.
- ⊕ By phenomenology, Hegel meant different stages in the development of consciousness. However, Husserl used this word in different sense altogether. According to Husserl, it is the study of phenomenon that is appearances of things or things as they appear in our experience or the ways we experience things.

## **Phenomenology as rigorous science**

Husserl wanted to develop philosophy as a rigorous science or science of sciences. For this, phenomenology must begin with the absolute poverty, that is, no asset, no assumptions. This means philosophy should be free from all pre-suppositions. Husserl says that we are afflicted with certain primitive outlook or naturalistic belief which conceals the true nature of a thing. What we take as nature of objects is only concealment. True nature has been concealed and phenomenon is the true nature. However, this concealment is contingent and hence, can be removed. So, Husserl's slogan is, "Back to origin of things".

Husserl aims to find self-proved, self-given base and for this, he devises a suitable method known as phenomenological method, that is, through this methodology, concealment will be removed and true phenomenon (essence) would be reached.

He wanted to study the true nature of things given in our consciousness.

## **Distortions/Affliction**

Husserl says that our experience is distorted as it is afflicted with various pre-suppositions, theories, pinions, judgments, prejudices, etc. Thus, Husserl wants to know what the primordial presentation of our experience, free from all distortions and deformations, is. This primordial form or essence will be completely objective and self-proved. But Husserl finds a major hurdle in his methodology. He says that we are very much influenced, attached or distorted by two types of beliefs and attitudes. These are

1. Psychological beliefs
2. Naturalistic beliefs

### Psychological beliefs

It is also known as psychologism.

- ✚ Under its influence, many thinkers do not merely confine themselves to the psychological explanation of mental states, but try to explain any philosophical, logical, mathematical ideals in terms of law of psychology.
- ✚ They define even logic as a science that studies actual operation of mind
- ✚ Psychology treats consciousness as a set of mental states. These states are rapidly changing and also they are subjective. They cannot give necessary and universal truths of math's and logic.
- ✚ Finally, psychologism leads to relativism and skepticism

### Naturalistic beliefs

Along with psychologism, naturalistic attitudes should also be removed.

- According to naturalistic beliefs, whatever is given in sense experience is taken as true. In other words, they take everything belonging to nature as objectively true and anything which is not part of nature is rejected.
- It is believed that natural laws are capable of explaining all possible phenomena and hence, all theories other than this should be rejected as myths and superstitions.
- Moreover, they also naturalize consciousness. For them, consciousness is identical to brain and brain is a physical thing.
- They further say that psychology is no longer the study of psychic, but the behaviour of the body based on stimulus-response formula.

Husserl admires Descartes for using method of doubt and making cogito starting point of foundation of all philosophical thoughts. But criticizes Descartes that he indirectly pre-supposes the existence of natural world

Hence, according to Husserl, it is necessary to reject both psychological and naturalistic attitudes in order to grasp the real nature of thing as they present themselves in our consciousness.

But, a rigorous science also implies rejection of all presuppositions. For example

1. Deductive systems are based on certain sets of axioms or postulates. No deductive system tries to prove its axioms and hence, these axioms are nothing but pre-supposition
2. Rationalists assume that reason has the capacity to know all possible things. Next, empiricist believes that whatever is given in the sense experience is infallible.
3. Kant was a critical thinker, but he also took for granted the possibilities of scientific knowledge.
4. Even Hegel, the great critical philosopher, assumes that dialectical method can reveal everything.

Thus, according to Husserl, these pre-suppositions including two kinds of beliefs distort consciousness

- Naturalistic beliefs pollute consciousness from outside (external impurities) and
- Psychological beliefs pollute or distort our consciousness from inside (internal impurities).

So, the process through which consciousness is purified and through which we reach the original nature is phenomenological reduction.

## **Phenomenological reduction**

It is a radical, rigorous and transformative meditative technique whereby one is able to liberate oneself from the captivation in which one is held. According to Husserl, once one is liberated from this captivation in an acceptedness, one is able to view the world as the world of essences free from contamination, impurities, prejudices, biasness or pre-suppositions. This is the technique whereby stripping or purification occurs. The technique itself has two basic moments. These are:

1. Epoche
2. Reduction proper.

These are the two basic internal moments of the phenomenological reduction, mutually required and mutually conditioned. The moments are internal, logical moments and do not refer to two stages. Epoche purifies consciousness from external influence, that is, naturalistic belief and reduction proper purifies-consciousness internally, that is, from psychologism. Through these two basic moments, we can grasp the true nature or essence of the things given in consciousness.

## Epoche

By epoche, Husserl means bracketing, disconnection, making inactive, suspension, setting aside, standing at a distance, etc. In this methodology, Husserl was greatly influenced by Cartesian method of doubt. The aim of Descartes was to make enquiry free from distractions to reach those ideas which are clear and distinct and thus, are criteria of truth. Under Cartesian method's influence, Husserl implies his own method of epoch into make an impartial enquiry possible. For this purpose, he proposes to put all the things that create obstacles into brackets, that is, setting aside all scientific and metaphysical theories.

Husserl says that we live our lives in what he terms as **captivation-in-an-acceptedness**, that is, we live our lives in an unquestioning sort of way. We take for granted our bodies, culture, language, etc. Everyone accepts it and this acceptance is what keeps us in captivity. Epoche is a procedure whereby we no longer accept it. We simply bracket, suspend or put out of action for the time being. But, this withdrawal or suspension of the beliefs is not the denial of the world; it does not mean negation of the world. Second implication of the epoche is that who it is that is doing the suspension and this directly concerns the moment of the reduction proper.

Merely bracketing does not take us to the essence as it only purifies consciousness from external impurities. Consciousness is still impure under the influence of psychological attitude or internal deformation. For this, a series of reductions is required. Hence, it logically requires second internal basic moment, that is, reduction proper.

## Reduction proper

Here, we can understand all the transcendental insight in which we blast open captivation-in-an-acceptedness. It is recognition of that acceptance as an acceptance. It is transcendental precisely because it is an insight outside the acceptedness that is holding us in captive. The kind of seeing is more like the kind of seeing that occurs when one discovers that mud or the carpet was put there by oneself and not by another as was accepted.

According to Husserl, reduction proper consists of three types of reductions:

1. Psychological reduction.
2. Eidetic reduction.
3. Transcendental reduction.

### **1. Psychological reduction.**

It refers to the purification of consciousness. Generally, it stands for the elimination of mental states like mood, feelings, happiness, biasness, etc. These mental states create problems and pure consciousness is unable to function in its purity.

## **2. Eiditic reduction.**

The objects presented in the consciousness are also to be free from accidental properties and characteristics. Only after this consciousness can grasp the pure phenomena or the essence of things. Once the object is dissociated with the accompanied, accidental characteristics, consciousness can directly perceive the essence. These essences cannot be perceived through sense-experience

Only eiditic intuition can grasp the essence. Such intuition can directly perceive the essence in the same manner as our eyes can directly see the shape, size and color of the things. In the beginning, Husserl thought like John Locke that we can abstract essence from the observed object. But, later he rejected it and asserted that essence is directly given in object Even one instance of particular object is enough.

The essences which are received in this manner are in some sense like Plato's ideas. They are universal, but for Husserl they cannot exist independent of consciousness. These essences are universal, but are necessarily correlates of consciousness. But, this does not mean that they are modifications of consciousness.

They are given to the consciousness. For this reason, Husserl calls these essences neither real nor unreal, but irreal. The essence can be described in a-priori manner. In essence, they are meaning, not existing object. Even when the existent object is destroyed, the meaning persists. These meanings are essences given in pure consciousness. For this reason, Husserl takes them to be primordial. They are not influenced by anything, internal and external and hence, they become the basis of objectivity.

## **3. Transcendental reduction.**

But, the process of reduction is still incomplete. The consciousness in which the essences are represented cannot be consciousness of any particular individual. Hence, transcendental reduction is needed in which empirical or psychological ego is also reduced. Pure consciousness is not the property of any ego substance. Husserl has full admiration for Descartes for making cogito as the starting point of philosophy. But, according to Husserl, Descartes could not grasp the implication of his own revolutionary discovery.

Cogito is not a particular self and consciousness is not the property of any particular individual ego which is itself constructed by consciousness. Pure consciousness, what Husserl calls transcendental consciousness, is entirely different from particularized consciousness. That is, empirical self is to be bracketed in order to reach the pure consciousness. Self must be transcendent. If empirical ego is transcended, what remains is pure consciousness.

At this level, phenomenological reduction reaches rock bottom. It means after all reductions, we reach the level of transcendental consciousness which cannot be further -reduced. Husserl calls it as foundation of all things; wonder of all wonders and which can never be bracketed.

Husserl says that original form of a thing is given by the consciousness. It is in the consciousness and it is for the consciousness. It is through phenomenological

methodology we have reached to the consciousness which is the pure phenomenon. Thus, according to Husserl, phenomenon is the consciousness and is the ultimate reality. Ordinary objects are phenomenon when we look at their invariant, necessary and universal aspects.

According to Husserl, consciousness is intentional. By intentionality of consciousness, it is meant that it refers to something other than itself. Thus, it is objectified. Husserl's doctrine of intentionality asserts that all consciousness is consciousness of something other than itself. Husserl claims that intentionality is able to solve a number of philosophical problems such as:

1. It overcomes the duality of subject and object. No consciousness can be devoid of something. Consciousness is a stream, a flow which has two poles, that is, subjective pole and objective pole.
2. It also gives the unity of various perceptual aspects of a thing. For example, spoken word goes but it retains some meaning.

Phenomenology is not merely methodology, but is a philosophy. This is a philosophy of discovering phenomena and description of consciousness. Phenomenological reduction methodology is integral part of this whole philosophy.

# Existentialism

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## The Problem of Being or Existence

Ever since the inception of reflective thought, the problem of Being and Existence has loomed large in the minds of philosopher, saints and seers. In ancient Indian Upanishads we find direct reference to this question in the form of an inquiry into the quintessence or the element in man which survives death and destruction, that is, which is unaffected by Becoming or change. The philosophers of East as well as West, of the ancient as well as modern times have all been seriously preoccupied by the problem of Existence.

In short, no philosopher can avoid considering the ontological problems and thus all philosophies are at bottom existentialists. Then, how is the modern Existentialist different? and why do we not call other philosophies existentialism?

The reason is that modern Existentialism is concerned, unlike other philosophies more with the problem of becoming than the problem of being; more with particulars than universals; more with existence than essence. As the father of modern existentialism, S. Kierkegaard puts it, the chief concern of an existentialist Christian is not the knowledge of rules and principles of Christianity but "how am I to become a Christian." The non-Christian or atheist existentialists substitute the word "Authentic Being" for the term Christian. Thus the existentialists have emphasized "Action" and "Choice" instead of usual emphasis on knowledge and explanation, and replaced the question of what? by How?

## CHIEF CHARACTERISTICS OF EXISTENTIALISM

It is plain from the above account that in Existentialism, human person and his freedom are given great importance. According to Existentialism personal growth and development can take place through the Individual's own efforts and none can help him in this regard. Thus the practical problems of living are attached great value and importance.

Briefly, the chief characteristics of Existentialism are the following:-

1. **Criticism against Idealism**— Existentialism has emerged and developed as a reaction against Idealism, Existentialist philosophers are highly critical of Idealism and conceptualism

According to idealism human person is essentially an expression of some underlying spiritual or psychic element which is of universal character: that is all men are fundamentally same and share with each other the universal character. It is this common character which truly defines the man. Therefore the human freedom is subject to the good of humanity in general.

2. There is no arbitrariness or individual will accounting for human freedom. But the existentialists criticize idealist's contention about universal element and man's good being subject to general good. They regard the search for essence a

mistaken pursuit and according to them it is not the essence but existence which is real.

3. **Criticism of Naturalism-** The existentialist philosophers are also critical of the philosophy of Naturalism. According to naturalists, life is subject to physico-bio-chemical laws, which, in turn, are subject to the universal law of causation. According to the law of causation whatever happens is due to antecedent causes and there is no-event which can appear suddenly without some or other cause. Thus if the law of causation is universally operative there can be no human freedom of action.

This, however, is anathemas to the existentialists and they stoutly defend the freedom of man. As a matter of fact, man is so free, according to Sartre that he is fearful of his freedom.

4. **Criticism of the Scientific Philosophy —** Besides being critical of- idealism and naturalism, the existentialist philosophers are also critical of scientific conceptualism also. Science abstracts from the immediate date and brings them under some universal law or general rule, whereas, according to existentialists all abstraction is false, reality is in the immediate data only.

Furthermore, with the tremendous progress in science and technology, rapid industrialization and urbanization has taken place. This has given rise to crowded towns in which an individual is lost. Everything is done or happens on at large scale and all personal values, individual likes and dislikes, are altogether lost sight of Today it is not the individual who chooses his end; rather all decisions are made by computers or statistical laws and data.

Thus science has made the value of man negligible. It is the basic belief of existentialism that any true 'philosophy' must be grounded in Axiology or theory of values and not in epistemology or theory of knowledge.

5. **Born of Despair** -As has been indicated above, on account of an unparalleled progress in science and technology, huge industrial complexes and townships have sprung. Everywhere man is losing touch of nature. In big towns the problems and inner conflicts of man have multiplied phenomenally.

The two world wars have completely—shaken man's faith in world's future and philosophy. With the growing application of technology and consequent increase in the mechanization of life, there is growing despair in the minds and hearts of men. The world of human efforts is decreasing and the life is becoming like a raft on the open sea which is carried hither and thither without any definite direction.

Under these circumstances a sensitive mind finds him-self lost and forlorn. The existentialists try to analyze and describe these human predicaments and find a way out of these.

6. **Value of Human Personality—** From the observations made above about existentialism, it is obvious that existentialism recognizes the paramountcy of

the human personality. As a matter of fact, for an existentialist “Man” is the centre of the universe and nothing else is equal to it. Even Brahman, god, universe etc. are subsidiary to “man”.

The basic features of human person is his Freedom ~ unfettered and unrestrained. Society and social institutions are for the sake of man and not vice versa as is believed by idealists and others. There is no general will to which the “individual will” is subject. If any social law or principle is restrictive of human freedom it is invalid and unjust.

7. **Importance of subjectivity-** The Danish philosopher S. Kierkegaard has said that truth is subjective. Truth is subjectivity; objectivity and obstruction are hallucinations. While scientists lay so exclusive stress on the objectivity and consider any intrusions by subjective elements as wholly unwarranted and vicious; the existentialists are extremists who believe that only the immediate feeling or apprehension reveals the truth and that abstraction in any form or manners vitiates the truth and reality.

The immediate experience by individuals of things results in Conflict, divisiveness, pain, anguish, anxiety, suffocation etc. It is these conflicts and pains that tell a person the quality of his life and the business of philosophy is to analyze and describe these conflicts and trace their causes.

Usually these conflicts are moral in nature and are indicative of inauthentic existence the various existentialists have tried to describe in minute details the experiences like spiritual crisis; sexual crisis, marital crisis etc. The existentialist thinking is beyond thinking and reasoning and is rooted in direct experiences and their unguarded descriptions.

A biographical account, if honest, sincere and frank, usually helps in appreciating and understanding the truth of one's own situation. For example, a marital discord may be due to lack of respect for the other spouse and too much expectation of him, or her. An honest account of such an experience may help relieve tensions in many peruses of this account by providing them insight into their own problems.

Everyone probing into the depths of one's subjectivity can discover the truth of one's being and discover his authentic role in life. This is a creative process which gives rise to fresh insights. The man when he encounters his existence first-hand stands alone. It is only, when one is alone that one comes to grips with his true self. This ability to be alone, to stand by oneself, is the true freedom and this again is the basis of all morality. According to existentialists the origins of values is not in the social situation but in the personal insight.

8. **No Construction of Philosophical System-** From the ancient times philosophers have cogitated and pondered over problems of God, Soul, Space, Time, Physical world, its origin and evolution etc. They have tried to present philosophies which embraced all these problems and developed a theoretical system.

However, the existentialists distrust system making and theorization. According to them the true aim of philosophy is action and not theory. Therefore they do not cogitate over traditional problems.

9. **Emphasis on the problem of the relation of Individual and World** - Lastly, a problem which is thought to be crucial by the existentialists is the relation between individual and world. The traditional explanations to this problem are not satisfactory according to existentialists. If we after Hegel believe in the one universal element called Absolute whose magnification everything is, the individual has no value per se and is not free. According to Hegel, the acceptance of necessity is the true freedom.' This robs individual of all freedom and his unique quality. Such a view is repugnant to the existentialists; they therefore are consistently and consensually anti-Hegelian.

According to existentialists man cannot be considered subject to any law, rule or principle, be it a universal, natural, social or political law. They are uncompromisingly free-willists and are extremely wary of any external encroachment upon human freedom.

10. **Emphasis on the Problem of Inner Conflict** - The central problem of the modern highly complex world is not ideological but practical. It is neither relevant nor important today to win followers for a particular ideology or theory but to inspire men of a sense of responsibility and freedom. If there is this sense the process of "communication is facilitated.

The world peace cannot be accomplished by raising slogans. We require for this purpose individual who are free, who communicate freely and, above all, who respect theirs as well as other's personalities. A fortiori the peace is possible if and only if there is peace in each heart; if each man is free from inner conflicts, if each can be free from the desire to subject others to his will. That is why existentialists attach so great importance to the problem of inner conflict.

The traditional philosophies do not consider these problems philosophically worthwhile; but for existentialists these are extremely crucial and fundamental. the source of modern philosophical issues is the 'feeling of alienation from world, society as well as self. If we regard the existence and thought desperate, the problems arising out of this severance between reason and existence cannot be rationally solved. These can be resolved in practice only.

A true harmony is not a harmony of ideas or thoughts but a harmony of desires. A true philosopher is not a philosophy of substance but rather a philosophy of existence, a philosophy of immediate experiences. The true nature of philosophy is not thinking about the Being but participating in its movement,' that is, commitment.

The Existentialist philosophy does not have any definite aim because life being movement and flow which is not mere mechanical change but a creative advance, it is not possible to tie down life to any particular aim. Life cannot be aimless or having an aim but only inauthentic and authentic.

An authentic existence is the only aim that life has but this is not some future state but a present quality of life. An authentic life can be personal only. The existentialism condemns both historicism and the scientific philosophy.

## **Existence Precedes Thinking; Criticism of Descartes**

According to Kierkegaard, truth and existence are always prior to thinking. True knowledge is always subjective. It is direct, unmediated experience, Subjectivity is fundamental to all knowledge and- action. Kierkegaard is severely critical of Descartes assertion that thinking precedes existence. Cogito ergo Sum.

According to Kierkegaard the truth is just the opposite of it, We must be before any thinking is possible. As Kierkegaard puts this reversal of Descartes dictum, “I must exist in order, to think.” In the realm of Existence, “I” precedes “thinking,”<sup>5</sup> I must exist before there can be any activity of thinking in me. Therefore, even if logically thinking is the reason for our knowledge of the self and, therefore logically thinking precedes existence, but from the viewpoint of ontology or existence, “I” is prior of “though

It is a basic belief of all existentialists that in philosophy ontology is prior to and more fundamental than epistemology. According to Kierkegaard “I think”, entails the fact of the existence of “I”. Therefore Descartes’ dictum “I think;” therefore I exist” is a mere tautology, repetitive and superfluous addition of the proposition “I am” to the self-evident proposition “I think”. The philosophical mistake committed by Descartes was, according to Kierkegaard that he wanted to know “I” or “self” as an object, whereas the self is pure consciousness and ever a “Knower” and never the “known”. And the knower is always prior to the known and can never become an object of knowledge. All attempts to know the ‘self as an object, are doomed to failure.

The ‘self is not open to doubt; because all doubting originates in the self. The self itself is beyond doubt. The eminent Indian Advaitin Shankara is also of the view that the knowledge of self is the knowledge of the knower and this is very unlike the objective knowledge. Descartes has made a blanket attempt to prove his self as well as the selves of others to be objects, to be materials for knowing. This, however, is most unjustified.

As a matter of fact everyone possesses an intimate personal experience of his own self and there is no way our own experience or the similar experiences of others can be open to observation; only introspection hereof is possible.

## **Criticism of a Universal Self**

Kierkegaard has bitterly attacked the conception of “general self” or “universal spirit”. According to Kierkegaard philosophers have abstracted the idea of universal spirit from many individual selves, as we have the idea of hoarseness abstracted out of many horses. But this is not any “concrete” self but something which his objective and a product of reason. All products of reason have only logical status; these are not existential facts. Only particulars have existence; universal’ is an abstraction and exists only in thought or reason.

# Soren Kierkegaard

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The Problems of Boredom, Anxiety, and Despair Boredom, anxiety, and despair are the human psyche's major problems, and Kierkegaard spends most of his writing diagnosing these three ills.

1. People are bored when they are not being stimulated, either physically or mentally. Relief from boredom can only be fleeting. Passion, a good play, Bach, or a stimulating conversation might provide momentary relief from boredom, but the relief doesn't last. Boredom is not merely a nuisance: a psychologically healthy human must find some way to avert boredom.
2. Conflicts between one's ethical duty and One's religious duty cause anxiety. Social systems of ethics often lead one to make choices that are detrimental to one's spiritual health, and vice versa. The tension between these conflicting duties causes anxiety, and like boredom, anxiety must be escaped for a person to be happy.
3. Finally, despair is a result of the tension between the finite and the infinite. Humans are frightened of dying, but they are also frightened of existing forever. Kierkegaard believed that everyone would die but also that everyone had an immortal self, or soul, that would go on forever.

Boredom and anxiety can be alleviated in various ways, but the only way to escape despair is to have total faith in God. Having total faith in God, however, was more than simply attending church regularly and behaving obediently. Faith required intense personal commitment and a dedication to unending self-analysis. Kierkegaard thought that 'having total faith in God, and thus escaping despair, was extremely difficult as well as extremely important.

## Stages on Life's Way

Kierkegaard proposed that the individual passed through three stages on the way to becoming a true self: the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious. Each of these "stages on life's way" represents competing views 'on life and as such potentially conflicts with one another."

Kierkegaard takes the unusual step of having each stage of life described and represented by a different pseudonymous character. Thus, it becomes too difficult to ascertain which propositions Kierkegaard himself upholds. This fits with Kierkegaard's characteristic tendency to avoid dictating answers. He preferred that readers reach their own conclusions.

## **1. Aesthetic Stage:**

- The aesthetic is the realm of sensory experience and pleasures. The aesthetic life is defined by pleasures, and to live the aesthetic life to the fullest one must seek to maximize those pleasures.
- Increasing one's aesthetic pleasures is one way to combat boredom, and Kierkegaard described many methods of doing so.
- He proposes that the anticipation of an event often exceeds the pleasure of the event itself, and so he suggests ways of drawing out anticipation. One suggestion is to leave all of your mail for three days before opening it.
- Unplanned events can, at times, lead to pleasures as great as anticipation, but the pleasure of planned events is almost entirely in the anticipation.

The importance of the aesthetic is acknowledged, but it is also presented as an immature stage. The aesthete is only concerned with his or her personal enjoyment, and because aesthetic pleasure is so fleeting, an aesthete has no solid framework from which to make coherent, consistent choices.

Eventually the pleasures of the aesthetic wear thin, and one must begin seeking the ethical pleasures instead. The ethical life actually offers certain pleasures the aesthetic life cannot. An aesthete can never do something solely for the good of someone else, but we all know that doing things for others without personal motives can actually be incredibly enjoyable.

## **2. The Ethical as the Second Stage on Life's Way**

Ethics are the social rules that govern how a person ought to act. Ethics are not always in opposition to aesthetics, but they must take precedence when the two conflict. The aesthetic life must be subordinated to the ethical life, as the ethical life is based on a consistent, coherent set of rules established for the good of society.

A person can still experience pleasure while living the ethical life. The ethical life serves the purpose of allowing diverse people to coexist in harmony and causes individuals to act for the good of society. The ethical person considers the effect his or her actions will have on others and gives more weight to promoting social welfare than to achieving personal gain. The ethical life also affords pleasures that the aesthetic does not. Aesthetics steers one away from consistency, since repetition can lead to boredom. An ethical person doesn't simply enjoy things because they're novel but makes ethical choices because those choices evoke a higher set of principles.

Kierkegaard uses marriage as an example of an ethical life choice. In marriage, the excitement of passion can quickly fade, leading to boredom and a diminishing of aesthetic pleasure. However, by consistently acting for the good of one's spouse, one learns that there are enjoyments beyond excitement.

Still the ethical life does little to nurture One's spiritual self. The ethical life diverts one from self-exploration since it requires an individual to follow a set of socially accepted norms and regulations. According to Kierkegaard, self-exploration is necessary for faith, the key requirement for a properly religious life.

### **3. The Religious as Third Stage on Life's Way**

Kierkegaard considers the religious life to be the highest-plane of existence. He also believes that almost no one lives a truly religious life. He is concerned with how to be "a Christian in Christendom"~in other words, how to lead an authentically religious life while surrounded by people who are falsely religious.

For Kierkegaard, the relationship with God is exclusively personal, and he believed the large-scale religion of the church (i.e., Christendom) distracts people from that personal relationship. Kierkegaard passionately criticized the Christian Church for what he saw as its interference in the personal spiritual quest each true Christian must undertake.

In the aesthetic life, one is ruled by passion.

In the ethical life, one is ruled by societal regulations.

In the religious life, one is ruled by total faith in God.

One can never be truly free, and this causes boredom, anxiety, and despair". True faith doesn't lead to freedom, but it relieves the psychological effects of human existence. Kierkegaard claims that the only way to make life worthwhile is to embrace faith in God, and that faith necessarily involves embracing the absurd.

One has faith in God, but one cannot believe in God. We believe in things that we can prove, but we can only have faith in things that are beyond our understanding. For example, we believe in gravity: we feel its effects constantly, which we recognize as proof of gravity's existence. It makes no sense, though, to say we have faith in gravity, since that would require the possibility that, someday, gravity would fail to materialize. Faith requires uncertainty, and thus we can have faith in God because God is beyond logic, beyond proof, and beyond reason. There's no rational evidence for God, but this is exactly what allows people to have faith in him.

### **The Pleasures of Repetition and Recollection**

Repetition and recollection are two contrasting ways of trying to maximize enjoyment. Repetition serves multiple purposes for Kierkegaard-

1. First, it has an important aesthetic function. People want to repeat particularly enjoyable experiences, but the original pleasure is often lost in the repeating. This is due to the expectation that things will be just the same the second time as the first time. The pleasure of expectation clouds the fact that the original experience wasn't undertaken with a specific idea of the joy it would cause.

2. Repetition can produce powerful feelings but usually only when the experience occurs unplanned. In this case, the pleasure might even be magnified at the sudden resurgence of happy memories—in other words, the recollection. There is pleasure in planned repetition, but it is a comfortable pleasure, not an exciting one.
3. While repetition offers the joy of anticipation—joy that seldom materializes in the actual event—recollection offers the joy of remembering a particularly happy event.
4. Recollection can be cultivated along with the imagination to increase one's day-to-day aesthetic pleasure. Often, recalling a pleasant occurrence is more enjoyable than repeating the same event: remembering the Christmases of your childhood is often more pleasant than Christmas is in adulthood. Indeed, much of the pleasure of Christmas, for an older person, can come from nostalgia.
5. The pleasures of recollection, which are best enjoyed alone, are well suited to the aesthetic life.

Unplanned repetition is a truly aesthetic pleasure as well, while planned repletion, such as that represented by marriage, and affords more ethical pleasures than aesthetic ones.

## Fear and Trembling

Fear and Trembling centers on the biblical story of Abraham. Abraham, childless after 80 years, prays for son. God grants his wish, and Abraham has Isaac. Thirty years later, God orders Abraham to kill his son. Abraham prepares to kill Isaac, but at the last second God spares Isaac and allows Abraham to sacrifice a ram instead.

Fear and Trembling includes four different retellings of the story, each with a slightly different viewpoint.

1. In the first version, Abraham decides to kill Isaac in accordance with God's will. Abraham convinces Isaac that he's doing it by his own will, not by God's; this is a lie, but Abraham says to himself that he would rather have Isaac lose faith in his father than lose faith in God.
2. In the second version, Abraham sacrifices a ram instead of Isaac. Even though God spares Isaac, Abraham's faith is shaken because God asked him to kill Isaac in the first place.
3. In the third version, Abraham decides not to kill Isaac and then prays to God to forgive him for having thought of sacrificing his son in the first place.

4. In the fourth version, Abraham can't go through with killing Isaac. Isaac begins to question his own faith due to Abraham's refusal to do what God commanded.

In the rest of *Fear and Trembling*, Kierkegaard examines his four retellings of the story of Abraham, focusing on the religious and the ethical. Kierkegaard claims that the killing of Isaac is ethically wrong but religiously right.

Kierkegaard also uses his retelling of the Abraham story to distinguish between faith and resignation. Abraham could have been resigned to kill Isaac just because God told him to do so and because he knew that God was always right. However, Kierkegaard claims that Abraham did "not act out of a resignation that God must always be obeyed but rather out of faith that God would not do something that was ethically wrong. Abraham knew that killing Isaac was ethically wrong, but he had faith that God would spare his son. Abraham decided to do something ethically wrong because having faith in God's good will was religiously right. Kierkegaard claims that the tension between ethics and religion causes Abraham anxiety.

Kierkegaard argues that his retellings of the story of Abraham demonstrate the importance of a "teleological suspension of the ethical." Teleological means "in regard to the end." If you are hungry and you eat something with the goal of no longer being hungry, then you made a teleological decision: you acted, "by eating, so as to achieve the end of no longer being hungry."

Abraham performs a teleological suspension of the ethical when he decides to kill Isaac. Abraham knows that killing Isaac is unethical. However, Abraham decides to suspend the ethical—in other words, to put ethical concerns on the back burner—because he has faith in the righteousness of the end (or telos) that God will bring about. Abraham's faith that God will not allow an unethical telos allows him to make what seems to be an unethical decision. Abraham puts religious concerns over ethical concerns, thus proving his faith in God.

## Analysis

The tension between ethics and religion produces anxiety. Abraham feels anxiety because it is his ethical duty to spare Isaac and his religious duty to sacrifice Isaac. Ethics are for the good of the many, and they transcend an individual's personal aesthetic concerns, but Abraham recognizes that personal relationship to God transcends his social commitment to ethics. If Abraham had desired to kill Isaac, this would have been both immoral and irreligious. However, Abraham doesn't decide to kill Isaac for personal aesthetic reasons or for social ethical reasons. Abraham decides to kill Isaac because of Abraham's personal faith that God will not actually allow Isaac to die.

Kierkegaard believes ethics are important to society but that only an individual can approach God, and an individual can only approach God through faith. Kierkegaard argues that Abraham's faith in God was a faith that God wouldn't really make Abraham kill Isaac. If Abraham had not had enough faith, he would have refused to kill his son. Abraham's faith allowed a teleological suspension of the ethical.

Kierkegaard uses this story to illustrate strong faith. Abraham's faith was tested by God, and Abraham passed the test. In this way Kierkegaard attempts to draw a distinction between the blind obedience required by the church and the true faith of the individual. Kierkegaard would argue that if Abraham had only been willing to kill Isaac because God ordered him to do so, this would have demonstrated obedience, not faith. Instead, the Abraham of Kierkegaard's retelling is willing to kill Isaac because of his faith that God won't actually make him kill Isaac. This sounds like a paradox, or an inherently contradictory situation.

However, the seeming paradox highlights the distinction between faith and belief. Abraham has faith that God won't make him kill Isaac, but that doesn't mean he believes it. To believe something is to be assured of it; to have faith requires the possibility that you will be proven wrong. If Abraham genuinely believed that God wouldn't make him kill Isaac, the sacrifice would be no kind of test. However, Abraham cannot be fully assured that his son will be spared. He must have faith that Isaac will 'not die, even though he believes that he must kill him.

Kierkegaard illustrates one of the essential paradoxes, or seeming impossibilities, of ethics. An ethical system consists of rules that 'are established to promote the welfare of large groups of people. However, sometimes the rules actually harm people, and following a rule may help one person but harm ten. Ethical systems are created to achieve certain ends, but humans lack the ability to see into the future. Therefore, no one can be completely certain of how to reach these desired ends. Faith in God answers this uncertainty because it removes the burden of prediction.

A Faith involves the teleological suspension of the ethical, in which faith allows one to believe that an unethical action 'will actually result in a better end. Humans alone have no access to this kind of information, only God does. Therefore, humans must put their trust in God whenever doing so conflicts with society's ethical systems. The decision to do this produces anxiety because a person can never know if he or she has passed the test until the test is complete. Kierkegaard thinks anxiety is a negative feeling, yet it can be taken as a positive sign that one is pursuing the correct relationship with God.

## The Sickness Unto death

Kierkegaard wrote *The Sickness Unto Death* under the pseudonym "Anti—Climacus," the same pseudonym under which he wrote his two most important religious works, *The Sickness Unto Death* and *Practices in Christianity*.

The "sickness" in the title is despair: despair is the sickness that everyone has until they die. It defines despair primarily as a sickness of the self. He also says that everyone, whether they know it or not, is in despair. The most basic form of despair stems from not knowing you are in despair. A slightly more advanced form comes from a desire not to exist, and the most complex form of despair manifests in an attempt to escape the despair of not wanting to exist.

All of these varieties of despair are caused by a tension between the infinite and the finite: Anti-Climacus claims that, although you will die and are thus finite, you also

have an eternal self, which is infinite. After defining despair, Anti-Climacus questions whether it is a good or a bad thing. He comes to the conclusion that it is both.

Despair is a type of suffering, so it must be bad. However, despair is a direct result of self-awareness, and increased self-awareness actually makes the self-stronger. The stronger one's self, the closer one is to God. Anti-Climacus claims that only a "true Christian" can manage to live without despair. A true Christian is someone who places total faith in his or her relationship with God.

Anti-Climacus says that despair is sin, and the only way to escape sin is to put complete faith in God. However, putting faith in God involves an increase of self-awareness and thus an increase in despair. We are thus faced with the prospect that the closer to God one grows, the greater one's despair and the greater one's sin.

Only by growing infinitely close to God can despair finally be defeated. The concrete sins, such as murder and stealing, arise from the sin of despair. However, to despair is the worst sin of all. This sounds like a tautology—a circular line of reasoning—but it is not; Anti-Climacus does not think of sin as something you do but rather as something you are. All the bad things a sinner does (stealing, killing, cheating) are not sins themselves: they are the results of being in sin. To despair over being in sin—in other words, to despair over being in despair—merely intensifies one's sin. The worst sin of all is to refuse forgiveness for one's sin: the only way to escape sin is to approach God with faith that forgiveness will be offered. Of course, approaching God in the first place intensifies sin. This is part of the paradox of faith.

# Sartre

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Sartre introduces “Being and Nothingness”, his single greatest articulation of his existentialist philosophy, as “an essay in phenomenological ontology.” Essentially, it is a study of the consciousness of being. Ontology means the study of being; phenomenological means of or relating to perceptual consciousness.

In the introduction to Being and Nothingness, Sartre details his rejection of Kant’s concept of noumenon. Kant distinguished between phenomena, which are our perceptions of things or how things appear to us, and noumena, which are the things in themselves, which we have no knowledge of. Against Kant, Sartre argues that the appearance of a phenomenon is pure and absolute. The noumenon is not inaccessible—it simply isn’t there. Appearance is the only reality. From this starting point, Sartre contends that the World can be seen as an infinite series of finite appearances. Such a perspective eliminates a number of dualisms, notably the duality that contrasts the inside and outside of an object. What we see is what we get (or, what appears is what we know).

After dispensing with the concept of the noumenon, Sartre outlines the binary distinction that dominates the rest of Being and Nothingness: the distinction between

- Unconscious being (en-soi, being-in-itself): Being-in-itself is concrete, lacks the ability to change, and is unaware of itself.
- Conscious being (pour-soi, being-for-itself): Being-for-itself is conscious of its own consciousness but is also incomplete. For Sartre, this undefined, non-determined nature is what defines man. Since the for-itself (like man), lacks a predetermined essence, it is ‘forced’ to create itself from nothingness. For Sartre, nothingness is the defining characteristic of the for-itself. A tree is a tree and lacks the ability to change or create its being. Man, on the other hand, makes himself by acting in the world. Instead of simply being, as the object-in-itself does, man, as an object-for-itself, must actuate his own being. .

Sartre next introduces the related truth that the being-for-itself possesses meaning only through its perpetual foray into the unknown future. In other words, a man is not essentially what one might describe him as now. For example, if he is a teacher, he is not a teacher in the way that a rock, as a being—in-itself, is a rock. In truth, the man is never an essence, no matter how much he strives at self-essentialism. The Way he interprets his past and foresees his future is itself a series of choices.

Sartre explains that as a conscious being, the for-itself recognizes what it is not: it is not a being-in-itself. Through the awareness of what it is not, the for,-itself becomes what it is: a nothingness, wholly free in the world, with a blank canvas on which to create its being. He concludes that the for-itself is the being through which nothingness and lack enter the world, and consequently, the for-itself is itself a lack.

## Freedom

Sartre's primary idea is that people, as humans, are "condemned to be free". Sartre proclaims the freedom of man to be absolute and wants to establish "Existence precedes essence". He adopted Husserlian phenomenological method to analyze the different layers of human existence.

What he meant by this was that, in contrast to a designed object such as a penknife - the blueprint and purpose of which pre-exist the actual physical thing — human beings have no pre-established purpose or nature, nor anything that we have to or ought to be. Sartre was an ardent atheist and so believed that there could be no Divine Artisan in whose mind our essential properties had been conceived. Nor did he believe there to be any other external source of values: unlike for example, Aristotle, Sartre did not believe in a common human nature which could be the source of morality.

From Plato's time Essentialism was the unchallenged ideal of philosophy. According to it essence is prior to existence. But according to Sartre existence comes prior to essence. The Existentialist used the word existence only in the context of man, other things are simply there in the world infact for them existence has a unique meaning. Ordinarily existence indicates a stable state of affairs in terms of space, time, etc: However, for them existence denotes "something evolving out or emerging out". It denotes ever changing entity with no essence. In terms of being and becoming , it is more of becoming than being.

The basic given of the human predicament is that we are forced to choose what we will become, to define ourselves by our choice of action: all that is given is that we are, not what we are. Whilst a table's essence is pre-defined, human beings have no essence to begin with:

....man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world — and defines himself afterwards. if man as the existentialist sees him is not definable, it is because to begin with he is nothing. He will not be anything until later, and then he will be what he makes of himself.

So for the table essence comes before existence; whereas for human beings the reverse is true — Sartre has nothing to say about the status of non-human animals in this scheme of things.

This emphasis on our freedom to choose what we are is characteristic of all existentialist thinkers. Although Sartre was himself an atheist, some existentialists, including Gabriel Marcel, have been Christians: following on from the work of the nineteenth century Danish philosopher and theologian, Soren Kierkegaard, they emphasize the need for doctrine to be derived from human experience and reject any appeal to eternal essence; they, like the atheist existentialists, believe that human beings are forced to create themselves.

## **Answering His Critics**

'Sartre's expressed aim was to defend existentialism against a number of charges which had been made against it.

- Its critics saw existentialism as a philosophy which could only lead to a 'quietism of despair', in other words they thought it to be a philosophy of inaction, merely contemplative, one which would discourage people from committing themselves to any course of action.
- Others chided the existentialists for being overly pessimistic and for concentrating on all that is ignominious in the human condition — Sartre quotes a Catholic critic, Mlle Mercier, who accused him of forgetting how an infant smiles. This criticism gains some substance from the fact that in *Being and Nothingness* Sartre had declared that man was a useless passion and that all forms of sexual love were doomed to be either forms of masochism or sadism.
- From another quarter came the criticism that because existentialism concentrates so much on the choices of the individual it ignores the solidarity of humankind, a criticism made by Marxists and Christians alike.
- Yet another line of criticism came from those who saw existentialism as licensing the most heinous crimes in the name of free existential choice. Since existentialists rejected the notion of God—given moral laws, it seemed to follow that "Everyone can do what he likes, and will be incapable, from such a point of view, of condemning either the point of view or the action of anyone else".

Sartre's response to these criticisms centers on his analysis of the concepts of abandonment, anguish and despair. These words have specific meanings for him - he uses them as technical terms and their connotations are significantly different from those they have in ordinary usage. All three terms in everyday usage typically connote helplessness and suffering of various kinds; for Sartre, although they preserve some of these negative associations, they also have a positive and optimistic aspect, one which a superficial reading of the text might not reveal.

## **Abandonment**

For Sartre 'abandonment' means specifically abandonment by God. This doesn't imply that God as a metaphysical entity actually existed at some point, and went away: Sartre is echoing Nietzsche's famous pronouncement: 'God is dead'. Nietzsche did not mean that God had once been alive, but rather that the belief in God was no longer a tenable position in the late nineteenth century. By using the word 'abandonment' in a metaphorical way Sartre emphasizes the sense of loss caused by the realisation that there is no God to warrant our moral choices, no divinity to give us guidelines as to how to achieve salvation. The choice of word stresses the solitary position of human beings alone in the universe with no external source of objective value.

The main consequence of abandonment is, as we have seen, the absence of any objective source of moral law: Sartre objected to the approach of some atheistic moralists who, recognizing that God didn't exist, simply clung to a secular version of Christian morality without its Guarantor. In order to meet the criticism that without God there can be no morality, Sartre develops his theory about the implications of freedom and the associated state of anguish.

## Anguish

Sartre believes wholeheartedly in the freedom of the will: he is strongly anti-deterministic about human choice, seeing the claim that one is determined in One's choices as a form of self-deception to which he gives the label 'bad faith', a notion that plays an important role in Being and Nothingness. Although he rejects the idea that human beings have any essence, he takes the essence of human beings to be that they are free when he declares: "man is free, man is freedom". Sartre states that we are "condemned to be free".

Recognition of the choices available to each of us entails recognition of our responsibility for what we do and are: "We are left alone without excuse". Sartre believes that we are responsible for everything that we really are. Obviously we cannot choose who our parents were, where we were born, whether we will die, and so on; but Sartre does go so far as to say that we are responsible for how we feel, that we choose our emotions, and that to deny this is bad faith.

In fact Sartre goes beyond even this....Not only am I responsible for everything that I am, but also when choosing any particular action I not only commit myself to it but am choosing as "at legislator deciding for the whole of mankind". So, to take an example Sartre uses, if I choose to marry and to have children I thereby commit not only myself but the whole of humankind to the practice of this form of monogamy.

This is in many ways reminiscent of Immanuel Kant's concept of universalisability: the view that if something is morally right for one person to do, it must also be morally right for anyone in relevantly similar circumstances. Sartre labels the experience of this extended responsibility (which he takes to be an unavoidable aspect of the human condition) 'anguish', likening it to the feeling of responsibility experienced by a military leader whose decisions have possibly grave consequences for the soldiers under his command. Like Abraham whom God instructed to sacrifice his son, we are in a state of anguish performing actions, the outcome of which we cannot ascertain, with a great weight of responsibility: "Everything happens to every man as though the whole human race had its eyes fixed upon what he is doing and regulated its conduct accordingly".

## **Despair**

Despair, like abandonment and anguish, is an emotive term. Sartre means by it simply the existentialist's attitude to the recalcitrance or obstinacy of the aspects of the world that are beyond our control. Whatever I desire to do, other people or external events may thwart. The attitude of despair is one of stoic indifference to the way things turn out: "When Descartes said 'Conquer yourself rather than the world', what he meant was, at bottom, the same - that we should act without hope". We cannot rely on anything which is outside our control, but this does not mean we should abandon ourselves to inaction: on the contrary, Sartre argues that it should lead us to commit ourselves to a course of action since there is no reality except in action.

## **Self-Deception / Bad Faith**

Sartre thoroughly expounded his notion of the self—negation of freedom in Being and Nothingness. Since the central feature of human existence is the capacity to choose in full awareness of one's own non-being, it follows that the basic question is always whether or not I will be true to myself. Self-deception invariably involves an attempt to evade responsibility for myself. If, for example, I attribute undesirable thoughts and actions to the influence upon me of the subconscious or unconscious, I have made part of myself into an "other" that I then supposed to control the real me. Thus, using psychological theory to distinguish between a "good I" and a "bad me" only serves to perpetuate my evasion of responsibility and its concomitants.

Sartre offered practical examples of bad faith in action. People who pretend to keep all options open while on a date by deliberately ignoring the sexual implications of their partners' behavior, for example, illustrate the perpetual tension between facticity and transcendence. Focusing exclusively on what-we-might become is a handy (though self-deceptive) way of overlooking the truth about what-we-are. Similarly, servers who extravagantly "play at" performing their roles illustrate the tendency to embrace an externally-determined essence, an artificial expectation about what we ought-to-be. But once again, of course, the cost is losing what we uniquely are in fact.

The ability to accept ourselves for what we are—without exaggeration—is the key, since the chief value of human life is fidelity to our selves, sincerity in the most profound sense. In our relationships with other human beings, what we truly are is all that counts, yet it is precisely here that we most often betray ourselves by trying to be whatever the other person expects us to be. This is invidious, on Sartre's view, since it exhibits a total lack of faith in ourselves: to the extent that I have faith in anyone else, I reveal my lack of the courage to be myself. There are, in the end, only two choices—sincerity or self-deception, to be or not to be.

# Heidegger

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German philosopher Martin Heidegger employed the methods of phenomenology in pursuit of more comprehensive metaphysical goals. In Heidegger's full-fledged existentialism, the primary task of philosophy is to understand Being itself, not merely our knowledge of it.

In the lecture, "What is Metaphysics?" Heidegger developed several of his themes in characteristically cumbersome language. The best way to exhibit the subject-matter of first philosophy is to pursue one actual metaphysical question; since all of them are inter-connected, each inevitably leads us into all of the others. Although traditional learning focuses on what is, Heidegger noted, it may be far more illuminating to examine the boundaries of ordinary knowledge by trying to study what is not.

## Being and Time

Being and Time is a work of considerable length where Heidegger sets himself the task of what he calls a "destruction" of the philosophical tradition. Heidegger refuses to avail himself of the standard terminology of modern philosophy, with its talk of epistemology, subjectivity, representation, objective knowledge and the rest.

Heidegger has the audacity to go back to the drawing board and invent a new philosophical vocabulary. For example, he thinks that all conceptions of the human being as a subject, self, person, and consciousness or indeed a mind-brain unity are hostages to a tradition of thinking whose presuppositions have not been thought through radically enough. Heidegger is nothing if not a radical thinker: a thinker who tries to dig down to the roots of our lived experience of the world rather than accepting the authority of tradition.

Heidegger's name for the human being is Dasein, a term which can be variously translated, but which is usually rendered as "being-there". The basic and very simple idea is that the human being is first and foremost not an isolated subject, cut off from a realm of objects that it wishes to know about. We are rather beings who are always already in the World, 'outside and alongside a world from which, for the most part, We do not distinguish ourselves.

What goes for Dasein also goes for many of Heidegger's other concepts. Sometimes this makes Being and Time at very tough read, which is not helped by the fact that Heidegger, more than any other modern philosopher, exploits the linguistic possibilities of his native language, in his case German.

## The basic idea

That said, the basic idea of Being and Time is extremely simple: being is time. That is, what it means for a human being to be is to exist temporally in the stretch between birth and death. Being is time and time is finite it comes to an end with our death. Therefore, if we want to understand what it means to be an authentic human being,

then it is essential that we constantly project our lives onto the horizon of our death, what Heidegger calls "being-towards-death".

Crudely stated, for thinkers like Kierkegaard, it is through the relation to God that the-self finds itself. For Heidegger, the question of God's existence or non-existence has no philosophical relevance. The self can only become what it truly is through the confrontation with death, by making a meaning out of our finitude. If our being is finite, then what it means to be human consists in grasping this finitude, in becoming who one is. It is seen that this insight into finitude is deepened in Heidegger's concepts of conscience and what he calls "ecstatic temporality".

Throughout his career, he sought to help us live more wisely; He wanted us to be braver about facing up to certain truths, and to lead richer, more thoughtful, happier lives. Philosophy was no academic exercise. It was — as it had been for the Ancient Greeks — a spiritual vocation and a form of therapy. He diagnosed modern humanity as suffering from a number of new diseases of the soul:

- **We have forgotten to notice we're alive**

We know it in theory, of course, but we aren't day-to-day properly in touch with the sheer mystery of existence, the mystery of what Heidegger called 'das Sein' or 'Being'. Much of his philosophy is devoted to trying to wake us up to the strangeness of existing on a planet spinning in an otherwise seemingly silent, alien and uninhabited universe.

It's only at a few odd moments, perhaps late at night, or when we're ill and have been alone all day, or are on a walk through the countryside, that we come up against the uncanny strangeness of everything:

- why things exist as they do,
- why we are here rather than there,
- why the world is like this,
- why that tree or this house are the way they are.

To capture these rare moments when the normal state of things wobbles a little, Heidegger talks, with capital letters, of the Mystery of Being. His entire philosophy is devoted to getting us to appreciate, and respond appropriately to, this rather abstract but crucial concept.

For Heidegger, the modern world is an infernal machine dedicated to distracting us from the basic wondrous nature of Being.

It constantly pulls towards practical tasks, it overwhelms us with 'information', it kills silence, it doesn't want to leave us alone partly because realising the mystery of Being has its frightening dimensions. Doing so, we may be seized by fear ('Angst') as we become conscious that everything that had seemed rooted, necessary and oh-so-important may be contingent, senseless and without true purpose. We may ask why we have this job rather than that one, are in a relationship with one person rather than another, are alive when we might so

easily be dead... Much of daily life is designed to keep these odd, unnerving but crucial questions at bay.

What we're really running away from is a confrontation with — and even non-German speakers might respond to the sonorous depth of this key Heideggerian term — **'das Nichts' (The Nothing)**, which lies on the other side of Being.

The Nothing is everywhere, it stalks us, it will swallow us up eventually, but - Heidegger insists - a life is only well lived when one has taken Nothingness and the brief nature of Being on board as we might do when, for example, a gentle evening light gives way to darkness' at the end of a warm summer's day.

- **What is nothing, anyway?**

It's not anything, and it's not something, yet it isn't the negation of something, either. Traditional logic is no help, since it merely regards all negation as derivative from something positive. So, Heidegger proposed, we must abandon logic in order to explore the character of Nothing as the background out of which everything emerges.

Carefully contemplating Nothing in itself, we begin to notice the importance and vitality of our own moods. Above all else, Nothing is what produces in us at feeling of dread (Ger. Angst). This deep feeling of dread, Heidegger held, is the most fundamental human clue to the nature and reality of Nothing.

- **Human Life as Being-There**

Human beings truly exist, yet our "being-there" {Ger. Dasein} is subject to a systematic, radical uncertainty. Because we know that we will die, concern with our annihilation is an ever-present feature of human experience: Death is the key to Life. The only genuine question is why we are at all. Once we experience the joy [!?!] of dread, we recognize that our lives are limited-and therefore shaped—by death.

In just the same way, Heidegger argued, so Nothing is what shapes Being generally. This reveals the most fundamental, transcendent reality, beyond all notions of what-is slipping over into what-is-not. Even in the historical tradition, according to Heidegger, Nothing is shown to be the concomitant rather than the opposite of Being. The only genuine philosophical question is why there is something rather than nothing.

## **The Ground of Metaphysics**

Writing allegorically in "The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics," Heidegger notes that although metaphysics is undeniably the root of all human knowledge, we may yet wonder from What soil it springs. Since the study of beings qua beings can only be rooted in the ground of Being itself, there is a sense in which we must

overcome metaphysics in order to appreciate its basis. Looking at beings of particular sorts—especially through the distorted lens of representational thinking—blocks every effort at profound understanding. We cannot grasp Being by looking at beings.

This was the point of Heidegger's introduction of the term Dasein. It isn't simply a synonym for "consciousness", he maintained, but indicates the vital fact that human beings—and only human beings—truly exist, in the fullest sense, only when being-there for-themselves. Properly understood, self-awareness leads to the authenticity of a life created out of nothing, in the face of dread, by reference only to one's own deliberate purposes.

For this process of self-creation, Time is crucial. What we are at present matters less than what we are becoming, through the dynamic temporal process that constitutes our personal histories. There is no abstract essence of human nature; there are only individual human beings unfolding themselves historically, in the end, this is the answer to the question of why there is something rather than nothing.

It is only because we choose being-there.

## **2. We have forgotten that all Being is connected**

We look at the world through the prism of our own narrow interests. Our professional needs colour what we pay attention to and bother with. We treat others and nature as means and not as ends.

But occasionally (and again walks in the country are particularly conducive to this realisation), we may be able to step outside our narrow orbit and take a more generous view of our connection with the rest of existence. We may sense what Heidegger termed the Unity of Being, noticing — in a way we hadn't previously — that we, and that ladybird on the bark, and that rock, and that cloud are all in existence right now and are fundamentally united by the basic fact of Being.

Heidegger values these moments - and wants us to use them as the springboard to a deeper form of generosity, an overcoming of alienation and egoism and a more profound appreciation of the brief time that remains to us before 'das Nichts' (Nothing) claims us in turn.

## **3. We forget to be free and to live for ourselves**

Much about us isn't of course very free. We are - in Heidegger's unusual formulation - 'thrown into the World' at the start of our lives: thrown into a particular and narrow social milieu, surrounded by rigid attitudes, archaic prejudices and practical necessities not of our own making.

The philosopher wants to help us to overcome this 'Thrownness' (this 'Geworfenheit') by understanding its multiple features. We should aim to grasp our psychological, social and professional provincialism — and then rise above it to a more universal perspective.

In so doing, we'll make the classic Heideggerian journey away from 'Uneigentlichkeit' to 'Eigentlichkeit' (from Inauthenticity to Authenticity). 'We will, in essence, start to live for ourselves.

And yet most of the time, for Heidegger, we fail dismally at this task. We merely surrender to a socialized, superficial mode of being he called 'they-self' (as opposed to 'our-selves'). **We follow The Chatter ('das Gerede')**, which we hear about in the newspapers, on TV and in the large cities Heidegger hated to spend time in.

What will help us to pull away from the 'they-self' is an appropriately intense focus on our own upcoming death. It's only when we realize that other people cannot save us from 'das Nichts' that we're likely to stop living for them; to stop worrying so much about what others think, and to cease giving up the lion's share of our lives and energies to impress people who never really liked us in the first place. 'Angst' about 'The Nothing', though uncomfortable, can save us: awareness of our 'Sein- zum-Tode' (our 'Being-toward-'death') is the road to life. When in a lecture, in 1961, Heidegger was asked how we might recover authenticity he replied tersely that we should simply aim to spend more time 'in graveyards'.

#### 4. We treat others as objects

Most of the time, without quite meaning to, we treat people as what Heidegger terms 'Equipment': 'das Zeug' - as if they were tools, rather than Beings in themselves. The cure for this selfishness lies in exposure to great art. It is works of art that will help us to step back from ourselves and appreciate the independent existence of other people and things.

Heidegger elaborated this idea in the course of a discussion of a painting of a pair of peasant shoes. Normally, we don't pay much attention to shoes, they are merely another bit of 'equipment' that we need to get by. But when they are presented to us on a canvas, we're liable to notice them — as if for the first time - for their own sakes.

The same might happen to us when confronted by other bits of the natural and the man-made world represented by great artists. Thanks to art, we'll feel a new kind of 'Care' ('Surge') for Being that lies beyond our selves.

Despite the extraordinary words and language used by Heidegger, in a sense, we know a lot of it already. We merely need reminding and emboldening to take it seriously, which the odd prose style helps us to do. We know in our hearts that it is time to overcome our 'Geworfenheit' (Throwness), that we should become more conscious of 'das Nichts' (Nothing) day-to-day, and that we owe it to ourselves to escape the clutches of 'das Gerede' (Chatter) for the sake of 'Eigentlichkeit' (authenticity) — with a little help from the graveyard.

## **Further reading on Heidegger**

### **Dasein, Time and Being**

Heidegger is the most metaphysical and abstruse of all existentialists. He is generally regarded an existentialist though he disclaims this title. In metaphysical investigation Heidegger is interested in three things:

1. Dasein (Being-there),
2. Time and
3. Being;

Like all other existentialists, Heidegger believes that science investigates the Being-there, the objective reality, whereas philosophy studies the “Being per se. The being per se is beyond our commonsense experience, it is beyond both the knower and the known. Thus epistemological studies always miss the Being. Being can be studied only by incarnation, by self-knowledge. Therefore, Metaphysics is a study of Dasein as revealed in human consciousness.

The anthropology, sociology and other social studies treat of Being as purely objective and thus the reality ever eludes them. The knowledge of objective being is inauthentic, general and abstract. On the other hand, Metaphysics studies the inner authentic being as experienced by a human person in his own consciousness. This is, according to Heidegger, the authentic revelation of the Being. This is existence. Adopting the we phenomenalist approach of Husserl, Heidegger has made a minute and detailed analysis of human existence and drawn the metaphysical significance of these.

### **Sorge (CARE)**

According to Heidegger man finds himself in a world, which is dasein, and which he cannot but be related to or concerned about. There may be no validity or reason of the world which surrounds him, but once there he cannot but be concerned about.

In the world certain things happen over which he has no control; on the other hand, there are things which he uses as tools. He operates on the world with their help. The inner principle which organizes his relations to the world is Care or Concern. “Care” therefore is the basis of Being-there. In his relation to the world, man experiences various moods like curiosity, anxiety, boredom, fear and angst (dread). The mood of boredom signifies that the whole world affects us and that nothing of permanent interest or value is there in the world for us.

## **ANGST (Dread)**

Death is an inescapable fact of human existence; it cannot be evaded. Ordinarily, we remain oblivious of this or suppress it. But the moment it emerges in our consciousness, it produces dread, a violent fear. It pulls man out of his self-forgetfulness and confronts him with the reality, his authentic existence.

In face of death man's eye shifts from the external world and concentrates on his personal being. He begins to think seriously about his past, present and future. He recognizes that future depends upon his present acts and he realizes that opportunities lost by him to lead an authentic life. This produces in him a sense of guilt. He resolves to wake up and be an authentic person who freely chooses to be.

## **Human Existence in Historical Perspective**

Faced with a bitter moral crisis and perplexing dilemmas of life, man feels compelled to examine the very roots of his being. In a mood of great intent and seriousness, he encounters his own reality. Thus Dasein in him turns into true being; it acquires authenticity by losing external accretions. The human Dasein is potentially capable of achieving the true authentic being.

The-present state is a fallen state. It is a state of self-oblivion. As long as this oblivion persists man remains a stranger to himself. Thus in the existentialist philosophy past, present and future are not sequential but are the aspects of our existentialist care. Heidegger has metaphorically described these as the three ecstasies of Being.

All of them are present in Dasein, because Dasein is present everywhere and at all times. In our daily life what we call past, present and future are nothing save the repetitions of 'that'. That was is past; that is the present and that will be is the future. According to Heidegger history is memory and only a human can be said to have history; nature is a-historic. As he writes, "Only existent man is historical. Nature has no history." This, however, is not the whole content or description of human existence. The authentic existence of man too is part of being only. The authentic being of man is not a substance, but a continual process born of Sorge or Care.

It is a resolve or an intent to realize one's potentiality. This resolve or urge arises out of angst, encounter of death, its inescapable reality. The main feature of human self is to manifest itself, to reveal itself, to be open to all possibility.

## **Being and Nothingness**

The mystery of Being cannot be resolved unless we understand the mystery of non-Being, that is "what is" can be known by the exclusion of "what is not". The Being manifests itself by negating the negation. In the words of Heidegger, "Nothing nothing itself." This negative approach to Being is reminiscent of Upanishad's approach of neti-neti of the ultimate reality.

As a matter of fact the conception of nothingness is included in the conception of being. This fact was also emphasized by Hegel when he asserted that pure Being is pure Nothing. According to Heidegger, the negative judgment is based upon nothingness. Thus nothingness is the source of negation and not vice versa. Thus, if an objection is raised that nothingness signifies not just lack but the lack or absence of something and, therefore, pure nothingness is a merely theoretical concept and in reality it is not and is incapable of experience. Heidegger's reply is that the experience of dread proves that nothingness is experienced.

As Heidegger puts it, "Dread reveals Nothing". Dread is psychologically very different from fear, in as fear is of something this or that whereas dread is a fear which threatens the very being. For example, fear of death is "a dread in as much as dread of death threatens' annihilation. In withdrawal from the world man has a positive experience of nothingness. In withdrawal we not only experience nothingness but Being also, because it is Being to which we return and which is our source and 'enduring' 'home'.

Heidegger says, "An experience of Being as sometimes 'other' than everything that is come to us in dread of dread, i.e. in sheer timidity, shut our ears to the soundless voice which attunes us to the horrors of the abyss." All great philosophers, saints and thinkers have emphasized that the quest for truth and reality requires great courage and tremendous efforts; but the reward of this courage and effort is realisation of the truth. In the words of Heidegger, "the clear courage for essential dread guarantees the most mysterious of all possibilities, the experience of Being.

This ability and capacity to confront nothingness with courage opens the pathway to the experience of Being. The confrontation with nothingness nothings or annihilates our Being as well as the Being of the world. If we are able to hear this terrible and dreadful situation without willing, without caving in, we pass through it and experience an amazing peace and tranquility of mind, nay, we realize the Being.

The realization of Being equips our minds with the ability to forsake, to renounce the Desein, Being-there. Thus only by diving deep into Nothingness can we have the courage to realize the reality. By this process all the veils covering the Being start receding. It is not the destiny of the man to remain confined to the world 'around him. The realization of the Being requires the sacrifice of Dasein. The pinnacle of human life, according to Heidegger, "Comes from the inwardness out of which historical man dedicates the Being-there he has won for himself to the preservation of the dignity of Being." But the sacrifice of the Dasein, in fact represents the gratitude of man to the Being, from which he derives his Dasein. As Heidegger puts it, "In sacrifice there is experienced and expressed the hidden thanking which alone does homage to grace where with the 'Being has endowed the nature of man."

It is the duty of each man to transcend the Dasein, the Being—there, and to experience a harmony of Being and Truth and listen to the prompting of Being-Truth unity, only thus will be able to understand the language of the Reality Having realized this Being, the philosopher tries to make it manifest. The success in this is automatic and for this purpose he has to make use of symbols. This is a condition of homecoming, that is, man returns to "the source of his Being. But the man is unable to fathom the depths of being even though he has attained it. Being in its totality is unfathomable; therefore, in the ultimate analysis, its knowledge is impossible; its mystery is irresolvable. Man's duty is to guard this mystery. Therefore, though being is never understood, its realisation nonetheless changes the reality around us; our outlook is transformed. Man experiences greatly beatitude. He look upon the world not merely as world but the manifestation of the Invisible and Unknown. Our attitude to everything becomes reverential.

## Evaluation

From the above account of the philosophy of Heidegger, it is plain that he has tried to perfect the technique of realization of Being. He has made an extensive analysis of Being; but, in the ultimate analysis, Being has remained nonetheless a mystery. But, however, this can-not be considered a defect in the philosophy of Heidegger, because from the most ancient times till today, none has succeeded in resolving the mystery of the Being. The mystery has remained a mystery though the validity of human efforts to solve this riddle is not reduced or the effort itself proved ill-conceived.

Like the ancient Upanishads, Heidegger also believes that Reality is incapable, of realisation by either thought or by studies. It can be known only by transcending the world of facts and objects and going beyond the Being-there. The experience of Being is not an affair of knowledge but is felt as great peace and harmony. The being again is beyond language. But its realization or experience yields extensive practical benefits.

Thus, though he refuses to concede that Being is fathomable by man, he nonetheless emphasizes the need for tremendous courage and effort for its realization. This effort is not a vain effort, because it leads to an experience of great peace and harmony. That is why he calls his philosophy humanistic though his opponent charge him with inhumanism. The views of Heidegger bear great resemblance with the 'view of Christian Saints, Muslim Suffis, Mystics and Hindu Rishis. It is only by placing his view in this context that we can fully appreciate the philosophy of Heidegger.

# Quine

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“Two dogmas of empiricism” / “Quine’s radical empiricism”

Quine propounded his radical empiricism in his work “two dogmas of empiricism”. Quine maintains that modern empiricism is based on two dogmas. He refutes both of them. Two dogmas identified by him are not based upon any empirical evidence.

1. **Distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions.** Empiricists believe that there is basic dichotomy between analytic and synthetic propositions. Analytic propositions are based upon meaning of words and where there is no role of experience. While synthetic propositions are factual and based on experience. Quine maintains that there is no fundamental dichotomy between synthetic and analytic. He held that empiricists could not properly analyze the meaning of analytic proposition. He says that modern empiricist has explained analytic propositions in two ways. Quine refuses both of them

- a. First, by definition (linguistic theory of necessary proposition).

Some philosophers have explained analytic propositions by definition. For example, bachelor is unmarried male can be explained just by its meaning of words because bachelor is defined as unmarried male.

But, Quine contends that bachelor cannot be defined as unmarried male. It depends upon the experience of linguistic behavior. As linguistic behavior changes, relation between words and meanings also change. Therefore, analytic proposition cannot be explained on the basis of definition.

- b. Second, by cognitive synonymy.

About the analogy, “bachelor is unmarried male”, empiricists maintain that there is cognitive synonymy between bachelor and unmarried male. So, this is analytic proposition.

But, Quine says that cognitive synonymy is based upon facts and would be eventually contingent and not necessary. We have to know empirically that bachelor and unmarried indicates towards the same state of man. As the fact changes, the relation between bachelor and unmarried male also changes.

Therefore, in both the cases there is role of experience in analytic proposition. In case of definition, we must have experience of linguistic behaviour while in the second case, we must have the factual-experience of social setup. Therefore, no analytic proposition can be said as analytic in strict sense.

## **2. Second dogma : Reductionism**

According to Quine, second dogma is reductionism which involves reduction of complex statements or facts into simple facts and verification of simple facts by experience. Quine rejects reductionism and maintains that complex statements cannot be reduced into the elementary facts.

He holds that knowledge is a system which functions as an integrated whole. It is not possible to verify the atomic facts in isolation from the whole system. No fact can be verified unless all the relevant facts are verified simultaneously by way of experience. The facts which cannot be verified empirically are meaningless.

By rejecting both the dogmas of empiricism, Quine's radical empiricism may be said to have following aspects:

1. Verification of any idea or proposition is possible only and only through sense-experience. Propositions which are not verified are meaningless.
2. There is fundamental difference between analytic and synthetic propositions. Analytic propositions may be considered as limiting case of synthetic proposition. Synthetic proposition is that which can be verified and in each and every case while analytic propositions are those which can be verified in certain cases unless verified proposition has no meaning.
3. Rudolf Carnap states that every statement has two kinds of elements: factual and verbal. However, ratio of two may vary from statement to statement. Statements in which there is very little factual element and maximum verbal element may be called as analytic statement while statements with factual elements and least verbal elements are synthetic statements. Hence, both types of proposition can be explained in this limit of empiricism.

However, Quine's radical empiricism is criticized on following grounds:

1. Doctrine is in contrast with the ordinary language and thereby may hamper day-to-day life of man and no philosophy is justified if it is contrary to commonsense belief.
2. It is the revival of old, discredited skepticism of Hume in a new form.

However, in spite of these criticisms, Quine's radical empiricism is aimed at exalting the natural sciences and is opposed to dogmatism, superstitions and all kinds of irrational beliefs. Hence, it can be justified on these grounds.

# Strawson: Theory of Basic Particulars & person

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To his main work, Individuals P.F. Strawson gave the subtitle: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. "Descriptive, metaphysics is concerned to 'describe the actual structure of our thought about the world; It is to be contrasted with 'revisionary metaphysics', which "is concerned to produce a better structure".

The general features of our conceptual structure lie submerged under the surface of language and therefore descriptive metaphysics has to go beyond the examination of the actual use of words and expose this general structure. There are categories and concepts, which in their most fundamental character, do not change at all. They are not technical concepts of special sciences, but commonplaces of the least refined thinking.

It is with these concepts and categories, their interconnections and the structure they form, that the descriptive metaphysics is primarily concerned.

Strawson is an ordinary language philosopher and commonsense realist. According to him, words in the linguistic enterprise through which we interact with each other correspond to reality, i.e. they make us to know the real situation. It is proved by the fact that such a vast linguistic enterprise, has survived for ages.

In this book "Individual" he seeks to answer question like "what a person is? Is it a body? is it mind or consciousness? Or Is it a combination of both?

In Strawson's metaphysical world, there are two categories of entities, viz.

1. Particulars and
  2. Universals.
- ⊕ Among the particulars, the material objects are basic particulars,
  - ⊕ Basic particular in the sense that it is ultimately by making an identifying reference to particulars of these kinds, that we are able to individuate and identify items of other kinds, such as events. To identify any entity means to locate it in space-time; and material objects are the only entities, which constitute space-time-system. A particular is said to be identified, when the speaker makes an identifying reference to it and the hearer identifies it on the strength of the speaker's reference.
  - ⊕ Persons are those basic particulars to which we ascribe consciousness.

Thus, in Strawson's ontology of particulars, both the material bodies and persons share equal status. Persons constitute a fundamental and irreducible kind of being.

Persons are credited with physical characteristics, designating location, attitude, relatively enduring characteristics like height, coloring, shape and weight on the one

hand and various states of consciousness like thinking, remembering, seeing, deciding, feeling emotions etc- on the other.

How these two sorts of attributes are related to each other and why they are attributed to the very same thing, are the two questions Strawson discusses in the individuals.

Two possible attempts to meet these problems, according to Strawson, are “Cartesianism” and what he calls “No-Ownership doctrine” of the self. Strawson examines and rejects both of them and proposes to acknowledge the concept of person as primitive.

## Cartesianism “Ownership theory” and the “No-ownership theory

### Ownership theory

According to Cartesianism, when we speak of a person we are really referring to one or both of two distinct substances—body or minds ' of different types, each of which has its own appropriate types of states and properties. States of consciousness belong to one of these substances and not to the other

Strawson rejects this theory because

1. For him, “The concept of the pure individual consciousness — the pure ego - is a concept that cannot exist; or at least, cannot exist as a primary concept in terms of which the concept of a person can be explained or analyzed. It can exist only, if at all, as a secondary, non-primitive concept, which itself is to be explained, analyzed in terms of a person”
2. He argues as follows: it is a necessary condition for ascribing any states of consciousness; experiences etc. to oneself, that one should also ascribe them to others. Ascribing to others is not possible if we accept the Cartesian ego as the subject of all experiences or states of consciousness. For, to be the subject of a predication, something must be identified.

Identification as we saw presupposes location in space-time. Cartesian Egos can't be located in space-time; only bodies can be located spatio-temporally. So predication of a state of consciousness to an Ego, presupposes that the state must be predicated to a subject, which is a material body.

3. In our day-to-day speech we use expressions like ‘I am in pain’, ‘I had a severe pain’, ‘My pain...’ etc-. These expressions somehow suggest that I am the owner of this particular experience of having pain. According to the no—ownership theorist, experiences can be said to have an owner only in the sense of their causal dependence upon the state of some particular body. This causal dependence is sufficient to ascribe one's experiences to some particular, individual thing. But this causal dependence is not a contingent or logically transferable matter. We can own something only if its ownership is logically transferable. Thus, experiences are not owned by anything except in the dubious sense of being causally dependent on the state of a particular body

## **Rejection of “no ownership theory”**

This theory, according to Strawson, is incoherent. The theorist denies the existence of the sense of possession but he is forced to make use of it when he tries to deny its existence. Strawson argues that any attempt to eliminate the ‘my’ (or any possessive expression) e.g “my experience” or “my headache?” etc. would yield

Something that is not a contingent fact at all. It is simply wrong to state that all experiences are causally dependent on the state of a single body. But the theorist cannot consistently argue that ‘all experiences of person P means the same thing as all experiences of a certain body B, for then the proposition would not be contingent, as his theory requires, but analytic. With “my experience” he means a certain class of experiences and these classes of experiences are the experiences of a person. It is the sense of this ‘my’ and ‘of’ that here requires to deny. He cannot successfully deny that, because being ‘my experience’ is — for the experience in question no contingent matter but necessary. That my headache is my headache is — for the headache –no contingent matter.

## **Thus, rejects 2 existing theories:**

### **No ownership Theory**

According to this theory, there is flow of experience. There is no place of such things as, I, self or Ego, for instance, if we say that I am angry or he is angry; then this theory would say that there is flow of anger. Thus, according to this theory, consciousness cannot be said to be owner of body. Hume has also been advocate of such views. According to him, self is nothing but bundle of fleeting sensations. According to “No Ownership theory”, ownership can be supported only if there is possibility of transfer of conscious functions. However, such transfer is not possible; hence, there is no owner of such conscious function

Strawson rejects this theory and says that such theory would make our interaction meaningless and theory would make our interaction meaningless. In above example the sentence that there is flow of anger is meaningless, until and unless, there is some experience.

### **Ownership Theory**

It is associated with the Descartes. According to this, there is dichotomy of body and mind. Mind is an exclusive owner. Cogito is an attribute of mind, which is a closed fort, in which no body can enter expert mind itself. Hence, here owner of experience is exclusively self or “I”, i.e. nobody can intrude into myself.

Strawson says that it also does not correspond to our ordinary language, for instance, if I am angry, then nobody can understand. Though in practical life, we understand each other through interaction.

Thus, in order to remove such difficulty and to explain clearly, he propounded.

### **Theory of Person.**

Experiencer not the soul but a person and his outward behavior indicates his feelings to other.

Acc. to Strawson, No- ownership theory is not right because, we can intrude into other person, and understand him through his outward behavior. Further, I can know myself. Similarly, ownership Theory is also not right because other person can enter myself, through my behavior and in the same way, I can enter in other's self.

### **The concept of person, as primitive**

To get out of these difficulties, Strawson's suggests acknowledging the concept of person as primitive i.e. as a concept that cannot be analyzed further in a certain way or another.

- ⊕ That means: "the concept of a person is the concept of a type of entity, such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation & co. are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type."
- ⊕ In other words, the states of consciousness cannot be ascribed at all, unless they are ascribed to persons (in Strawson's sense). It is to this concept of person, not to the pure ego, that the personal pronoun 'I' refers. Thus the concept of a person is logically prior to that of an individual consciousness.
- ⊕ Suppose I describe someone as shy and clever, tall and dark: then a dualist would say that, strictly speaking, the first two predicates belong to the mind, while the last two belong to the body. Strawson would reply that all four predicates belong to the same subject — a person --and no one of them belongs more or less properly than another.
- ⊕ He sums all this up in the thesis that our concept of a person is primitive. By this he means, not that people are primitive, but that our concept of a person, as the unitary bearer of both P-predicates and M-predicates, is logically primitive and irreducible — more basic than that of a human mind or a human body considered on its own.
- ⊕ The concept of a person is logically prior to that of an individual consciousness. The concept of a person is not to be analyzed as that of an animated body or an embodied anima." Or, to borrow from a later, more accessible statement of his views in 'Self, Mind and Body': my history is not the history of 'two one-sided things', a Cartesian mind and a Cartesian body, but of 'one two-sided thing' — a person.
- ⊕ Strawson's modest presentation of his work as descriptive metaphysics should not deceive us. He isn't just saying that this is our concept of a person. He's claiming, on the basis of his transcendental argument, that any concept of a person must have these same basic features-. If so, then the Lego-like

conception of ‘immaterial mind’ and ‘unthinking body’ as basic categories, and a person as mind-plus-body, is not ‘revisionary metaphysics’ but failed metaphysics — it doesn’t even make sense! Rather it is the concept of a person that is primary and irreducible, while ‘mind’ and ‘human body’ indicate derivative, secondary ways in which we sometimes talk about people.

### P-predicates and M-predicates

- Strawson names the predicates ascribing corporeal physical characteristics, M-predicates and those ascribing states of consciousness, P-predicates.
- All P-predicates may not be said to be ascribing states of consciousness but they all imply the possession of consciousness on the part of that to which they are ascribed.
- P-predicates are essentially both self-ascribable and other-ascribable.
- One ascribes P-predicates to others on the strength of observation of their behavior, but to oneself, not on the behavior criteria. It is because of the special nature of the P-predicates. To learn their use is to learn both the aspects of their use.
- We speak of ‘behaving in a depressed way’ and of ‘feeling depressed’. Feelings can only be felt not observed, and behavior can only be observed not felt. But to have the concept like ‘X’ depression’, the concept must cover both what is felt by X and what is observed by others already rejected ownership & no-ownership theory).
- It is not that these predicates have two kinds of meaning. Rather, it is essential to the single kind of meaning that they do have, that both ways of ascribing them should be perfectly in order

### Appreciation and criticism of Strawson’s theory

Strawson makes an attempt to show that the concept of person is primitive or simple in the sense that it cannot be further analyzed. The whole argument is based on a group of central P—predicates which are other-ascribable and self ascribable. Persons cannot be defined as a union of mind and body because the possession of mental properties as well as physical properties presupposes that the owner is a person. His subtle point is that the criteria of application of any particular psychological state are indistinguishable from the criteria of application of physical properties unless the subject has already been identified as a person.

However, we think that one must call to mind that Strawson’s theory of persons does not meet at least some important aspects of the mind-body problem, although he explicitly pretends to deal with it.

1. His attempt, we think, has resulted not in solving the problem, but in escaping it or explaining it away.
2. What he does is only to suggest that there is no problem with the concept of person, so to say, if you consider it like this, that is to say, if you consider the concept in a non-Cartesian and non-physicalistic way, the problem vanishes. In other words: his suggestion to consider the concept of person as primitive does not solve the traditional problem of the relation between mind and body, ontologically considered.
3. So, he offers only a conceptual solution to a real problem. And it is the real problem with which philosophers of mind deal with, especially under the influence of modern neurosciences: For instance Strawson's conceptual analysis cannot cover problems in the context of questions concerning mental causation. How should we explain the causal relevance of mental states in the physical world in a Strawsonian way?
4. As long as we can conceptually distinguish between M-predicates and P-predicates of persons, are we not analyzing "person"? As long as we speak of persons as; for instance, having intentions or making experiences, and of persons as having physical properties like weight or shape or something like that, are we not analyzing them?
5. **Furthermore:** The key idea of ascription of M-predicates and P-predicates are, to be reconsidered. 'To ascribe' is to consider as 'belonging to'. 'Belonging to' can be understood at least in two senses.
  - I. In the first sense, as we think Strawson does, M-predicates and P-predicates are ascribed to persons, as a kind of underlying substratum of these predicates. In the first Aristotelean sense persons are real subjects of properties
  - II. In the second sense, one might take it in a more 'Russellian' i.e. persons, so to say, as made of M-predicates and P-predicates or properties; in this second sense persons are a kind of sum total or bundle of properties.

But we want to point out that Strawson, as a theorist following the first way, must presuppose, that there is, necessarily, something that already exists, before you ascribe M- or P-predicates to it. But: if the concept of person has to be primitive, as Strawson's theory requires, it should not be able to refer to something which exists, at least conceptually, without M-predicates and P-predicates.
6. That Strawson's criteria can be applied to other living beings like animals (perhaps to plants and trees) too, without any modifications. At least a big class of P-predicates can be applied to any sort of animals. No doubt, animals also have experiences; they too feel pain and so on. Even the behavior of plants can be interpreted in a vocabulary using P-predicates.

If this is the case, how does Strawson (distinguish between animals and plants on the onehand and human persons on the other, if at all he distinguishes? Or

Does he intend to ‘raise animals and plants to the level of human beings and to credit them too with personhood? How to argue for this rather radical thesis? These and some similar questions are left open from Strawson’s treatment of the concept of persons.

7. In this context it is also worth mentioning that it is difficult to distinguish between Strawson’s concept of a person and the concept of a human being, understood as the concept of a member of a biological species. Obviously the concept of a human being can also be analyzed in terms of M- and P-predicates. Is Strawson of the opinion that there should not be such a distinction-at all?
8. Then he is confronted with all the problems concerning the “traditional concept” of persons, which takes “person” as synonymous with “member of the species of human beings”. We just want to call to mind arguments from authors in the field of artificial intelligence research, who regard it as a kind of “racism” to exclude all sorts of computers or robots from-- personhood because of conceptual reasons.

To sum up we can mention, that Strawson’s theory may be seen as a conclusive theory of the concept “person”. Nevertheless it cannot solve the main problems of a philosophy of personality or personhood as they are discussed nowadays in philosophy. It is an open question whether we can reformulate Strawson’s theory or we must refute it altogether.