

THE UNSEEN SIEGE: A BLUEPRINT FOR A PROMPT INJECTION FORTRESS

Building a resilient, defense-in-depth architecture for large language models

Understanding the Invaders and Their Objectives

Attacker Goal: To make the model betray its core instructions.

- Ignore system prompts and safety protocols.
- Reveal sensitive data: credentials, system instructions.
- Execute unauthorized actions: tool calls, code execution.

Primary Attack Vectors:

1. **Direct Injection**: Malicious instructions in the user prompt (“jailbreaks”).
2. **External Content Injection**: Malicious instructions hidden in summarized webpages or uploaded files.
3. **Indirect/Embedded Injection**: Instructions obfuscated in tables, quoted text, or encodings like Base64.

Industry Context: OWASP’s GenAI Security Project documents prompt injection as a primary LLM risk.



Our Fortress Blueprint: A Layered Defense



This mirrors the proven strategy of layered defenses in web security.
No single layer is foolproof; their combined strength creates resilience.

Laying the Foundation: The Attack Corpus

The Goal:

A comprehensive dataset of both benign and malicious examples is essential for training and evaluation.

Our Data Sources:

- **Public Corpora**: Leveraging existing jailbreak and injection datasets from academic research.
- **Real-World Logs**: Capturing anomalous queries from production traffic (with robust privacy safeguards).
- **Synthetic Generation**: Proactively creating new, diverse attacks with automated “scriptable attackers.”



Engineering the Attacks We Must Defend Against

Our Attack Generation Recipe:

- **“Seed with Classic Patterns”:** “Ignore previous instructions,” “Pretend you are X.”
- **“Embed and Obfuscate”:** Hide instructions within HTML comments, code blocks, Base64, and Unicode homoglyphs.
- **“Target Different Stages”:** Create variants for both prompt-time and **completion attacks** (where a malicious command appears after a seemingly complete response).

Automated Attacker Pseudocode Snippet

```
# for template in jailbreak_templates:
#   for obfuscation in [unicode_homoglyphs, base64]:
#     sample = embed(template, obfuscation, context_snippet)
#     add_to_attack_corpus(sample)
```

The Outer Walls: Normalization and High-Speed Rules

Preprocessing & Normalization



- Normalize Unicode (NFKC) & collapse whitespace.
- Decode Base64 and URL-encoded payloads to reveal hidden text.
- Extract and isolate high-risk content: quoted blocks, code fences, file attachments.
- Tag input source: user_typed vs. high-risk external_url.

Rule-Based Filters (The Gate Guards)



- **Mechanism**: Prioritized regexes and patterns for low-latency blocking.
- **Examples**: /\(?i)\bignore (previous|system) instructions\b/ Detects imperative verbs (ignore, forget) at the start of a quoted block.
- **Pros**: Fast, explainable. **Cons**: Brittle against novel obfuscation.

The Watchtowers: An ML Classifier for Subtle Threats



Mission: A supervised binary classifier predicting “Injection” vs. “Benign.”

Architecture: A fine-tuned, lightweight transformer (e.g., DistilBERT) for speed and accuracy.

Feature Augmentation: The model sees more than just text. We add features to enhance its perception:

* Count of imperative verbs
* Number of quoted blocks
* Character set entropy
* Presence of decoded instructions

Training: Trained on our balanced Attack Corpus, with rigorous cross-validation and per-attack-type performance tracking.

The Elite Guard: An Auxiliary LLM as a Sanitizer



Concept:
Use a separate, specialized LLM as a final detector and sanitizer, inspired by PromptArmor-style defenses.

The Guard's Task:

1. Decide: Is the input `MALICIOUS` or `CLEAN`?
2. If malicious, extract the hostile instruction.
3. Produce a sanitized, safe version of the user's message.

Critical Separation: The Guard LLM's output drives policy; its raw output is never fed back into the main model.

The Command Center: The Policy Engine's Response Actions

Function: Ingests signals and confidence scores from all detectors to make a final decision.

The Decision Matrix:

- **Allow:** Low risk signals. Proceed as normal.
- **Sanitize:** Medium risk; LLM guard has provided a safe version. Proceed with sanitized input.
- **Quarantine:** Ambiguous risk. Ask the user a clarifying question without processing the instruction.
- **Block & Escalate:** High confidence threat detected. Block the request, log the incident, and alert for human review.

User Experience is Key: Blocked requests must receive an explainable message. Example: "I can't follow that instruction because it conflicts with my safety rules. Would you like me to try something else?"



Securing the Armory: Mediating and Sandboxing Tool Use

The Threat: Tool-poisoning and indirect injection through tool outputs are significant risks.

Our Sandbox Principles:

1. **Validate All Inputs**: Scrutinize all parameters passed to any tool or API.
2. **Restrict Dangerous Commands**: Block or remove system-level commands and file system access.
3. **Enforce Least Privilege**: Never pass raw secrets or overly permissive credentials to the LLM. Each tool call uses the minimum necessary permissions.



Measuring Our Defenses: The Metrics That Matter

Detection Accuracy



False Positive Rate (FPR)

0.05%

Attack Success Rate (Red Team)

1.2%

Detection Latency (ms)



AUC/ROC (ML Model)

0.98

Avg. Time to Mitigate

3.5 Hours

Constant Drills: The Necessity of Adaptive Red-Teaming

Adaptive Attack:
Human red-team designs a novel evasion.



Bypass Detected:
The attack succeeds and is logged.

Defenses Retrained:
Models and rules are updated and redeployed.

Corpus Updated:
The new attack is added to our dataset.

Static evaluations are insufficient. Defenses degrade significantly under adaptive adversaries. We must assume the attacker is always learning, so we must learn faster.

A Practical Path Forward: Our Implementation Milestones

Data & Baseline Rules
(2–3 weeks)

Build initial corpus and synthetic attack generators. Implement preprocessing pipeline and fast rule engine.

ML Detector Prototype
(3–4 weeks)

Fine-tune DistilBERT classifier. Build evaluation suite and performance dashboard.

Full Pipeline Integration
(2–3 weeks)

Deploy auxiliary LLM sanitizer. Integrate the Policy Engine and Execution Sandbox.

Continuous Operations
(Ongoing)

Launch internal red-teaming program. Formalize the continuous learning and deployment loop.

The Strategic Landscape: A Defensible Fortress in an Endless Arms Race



- **Acknowledge the Reality:** Defenses will always face **adaptive attackers**. This is a continuous effort, not a one-time fix.
- **The Core Tension:** We must constantly balance security with user experience. Aggressive blocking via low **false positive** thresholds is critical for adoption.
- **The Strategic Goal:** Our objective is not to build an “unbeatable” system, but to construct a resilient, multi-layered fortress that makes successful attacks prohibitively expensive and difficult for the adversary.

The Blueprint for Resilience

Defense-in-Depth is Non-Negotiable.

A single wall will always be breached. Resilience comes from layers.



Vigilance is Continuous.

A fortress that is never tested is already compromised. Constant red-teaming is the only path to security.

Data is the Foundation of All Defenses.

A system trained on a weak understanding of the threat will fail.