

# ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES AGAINST A BERT ABSA MODEL

FOOLING BERT WITH L33T, MISSPELLIGN, AND PUNCTUATION,

N. HOFER, P. SCHÖTTLE, A. RIETZLER, S. STABINGER AUGUST, 2021

## **Adversarial Examples Against a BERT ABSA Model**



Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers - BERT




Abbildung: Transformer Model Architecture (Vaswani et al., 2017)

## **Adversarial Examples Against a BERT ABSA Model**






Abbildung: Adversarial Examples in Computer Vision (Goodfellow et al, ICLR 2015)






Abbildung: Object detection in autonomous driving (Source: becominghuman.ai)





Abbildung: Tweet containing misleading information regarding Covid-19, detected and labeled correctly





Abbildung: Tweet containing misleading information regarding Covid-19, detected and labeled correctly





Abbildung: Tweet containing misleading information regarding Covid-19. Potential problems due to the use of Leet Speak.

1. Fine-Tuning BERT base for ABSA

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Aspect-based Sentiment Analysis

#### Fine-Tuning BERT base for ABSA

#### Aspect-based Sentiment Analysis

#### **Dataset**

- Labels contain a set of Entity Attribute -Sentiment
- 23 Entities 9 Attributes 3 Sentiments (POS, NEG, NEU)
- Entity: reviewd entity
- Attribute: particular attribute of an entity
- Sentiment: polarity towards the entity and its attribute

Entity Labels				
1. LAPTOP	13. BATTERY			
2. DISPLAY	14. GRAPHICS			
3. KEYBOARD	15. HARD DISK			
4. MOUSE	16. MULTIMEDIA DEVICES			
5. MOTHERBOARD	17. hardware			
6. CPU	18. SOFTWARE			
7. FANS& COOLING	19. os			
8. PORTS	20. WARRANTY			
9. MEMORY	21. SHIPPING			
10. POWER SUPPLY	22. SUPPORT			
11. OPTICAL DRIVES	23. COMPANY			
Attribute Labels				
A. GENERAL	E. USABILITY			
B. PRICE	F. DESIGN& FEATURES			
C. QUALITY	G. PORTABILITY			
D. OPERATION&	H. CONNECTIVITY			
PERFORMANCE	I. MISCELLANEOUS			

#### 1. Fine-Tuning BERT base for ABSA

Aspect-based Sentiment Analysis


The computer is excellent for gaming but I think it is way too expensive!!


#### 1. Fine-Tuning BERT base for ABSA

Aspect-based Sentiment Analysis

The computer is excellent for gaming but I think it is way too expensive !!

Aspect: Gaming, Sentiment: POS Aspect: Price, Sentiment: NEG





Leave-One-Out Method


### Fine-Tuning BERT base for ABSA




#### 2. Identify Important Word

#### Leave-One-Out Method







### **Adversarial Attacks**



## **Objectives**

- Semantic Meaning
- Inconspicousness
- Relevance

#### 1. Leetspeak

The computer is excellent for gaming but I think it is way too expensive!!

Aspect: Gaming, Sentiment: POS Aspect: Price, Sentiment: NEG

Original important word: **excellent**Modified important word: **excellent** 

The computer is excellent for gaming but I think it is way too expensive!!

Aspect: Gaming, Sentiment: NEG Aspect: Price, Sentiment: NEG

#### 2. Misspellings

The computer is excellent for gaming but I think it is way too expensive!!

Aspect: Gaming, Sentiment: POS Aspect: Price, Sentiment: NEG

Original important word: **excellent** Modified important word: **ecxellent** 

The computer is ecxellent for gaming but I think it is way too expensive!!

Aspect: Price, Sentiment: NEG

#### 3. Punctuation

The computer is excellent for gaming but I think it is way too expensive!!

Aspect: Gaming, Sentiment: POS Aspect: Price, Sentiment: NEG

Original important word: **excellent** Modified important word: **excellent**,

The computer is excellent, for gaming but I think it is way too expensive!!

Aspect: Laptop (general), Sentiment: NEG
Aspect: Gaming, Sentiment: NEG
Aspect: Price, Sentiment: NEG

### **Qualitative Results**



Perturbation Method	Leetspeak	Misspellings	Punctuation
Dataset A - # of original sentences	943	943	943
Dataset B - # of modifiable original sentences	897	369	943
Dataset C - # of adversarial sentences	2232	1354	2555
Dataset D - # of changed predictions total	1066	420	382
Dataset E - # of changed predictions per sentence	790	259	253
Overall Success Rate	47.76%	31.01%	14.95%
Distinct Success Rate	88.07%	70.19%	26.83%

Tabelle: Comparison of the success rates of the three attack methods.

# **Conclusion & Further Steps**



#### Summary

- BERT can be fooled by input modofications
- Three attack methods:
  - Leetspeak
  - Misspellings
  - Falsly placed Punctuation

## Next Steps

- Transferability between Transformer Models
- Using generated adversarial datasets for Adversarial Training



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