

Implementing Privileged Access Workstations

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- IT Admin since 1996
- MVP in Windows OS since 2011
- **"100 Most Influential people in IT in Finland"**
– TiVi'2019→
- Specializes in and trains:
 - Troubleshooting
 - Security, Social Engineering, Auditing
- Trophies:
 - **Ignite 2018 – Best Session and #2 (out of 1708) !**
 - Best speaker at Advanced Threat Summit 2020, Poland
 - Best Speaker at NIC, Oslo 2016, 2017, 2019 and 2020
 - Best Session at AppManagEvent 2017, 2018, Utrecht
 - TechEd Europe and North America 2014 - Best session, Best speaker
 - TechEd Australia 2013 - Best session, Best speaker



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Wartime...

← Thread



Sami Laiho
@samilaiho

...

Через поточний стан кібербезпеки, та для захисту КОРПОРАТИВНИХ мереж в Україні я вирішив опублікувати прості та безкоштовні інструкції щодо захисту середовищ Windows від зловмисників.

Прочитайте весь тред і, якщо вважаєте його корисним, зробіть ретвіт! [#StandWithUkraine](#)

[Translate Tweet](#)

2:43 PM · Mar 2, 2022 · TweetDeck

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blog.win-fu.com



Kunnia Ukrainalle

Muuttuneen kyberturvallisuustilanteen johdosta, maanpuolustushengessä, päätin julkaista mahdollisimman yksinkertaiset ohjeet Windows-ympäristön puolustamiseen, ulkoista hyökkääjää vastaan. LUE KOKO KETJU, ja jos koet, että tästä on hyötyä → Retweet!

For all my English followers, normally I would tweet in English but this is a matter of protecting my own country. I'll translate ASAP, until → Google.

Voisin ohjeistaa, että teidän pitää ottaa pois admin-oikat, asentaa AppLocker jne. mutta tosiasia on, että näitä ei tehdä päivässä, eikä kahdessa. Joten seuraavassa nopeat ohjeet, joilla on oikeasti merkitystä ja välitön teho, kyberhyökkäyksiä vastaan.

Tietoturva on lopulta yksinkertaista. Kyse on enemmän oikeista toimintatavoista, konsepteista, kuin kalliista tuotteista. Seuraavassa käyn läpi, mitä tekisin, jos olisin sotatilanteessa ja suojaus pitäisi saada äkkiä nostettua potenssiin kaksi, irrottamatta verkkoa Internetistä.

Ohjeet on tehty estämään kokonaisen ympäristön menetys. Pari sotilasta voidaan tässä menettää, mutta estetään vierasta tahoa valtaamasta koko firmaa. Yritykset eivät joudu uutisiin, koska heidän käyttäjä saa ransomwaren, vaan siksi, että koko yrityksen toiminta voidaan lamauttaa.

Ohjeet ovat yksinkertaisia, jotka auttavat kaikkia yrityksiä, joilla on hakemistopalvelu(AD/AAD). Näistä saadaan paremmat, jos yhdessä tehdään, juuri teille - Nyt kuitenkin on tarkoitus tehdä ohjeita, jotka sopivat kaikille.

Aina voi parantaa, mutta muistakaa, että tietoturvassa ei saa antaa täydellisen olla hyvän vihollinen. Nyt pitää TEHDÄ näitä asioita, jotta maan yritykset pysyvät turvassa! Ei ole aikaa siihen, että "Tämä ei ole 100% turvallinen" tai "Tämä vuotaa kuitenkin".

Nyt parannetaan olemassa olevaa. Tehdään täydellisempää sitten kun perussuojaukset on kytketty!

1. Tier0-suojaus. Jokaisen hyökkäyksen graalin malja on Domain Admin -tunnus. Jotta sitä ei voi varastaa, sen käyttö estetään siellä missä sitä ei tarvita. Osoita seuraava policy kaikille koneille, paitsi DC-koneille.

Security is simple at the end...

Don't let accounts that can take down your environment logon to devices with access to malware...


Don't let computers that can take down your environment talk to Facebook...

Tier Model & PAW's


Mitigating PtH

Split your environment into three layers (Azure minimum 2 layers)

Never allow higher layer admins to logon to lower layers



My AD



Normal Workstation

Group Policy Management

File Action View Window Help

Group Policy Management

Forest: XENONIA.local

Domains

XENONIA.local

- c_ALLOS_Avecto
- c_ALLOS_DomainSecurity
- c_ALLOS_IPsec
- c_ALLOS_PowerOptions_RDP_GPO
- c_ALLOS_Shortcuts
- Default Domain Policy
- KIDBLOCK

Accounts

- Computers
 - Secure Workstations
 - c_ALLOS_SecureWorkstationSecurity
 - Servers
 - c_ALLOS_ServerSecurity
 - Workstations
 - c_ALLOS_WorkstationSecurity**
- Groups
- Users

Domain Controllers

Group Policy Objects

WMI Filters

Starter GPOs

Sites

- Group Policy Modeling
- Group Policy Results

c_ALLOS_WorkstationSecurity

Scope Details Settings Delegation

c_ALLOS_WorkstationSecurity

Data collected on: 24.3.2017 15.06.16

Computer Configuration (Enabled)

Policies

Windows Settings

Security Settings

Local Policies/User Rights Assignment

Policy	Setting
Deny access to this computer from the network	XENONIA\G_Server_Admins, XENONIA\Domain Admins, NT AUTHORITY\Local account and member of Administrators group
Deny log on as a batch job	XENONIA\Domain Admins, XENONIA\G_Server_Admins
Deny log on as a service	XENONIA\Domain Admins, XENONIA\G_Server_Admins
Deny log on locally	XENONIA\Domain Admins, XENONIA\G_Server_Admins
Deny log on through Terminal Services	XENONIA\Domain Admins, XENONIA\G_Server_Admins

Restricted Groups

Group	Members	Member of
XENONIA\G_Workstation_Admins		BUILTIN\Administrators

Windows Firewall with Advanced Security

Application Control Policies

User Configuration (Enabled)

No settings defined.

Servers

c_ALLOS_ServerSecurity
Scope Details Settings Delegation

c_ALLOS_ServerSecurity
Data collected on: 24.3.2017 15.06.49 [show](#)

Computer Configuration (Enabled)

Policies

Windows Settings

Security Settings

Local Policies/User Rights Assignment

Policy	Setting
Deny access to this computer from the network	XENONIA\G_Workstation_Admins, XENONIA\Domain Admins, NT AUTHORITY\Local account and member of Administrators group
Deny log on as a batch job	XENONIA\Domain Admins, XENONIA\G_Workstation_Admins
Deny log on as a service	XENONIA\Domain Admins, XENONIA\G_Workstation_Admins
Deny log on locally	XENONIA\Domain Admins, XENONIA\G_Workstation_Admins
Deny log on through Terminal Services	XENONIA\Domain Admins, XENONIA\G_Workstation_Admins

Restricted Groups

User Configuration (Enabled)

No settings defined.

Good start

- <https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/core-infrastructure-and-security/initially-isolate-tier-0-assets-with-group-policy-to-start/ba-p/1184934>

Group Policy Management

- Forest: concept.local
 - Domains
 - concept.local
 - cu_Custom_Default_Domain_Policy
 - Default Domain Policy
 - Accounts
 - Computers** (highlighted with red arrow)
 - c_AppLocker_Hardening
 - Tier0_Protection (highlighted with red arrow)
 - PAWs
 - Servers
 - Workstations

Computers

Link Order	GPO	Enforced	Link Enabled	GPO Status	W
1	c_AppLocker_Hard...	No	Yes	Enabled	No
2	Tier0_Protection	No	Yes	Enabled	No

Group Policy Management Editor

File Action View Help



Tier0_Protection [CONDC1.CONCEPT.LOCAL] Policy

- Computer Configuration
 - Policies
 - Software Settings
 - Windows Settings
 - Name Resolution Policy
 - Scripts (Startup/Shutdown)
 - Security Settings
 - Account Policies
 - Local Policies
 - Audit Policy
 - User Rights Assignment

Policy

Policy	Policy Setting
Create permanent shared objects	Not Defined
Create symbolic links	Not Defined
Debug programs	Not Defined
Deny access to this computer from the network	CONCEPT\Domain Admins
Deny log on as a batch job	CONCEPT\Domain Admins
Deny log on as a service	CONCEPT\Domain Admins
Deny log on locally	CONCEPT\Domain Admins
Deny log on through Remote Desktop Services	CONCEPT\Domain Admins
Enable computer and user accounts to be trusted for delega...	Not Defined
Force shutdown from a remote system	Not Defined
Generate security audits	Not Defined


Managing Groups (GP or GPP)



Mitigating PtH (Native Cloud)

Split your environment into two layers

Never allow higher layer admins to logon to lower layers



- Home
- Dashboard
- All services
- FAVORITES
- Devices
- Apps
- Endpoint security
- Reports

[Home](#) > [Block Global Admins](#) >

Custom ...

Windows 10 and later

1 Configuration settings **2** Review + save

OMA-URI Settings ⓘ

Add

Export

Name ↑↓	Description ↑↓	OMA-URI ↑↓	Value	
User Rights Test	Not configured	./Device/Vendor/MSFT/Polic...	String	...

`./Device/Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/UserRights/DenyLocalLogOn`

Edit Row

OMA-URI Settings

Name *

User Rights Test

Description

Not configured

OMA-URI *

./Device/Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/UserRigh...

Data type

String

Value *

AzureAD\admin@adminize.com

Managing Groups with Intune

Microsoft Endpoint Manager admin center

Home > Endpoint security >

Create profile ...

Local user group membership (Preview)

1 Basics 2 Configuration settings 3 Assignments 4 Scope tags 5 Review + create


Local Users And Groups

+ Add - Delete

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Local group ⓘ	Group and user action ⓘ	User selection type ⓘ	Selected users/groups
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Administrators ▾	Add (Update) ▾	Users/Groups ▾	Users selected: 1

Don't remove these

- Applies to all "Azure admins" including "Device Administrators"



Privileged Access Workstation (PAW)

PAW-workstations

- Management WS
 - RSAT installed
 - Allowed to use Windows Admin Center
 - Allowed to logon with administrative users (and usually only by them)
 - Hopefully not interactively though
- <https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/datacentersecurity/2017/10/13/privileged-access-workstationpaw/>

Group Policy Management

File Action View Window Help

Group Policy Management

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Starter GPOs

c_ALLOS_SecureWorkstationSecurity

Scope Details Settings Delegation

c_ALLOS_SecureWorkstationSecurity

Data collected on: 24.3.2017 15.06.15

Computer Configuration (Enabled)

Policies

Windows Settings

Security Settings


Local Policies/User Rights Assignment

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Deny log on as a service	XENONIA\Domain Admins, XENONIA\G_Server_Admins
Deny log on through Terminal Services	XENONIA\Domain Admins, XENONIA\G_Server_Admins

Restricted Groups

Application Control Policies

User Configuration (Enabled)



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PATCH
MY PC




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Why?

Why?

- Management tools just were not meant to work on servers
- RDP is an emergency console with two licenses
- No GUI
- High privileged user accounts can't be used "where ever"



<https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/windowsserver/2019/04/29/its-time-to-update-your-windows-management-strategy/>

How?

Platforms?

- Platform Level 1
 - A workstation is either a normal or a privileged one
- Platform Level 2
 - Admins have a VM
 - Running the admin stuff on the VM
 - Running the admin stuff on the Host
- Platform Level 3
 - Admins have separate computers for normal and privileged use

What about Jump Servers?


Jump Servers


- This approach is frequently proposed to mitigate risk to administration and does provide some security assurances, but the jump server approach by itself is vulnerable to certain attacks because it violates the ["clean source" principle](#). The clean source principle requires all security dependencies to be as trustworthy as the object being secured.




Jump Servers

- The administrative session on the jump server relies on the integrity of the local computer accessing it. If this computer is a user workstation subject to phishing attacks and other internet-based attack vectors, then the administrative session is also subject to those risks.





Administrators- group members



IPsec

Recommended Reading


Good run-through for AD-environment's IPsec

- <https://improsec.com/tech-blog/setup-rdp-dc-jumphost-paw-ipsec>

Azure PAW

Microsoft RAMP

- <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security/compass/security-rapid-modernization-plan>



Recommended Reading

Good run-through for AAD-environments

- <https://call4cloud.nl/2021/11/paw-love-and-thunder/>

Conditional Access for Devices

- <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/conditional-access/concept-condition-filters-for-devices>

Thank you!

Please remember to fill out the evals!

<https://stream.nordicvirtualsummit.com/feedback>

