The road to Defender Application Control enforcement

- Kim Oppalfens
- EIEIO @ OSCC
- Twitter @TheWMIGuy
- MVP (for now)

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The road to Defender **Application Control** enforcement

- Tom Degreef
- XYZO @ OSCC
- Twitter @Tomdegreef
- MVP (for now)

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The road





"Sell" the project



Pick your targets



Define your strategy



Build the base audit policy



Centralize your event logging



Pitfalls

Why? / Sell the project





The principle of least privilege is a guideline that states that users should have access to the resources they need to perform their tasks, but not more.

Windows code execution, in allowing any code to run, doesn't appear to follow that practice.

Proactive

Reactive

Threat analytics

36

Latest threats

Malware profile: Emotet

Log4j active exploitation

organizations globally

Threat Insights: NICKEL targeting government-affiliated

Threat Insights: Qakbot abuses Craigslist email relay

■ No alerts ■ Resolved alerts ■ Active alerts

Activity group 91.50943

High-impact threats ^①

Simulated threat WannaCrypt

■ No alerts ■ Resolved alerts ■ Active alerts

Smoke Loader (Dofoil) mines coin

Highest exposure threats

CVE-2021-34527 and other Print Spooler vulnerabilities 26 - Low Threat Insights: CVE-2021-36955 Common Log File System 25 - Low **Driver EoP**

CVE-2021-40444 MSHTML remote code execution Threat Insights: Win32k elevation of privilege vulnerability

(CVE-2021-40449) exploited

■ High 70-100 ■ Medium 30-69 ■ Low 0-29

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Email notification settings



Further Proof / Sell the project

Actual Vulnerabilities

- PrintNightmare (307.000)
- HiveNightmare/SeriousSAM(67.700)
- Windows Installer Privesc (20.700)
- Razer Mouse Driver install (944)
- Solarwinds supply chain attack? (72.400)
 - Powershell
 - C:\windows\idmu\common\ypprop.dll

Applocker as an alternative / Sell the project



- DLL / Scripts?
 - Offensive security tooling exists entirely in PowerShell
 - Invoke-Mimikatz
 - Developing offensive tooling that results in .exe is just as usuable as tooling that results in a .dll
- No Managed Installer
- No ISG

Targets





Information Workers



ICT Department



Servers

Define your strategy – High Level



Strict Allow policy

Applocker like path rules Allow policy

Automatically deny user writable folders

Application Control assistants

- Managed installers
- Intelligent security graph

Block Policy

Define your strategy - Lowlevel



Security Catalogs

Intelligent security graph

Managed installer

Policy

- FilePublisher & Hash
- Path Rules

Build the base audit policy



- Windows Default Audit policy
- Corporate Codesigning certificate / Codesigning certificate infra

```
$rules = New-CIPolicyRule -Level PcaCertificate -DriverFilePath C:\temp\signedfile.exe
```

.net Native Images

```
$rules = New-CIPolicyRule -FilePathRule C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\*
$rules += New-CIPolicyRule -FilePathRule C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_64\*
New-CIPolicy -FilePath policy.xml -Rules $rules
```

- Managed installers
 - set-ruleoption -Option 13 -FilePath Policy.xml
- Recommended block rules
 - Microsoft recommended block rules (Windows) Windows security | Microsoft Docs
 - Microsoft recommended driver block rules (Windows) Windows security | Microsoft Docs

The unsurmountable challenge of code signing

```
//Create your own cert without a PKI
New-SelfSignedCertificate -Type CodeSigningCert
-Subject 'Application control signing cert'

//Sign a file using that cert
$cert = gci Cert:\LocalMachine\My -CodeSigningCert


Set-AuthenticodeSignature
-Certificate $cert
-TimestampServer http://timestamp.digicert.com -HashAlgorithm sha256
-FilePath "file"
```





Security catalogs & the backlog



- .cat files, Introduced 2 decades ago with Windows 2000
- Enforcement started in Windows XP
 - Driver signing is Kernel Mode Code Integrity
- Windows Defender Application Control adds User mode Code Integrity







Centralized reporting



- Microsoft Defender for Endpoint
 - Plan 1 included in Microsoft 365 E3
 - Plan 2 included in Microsoft 365 E5
 - The Applocker logging Caveats
- Azure Log Analytics MSEndpointMgr style
- Windows Event Forwarding
 - CodeIntegrity 3076, 3077 & 3089

Pitfalls



- Intune accidental reboots!
 - Use the AppControl CSP custom OMA-URI
- Software during OSD
- Auto-updating software
- ISG & Invalidate EAs on reboot
- Applocker Logging & Managed installer



A big thanks to our sponsors









Please remember to fill out the evals!

https://stream.nordicvirtualsummit.com/feedback

