

The road to Defender Application Control enforcement

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- MVP (for now)

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The road to Defender Application Control enforcement

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- MVP (for now)



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The road



“Sell” the project



Pick your targets



Define your strategy



Build the base audit policy



Centralize your event logging



Pitfalls

Why? / Sell the project




The principle of least privilege is a guideline that states that users should have access to the resources they need to perform their tasks, but not more.

Windows code execution, in allowing any code to run, doesn't appear to follow that practice.

Proactive

Reactive



Further Proof / Sell the project

Actual Vulnerabilities

- PrintNightmare (307.000)
- HiveNightmare/SeriousSAM (67.700)
- Windows Installer Privesc (20.700)
- Razer Mouse Driver install (944)
- Solarwinds supply chain attack? (72.400)
 - Powershell
 - C:\windows\idmu\common\ypprop.dll

Applocker as an alternative / Sell the project

- DLL / Scripts?
 - Offensive security tooling exists entirely in PowerShell
 - Invoke-Mimikatz
 - Developing offensive tooling that results in .exe is just as usable as tooling that results in a .dll
- No Managed Installer
- No ISG

Targets



Information Workers



ICT Department



Servers

Define your strategy – High Level

Strict Allow policy

Applocker like path rules Allow policy

- Automatically deny user writable folders

Application Control assistants

- Managed installers
- Intelligent security graph

Block Policy

Define your strategy - Lowlevel

Security Catalogs

Intelligent security graph

Managed installer

Policy

- FilePublisher & Hash
- Path Rules

Build the base audit policy

- Windows Default Audit policy
- Corporate Codesigning certificate / Codesigning certificate infra

```
$rules = New-CIPolicyRule -Level PcaCertificate -DriverFilePath C:\temp\signedfile.exe
```

- .net Native Images

```
$rules = New-CIPolicyRule -FilePathRule C:\windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\*  
$rules += New-CIPolicyRule -FilePathRule C:\windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_64\*  
New-CIPolicy -FilePath policy.xml -Rules $rules
```

- Managed installers
 - set-ruleoption -Option 13 -FilePath policy.xml
- Recommended block rules
 - [Microsoft recommended block rules \(Windows\) - Windows security | Microsoft Docs](#)
 - [Microsoft recommended driver block rules \(Windows\) - Windows security | Microsoft Docs](#)

The unsurmountable challenge of code signing


//Create your own cert without a PKI

```
New-SelfSignedCertificate -Type CodeSigningCert `
-Subject 'Application control signing cert'
```

//Sign a file using that cert




```
$cert = gci Cert:\LocalMachine\My -CodeSigningCert

Set-AuthenticodeSignature `
-Certificate $cert `
-TimestampServer http://timestamp.digicert.com -HashAlgorithm
sha256
-FilePath "file"
```



Security catalogs & the backlog

- .cat files, Introduced 2 decades ago with Windows 2000
- Enforcement started in Windows XP
 - Driver signing is Kernel Mode Code Integrity
- Windows Defender Application Control adds User mode Code Integrity



Centralized reporting

- Microsoft Defender for Endpoint
 - Plan 1 included in Microsoft 365 E3
 - Plan 2 included in Microsoft 365 E5
 - The Applocker logging Caveats
- Azure Log Analytics – MSEndpointMgr style
- Windows Event Forwarding
 - CodeIntegrity 3076, 3077 & 3089

Pitfalls

- Intune accidental reboots!
 - [Use the AppControl CSP custom OMA-URI](#)
- Software during OSD
- Auto-updating software
- ISG & Invalidate EAs on reboot
- Applocker Logging & Managed installer

A big thanks to our sponsors



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Thank you!

Please remember to fill out the evals!

<https://stream.nordicvirtualsummit.com/feedback>

