## Microsoft 365 Defender – Things you should go do

- Stefan Schörling, Onevinn
- Twitter @stefanschorling
- Microsoft MVP
- Mattias Borg, Onevinn
- Twitter @mattiasborg82
- Microsoft MVP





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# But first – No sessions this year without ChatGPT

Yes, we asked ChatGPT for the top 5 must do things as a SecOp and SecAdmin with Microsoft 365 Defender

## 5 Sec Ops must do things according to ChatGPT



As a security operator with Microsoft 365 Defender, here are five essential tasks you should do:

- 1.Investigate security incidents
- 2.Respond to threats
- 3. Monitor and maintain security
- 4.Stay informed: Keep up-to-date with the latest cybersecurity threats and trends
- 5. Report and document incidents



### Introduction – M365Defender


#### **Defender Overview**



- M365D Microsoft 365 Defender
  - MDI Microsoft Defender for Identity
  - MDCA Microsoft Defender for Clous Apps
  - MDO Microsoft Defender for Office
  - MDE Microsoft Defender for Endpoint
    - TVM Add-on
- MDC Defender for Cloud
- MDTI
- MD4IoT Microsoft Defender for IoT

### XDR coverage








## Things to do

#### M365D Unified RBAC






Permissions and roles		
Roles give users permission to view data and	complete tasks in Microsoft 365 Defende	r. Help keep your organization secure
i) Import your existing roles from other data sources.		
+ Create custom role = Import roles	t 🗓 Delete roles	
Role name	Description	Data source
M365 Defender Administrators	:	All Scopes
Onevinn MDR Security Analysts	:	All Scopes
Onevinn MDR Security Administrators	i .	All Scopes

### Use Threat Analytics






### **Use Threat Analytics**

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
Human operated ransomware



### **Use Threat Analytics**



Business email compromise






## MDI

Microsoft Defender for Identity

#### MDI Readiness






#### MDI – Health alerts



- NTLM Auditing is not enabled
- Directory Services Advanced
   Auditing is not enabled as required
- Directory Services Object Auditing is not enabled as required
- Power mode is not configured for optimal processor performance




#### **MDI** Actions

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- Disable user in AD
- Enable user in AD
- Force Password reset

Requires gMSA account for custom delegation of permissions



#### **MDI Action Account**



#### Defender for Identity release 2.193

Released October 30, 2022

By default, the Microsoft Defender for Identity sensor installed on a domain controller will impersonate the LocalSystem account of the domain controller and perform the actions. However, you can change this default behavior by setting up a gMSA account and scope the permissions as you need.

#### **Microsoft Defender for Identity**

General	
Sensors	
Directory services accounts	
Manage action accounts	
VPN	
Health issues	
Portal redirection	
Advanced settings	
About	
Entity tags	П

	nsors can use to perform actions on on-p ediation actions can be taken manually o	oremises Active Directory users, such as disable or automatically. Learn more
Automatically use the sensor's lo	ocal system account 🔵 Manually con	figure your management accounts
Filter  Domain: Any  Group mana	aged service account: <b>Any</b> ∨	
$\pm$ Export $+$ Add credentials		1 item 🗔 Custo
Account	Domain	Group managed service account (i)
gMSA-mdi-action	RANGE.LOCAL	True

#### MDI Action Account Troubleshooting



- Wrong Account Type
- Not allowed to logon as service
- Permissions

#### **Events with the configured MDI account (Requires central logging)**

SecurityEvent

where Account has "gMSA-MDIAction\$"

Portal action events by the configured MDI account (Requires central logging)

SecurityEvent

| where EventID in(4738,4725,4722)

where Account has "gMSA-mdi-action\$" //mdi account account name

where TargetAccount contains "test" //the user you want to take action on

TimeGenerated [UTC]	2022-12-09T17:24:33.2865665Z
Account	sec-labs.com\gMSA-mdi-action\$
AccountType	Machine
Activity	4625 - An account failed to log on.
LogonType	5
LogonTypeName	5 - Service
Status	0xc000015b




## MDO

Microsoft Defender for Office

#### Old School - ORCA

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- Install-Module -Name ORCA
- Get-ORCAReport



#### **New School - Configuration Analyzer**



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#### **Configuration analyzer**

The configuration analyzer can help identify issues in your current configuration, and help improve your policies for better security. Learn more.

**Standard recommendations** Strict recommendations Configuration drift analysis and history

i-snam Anti-phishing Anti-malwa


5 32 1

( ) Pofrach

Refresh					38 items	∠ Search	∑ Filter
Recommendations	Policy	Policy group/setting name	Policy type	Current configuration	Last modified	Status	
Quarantine message	Default	High confidence spam detection action	Anti-spam	Move to Junk Email folder	Sep 9, 2020 11:10 PM	Not started	
Quarantine message	Default	Phishing email detection action	Anti-spam	Move to Junk Email folder	Sep 9, 2020 11:10 PM	Not started	
Change 7 to 6	Default	Bulk email threshold	Anti-spam	7	Sep 9, 2020 11:10 PM	Not started	
Change 15 to 30	Default	Quarantine retention period	Anti-spam	15	Sep 9, 2020 11:10 PM	Not started	
Change False to True	Default	Enable end-user spam notifications	Anti-spam	False	Sep 9, 2020 11:10 PM	Not started	
Change False to True	Company ATP Phishing Policy (all use	ers) Add users to protect	Anti-phishing	False	Nov 6, 2020 12:22 PM	Not started	
Change False to True	Company ATP Phishing Policy (all use	ers) Automatically include the domains I own	Anti-phishing	False	Nov 6, 2020 12:22 PM	Not started	
Change False to True	Company ATP Phishing Policy (all use	ers) Include custom domains	Anti-phishing	False	Nov 6, 2020 12:22 PM	Not started	
Quarantine message	Company ATP Phishing Policy (all use	ers) If email is sent by an impersonated user	Anti-phishing	No action	Nov 6, 2020 12:22 PM	Not started	
Quarantine message	Company ATP Phishing Policy (all use	ers) If email is sent by an impersonated domain	Anti-phishing	No action	Nov 6, 2020 12:22 PM	Not started	
Change False to True	Company ATP Phishing Policy (all use	ers) Enable Intelligence for impersonation protection (Recommended)	Anti-phishing	False	Nov 6, 2020 12:22 PM	Not started	
Change False to True	Company ATP Phishing Policy (all use	ers) Show tip for impersonated users	Anti-phishing	False	Nov 6, 2020 12:22 PM	Not started	
Change False to True	Company ATP Phishing Policy (all use	ers) Show tip for impersonated domains	Anti-phishing	False	Nov 6, 2020 12:22 PM	Not started	

### MDO go do

- Configuration Analyzer
- EOP Hardening
  - Allowed filetypes
- Move e-mail actions to Quarantine
- Reduce Allow lists in favor for stricter Exchange Transport Rules
  - Sender + DMARC set SCL -1
- Look for policies overriding threat





### MDE for Servers

Microsoft Defender for Endpoints for Servers

### Red or Blue Pill – Not any more



Requires licensing through Azure via MDC



-Prem Licens al (MSI+Onboa MEMCM

Defender for Cloud P1/P2

Prerequisites

Azure ARC

**Automatic Deployment** 

Non-Azure Servers

### MDE unified agent

- April 2021 New Server Agent GA (2012 R2 / 2016)
- MMA Agent EOL August 2024
- Feature parity with clients

Server version	AV	EDR
Windows Server 2012 R2 SP1		
Windows Server 2016	Built-in	
Windows Server 2019 or later	Built-in	Built-in

#### Supported capabilities for Windows devices Operating System Windows Windows 10 Windows Windows Server 2019 & 2022 Server 1803+ Server 2016[1] Prevention Attack Surface Reduction rules Device Control Firewall Network Protection Next-generation protection Tamper Protection Web Protection Detection Advanced Hunting Custom file indicators Custom network indicators EDR Block & Passive Mode Sense detection sensor Endpoint & network device discovery Automated Investigation & Response collect investigation package, run AV scan File response capabilities: collect file, deep analysis, block file, stop, and guarantine processes Live Response (1) Refers to the modern, unified solution for Windows Server 2012 and 2016. For more information, see Onboard Windows Servers to the Defender for Endpoint service ① Note


Windows 7, 8.1, Windows Server 2008 R2 include support for the EDR sensor, and AV using System Center Endpoint Protection (SCEP).



#### Deploy with Defender for Cloud



Enable unified solution



Allow Microsoft Defender for Endpoint to access my data. Learn more >

Enable for Linux machines

Defender for Cloud supports Microsoft Defender for Endpoint on Linux machines. Learn more >

Enable unified solution

Defender for Cloud supports Microsoft Defender for Endpoint unified solution for Windows servers 2012R2 and Windows servers 2016. Learn more >

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/plan-defender-for-servers-select-plan

#### **NOTE! Network Protection**



- To enable Network Protection, more configurations are required:
  - Set-MpPreference -EnableNetworkProtection Enabled
  - Set-MpPreference -AllowNetworkProtectionOnWinServer 1
  - Set-MpPreference -AllowNetworkProtectionDownLevel 1
  - Set-MpPreference -AllowDatagramProcessingOnWinServer 1


In addition, on machines with a high volume of network traffic, performance testing in your environment is highly recommended before enabling this capability broadly. You may need to account for extra resource consumption.

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/configure-server-endpoints?view=o365-worldwide

### New sensor update



- Important, Maintain the new sensor through update KB5005292
  - WSUS/MEMCM
    - Classification: Definition Updates
    - Product : Defender for Endpoint
  - Manual
    - https://www.catalog.update.microsoft.com/Search.aspx?q=KB5005292



#### Common Pitfalls and Lessons learned



- FW audit log turned off
- Don't forget to configure and harden AV, not just focus on deploying EDR
- New path, and custom detection exclusions
- No AV GUI on 2012 R2, only basic operations in 2016 GUI
- A few ASR Rules not supported on Server OS:
  - Attack surface reduction rules reference | Microsoft Docs
- Network events not populate if not patched
  - October 12, 2021 monthly rollup (KB5006714)
- No Automatic exclusions 2012 R2
- Review Dynamic AAD Group Rules before enrolling
- Operating system upgrades aren't supported. Offboard then uninstall before upgrading.



## MDE

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint

### Harden Defender Configuration



- Cloud Protection
  - MAPSReporting = 2
  - CloudBlockLevel = 2
  - CloudExtendedTimeout = 50
- Network Protection
  - EnableNetworkProtection = 1
- SubmitSamplesConsent = 3 (Always) | 1 (Safe Samples) Requirement for Cloud Protection
- Tamper Protection
- Firewall Auditing
  - auditpol /set /subcategory:"Filtering Platform Packet Drop" /failure:enable
  - auditpol /set /subcategory:"Filtering Platform Connection" /failure:enable

Requirement for Firewall Report and Hunting events

- AttackSurfaceReduction
- DefaultActions
  - Quarantine
- EDR BlockMode
- Exclusions
- DisableLocalAdminMerge
- General Auditing
  - <a href="https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/defender/advanced-hunting-extend-data?view=0365-worldwide">https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/defender/advanced-hunting-extend-data?view=0365-worldwide</a>




### TVM

Threat and Vulnerability Management

## Configure email notifications for vulnerabilities




Keep up to date - Don't miss a severe vulnerability



## Service Executables – Instant Admin privilege






Security recommendation	OS platfo	Weaknesses	Related component	Threats	Exposed devices	Remediation type	Remediation activities	Impact ①	Tags
Fix unquoted service path for Windows services	Windows	1	Operating system (Services)	¢ ö	263 / 330	Configuration cha	0	<b>▼</b> 0.76   +6.38	
Change service executable path to a common protected location	Windows	1	Operating system (Services)	Ø Ö	49 / 330	Configuration cha	0	<b>▼</b> 0.14   <b>+</b> 1.19	

scid-3001 scid-3002

#### **SMB** and **Shares**





Security recommendation	OS platform Weaknes	ses Related component	Threats	Exposed devices	Remediation type	Remediation activities	Impact ①	Tags
Enable 'Microsoft network client: Digitally sign communications (always)'	Windows 1	Network	Ø 5	t	Configuration change	0	<b>▼</b> 0.15   +0.51	COVID-19
☐ Disable SMBv1 client driver	Windows 1	Network	Ø Ö	k	Configuration change	0	<b>▼</b> 0.04   +0.13	
Set folder access-based enumeration for shares	Windows 1	Operating system (Shares)	© Ö	k	Configuration change	0	<b>▼</b> 0.02   +7.32	
☐ Disable 'Insecure guest logons' in SMB	Windows 1	Operating system	© 0		Configuration change	0	<b>▼</b> <0.01   +0.01	COVID-19
☐ Disable SMBv1 server	Windows 1	Network	© Ö		Configuration change	0	<b>▼</b> <0.01   +0.00	
Disable sending unencrypted password to third-party SMB servers	Windows 1	Network	Ø 0	Μ	Configuration change	0	<b>▼</b> 0.00   +0.00	COVID-19

#### Hardware and Firmware



#### CPU

Name	Processor family	OS platform	Vendor	Weaknesses	Threats	Impact ① ↓
Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-8365U CPU @ 1.60GHz	8th Generation Intel(R) Core i5 Processors	Windows	Intel	78	<b>6</b> 9	▼2.75
Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-10310U CPU @ 1.70GHz	10th Generation Intel(R) Core i5 Processors	Windows	Intel	82	<b>6</b> 9	▼1.62
Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-10500T CPU @ 2.30GHz	10th Generation Intel(R) Core i5 Processors	Windows	Intel	79	<b>6</b> 9	▼ 1.45
Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-8350U CPU @ 1.70GHz	8th Generation Intel(R) Core i5 Processors	Windows	Intel	76	© Ö	▼1.43
Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-9500 CPU @ 3.00GHz	9th Generation Intel(R) Core i5 Processors	Windows	Intel	11	<b>6</b> 9	▼1.38
Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-7300U CPU @ 2.60GHz	7th Generation Intel(R) Core i5 Processors	Windows	Intel	75	© Ö	▼1.05
☐ Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-9850H CPU @ 2.60GHz	9th Generation Intel(R) Core i7 Processors	Windows	Intel	72	© Ö	▼ 0.95
Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-10850H CPU @ 2.70GHz	10th Generation Intel(R) Core i7 Processors	Windows	Intel	43	© 5	▼ 0.46
Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-8500T CPU @ 2.10GHz	8th Generation Intel(R) Core i5 Processors	Windows	Intel	73	© Ö	▼ 0.46
Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-9500T CPU @ 2.20GHz	9th Generation Intel(R) Core i5 Processors	Windows	Intel	71	© Ö	▼ 0.42
Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-7500T CPU @ 2.70GHz	7th Generation Intel(R) Core i5 Processors	Windows	Intel	3	<b>6</b> 9	▼ 0.42

#### BIOS

Name	OS platform	Vendor	Weaknesses	Threats	Impact ① ↓
Latitude 7400 Firmware	Windows	Dell	75	<b>6</b> 4	▼ 2.61
Latitude 7410 Firmware	Windows	Dell	78	<b>&amp;</b> 8	<b>▼</b> 1.73
Optiplex 5270 Aio Firmware	Windows	Dell	11	<b>*</b> 5	<b>▼</b> 1.38
Latitude 7490 Firmware	Windows	Dell	74	© Ö	▼1.12
Optiplex 3280 Aio Firmware	Windows	Dell	19	© Ö	▼1.02
Latitude 7480 Firmware	Windows	Dell	75	© Ö	▼1.02
Precision 5540 Firmware	Windows	Dell	72	<b>©</b> 8	▼ 0.95
Precision 5550 Firmware	Windows	Dell	43	© Ö	▼ 0.53
Optiplex 3060 Firmware	Windows	Dell	73	© Ö	▼ 0.46
Optiplex 3070 Firmware	Windows	Dell	71	<b>©</b> Ö	▼ 0.42
Latitude E7470 Firmware	Windows	Dell	72	© Ö	▼ 0.39

#### **MODELS**

1	lame	Model family	OS platform	Vendor	Weaknesses	Threats	Impact ①、
	atitude 7400	Latitude	Windows	Dell	75	¢ 5	<b>▼</b> 2.61
I	atitude 7410	Latitude	Windows	Dell	78	¢ ö	<b>▼</b> 1.73
	Optiplex 5270 Aio	OptiPlex	Windows	Dell	11	¢ ö	▼1.38
	atitude 7490	Latitude	Windows	Dell	74	¢ ö	▼1.12
	Optiplex 3280 Aio	OptiPlex	Windows	Dell	19	¢ ö	▼1.02
	atitude 7480	Latitude	Windows	Dell	75	¢ 5	▼1.02

#### **Browser Extensions**



Google Chrome 183

Microsoft Edge

Mozilla Firefox

62

19

$\underline{\downarrow}$	Export			
	Name			

Name	Browser	OS platform	Permission risk ①	Requested permissions
Adobe Acrobat: PDF edit, convert, sign tools	Google Chrome	Windows	■■■ Critical	11
Cisco Webex Extension	Google Chrome	Windows	■■■ High	3
AdBlock â€" best ad blocker	Google Chrome	Windows	■■■ Critical	13
Grammarly: Grammar Checker and Writing App	Google Chrome	Windows	■■■ High	6

# Certificates



Name ↑	Issued by	Туре	Validation status ①	Scope	Instances / Installed devices
"Brother Industries	VeriSign Class 3 Code Signing 2010 CA	Trusted publisher	▲ Expired (+ 1 more)	Public	1/1
"Brother Industries	VeriSign Class 3 Code Signing 2009-2 CA	Trusted publisher	▲ Expired (+ 2 more)	Private	1/1
"Brother Industries	VeriSign Class 3 Code Signing 2010 CA	Trusted publisher	▲ Expired (+ 1 more)	Public	1/1
"Brother Industries	VeriSign Class 3 Code Signing 2010 CA	Trusted publisher	▲ Expired (+ 1 more)	Public	1/1



# Threat Hunting


## Defender data-model



#### **Alerts**

# Alerts ✓ ☐ AlertInfo ✓ ☐ AlertEvidence

#### E-mail



#### MDCA / AAD / AD

Apps & identities			^
~	0	IdentityInfo	:
~	0	IdentityLogonEvents	:
~	0	IdentityQueryEvents	:
~	0	IdentityDirectoryEvents	:
~	0	CloudAppEvents	:
~	0	AADSpnSignInEventsBeta	:
<b>&gt;</b>	0	AADSignInEventsBeta	:

# Defender data-model



#### **Device**


Devices			^
~	0	DeviceInfo	:
<b>\</b>		DeviceNetworkInfo	:
~	0	DeviceProcessEvents	:
~	0	DeviceNetworkEvents	:
~	0	DeviceFileEvents	:
~	0	DeviceRegistryEvents	:
~	0	DeviceLogonEvents	:
~	0	DeviceImageLoadEvents	:
~	0	DeviceEvents	:
<b>~</b>	0	DeviceFileCertificateInfo	:

#### **Vulnerabilities and Configuration**

Threat & Vulnerability Management				
∨				
∨ ☐ DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilitiesKB				
✓ ☐ DeviceTvmSecureConfigurationAssessment				
✓ ☐ DeviceTvmSecureConfigurationAssessmentKB				
✓ ☐ DeviceBaselineComplianceAssessment				
✓ ☐ DeviceBaselineComplianceAssessmentKB				
∨ ☐ DeviceBaselineComplianceProfiles				
✓ □ DeviceTvmSoftwareInventory				
∨ □ DeviceTvmCertificateInfo				
∨ □ DeviceTvmInfoGathering				
∨ ☐ DeviceTvmInfoGatheringKB				
∨ □ DeviceTvmSoftwareEvidenceBeta				
∨ □ DeviceTvmBrowserExtensions				
∨ □ DeviceTvmBrowserExtensionsKB				
✓ ☐ DeviceTvmHardwareFirmware				

## Defender data-model schema ref





	×
Schema reference  Search table name	
/ Sea.c., case	
AADSignInEventsBeta	
AADSpnSignInEventsBeta	
AlertEvidence	
AlertInfo	
CloudAppEvents	
DeviceBaselineComplianceAssessment	
DeviceBaselineComplianceAssessmentKB	
DeviceBaselineComplianceProfiles	
DeviceEvents	
DeviceFileCertificateInfo	
DeviceFileEvents	
DeviceImageLoadEvents	
DeviceInfo	
DeviceLogonEvents	
DeviceNetworkEvents	
DeviceNetworkInfo	
DeviceProcessEvents	

# Identifying Logins were user is Local Admin



```
DeviceLogonEvents
```

| where Timestamp > = ago(30d)

| where IsLocalAdmin == 1

// where LogonType == "Interactive"

summarize count() by DeviceName, AccountName,LogonType

sort by AccountName

# Identifying Logins were user is Tier Admin



DeviceLogonEvents

| where Timestamp > = ago(30d)

| where AccountName startswith "a1-" or AccountName startswith "a2-"

| where LogonType == "Interactive"

summarize count() by DeviceName, AccountName,LogonType

sort by AccountName

## AppLocker Events



DeviceEvents

| where ActionType == 'AppControlExecutableAudited'

#### AppControlExecutableAudited

Application control detected the use of an untrusted executable.

#### AppControlExecutableBlocked

Application control blocked the use of an untrusted executable.

#### **AppControlPackagedAppAudited**

Application control detected the use of an untrusted packaged app.

#### **AppControlPackagedAppBlocked**

Application control blocked the installation of an untrusted packaged app.

#### AppControlPolicyApplied

An application control policy was applied to the device.

#### AppControlScriptAudited

Application control detected the use of an untrusted script.

#### AppControlScriptBlocked

Application control blocked the use of an untrusted script.

# Firewall Exposure

```
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```

```
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where ActionType == "InboundConnectionAccepted"
| extend IPaddress =
extract(@"\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\",0,LocalIP)
| where IPaddress !startswith "127.0.0"
| extend IsPrivate = ipv4_is_private(IPaddress)
| where IsPrivate == 0
```

### PowerShell Version 2



```
DeviceImageLoadEvents
  where InitiatingProcessFileName =~
         "powershell.exe" and
         FileName in~(
              "system.management.automation.ni.dll",
              "System.Management.Automation.dll")
         and FolderPath matches regex
                        @"[12]\.(\d)+\.(\d)+\.(\d)+"
```

### **Firewall Events**

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DeviceEvents

where ActionType startswith "Firewall"

# Device Health Report




#### **Device Health**

Latest updates

Sensor health & OS Mi


Microsoft Defender Antivirus health



Learn about updates

# **USB** Report






2022-09-18			
USB drive mount and unmount (13 754)	Device Control external device activity (0)	Device Control evidence file (0)	Plug and Play (31 264)
USB Mount 10 563			USB 22 897
USB Unmount 3 191			USBDevice 840
			SmartCard 5
			CDROM <b>69</b>
			WPD 1 907
			DiskDrive 349
			Bluetooth 1 483
			Printer 3 714

# Firewall Report





Top processes initiating blocked connections				
Last updated 2023-02-15T16:31:00.8132	Z			
Process	Connection attempts			
svchost.exe	5			
System	2			
msedge.exe	2			
Remote IPs targeting multiple computers				

Kemote ir s targeting multiple compe	iters
Last updated 2023-02-15T16:31:00.813Z	
Remote IP	Unique computers
172.22.208.1	1
fe80::dd46:bac5:1af4:11e1	1

# Firewall in Advanced Hunting




1 2	DeviceEvents   where ActionType startswith "F:	irewall"		RemotelP (○) 13.107.18.254 □	:	
3	distinct ActionType, DeviceName	2		RemotePort 443	:	
				LocalIP (○) 172.22.209.67 □	:	
				LocalPort 49704	:	
Getting	started Results			InitiatingProcessSHA1  75e2ede98ef98e220ef89b3066b9e2	: ?ea862a0e9a ⊏*	
± Expo	rt			InitiatingProcessMD5	: bbe ⊏'	
Act	tionType	DeviceName	FirewallInboundConnectionBlocked			
Fir	rewallInboundConnectionToAppBlocked	☐ app02.cobrakaidojo.local	A firewall or another application blocked Windows Filtering Platform.	d an inbound connection	using the	12txyewy
Fir	rewallOutboundConnectionBlocked	☐ haxwell-test	FirewallInboundConnectionToAppBlo	rcked		
☐ Fir	rewallInboundConnectionBlocked	□ haxwell-test	The firewall blocked an inbound connec			4bsbneegw0kyx

#### FirewallOutboundConnectionBlocked

A firewall or another application blocked an outbound connection using the Windows Filtering Platform.

# M365D Query Consumption





https://security.microsoft.com/advanced-hunting/quotareport

# Tamper Protection - Excluions



### January 2023

- Tamper protection can now protect exclusions when deployed with Microsoft Intune. See What about exclusions?
- Live Response is now generally available for macOS and Linux. For more information, see, Investigate entities on devices using live response.
- Live response API and library API for Linux and macos is now generally available You can now run live response API commands on Linux and macos.

### THANK YOU





Mattias Borg blog.sec-labs.com

mattiasborg82



Stefan Schörling blog.sec-labs.com

@stefanschorling



We want your feedback!

# Thank you!



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