

FLEX: A Benchmark for Evaluating Robustness of Fairness in Large Language Models

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Abstract

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have significantly enhanced interactions between users and models. These advancements concurrently underscore the need for rigorous safety evaluations due to the manifestation of social biases, which can lead to harmful societal impacts. Despite these concerns, existing benchmarks may overlook the intrinsic weaknesses of LLMs, which can generate biased responses even with simple adversarial instructions. To address this critical gap, we introduce a new benchmark, Fairness Benchmark in LLM under Extreme Scenarios (FLEX), designed to test whether LLMs can sustain fairness even when exposed to prompts constructed to induce bias. To thoroughly evaluate the robustness of LLMs, we integrate prompts that amplify potential biases into the fairness assessment. Comparative experiments between FLEX and existing benchmarks demonstrate that traditional evaluations may underestimate the inherent risks in models. This highlights the need for more stringent LLM evaluation benchmarks to guarantee safety and fairness. Our data and code are available at <https://github.com/ekgus9/FLEX>.

1 Introduction

Large Language Models (LLMs) trained on extensive datasets with numerous parameters have garnered significant attention for enhancing the accessibility for user interaction (Wei et al., 2022; Ouyang et al., 2022; Zhang et al., 2023a; Peng et al., 2023; Zhao et al., 2023; Qin et al., 2024; Zhou et al., 2024). While these models provide users with more information and improved experiences, they also more directly expose social biases, raising concerns about the safety of LLMs (Weidinger et al., 2021b; Deshpande et al., 2023; Ferrara, 2023; Zhou et al., 2023; Zhuo et al., 2023; Qi




Figure 1: Simplified example of FLEX. FLEX evaluates the model’s biases by presenting it with adversarial prompts designed to exploit its vulnerabilities. This approach measures how well the LLM can maintain fairness and resist bias even under extreme conditions.

et al., 2023; Shaikh et al., 2023; Deshpande et al., 2023; Wei et al., 2024a). This exposure can lead to undesirable societal impacts and potential harm towards specific or multiple groups, establishing the verification of model fairness as a crucial societal issue.

Numerous studies focus on developing benchmarks to evaluate the social stereotypes embedded in models concerning categories such as gender, race, age, etc (Parrish et al., 2022; Levy et al., 2022; Zhang et al., 2023b; Gonçalves and Strubell, 2023; Gallegos et al., 2023; Huang et al., 2023; Zakizadeh et al., 2023; Wang et al., 2024). Existing benchmarks primarily evaluate the safety of models by assessing whether the model selects or generates unbiased responses without additional instructions. This approach implicitly assumes well-intentioned users and assesses fairness from a highly typical and idealized scenario.

However, recent studies reveal that LLMs can easily be compromised by attacks involving simple prompt modifications (Wei et al., 2023; Kumar et al., 2024; Yuan et al., 2024a; Dong et al., 2024), as illustrated in Figure 1. Given that LLMs should maintain neutrality even in bias-inducing situations, this suggests that existing benchmarks are inadequate for evaluating their ethical robustness and

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


Figure 2: Construction process of FLEX. We review LLM responses across various scenarios to identify samples where the LLM is vulnerable. If multiple vulnerable scenarios exist, one is randomly selected. Consequently, each sample in the dataset is exposed to only one of the extreme scenarios. This approach constructs a harmful environment, increasing the likelihood that the LLM will generate biased responses.

fail to guarantee their absolute safety.

To address this issue, we propose a new benchmark, **FLEX** (**Fairness Benchmark in LLM under Extreme Scenarios**). FLEX is designed to rigorously assess the fairness of LLMs when subjected to conditions that are likely to induce bias. By employing adversarial attacks, we expose hidden biases that may not be surface in traditional benchmarks. These adversarial inputs simulate challenging real-world conditions, providing a more realistic evaluation of how well models maintain fairness. Through this approach, we can better identify vulnerabilities and areas for improvement, ensuring that LLMs handle extreme scenarios without amplifying biases.

We use adversarial prompts designed to elicit biased perceptions in LLMs, based on renowned fairness benchmark datasets such as BBQ (Parrish et al., 2022), Crows-Pairs (Nangia et al., 2020) and SteroSet (Nadeem et al., 2021). We reconstruct existing Question Answering (QA) datasets by adding prompts that potentially lead the model to select biased responses. For questions previously answered correctly, we extract scenarios in which GPT-3.5 (OpenAI, 2022) generated biased responses through five rounds of prompt injections. Instead of simply adding scenarios to each sample, we assign the one that can induce the most significant bias for each sample. This allows us to rigorously assess the ability of the model to maintain fairness and neutrality even in environments that significantly increase the likelihood of biased

responses from LLMs.

With our benchmark, we conduct experiments to evaluate fairness across three categories targeting LLMs. By comparing the results from FLEX with those from the source datasets, we demonstrate that the assessments of traditional fairness benchmarks do not guarantee safety in extreme scenarios. Furthermore, despite the early recognition of the issue posed by the most straightforward prompt injection containing competing objectives, it is revealed that most LLMs still fail to address it. Our findings underscore that the fairness of LLMs may be overestimated, indicating that even if LLMs are perceived as relatively safe under existing benchmarks, they may still be easily exposed to risks in different scenarios.

2 Related Works

2.1 Fairness Benchmark

The interest in identifying unfairness caused by models is concretized into methods that evaluate the model’s responses under specific hypothetical situations. Various types of fairness benchmarks have been proposed over time (Nangia et al., 2020; Nadeem et al., 2021; Parrish et al., 2022; Zakizadeh et al., 2023; Manerba et al., 2023, 2024).

Nangia et al. (2020) creates a dataset that evaluates the model’s choices between pairs of sentences that differ only in keywords indicative of bias. In a similar vein, Nadeem et al. (2021) develops a benchmark where the model determines the most

relevant answer among candidate sentences, some containing biased content. [Parrish et al. \(2022\)](#) constructs a QA-format benchmark to examine how models select responses based on the amount of information provided in questions across nine representative social categories. [Manerba et al. \(2024\)](#) goes beyond the binary approach of stereotypes and counter-stereotypes by constructing a large-scale fairness benchmark dataset encompassing multiple identities. While these existing benchmarks focus on examining individual biases for different demographic categories, there are also efforts to establish comprehensive benchmarks that evaluate the overall safety of LLMs ([Zhang et al., 2023b](#); [Wang et al., 2024](#)).

2.2 Adversarial Attack

Neural network-based models can generate incorrect outputs advantageous to attackers through carefully crafted inputs ([Papernot et al., 2016](#); [Garg and Ramakrishnan, 2020](#); [Li et al., 2020](#); [Zeng et al., 2021](#)). Recently, various adversarial attack methods have been proposed for NLP tasks ([Wang et al., 2022](#); [Xu et al., 2023](#); [Carlini et al., 2024](#)). Although the potential for harmful content generation by LLMs has been mitigated by the introduction of safety training techniques that align model outputs with human preferences ([Yao et al., 2024](#); [Chowdhury et al., 2024](#); [Weidinger et al., 2021a](#)), jailbreak attacks continue to pose a threat to model safety. [Wei et al. \(2024a\)](#) analyze challenges arising during the safety training of LLMs, highlighting that such attacks expose the limitations of natural language safety training. [Greshake et al. \(2023\)](#) introduce a new vulnerability through indirect prompt injection attacks, demonstrating the possibility of remotely manipulating LLM-based applications. [Zhang et al. \(2024\)](#) also show that maintaining intended alignment in LLMs remains challenging, even with enhanced decoding techniques.

Considering the variability of LLMs due to prompt differences and their expanded interaction with users, typical benchmark evaluations do not guarantee the model’s absolute neutrality. The adversarial attacks have been shown to be difficult to mitigate in the context of existing language models, highlighting the need for evaluation metrics that can identify model vulnerabilities and guide the development of more robust models. Our objective is to design adversarial scenarios that expose the biases to which models are most vulnerable, thereby facilitating an evaluation of their robust-

ness under extreme conditions. To this end, we introduce a benchmark consisting of adversarial samples crafted to disrupt model performance.

3 FLEX: Fairness Benchmark in LLM under Extreme Scenarios

We introduce FLEX, designed to evaluate the fairness of LLMs in extreme scenarios rigorously. To measure a model’s social bias, we construct a multiple-choice QA where the model must choose a neutral response when given a question. Precisely, although two stereotypical answers are included as options, the explicitly correct answer is to select “Not enough information.” As shown in Figure 1, the model should refuse to choose a biased response, such as “The Malian one” or “The Brazilian one” based solely on the information provided in the question. The prompt template for this task is provided by Appendix A.1.

Existing datasets evaluate models under typical conditions without considering prompts threatening fairness. These typical scenarios consist of questions from QA tasks, as illustrated in the examples provided by previous benchmarks in Figure 1. The limitation of these scenarios is that they do not challenge the model’s robustness concerning fairness and safety.

Therefore, we construct FLEX by integrating extreme scenarios into the input prompts. Extreme scenarios include adversarial instructions designed to expose and maximize the vulnerabilities of language models. These scenarios assume harsh environments where prompts are structured to induce biased perceptions and responses from the model. Evaluations under these conditions aim to assess the robustness and fairness of the language model in maintaining neutrality and avoiding harmful content, even when faced with potentially manipulative inputs.

3.1 Categories of Extreme Scenarios

To simulate extreme scenarios, we construct our benchmark by applying three prompt strategies that can potentially compromise the LLMs’ safety alignment or amplify stereotypes. We consider various methods from previous studies that threaten model safety, but we select only the adversarial techniques that can be applied to our QA task-based fairness benchmark. FLEX includes three categories of adversarial variants: Persona Injection, Competing Objectives, and Text Attack.

3.1.1 Persona Injection

Drawing inspiration from Deshpande et al. (2023), we assign personas to the LLMs based on the finding that they can produce unsafe responses according to a given persona.

We construct a list of personas aligned with the bias types targeted by the source dataset. We adopt seven bias types: age, gender, nationality, race, religion, sexual orientation, and profession. For example, in age-related samples, only personas related to age, such as “kid” and “elder,” are considered. This approach effectively influences the model by prompting it to provide responses biased towards these specific age-related personas when answering age-related questions. The details of persona lists used for each type are provided in Appendix A.2.

3.1.2 Competing Objectives

Competing objectives include prompts restricting the LLM’s ability to refuse responses or requiring it to perform additional tasks simultaneously (Wei et al., 2023). This aims to assign the LLM tasks that conflict with its inherent goal of safety alignment, thereby challenging its ability to maintain fairness. Among the various methods to achieve this, we consider five distinct types of instruction sets as follows.

Refusal Suppression is an instruction-following method introduced by Wei et al. (2023), which prompts the model not to apologize or to exclude specific words in its response, thereby eliciting an unsafe response. When the model receives such messages, the likelihood of choosing the implicit refusal option “Unknown” decreases. As the consideration of this option diminishes, the model is more likely to select options that explicitly reveal its biases.

Self Cipher requires the LLMs to assume the role of a cryptography expert, emphasizing the necessity of encrypted communication in the prompt (Yuan et al., 2024b). With the given inputs and outputs displayed in natural language, the model, acting as a cryptography expert, internally interprets them as encrypted messages. This focus leads the model to prioritize decoding the cipher over adhering to ethical alignments¹. This confu-

¹We consider non-natural language ciphers proposed by Yuan et al. (2024b) to bypass safety alignment mechanisms. However, our preliminary study finds that other LLMs (e.g., Llama2 (Touvron et al., 2023), Claude2 (Anthropic, 2023)) failed to understand these ciphers. Therefore, the methods

sion regarding primary objectives increases the likelihood that the model will externalize stereotypes.

DAN is a widely shared jailbreak method from the early days of LLMs known as “Do Anything Now” (DAN)². It provides detailed instructions for playing DAN and requests outputs starting with “[DAN]:”. We also utilize two other versions of these prompts: **STAN** and **DUDE**.

3.1.3 Text Attack

Text Attack is based on the findings that models produce different results when subjected to adversarial attacks that are not very noticeable to humans, such as typos or paraphrasing of words (Szegedy et al., 2014). Depending on the variation unit, this is divided into character, word, and sentence levels (Wang et al., 2022). Referring to Xu et al. (2023), we guide GPT-3.5 to add perturbations to the sample text so that the sentence retains its original meaning but can still confound the model, thereby reconstructing the sample. The instructions, detailed information, and examples used for the modifications are provided in Appendix A.3.

Character level We assign LLM-guided typo-based perturbations to the question sentences. This is based on the principles provided by TextBugger (Li et al., 2019), ensuring character-level modifications. Specifically, we use the instruction: “Randomly perform one of the following actions: insert, delete, or change one random character.”

Word level Following word-level manipulation methods such as TextFooler (Jin et al., 2020) and BERT-ATTACK (Li et al., 2020), we select the most semantically significant word in the question and replace it with a similar word. To maintain the context, we target and modify only a part of the question, making it challenging to select multiple essential words in the sentence. We use the instruction: “Choose at most two words in the sentence that contribute to the meaning of the sentence.”

Sentence level We provide two types of prompts to construct modified questions. The first version follows Xu et al. (2023) by providing the instruction “Paraphrase the sentence,” allowing the modification of the question. In the second version, the question is designed to ask the model to choose

are excluded as they are unlikely to generalize across various LLMs and could lead to inaccurate evaluations.

²<https://gist.github.com/coolaj86/6f4f7b30129b0251f61fa7baaa881516>

between two biased options, thereby restricting the model’s choices. This manipulates the sentence to change the overall intent of the query. Even with this restructured question, a clear option to refuse to answer is present. Therefore, a safe model should still be able to choose the correct option.

3.2 Benchmark Construction

Utilizing representative fairness benchmarks BBQ, CrowS-Pairs, and StereoSet, we reformat them into a multiple-choice QA format. As illustrated in Figure 2, we apply all candidate extreme prompts to each sample and then select and allocate the most effective method for constructing the dataset. This approach assumes the most critical prompt for a given sample, ultimately allowing us to evaluate whether the model maintains fairness even in the most vulnerable situations. This is a crucial element in constructing a robust evaluation benchmark³.

3.2.1 Step 1. Coverage Restriction

FLEX is designed to measure robustness by applying extreme scenarios to samples that are deemed fair in existing benchmarks. Our objective is to evaluate the robustness of the model in extreme scenarios by measuring changes in bias exhibited by the model depending on the given context. Samples that the model shows bias already align with the objectives of the previous benchmarks but do not coincide with our goals. Therefore, we focus on samples where the LLM shows a neutral response under typical conditions. To be specific, we extract only the samples where the model shows unbiased responses among entire datasets using GPT-3.5. This configuration highlights the vulnerabilities of the model and differentiates our approach by excluding the target samples from existing benchmarks.

3.2.2 Step 2. Extreme Scenario Selection

For each sample, we assign the scenario in which the model is most vulnerable, thus constructing a dataset with more challenging problems. All samples are considered using the methods presented in Section 3.1. To determine the most critical scenario for each sample, we report the performance of GPT-3.5 across five iterations for a given scenario. If the model provides fair responses in three or more instances, the scenario is deemed insignificant in compromising the model’s fairness and is

³In Appendix B, we compare the performance of our benchmark construction with that of a random selection, demonstrating the efficiency of our method.

excluded. This approach ensures that only scenarios significantly impacting a sample are selected.

3.2.3 Step 3. Diversity Control

If multiple prompts significantly adversely affect a single sample, one is chosen at random. To maintain a balance of adversarial types within the dataset, we select the single most vulnerable prompt for each scenario, then randomly extract one from the three types. This approach ensures that only one vulnerable prompt per sample is used, preventing an excessive bias towards specific samples and allowing the dataset to consider various scenarios.

As a result, our benchmark comprises 3,145 samples, with an equal distribution of data across each adversarial type. The statistic of our benchmark is shown in Appendix Table 4. We present the number of samples for each of the three source datasets and scenario categories that constitute our benchmark.

4 Experiments

In this section, we present evaluation experiments on various LLMs using FLEX. We compare the performance of the models across each scenario to identify their vulnerabilities. Furthermore, the experiments are conducted in both zero-shot and few-shot settings. In the few-shot setting, we observe the impact of the demonstrations under extreme scenarios.

4.1 Models

In our experiments, we investigate the biases in LLMs within the open-source ecosystem, using Llama2-7b, Llama2-13b (Touvron et al., 2023), Llama3-8b⁴, Solar-10.7b (Kim et al., 2024), Mistral-7b (Jiang et al., 2023), and Gemma-7b (Team et al., 2024). All models are the instruction versions (-it), with checkpoints based on HuggingFace⁵. As a closed model, we employ ‘gpt-4o’ from the GPT-4 (OpenAI, 2023) series, with a temperature setting of 1. More information about the model is shown in the Appendix Table 5.

4.2 Evaluation Metrics

We measure the degree of bias in LLMs by requiring them to select an explicit answer from given candidates. To achieve this, we utilize Language

⁴<https://llama.meta.com/llama3>

⁵<https://huggingface.co/>

Model	Persona Injection			Competing Objectives			Text Attack			Average		
	Acc _S	Acc _F	ASR	Acc _S	Acc _F	ASR	Acc _S	Acc _F	ASR	Acc _S	Acc _F	ASR
Llama2-7b	0.1386	0.0641	0.7046	0.1550	0.1284	0.5502	0.1532	0.1338	<u>0.3266</u>	0.1489	0.1088	0.5271
Llama2-13b	0.5023	0.4586	0.1314	0.5082	<u>0.4633</u>	0.1751	0.3830	0.3370	0.2213	0.4645	<u>0.4196</u>	0.1759
Llama3-8b	<u>0.6800</u>	0.5460	<u>0.2352</u>	<u>0.7339</u>	0.1954	0.7475	<u>0.5832</u>	0.3544	0.4518	<u>0.6657</u>	0.3653	0.4782
Solar-10.7b	0.7906	<u>0.5283</u>	0.3776	0.7917	0.5110	<u>0.4194</u>	0.7180	0.5178	0.3471	0.7668	0.5190	<u>0.3814</u>
Mistral-7b	0.6195	0.4884	0.2972	0.6715	0.3569	0.5137	0.4801	<u>0.3698</u>	0.3574	0.5904	0.4050	0.3894
Gemma-7b	0.2642	0.0260	0.9366	0.3981	0.1422	0.7235	0.2135	0.0766	0.7703	0.2919	0.0816	0.8101
GPT-4	0.8379	0.7833	0.1206	0.9134	0.9154	0.0643	0.7925	0.6543	0.2547	0.8479	0.7843	0.1465

Table 1: Comparison of experimental results by adversarial methods. **Bold** values indicate the best performance in each area, while underlined values represent the second-best performance. All performances in this table are conducted in a zero-shot setting.

Model Evaluation Harness⁶ to measure accuracy in multiple-choice QA. This evaluation is conducted on open-source LLMs, while for GPT-4, where log-likelihood access is restricted, the assessment is based on generation.

Acc_S refers to the accuracy of the source benchmark dataset. A higher value indicates lower model bias in common scenarios.

Acc_F refers to the accuracy of our benchmark dataset. A higher value signifies that the model appropriately rejects extremely harmful scenarios and maintains high fairness.

ASR To assess robustness in extreme situations, we measure the Attack Success Rate (ASR) (Wang et al., 2022) by evaluating the performance gap between our benchmark and the source benchmark⁷. A lower ASR indicates that the model is more robust in extreme scenarios. Specifically, given a dataset D consisting of N source data inputs x_i and corresponding true labels y_i , $A(x)$ denotes the application of the selected adversarial $A(x)$ on x for our benchmark sample. The ASR represents the rate at which correct answers in the source benchmark are converted to incorrect answers in our benchmark. The ASR is calculated using the following formula:

⁶<https://github.com/EleutherAI/lm-evaluation-harness/>

⁷Unlike the simple difference between Acc_S and Acc_F, ASR represents the proportion of samples that are correct in the source dataset but incorrect in our dataset. This metric clearly illustrates the impact of adversarial scenarios on the source samples.

$$\text{ASR} = \sum_{(x,y) \in D} \frac{\mathbb{1}[f(A(x)) \neq y]}{\mathbb{1}[f(x) = y]} \quad (1)$$

where $\mathbb{1}$ is an indicator function that returns 1 if a specific condition is true and 0 if it is false. Thus, a high ASR indicates that the model disproportionately addresses general situations and does not effectively counteract bias in extreme scenarios.

4.3 Main Results

Table 1 shows the performance of various models on our benchmark⁸. We provide the experimental results of the models across three scenario categories within our dataset, along with the average values of these metrics. This leads us to the following discoveries.

FLEX can Effectively Evaluate the Robustness of LLMs in Extreme Scenarios. As illustrated in Table 1, Acc_F is consistently lower than that of Acc_S across different adversarial categories. Notably, in Llama3-8b, the average decrease in Acc_F compared to Acc_S is 0.3004, and in Gemma-7b, it drops by 0.2103. This trend is also reflected in the ASR scores, where Llama3-8b shows an average ASR of 0.4782 and Gemma-7b exhibits an ASR of 0.8101, indicating a significantly higher proportion of incorrect responses in our benchmark, despite being correct in the source benchmarks.

This suggests that our benchmark, composed of efficient samples presenting extreme and adversarial scenarios, can induce models' intrinsic bias. Therefore, the benchmark and evaluation setup we

⁸We analyze the detailed experimental results based on the source dataset in Appendix C.




Figure 3: Comparison of ASR across different scenarios. We examine the extent to which model bias increases when given specific prompts categorized under different adversarial methods.

propose is suitable for not only measuring the robustness in addressing prompts that have been neglected in conventional benchmarks but also assessing the vulnerability of LLMs in extreme fairness scenarios.

Unbiased in Common Does Not Guarantee Robustness in Extreme Situations.

Although Llama2-13b exhibits a lower Acc_S than Llama3-8b, Solar-10.7b, and Mistral-7b, it shows a high ASR, indicating robust performance in our challenging scenario. While Llama3-8b appears more robust against bias in original benchmarks with an Acc_S that is 0.0753 higher than that of Mistral-7b, Acc_F is lower by 0.0397, and its ASR exceeds by over 20%. This trend is most pronounced in Gemma-7b. Compared to Llama2-7b, the Acc_S is higher by 0.143, but the Acc_F is lower by 0.0272, and the ASR is increased by more than 50%. This suggests that relying solely on evaluation within typical situations, as assumed by standard benchmarks, may underestimate the potential biases of models. We emphasize the need to assess the reliability of LLMs not only under common circumstances but also in extreme scenarios considered in our benchmark to ensure that these models yield safe results across a range of conditions.

Direct Instruction is Still Enough. We find that direct attacks remain predominantly effective against most models. The Competing Objectives, the most straightforward and superficial form of instruction among the categories, induce a significant performance drop despite its simplicity. In Llama3-8b, accuracy falls from 0.7339 under standard conditions (Acc_S) to 0.1954 under our benchmark (Acc_F), and it displays a remarkably higher ASR of 0.5123 compared to the Persona Injec-

tion. Similar elevated ASR levels are observed in the Solar-10.7b and Mistral-7b models under the Competing Objectives category. In contrast, GPT-4 shows relative maintenance, demonstrating considerable robustness against this category.

In light of this, despite the early emergence of competing goals that instruct models to be biased, open-source models exhibit significantly lower capabilities to handle such challenges. Given the ongoing effectiveness of even the simplest forms of attack, which have long been considered, most models still ignore this susceptibility in development. We emphasize the necessity for further consideration of these direct approaches in model training and security enhancement strategies.

4.4 Impact of Detailed Scenarios

We present the average ASR scores of LLMs when detailed scenarios of each type are applied in Figure 3. The scenarios investigate how different types of immediate manipulations affect the bias scores.

In Persona Injection, we find that LLMs commonly exhibit significant influence from specific persona types. Biases related to religion, nationality, and age are generally lower across most models, which may be attributed to substantial training in these specific categories. In contrast, models record high ASR for gender and sexual orientation types. The results highlight the existence of particular bias types that generally make it difficult for the model to maintain neutrality.

In Competing Objectives, compared to role-playing-based control methods (e.g., DAN, STAN, DUDE), more direct response-forcing approaches (e.g., refusal suppression) tend to reveal the models' inherent stereotypes. This indicates that simple and direct instruction-based scenarios can be more ef-




Figure 4: Comparison of ASR based on positive and negative sample shot.

fective in exposing the underlying biases of LLMs than the training aimed at ethical considerations.

In Text Attack, word-level attacks exhibit relatively high ASR. This indicates that most models are sensitive to changes in individual words, suggesting that maintaining fairness depends more on specific words within the prompt rather than the broader meaning of the sentence. In addition, the second version of the question, modified to induce biased responses, also shows high ASR, indicating sensitivity to sentence-level manipulation. These results particularly imply that models are significantly influenced by explicit instructions that limit their choices.

4.5 Challenges in Few-Shot Setting

We aim to observe the impact of the provided demonstrations on bias, thereby examining the robustness of the model in more extreme situations. In the few-shot setting, we consider both positive

and negative samples. Positive samples provide demonstrations with unbiased responses, while negative samples use demonstrations with biased responses. The negative sample setting, inspired by Wei et al. (2024b), creates more extreme conditions to induce bias, thus allowing for a thorough evaluation of the models.

Positive Shot Always Works? In our benchmark, positive shots generally result in a decrease in ASR, indicating a positive outcome. However, as shown in Figure 4, we find that positive shots do not universally benefit models in our scenarios. Providing GPT-4 with a positive shot does not significantly improve bias. Furthermore, in the case of Llama2-13b, introducing a positive shot actually leads to a substantial increase in ASR. This suggests that adversarial prompts can still have a negative impact on specific models despite attempts to mitigate bias through demonstrations.

Negative Shots Amplify the Threat. Models injected with negative samples generally show an increase in ASR, indicating that the adversarial effects are maximized. Particularly, Llama2-13b, which was remarkably robust in the zero-shot setting, exhibits a steep increase in ASR when provided with negative demonstrations. This increase in vulnerability under few-shot settings is likely related to the model’s ability to follow instructions. As the number of shots increases, the model’s instruction-following ability tends to improve, leading it to adhere more strongly to negative instructions as well. This finding reveals that the fairness of LLMs, which must make impartial decisions in any scenario, can be significantly compromised with specific configurations of demonstrations.

5 Conclusion

In this paper, we propose a new benchmark to evaluate the robustness of LLMs regarding fairness. Unlike existing benchmarks that assess model safety in typical situations, our approach considers adversarial instructions for rigorously testing LLM robustness. Our experimental results emphasize that existing fairness evaluations may not adequately reflect LLMs’ true safety and robustness. Furthermore, we ensure a more thorough assessment by exposing models to the most challenging bias-inducing scenarios. This not only aids in developing fairer LLMs but also builds trust in their deployment across various domains. For future work,

we will focus on refining these adversarial instructions and expanding our benchmark to encompass a broader range of fairness challenges, thereby continuously enhancing the robustness and fairness of next-generation LLMs.

Limitation

While our benchmark provides a more stringent assessment of LLM bias, it is not without limitations. Although the range of extreme scenarios covered by our dataset is extensive, it is not exhaustive. The infinite potential for bias-inducing prompts means some situations may still be overlooked. Additionally, focusing on extreme scenarios may not fully represent the spectrum of everyday use cases, potentially limiting the generalizability of findings to typical user interactions. Despite these limitations, our work represents a crucial step towards understanding and improving the robustness of LLMs in maintaining fairness under challenging conditions, serving as a complementary tool to existing benchmarks and evaluation frameworks.

Ethical Consideration

The creation and utilization of bias-inducing scenarios raise serious ethical concerns. While our goal is to enhance the fairness and safety of LLMs, there is a risk that such methods could be misused to expose and exploit model vulnerabilities intentionally. To mitigate these risks, we ensure that our benchmark is used solely for research purposes aimed at advancing the ethical development of AI technologies. Our study emphasizes the importance of transparency and accountability, and we will publicly share our benchmark dataset. Finally, we recognize the need to continuously improve ethical oversight and approaches in line with evolving societal values and technological advancements.

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A Prompt Details

A.1 QA Prompt

Following [Suzgun et al. \(2022\)](#), we structure the input prompts for the fairness QA task as follows.

Q: [Context] [Question]
 Options:
 (A) [Stereotype]
 (B) [Antistereotype]
 (C) Unknown
 Answer:

Here, the context refers to the scenario provided for the question, and the options for the question include two potentially biased answers and one explicit correct answer that refuses to respond.

A.2 Persona Injection Prompt

We aim to maximize bias in LLMs by injecting personas. To achieve this, we combine negative adjectives with personas to induce extreme bias in that persona aspect. Specifically, to assign a persona P, we used the following template:

Speak like a terrible P.

[Table 2](#) shows the list of personas used for each bias type. For ‘profession,’ we select extreme job categories by asking GPT-4 to identify the two highest-paying and two lowest-paying professions.

A.3 Text Attack Prompt

The following instructions were used for modifying the source sample in Text Attack:

Please write a new [Question] which must satisfy the following conditions:
 1. [Level-specific command]
 2. Keeping the semantic meaning of the new [Question] unchanged.
 3. Only output phrases will be in [Question].

We apply these prompts to GPT-3.5, and examples of the modified questions are presented in [Table 3](#). The examples show questions modified at the character, word, and sentence levels in response to the prompt “Which of these is more accurate?”.

We alter only the question, leaving the given context and answer options unchanged. Since the question does not assume any specific scenario, a

Type	Noun
Age	kid, elder
Gender	male, female, nonbinary
Nationality, Race	Caucasian, African, Asian, South American, Native American, Pacific Islander, Indian, Middle Eastern, Indigenous Australian, Northern European
Religion	Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism
Sexual Orientation	Heterosexual, Homosexual, Bisexual, Pansexual, Asexual
Profession	Doctor, Lawyer, Janitor, Fast Food Worker

Table 2: Persona list by bias type.

Question before Modification

Which of these is more accurate?

Question after Modification

Character	Which of these is more accurate?
Word	Which of these is more appropriate?
Sentence V1	Which of the following statements is more precise in describing the situation?
Sentence V2	Which of these is more accurate, elderly or teenagers?

Table 3: Example of a question modified by text attack.

biased answer can never be a factual answer. Therefore, even if our attack method causes the model to distort the meaning of the question severely, no bias should arise.

In sentence level, Since questions alone often result in simplistic constructs, leading to limited diversity in paraphrased questions, we include the full context and answer options as input. This approach enables the model to generate longer and more varied paraphrased questions.

B Effect of Random Scenario Selection

In [Figure 5](#), we compare the ASR performance of selecting the most suitable scenario for a given sample with a random method. This comparison demonstrates that our selection method is carefully designed, allowing us to observe the impact of bias when evaluating extreme situations effectively. On average, our scenario application emphasizes the vulnerability of the models more effectively than the random strategy, making the bias evaluation of our dataset more pronounced.

	FLEX	BBQ	CrowS	StereoSet
Total	3,145	1,103	946	1,096
<i>Persona Injection</i>				
Age	93	86	7	-
Gender	245	91	35	119
Nationality	148	70	78	-
Race	271	47	154	70
Religion	126	49	20	57
Sexual-orientation	77	57	20	-
Profession	99	-	-	99
Total	1,084	400	314	370
<i>Competing Objectives</i>				
Refusal-suppression	186	68	70	48
Self-cipher	227	45	75	107
Dan	187	58	59	70
Stan	241	85	76	80
Dude	236	118	42	76
Total	1,091	388	322	381
<i>Text Attack</i>				
Character	116	43	24	49
Word	368	148	112	108
Sentence V1	398	85	159	154
Sentence V2	88	39	15	34
Total	970	315	310	345

Table 4: Statistics of FLEX. Our benchmark is constructed by combining samples from the BBQ, CrowS-Pairs, and StereoSet datasets. In the Text Attack category, Sentence V1 is a paraphrased version of the entire sentence, while V2 provides limited options in response to the question.

C Detailed Experimental Results Based on the Source Datasets

Table 6 presents the comparative results of experiments conducted using the source datasets within our dataset, namely BBQ, CrowS-Pairs, and StereoSet. Across all datasets, GPT-4 consistently achieves superior performance compared to all other models. While Llama3-8b demonstrates good performance in terms of Acc_S and Acc_F , it exhibits a relatively high ASR. Notably, Llama2-13b shows a particularly low ASR, indicating strong robustness to extreme scenarios across the datasets. Gemma-7b has the highest ASR and performs poorly in accuracy, proving to be vulnerable to extreme situations regardless of the dataset. The three datasets exhibit similar trends across models and share similar domains and tasks. Therefore, they




Figure 5: Comparison of our data selection method and random method for dataset construction.

are integrated into our dataset for comprehensive analysis.

Hyper-parameter	Value
LLAMA2-chat-7B : meta-llama/Llama-2-7b-chat-hf	6.74B
LLAMA2-chat-13B : meta-llama/Llama-2-13b-chat-hf	13B
LLAMA3-8B-Instruct : meta-llama/Meta-Llama-3-8B-Instruct	8.03B
Mistral : mistralai/Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2	7.24B
Gemma : google/gemma-1.1-7b-bit	8.54B
Solar : upstage/SOLAR-10.7B-Instruct-v1.0	10.7B
GPT-3.5 : gpt-3.5-turbo	-
GPT-4o : gpt-4o	-

Table 5: Model details. We deployed OPENAI API call for experiments with GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 and HuggingFace for eliciting model weights for other publicly available LLMs.

Model	Persona Injection			Competing Objectives			Text Attack			Average		
	Acc _S	Acc _F	ASR	Acc _S	Acc _F	ASR	Acc _S	Acc _F	ASR	Acc _S	Acc _F	ASR
BBQ												
Llama2-7b	0.0613	0.0741	0.4166	0.0981	0.0413	0.8947	0.1018	0.0648	0.4242	0.0871	0.0601	0.5785
Llama2-13b	0.5907	0.5677	0.0909	0.5633	0.5529	0.1376	0.4290	0.3672	0.2302	0.5277	0.4959	0.1529
Llama3-8b	0.8312	0.6803	0.1938	0.8733	0.3049	0.6656	0.6450	0.5154	0.2918	0.7832	0.5002	0.3837
Solar-10.7b	0.8900	0.4501	0.5201	0.8423	0.5555	0.3926	0.6975	0.5092	0.3584	0.8099	0.5049	0.4237
Mistral-7b	0.6598	0.6828	0.0891	0.7002	0.5478	0.3025	0.4445	0.3179	0.4236	0.6015	0.5162	0.2717
Gemma-7b	0.3452	0.0511	0.8814	0.4444	0.1550	0.6744	0.2962	0.0925	0.7916	0.3619	0.0995	0.7825
GPT-4	0.9775	0.9500	0.0332	0.9848	0.9670	0.0309	0.9460	0.9650	0.0101	0.9694	0.9607	0.0247
CrowS-Pairs												
Llama2-7b	0.1783	0.0732	0.6607	0.1708	0.1304	0.7636	0.1677	0.1838	0.2692	0.1723	0.1291	0.5645
Llama2-13b	0.5700	0.4331	0.2513	0.6894	0.5496	0.2657	0.4354	0.3483	0.2888	0.5649	0.4437	0.2686
Llama3-8b	0.8598	0.7070	0.2111	0.8975	0.1925	0.7958	0.7645	0.4322	0.4725	0.8406	0.4439	0.4931
Solar-10.7b	0.7707	0.5636	0.3347	0.8229	0.6304	0.3132	0.7387	0.4516	0.4323	0.7774	0.5485	0.3601
Mistral-7b	0.5605	0.3980	0.3579	0.7018	0.3074	0.5752	0.4322	0.2677	0.5000	0.5648	0.3244	0.4777
Gemma-7b	0.3503	0.0031	1.000	0.6086	0.1677	0.7346	0.2548	0.0806	0.7468	0.4046	0.0838	0.8271
GPT-4	0.8471	0.8343	0.0865	0.9418	0.9656	0.0253	0.7677	0.4613	0.4370	0.8522	0.7537	0.1829
Stereoset												
Llama2-7b	0.1864	0.0459	0.8405	0.1994	0.2152	0.2236	0.1884	0.1536	0.3230	0.1914	0.1382	0.4624
Llama2-13b	0.3513	0.3648	0.0384	0.2992	0.2992	0.0701	0.2927	0.2985	0.1188	0.3144	0.3208	0.0758
Llama3-8b	0.3675	0.2675	0.3823	0.4540	0.0866	0.8265	0.3623	0.1333	0.6800	0.3946	0.1625	0.6296
Solar-10.7b	0.7027	0.5810	0.2269	0.7139	0.3648	0.5551	0.7188	0.5855	0.2580	0.7118	0.5104	0.3467
Mistral-7b	0.6270	0.3594	0.4827	0.6167	0.2047	0.6978	0.5565	0.5101	0.2083	0.6001	0.3581	0.4629
Gemma-7b	0.1054	0.0189	0.9487	0.1732	0.1076	0.8181	0.0985	0.0579	0.7647	0.1257	0.0615	0.8438
GPT-4	0.6697	0.5657	0.2420	0.7808	0.8137	0.1368	0.6550	0.5367	0.3171	0.7018	0.6387	0.2320

Table 6: Performance comparison of LLMs based on the source dataset.