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**Pro**

## **NPT Contention**

## Constructive Case

### **NPT tensions are at a breaking point – polarization over Article VI and the ban treaty create a unique threat to the treaty's resilience**

**Durkalec 18** (Dr. Jacek Durkalec, a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, June 29, 2018. "The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty at fifty: a midlife crisis."  
<https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2018/Also-in-2018/the-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-at-fifty-a-midlife-crisis/EN/index.htm>)

On 1 July 1968, the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (**Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty**, or **NPT**) was opened for signature. Since then, the Treaty has become a cornerstone of international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to eventually eliminate them and to facilitate peaceful use of nuclear energy. With the adherence of 190 countries, the NPT is close to universal world participation. In 1995 the Treaty was extended indefinitely, after its initial period of 25 years. The NPT remains unique as there is no other international agreement based on a bargain between nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon states. The 185 non-nuclear countries pledge to abstain from acquiring nuclear weapons. On their side of the bargain, the five recognised nuclear possessors – China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States – promise not to help non-weapon states get nuclear weapons and to seek the grand goal of nuclear disarmament. For the benefit of all parties, the Treaty facilitates cooperation on peaceful applications of nuclear technology under the watch of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The non-proliferation record of the NPT is not perfect, although the Treaty has helped curb the spread of nuclear weapons. Its disarmament impact, however, is far more contentious, which helps explain the broad support for the recent Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). With growing polarisation among the States Parties on the pace of nuclear disarmament, the NPT at 50, enters its midlife crisis. There are reasons to expect that amid this crisis the durability of the NPT will probably be tested as never before. Non-proliferation record Scholars disagree on the extent to which the NPT has helped to stop nuclear proliferation, as its direct or indirect impact is difficult to prove. Yet it can be, at least partially, credited with embedding the non-proliferation norm that is responsible for keeping the number of countries armed with nuclear weapons lower than ten. As Lewis Dunn – an astute observer of the NPT – notes, the Treaty has curbed proliferation pessimism, which was widespread in the 1960s. The increasing number of states adhering to the Treaty has helped to reverse the perception that 'runaway' or 'cascading' proliferation is unavoidable. Even though there are many reasons why all but a few

countries have refrained from acquiring nuclear weapons, the NPT might have helped some of them to crystallize their decisions by compelling them to make a choice. After prolonged political and bureaucratic debates and taking into account various considerations, countries like Australia, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland and West Germany decided that joining the Treaty would be in their best interest. In the case of countries allied with the United States, the diplomatic efforts of the United States to convince them to join the Treaty, backed up by nuclear guarantees, significantly contributed to their final choices. For many states that never contemplated obtaining nuclear weapons, technical and financial help with the peaceful use of nuclear technology was the main incentive for acceding to the Treaty. Only three countries decided to not adhere to the NPT from the outset: India, which carried out a "peaceful" nuclear test in 1974; Pakistan, which conducted nuclear tests back to back with India in 1998; and Israel, which has neither confirmed nor denied that it has nuclear weapons. There are positive examples of countries that joined the NPT even though they initially acquired nuclear weapon capability or were close to obtaining it. South Africa joined the NPT in 1991 after it had unilaterally discontinued its nuclear weapons programme and destroyed its nuclear arsenal. It became a member state of the United Nations in 1994, and inherited in 1991, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Even though the decisions of these countries were prompted by factors other than the NPT, their accession to the Treaty cemented these decisions and made them far more difficult to reverse. The non-proliferation score of the NPT is not perfect, as a number of countries have decided to cheat and pursue nuclear options while remaining NPT parties. Yet, because of the NPT, they have had to pursue nuclear weapons covertly, constraining their efforts. In some cases, it has bought time for them to reconsider their nuclear options, or for outside intervention that has prevented further progress. For example, Libya's pursuit of nuclear weapons for almost 30 years was terminated in 2003, thanks to the diplomatic efforts of the United Kingdom and the United States, and a change of mind by the country's leader, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi. Iraq's nuclear pursuit of almost 20 years was ended by the 1991 Gulf War, and Syria's decade-long efforts were disrupted by Israel's 2007 attack on the covert Al Kibar nuclear reactor. Those NPT countries that have been caught cheating and have refused to abandon their clandestine programmes have paid a significant price for noncompliance. North Korea, which in 2003 announced its withdrawal from the Treaty and soon acquired nuclear weapons capability, did it despite extensive international sanctions and political isolation. Sanctions imposed on Iran for its covert nuclear activities were eased after the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and Iran's renewed commitment to abide by its obligations under the Treaty. Without the NPT, the concerted global efforts to prevent, slow down, curb, punish and reverse the actions of Iran and North Korea would be much more difficult. The Treaty gives legitimacy to the non-proliferation norm and to actions to enforce it. While the Treaty has significant loopholes, detection of illegal proliferation by its safeguards system has mobilised efforts to strengthen verification and enforcement. The exposure of Saddam Hussein's clandestine programme in 1991 led to improvements of the IAEA's inspection authority with the 1997 Additional Protocol. The Protocol has been ratified by over 130 countries. The non-proliferation impact of the NPT Treaty has been multiplied by a dense network of international initiatives and agreements created to support the NPT goals, including the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, United Nations Security

Council Resolution 1540, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and the Nuclear Security Summits. Together, these multilateral efforts reinforce the non-proliferation regime and the NPT. Disarmament progress: **Article VI** of the NPT commits all parties to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control". There are differences among NPT parties on how to interpret this article, and a nuclear-weapon-free world remains a distant vision. While there are sharp differences among the five NPT nuclear-weapon states in terms of numbers and variety of nuclear capabilities, the roles attached to these capabilities and their attitudes toward reductions, they all defend their disarmament records and their fidelity to Article VI. The United States argues that its overall nuclear arsenal is 88 per cent smaller than its peak number. According to available data, between 1967 and 2017 the US arsenal shrank from 31,255 to 3,822 warheads. Russia claims that it has decreased its nuclear arsenal by more than 85 per cent. Under the limits of the 2010 New START Treaty, the deployed strategic nuclear arsenals of the two biggest nuclear possessors are now capped at their lowest level since the 1950s. The United Kingdom has announced the reduction of its operational warheads to no more than 120. France states that it has reduced the airborne and sea-based components of its nuclear deterrent forces by one third and capped its overall nuclear arsenal at 300 warheads. China, the only NPT nuclear weapon state that does not claim any reductions, assures that its nuclear arsenal is at "the minimal level required by national security". The nuclear weapon states argue that these and other actions they have taken, including the voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing, signify progress towards the goals envisioned in Article VI. Progress toward nuclear disarmament remains, however, the most serious bone of contention within the NPT. While the nuclear weapon states highlight what they have achieved so far, a vast majority of non-nuclear weapon states focus on what more needs to be done. Non-nuclear-weapon states criticise nuclear possessors for slow progress and for not fulfilling their promises, including falling short of achieving a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which has not been ratified by China and the United States. While nuclear-weapon states and US non-nuclear allies claim that further progress toward disarmament must take into

account the overall security environment, for the majority of non-nuclear-weapon states the time for nuclear disarmament is now and arguments from countries relying on nuclear weapons are not convincing. **Risks of the current crisis** The history of the NPT is fraught with tensions and pessimism about the Treaty's future. Four out of nine review conferences concluded without a consensus statement. Over past decades, there has been a prevailing perception among NPT observers that the Treaty is in bad shape and at risk of becoming obsolete and eventually collapsing, because of proliferation challenges and disputes about disarmament. Discord among the NPT parties reached new levels on 7 July 2017 when 122 NPT members voted in favour of TPNW, which embraces the goal of outlawing all nuclear weapons, including those possessed by the five NPT nuclear weapon states. The TPNW was opened for signature in September 2017 and has already been signed by 59 countries and ratified by ten. According to its proponents, it represents an effective measure under Article VI of the NPT by creating a legally binding prohibition on nuclear weapons. For countries opposing the TPNW, including NATO Allies, the Treaty will not only be ineffective but risks undermining the NPT. The TPNW can be interpreted as a symptom of the NPT's midlife crisis – an expression of the frustration of non-nuclear weapon states, which have a deep sense of remorse for slow disarmament progress. For its advocates, the TPNW is also an attempt to give nuclear disarmament new youth and energy. Eventually, it may be possible for NPT members to find a formula of compromise and agree to disagree on the new treaty. The troubles on the horizon are not necessarily fatal, as the dissatisfaction of some States Parties with disarmament progress does not seem sufficiently strong to warrant withdrawal from the NPT. So far, at least, despite many worries, no state seems prepared to make that choice. The common denominator of both proponents and opponents of the TPNW is that their main goal is to strengthen the NPT. Yet, the TPNW further polarises the NPT process at a time when longstanding points of tension take on new significance in a changed security environment. Before any compromise on the TPNW can be achieved, the resilience of the NPT will be tested as never before, which may have irreversible and highly undesirable consequences. With the re-emergence of "great power competition", managing the disarmament demands of the TPNW supporters will be increasingly difficult. Against the wishes of many non-nuclear weapon states, the role of nuclear weapons in international politics is not decreasing but growing. Despite its past willingness to accept strategic nuclear reductions, Russia is increasingly relying on nuclear weapons in its security and foreign policy, which was confirmed by President Putin in a speech on 1 March 2018 when he revealed new investments into various exotic nuclear capabilities. Russia's increased nuclear emphasis over recent years has prompted the United States to respond. Even though US investments into supplementary nuclear capabilities are modest compared to Russian programmes and do not increase the total number in the arsenal, disarmament advocates view them equally and treat them all as yet another sign of disingenuousness on the part of nuclear-weapon states. While Chinese actions in the nuclear weapons realm remain opaque, there is little doubt that China has been updating its nuclear arsenal to keep pace not only with the United States and Russia, but also as a part of its strategic competition with India. Yet the United States and its NATO Allies remain the primary target of the TPNW activists' ire. Failure by China and the United States to resolve the North Korea nuclear and missile problem, and a collapse of the JCPOA, will make it much more difficult for the NPT members to maintain unity in tackling non-proliferation challenges. If Iran resumes the activities constrained by the JCPOA, it will make the non-proliferation landscape in the Middle East even more fragile, adding to persisting tensions that are often channelled into NPT debate about the Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone.

## NPT breakdown triggers a widespread nuclear cascade

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All players discount the future by  $d > 0$ , and all payoffs are common knowledge. Let  $S_t N$  be the set of states that have nuclear weapons at the end of period  $t$ . The per-period payoff of each state  $j \in S$  is  $v(j|S_t N)$ . We assume that, for any  $j \in S$ ,  $T \subseteq S$ , and  $k \neq j$ ,  $v(j|T) \geq v(j|T \cup k)$ : for any given state, the spread of nuclear weapons to other states is (weakly) bad. We also make the following “breakdown” assumption:

**if any state gets nuclear weapons and the superpowers will not collude to prevent any other state from following then all states that do not have nuclear weapons will seek them immediately,** and  $S_t N$  will be the unique equilibrium outcome. In effect, if proliferation gets started and is not stopped then it will snowball.<sup>6</sup> This nuclear domino theory was, and is widely believed, at least among US policy makers, and there is now substantial evidence for it.

(Miller 2014a). The per-period payoffs of the superpowers are  $v_{US} p(S_t N) 1 a_1 2 i(S_t N) 2 iUS(S_t N)$  and  $v_{SU} p(S_t N) 1 a_2 2 i(S_t N) 2 iSU(S_t N)$ . These represent the two different effects that proliferation can have on the superpowers' interests, termed inter-alliance effects and intra-alliance effects, with the relative importance of the latter given by  $a$ . First, proliferation may alter the balance of power between the superpowers' alliances, represented by  $p(\cdot)$ . Because nuclear-armed clients would be stronger, the spread of weapons to a superpower's clients might strengthen its side relative to the other superpower's. The change in sign of  $p(\cdot)$  between the superpowers reflects the fact that what strengthens one side's relative power must weaken the other's. We assume that, for any  $T \subseteq S$  and  $j \notin T$ ,  $p(T \cup j) \geq p(T) \text{ if } j \in SU$ , and  $p(T \cup j) \leq p(T) \text{ if } j \in SU$ . In other words, the spread of nuclear weapons to one superpower's ally (weakly) shifts the inter-alliance balance of power in that superpower's favor? The second effect of proliferation is to alter the balance of power within each superpower's alliance, represented by the bracketed terms in the superpowers' payoffs. A client that got nuclear weapons would no longer need to rely so heavily on its superpower patron, as its nuclear arms would partially substitute for a patron's protection. Thus, a nuclear-armed client might be more assertive of its interests within the alliance or seek more autonomy from it. On the one hand, the patron's loss of influence over a newly nuclear-armed client could be good for the other superpower, who would face a less cohesive opposing alliance and possibly find common interests with the erstwhile client. This is represented by  $i(\cdot)$ , which can be thought of as the total US influence over all states with respect to issues where US and Soviet interests are directly opposed. The sign of  $i(\cdot)$  changes between the superpowers because one's loss of influence on such issues must be the other's gain. We assume that, for any  $T \subseteq S$  and  $j \notin T$ ,  $i(T \cup j) \leq i(T) \text{ if } j \in SU$ , and  $i(T \cup j) \geq i(T) \text{ if } j \in SU$ . That is, the spread of nuclear weapons to one superpower's ally is (weakly) bad for that superpower and (weakly) good for the other, as the ally may now act less consistently with the interests of its patron superpower and more consistently with those of the other superpower. On the other hand, the patron's loss of influence is not fully recuperated by the other superpower, because newly nuclear-armed states achieve greater autonomy from both superpowers and so may pursue interests that neither superpower supports. Proliferation can thus shift influence, not just from one superpower to the other but from the superpowers to the other states. This is represented by the functions  $USU(\cdot)$  and  $SUSU(\cdot)$ , which can be thought of as each superpower's loss of influence over the newly nuclear-armed states on issues where the superpowers' interests are not opposed. For any  $T \subseteq S$  and  $j \notin T$ ,  $USU(T \cup j) \geq USU(T)$  and  $SUSU(T \cup j) \geq SUSU(T)$ , so that these losses (weakly) grow as nuclear weapons spread. Power and influence, as we use the terms here, should be construed quite broadly. A state's acquisition of nuclear weapons can affect a superpower's interests in many ways: deterring the superpower from using military force against that state; reducing its ability to coerce that state; triggering regional instability that might entrap the superpower or require its mediation; undermining the superpower's alliance structure by reducing the value of or need for its security guarantees; and absorbing strategic attention that a superpower might otherwise devote to other states; all in addition to the possibility of generating further proliferation (Krepon 2009, 2010, 2014). Each of these can be understood in terms of  $p(\cdot)$ ,  $i(\cdot)$ , and  $I(\cdot)$ . As example, the risk of entrapment increases  $I(\cdot)$ , while the reduced ability to coerce a nuclear-armed Soviet client may decrease  $p(\cdot)$  (the Soviet alliance is more powerful) but increase  $i(\cdot)$  (the freed client may drift toward the United States). For convenience, we normalize  $p(0)$ ,  $i(0)$ ,  $USU(0)$ , and  $SUSU(0)$  to zero. We also assume that  $p(S) = 0$  and  $USU(S) = SUSU(S) = p(S)$ : if proliferation goes from zero to universal, the many resulting gains and losses in power and competitive influence for each superpower will cancel out, and each will suffer the same total loss of noncompetitive influence. Finally, we assume that, for any  $T \subseteq S$ ,  $(1 d|T) \leq (d|T) \leq (d+1|T)$ . That is, any momentary shift in influence between the superpowers due to some states getting nuclear weapons is no larger than the loss of influence that would result from permanent universal proliferation.

Collusion and nonproliferation. We look for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which no state seeks nuclear weapons.<sup>9</sup>

We require that no individual state have an incentive to deviate from nonproliferation, as is standard, but additionally that no coalition of states drawn from  $S$  and either superpower have an incentive to deviate together. A regime that managed to keep individual states in line but could not prevent a concerted breakaway by a group of “spoilers,” possibly aided by a superpower, would not last long. If  $S_1$  be composed of every state  $j \in S$  such that  $v(j|1) \geq v(j|1 \cup 2 \cup \dots \cup n)$ , then  $S_1$  is a potential spoiler. Proposition 1. There is a universal nonproliferation equilibrium if and only if, for all  $j \in S_1$ ,  $T \subseteq S_1$ , and  $a \in US$ ,  $SU$ :  $j \geq (1|j) \geq (1|1 \cup j) \geq (1|1 \cup 2 \cup \dots \cup j)$ ;  $(1|1 \cup 2 \cup \dots \cup j) \geq (1|1 \cup 2 \cup \dots \cup j \cup 1)$ ;  $(1|1 \cup 2 \cup \dots \cup j \cup 1) \geq (1|1 \cup 2 \cup \dots \cup j \cup 2)$ ;  $(1|1 \cup 2 \cup \dots \cup j \cup 2) \geq (1|1 \cup 2 \cup \dots \cup j \cup 3)$ ;  $\dots$  As we will

explain,<sup>10</sup>  $S_1$  is the set of potential spoilers. Proposition 1. There is a universal nonproliferation equilibrium if and only if, for all  $j \in S_1$ ,  $T \subseteq S_1$ , and  $a \in US$ ,  $SU$ :  $j \geq (1|j) \geq (1|1 \cup j) \geq (1|1 \cup 2 \cup \dots \cup j)$ ;  $(1|1 \cup 2 \cup \dots \cup j) \geq (1|1 \cup 2 \cup \dots \cup j \cup 1)$ ;  $(1|1 \cup 2 \cup \dots \cup j \cup 1) \geq (1|1 \cup 2 \cup \dots \cup j \cup 2)$ ;  $(1|1 \cup 2 \cup \dots \cup j \cup 2) \geq (1|1 \cup 2 \cup \dots \cup j \cup 3)$ ;  $\dots$  As we will

If this equilibrium exists, it is enforced by superpower collusion to stop the spoilers. Under this equilibrium, each state is deterred from seeking nuclear weapons in one of two ways. First, most states are deterred by the fact that their acquisition of nuclear arms would lead to the breakdown of the nonproliferation regime leading other states to seek weapons. For these states, the resultant widespread proliferation would be worse than abiding by the nonproliferation regime even if it meant giving up

the chance to be the first, and temporarily the only, state to acquire nuclear weapons. However,

**other states—the spoilers—have the opposite preference**

These states would actually prefer seeking nuclear weapons, even if all other states followed, to complying with the nonproliferation regime along with the other states.

This preference is formalized in the condition defining  $S_1$ . The right

side is the value of abiding by the regime, while the left side is the value of cheating on it: the spoiler enjoys sole possession of nuclear weapons temporarily, but eventually all other states get nuclear weapons as well. Obviously, the spoilers cannot be deterred from seeking weapons by the threat of the regime's subsequent breakdown, since they actually prefer this outcome. Instead they are deterred by the prospect that, if they seek nuclear weapons and are detected, the superpowers will collude to stop them, so that the resources invested in a nuclear program will be lost.

In condition (1) above, the left side is the expected cost of pursuing nuclear weapons (sacrificing the investment  $d$  if caught

and stopped), while the right side is the expected benefit of going undetected and getting nuclear weapons, over and above the value received from abiding by the regime. Thus, this condition specifies that, for any spoiler, the expected cost of cheating on the regime outweighs the expected benefit.

These spoilers are not just a theoretical possibility.

India sought nuclear weapons despite surely knowing that Pakistan would follow and preferring that it not; it is hard to believe that North Korea would have been deterred from pursuing nuclear weapons if it thought that South Korea, or any other country, would get them in response. In a counterfactual world without superpower enforcement of nonproliferation, it is easy to imagine other spoilers.

For instance, West Germany, which had to contend with the massive conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact and the uncertain reliability of its US security guarantee, might have resorted to nuclear arms in spite of the likelihood that other European states would follow. For their part, the superpowers enforce nonproliferation because the cost of doing so is outweighed by the losses they will suffer from proliferation if they shirk. For each possible set of spoilers, and each superpower, condition (2) above requires that the superpower's value of enforcing the regime at least equal its value of shirking, wherein the superpower allows the set of spoilers to get nuclear weapons but soon faces proliferation by the other states.<sup>11</sup> This result synthesizes the grand bargain and cartel views of the nonproliferation regime and also exposes the flaws of each view when considered on its own. The grand bargain envisions a set of states that agree to eschew nuclear weapons so long as other states also do so. And, indeed, this is an apt description of the way the equilibrium looks from the point of view of the nonspoiler states. These states prefer nonproliferation to widespread proliferation, are willing to give up weapons themselves to support the former, and will renege only if other states cheat on the bargain. These states abide by the regime voluntarily rather than being coerced into

compliance by the superpowers. However, this in itself is not enough to make the regime viable. In the absence of superpower enforcement, the spoiler

states would seek nuclear weapons, and in response, other states would pursue nuclear weapons, and yet more states would acquire weapons in response to these, so that proliferation would eventually be widespread.<sup>12</sup> The grand bargain is thus not robust to spoilers. To make the regime—and the underlying grand bargain among the nonspoilers—viable, the spoilers must be coerced into nonproliferation, so that it is safe for the nonspoilers to abide by their bargain.

From the spoilers' point of view, then, the nonproliferation equilibrium looks much more like the cartel: the superpowers collude to strong-arm these states into the regime. The flaw in the cartel view is that because this enforcement is expensive for the superpowers, it is only worth doing if, by coercing just a few states, the superpowers can make nonproliferation among a much wider set of states possible. Thus, the superpowers are willing to form a cartel only because many states do not need to be strongarmed into nonproliferation at all. In short, the cartel is needed to render the grand bargain robust to spoilers, and the grand bargain is needed to make the cartel affordable. The origins and roles of the NPT

we first discuss the origins of the NPT in a shift in the superpowers' perceptions of the effects of proliferation. We

then explain how the NPT itself affects the underlying parameters that govern the viability of the nonproliferation regime. This in turn leads to the observable implications of our theory that are tested in the subsequent section. We use the following result to make explicit how the regime's viability is affected by the parameters of our model.

<sup>6</sup>Proposition 2. The nonproliferation equilibrium only exists if  $i_1$  is high enough and  $I_1$  is low enough, and it is more likely to exist if  $I_1$  is higher and  $I_2$  is lower. Recall that  $i$  governs the importance of the inter-alliance effects (a superpower loses influence over a nuclear-armed client) relative to the intra-alliance effects (a superpower's side gains stronger with nuclear-armed clients) of proliferation. In the limiting case where  $i = 0$ , there are no intra-alliance effects and proliferation simply

The NPT contributes to the viability of the incipient nonproliferation

regime in four ways. First, the inspections that nonnuclear signatories are required to accept increase the chance that a covert nuclear weapons program will be detected and subsequently stopped (raising  $j$ ). This decreases the

**willingness of spoilers to cheat** under the regime **and** thus also renders enforcement cheaper for the superpowers. Second, the same inspections also make it easier to catch a superpower surreptitiously helping a state with its program or simply allowing it to proceed (increasing  $t$ ). This increases the willingness of each superpower to enforce nonproliferation, secure in the knowledge that the other superpower is doing its part and thus that their efforts will be effective, and it decreases the temptation to enable favored states to get nuclear weapons. Third, the willingness of non-nuclear states to sign the NPT, and thus voluntarily subject themselves to better monitoring, reveals that most states are no

spoilers.14 This lowers the superpowers' perceived costs of enforcing the regime (by decreasing FS1 F), because it enables the superpowers to confirm that only a few holdouts will have to be strong-armed into nonproliferation. And, finally, the NPT served as a device to coordinate all states on the nonproliferation equilibrium, rather than the widespread proliferation that might otherwise result. By leading nonspoilers to expect nonproliferation to be upheld, it encouraged them to abide by it and contribute to the superpowers' efforts to enforce the regime, lowering the costs of enforcement.<sup>(c)</sup> Our theory of the nonproliferation regime, and the origins and roles of the NPT within it, offers at least three observable implications. First, our model assumes that collusion between the superpowers is central to the regime's establishment and enforcement, so the first implication is that this collusion should have taken place during negotiations over the regime.

**Implications.** First, our model assumes that collusion between the superpower is central to the regime's establishment and enforcement, so the first implication is that this collusion should have taken place during negotiations over the regime and in reactions to states' noncompliance with the regime. H1. The superpowers will collude with one another on nonproliferation concerns and press one another to comply with their side of the collision terms. Second, the theory implies that the superpowers should pressure the other states into joining the NPT. If a state refused to join, it would increase the difficulty of catching up nuclear weapons, potentially undermine the willingness of other states to join and comply with the treaty, and thereby increase the superpowers' costs of enforcing the regime. Since each superpower ought to have more leverage over its own clients than other states, we expect that each would be held responsible for policing its own clients, while the other superpower would be expected not to interfere in or obstruct this policing. We also expect the superpowers to apply this pressure only when it is actually perceived as necessary to induce a state to join the NPT and only when it is perceived to have some chance of success. Third, each superpower will pressure other states, especially its own clients, to join the NPT, focusing its efforts on cases where pressures are likely to be both necessary and effective, and neither superpower will undermine the other's efforts. Third, the superpowers should collude to stop any state that is revealed to be (potentially) pursuing nuclear weapons, as doing otherwise could lead to the breakdown of the regime. Here again, we expect that each superpower would be most involved in the policing of its own clients, while the other superpower would be expected not to aid the erstwhile client. H3. Each superpower will apply pressure to prevent other states, especially its own clients, from moving toward acquiring nuclear weapons. Neither superpower will offer assistance to a state suspected to be

**EMPIRICAL TESTS** We turn now to testing these observable implications of our

**Hymans** (2010) argues that the fundamental question for students of proliferation is why so few of the nuclear-capable states ended up acquiring nuclear weapons.

six nuclear weapons states out of more than 40 estimated to be nuclearcapable by 1970. Our answer is that once the superpowers realized nonproliferation was necessary to preserve their influence and set about colluding to enforce it many states

**chose not to realize their latent nuclear capacity.** A few of these states refrained because they were deterred by the punishment the superpowers would impose if they were

**most** preferred nonproliferation to widespread proliferation and <sup>they</sup> were

**confident enough that the superpowers would be able to curtail proliferation to voluntarily**

**forgo weapons for themselves.** These latter states' willing compliance with nonproliferation made the regime's enforcement affordable for the superpowers. Moreover, we presented evidence, consistent with this answer that the superpowers explicitly colluded to create

the nonproliferation regime and to cajole the few worrisome states into joining and complying with it. Within this regime, the NPT serves to ease detection of cheating by either these states or the

superpowers, to identify potential spoilers, and finally to coordinate states' expectations on

widespread nonproliferation. This strongly suggests that the nonproliferation regime, and the treaty that coordinated states' behavior in accordance with it, substantially reduced proliferation relative to what would have occurred in its absence.

**absence** To explain this, we need to specify exactly what is meant by "the regime" and "its absence," since the latter is the appropriate counterfactual for assessing the regime's overall effect. In our theory, the regime is an equilibrium in which the

**absence of the regime** is an equilibrium in which states **expect spoilers** to get nuclear weapons

and others to follow eventually resulting in widespread proliferation so that many non-spoiler states are unwilling to eschew nuclear weapons, which in turn makes the superpowers unwilling

to stop them. The NPT coordinates the movement of all states from the latter equilibrium to the former. **To conclude** that the regime did not substantially reduce proliferation, one of two claims would have to be true: first, that breakdown would not

**occur in the absence of the regime:** the numerous states that were initially—or might in response become—interested in nuclear weapons would prefer to abstain, even knowing that they would not be stopped and that proliferation would eventually be widespread; or, second, that in the absence of the NPT to coordinate states on nonproliferation, the superpowers would be able and willing to stop proliferation, even given that many states were seeking nuclear weapons and would thus have to be coerced. The history of states' nuclear decision making and of the superpowers' attitudes toward proliferation presented here shows that neither claim is plausible.

By contrast, the most recent previous research concludes that the regime has had little effect on proliferation (Sagan 2011). Although several studies find that NPT membership is associated with a reduced risk of seeking or getting nuclear weapons (Fuhrmann 2009a, 2012; Jo and Gartzke 2007; Kroenig 2010), some have suggested it may only be that NPT members are mostly those states that do not want nuclear weapons anyway, so that the treaty does not constrain states so much as screen them (Fuhrmann 2012; Jo and Gartzke 2007).<sup>19</sup> Similarly,

Hymans (2006) and Solingen (2007) argue that the regime only appears successful

because it prohibits things that few states want.

Fuhrmann (2009b, 2012) shows that NPT membership has little effect on the provision of peaceful nuclear assistance, and that, having received such assistance, NPT membership has little effect on a state's subsequent pursuit of nuclear weapons. Jo and Gartzke (2007) find that the adoption of the NPT (measured by the proportion of states that are members) is not associated with a reduction in the initiation of weapons programs, and Kroenig (2010) finds that the establishment of the NPT does not itself affect the provision of sensitive nuclear assistance. Finally, Hymans (2012) argues that it is managerial incompetence due to domestic politics, rather than the nonproliferation regime, that explains why states seeking nuclear weapons after the regime's creation have been less likely to succeed and have taken much longer to get them when they do.

**Our theory yields, different interpretation of these findings that is consistent with the regime substantially reducing proliferation overall.** Even if NPT membership serves only to screen voluntary compliers, the wide joining of the NPT may still have a large effect by reinforcing the superpowers' belief that enforcement

will be affordable and thus that the regime is viable. States that comply may simply not want nuclear weapons, as Hymans (2006) and Solingen (2007) find, but this likely depends on the belief that most other states are not seeking them and in other cases on the belief that pursuing weapons would bring international pressure—both beliefs that only exist because of the regime.

The fact that the receipt of peaceful nuclear assistance and its link to nuclear weapons programs are unaffected by whether a state is an NPT member, as Fuhrmann (2009b, 2012) shows, is also explicable within our framework. The existence of the regime makes peaceful nuclear assistance less dangerous, regardless of whether the recipient is an NPT member, because even if an occasional state receiving assistance ends up getting nuclear weapons, the regime makes a subsequent breakdown into widespread proliferation less likely.

Similarly, the regime makes the rare provision of weapons-relevant nuclear assistance more tempting to some potential suppliers, who can be assured that any resulting proliferation will be isolated. So it is not surprising that the establishment of the regime is not associated with a reduction in such assistance, as Kroenig (2010) found.

Finally, though Hymans (2012) is surely right that incompetence played an important role in the long timelines of later nuclear programs, the regime's prevention of a broad market in nuclear weapons likely also contributed.

We close with the hope that scholars of the politics of nuclear weapons will find this study helpful in developing new avenues for research and interpreting new findings. Our theory and evidence provide an overarching picture of the constellation of states' interests in and expectations about nuclear weapons that gave rise to the nonproliferation regime. This theory is built upon, but also clarifies and integrates, previous research on particular elements of this constellation. It should thus form a solid foundation for further research, including theorizing about the evolution of the nonproliferation regime since the Cold War's end, evaluating present-day fears about a "nuclear tipping point," and explaining the occurrence of and responses to the challenges to the regime posed by North Korea, Iran, and others.

## Collapse of the NPT would destroy the global nuclear policeman, and incentivize rapid proliferation to the detriment of the U.S. led global order.

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We develop and test a theory of the origins and enforcement of the nonproliferation regime, and the roles of the NPT within it, based on our analysis of a game-theoretic model of proliferation that is tailored to the Cold War context in which the regime was born. Our model implies that widespread nonproliferation could only be possible if the superpowers colluded to enforce it. Their enforcement would be effective because of the power and influence they possessed over most other states; collusion would be necessary because otherwise one superpower might exploit and undermine the other's attempt to stop an aspirant.<sup>21</sup> Despite the ability of the superpowers to enforce nonproliferation, we show that their willingness to do so depends critically on their perceptions of the consequences of proliferation. The origins of the regime can then be traced to a shift in these perceptions documented by historians. Initially, each superpower saw the spread of nuclear weapons to certain of its own clients as a way to strengthen its side against the other's. Our model demonstrates that the superpowers cannot collude to enforce nonproliferation while they hold these views. In time, experience taught the superpowers that states could

also substitute nuclear weapons for their **patronage** and subsequently gain autonomy. We show that, under the right conditions, this revised conception can motivate the superpowers to jointly try to stop proliferation. These conditions are that the necessary enforcement cannot be too expensive for the superpowers and the monitoring of states' nuclear programs and of the superpowers' own fidelity to collusion must be reliable enough. We argue that enforcement is affordable only if many states support nonproliferation and so do not have to be coerced into compliance.

Under this theory, the NPT's roles are to bolster monitoring, to signal that the needed enforcement will be modest, and to coordinate states' expectations and behavior on nonproliferation rather than the widespread proliferation that might otherwise result. We proceed to test three observable implications of our theory. First, we should actually observe the superpowers colluding with each other on nonproliferation concerns and pressing each other to uphold their side of the collusion. We examine the declassified record of private superpower interactions, both during the NPT negotiations and on occasions when a new nuclear aspirant surfaced, and find ample evidence of this collusion. Second, the **superpowers** should apply pressure as needed to induce states to join the NPT. To test this, we present a new data set of all those states judged by the superpowers to be at risk of pursuing nuclear weapons, with information on the measures (if any) the superpowers used to pressure these states to join the treaty. Consistent with the theory, we find that though the superpowers' efforts were not always successful, they generally applied pressure when states did not join the treaty, and we found no evidence of any attempt by either superpower to undermine the other's pressure. Third, upon discovering a state's nuclear weapons program, the superpowers should attempt to coerce that state back into compliance.

We present data on all known cases in which a state's possible transgression was detected, measure the superpowers' responses to these cases, and also assess instances in which a superpower assisted such a nuclear aspirant state or exploited the other's pressure. The data generally support the theory: in most cases, the superpowers intervened forcefully to correct errant states. In no case did a superpower assist a state with a nuclear weapons program, and we again found no evidence of any attempt by either superpower to undermine the other's pressure. There are two other general theories of the nonproliferation regime and the NPT. The "cartel" theory holds that some of the nuclear haves" coerced or bribed the nuclear have-nots" into nonproliferation in order to maintain their nuclear oligopoly and preeminence (Swango 2009; Verdier 2008). A more common theory holds that the NPT represents a "grand bargain," with two aspects: first, the nuclear haves promise nuclear energy assistance and eventual nuclear disarmament in exchange for the nuclear have-nots eschewing nuclear weapons; and second, each have-not goes without weapons so long as the rest do and accepts international safeguards to assure others of this.<sup>2</sup> Neither theory is in accord with the evidence we present, and each leaves important questions unanswered. If the cartel theory is right, then the superpowers should have had to coerce many more states than the few in our data set. Why would so many states willingly go along with an instrument that only served to oppress them? If the benefits of nonproliferation were worth the costs of enforcing it, why did the superpowers not do it sooner, before China and France got nuclear weapons? If the grand bargain theory is right, many more nuclear have-nots should have defected from the regime, since some have-nots got nuclear weapons and the nuclear haves neither disarmed nor conditioned energy assistance on regime membership (Fuhrmann 2012; Swango 2014). How exactly would the bargain be enforced should some have-not decide it favored obtaining nuclear weapons even at the cost of access to nuclear energy assistance and other states following suit once it was detected? Our theory provides a synthesis of the cartel and grand bargain views that answers these questions and is consistent with the evidence. Most

**states** voluntarily adhered to the regime because they preferred widespread nonproliferation to widespread proliferation, in line with the grand bargain theory. The few that would have risked widespread proliferation in order to get their own nuclear weapons were prevented by the superpowers from "spoilng" the regime, in line with the cartel theory. But the superpowers were willing to collude and bear the costs of enforcement only because there were relatively few spoilers that had to be coerced, and only belatedly, once the superpowers realized that widespread proliferation would be injurious to their interests. The principal contribution of our work is to show how the constellation of states' interests in nuclear weapons and expectations about the extent and consequences of future proliferation gives rise to the regime. By contrast, most prior scholarship has focused on four particular elements within this constellation. First, and most closely related, Kroenig (2009, 2010, 2014) develops a theory of individual states' attitudes toward other states' proliferation, in which a state disfavors proliferation to other states over which it can project power. While this theory implies that the superpowers will see benefits to nonproliferation, it does not recognize the necessity of collusion to their ability to enforce it or the importance of other states' voluntary compliance to the superpowers' willingness to enforce it. It also does not explain why the regime's establishment was delayed. A second body of work analyzes the efficacy of various means of enforcing nonproliferation, including safeguards (Fuhrmann 2012), supply controls (Fuhrmann 2009a, 2012; Kroenig 2009, 2010; Montgomery 2005), economic sanctions (Miller 2014b; Solingen 2012), preventive attack (Bas and Coe 2012; Debs and Monteiro 2014; Fuhrmann and Kreps 2010), and security guarantees (Monteiro and Debs 2014). However, these studies do not elucidate how expectations about the extent and effects of future proliferation influence the superpowers' willingness to undertake these costly measures. Third,

historians have documented the superpowers' collusion on nonproliferation, the shift toward it in the mid-1960s, and the effect this had on negotiations for the NPT, but they cannot explain why this shift enabled the regime's creation (Brands 2006, 2007; Gavin 2004, 2010; Popp 2014). Finally, recent research examining individual states' interests in nuclear weapons and capacities for obtaining them appears to take for granted states' expectation that proliferation will be rare (Hyman 2006, 2012; Paul 2000; Solingen 2007).<sup>3</sup> Many of these studies conclude that the regime has had little effect on nonproliferation (Sagan 2011). However, as we will explain, our theory gives rise to an alternative interpretation of this evidence, one in which the regime substantially reduced proliferation. The next section describes our theory and elaborates on its synthesis of previous views. We then turn to the empirical evidence and the results of our tests. The final section discusses the broader implications of our results for previous research on the regime. A Theory of the Nonproliferation Regime We will first describe the assumptions of the model we use to formalize states' interactions over proliferation. We will then establish the conditions for a nonproliferation regime to exist in equilibrium, showing that it must entail the superpowers colluding to stop certain states from getting nuclear weapons. These conditions enable us to synthesize the cartel and grand bargain views of the NPT, to explain why the NPT came about when it did, and finally to elucidate the specific roles the NPT plays in the viability of the nonproliferation regime. Proofs of the propositions can be found in the online appendix. Model setup Two superpowers, US and SU, and a finite set of other states, S, which includes clients of the United States (SUSCS) and of the Soviet Union (SUUS), interact repeatedly over time. In the first period, all of the states simultaneously decide whether to initiate a nuclear weapons program, and the period ends. In the next and all future periods, a state's choice to start a program in the last period is revealed with probability  $j$ . Each superpower then simultaneously decides whether to allow each revealed state (if there is any) to continue its program, paying a cost  $c > 0$  for each state it tries to stop. A superpower's choice to allow a state to continue is revealed with probability  $t$ , but it is otherwise known only to the superpower and that state. All of the states that do not currently have an ongoing nuclear weapons program then simultaneously decide whether to start one. If any state began a program in the previous period, and it went undetected in this period or was detected but either superpower chose to allow it, then its program now succeeds, and that state is observed to acquire nuclear weapons, which it retains permanently. If instead both superpowers tried to stop the state, then its program ends, and the state loses the value of the resources invested in it, worth  $d > 0$ . Payoffs are realized, and the period ends. The structure of the game assumes that the superpowers—and only the superpowers—are capable of stopping a state that has chosen to seek nuclear weapons from getting them.<sup>5</sup> This capability derives from the unique power and influence the superpowers wield over other nations. Each can more easily detect and more severely punish a proliferant than any nonsuperpower or even group of such states, and they can do this at lower relative cost. Each superpower is capable of persuading or compelling many other states to support a proliferant's punishment, making it even more severe. This capability would be most formidable when dealing with each superpower's own clients: preferential trade arrangements, diplomatic support, assistance with nuclear technology, transfers of arms, stationing of the superpower's own forces in-country, and even guarantees of security could all be ended as punishment for seeking nuclear weapons. The empirical record of superpower attempts to stop proliferation, described in the next section, shows that the threat of these punishments has usually been effective. However, the game's structure also presumes that neither superpower can stop proliferation unilaterally. The same power and influence that makes a superpower a superb punisher also renders it uniquely able to undermine other states' attempts at punishment. A superpower can replace much of what a state might lose due to other states' attempts to punish it, whether markets for trade, diplomatic recognition, arms transfers, or even a security guarantee. It could assist the proliferant with its nuclear program or even defend it from attack. Even if a state's punishment came at the hands of its patron superpower, the other superpower could offer its own services to the newly needy state and thereby replace its former

patron. Thus, the superpowers must collude to stop a state from getting nuclear weapons. A state seeking nuclear weapons, and a superpower enabling it to do so, would obviously have strong incentives to conceal their actions so as to prevent others from reacting adversely. The possibility that these might go undetected is why the states' and the superpowers' decisions are each treated as simultaneous and revealed only with some probability. Each state must decide whether to pursue nuclear weapons while not knowing whether other states are at that moment doing so. It might learn of another state's program before it succeeds, giving it a chance to react accordingly, or it might remain in the dark until that state's program succeeded and it revealed the new capability. Similarly, a superpower must react to the discovery of a state's program while not knowing how the other superpower is reacting. All players discount the future by  $d > 0$ , and all payoffs are common knowledge. Let  $S \cup N$  be the set of states that have nuclear weapons at the end of period  $t$ . The per-period payoff of each state  $j \in S \cup N$ . We assume that, for any  $j \in S \cup N$ ,  $T \subseteq S$ , and  $k \neq j$ ,  $v_j(T) \geq v_j(T \cup k)$ : for any given state, the spread of nuclear weapons to other states is (weakly) bad. We also make the following "breakdown" assumption:

**if any state gets nuclear weapons**, and the superpowers will not collude to prevent any other state from following, then all states that do not have nuclear weapons will seek them immediately, and  $S \cup N$  will be the unique equilibrium outcome. In effect, if proliferation gets started and is not stopped, then it will snowball.<sup>6</sup> This nuclear domino theory was, and is, widely believed, at least among US policy makers, and there is now substantial evidence for it (Miller 2014a). The per-period payoffs of the superpowers are  $v_{US} p_j p_{j+1}(N) 1 - i_j(N) 2 I_{US}(N)$  and  $v_{SU} p_k p_{k+1}(N) 1 - a_k(N) 2 I_{SU}(N)$ . These represent the two different effects that proliferation can have on the superpowers' interests, termed inter-alliance effects and intra-alliance effects, with the

relative importance of the latter given by  $a$ . First, **proliferation may alter the balance of power** between the superpowers' alliances, represented by  $p(\cdot)$ .

Because nuclear-armed clients would be stronger, the spread of weapons to a superpower's clients might strengthen its side relative to the other superpower's. The change in sign of  $p(\cdot)$  between the superpowers reflects the fact that strengthens one side's relative power must weaken the other's. We assume that, for any  $T \subseteq S$  and  $j \in T$ ,  $p(T \cup \{j\}) \geq p(T)$  if  $j \in \text{SUS}$ , and  $p(T \cup \{j\}) \leq p(T)$  if  $j \in \text{SSU}$ . In other words, the spread of nuclear weapons to one superpower's ally (weakly) shifts the inter-alliance balance of power in that superpower's favor.<sup>7</sup> The second effect of proliferation is to alter the balance of power within each superpower's alliance, represented by the bracketed terms in the superpowers' payoffs. A client that got nuclear weapons would no longer need to rely so heavily on its superpower patron, as its nuclear arms would partially substitute for a patron's protection. Thus, a nucleararmed client might be more assertive of its interests within the alliance or seek more autonomy from it. On the one hand, the patron's loss of influence over a newly nucleararmed client would be good for the other superpower, who would face a less cohesive opposing alliance and possibly find common interests with the erstwhile client. This is represented by  $i(\cdot)$ , which can be thought of as the total US influence over all states with respect to issues where US and Soviet interests are directly opposed. The sign of  $i(\cdot)$  changes between the superpowers because one's loss of influence on such issues must be the other's gain. We assume that, for any  $T \subseteq S$  and  $j \notin T$ ,  $i(T \cup \{j\}) \leq i(T)$  if  $j \in \text{SUS}$ , and  $i(T \cup \{j\}) \geq i(T)$  if  $j \in \text{SSU}$ . That is, the spread of nuclear weapons to one superpower's ally is (weakly) bad for that superpower and (weakly) good for the other, as the ally may now act less consistently with the interests of its patron superpower and more consistently with those of the other superpower.<sup>8</sup> On the other hand, the patron's loss of influence is not fully recouped by the other superpower, because newly nuclear-armed states achieve greater autonomy from both superpowers and so may pursue interests that neither superpower supports. Proliferation can thus shift influence, not just from one superpower to the other but from the superpowers to the other states. This is represented by the functions  $\text{IUS}(\cdot)$  and  $\text{ISU}(\cdot)$ , which can be thought of as each superpower's loss of influence over nuclear-armed states on issues where the superpowers' interests are not opposed. For any  $T \subseteq S$  and  $j \notin T$ ,

$\text{IUS}(T \cup \{j\}) \geq \text{IUS}(T)$  and  $\text{ISU}(T \cup \{j\}) \geq \text{ISU}(T)$ , so that these losses (weakly) grow as nuclear weapons spread. Power and influence, as we use the terms here, should be construed quite broadly.

**A state's acquisition of nuclear weapons can affect a superpower's interests** in many ways: **deterring the superpower from using military force against that state reducing its ability to coerce that state**; triggering regional instability that might entrap the superpower or require its mediation; **undermining the superpower's alliance structure**

by reducing the value of or need for its security guarantees; **and absorbing strategic attention that a superpower might otherwise devote to other states** all in addition to the possibility of generating further **proliferation** (Kroenig 2009, 2010, 2014). Each of these can be understood in terms of  $p(\cdot)$ ,  $i(\cdot)$ , and  $\text{l}(\cdot)$ . As examples, the risk of entrapment increases  $\text{l}(\cdot)$ , while the reduced ability to coerce a nuclear-armed Soviet client may decrease  $p$  (the Soviet alliance is more powerful) but increase  $i$  (the freed client may drift toward the United States). For convenience, we normalize  $p(\emptyset)$ ,  $i(\emptyset)$ ,  $\text{IUS}(\emptyset)$ , and  $\text{ISU}(\emptyset)$  to zero. We also assume that  $p(S)p(S)p(0)$  and  $\text{IUS}(S)\text{IUS}(S)p(0)$ : if proliferation goes from zero to universal, the many resulting gains and losses in power and competitive influence for each superpower will cancel out, and each will suffer the same total loss of noncompetitive influence. Finally, we assume that, for any  $T \subseteq S$ ,  $(1-d)(i(T)) \leq (d=1-2d)i(S)$ . That is,

**any momentary shift in influence between the superpowers due to some states getting nuclear weapons is no larger than the loss of influence that would result from permanent universal proliferation.**

**Collision and nonproliferation** We look for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which no state seeks nuclear weapons.<sup>9</sup> We require that no individual state have an incentive to deviate from nonproliferation, as is standard, but additionally that no coalition of states drawn from  $S$  and either superpower have an incentive to deviate together. A regime that managed to keep individual states in line but that could not prevent a concerted breakout by a group of "spoilers," possibly aided by a superpower, would not last long. Let  $S1$  be composed of every state  $j \in S$  such that  $v(j|1) \geq v(j|2)$  and  $v(j|3) \geq v(j|4)$ . As we will explain,<sup>10</sup>  $S1$  is the set of potential spoilers. Proposition 1. There is a universal nonproliferation equilibrium if and only if, for all  $j \in S1$ ,  $T \subseteq S1$ , and  $a \in \text{FUS}, \text{SUG}: d \geq (1-2)(1-d)v(j|1) \geq (1-2)(1-d)v(j|2) \geq (1-2)(1-d)v(j|3) \geq (1-2)(1-d)v(j|4)$ . If this equilibrium exists, it is enforced by superpower collusion to stop the spoilers. Under this equilibrium, each state is deterred from seeking nuclear weapons in one of two ways. First, most states are deterred by the fact that their acquisition of nuclear arms would lead to the breakdown of the nonproliferation regime, leading other states to seek weapons. For these states, the resultant widespread proliferation would be worse than abiding by the nonproliferation regime, even if it meant giving up the chance to be the first, and temporarily the only, state to acquire nuclear weapons. However, other states—the spoilers—have the opposite preference. These states would actually prefer seeking nuclear weapons, even if all other states followed, to complying with the nonproliferation regime along with the other states. This preference is formalized in the condition defining  $S1$ . The right side is the value of abiding by the regime, while the left side is the value of cheating on it: the spoiler enjoys sole possession of nuclear weapons temporarily, but eventually all other states get nuclear weapons as well. Obviously, the spoilers cannot be deterred from seeking weapons by the threat of the regime's subsequent breakdown, since they actually prefer this outcome. Instead they are deterred by the prospect that, if they seek nuclear weapons and are detected, the superpowers will collude to stop them, so that the resources invested in a nuclear program will be lost. In condition (1) above, the left side is the expected cost of pursuing nuclear weapons (sacrificing the investment  $d$  if caught and stopped), while the right side is the expected benefit of going undetected and getting nuclear weapons, over and above the value received from abiding by the regime. Thus, this condition specifies that, for any spoiler, the expected cost of cheating on the regime outweighs the expected benefit. These spoilers are not just a theoretical possibility. India sought nuclear weapons despite surely knowing that Pakistan would follow and preferring that it not; it is hard to believe that North Korea would have been deterred from pursuing nuclear weapons if it thought that South Korea, or any other country, would get them in response. In a counterfactual world without superpower enforcement of nonproliferation, it is easy to imagine other spoilers. For instance, WestGermany, which had to contend with the massive conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact and the uncertain reliability of its US security guarantee, might have resorted to nuclear arms in spite of the likelihood that other European states would follow. For their part, the superpowers enforce nonproliferation because the cost of doing so is outweighed by the losses they will suffer from proliferation if they shirk. For each possible set of spoilers, and each superpower, condition (2) above requires that the superpower's value of enforcing the regime at least equal its value of shirking, wherein the superpower allows the set of spoilers to get nuclear weapons but soon faces proliferation by the other states.<sup>11</sup> This result synthesizes the grand bargain and cartel views of the nonproliferation regime and also exposes the flaws of each view when considered on its own. The grand bargain envisions a set of states that agree to eschew nuclear weapons so long as other states also do so. And, indeed, this is an apt description of the way the equilibrium looks from the point of view of the nonspoiler states. These states prefer nonproliferation to widespread proliferation, are willing to give up weapons themselves to support the former, and will renegue only if other states cheat on the bargain. These

states abide by the regime voluntarily rather than being coerced into compliance by the superpowers. However, this in itself is not enough to make the regime viable. **In the absence of superpower enforcement, the spoiler states would seek nuclear weapons, and other states would pursue nuclear weapons, and yet more states would acquire weapons in response to these, so that proliferation would eventually be widespread.**

<sup>12</sup> The grand bargain is thus not robust to spoilers. To make the regime—and the underlying grand bargain among the nonspoilers—viable, the spoilers must be coerced into nonproliferation, so that it is safe for the nonspoilers to abide by their bargain. From the spoilers' point of view, then, the nonproliferation equilibrium looks much more like the cartel: the superpowers collude to strong-arm these states into the regime. The flaw in the cartel view is that because this enforcement is expensive for the superpowers, it is only worth doing if, by coercing just a few states, the superpowers can make nonproliferation among a much wider set of states possible. Thus, the superpowers are willing to form a cartel only because many states do not need to be强forced into nonproliferation at all. In short, the cartel is needed to render the grand bargain robust to spoilers, and the grand bargain is needed to make the cartel affordable. The origins and roles of the NPT We first discuss the origins of the NPT in a shift in the superpowers' perceptions of the effects of proliferation. We then explain how the NPT itself affects the underlying parameters that govern the viability of the nonproliferation regime. This in turn leads to the observable implications of our theory that are tested in the subsequent section. We use the following result to make explicit how the regime's viability is affected by the parameters of our model. Proposition 2. The nonproliferation equilibrium only exists if  $a, j$  are high enough and  $c$  is low enough, and it is more likely to exist if  $t$  is higher and  $F_S F_F$  is lower. Recall that  $t$  governs the importance of the intra-alliance effects (a superpower loses influence over a nuclear-armed client) relative to the inter-alliance effects (a superpower's side gets stronger with nuclear-armed clients) of proliferation. In the limiting case where  $a = 0$ , there are no intra alliance effects and proliferation simply increases one side's power and decreases the other's by the same amount, so that proliferation is zero-sum. Then, for any set of states that get nuclear weapons, one superpower will be left at least equally well off by this proliferation. This superpower will be unwilling to pay the costs of enforcing nonproliferation against these states, and anticipating this, the other superpower will not try either, since enforcement would fail without the first superpower's help. So, if proliferation is zero-sum, neither superpower will ever enforce nonproliferation in equilibrium. As it rises from zero, proliferation has increasingly strong intra-alliance effects. Because one superpower's loss of influence over a nuclear-armed client is not fully recouped by the other, proliferation becomes increasingly negative-sum. Now, if nuclear weapons spread far enough, both superpowers could be left worse off because of their net loss of influence. Once  $a$  is high enough, the anticipated joint loss of influence from proliferation will outweigh the costs of stopping it and the superpowers will become willing to institute a nonproliferation regime. Essentially, a controls the size of the net benefits to the superpowers from nonproliferation. The superpowers' perceived value of a changed over the course of the early Cold War, explaining why the regime was not instantiated until the late 1960s. In principle, the superpowers could have pushed the NPT forward as early as the 1950s, once both had nuclear weapons and established alliances and thus something potentially to lose from further proliferation. However, until well into the 1960s, each superpower instead saw substantial advantages to be gained from selective proliferation to certain of their clients. The United States perceived nuclear cooperation and weapons-sharing with its European allies to be a valuable counter to the USSR's superior conventional forces, and these initiatives were prioritized over nonproliferation. As late as the mid-1960s, the US interest in sharing weapons with West Germany in the form of the multi-lateral force (MLF), adamantly opposed by the Soviets, was an important obstacle to creating the regime (Brands 2007). High-level US officials also privately advocated the consideration of giving weapons to India and Japan, reasoning that this would help to balance the threat from nuclear-armed China.<sup>13</sup> For its part, the USSR greatly facilitated China's development of the bomb in the 1950s, providing expertise and materials and even building a model weapon intended for China to copy (Timberbaev 1999). In short, both superpowers focused on the inter-alliance effects as opposed to the intra-alliance effects of proliferation, suggesting that they perceived the importance of the latter (i.e.,  $a$ ) to be low. The experience of dealing with newly nuclear—and newly obstreperous—allies led the superpowers to reassess the intraalliance effects of proliferation, raising their perceived value of  $a$ . The estrangement of China from the USSR allowed the United States to play one against the other, while the ructions France generated in NATO were surely to the USSR's liking. However, after ending its alliance with the USSR, China proselytized for a more radical version of communist ideology that neither superpower favored, while France sought to preserve control over its remaining colonies against both superpowers' desires for colonial independence. In the United States, elites increasingly recognized that nonproliferation was needed to limit the superpowers' joint loss of influence. High-level deliberations after China's nuclear test led to the United States dropping its support for the MLF in favor of establishing a nonproliferation regime (Brands 2007). A similar evolution of views took place in the Soviet Union (Potter 1985). With both superpowers weighing the intraalliance effects of proliferation more heavily, both became more willing to pay the costs of enforcement under a nonproliferation regime, and so the NPT was agreed. Thus, the increase in  $a$

explains the origins of the NPT. The NPT contributes to the viability of the incipient nonproliferation regime in four ways. First, the inspections that nonnuclear signatories are required to accept increase the chance that a covert nuclear weapons program will be detected and subsequently stopped (raising  $j$ ). This decreases the willingness of spoilers to try to cheat under the regime and thus also renders enforcement cheaper for the superpowers. Second, the same inspections also make it easier to catch a superpower surreptitiously helping a state with its program or simply allowing it to proceed (increasing  $t$ ). This increases the willingness of each superpower to enforce nonproliferation, secure in the knowledge that the other superpower is doing its part and thus that their efforts will be effective, and it decreases the temptation to enable favored states to get nuclear weapons. Third, the willingness of non-nuclear states to sign the NPT, and thus voluntarily subject themselves to better monitoring, reveals that most states are not spoilers.<sup>14</sup> This lowers the super powers' perceived costs of enforcing the regime (by decreasing FS1 F), because it enables the superpowers to confirm that only a few holdouts will have to be strong-armed into nonproliferation. And, finally, the NPT served as a device to coordinate all states on the nonproliferation equilibrium, rather than the widespread proliferation that might otherwise result. By leading nonspoilers to expect nonproliferation to be upheld, it encouraged them to abide by it and contribute to the superpowers' efforts to enforce the regime, lowering the costs of enforcement (c). Our theory of the nonproliferation regime, and the origins and roles of the NPT within it, offers at least three observable implications. First, our model assumes that collusion between the superpowers is central to the regime's establishment and enforcement, so the first implication is that this collusion should have taken place during negotiations over the regime and in reactions to states' noncompliance with the regime. H1. The superpowers will collude with one another on nonproliferation concerns and press one another to comply with their side of the collusion terms. Second, the theory implies that the superpowers should pressure the other states into joining the NPT. If a state refused to join, it would increase the difficulty of catching it pursuing nuclear weapons covertly, undermine the willingness of other states to join and comply with the treaty, and thereby increase the superpowers' costs of enforcing the regime. Since each superpower ought to have more leverage over its own clients than other states, we expect that each would be held responsible for policing its own clients, while the other superpower would be expected not to interfere in or obstruct this policing. We also expect the superpowers to apply this pressure only when it is actually perceived as necessary to induce a state to join the NPT and only when it is perceived to have some chance of success. H2. Each superpower will pressure other states, especially its own clients, to join the NPT, focusing its efforts on cases where pressures are likely to be both necessary and effective, and neither superpower will undermine the other's efforts. Third, the superpowers should collude to stop any state that is revealed to be (potentially) pursuing nuclear weapons, as doing otherwise could lead to the breakdown of the regime. Here again, we expect that each superpower would be most involved in the policing of its own clients, while the other superpower would be expected not to aid the erstwhile client. H3. Each superpower will apply pressure to prevent other states, especially its own clients, from moving toward acquiring nuclear weapons. Neither superpower will offer assistance to a state suspected to be pursuing a nuclear weapons program.

## The capabilities and resources to develop nuclear weapons are globally dispersed and widely available – the only barrier is the NPT

**Burns and Coyle 15** (Philip E. Coyle III, the Senior Science Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, and a recognized expert on U.S. and worldwide military research, served as the Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs (NSIA) in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), served as a Senior Advisor to the President of the World Security Institute and to its Center for Defense Information, was Assistant Secretary of Defense and Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, in the Department of Defense, served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs in the Department of Energy (DOE), worked at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in Livermore, California for 33 years and was named Laboratory Associate Director Emeritus; Richard D. Burns, professor emeritus of history at California State University, Los Angeles, CA, 2015. "The Challenges of Nuclear Non-Proliferation." Chapter 8 Pages 175-177.

[https://books.google.com/books?id=KzELCAAAQBAJ&pg=PA175&lpg=PA175&dq=%22Reiss%22+AND+%22nuclear%22+AND+%22tipping+point%22+AND+%22epidemic%22&source=bl&ots=tIyqEypztg&sig=PNYvnYeCYn\\_930wRveQIWzQjo&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjij3bTBnMneAhVDpoMKHw-IAPAQ6AEwB3oECCEQAQ#v=onepage&q=%22Reiss%22%20AND%20%22nuclear%22%20AND%20%22tipping%20point%22%20AND%20%22epidemic%22&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=KzELCAAAQBAJ&pg=PA175&lpg=PA175&dq=%22Reiss%22+AND+%22nuclear%22+AND+%22tipping+point%22+AND+%22epidemic%22&source=bl&ots=tIyqEypztg&sig=PNYvnYeCYn_930wRveQIWzQjo&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjij3bTBnMneAhVDpoMKHw-IAPAQ6AEwB3oECCEQAQ#v=onepage&q=%22Reiss%22%20AND%20%22nuclear%22%20AND%20%22tipping%20point%22%20AND%20%22epidemic%22&f=false)

When the Cold War ended in 1990 and new regional threats arose, several of the nonnuclear weapon nations began reconsidering their earlier decisions to reject nuclear weapons. The potential for widespread nuclear proliferation certainly existed. In 2006, for example, Mohamed ElBaradei, then director general of the IAEA, estimated that as many as forty-nine nonnuclear weapons nations possessed the technical knowledge to make nuclear weapons and warned that global or regional tensions might persuade some to launch such programs.

Unquestionably, what German physicist Werner Heisenberg warned in 1947 had come to pass: the making of atomic bombs was "no longer a problem of science in any country, but a problem of engineering." Mitchell Reiss amplified Heisenberg's warning by pointing out in *The Nuclear Tipping Point* that "the building blocks for a nuclear arsenal – the scientific and engineering expertise, precision machine tools, computer software, and nuclear design information – are more readily available than ever before." Reiss and his colleagues argued states that adopted a "hedging strategy," which permits them to gradually acquire nuclear competence, posed the most serious threat to non-proliferation. A nuclear "tipping point" would occur, they claim, once several states make the political decision to acquire nuclear weapons and the means of delivery. This could create a proliferation epidemic. If technical and engineering capabilities abound, then what are the key factors that might activate a proliferation epidemic? There are at least two elements that singly or collectively could be significant: the collapse of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and a breakdown of regional or global stability. Certainly the emergence of new nuclear weapon states could

**further erode the effectiveness of the global NPT regime**, but it is likely that the international community would work to eliminate or at least limit the extent of those new nuclear capabilities, as it has done with Iran and North Korea. Some observers argue that those who violate the NPT regime and obtain nuclear weapons should face severe consequences in order for the NPT to survive. No agreement on severe penalties has been forthcoming against those nations that acquired nuclear arsenals since China's 1964 emergence as the last of the NPT's original five nuclear weapon states, namely, Israel, India, Pakistan, South Africa, and North Korea.<sup>17</sup>

## **Prolif causes nuclear terrorism and war via brinksmanship and preemptive strikes**

**Kroenig 15** (Matthew, Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, 2015. "The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?" *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Volume 38, Issue 1-2, 2015)

The spread of nuclear weapons poses at least six severe threats to international peace and security including: nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, global and regional instability, constrained US freedom of action, weakened alliances, and further nuclear proliferation. Each of these threats has received extensive treatment elsewhere and this review is not intended to replicate or even necessarily to improve upon these previous efforts. Rather the goals of this section are more modest: to usefully bring together and recap the many reasons why We should be pessimistic about the likely consequences of nuclear proliferation. Many of these threats will be illuminated with a discussion of a case of much contemporary concern: Iran's advanced nuclear program. Nuclear War The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is nuclear war. The more states in possession of nuclear weapons, the greater the probability that somewhere, someday, there will be a catastrophic nuclear war. To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States used nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to the 65-plus-year tradition of nuclear non-use as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but it would be naïve to think that nuclear weapons will never be used again simply because they have not been used for some time. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide economic downturns like the Great Depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dot-com bubble bursting later in the decade and the Great Recession of the late 2000s.<sup>48</sup> This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used again sometime in his lifetime. Before reaching a state of MAD, new nuclear states go through a transition period in which they lack a secure second strike capability. In this context, one or both states might believe that it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first. For example, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure, second-strike capability. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth, Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force. In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, the state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a splendid first strike capability. In a crisis, Israel might, therefore, decide to launch a preventive nuclear strike to disarm Iran's nuclear capabilities. Indeed, this incentive might be further increased by Israel's aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes preemptive action. Second, the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, in this case Iran, might feel use them or lose them pressures. That is, in a crisis, Iran might decide to strike first rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, nuclear war could result due to the reciprocal fear of surprise attack.<sup>49</sup> If there are advantages to striking first, One state might start a nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable and that it would be better to go first than to go second. Fortunately, there is no historic evidence of this dynamic occurring in a nuclear context, but it is still possible. In an Israeli-Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack from an opponent. Even in a world of MAD, however, when both sides have secure, second-strike capabilities, there is still a risk of nuclear war. Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear-armed states are governed by rational leaders who would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war. This assumption appears to have applied to past and current nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the future. Iran's theocratic government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it contains leaders who hold

millenarian religious worldviews and could one day ascend to power. We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to spread, some leader somewhere will choose to launch a nuclear war, knowing full well that it could result in self-destruction. One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine nuclear war under MAD. Nuclear weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of international politics. As was discussed above, nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest and leaders still seek to coerce nuclear-armed adversaries. Leaders might, therefore, choose to launch a limited nuclear war.<sup>50</sup> This strategy might be especially attractive to states in a position of conventional inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly to the nuclear level. During the Cold War, the United States planned to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe given NATO's conventional inferiority.<sup>51</sup> As Russia's conventional power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons in its military doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a way to de-escalate a crisis. Similarly, Pakistan's military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger India. And finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use against a US superpower in a possible East Asia contingency. Second, as was also discussed above, leaders can make a 'threat that leaves something to chance'.<sup>52</sup> They can initiate a nuclear crisis. By playing these risky games of nuclear brinkmanship, states can increase the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. Historical crises have not resulted in nuclear war, but many of them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, have come close. And scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents nearly led to war.<sup>53</sup> When we think about future nuclear crisis dyads, such as Iran and Israel, with fewer sources of stability than existed during the Cold War, we can see that there is a real risk that a future crisis could result in a devastating nuclear exchange. Nuclear Terrorism The spread of nuclear weapons also increases the risk of nuclear terrorism.<sup>54</sup> While September 11th was one of the greatest tragedies in American history, it would have been much worse had Osama Bin Laden possessed nuclear weapons. Bin Laden declared it a 'religious duty' for Al-Qa'eda to acquire nuclear weapons and radical clerics have issued fatwas declaring it permissible to use nuclear weapons in Jihad against the West.<sup>55</sup> Unlike states, which can be more easily deterred, there is little doubt that if terrorists acquired nuclear weapons, they would use them.<sup>56</sup> Indeed, in recent years, many US politicians and security analysts have argued that nuclear terrorism poses the greatest threat to US national security.<sup>57</sup> Analysts have pointed out the tremendous hurdles that terrorists would have to overcome in order to acquire nuclear weapons.<sup>58</sup> Nevertheless, as nuclear weapons spread, the possibility that they will eventually fall into terrorist hands increases. States could intentionally transfer nuclear weapons, or the fissile material required to build them, to terrorist groups. There are good reasons why a state might be reluctant to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists, but, as nuclear weapons spread, the probability that a leader might someday purposely arm a terrorist group increases. Some fear, for example, that Iran, with its close ties to Hamas and Hezbollah, might be at a heightened risk of transferring nuclear weapons to terrorists. Moreover, even if no state would ever intentionally transfer nuclear capabilities to terrorists, a new nuclear state, with underdeveloped security procedures, might be vulnerable to theft, allowing terrorist groups or corrupt or ideologically-motivated insiders to transfer dangerous material to terrorists. There is evidence, for example, that representatives from Pakistan's atomic energy establishment met with Al-Qa'eda members to discuss a possible nuclear deal.<sup>59</sup> Finally, a nuclear-armed state could collapse, resulting in a breakdown of law and order and a loose nukes problem. US officials are currently very concerned about what would happen to Pakistan's nuclear weapons if the government were to fall. As nuclear weapons spread, this problem is only further amplified. Iran is a country with a history of revolutions and a government with a tenuous hold on power. The regime change that Washington has long dreamed about in Tehran could actually become a nightmare if a nuclear-armed Iran suffered a breakdown in authority, forcing us to worry about the fate of Iran's nuclear arsenal. Regional Instability The spread of nuclear weapons also emboldens nuclear powers, contributing to regional instability. States that lack nuclear weapons need to fear direct military attack from other states, but states with nuclear weapons can be confident that they can deter an intentional military attack, giving them an incentive to be more aggressive in the conduct of their foreign policy. In this way, nuclear weapons provide a shield under which states can feel free to engage in lower-level aggression. Indeed, international relations theories about the 'stability-instability paradox' maintain that stability at the nuclear level contributes to conventional instability.<sup>60</sup> Historically, we have seen that the spread of nuclear weapons has emboldened their possessors and

contributed to regional instability. Recent scholarly analyses have demonstrated that, after controlling for other relevant factors, nuclear-weapon states are more likely to engage in conflict than nonnuclear-weapon states and that this aggressiveness is more pronounced in new nuclear states that have less experience with nuclear diplomacy.<sup>61</sup> Similarly, research on internal decision-making in Pakistan reveals that Pakistani foreign policymakers may have been emboldened by the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which encouraged them to initiate militarized disputes against India.<sup>62</sup> Currently, Iran restrains its foreign policy because it fears major military retaliation from the United States or Israel, but with nuclear weapons it could feel free to push harder. A nuclear-armed Iran would likely step up support to terrorist and proxy groups and engage in more aggressive coercive diplomacy. With a nuclear-armed Iran increasingly throwing its weight around in the region, we could witness an even more crisis prone Middle East. And in a poly-nuclear Middle East with Israel, Iran, and, in the future, possibly other states, armed with nuclear weapons, any one of those crises could result in a catastrophic nuclear exchange.

### Even one accident or misperception triggers our impact

**Thakur 15** (Ramesh Thakur, Director of the Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament in the Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University. 2015. "Nuclear Weapons and International Security." Routledge)

The world faces two existential threats: climate change and nuclear Armageddon. Those who reject the first are derided as denialists; those dismissive of the second are praised as realists. Nuclear weapons may or may not have kept the peace among various groups of rival states; they could be catastrophic for the world if ever used by both sides in a war between nuclear-armed rivals; and the prospects for their use have grown since the end of the Cold War. Even a limited regional nuclear war in which India and Pakistan used 50 Hiroshima-size (15kt) bombs each could lead to a famine that kills up to a billion people. <sup>1</sup> Having learnt to live with nuclear weapons for 70 years (1945–2015), we have become desensitized to the gravity and immediacy of the threat. The tyranny of complacency could yet exact a fearful price with nuclear Armageddon. The nuclear peace has held so far owing as much to good luck as sound stewardship. Deterrence stability depends on rational decision-makers being always in office on all sides: a dubious and not very reassuring precondition It depends equally critically on there being no rogue launch, human error or system malfunction: an impossibly high bar. For nuclear peace to hold, deterrence and fail-safe mechanisms must work every single time. For nuclear Armageddon, deterrence or fail-safe mechanisms need to break down only once. This is not a comforting equation. It also explains why, unlike most situations where risk can be mitigated after disaster strikes, with nuclear weapons all risks must be mitigated before any disaster. <sup>2</sup> As more states acquire nuclear weapons, the risks multiply exponentially with the requirements for rationality in all decision-makers; robust command-and-control systems in all states; 100 percent reliable fail-safe mechanisms and procedures against accidental and unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons; and totally unbreachable security measures against terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons by being able to penetrate one or more of the growing nuclear facilities or access some of the wider spread of nuclear material and technology.

### Nuclear terrorism causes extinction—misattribution errors, miscalc and high tensions spark global nuclear conflict

**Hayes 18** (Peter Hayes, Director of the Nautilus Institute and Honorary Professor at the Centre for International Security Studies at the University of Sydney, January 18, 2018. "NON-STATE

TERRORISM AND INADVERTENT NUCLEAR WAR." <https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/non-state-terrorism-and-inadvertent-nuclear-war/>)

We now move to our conclusion. Nuclear-armed states can place themselves on the edge of nuclear war by a combination of threatening force deployments and threat rhetoric. Statements by US and North Korea's leaders and supporting amplification by state and private media to present just such a lethal combination. Many observers have observed that the risk of war and nuclear war, in Korea and globally, have increased in the last few years—although no-one can say with authority by how much and exactly for what reasons. However, states are restrained in their actual decisions to escalate to conflict and/or nuclear war by conventional deterrence, vital national interests, and other institutional and political restraints, both domestic and international. It is not easy, in the real world, or even in fiction, to start nuclear wars.<sup>[19]</sup> Rhetorical threats are standard fare in realist and constructivist accounts of inter-state nuclear deterrence, compellence, and reassurance, and are not cause for alarm per se. States will manage the risk in each of the threat relationships with other nuclear armed states to stay back from the brink, let alone go over it, as they have in the past. This argument was powerful and to many, persuasive during the Cold War although it does not deny the hair-raising risks taken by nuclear armed states during this period. Today, the multi-polarity of nine nuclear weapons states interacting in a four-tiered nuclear threat system means that the practice of sustaining nuclear threat and preparing for nuclear war is no longer merely complicated, but is now enormously complex in ways that may exceed the capacity of some and perhaps all states to manage, even without the emergence of a fifth tier of non-state actors to add further unpredictability to how this system works in practice. The possibility that non-state actors may attack without advance warning as to the time, place, and angle of attack presents another layer of uncertainty to this complexity as to how inter-state nuclear war may break out. That is, non-state actors with nuclear weapons or threat goals and capacities do not seek the same goals, will not use the same control systems, and will use radically different organizational procedures and systems to deliver on their threats compared with nuclear armed states. If used tactically for immediate terrorist effect, a non-state nuclear terrorist could violently attack nuclear facilities, exploiting any number of vulnerabilities in fuel cycle facility security, or use actual nuclear materials and even warheads against military or civilian targets. If a persistent, strategically oriented nuclear terrorist succeed in gaining credible nuclear threat capacities, it might take hostage one or more states or cities. If such an event coincides with already high levels of tension and even military collisions between the non-nuclear forces of nuclear armed states, then a non-state nuclear terrorist attack could impel a nuclear armed state to escalate its threat or even military actions against other states, in the belief that this targeted state may have sponsored the non-state attack, or was simply the source of the attack, whatever the declared identity of the attacking non-state entity. This outcome could trigger these states to go onto one or more of the pathways to inadvertent nuclear war, especially if the terrorist attack was on a high value and high risk nuclear facility or involved the seizure and/or use of fissile material. Some experts dismiss this possibility as so remote as to be not worth worrying about. Yet the history of nuclear terrorism globally and in the Northeast Asian region suggests otherwise. Using the sand castle metaphor, once built on the high tide line, sand castles may withstand the wind but eventually succumb to the tide once it reaches the castle—at least once, usually twice a day. Also, theories of organizational and technological failure point to the coincidence of multiple, relatively insignificant driving events that interact or accumulate in ways that lead the “metasystem” to fail, even if each individual component of a system works perfectly. Thus, the potential catalytic effect of a nuclear terrorist incident is not that it would of itself lead to a sudden inter-state nuclear war; but that at a time of crisis when alert levels are already high, when control systems on nuclear forces have already shifted from primary emphasis on negative to positive control, when decision making is already stressed, when the potential for miscalculation is already high due to shows of force indicating that first-use is nigh, when rhetorical threats promising annihilation on the one hand, or collapse of morale and weakness on the other invite counter-vailing threats by nuclear adversaries or their allies to gain the upper hand in the “contest of resolve,” and when organizational cybernetics may be in play such that purposeful actions are implemented differently than intended, then a terrorist nuclear attack may shift a coincident combination of some or all of these factors to a threshold level where they collectively lead to a first-use decision by one or more nuclear-armed states. If the terrorist attack is timed or happens to coincide with high levels of inter-state tension involving nuclear-armed states, then some or all of these tendencies will likely be in play anyway—precisely the concern of those who posit pathways to inadvertent nuclear war as outlined in section 2 above. The critical question is, just as a catalyst breaks some bonds and lets other bonds form, reducing the energy cost and time taken to achieve a chemical reaction, how would a nuclear terrorist attack at time of nuclear charged inter-state tension potentially shift the way that nuclear threat is projected and perceived in a four or five-way nuclear-prone conflict, and how might it affect the potential pathways to inadvertent nuclear war in such a system? Such a pervasive incremental effect is shown in Figure 6 below. Any one or indeed all of these starting nuclear control profiles may be disputed, as might the control profile at the end of the response arrow. (In Figure 6, each nuclear state responds to a terrorist nuclear attack by loosening or abandoning negative controls against unauthorized use, and shifts towards reliance mostly on positive procedural controls biased towards use). But each nuclear armed state will make its moves in response to the posited terrorist nuclear attack partly in response to its expectations as to how other nuclear armed states will perceive and respond to these moves, as well as their perception that an enemy state may have sponsored a terrorist nuclear attack—and considered together, it is obvious that they may not share a common image of the other states' motivations and actions in this response, leading to cumulative potential for misinterpretation and rapid subsequent action, reaction, and escalation. It is also conceivable—although intuitively it would seem far less likely—that a terrorist nuclear attack at such a conjuncture of partly or fully mobilized nuclear armed states might induce one or more of them to stand down, slow down its decision making or deployments, establish new communication channels with potential nuclear enemy states, and even make common cause to hunt down and eliminate the non-state nuclear terrorist entity, or coordinate operations to respond to the threat of a second terrorist nuclear attack—the credibility of which would be high in the aftermath of a successful initial non-state nuclear attack. As Robert Ayson concluded: In considering the ways in which a terrorist nuclear attack could (wittingly or unwittingly) spark off a wider nuclear exchange government leaders are entitled to be just as worried about their own actions—how they would respond to a terrorist nuclear attack and how that response might get very catastrophically out of control—as about the terrorist act per se. If so, states

need to do more than consider the best ways to prevent terrorists from acquiring, deploying and then detonating a nuclear weapon. They also need to think about how they can control themselves in the event of a nuclear terrorist attack (even if some might suggest this risks handing the terrorist a premature and unnecessary victory by giving them indirect influence over the choices states make).[20]

than the bombs that leveled Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Even if a nuclear war did somehow remain limited and contained, recent studies suggest that environmental and atmospheric damage would cause a "decade of winter" and mass crop die-outs that could kill up to 1 billion people in a global famine.

## **NPT Solves Nuclear Terrorism**

### **NPT safeguards prevent nuclear terror now**

**Pilat 7** (Joseph F. Pilat, senior advisor in the National Security Office, Office of the Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory and a Global Fellow in International Security Studies at the Wilson Center in Washington, D.C. He holds a PhD in history from Georgetown University, 2007. "The End of the NPT Regime?" Royal Institute of International Affairs. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/4541753.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A9a97b547a4440e8c369e5934f352e801>)

Looking beyond the debates on US nuclear policy, as well as on US foreign and defence policies, in the context of today's threat landscape, and its implications for the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, **is the NPT worth saving?** Created in a different time to deal with different threats, the treaty is clearly showing its age. Yet, however serious its problems and the challenges it confronts, **the NPT has been the basis of international consensus; and it is likely to be with us as we think about dealing with today's and tomorrow's proliferation problems.** **With reforms,** the regime can provide the foundation for future non-proliferation efforts, including **the commitment to finding institutional means to enhance efforts to combat proliferation and to strengthen the proliferation resistance of civilian nuclear power programmes.** The value of the regime goes beyond combating proliferation. Directly or indirectly, it can play a growing, albeit limited, role in preventing nuclear terrorism. **It should not be surprising that efforts to control proliferation, including the NPT, can contribute to this end.** To the extent that **the NPT** works to prevent an increase in the number of states with nuclear weapons, it **decreases opportunities for the emergence of new nuclear weapon states with possibly inadequate security measures.** **The NPT also can play a positive role in preventing terrorism through controls on nuclear materials.** The NPT has provided a basis for **continuing efforts to control these materials**, and there are proposals from the United States, the IAEA and others to impose greater controls on sensitive fuel-cycle activities-specifically, enrichment and reprocessing. Moreover, as **NPT safeguards** involve state systems of accounting and control, safeguards can **provide a line of defence against nuclear theft, and could offer a degree of early warning of the loss of materials** that might be **used in** an improvised nuclear explosive or **radiological device.** In this fashion, **the NPT, if fully implemented,** can function as one of many lines of **defence against nuclear terrorism, by reducing access to-or the availability of -nuclear weapons and materials.** **This highlights the importance of compliance with the treaty,** including the need to **address clandestine procurement networks that can be exploited by terrorists.** Other elements of the regime and extra-regime activities are also addressing this problem, including IAEA programmes, CTR, PSI, GTRI, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, UN Security Council Resolution 1540, and amendments to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. It is clear that since 9/11 there has been considerable progress, through these and other efforts, in strengthening the security of nuclear and radiological materials and in expanding the norms and measures developed to combat proliferation into the counterterrorist realm. More needs to be done, however. **There is a need-on counterterrorism** as well as non-proliferation grounds-**to continue to strengthen the NPT** by such actions as promoting the universality of the Additional Protocol, tightening export controls, expanding and strengthening various threat reduction initiatives and addressing non-compliance more vigorously. **This should advance not only non-proliferation but also counterterrorism objectives.** In addition, states should support IAEA efforts to address nuclear terrorism, as well as promote the effective implementation and enforcement of Resolution 1540. Given the stakes involved, in addressing terrorism as well as proliferation, the states with an interest in the existing regime-particularly the United States- must recognize regime problems and manage them. **Safeguards, export controls and compliance enforcement will be critical. Efforts to strengthen the regime** along the lines of President Bush's initiatives, including those of February 2004, **will be critical** if the regime is to meet the challenges of the future. There are no 'silver bullets', however.

### **They can construct and deliver the bomb**

**Jabr and Wellerstein 18** (Ferris Jabr, contributing writer to The New York Times Magazine and Scientific American, MA in Journalism from NYU, Alex Wellerstein, historian of science at the Stevens Institute of Technology, PhD in the History of Science from Harvard. 6/11/18, "This

Is What a Nuclear Bomb Looks Like," New York Magazine,  
<http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2018/06/what-a-nuclear-attack-in-new-york-would-look-like.html>)

Once terrorists obtained the uranium, they would need only a small team of sympathetic engineers and physicists to build what is known as a gun-type nuclear bomb, like the one dropped on Hiroshima. A gun-type nuke uses traditional explosives to fire a slug of uranium through a tube directly into another chunk of uranium, fracturing huge numbers of atoms and unleashing a massive amount of energy. Compared to modern nuclear missiles, which are far more powerful and complex, constructing a crude gun-type nuke is fairly straightforward. In 2002, when Joe Biden was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he asked several nuclear laboratories whether a terrorist group could construct an off-the-shelf nuclear weapon. Several months later, they gave their answer: Without resorting to any illegal activities or drawing on classified information, and using only commercially available parts, they had built a nuclear bomb that was "bigger than a breadbox but smaller than a dump truck." To underscore the danger, Biden had them bring the device to the Senate. The last step in the process — smuggling the weapon into the United States — would be even easier. A ten-kiloton bomb, which would release as much energy as 10,000 tons of TNT, would be only seven feet long and weigh about 1,000 pounds. It would be simple to transport such a device to America aboard a container ship, just another unseen object in a giant metal box among millions of other metal boxes floating on the ocean. Even a moderate amount of shielding would be enough to hide its radioactive signature from most detectors at shipping hubs. Given all the naturally radioactive items that frequently trigger false alarms — bananas, ceramics, Brazil nuts, pet deodorizers — a terrorist group could even bury the bomb in bags of Fresh Step or Tidy Cats to fool inspectors if a security sensor was tripped. In 1946, a senator asked J. Robert Oppenheimer, the physicist who played a key role in the Manhattan Project, what instrument he would use to detect a nuclear bomb smuggled into the United States. Oppenheimer's answer: "A screwdriver." Amazingly, our detection systems have still not caught up to this threat: One would essentially have to open and visually inspect every single crate and container arriving on America's shores. Once the container ship reached a port like Newark, terrorists would have no trouble loading the concealed bomb into the back of an unassuming white van and driving it through the Lincoln Tunnel directly into Times Square.

## AT: No Fast Breakout

### **Dozens of states will quickly nuclearize**

**Burns and Coyle 15** (Philip E. Coyle III, the Senior Science Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, and a recognized expert on U.S. and worldwide military research, served as the Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs (NSIA) in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), served as a Senior Advisor to the President of the World Security Institute and to its Center for Defense Information, was Assistant Secretary of Defense and Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, in the Department of Defense, served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs in the Department of Energy (DOE), worked at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in Livermore, California for 33 years and was named Laboratory Associate Director Emeritus; Richard D. Burns, professor emeritus of history at California State University, Los Angeles, CA, 2015. "The Challenges of Nuclear Non-Proliferation." Chapter 8 Pages 175-177.

[https://books.google.com/books?id=KzELCAAAQBAJ&pg=PA175&lpg=PA175&dq=%22Reiss%22+AND+%22nuclear%22+AND+%22tipping+point%22+AND+%22epidemic%22&source=bl&ots=tJyqEypztg&sig=PNYvnYeoVCyn\\_930wRveQIWzQjo&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj3bTBnMneAhVdp0MKHwIAPAQ6AEwB3oECCEQAQ#v=onepage&q=%22Reiss%22%20AND%20%22nuclear%22%20AND%20%22tipping%20point%22%20AND%20%22epidemic%22&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=KzELCAAAQBAJ&pg=PA175&lpg=PA175&dq=%22Reiss%22+AND+%22nuclear%22+AND+%22tipping+point%22+AND+%22epidemic%22&source=bl&ots=tJyqEypztg&sig=PNYvnYeoVCyn_930wRveQIWzQjo&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj3bTBnMneAhVdp0MKHwIAPAQ6AEwB3oECCEQAQ#v=onepage&q=%22Reiss%22%20AND%20%22nuclear%22%20AND%20%22tipping%20point%22%20AND%20%22epidemic%22&f=false)

When the Cold War ended in 1990 and new regional threats arose, several of the nonnuclear weapon nations began reconsidering their earlier decisions to reject nuclear weapons. The potential for widespread nuclear proliferation certainly existed. In 2006, for example, Mohamed ElBaradei, then director general of the IAEA, estimated that as many as forty-nine nonnuclear weapons nations possessed the technical knowledge to make nuclear weapons and warned that global or regional tensions might persuade some to launch such programs. Unquestionably, what German physicist Werner Heisenberg warned in 1947 had come to pass: the making of atomic bombs was "no longer a problem of science in any country, but a problem of engineering." Mitchell Reiss amplified Heisenberg's warning by pointing out in *The Nuclear Tipping Point* that "the building blocks for a nuclear arsenal – the scientific and engineering expertise, precision machine tools, computer software, and nuclear design information – are more readily available than ever before." Reiss and his colleagues argued states that adopted a

"hedging strategy," which permits them to gradually acquire nuclear competence, posed the most serious threat to non-proliferation. A nuclear tipping point would occur, they claim, once several states make the political decision to acquire nuclear weapons and the means of delivery. This could create a proliferation epidemic. If technical and engineering capabilities abound, then what are the key factors that might activate a proliferation epidemic? There are at least two elements that singly or collectively could be significant: the collapse of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and a breakdown of regional or global stability. Certainly the emergence of new nuclear weapon states could further erode the effectiveness of the global NPT regime, but it is likely that the international community would work to eliminate or at least limit the extent of those new nuclear capabilities, as it has done with Iran and North Korea. Some observers argue that those who violate the NPT regime and obtain nuclear weapons should face severe consequences in order for the NPT to survive. No agreement on severe penalties has been forthcoming against those nations that acquired nuclear arsenals since China's 1964 emergence as the last of the NPT's original five nuclear weapon states, namely, Israel, India, Pakistan, South Africa, and North Korea. 17 In the post-Cold War era, tensions have arisen among regional opponents that have led, in some instances, to the creation of nuclear weapon.

I. This may be because relative conventional military strength emerged as an important factor in driving nuclear proliferation. According to Z�chariy Keck, a disparity in conventional military power in the past led some states to seek nuclear weapons and may well do so in the future. He points to France's early decision to go nuclear based on a fear of Germany's potential, Israel's sense of a continuing threat from its Arab neighbors, North Korea's concern with the growth of the South's overall strength, India's fear of China's growing dominance in East Asia, and of course Pakistan's worries with India's increase of power. Consequently, in South Asia both India and Pakistan have tested nuclear devices and delivery vehicles, creating a situation where a regional nuclear exchange would likely have global implications. North Asia also has become

a regional hot spot with North Korea's violation of its NPT pledges prompting the fear that Japan, traditionally an ardent supporter of the NPT regime and nuclear disarmament, might believe its security is so seriously threatened that it should resort to creating a nuclear arsenal. Two other states, South Korea and Taiwan, the latter fearful of China, have sought to develop nuclear weapons in the past, only to be persuaded to abandon their programs. If Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan became fearful of their security, they might choose to ignore the NPT and seek nuclear weapons. There is the potential of a nuclear arms race in North Asia; therefore, it falls to the

United States and China to take the lead to diminish such a threat. The Middle East is an area where tense relationships long have been the norm and where the prospect of additional nuclear weapon states greatly worries the international community. Israel's unacknowledged possession of a nuclear arsenal has created an unequal power balance in the region, and Iran may be considering the building of a nuclear counterbalance. The appearance of such a decision by Iran, although denied by Tehran, has created a multitude of problems not only for the region but also for the international community. In addition to a potential threat to its survival, Israel fears that a nuclear-armed Iranian missile armada might significantly limit the influence and operations of its superior conventional military forces. In addition to the Arab-Israeli element of the political-religious equation, the rise of an ultra orthodox Islamic activism, viewed as

supported by Tehran, threatens an already fragmented Arab community. The kingdom of **Saudi Arabia** that possesses a vast territory, large oil reserves, weak armed forces, and dangerous neighbors formally rejected nuclear weapons when it signed the NPT in 1988. The Saudi's quiet purchase of thirty to sixty Chinese Dongfeng-3 intermediate-range ballistic missiles during the mid-1980s created a brief diplomatic storm that ended with Saudi Arabia joining the non-proliferation treaty to placate its most powerful supporter—the United States. The aging, largely worthless Dongfeng-3s remain on Saudi territory without nuclear warheads, since Riyadh never sought their acquisition. In mid-2007, again without any public fanfare, Saudi officials reportedly purchased an unannounced number of Dongfeng-Z1 missiles from China after assurances to US Central Intelligence Agency officials that the missiles were not nuclear-ready. The Dongfeng-Z1 was viewed as more capable than the Dongfeng-3 for targeting Tehran and also could be launched on shorter notice; moreover, the James Martin Center's nuclear specialist Jeffrey Lewis has suggested such missiles could be altered to accommodate nuclear payloads.<sup>18</sup> Should Tehran abandon the recent negotiations to reduce the scope of its nuclear program to clearly peaceful civil

purposes and instead build a nuclear arsenal, **it could call into question the official Saudi policy of seeking a nuclear-free Middle East.** The fear of radical Islamic Iran with nuclear weapons might persuade Saudi officials to consider their own nuclear weapons option.

A widely held regional view has been that a Shia (Iranian) nuclear bomb would have to be matched by a Sunni (Saudi) one. **Egypt**, as noted above, initially **considered a full-scale nuclear program** but found it too costly. Early in the twenty-first century, Western observers feared that a nuclear-armed Iran might prompt Egypt to reconsider a similar weapons program; however, such a program seems unlikely, given Egypt's long-standing advocacy for nuclear non-proliferation **and** the NPT. **Syria has been considered a potential nuclear weapon state**; however, since it has been in the throes of a devastating, prolonged civil war, it is unlikely that officials in Damascus will soon be interested in **pursuing nuclear weapons**.



## AT: Prolif Good

We only have to be right once about rlf being bad

**Thakur 15** (Ramesh Thakur, Director of the Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament in the Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University. 2015. "Nuclear Weapons and International Security." Routledge)

The world faces two **existential threats**: climate change and **nuclear Armageddon**. Those who reject the first are derided as denialists; those dismissive of the second are praised as realists. Nuclear weapons may or may not have kept the peace among various groups of rival states; they could be **catastrophic** for the world if ever used by both sides in a war between nuclear-armed rivals, and the prospects for their use have **grown** since the end of the Cold War. Even a **limited regional** nuclear war in which India and Pakistan used 50 Hiroshima-size (15kt) bombs each could lead to a **famine that kills up to a billion people**.<sup>1</sup> Having learnt to live with nuclear weapons for 70 years (1945–2015), we have become desensitized to the gravity and immediacy of the threat. The **tyranny of complacency** could yet exact a **fearful price with nuclear Armageddon**. The nuclear peace has held so far owing as much to good **luck** as sound stewardship. Deterrence **stability** depends on **rational decision-makers** being always in office on all sides: a **dubious and not very reassuring precondition**. It depends equally critically on there being **no rogue launch, human error or system malfunction**: an impossibly high bar. For nuclear **peace** to hold, deterrence and fail-safe **mechanisms must work every single time**. For nuclear **Armageddon**, deterrence or fail-safe mechanisms **need to break down only once**. This is not a comforting equation. It also explains why, unlike most situations where risk can be mitigated after disaster strikes, with nuclear weapons all risks must be mitigated before any disaster.<sup>2</sup> As more states acquire nuclear **weapons**, the risks **multiply exponentially** with the requirements for **rationality in all decision-makers**; robust **command-and-control systems in all states**; **100 percent reliable fail-safe mechanisms** and **procedures** against accidental and unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons; and **totally unbreachable security** measures against terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons by being able to penetrate one or more of the growing nuclear facilities or access some of the wider spread of nuclear material and technology.

There is the added risk of **proliferation to extremist elements** through **leakage, theft, state collapse and state capture**. There are political costs and risks of creating a national security state with a premium on increased secretiveness and reduced public accountability.

## **Asian arms race leads to extinction**

**Adams 14** (Shar Adams, writer for Epoch Times, citing Professor Desmond Ball, a senior defense and security expert at the Australian National University, October 13, 2014. "Asian Cold War: Escalating Conflict in North-East Asia Bigger Threat Than War on Terror."  
<http://m.theepochtimes.com/n3/1014683-asian-cold-war-escalating-conflict-in-north-east-asia-bigger-threat-than-war-on-terror/>) AR

The world may be focused on the "war on terror", but **the arms build up in North-East Asia poses a far greater threat to global stability**, says Professor Desmond Ball, a senior defence and security expert at the Australian National University (ANU). A former head of ANU's Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, Professor Ball is no lightweight when it comes to security concerns. It is Professor Ball's **expertise in command and control systems**, particularly in relation to nuclear war, that **underlies his concerns** about North-East Asia. "**North-East Asia has now**

become the **most disturbing part of the globe**,” Prof Ball told Epoch Times in an exclusive interview. **China, Japan and South Korea** – countries that are “**economic engines of the global economy**” – are embroiled in an **arms race of unprecedented proportions**, punctuated by “very dangerous military activities”, he says. Unlike the arms race seen during the Cold War, however, **there are no mechanisms in place to constrain the military escalation in Asia**. “Indeed, the **escalation dynamic could move very rapidly and strongly to large scale conflict, including nuclear conflict**,” said Prof Ball. “**It is happening as we watch.**” Arms Race **Military spending** in Asia has grown steadily over the last decade. According to a 2013 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute report, China is now the world’s second largest military spender behind the United States, spending an estimated \$188 billion in 2013. Japan and South Korea are also among the world’s top 10 military spenders. When North Korea and Taiwan are included, **North-East Asian countries constitute around 85 per cent of military spending in Asia**. But what is more disturbing, Prof Ball says, is the motivation for the acquisitions. “**The primary reason** now for the acquisitions, whether they are air warfare destroyers, missiles or defense submarines, **is simply to match what the other [countries] are getting**,” he said. While he believes it is likely that Japan would have embarked on military modernisation, he says it is China’s military provocation of countries across Asia that is fuelling the build-up. Since **China lay claim to all of the South China Sea, it has escalated territorial disputes** with Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia. **What started with skirmishes between locals and Chinese fishing boats or navy vessels has now become territorial grabs** – island building on contested rocky outcrops. In a sign of things to come, the South China Morning Post reported in June: “China is looking to expand its biggest installation in the Spratly Islands into a fully formed artificial island, complete with airstrip and sea port, to better project its military strength in the South China Sea.” According to Filipino media, the artificial island falls within the Philippines’ 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone. Prof Ball says China’s behaviour in the South China Sea is provocative, but “in the scale of what we are talking about, that is nothing” compared with conflicts in North-East Asia, where **China and Japan are contesting claims over the Tokyo-controlled Senkaku Islands** (claimed as the Diaoyus by China). Of the Senkakus conflict, Prof Ball says: “**We are talking about actual footsteps towards nuclear war** – submarines and missiles.” Chinese and Japanese activity in the Senkakus region has escalated to the point where sometimes **there are “at least 40 aircraft jostling” over the contested area**, he said. Alarm bells were set off near the Senkakus in January last year when a Chinese military vessel trained its fire-control radar on a Japanese naval destroyer. The incident spurred the Japanese Defense Ministry to go public about that event and reveal another incident from a few days prior, when a Chinese frigate directed fire-control radar at a Japanese military helicopter. Fire-control radars are not like surveillance or early warning radars – they have one purpose and that is to lock onto a target in order to fire a missile. “Someone does that to us, we fire back,” Prof Ball said. Counter Measures Needed Prof Ball is recognised for encouraging openness and transparency, and for his advocacy of multilateral institutions. He has been called one of the region’s “most energetic and activist leaders in establishing forums for security dialogue and measures for building confidence”. In his experience visiting China over the years, however, Prof Ball says gaining open dialogue and transparency with Chinese military leaders is difficult. He recounted a private meeting with a Chinese admiral shortly after the fire-control radar incident. Prof Ball had seen direct evidence of the encounter – “tapes of the radar frequencies, the pulse rates and the pulse repetition frequencies” – and wanted to know what had happened on the Chinese side and why it took place. “In a private meeting, I asked the admiral why ... and he denied it to my face,” Prof Ball said. The Chinese admiral would not even concede that an incident had happened. “I don’t see the point of this sort of dialogue,” he added. **With so many players in the region and few barriers against conflict escalation, the North-East Asian nuclear arms race is now far more complex and dangerous than the Cold War**, he says. **In the Cold War, there were mechanisms at each level of potential confrontation, including a direct hotline** between the US and Soviet leaders. “**Once things get serious here, [there is] nothing to slow things down.** On the contrary, **you have all the incentives to go first,**” he said.

## AT: NPT Means Opaque Prolif

### **NPT verification checks opaque prolif and strengthens the regime**

**Horovitz 14**, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, Switzerland, 14 (Liviu, "Beyond Pessimism: Why the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Will Not Collapse," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* [https://www.academia.edu/7795260/Beyond\\_Pessimism\\_Why\\_the\\_NPT\\_Will\\_Not\\_Collapse\\_Journal\\_of\\_Strategic\\_Studies\\_2015\\_38\\_1-2\\_126-158](https://www.academia.edu/7795260/Beyond_Pessimism_Why_the_NPT_Will_Not_Collapse_Journal_of_Strategic_Studies_2015_38_1-2_126-158))

Third, prestige and domestic theories do not yield more pessimistic expectations. When the NPT was negotiated, perfect compliance seemed illusory. The verification regime was designed only to provide timely notification of a breach in order to give treaty members the opportunity to react. However, the limited expectations of the drafters have been widely surpassed. Thus, there is very little evidence that any additional proliferation would somehow cause the NPT's members to become disillusioned with the agreement, consider the treaty's reputation destroyed, its normative binding flawed, believe nuclear acquisition to be the 'appropriate behaviour', and start forswearing their membership. The domestic influence of NPT noncompliance also seems overrated. Interested bureaucracies might be able to use a neighbour's or foe's noncompliance or withdrawal to aid their case. However, the governance model proposed by recent would-be proliferators does not seem very appealing to either policy-makers or publics. Thus, it is no surprise that emulation of Iraq, Libya, or North Korea is very limited. To the contrary, the detection of further proliferation seems to help generate the consensus to strengthen the NPT regime's constraints: for example, it was the discovery of Iraq's clandestine programme that spawned the design of enhanced safeguards instruments.<sup>70</sup>

## AT: NPT Bad – Prolif

### Credible NPT curbs nuclear proliferation

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Many scholars have argued that **the NPT has restrained nuclear proliferation** (e.g., Nye, 1981; Sagan, 1996; Rublee, 2009; Dai, 2002; Coe and Vaynman, 2015). According to this view, numerous **countries that ultimately refrained from building the bomb would have been more likely to proliferate in the absence of an NPT commitment**. Why might this be the case? **The NPT** is thought to **reduce** the risk of nuclear proliferation **for several reasons**. A particularly common argument draws on broader ideas about how international institutions can facilitate international cooperation. Based on this perspective, **the NPT regime facilitates the exchange of information, reduces uncertainty about others' behavior, capabilities and intentions, and increases the costs of cheating, all of which should bring states into compliance** (e.g., Dai, 2002).<sup>3</sup> When states join the NPT, they pledge not to build or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. **Member-states must accept** fairly **stringent verification measures**, including allowing inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to visit their nuclear facilities and verify that materials have not been diverted for military purposes. According to institutionalist theory, **this deters NPT members from shirking** their commitments. In contrast, **countries that remain outside the NPT generally have greater confidence that they can keep weapons-related activities secret**. Once transgressions are detected, enforcement falls mostly to individual countries. **It is not uncommon for states invested in nonproliferation to seriously consider launching preventive strikes against states seeking to build the bomb.** In a handful of cases – most notably, Israel's attacks against Iraq (1981) and Syria (2007) – countries actually carried out "bolt from the blue" strikes against nuclear facilities (see Fuhrmann and Kreps, 2010). **States found to be in noncompliance with their NPT commitments could also face economic sanctions that lead to a loss in foreign investment** (Solingen, 2007). Material costs aside, **NPT violators might be labeled "irresponsible" actors by the international community, which would reduce their standing in the international system** (Rublee, 2009).<sup>4</sup> **Domestic politics might also aid the treaty's effectiveness.** International agreements can empower domestic actors who have a vested interest in compliance. **The NPT may enable operators of nuclear power plants to pressure leaders to remain in compliance so that a country's civilian nuclear program is not disrupted** (Sagan, 2011: 238). Domestic civil society actors can also mobilize and pressure the government to refrain from violating the NPT. In Japan, for instance, **NPT membership increased the efficacy of anti-nuclear NGOs domestically by granting them additional platforms and increased legitimacy** (Rublee, 2009: 79). Along similar lines, **treaty commitment strengthens the ability of transnational actors to pressure the government to improve its practices and impose costs on the government when it violates international norms** (e.g., Simmons, 2009; Linos, 2011). **In the NPT case, non-state actors often use conferences associated with the treaty as "focal points" to lobby governments and protest pro-nuclear policies** (Rublee, 2009: 38). **These international and domestic mechanisms together "lock in" a non-nuclear posture** after countries make an NPT commitment, according to NPT optimists. It is always possible, of course, for an NPT member to revisit its nuclear policy, but this option is often viewed as unattractive – even if new security threats arise. Australia, for instance, ratified the NPT in 1973. The following year, India conducted its first nuclear test, leaving some officials in Canberra feeling threatened. Rather than exploring the nuclear option in response to a threat – as it did prior to ratifying the NPT – Australia maintained the status quo, in **For a fuller discussion of how norms might contribute to nonproliferation, see Rublee (2009) and Tannenwald (2007).** part because ratifying the NPT increased the costs of a policy reversal. Thus, as Jim Walsh (1997: 13) argues in his history of Australia's nuclear program, "**ratification of the NPT marked a turning point, a decisive step away from nuclear weapons.**" This logic leads to the following hypothesis: NPT Optimist Hypothesis. Ratification of **the NPT reduces the likelihood of nuclear proliferation**.

## Prefer 30 years of causal data over punditry

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The extant literature does not provide a clear answer. While many studies have examined the correlation between NPT ratification and nuclear proliferation (e.g., Jo and Gartzke, 2007; Fuhrmann, 2012; Miller, 2014), these studies are not designed to reduce the strength of the assumptions needed to infer a causal connection. States "self-select" into the treaty, meaning that whether they enter the treaty depends partly on their treaty commitment preferences (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom, 1996; von Stein, 2005). Without accounting for this, scholars risk inferring a relationship between treaty commitment and compliance that is an artifact of underlying preferences. This study addresses this limitation. We analyze the relationship between NPT ratification and nuclear proliferation using a technique that estimates states' treaty commitment preferences and, based on these, states' ex ante probability of ratifying the NPT (Lupu, 2013b). Using these estimates allows us to make inferences about the effects of NPT while weakening the assumptions needed to do so. Yet, as with any other observational study, our inferences nonetheless require important assumptions. Our analysis of nuclear proliferation from 1970 to 2000 provides evidence that the NPT has played a key role in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons. Even after accounting for strategic selection into the treaty, NPT ratification is robustly associated with lower likelihoods of pursuing and obtaining nuclear weapons. We therefore provide evidence of a causal relationship between NPT membership and the spread of nuclear weapons, helping to resolve a long-standing debate about the effects of the NPT. While assumptions are always needed to infer a causal relationship, our research design allows us to weaken these assumptions significantly relative to existing studies. More generally, the findings speak to scholarly debates about whether (and how) security agreements affect international politics. Many scholars argue that international institutions do not have an independent effect on state behavior (e.g., Mearsheimer, 1994). Our study suggests that this view may be too pessimistic. To be sure, international cooperation on security issues can be difficult. Yet we provide new evidence that security-related treaties restrain states from pursuing policies they might otherwise prefer. Combined with insights from earlier studies (e.g., Leeds, 2003; Fortna, 2003), this suggests that international institutions may play a greater role in promoting peace than many scholars believe. Our findings are important not only for informing academic debates about international institutions, but also have important policy implications. Few issues are more consequential than the proliferation of nuclear weapons. U.S. President Barack Obama has called the threat of nuclear weapons "the greatest danger to the American people." It is therefore important to better understand how and why nuclear weapons spread and how the risk of proliferation can be reduced. Our results indicate that the NPT has been effective in reducing this risk and that the NPT is central to understanding nuclear proliferation dynamics. We hope our findings will contribute to policy debates regarding how to design, implement, and assess the effectiveness of other arms control agreements, including those covering small arms, chemical weapons, and biological weapons.

## The ban treaty will fill-in post-NPT – that increases prolif

**Carlson 18** (John Carlson, Director General, Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office. "The nuclear weapons ban treaty, one year on". October 4, 2018. <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/nuclear-weapons-ban-treaty-one-year-swap>)

The ban treaty proponents were looking for a quick outcome and decided against seeking an inclusive approach with the nuclear-armed countries, which would require a sustained effort over many years. Realistically, however, nuclear disarmament cannot be imposed. Nuclear weapons can be eliminated only with the agreement of the nuclear-armed countries. Regrettably the ban treaty has proven highly contentious. Not only are none of the nuclear-armed countries prepared to join, the treaty text has serious substantive problems, likely to damage rather than advance the goal of

disarmament. These include weak safeguards (**verification**) provisions, uncertain impact on existing treaties such as the NPT and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and uncertain implications for defence alliances. On safeguards, the ban treaty undermines the requirement, unanimously endorsed by NPT Review Conferences, for the highest safeguards standard – currently the International Atomic Energy Agency's "additional protocol" – to apply to all countries. The universal application of the highest safeguards standard is essential, because the nuclear-armed countries will not disarm if they believe new nuclear-armed states could emerge. **Paradoxically**, in a "nuclear-free" world the motivation for a country to pursue nuclear weapons could be even greater, hence the need for stronger, not weaker, safeguards.

## leaders, misperceptions, and counter-forcing make prolif destabilizing and dangerous

**Barash 18** (David Barash, Professor of Psychology at the University of Washington, author or editor of over 40 books, citing a body of area and field-study experts, The Guardian, June 14, 2018. "Nuclear deterrence is a myth. And a lethal one at that," <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/14/nuclear-deterrence-myth-lethal-david-barash>)

In his classic The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (1989), Lawrence Freedman, the dean of British military historians and strategists, concluded: 'The Emperor Deterrence may have no clothes, but he is still Emperor.' Despite his nakedness, this emperor continues to strut about, receiving deference he doesn't deserve, while endangering the entire world. Nuclear deterrence is an idea that became a potentially lethal ideology, one that remains influential despite having been increasingly discredited. After the United States' nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, war changed. Until then, the overriding purpose of military forces had ostensibly been to win wars. But according to the influential US strategist Bernard Brodie writing in 1978: 'From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose.' Thus, nuclear deterrence was born, a seemingly rational arrangement by which peace and stability were to arise by the threat of mutually assured destruction (MAD, appropriately enough). Winston Churchill described it in 1955 with characteristic vigour: 'Safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation.' Importantly, deterrence became not only a purported strategy, but the very grounds on which governments justified nuclear weapons themselves. Every government that now possesses nuclear weapons claims that they deter attacks by their threat of catastrophic retaliation. Even a brief examination, however, reveals that deterrence is not remotely as compelling a principle as its reputation suggests. In his novel The Ambassadors (1903), Henry James described a certain beauty as 'a jewel brilliant and hard', at once twinkling and trembling, adding that 'what seemed all surface one moment seemed all depth the next'. The public has been bamboozled by the shiny surface appearance of deterrence, with its promise of strength, security and safety. But what has been touted as profound strategic depth crumbles with surprising ease when subjected to critical scrutiny. Let's start by considering the core of deterrence theory: that it has worked. Advocates of nuclear deterrence insist that we should thank it for the fact that a third world war has been avoided, even when tensions between the two superpowers – the US and the USSR – ran high. Some supporters even maintain that deterrence set the stage for the fall of the Soviet Union and the defeat of Communism. In this telling, the West's nuclear deterrent prevented the USSR from invading western Europe, and delivered the world from the threat of Communist tyranny. There are, however, compelling arguments suggesting that the US and the former Soviet Union avoided world war for several possible reasons, most notably because neither side wanted to go to war. Indeed, the US and Russia never fought a war prior to the nuclear age. Singling out nuclear weapons as the reason why the Cold War never became hot is somewhat like saying that a junkyard car, without an engine or wheels, never sped off the lot only because no one turned the key. Logically speaking, there is no way to demonstrate that nuclear weapons kept the peace during the

Cold War, or that they do so now. Perhaps peace prevailed between the two superpowers simply because they had no quarrel that justified fighting a terribly destructive war, even a conventional one. There is no evidence, for example, that the Soviet leadership ever contemplated trying to conquer western Europe, much less that it was restrained by the West's nuclear arsenal. Post facto arguments – especially negative ones – might be the currency of pundits, but are impossible to prove, and offer no solid ground for evaluating a counterfactual claim, conjecturing why something has not happened. In colloquial terms, if a dog does not bark in the night, can we say with certainty that no one walked by the house? Deterrence enthusiasts are like the woman who sprayed perfume on her lawn every morning. When a perplexed neighbour asked about this strange behaviour, she replied: 'I do it to keep the elephants away.' The neighbour protested: 'But there aren't any elephants within 10,000 miles of here,' whereupon the perfume-sprayer replied: 'You see, it works!' We should not congratulate our leaders, or deterrence theory, much less nuclear weapons, for keeping the peace. What we can say is that, as of this morning, those with the power to exterminate life have not done so. But this is not altogether comforting, and history is no more reassuring. The duration of 'nuclear peace', from the Second World War to the end of the Cold War, lasted less than five decades. More than 20 years separated the First and Second World Wars; before that, there had been more than 40 years of relative peace between the end of the Franco-Prussian War (1871) and the First World War (1914), and 55 years between the Franco-Prussian War and Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo (1815). Even in war-prone Europe, decades of peace have not been so rare. Each time, when peace ended and the next war began, the war involved weapons available at the time – which, for the next big one, would likely include nuclear weapons. The only way to make sure that nuclear weapons are not used is to make sure that there are no such weapons. There is certainly no reason to think that the presence of nuclear weapons will prevent their use. The first step to ensuring that humans do not unleash nuclear [winter] holocaust might be to show that the Emperor Deterrence has no clothes – which would then open the possibility of replacing the illusion with something more suitable. It is possible that the post-1945 US-Soviet peace came 'through strength', but that need not imply nuclear deterrence. It is also undeniable that the presence of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert capable of reaching each other's homeland in minutes has made both sides edgy. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 – when, by all accounts, the world came closer to nuclear war than at any other time – is not testimony to the effectiveness of deterrence: the crisis occurred because of nuclear weapons. It is more likely that we have been spared nuclear war not because of deterrence but in spite of it. Even when possessed by just one side, nuclear weapons have not deterred other forms of war. The Chinese, Cuban, Iranian and Nicaraguan revolutions all took place even though a nuclear-armed US backed the overthrown governments. Similarly, the US lost the Vietnam War, just as the Soviet Union lost in Afghanistan, despite both countries not only possessing nuclear weapons, but also more and better conventional arms than their adversaries. Nor did nuclear weapons aid Russia in its unsuccessful war against Chechen rebels in 1994-96, or in 1999-2000, when Russia's conventional weapons devastated the suffering Chechen Republic. Nuclear weapons did not help the US achieve its goals in Iraq or Afghanistan, which have become expensive catastrophic failures for the country with the world's most advanced nuclear weapons. Moreover, despite its nuclear arsenal, the US remains fearful of domestic terrorist attacks, which are more likely to be made with nuclear weapons than be deterred by them. In short, it is not legitimate to argue that nuclear weapons have deterred any sort of war, or that they will do so in the future. During the Cold War, each side engaged in conventional warfare: the Soviets, for example, in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan (1979-89); the Russians in Chechnya (1994-96; 1999-2009), Georgia (2008), Ukraine (2014-present), as well as Syria (2015-present); and the US in Korea (1950-53), Vietnam (1955-75), Lebanon (1982), Grenada (1983), Panama (1989-90), the Persian Gulf (1990-91), the former Yugoslavia (1991-99), Afghanistan (2001-present), and Iraq (2003-present), to mention just a few cases. Nor have their

weapons deterred attacks upon nuclear armed states by non-nuclear opponents. In 1950, China stood 14 years from developing and deploying its own nuclear weapons, whereas the US had a well-developed atomic arsenal. Nonetheless, as the Korean War's tide was shifting dramatically against the North, that US nuclear arsenal did not inhibit China from sending more than 300,000 soldiers across the Yalu River, resulting in the stalemate on the Korean peninsula that divides it to this day, and has resulted in one of the world's most dangerous unresolved stand-offs. In 1956, the nuclear-armed United Kingdom warned non-nuclear Egypt to refrain from nationalising the Suez Canal. To no avail: the UK, France and Israel ended up invading Sinai with conventional forces. In 1982, Argentina attacked the British-held Falkland Islands, even though the UK had nuclear weapons and Argentina did not. Following the US-led invasion in 1991, conventionally armed Iraq was not deterred from lobbing Scud missiles at nuclear-armed Israel, which did not retaliate, although it could have used its nuclear weapons to vaporise Baghdad. It is hard to imagine how doing so would have benefitted anyone. Obviously, us nuclear weapons did not deter the terrorist attacks on the US of 11 September 2001, just as the nuclear arsenals of the UK and France have not prevented repeated terrorist attacks on those countries. Deterrence, in short, does not deter. The pattern is deep and geographically widespread. Nuclear-armed France couldn't prevail over the non-nuclear Algerian National Liberation Front. The us nuclear arsenal didn't inhibit North Korea from seizing a us intelligence-gathering vessel, the USS Pueblo, in 1968. Even today, this boat remains in North Korean hands. US nukes didn't enable China to get Vietnam to end its invasion of Cambodia in 1979. Nor did us nuclear weapons stop Iranian Revolutionary Guards from capturing US diplomats and holding them hostage (1979-81), just as fear of us nuclear weapons didn't empower the US and its allies to force Iraq to retreat from Kuwait without a fight in 1990. In Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy (2017), the political scientists Todd Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann examined 348 territorial disputes occurring between 1919 and 1995. They used statistical analysis to see whether nuclear-armed states were more successful than conventional countries in coercing their adversaries during territorial disputes. They weren't. Not only that, but nuclear weapons didn't embolden those who own them to escalate demands; if anything, such countries were somewhat less successful in getting their way. In some cases, the analysis is almost comical. Thus, among the very few cases in which threats from a nuclear-armed country were coded as having compelled an opponent was the US insistence, in 1961, that the Dominican Republic hold democratic elections following the assassination of the dictator Rafael Trujillo, as well as the US demand, in 1994, following a Haitian military coup, that the Haitian colonels restore Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power. In 1974-75, nuclear China forced non-nuclear Portugal to surrender its claim to Macau. These examples were included because the authors honestly sought to consider all cases in which a nuclear-armed country got its way vis-à-vis a non-nuclear one. But no serious observer would attribute the capitulation of Portugal or the Dominican Republic to the nuclear weapons of China or the US. All of this also suggests that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran or North Korea is unlikely to enable these countries to coerce others, whether their 'targets' are armed with nuclear or conventional weapons. It is one thing to conclude that nuclear deterrence hasn't necessarily deterred, and hasn't provided coercive power – but its extraordinary risks are even more discrediting. First, deterrence via nuclear weapons lacks credibility. A police officer armed with a backpack nuclear weapon would be unlikely to deter a robber: 'Stop in the name of the law, or I'll blow us all up!' Similarly, during the Cold War, NATO generals lamented that towns in West Germany were less than two kilotons apart – which meant that defending Europe with nuclear weapons would destroy it, and so the claim that the Red Army would be deterred by nuclear means was literally incredible. The result was the elaboration of smaller,

**more accurate tactical weapons** that would be more usable and, thus, **whose employment in a crisis** would be more credible. But deployed weapons that **are more usable**, and thus **more credible as deterrents**, are more liable to be used. Second, **deterrence requires** that **each side's arsenal remains invulnerable** to attack, or at least that such an attack would be prevented insofar as a potential victim **retained a 'second-strike' retaliatory capability**, sufficient to prevent such an **attack in the first place**. Over time, however, **nuclear missiles have become increasingly accurate**, raising concerns about the **vulnerability** of these weapons to a 'counterforce' strike. In brief, **nuclear states are increasingly able to target their adversary's nuclear weapons for destruction**. In the **perverse argot** of deterrence theory, this is called **counterforce vulnerability**, with 'vulnerability' referring to the target's nuclear weapons, not its population. The **clearest outcome** of increasingly accurate nuclear weapons and the 'counterforce vulnerability' component of deterrence theory **is to increase the likelihood of a first strike**, while also **increasing the danger** that a potential victim, fearing such an event, **might be tempted to pre-empt with its own first strike**. The resulting situation – in which **each side perceives** a possible **advantage** in striking first – is **dangerously unstable**. Third, **deterrence theory assumes optimal rationality** on the part of decision-makers. It presumes that those with their fingers on the **nuclear triggers** are **rational actors** who will also **remain calm** and cognitively unimpaired under extremely stressful conditions. It also **presumes** that **leaders will always retain control** over their forces and that, moreover, they will always retain control over their emotions as well, **making decisions based solely on a cool calculation** of strategic costs and benefits. Deterrence theory maintains, in short, that **each side will scare the pants off the other with the prospect of the most hideous, unimaginable consequences**, and will **then conduct itself with the utmost deliberate and precise rationality**. Virtually **everything known about human psychology suggests** that **this is absurd**. In Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Journey Through Yugoslavia (1941), Rebecca West noted that: 'Only part of us is sane: only part of us loves pleasure and the longer day of happiness, wants to live to our 90s and die in peace ...' **It requires no arcane wisdom to know** that **people** often **act out of misperceptions**, anger, despair, insanity, stubbornness, revenge, pride and/or dogmatic conviction. Moreover, **in certain situations – as when either side is convinced that war is inevitable**, or when the pressures to avoid losing face are **especially intense** – an irrational act, including a **lethal one**, can appear appropriate, even **unavoidable**. When he ordered the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese defence minister observed that: 'Sometimes it is necessary to close one's eyes and jump off the platform of the Kiyomizu Temple [a renowned suicide spot].' During the First World War, Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany wrote in the margin of a government document that: 'Even if we are destroyed, England at least will lose India.' While in his bunker, during the final days of the Second World War, Adolf Hitler ordered what he hoped would be the total destruction of Germany, because he felt that Germans had 'failed' him. **Consider**, as well, a US president who shows signs of mental illness, and whose statements and tweets are **frighteningly consistent** with dementia or genuine **psychosis**. National leaders – nuclear-armed or not – aren't immune to mental illness. Yet, deterrence theory **presumes otherwise**. Finally, **there is just no way for** civilian or **military leaders to know** when their country has **accumulated enough nuclear firepower** to satisfy the requirement of having an 'effective deterrent'. For example, **if one side is willing to be annihilated** in a counterattack, **it simply cannot be deterred**, no matter the threatened retaliation. Alternatively **if one side is convinced of the other's implacable hostility**, or of its presumed indifference to loss of life, **no amount of weaponry can suffice**. Not only that, but **so long as accumulating weapons makes money** for defence contractors, **and so long as** designing, producing and deploying **new 'generations'** of nuclear stuff advances careers, the **truth about deterrence theory will remain obscured**. Even the sky is not the limit; militarists want to put weapons in outer space. Insofar as nuclear weapons also serve symbolic, psychological needs, **by demonstrating the technological**

**accomplishments** of a nation **and** thus **conveying legitimacy to** otherwise **insecure leaders and countries**, then, once again, **there is no rational way** to establish the minimum (or cap the maximum) **size of one's arsenal**. At some point, **additional detonations** nonetheless **come up against the law of diminishing returns**, or as Winston Churchill pointed out, they simply 'make the rubble bounce'. In addition, ethical deterrence is an oxymoron. Theologians know that a nuclear war could never meet so-called 'just war' criteria. In 1966, the Second Vatican Council concluded: 'Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along with their populations is a crime against God and man itself. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation.' And in a pastoral letter in 1983, the US Catholic bishops added: 'This condemnation, in our judgment, applies even to the retaliatory use of weapons striking enemy cities after our own have already been struck.' They continued that, if something is immoral to do, then it is also immoral to threaten. In a message to the 2014 Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, Pope Francis declared that: '**Nuclear deterrence and the threat of mutually assured destruction cannot be the basis of** an ethics of fraternity and **peaceful coexistence** among peoples and states.' The United Methodist Council of Bishops go further than their Catholic counterparts, concluding in 1986 that: 'Deterrence must no longer receive the churches' blessing, even as a temporary warrant for the maintenance of nuclear weapons.' In *The Just War* (1968), the Protestant ethicist Paul Ramsey asked his readers to imagine that traffic accidents in a particular city had suddenly been reduced to zero, after which it was found that everyone had been required to strap a newborn infant to the bumper of every car. Perhaps **the most frightening thing about nuclear deterrence is its many paths to failure**. Contrary to what is widely assumed, the **least likely** is a '**bolt out of the blue**' (BOOB) attack. Meanwhile, **there are substantial risks** associated **with escalated conventional war, accidental or unauthorised use, irrational use** (although it can be argued that any use of nuclear weapons would be irrational) **or false alarms, which have happened with frightening regularity**, and could **lead to 'retaliation' against an attack that hadn't happened**. There have also **been numerous 'broken arrow' accidents** – accidental launching, firing, theft or loss of a nuclear weapon – as well as circumstances in which such **events as a flock of geese, a ruptured gas pipeline or faulty computer codes** have been interpreted as a **hostile missile launch**. The above describes only some of the **inadequacies and outright dangers** posed by deterrence, the **doctrinal fulcrum** that **manipulates nuclear hardware, software, deployments, accumulation and escalation**. **Undoing the ideology** – verging on theology – of deterrence **won't be easy, but neither is living under the threat of worldwide annihilation**. As the poet T S Eliot once wrote, unless you are in over your head, how do you know how tall you are? And when it comes to nuclear deterrence, we're all in over our heads.

## AT: Schlosser “NPT Bad”

**The NPT solves prolif – Coe and Veyman say it allows superpower monitoring and enforcement while creating an international norm against proliferation – their evidence goes neg because the programs Iran, Iraq, Libya started were stopped BECAUSE of the NPT**

**Horovitz 14**, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, Switzerland, 14 (Liviu, “Beyond Pessimism: Why the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Will Not Collapse,” *The Journal of Strategic Studies* [https://www.academia.edu/7795260/Beyond\\_Pessimism\\_Why\\_the\\_NPT\\_Will\\_Not\\_Collapse\\_Journal\\_of\\_Strategic\\_Studies\\_2015\\_3\\_8\\_1-2\\_126-158](https://www.academia.edu/7795260/Beyond_Pessimism_Why_the_NPT_Will_Not_Collapse_Journal_of_Strategic_Studies_2015_3_8_1-2_126-158))

Third, prestige and domestic theories do not yield more pessimistic expectations. When the NPT was negotiated, perfect compliance seemed illusory. The verification regime was designed only to provide timely notification of a breach in order to give treaty members the opportunity to react. However, the limited expectations of the drafters have been widely surpassed. Thus, there is very little evidence that any additional proliferation would somehow cause the NPT’s members to become disillusioned with the agreement, consider the treaty’s reputation destroyed, its normative binding flawed, believe nuclear acquisition to be the ‘appropriate behaviour’, and start forswearing their membership. The domestic influence of NPT noncompliance also seems overrated. Interested bureaucracies might be able to use a neighbour’s or foe’s noncompliance or withdrawal to aid their case. However, the governance model proposed by recent would-be proliferators does not seem very appealing to either policy-makers or publics. Thus, it is no surprise that emulation of Iraq, Libya, or North Korea is very limited. To the contrary, the detection of further proliferation seems to help generate the consensus to strengthen the NPT regime’s constraints: for example, it was the discovery of Iraq’s clandestine programme that spawned the design of enhanced safeguards instruments. 70

**Moreover, the Schlosser card also says that NPT reforms can solve**

**Schlosser 18** (Eric, Journalist, author of *Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons*, M.A. in British Imperial History @ Oxford, “Ban the bomb: How the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons helped prevent annihilation,” 6-8-18, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-ban-the-bomb-how-the-treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear/>)

One of the compromises that made the NPT possible now threatens to make it irrelevant. Article IV of the treaty guarantees its signatories “the inalienable right” to obtain nuclear technology for peaceful uses. Without strict monitoring and enforcement, however, the possession of civilian nuclear-power facilities can enable the development of military nuclear technology. Weapons-grade uranium and plutonium can be made at enrichment and reprocessing plants ostensibly built to make fuel for nuclear reactors. India developed its atomic bomb with civilian nuclear technology obtained from Canada and the United States; Israel got its bomb with civilian technology from France. Despite having signed the NPT, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Syria secretly launched nuclear-weapon programs under the guise of seeking the peaceful use of nuclear energy.¶ Today, all three pillars of the NPT are in grave jeopardy. Instead of disarming, the five nuclear states recognized by the treaty are modernizing their arsenals. The renewed arms race between the United States and Russia is especially dangerous. Thanks to the “inalienable right” to civilian nuclear power, perhaps 20 to 30 NPT signatories have the latent ability to develop nuclear weapons. Japan has stockpiled about 10 tonnes of plutonium, enough to produce thousands of nuclear warheads, and could probably manufacture some within a year. The nuclear threat posed by North Korea may encourage South Korea, as well as Japan, to become a nuclear weapon state. Last year, an opinion poll found that about 60 per cent of South Koreans would like their country to have its own nuclear weapons. Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Washington, thinks that the Middle East now stands on the brink of a volatile and chaotic nuclear arms race. “If Iran resumes its nuclear weapons program,” Mr. Sokolski recently wrote in Foreign Policy, “the Saudis will certainly pursue their own – and Algeria, Egypt and Turkey might well follow.” Given the large petroleum and natural-gas supplies in Saudi Arabia, as well as the ample sunlight available there for solar power, the current Saudi proposal to spend more than \$80-billion on nuclear technology suggests that future energy needs aren’t the sole reason for the investment.¶ To ensure that a treaty written to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons isn’t transformed into one that facilitates their spread, a number of important steps can still be taken. The United States and Russia possess about 90 per cent of the world’s nuclear weapons, and those two countries must be pressured to reduce the size of their arsenals and minimize the risk of nuclear war. Frustrated with the slow pace of disarmament by the NPT’s five nuclear states, a few years ago the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) began to seek a treaty to ban nuclear weapons. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was adopted by the United Nations last year, and ICAN was subsequently awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Ray Acheson, a Canadian who serves on ICAN’s steering committee, supports the goal of non-proliferation but strongly defends the group’s strategy of focusing their criticism on the NPT’s five nuclear states. “The nuclear weapons that already exist are more dangerous,” she says, “than the ones that don’t.”¶ As for the other NPT signatories,

Scott Sagan, a nuclear-weapon expert who's a professor of political science at Stanford University, thinks that an "unalienable right" to the peaceful use of nuclear energy doesn't mean the right to hedge your bets and develop a latent nuclear-weapon capability. The NPT allows a country to leave the treaty simply by giving 90 days notice. Prof. Sagan argues that violating **the treaty should lead to much stronger punishments by the United Nations and that leaving the treaty should be made more difficult.** Contracts for the sale of civilian nuclear facilities and technology should have a "return to sender" clause – a requirement that any country that leaves the NPT must return all the nuclear equipment it bought.<sup>¶</sup> The issue of nuclear proliferation is hardly inconsequential for Canada. Although Canada has never formally been a nuclear weapon state, its deployment of American weapons during the Cold War was precisely the sort of arrangement that inspired Ireland to seek a non-proliferation treaty. Between 1963 and 1984, hundreds of American nuclear weapons were assigned to Canadian forces. Two squadrons of BOMARC anti-aircraft missiles, carrying a total of 56 warheads, were based at North Bay, Ont., and La Macaza, Que. About 100 Genie anti-aircraft rockets with nuclear warheads were stationed at Royal Canadian Air Force bases, and Canadian fighter planes assigned to NATO carried low-yield Mark 28 hydrogen bombs. The weapons were technically in the custody of the United States, but Canadian officers were granted the authority to turn one of the two keys that launched the BOMARC missiles – and sole control over firing the Genies and dropping the Mark 28s. A Soviet bomber attack on the United States would have prompted nuclear warfare in the skies over Canada, as BOMARCS and Genies sought their targets. And the three nuclear-weapon systems operated by Canadian forces had serious safety defects that could have caused accidental nuclear detonations. Canada, like the United States, was fortunate to survive the Cold War without nuclear devastation. The effects of nuclear blasts, the electromagnetic pulses and deadly fallout, show little regard for national borders. Even if you don't have nuclear weapons, having a neighbour who does can pose a considerable threat.<sup>¶</sup> Some academics have argued that nuclear proliferation might make the world safer, suggesting that countries with nuclear weapons are less likely to fight one another. That argument makes about as much sense as the contention that having more guns will reduce the number of people killed by gunfire. A single switch prevented the accidental detonation of an American hydrogen bomb in North Carolina during January 1961. The following year the vote of a single officer on a Soviet submarine prevented the launch of a nuclear torpedo that would have turned the Cuban Missile Crisis into a thermonuclear war. The number of close calls during the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union is terrifying. Multiply that number by multiple arms races and, short of divine intervention, you have a recipe for disaster.<sup>¶</sup> Mr. Trump has an extraordinary opportunity in Singapore to reassert the principles guiding the NPT. If North Korea can be persuaded to give up its nuclear weapons, it will be a tremendous victory for the cause of non-proliferation. But lasting success will never be attained by the kind of unilateral American action that has started a trade war with longstanding allies, pulled out of the Iran deal and withdrawn from the Paris agreement on climate change. "I alone can fix it," Mr. Trump declared two summers ago at the Republican National Convention. Applied to nuclear weapons, that belief is delusional and potentially catastrophic. International co-operation, through mechanisms like the NPT, offers the only real hope of survival. Robert Oppenheimer recognized that fact in his farewell speech to the Los Alamos scientists, at the dawn of the nuclear age. He told them: "I think it

is true to say that atomic weapons are a peril which affect everyone in the world, and in that sense a completely common problem."

## Independently, boosting US NPT cred with non-nuclear states is key to stronger IAEA safeguards

**Gibbons 18** (Rebecca Davis Gibbons, research fellow at the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center, previously was a visiting assistant professor of government at Bowdoin College, December 11, 2018. "Our deep divide over nuclear disarmament." <https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/420446-our-deep-divide-over-nuclear-disarmament>)

**Today the nuclear nonproliferation regime** that has served U.S. interests for 50 years **is at real risk of faltering**, as the United States and Russia are not pursuing additional disarmament and do little to maintain the existing arms control architecture. **The regime has allowed the United States to promote nonproliferation in a way that is more legitimate and less costly than alternatives, including inducements, sanctions and even war.** While it is unlikely that **non-nuclear states** will start exiting the NPT soon, they **will be more likely to see it as a failed bargain** and will be less interested in cooperating with U.S. nonproliferation goals, such as **strengthening the withdrawal clause of the NPT or promoting universal adoption of stronger IAEA safeguards**. The nuclear nonproliferation treaty [NPT] is **unlikely to be a useful mechanism** for promoting nuclear nonproliferation in perpetuity if the majority of its membership **no longer buys the basic bargain**: that those without nuclear weapons will not acquire them, those with nuclear weapons will take efforts to get rid of them.

## IAEA safeguards are key to prevent accidental nuclear meltdowns

**Shultz et al 12** (George, former U.S. Secretary of State and PhD in industrial economics, and Sidney Drell – PhD in physics, arms control specialist and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and a professor of theoretical physics emeritus at Stanford's SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory, Steven P. Andreasen -- lecturer at the Humphrey School of Public

Affairs at the University of Minnesota, "Reducing the Global Nuclear Risk" October 2, 2012, Policy Review, No. 175, Hoover Institution, <http://www.hoover.org/research/reducing-global-nuclear-risk>)

In the 26 years since the meltdown of the nuclear reactor at Chernobyl in Soviet-era Ukraine, the nuclear power industry has strengthened its safety practices. Over the past decade, growing concerns about global warming and energy independence have actually strengthened support for nuclear energy in the United States and many nations around the world. Yet despite these trends, the civil nuclear enterprise remains fragile. Following Fukushima, opinion polls gave stark evidence of the public's deep fears of the invisible force of nuclear radiation, shown by public opposition to the construction of new nuclear power plants in close proximity. It is not simply a matter of getting better information to the public but of actually educating the public about the true nature of nuclear radiation and its risks. Of course, **the immediate task of the nuclear power component of the enterprise is to strive for the best possible safety record. The overriding objective could not be more clear: no more Fukushimas.** Another issue that must be resolved involves the **continued effectiveness** of a policy of deterrence that remains primarily dependent on nuclear weapons, **and the hazards these weapons pose due to the spread of nuclear technology and material.** There is growing apprehension about the **determination of terrorists** to get their hands on weapons or, for that matter, on the special **nuclear material** — plutonium and highly enriched uranium — that fuels them in the **most challenging step** toward developing a weapon. The **global effects** of a regional war between nuclear-armed adversaries such as India and Pakistan **would also yield an enormous impact**, potentially involving radioactive fallout at large distances caused by a limited number of nuclear explosions. This is true as well for **nuclear radiation from a reactor explosion — fallout at large distances would have a serious societal impact** on the nuclear enterprise. **There is little understanding of the reality and potential danger of consequences if such an event were to occur halfway around the world.**

An effort should be made to prepare the public by providing information on how to respond to such an event. An active nuclear diplomacy has grown out of the Cold War efforts to regulate testing and reduce superpower nuclear arsenals. There is now a welcome focus on rolling back nuclear weapons proliferation. Additional important measures include the Nunn-Lugar program, started in 1991 to reduce the nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union. Such initiatives have led to greater investment by the United States and other governments in better security for nuclear weapons and material globally, including billions of dollars through the g8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. The commitment to improving security of all dangerous nuclear material on the globe within four years was made by 47 world leaders who met with President Obama in Washington, D.C., in April 2010; this commitment was reconfirmed in March 2012 at the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, South Korea. Many specific commitments made in 2010 relating to the removal of nuclear materials and conversion of nuclear research reactors from highly enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium fuel have already been accomplished, along with increasing levels of voluntary commitments from a diverse set of states, improving prospects for achieving the four-year goal. Three principles it is evident that globally, the nuclear enterprise faces new and increasingly difficult challenges. Successful leadership in national security policy will require a continuous, diligent, and multilateral assessment of these newly emerging risks and consequences. In view of the seriousness of the potentially deadly consequences associated with nuclear weapons and nuclear power, we emphasize the importance of three guiding principles for efforts to reduce those risks globally: First, the calculations used to assess nuclear risks in both the military and the civil sectors are fallible. Accurately analyzing events where we have little data, identifying every variable associated with risk, and the possibility of a single variable that goes dangerously wrong are all factors that complicate risk calculations. Governments, industry, and concerned citizens must constantly reexamine the assumptions on which safety and security measures, emergency preparations, and nuclear energy production are based. When dealing with very low-probability and high-consequence operations, we typically have little data as a basis for making quantitative analyses. It is therefore difficult to assess the risk of a nuclear accident and what would contribute to it, and to identify effective steps to reduce that risk. It's important to remember that the calculations used to assess nuclear risks in the military and civil sectors are fallible. In this context, it is possible that a single variable could exceed expectations, go dangerously wrong, and simply overwhelm safety systems and the risk assessments on which those systems were built. This is what happened in 2011 when an earthquake, followed by a tsunami — both of which exceeded expectations based on history — overwhelmed the Fukushima complex, breaching a number of safeguards that had been built into the plant and triggering reactor core meltdowns and radiation leaks. This in turn exposed the human factor, which is hard to assess and can dramatically change the risk equation. Cultural habits and regulatory inadequacy inhibited rapid decision-making and crisis management in the Fukushima disaster. A more nefarious example of the human factor would be a determined nuclear terrorist attack specifically targeting either the military or civilian component of the nuclear enterprise. Second, risks associated with nuclear weapons

and nuclear power will likely grow substantially as nuclear weapons and civilian nuclear energy production technology spread in unstable regions of the world where the potential for conflict is high. **States that are new to the nuclear enterprise may not have effective nuclear safeguards to secure nuclear weapons and materials** — including a developed fabric of early warning systems and nuclear confidence-building measures that could increase warning and decision time for leaders in a crisis — or the capability to safely manage and regulate the construction and operation of new civilian reactors. **Hence there is a growing risk of accidents,** mistakes, **or miscalculations involving nuclear weapons, and of regional wars or nuclear terrorism.** **The consequences would be horrific:** A Hiroshima-size nuclear bomb detonated in a major city could kill a half-million people and result in \$1 trillion in direct economic damage. On the civil side of the nuclear ledger, the sobering paradox is this: While an accident would be considerably less devastating than the detonation of a nuclear weapon, **the risk of an accident occurring is probably higher.** Currently, 1.4 billion people live without electricity, and by 2030 the global demand for energy is projected to rise by about 25 percent. With the added need to minimize carbon emissions, **nuclear power reactors will become increasingly attractive alternative sources for electric power**, especially for developing nations. **These countries**, in turn, **will need to meet the challenge of developing** appropriate governmental institutions and the

infrastructure, expertise, and experience to support nuclear power efforts with **a suitably high standard of safety.** As the world witnessed in Fukushima, a nuclear power plant accident can lead to the spread of dangerous radiation, massive civil dislocations, and billions of dollars in cleanup costs. Such an event can also fuel widespread public skepticism about nuclear institutions and technology. Some developed nations — notably Germany — have interpreted the Fukushima accident as proof that they should abandon nuclear power altogether, primarily by prolonging the life of existing nuclear reactors while phasing out nuclear-produced electricity and developing alternative energy sources. Third, we need to understand that no nation is immune from risks involving nuclear weapons and nuclear power within their borders. There were 32 so-called "Broken Arrow" accidents — nuclear accidents that do not pose a danger of an outbreak of nuclear war — involving U.S. weapons between 1950 and 1980, mostly involving U.S. Strategic Air Command bombers and earlier bomb designs not yet incorporating modern nuclear detonation safety designs. The U.S. no longer maintains a nuclear-armed, in-air strategic bomber force, and the record of incidents is greatly reduced. In several cases, accidents such as the North Carolina bomber incident came dangerously close **to triggering catastrophes**, with **disaster averted simply by luck.**

The United States has had an admirable safety record in the area of civil nuclear power since the 1979 Three Mile Island accident in Pennsylvania, yet **safety concerns persist.** One of the critical assumptions in the design of the Fukushima reactor complex was that, if electrical power was lost at the plant and back-up generators failed, power could be restored within a few hours. The combined one-two punch of the earthquake and tsunami, however, made the necessary repairs impossible. In the United States today, some nuclear power reactors are designed with a comparably short window for restoring power. After Fukushima, this is an issue that deserves action — especially in light of our own Hurricane Katrina experience, which rendered many affected areas inaccessible for days in 2005, and the August 2011 East Coast earthquake that shook the North Anna nuclear power plant in Mineral, Virginia, beyond expectations based on previous geological activity. Reducing risks To reduce these nuclear risks, we offer four related recommendations that should be adopted by the nuclear enterprise, both military and civilian, in the United States and abroad. First, the reduction of nuclear risks requires every level of the nuclear enterprise and related military and civilian organizations to embrace the importance of safety and security as an overarching operating rule. This is not as easy as it sounds. To a war fighter, more safety and control can mean less reliability and availability and greater costs. For a company or utility involved in the construction or operation of a nuclear power plant, more safety and security can mean greater regulation and higher costs. The absence of a culture of safety and security is perhaps the most reliable indicator of an impending disaster. But **the absence of a culture of safety and security, in which priorities**

and meaningful standards are set and rigorous discipline and accountability are enforced, is perhaps the most reliable indicator of an impending disaster.

In August 2007, after a b-52 bomber loaded with six nuclear-tipped cruise missiles flew from North Dakota to Louisiana without anyone realizing there were live weapons on board, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates fired both the military and civilian heads of the U.S. Air Force. His action was an example of setting the right priorities and enforcing accountability, but the reality of the incident shows that greater incorporation of a safety and security culture is needed. Second, independent regulation of the nuclear enterprise is crucial to setting and enforcing the safety and security rule. In the United States today, the nuclear regulatory system — in particular, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (nrc) — is credited with setting a uniquely high standard for independent regulation of the civil nuclear power sector. This is one of the keys to a successful and safe nuclear program. Effective regulation is even more crucial when there are strong incentives to keep operating costs down and keep an aging nuclear reactor fleet in operation, a combination that could create conditions for a catastrophic nuclear power plant failure. Careful attention is required to protect the nrc from regulatory capture by vested interests in government and industry, the latter of which funds a high percentage of the nrc's budget. In too many countries, strong, independent regulatory agencies are not the norm. The independent watchdog organization advising the Japanese government was working with Japanese utilities to influence public opinion in

favor of nuclear power. **Strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency (iaea) so that it can play a greater role in civil nuclear safety and security would also help reduce risks, and will require substantially greater authorities to address both safety and security,**

and most importantly, more resources for an agency whose budget is only €333 million, with only one-tenth of that total devoted to nuclear safety and security. In addition, exporting "best practices" of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission — that is, lessons of nuclear regulation, oversight, and safety learned over many decades — to other countries would pay a huge safety dividend.

## Large solar storms will inevitably cause extinction – only increased safety solves

**Stein 12** (Matthew Stein, graduate of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in mechanical engineering, March 24, 2012. "Four Hundred Chernobyls: Solar Flares, Electromagnetic Pulses and Nuclear Armageddon." <https://truthout.org/articles/400-chernobyls-solar-flares-electromagnetic-pulses-and-nuclear-armageddon/>)

In the past 152 years, Earth has been struck by roughly **100 solar storms**, causing significant **geomagnetic disturbances (GMD)**, two of which were powerful enough to rank as "extreme GMDs." If **an extreme GMD** of such magnitude were to occur today, **in all likelihood**, it **would initiate a chain of events leading to catastrophic failures at the vast majority of our world's nuclear reactors**, similar to but **over 100 times worse** than, the disasters at both Chernobyl and Fukushima. When massive solar flares launch a huge mass of highly charged plasma (a coronal mass ejection, or CME) directly toward Earth, colliding with our planet's outer atmosphere and magnetosphere, the result is a significant geomagnetic disturbance. The last extreme GMD of a magnitude that could collapse much of the US grid was in May of 1921, long before the advent of modern electronics, widespread electric power grids, and nuclear power plants.

We are, mostly, blissfully **unaware of this threat and unprepared for its consequences**. The good news is that relatively affordable **equipment and processes could be installed to protect critical components in** the electric power grid and its **nuclear reactors**, thereby **averting this "end-of-the-world-as-we-know-it" scenario**. The bad news is that even though panels of scientists and engineers have studied the problem, and the bipartisan Congressional electromagnetic pulse (EMP) commission has presented a list of specific recommendations to Congress, our leaders have yet to approve and implement any significant preventative measures. Most of us believe that an emergency like this could never happen, and that, if it could, our "authorities" would do everything in their power to prevent such an apocalypse. Unfortunately, the

opposite is true. "How could this happen?" you might ask. Nuclear Power Plants and the Electric Power Grid **Our current global system of electrical power generation and distribution ("the grid"), upon which our modern lifestyles are utterly dependent, is extremely vulnerable** to severe geomagnetic storms, which tend to strike our planet on an average of approximately once every 70 to 100 years. We depend on this grid to maintain food production and distribution, telecommunications, Internet services, medical services, military defense, transportation, government, water treatment, sewage and garbage removal, refrigeration, oil refining, gas pumping and all forms of commerce. Unfortunately, the world's nuclear power plants, as they are currently designed, are critically dependent upon maintaining connection to a functioning electrical grid, for all but **relatively short periods of electrical blackouts**, in order to keep their reactor cores continuously cooled so as to avoid catastrophic reactor core meltdowns and fires in storage ponds for spent fuel rods. If **an extreme GMD were to cause widespread grid collapse (which it most certainly will)**, in as little as one or two hours after each nuclear

reactor facility's backup generators either fail to start, or run out of fuel, the **reactor cores will start to melt down**. After a few days without electricity to run the cooling system pumps, the water bath covering the spent fuel rods stored in "spent-fuel ponds" will boil away, allowing the stored fuel rods to melt down and burn [2]. Since the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) currently mandates that only one week's supply of backup generator fuel needs to be stored at each reactor site, it is likely that, after we witness the spectacular nighttime celestial light show from the next extreme GMD, **we will have about one week** in which to prepare ourselves for **Armageddon**. To do nothing is to behave like ostriches with our heads in the sand, blindly believing that "everything will be okay" as our world drifts towards the next natural, inevitable super solar storm and resultant extreme GMD. Such a storm would end the industrialized world as we know it, **creating almost incalculable suffering, death and environmental destruction** on a scale not seen since the extinction of the dinosaurs some 65 million years ago. The End of "The Grid" as We Know It There are records from the

1850s to today of roughly 100 significant geomagnetic solar storms, two of which, in the last 25 years, were strong enough to cause millions of dollars worth of damage to key components that keep our modern grid powered. In March of 1989, a severe solar storm induced powerful electric currents in grid wiring that fried a main power transformer in the HydroQuebec system, causing a cascading grid failure that knocked out power to 6 million customers for nine hours and damaging similar transformers in New Jersey and the UK. More recently, in 2003, a less intense but longer solar storm caused a blackout in Sweden and induced powerful currents in the South African grid that severely damaged or destroyed 14 of their major power transformers, impairing commerce and comfort over major portions of that country as it was forced to resort to massive rolling blackouts that dragged on for many months.<sup>[3]</sup> During the great geomagnetic storm of May 14-15, 1921, brilliant aurora displays were reported in the Northern Hemisphere as far south as Mexico and Puerto Rico, and in the Southern Hemisphere as far north as Samoa.<sup>[4]</sup> This extreme GMD produced ground currents roughly ten times as strong as the 1989 Quebec incident. Just 62 years earlier, the great granddaddy of recorded GMDs, referred to as "the Carrington Event," raged from August 28 to September 4, 1859. This extreme GMD induced currents so powerful that telegraph lines, towers and stations caught on fire at a number of locations around the world. Best estimates are that the Carrington Event was approximately 50 percent stronger than the 1921 storm.<sup>[5]</sup>

Since **we are headed into an active solar period** much like the one preceding the Carrington Event, **scientists are concerned that conditions could be ripe for the next extreme GMD.**<sup>[6]</sup> Prior to the advent of the microchip and modern extra-high-voltage (EHV) transformers (key grid components that were first introduced in the late 1960s), most electrical systems were relatively robust and resistant to the effects of GMDs. Given that a simple electrostatic spark can fry a microchip and thousands of miles of power lines could act like giant antennas for capturing massive amounts of GMD-spawned electromagnetic energy, modern electrical systems are far more vulnerable than their predecessors. The federal government recently sponsored a detailed scientific study to better understand how much critical components of our national electrical power grid might be affected by either a naturally occurring GMD or a man-made EMP. Under the auspices of the EMP Commission and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and reviewed in depth by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the National Academy of Sciences, Metatech Corporation undertook extensive modeling and analysis of the potential effects of extreme geomagnetic storms on the US electrical power grid. Based upon a storm as intense as the 1921 storm, Metatech estimated that within the United States, induced voltage and current spikes, combined with harmonic anomalies, would severely damage or destroy over 350 EHV power transformers critical to the functioning of the US grid and possibly impact well over 2000 EHV transformers worldwide.<sup>[7]</sup> EHV transformers are made to order and custom-designed for each installation, each weighing as much as 300 tons and costing well over \$1 million. Given that there is currently a three-year waiting list for a single EHV transformer (due to recent demand from China and India, lead times grew from one to three years), and that the total global manufacturing capacity is roughly 100 EHV transformers per year when the world's manufacturing centers are functioning properly, you can begin to grasp the implications of widespread transformer losses. The loss of thousands of EHV transformers worldwide would cause a catastrophic grid collapse across much of the industrialized world. It will take years, at best, for the industrialized world to put itself back together after such an event, especially considering the fact that most of the manufacturing centers that make this equipment will also be grappling with widespread grid failure. Our Nuclear "Achilles Heel" Five years ago, I visited the still highly contaminated areas of Ukraine and the Belarus border where much of the radioactive plume from Chernobyl descended on 26 April 1986. I challenge chief scientist John Beddington and environmentalists like George Monbiot or any of the pundits now downplaying the risks of radiation to talk to the doctors, the scientists, the mothers, children and villagers who have been left with the consequences of a major nuclear accident. It was grim. We went from hospital to hospital and from one contaminated village to another. We found deformed and genetically mutated babies in the wards; pitifully sick children in the homes; adolescents with stunted growth and dwarf torsos; fetuses without thighs or fingers and villagers who told us every member of their family was sick. This was 20 years after the accident, but we heard of many unusual clusters of people with rare bone cancers.... Villages testified that 'the Chernobyl necklace' – thyroid cancer – was so common as to be unremarkable. – John Vidal, "Nuclear's Green Cheerleaders Forget Chernobyl at Our Peril," The Guardian, April 1, 2011 [8] What do extended grid blackouts have to do with potential nuclear catastrophes? Nuclear power plants are designed to disconnect automatically from the grid in the event of a local power failure or major grid anomaly; once disconnected, they begin the process of shutting down the reactor's core. In the event of the loss of

coolant flow to an active nuclear reactor's core, the reactor will start to melt down and fail catastrophically within a matter of a few hours, at most. **In an extreme GMD, nearly every reactor in the world could be affected.**

It was a short-term cooling-system failure that caused the partial reactor core meltdown in March 1979 at Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania. Similarly, according to Japanese authorities, it was not direct damage from Japan's 9.0 magnitude Tohoku Earthquake on March 11, 2011, that caused the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactor disaster, but the loss of electric power to the reactor's cooling system pumps when the reactor's backup batteries and diesel generators were wiped out by the ensuing tidal waves. In the hours and days after the tidal waves shuttered the cooling systems, the cores of reactors number 1, 2 and 3 were in full meltdown and released hydrogen gas, fueling explosions which breached several reactor containment vessels and blew the roof off the building housing reactor number 4's spent-fuel storage pond. Of even greater danger and concern than the reactor cores themselves are the spent fuel rods stored in on-site cooling ponds. Lacking a permanent spent nuclear fuel storage facility, so-called "temporary" nuclear fuel containment ponds are features common to nearly all nuclear reactor facilities. They typically contain the accumulated spent fuel from ten or more decommissioned reactor cores. Due to lack of a permanent repository, most of these fuel containment ponds are greatly overloaded and tightly packed beyond original design. They are generally surrounded by common light industrial buildings with concrete walls and corrugated steel roofs. Unlike the active reactor cores, which are encased inside massive "containment vessels" with thick walls of concrete and steel, the buildings surrounding spent fuel rod storage ponds would do practically nothing to contain radioactive contaminants in the event of prolonged cooling system failures. Since spent fuel ponds typically hold far greater quantities of highly radioactive material than the active nuclear reactors locked inside reinforced containment vessels, **they**

**clearly present far greater potential for the catastrophic spread of highly radioactive contaminants over huge swaths of land, polluting the environment for multiple generations.** A

study by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) determined that the "boil down time" for spent fuel rod containment ponds runs from between 4 and 22 days after loss of cooling system power before degenerating into a Fukushima-like situation, depending upon the type of nuclear reactor and how recently its latest batch of fuel rods had been decommissioned.<sup>[9]</sup> Reactor fuel rods have a protective zirconium cladding, which, if superheated while exposed to air, will burn with intense, self-generating heat, much like a magnesium fire, releasing highly radioactive aerosols and smoke. According to nuclear whistleblower and former senior vice president for Nuclear Engineering Services Arnie Gundersen, once a zirconium fire has started, due to its extreme temperatures and high reactivity, contact with water will result in the water dissociating into hydrogen and oxygen gases, which will almost certainly lead to violent explosions. Gundersen says that once a zirconium fuel rod fire has started, the worst thing you could do is to try to quench the fire with water streams, which would cause violent explosions. Gundersen believes the massive explosion that blew the roof off the spent fuel pond at Fukushima was caused by zirconium-induced hydrogen dissociation.<sup>[10]</sup> Had it not been for heroic efforts on the part of Japan's nuclear workers to replenish waters in the spent fuel pool at Fukushima, those spent fuel rods would have melted down and ignited their zirconium cladding, which most likely would have released far more radioactive contamination than what came from the three reactor core meltdowns. Japanese officials have estimated that Fukushima Daiichi has already released just over half as much total radioactive contamination as was released by

Chernobyl into the local environment, but other sources estimate it could be significantly more than at Chernobyl. In the event of **an** extreme

**GMD-induced** long-term **grid collapse** covering much of the globe, if just half of the world's spent fuel ponds were to boil off their water

and become radioactive, zirconium-fed infernos, the ensuing contamination **could far exceed the cumulative effect of 400 Chernobyls.**





## **Executive First Strikes**

## Presidential First Strikes Contention

### **Executive first-use risks nuke war --- NFU solves.**

Steve **Fetter** and Jon **Wolfsthal** 18. \*\*Professor in the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland. \*\*Director of the Nuclear Crisis Group, a Global Zero initiative; nonresident fellow at the Belfer Center at Harvard University; senior director for arms control and nonproliferation at the National Security Council. "No First Use and Credible Deterrence." Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, 1:1, 102-114.

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/25751654.2018.1454257>.

One need look no further than today's headlines to see how the lack of a no first use policy has increased the prospects for nuclear conflict. As with so many other things, President Donald Trump's rejection of accepted norms and codes of conduct is likely to significantly undermine America's historical position as a nonproliferation champion and already increasing the risks that nuclear weapons will be used. The situation on the Korean peninsula in particular risks accidental or miscalculated first-use of nuclear weapons by North Korea and the United States, due to a lack of restraint and overreliance on nuclear ambiguity. As a candidate Donald Trump refused to rule out the first use of nuclear weapons by the United States (Sanger 16) and implied his willingness to initiate nuclear weapons' use against North Korea (Fifield and Wagner 17). Russia's stated willingness to initiate nuclear use in Europe (Tucker 17), combined with their military adventurism, remains a serious concern. The poor relations between the United States and Russia and the disparity in conventional and nuclear forces and doctrine fuel these dangers.

This contrasts with the consideration, reported in 2016 by the New York Times (Sanger and Broad 16) and the Washington Post (Rogin 16a) that President Obama was considering ruling out the first-use of nuclear weapons for the United States. The issue of possible first use contingencies was deeply debated in the process leading up to the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). In the end, the President determined that the capabilities of the United States were not yet to a point where nonnuclear options were sufficient for the United States to state that the sole purpose of US nuclear weapons was to deter or respond to nuclear attacks against the United States or its allies. Instead, the NPR made clear that the United States would seek to create the conditions where a sole-purpose statement could be adopted, because it would benefit American security and the pursuit of nuclear reductions and stability. His visit to Hiroshima in May 2016 indicated his openness to the idea when he said: "among those nations like my own that hold nuclear stockpiles, we must have the courage to escape the logic of fear and pursue a world without them." 1

Former defense officials with full knowledge of America's conventional and nuclear capabilities and the threats America faces, including former Defense Secretary William Perry2 and former Strategic Command commander and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. James Cartwright (Cartwright and Blair 16), have spoken in favor of no first use. According to General Cartwright, "nuclear weapons today no longer serve any purpose beyond deterring the first use of such weapons by our adversaries" (Cartwright and Blair 16).

According to the Times and Post reports, the main reason President Obama did not adopt a policy of no first use was concern about the reaction of allies – particularly Japan. In fact, the Washington Post reported that Prime Minister Abe personally conveyed his opposition to NFU, because he believed it could increase the likelihood of conventional conflict with North Korea or China (Rogin 16b). Reports indicated, however, that the Japanese concern stemmed from a belief that adopting no first use would weaken the perceived American commitment to Japan's defense. While untrue and not even directly related, this perception made rapid adoption of a no-first-use statement impossible. President Obama left office without adopting a policy of NFU or making any additional major changes to US nuclear policy.

The 2018 NPR, completed by the Trump Administration, made major changes to US declaratory nuclear policy, including steps that would increase the circumstances in which the United States would consider using nuclear weapons first (US Department of Defense 18). The new NPR reserves the right to use nuclear weapons first not only against nuclear weapon states in response to nonnuclear strategic attacks, but would also reserve the right to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear weapon states. Somewhat ironically, the new NPR also notes that potential adversaries must

"not miscalculate regarding the consequences of nuclear first use, either regionally or against the United States itself. They must understand that there are no possible benefits from...limited nuclear escalation. Correcting any such misperceptions is now critical to maintaining strategic stability in Europe and Asia"

(US Department of Defense 18, VII). It is unclear why that same logic does not apply to first use by the United States. Trump, who has called for strengthening and expanding US nuclear capability<sup>3</sup> and seems unable or unwilling to connect how America's nuclear doctrine can influence its ability to achieve nonproliferation and disarmament outcomes, may be willing to take a far more expansive view of when he might use nuclear weapons than his predecessor.

Regardless of how President Trump will implement the nuclear strategy based on this new NPR, there are certain facts that should inform his decision, and will clearly affect the analysis of allies and experts on whatever position the United States adopts. Chief among these is the reality that, as the world's sole conventional military superpower, the United States does not need nuclear weapons to deter or respond to any nonnuclear threats to itself or its allies. The debate is not whether the United States can win a war; it is to what extent does US nuclear posture deter conflict and convince potential adversaries not to initiate conflict, and to what extent US nuclear capabilities be used to respond to nonnuclear threats. Some believe nuclear weapons are useful and even essential to deter or respond to nonnuclear aggression (Payne 16; Sestanovich 16). Others believe it is dangerous and undermines deterrence and crisis stability.<sup>4</sup> A key challenge for those who support no first use is working with and helping allies understand in concrete terms that such a step would enhance the credibility of US commitments to their security.

## **First Strike Bad**

### **First strike goes global and draws in great powers**

**Benjamin, 17**

(Medea, co-founder of Global Exchange and CODEPINK: Women for Peace, 7/29/17, “Urgent Warning: Time to Hit the Reset Button on US-Korean Policy,”  
<https://www.commondreams.org/views/2017/07/29/urgent-warning-time-hit-reset-button-us-korean-policy>)

The United States has also long held a “pre-emptive first strike” policy towards North Korea. This frightening threat of an unprovoked US nuclear attack gives North Korea good reason to want its own nuclear arsenal.

North Korea’s leadership also looks at the fate of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, leaders who gave up their nuclear programs, and conclude that nuclear weapons are their key to survival.

So the North Korean leadership is not acting irrationally; on the contrary. On July 29, the day after the test, North Korean President Kim Jong-un asserted that the threat of sanctions or military action “only strengthens our resolve and further justifies our possession of nuclear weapons.”

Given the proximity of North Korea to the South’s capital Seoul, a city of 25 million people, any outbreak of hostilities would be devastating. It is estimated that a North Korean attack with just conventional weapons would kill 64,000 South Koreans in the first three hours.

A war on the Korean Peninsula would likely draw in other nuclear armed states and major powers, including China, Russia and Japan. This region also has the largest militaries and economies in the world, the world’s busiest commercial ports, and half the world’s population.

Trump has few options. His Defense Secretary Jim Mattis has warned that a pre-emptive strike on the North’s nuclear and missile capabilities could reignite the Korean War. Trump had hoped that Chinese President Xi Jinping could successfully rein in Kim Jong-un, but the Chinese are more concerned about the collapse of North Korea’s government and the chaos that would ensue. They are also furious about the deployment of THAAD in South Korea, convinced that its radar can penetrate deep into Chinese territory.

But the Chinese do have another proposal: a freeze for a freeze. This means a freeze on North Korean missile and nuclear tests in exchange for a halt on US-South Korean war games.

The massive war games have been taking place every year in March, with smaller ones scheduled for August. A halt would alleviate tensions and pave the way for negotiations. So would halting the deployment of the destabilizing THAAD system so disliked by South Korean villagers, North Koreans and the Chinese.

Given the specter of nuclear war, the rational alternative policy is one of de-escalation and engagement. President Moon has called for dialogue with the North and a peace treaty to permanently end the Korean War. North Korean diplomats have raised the possibility of a

“freeze for a freeze.” Time has proven that coercion doesn’t work. There’s an urgent need to hit the reset button on US-Korean policy, before one of the players hits a much more catastrophic button that could lead us into a nuclear nightmare.

## **Accidents Contention**

## Accidents Case Cards

**Network centric war makes miscalculation more likely now than ever.**

Stephen J. Cimbala, Political Science @ Penn State, '20, *The United States, Russia and Nuclear Peace*, Springer, ISBN 978-3-030-38088-5

The 1983 “war scare” as between Moscow and the West was a sufficiently serious and dangerous Cold War confrontation to merit retrospective interest and analysis. Not all aspects of the issue can be dealt with here. A series of apparently discrete events between 1979 (NATO’s INF modernization decision) and November 1983 (“Able Archer”) cumulated unexpectedly into a “positive feedback loop” of negative expectations. Soviet foreign and military intelligence, tasked by their uptight political masters, reported back to Moscow Central some indicators and pessimistic appraisals that seemed to confirm initial suspicions that the West was up to something unusual. Fortunately, neither all Soviet and allied intelligence organs, nor most of the Soviet leadership, adopted the most pessimistic interpretation of US and NATO military exercises in the fall of 1983.

In addition to findings with implications for policy, the study also holds implications for policy-relevant theorizing in international relations and in security studies.

There are two different ways in which the manipulation of risk, within the context of nuclear crisis management, can take place. The first context is that a risk with a known and bounded range of outcomes is used by one side to test the resolve of the other. This is a true competition in risk taking: the uncertainties have mainly to do with the willingness of each side to stay in the bidding. Games of “chicken” played on highways by risk acceptant motorists (or by policy makers in crises) illustrate one dangerous variation of this kind of competition.

Another kind of competition in risk taking differs from this linear test of resolve. In the more complicated kind of risk manipulation, the universe of potential outcomes is more unstructured. Because the range of outcomes is less predictable, the ability of leaders to rank order or otherwise prioritize preferred outcomes, or to attach probabilities to desired outcomes, is reduced in comparison to the bounded-outcomes case. One reason why nuclear bipolar systems may be more manageable and more stable than multipolar systems is that bipolar systems reduce the cognitive complexity of leaders’ assessments by offering them a more structured array of potential outcomes. A two-sided crisis or war cannot usually be complicated by third parties unless those parties have sufficient military power and political influence for a seat at the great power table.

The 1983 war scare also reminds us that policy makers are challenged to keep distinct the possibility of two kinds of failure in crisis decisionmaking: miscalculated escalation and loss of control. Miscalculated escalation is a deliberate but mistaken decision taken to raise one side’s military stakes and/or policy commitments, in the erroneous expectation that the other side will back down as a result. Loss of control is an inadvertent or accidental lapse of policy control over military actions, or the failure of standard operating procedures to cope with the stress of crisis management, that is neither designed nor intended. Examples of miscalculated escalation are provided by the behavior of various European heads of state during the July crisis of 1914. Examples of loss of control were apparent during the Cuban missile crisis, including a U-2

“routine” air sampling mission that strayed into Soviet air space at one of the tensest moments of that confrontation. A nuclear crisis could be marked by either miscalculated escalation, loss of control or both to some degree. In the case of the war scare of 1983, there was less of an aspect of loss of control and more of a danger of miscalculated escalation based on flawed or tendentiously interpreted intelligence. Fortunately, neither the Soviet Union nor NATO undertook provocative military moves in Europe that would have confirmed the worst case fears of Soviet or US threat assessors.

Finally, as Paul Bracken reminds us, institutions matter—and so do people.<sup>36</sup> Persons so tasked by intelligence organs, following orders from superiors, fed expected indicators into action channels. The interpretation of accumulated anecdotal and other intelligence pertinent to RYAN was left to higher levels but there was not necessarily effective coordination across those “stovepipes” of intelligence and policy making. Fortuitous disconnection within and between stovepipes might have decelerated the shock effect and dissipated the alarmism otherwise held in some more threat-inflating bureaucratic quarters. Ironically, had the Soviet commandcontrol, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) systems been operating according to principles of modern hyperactive “network-centric warfare”, the amount of misinformation in the system and its exchange velocity between and among bureaucratic channels might have been greater than it was.

People also matter. It mattered that Soviet Colonel Petrov used his head in late September 1983 and remained skeptical of a false missile attack warning, due to the absence of confirming indicators from other sources. Given the tense political atmospherics as between the US and the Soviet Union at the time, a less clearheaded thinker and a more backsidecovering bureaucrat might simply have rocketed the warning up the chain of command, with unpredictable results. It also mattered that an experienced spymaster like Markus Wolf was in a key position to separate fact from fiction, and to distinguish concern from undue alarmism, in collecting and analyzing intelligence relative to RYAN tasking. Germany was, after all, the most likely place for an eruption of miscalculated escalation based on false positives among indicators of plans for nuclear attack. With respect to people, it also mattered that Ronald Reagan was US President because, notwithstanding his tough rhetoric toward Moscow, Reagan was horrified by nuclear weapons and actually attracted to the idea of nuclear abolition and-or negation by futuristic defense systems. This deep structure of Reagan’s thinking about the Soviets and nuclear war led him to draw some conclusions about nuclear danger after 1983 that paved the way for US-Soviet rapprochement when Gorbachev came to power in 1985. Reagan’s view, that a nuclear war could never be won and must never be fought, was reinforced by the experience of Able Archer and other events of those dangerous days.

The significance of nuclear deterrence in the “war scare” episode of 1983 is debatable. It could be argued that the two sides’ nuclear forces inhibited undue adventurism and any outbreak of war in Europe, not only in 1983 but throughout much of the Cold War. On the other hand, it is notable that the “war scare” of 1983 was about fear of nuclear attack and specifically about Soviet leaders’ possible fears of US and NATO intentions with respect to nuclear first use or first strike. More broadly, deterrence as an intellectual construct for discourse among academics, policy makers and others had certain uses as a common frame of reference that expedited discussion about strategy and policy. But deterrence theory offered little guidance for military

tactics and operational art, and even more problematically, often fell short of strategic effect when it failed to create a viable “bridge” between policy and the threat or use of force.<sup>37</sup> In the aftermath of the US and Russian decisions in 2019 to abrogate the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987, a mainstay of Cold War and later nuclear arms control that eliminated an entire class of ground-launched missiles with ranges from 500 to 5500 kilometers, the nuclear uncertainties of Europe in the 1980s suggest warning lights for twenty-first-century US, allied NATO and Russian leaders.<sup>38</sup>

### Unpredictability is key – that makes extinction from accidents inevitable Scientific American, 17

(The Editors of Scientific American, No One Should Have Sole Authority to Launch a Nuclear Attack, August 1, 2017, <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/no-one-should-have-sole-authority-to-launch-a-nuclear-attack/>)

In just five minutes an American president could put all of humanity in jeopardy. Most nuclear security experts believe that's how long it would take for as many as 400 land-based nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal to be loosed on enemy targets after an initial “go” order. Ten minutes later a battalion of underwater nukes could join them. That unbridled power is a frightening prospect no matter who is president. Donald Trump, the current occupant of the Oval Office, highlights this point. He said he aspires to be “unpredictable” in how he might use nuclear weapons. There is no way to recall these missiles when they have launched, and there is no self-destruct switch. The act would likely set off a lethal cascade of retaliatory attacks, which is why strategists call this scenario mutually assured destruction. With the exception of the president, every link in the U.S. nuclear decision chain has protections against poor judgments, deliberate misuse or accidental deployment. The “two-person rule,” in place since World War II, requires that the actual order to launch be sent to two separate people. Each one has to decode and authenticate the message before taking action. In addition, anyone with nuclear weapons duties, in any branch of service, must routinely pass a Pentagon-mandated evaluation called the Personnel Reliability Program—a battery of tests that assess several areas, including mental fitness, financial history, and physical and emotional well-being. There is no comparable restraint on the president. He or she can decide to trigger a thermonuclear Armageddon without consulting anyone at all and never has to demonstrate mental fitness. This must change. We need to ensure at least some deliberation before the chief executive can act. And there are ways to do this without weakening our military responses or national security. This is not just a reaction to current politics. Calls for a bulwark against unilateral action go back more than 30 years. During the Reagan administration, the late Jeremy Stone, then president of the Federation of American Scientists, proposed that the president should not be able to order a first nuclear strike without consulting with high-ranking members of Congress. Such a buffer would ensure that actions that could escalate into world-destroying counterattacks would not be taken lightly. Democratic legislators recently introduced a law that would require not just consultation but congressional support for a preemptive nuclear attack. Whether or not that seems like the best check on presidential nuclear power is a matter for Congress. We already know that second-check plans would not

compromise American safety. Security experts used to worry that a hair-trigger launch was needed to deter a first strike by an enemy: our instant reactions would ensure that our opponent would feel catastrophic consequences of aggression. In the modern world, that is no longer the case. The U.S. has enough nukes in enough locations—including, crucially, our roving, nuclear-armed submarines—that nuclear strategists now agree it would not be possible to take out all of the nation's weapons with a first strike. The Pentagon, in a 2012 security assessment, said the same thing. It noted that even in the unlikely event that Russia launched a preemptive attack on the U.S.—and had more nuclear capability than current international agreements allow for—it “would have little to no effect on the U.S. assured second-strike capabilities.” That conclusion suggests that we will have ample firepower even if two or more people discuss how to use it. We have come close to nuclear war in the past because of misidentified threats, including an incident in 1979 in which computers at a military command center in Colorado Springs wrongly reported the start of a major Soviet nuclear offensive. Ballistic and nuclear bomber crews immediately sprang into action. Crisis was averted only after satellite data could not corroborate the warning, and American forces finally stood down. In our March issue, Scientific American called for taking the U.S. nuclear arsenal off high alert because of this and other such near misses. Taking the arsenal off high alert is an important step. But putting another check into the system—removing one person's unfettered ability to destroy the world—will create another essential, lasting safeguard for the U.S. and the planet.

### A statutory NFU is key to prevent crisis escalation from ambiguity

**Blair, 18**

(Bruce Blair, nuclear security expert and a research scholar at the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton and the co-founder of Global Zero, Strengthening Checks on Presidential Nuclear Launch Authority, January/February 2018, Arms Control Today, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-01/features/strengthening-checks-presidential-nuclear-launch-authority>)

U.S. nuclear launch protocol has important virtues and serious liabilities. Major changes are needed to constrain a president who would seek to initiate the first use of nuclear weapons without apparent cause and to prevent him or her from being pushed into making nuclear retaliatory decisions in haste.

The virtues of the protocol—the procedures and timelines for ordering the use of nuclear weapons and for carrying out such an order—are twofold. First, it concentrates launch authority at the highest level of the executive branch, the presidency, taking it out of the hands of the military and others. This is a function of paramount importance. The principle of civilian control over weapons of mass destruction must never be compromised. Together with the imposition of organizational and technical safeguards on the weapons and their handlers, the protocol elevates the locus of launch capability, as well as of launch authority, to the highest practical level.<sup>1</sup>

Second, it is designed to allow the president and the nuclear forces under his command to respond rapidly and decisively in the face of an enemy attack by nuclear-armed missiles that can fly from the opposite side of the planet to U.S. territory in 30 minutes or from forward-deployed

submarines in 15 minutes.<sup>2</sup> This is of critical importance in view of the acute vulnerability of U.S. nuclear command, control, and communications, as well as of a large portion of the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal, particularly the silo-based missile force and the bomber fleet in its normal peacetime posture.<sup>3</sup>

Despite fast-flying inbound warheads, the protocol on paper provides enough time for detecting and assessing an attack, convening an emergency conference between the president and his top nuclear advisers, briefing the president on his options and their consequences, authenticating the president's decision, and formatting and transmitting a launch order to the launch crews in time to ensure the survival and execution of their forces.

**The flip side of these virtues are serious liabilities.** The protocol concentrates authority and emphasizes speed to such a degree that it may allow a president to railroad the nuclear commanders into initiating a first strike without apparent cause and quickly executing an order that may be horrifyingly misguided, illegal, or both. A demented commander-in-chief could start a nuclear conflagration that no one could forestall, veto, or stop.

Equally deleterious, a president can become hostage to the protocol itself, like a conductor on a runaway train, if an enemy nuclear strike appears underway. He may be pushed into hastily ordering "retaliation" in response to a false alarm. Rationality would be lost in the fog of crisis under a short deadline fraught with confusion and emotion.

#### Protocol for Intentional First Use

If the president wishes to order the first use of nuclear weapons, he would be expected to do so in close consultation with his top national security advisers, particularly the secretaries of defense and state (statutory advisers on the National Security Council), the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the national security adviser, and the senior generals who command the military forces. Depending on the urgency of the situation, this could be a protracted process with extensive planning, heightened force readiness, and regular briefings of the president, or it could be truncated to minutes if an imminent attack is perceived.

When a decision is imminent, the process goes critical. The commander-in-chief would be connected to his key advisers via a secure communications network designed to support nuclear emergency actions. The president could initiate this conference anytime, even abruptly in the night, through his military aide who is always nearby with the "football"—a satchel containing the nuclear war plans, including a one-pager graphically depicting the major options at his disposal.

#### Reforms: Toward a True Retaliatory Posture

A six-minute deadline for deliberation and decision is ridiculous. The president needs much more warning and decision time to rationally cope with indications of a nuclear attack on the United States or its allies. He must no longer be jammed to authorize what could be a civilization-ending response to attack indications that may be false. **The risks of miscalculation and irrational decision-making leading to incoherent operations and further escalation are unacceptably high.**

This terrifying reality has been ignored for decades. Reform is long overdue.

This means that the current prompt-launch posture must be drastically altered. Use-or-lose forces such as the silo-based missile force should be eliminated. Launch on warning should be eliminated. Reducing the vulnerability of command, control, and communications to kinetic attack and cyberattack should be the top priority of the nuclear modernization plan, even if it means cutting spending on replacement forces in the pipeline. The submarine force has already become the premier leg of the strategic triad, the central component of U.S. deterrence policy. This force can patiently wait for months for direction from higher authority.

Equally overdue is the adoption of a policy that eschews the first use of nuclear weapons. A clear marker would be established in limiting the president's leeway to initiate a first strike.<sup>17</sup> If taken seriously, the operational plans would also be modified in ways that would hamstring any effort to order the use of nuclear weapons without apparent cause.

Congress has considerable legal standing to pass legislation that prohibits first use. A recent bill introduced by Representative Adam Smith (D-Wash.) is a step in this direction,<sup>18</sup> but a law would draw real redlines around the policy. Crossing them would make the president accountable and even impeachable.

The Trump administration appears to be heading in the opposite direction. Its nuclear review in the works is leaning toward the deployment of smaller-yield nuclear weapons (e.g., a primary-only warhead on Trident missiles) that will make them more usable in both first- and second-use scenarios. It is also leaning toward widening the conditions under which nuclear weapons may be used first in response to non-nuclear strategic aggression and toward revoking Obama-era assurances given to non-nuclear countries that the United States would never attack them with nuclear weapons.

### **The key internal link is the credibility of our position**

**Blair, 16**

(Bruce G. Blair, nuclear security expert and a research scholar at the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton and the co-founder of Global Zero, How Obama Could Revolutionize Nuclear Weapons Strategy Before He Goes, June 22, 2016, <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/06/barack-obama-nuclear-weapons-213981>)

Why are these changes necessary? Our current, outdated nuclear strategy requires preparations for the first use of U.S. nuclear weapons, including preemptive nuclear strikes against Russia, China and North Korea as well as nations that do not even possess nuclear weapons, such as Iran (and until very recently, Syria). The strategy emphasizes war-fighting—meaning that the majority of targets are nuclear forces and the command centers that direct them. Dressed up as "deterrence requirements," the war-fighting goal is to destroy the vast bulk of nearly 1,000 aim points in Russia (including 100 in the Moscow area), 500 in China, and scores in North Korea and Iran. It defies common sense that this degree of overkill is needed to deter; the scale of destruction vastly exceeds any reasonable person's notion of what is necessary to deter an adversary from attacking the United States. This excess also begets excessive counterpreparations that only stimulate arms racing in peacetime and fuel instability during a

**crisis.** The strategy also sustains dangerous “hair-trigger” operational practices that risk causing an accidental, unauthorized, or mistaken launch of strategic missiles. Both the United States and Russia are poised to launch quickly on warning of an incoming strike, and to a significant degree each relies on it in order to be able to destroy the very long list of targets on the other side. Their “launch-on-warning” options impose extremely short deadlines for assessing warning and rendering a decision. The U.S. president would have only minutes—at most 12 minutes—to determine whether and how to respond to indications of an apparent missile attack. Because of Russia’s decrepit satellites, its president has only two to four minutes to sort out the situation and order a response. Their hair-trigger postures carry a very real risk that a catastrophic nuclear exchange could begin with a false or confusing report from early warning sensors compounded by fear and panic. The strategy also drives wasteful investments in nuclear weapons “modernization.” The United States is embarking on a trillion-dollar investment to trade in its aging strategic land-based missiles, submarines and bombers (the “Triad” of nuclear attack vehicles) for newer versions in order to sustain its accident-prone, destabilizing, first-use and quick-second-use (launch on warning), war-fighting strategy designed for Cold War scenarios that no longer make any sense. The perverse misallocation of investment driven by such Cold War anachronisms as the strategic requirement to maintain three kinds of attack vehicles—the Triad—is exemplified by plans to replace the vulnerable land-based strategic missile force in fixed underground silos with—yes, you guessed it—vulnerable land-based strategic missile forces in fixed underground silos. These sitting ducks are an albatross around the neck of any president who might not wish to be saddled with highly vulnerable forces at a moment of confusion over reports of enemy attack coming from early warning sensors. Lastly, the strategy thwarts progress toward Obama’s vision of a world without nuclear weapons. It works to stimulate nuclear arms competition among the rivals, whose numbers have risen to nine, with the jury still out on a 10th (Iran) and with dozens of potential proliferators in the wings. A nuclear war-fighting strategy that requires the destruction of several other countries’ capacity for nuclear war-fighting is a formula for preserving, not eliminating, the arsenals. Obama is undoubtedly reconsidering no-first-use and no-launch-on-warning as ways to break out of this hoary strategic dead end. The logic for adopting no-first-use begins with the hard fact that the first use of U.S. nuclear weapons on any scale against Russia or China would only ensure the destruction of the United States by their nuclear forces launched in retaliation. Some observers challenge this conclusion on the grounds that the United States possesses nuclear primacy over these countries and could effectively disarm them in a first strike. This argument is wrong, but even if the United States achieved such superiority and could sustain it over time, its security would only be undermined because it would create a powerful incentive for an adversary to launch a preemptive attack in a crisis out of fear of a U.S. disarming strike. U.S. security would be far better served if we lacked such primacy and convinced potential nuclear aggressors that we neither possess nor want it, and in fact have abandoned first-use plans and placed top priority on survivable forces that do not project a first-strike threat. Regarding other adversaries such as Iran and Syria, “sole purpose” implies that U.S. nuclear forces would not be used in conflict with them because they lack nuclear weapons. Nor would U.S. nukes be needed in fighting them, or for that matter fighting any other challenger. The capabilities of today’s non-nuclear U.S. forces constitute a juggernaut capable of delivering a fatal blow to Iranian, Syrian, and terrorist threats to U.S. interests, including biological or

chemical weapons threats. U.S. conventional capabilities in combination with South Korean armed forces could also handily defeat North Korean conventional, nuclear, biological or chemical aggression. Although U.S. nuclear forces would serve to deter North Korea from initiating a nuclear strike against the U.S. or our allies, there exist strong disincentives against their actual use against the DPRK. Such use would cause a huge self-inflicted wound from the prevailing winds on the Korean Peninsula blowing deadly radioactive fallout onto Japanese territory. At any rate, U.S. and South Korean non-nuclear forces would prevail in any conflict with North Korea. The second reform of eliminating plans for and exercising of "launch on warning" would increase the president's decision time and reduce the risks of the mistaken launch of U.S. strategic missiles on false warning. Given the 15- to 30-minute flight times of incoming missiles, a presidential launch decision must be made at such lightning speed that careful deliberation is simply impossible. As long as they retain and rely upon launch on warning, both the United States and Russia will run the risk of launching on false indications of enemy attack—indeed false alarms have brought both close to mistaken launch on numerous occasions—and the emergence of cyber warfare threats to early warning data bases has increased the risk. The launch-ready nuclear postures of Russia and the United States are throwbacks to a bygone era. The likelihood is extremely remote that either nation would deliberately initiate a massive strike aimed at comprehensively destroying the other side's strategic forces. (No-first-use policies would further reduce this likelihood.) The risks run by these archaic postures are thus unnecessary because the underlying attack scenario is implausible. There is therefore an urgent need and opportunity for the U.S. and Russia to immediately eliminate "launch on warning" from their operational repertoire, either by mutual agreement or independent action. In short, there exists no plausible circumstance in which nuclear first use would be in the national security interest of the United States. Although U.S. nuclear forces would continue to deter the first use of Russian, Chinese, and North Korean nuclear weapons, this role is not served, but rather is undermined, by any first use of U.S. nuclear weapons. The removal of the U.S. threat of a nuclear first strike would strengthen strategic and crisis stability, and would also exert pressure on other nations whose doctrines allow for nuclear first use—Russia and Pakistan in particular—to revise those doctrines accordingly. Secondly, since the risks of launch on false warning outweigh any plausible benefits, the president should order an end to planning, training and exercising it.

### **NFU prevents circumvention and lowers the risk of a civilization ending war.**

Lisa **Fuller** **17**. Senior staff member and a civilian peacekeeper at Nonviolent Peaceforce, working in war zones such as Iraq, South Sudan, and Sri Lanka. "Lawmakers Are Scrambling to Prevent Trump from Launching a Nuclear War." Foreign Policy in Focus.  
<https://fpif.org/lawmakers-scrambling-prevent-trump-launching-nuclear-war/>.

Former National Security Council Director Peter Feaver recently told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "even a single nuclear detonation" could "trigger an escalatory spiral that would lead to civilization-threatening outcomes."

Two days later, Rep. Adam Smith (D-WA) introduced a bill that could therefore save civilization. The entirety of the No First Use bill reads: "It is the policy of the United States to not use nuclear weapons first."

The risk of nuclear war is at an all-time high, according to Former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry and expert Scott Sagan. Smith's bill could be one of the most effective ways to mitigate that risk. It would substantially reduce the likelihood that either the U.S. or North Korea would start a war, whether through a pre-meditated attack or as a result of miscalculation.

First, the policy would constrain the Trump administration from launching a preventative nuclear strike on North Korea — a scenario that has become a realistic possibility.

The problem isn't only that nobody can stop Trump from realizing his long standing desire to use nuclear weapons. It's also that Trump's advisers may now be more likely to toss him the nuclear football than to pry it out of his hands.

Top administration officials — including Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, CIA Director Mike Pompeo, National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster, Chief of Staff John Kelly, and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Joseph Dunford — have all voiced support for using a preemptive strike to prevent North Korea from developing the capacity to strike the continental U.S., even while acknowledging the "horrific" ramifications.

As U.S. intelligence indicates that North Korea could attain such capabilities in early 2018, former U.S. General Barry McCaffrey's predicts that we'll be at war by summer 2018. North Korea's latest missile test confirms that they are making rapid progress.

Rep. Ted Lieu and Sen. Edward Markey had enough foresight in January to introduce other legislation intended to prevent Trump from launching a pre-emptive strike. Unfortunately, their bill had too many loopholes to be reliable — including an exception in the event of an "imminent threat."

Unfortunately, the restriction becomes impotent if the Trump administration uses "elastic definitions of the phrase 'imminent threat,'" as the Cato Institute's John Glaser puts it. Given Trump's propensity for stretching the truth, it's safe to assume that he considers definitions to be elastic as a general rule.

Smith's bill, in contrast, allows scant wiggle room. Unless we fall down the Orwellian rabbit hole into a world where "war is peace and freedom is slavery," it will be difficult to falsely claim that North Korea dropped a nuclear bomb.

Of course, a U.S. pre-emptive strike isn't the only way to start a war — North Korea could also initiate hostilities. Smith's bill would reduce the likelihood of that scenario as well.

While the CIA and independent experts agree that Kim Jong-un would only launch a pre-emptive attack if he believed that a U.S. offensive was imminent and unavoidable, the risk of miscalculation remains high. Misunderstandings and computer errors nearly led to nuclear war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union on at least seven occasions during the Cold War.

Given that U.S. and North Korea are not even on speaking terms, the risk of miscalculation is even higher now. Even when Cold War tensions peaked during the Cuban Missile Crisis, President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev were in direct communication.

Plus, it would be understandable if Kim were feeling a little jumpy, given that the U.S. has deployed all of the military assets needed to launch an offensive over the last three months — including aircraft carriers, ships, and submarines armed with missiles, as well as bombers, munitions, and fighter jets — and has been practicing large-scale attacks off the Korean coast.

The most effective way to reduce the chances that Kim Jong-un will press the nuclear button would therefore be to convince him that the U.S. won't drop the first bomb.

Opponents of Smith's bill would likely claim that this strategy is counterproductive because it undermines U.S. deterrence capabilities. However, as Senator Ben Cardin points out, this argument is based on Cold War realities, and doesn't apply to the North Korea crisis: Unlike the Soviet Union, North Korea doesn't have the ability to obliterate U.S. nuclear assets in a first strike.

There is little reason to believe that the North Korea crisis will de-escalate if we continue on our current trajectory. Sanctions are unlikely to succeed, diplomatic deadlock has set in, and talks have ceased. Trump will continue to spout off threats and other dangerous rhetoric as long as he retains the ability to speak or tweet, and he may well undermine any serious attempts to restart diplomacy.

As long as Trump is in office, therefore, the No First Use bill is our best hope of preventing war.

Our survival may depend on it.

### Nuke winter causes extinction.

Steven Starr 17. Director, University of Missouri's Clinical Laboratory Science Program; senior scientist, Physicians for Social Responsibility. "Turning a Blind Eye Towards Armageddon — U.S. Leaders Reject Nuclear Winter Studies." Federation of American Scientists.

<https://fas.org/2017/01/turning-a-blind-eye-towards-armageddon-u-s-leaders-reject-nuclear-winter-studies/>.

Now 10 years ago, several of the world's leading climatologists and physicists chose to reinvestigate the long-term environmental impacts of nuclear war. The peer-reviewed studies they produced are considered to be the most authoritative type of scientific research, which is subjected to criticism by the international scientific community before final publication in scholarly journals. No serious errors were found in these studies and their findings remain unchallenged.

Alan Robock et al., "Nuclear winter revisited with a modern climate model and current nuclear arsenals: Still catastrophic consequences," Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres 112 (2007).

Owen Brian Toon et al., "Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism," Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics 7 (2007).

Michael Mills et al., "Massive global ozone loss predicted following regional nuclear conflict," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 105, no. 14 (2008).

Michael Mills et al., "Multidecadal global cooling and unprecedeted ozone loss following a regional nuclear conflict," Earth's Future 2.

Alan Robock et al., "Climatic consequences of regional nuclear conflicts," Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics 7 (2007).

Working at the Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics at the University of Colorado-Boulder, the Department of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers, and the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at UCLA, these scientists used state-of-the-art computer modeling to evaluate the consequences of a range of possible nuclear conflicts. They began with a hypothetical war in Southeast Asia, in which a total of 100 Hiroshima-size atomic bombs were detonated in the cities of India and Pakistan. Please consider the following images of Hiroshima, before and after the detonation of the atomic bomb, which had an explosive power of 15,000 tons of TNT.

The detonation of an atomic bomb with this explosive power will instantly ignite fires over a surface area of three to five square miles. In the recent studies, the scientists calculated that the blast, fire, and radiation from a war fought with 100 atomic bombs could produce direct fatalities comparable to all of those worldwide in World War II, or to those once estimated for a "counterforce" nuclear war between the superpowers. However, the long-term environmental effects of the war could significantly disrupt the global weather for at least a decade, which would likely result in a vast global famine.

The scientists predicted that nuclear firestorms in the burning cities would cause at least five million tons of black carbon smoke to quickly rise above cloud level into the stratosphere, where it could not be rained out. The smoke would circle the Earth in less than two weeks and would form a global stratospheric smoke layer that would remain for more than a decade. The smoke would absorb warming sunlight, which would heat the smoke to temperatures near the boiling point of water, producing ozone losses of 20 to 50 percent over populated areas. This would almost double the amount of UV-B reaching the most populated regions of the mid-latitudes, and it would create UV-B indices unprecedented in human history. In North America and Central Europe, the time required to get a painful sunburn at mid-day in June could decrease to as little as six minutes for fair-skinned individuals.

As the smoke layer blocked warming sunlight from reaching the Earth's surface, it would produce the coldest average surface temperatures in the last 1,000 years. The scientists calculated that global food production would decrease by 20 to 40 percent during a five-year period following such a war. Medical experts have predicted that the shortening of growing seasons and corresponding decreases in agricultural production could cause up to two billion people to perish from famine.

The climatologists also investigated the effects of a nuclear war fought with the vastly more powerful modern thermonuclear weapons possessed by the United States, Russia, China,

France, and England. Some of the thermonuclear weapons constructed during the 1950s and 1960s were 1,000 times more powerful than an atomic bomb.

During the last 30 years, the average size of thermonuclear or “strategic” nuclear weapons has decreased. Yet today, each of the approximately 3,540 strategic weapons deployed by the United States and Russia is seven to 80 times more powerful than the atomic bombs modeled in the India-Pakistan study. The smallest strategic nuclear weapon has an explosive power of 100,000 tons of TNT, compared to an atomic bomb with an average explosive power of 15,000 tons of TNT.

Strategic nuclear weapons produce much larger nuclear firestorms than do atomic bombs. For example, a standard Russian 800-kiloton warhead, on an average day, will ignite fires covering a surface area of 90 to 152 square miles.

A war fought with hundreds or thousands of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons would ignite immense nuclear firestorms covering land surface areas of many thousands or tens of thousands of square miles. The scientists calculated that these fires would produce up to 180 million tons of black carbon soot and smoke, which would form a dense, global stratospheric smoke layer. The smoke would remain in the stratosphere for 10 to 20 years, and it would block as much as 70 percent of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Northern Hemisphere and 35 percent from the Southern Hemisphere. So much sunlight would be blocked by the smoke that the noonday sun would resemble a full moon at midnight.

Under such conditions, it would only require a matter of days or weeks for daily minimum temperatures to fall below freezing in the largest agricultural areas of the Northern Hemisphere, where freezing temperatures would occur every day for a period of between one to more than two years. Average surface temperatures would become colder than those experienced 18,000 years ago at the height of the last Ice Age, and the prolonged cold would cause average rainfall to decrease by up to 90%. Growing seasons would be completely eliminated for more than a decade; it would be too cold and dark to grow food crops, which would doom the majority of the human population.

**The plan’s demand delegitimizes nuclear weapons and builds momentum for total disarmament --- shifting away from deterrence logic peels away at the ideology of militarism.**

Mitsuru Kurosawa **18**. Professor at Osaka Jogakuin University and a Professor Emeritus at Osaka University. “Stigmatizing and Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons.” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 1.1, 32-48.

The report by James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, “Delegitimizing nuclear weapons: examining the validity of nuclear deterrence,” was published during the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The main purpose of the publication is thus described as follows: in order to eliminate nuclear weapons, we first need to deconstruct the nuclear weapons security edifice, examine the beliefs surrounding nuclear deterrence and nuclear weapons, and remove the value that has been assigned to nuclear arms. A process of delegitimization requires revoking the legal or legitimate status of the weapons

**through a process of devaluation**, i.e., diminishing and **destroying all claims to legitimacy, prestige, and authority.**

In the report, nuclear deterrence is criticized: nuclear deterrence has been such a risky strategy, fraught with the consequences of accident and unchecked aggression, bound to promote proliferation, and not based on historical evidence. Small mistakes are not possible with nuclear weapons. Deterrence is the most commonly accepted quality of nuclear weapons, and in debates on nuclear weapons, it is an area in which the proponents of nuclear weapons and advocates of arms control find that they can compromise. However, it is striking how widely accepted nuclear deterrence is, given the paucity of real evidence in support of it (Berry et al. 2010, vi).

In conclusion, delegitimization of nuclear weapons is emphasized in the report as follows: Delegitimization of nuclear weapons is fundamental to prevent their use and achieve nuclear disarmament. Delegitimization is a process of devaluation, i.e., diminishing and destroying all claims to legitimacy, prestige, and authority. Delegitimization gets to the heart of the nuclear deterrence debate. The evidence for nuclear deterrence has been found wanting. Nuclear weapons are not particularly useful in today's world, and may even have increased pre-existing dangers in the form of international terrorism and old and decaying weapons lying in storage. Nuclear weapons have no inherent legitimacy as weapons of war in that they are inhumane and indiscriminate and cause unacceptable harm. What deterrent legitimacy they possess has been conferred on them through the mind-games of the Cold War, a period that is now over. Delegitimization will be a self-reinforcing endeavor, affecting the credibility of deterrent threats and allowing the restatement of the immorality of both the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons (Berry et al. 2010, 69).

Various studies on issues having a deep connect with the delegitimization of nuclear weapons are outlined in the report. These studies are thus summarized.

First, there is clear evidence that the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not end the Pacific War in 1945, but rather the declaration of war by the Soviet Union on August 8 did. Recent historical research in Japan and not-so-recent research from the Soviet archives have demonstrated that the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not significantly influence the willingness of Japan's General Staff and government to fight. Rather, the declaration of war by the Soviet Union on 8 August 1945 brought the Pacific War to an end because only at that point did Japan find itself in a no-win situation of fighting on two fronts simultaneously.

Second, contrary to the common belief, there is no evidence that nuclear weapons were instrumental in keeping peace during the Cold War. There is positive evidence that nuclear threats do not prevent conventional, chemical, or biological weapons attacks, even in circumstances where nuclear deterrence ought to work robustly. Nuclear weapons did not prevent the Soviet Union from occupying and holding most of Eastern Europe in the years after World War II. Nuclear weapons had no impact on events in China, where communist forces were victorious despite the possession of nuclear weapons by the US. Furthermore, US nuclear weapons had no power during both the Korean War and the Vietnam War.

Third, nuclear weapons have become a **currency of power**; even though nuclear weapons provide status today, new and different status symbols of power could be identified in the future. One of the fundamental mistakes of much of the thinking about nuclear weapons has been to be **overly impressed with means, while ignoring ends**. It is not surprising that this happened: nuclear explosions are awe-inspiring and impressive events. However, nuclear weapons have been around long enough for common sense to prevail.

Finally, nuclear weapons and their use are generally prohibited under existing international humanitarian law and customary international law. Some rules derived from the UN Charter and the Geneva Conventions require that the use of any weapon

- must be proportional to the initial attack;
- must be necessary for effective self-defense;
- must not be directed at civilians and civilian objects;
- must be used in a manner that makes it possible to discriminate between military targets and civilian non-targets;
- must not cause unnecessary or aggravated suffering to combatants;
- must not affect states that are not parties to the conflict; and
- must not cause severe, widespread or long-term damage to the environment.

Nuclear weapons violate each one of these rules (Berry et al. 2010, 15–36).

As a way to achieve nuclear disarmament, the engagement of the public has been identified as the single most important factor for achieving success in delegitimizing nuclear weapons. Mobilizing international public and political support and sustaining it throughout the disarmament process are possibly the most fundamental preconditions for progress on the path toward a world without nuclear weapons. A like-minded representative core group of states could begin a parallel track process to negotiate such agreements over a non-use treaty. It is time to open up a new debate and to consider the possibility that nuclear deterrence is not a valid framework for international security in the twenty-first century. It is time to make arrangements to get rid of nuclear weapons while we still have the opportunity

#### Other arguments for delegitimizing nuclear weapons

First, at the panel discussion on delegitimizing nuclear weapons at the United Nations in December 2010, Randy Rydell argued for delegitimizing nuclear weapons as follows:

The entire nuclear weapons enterprise rests on a bedrock foundation of strata. The first strata is what could be called “interest,” consisting of material and political interests and institutional constituencies representing them who have an interest in the perpetuation of these weapons.

The second stratum is known as “ideas,” i.e., the power of ideas in shaping the thinking about nuclear weapons. These include the doctrine of deterrence, myths like the genie out of the bottle, and the alleged value of nuclear weapons in preventing further proliferation and preventing the use of other types of weapons of mass destruction, as well as conventional war, the perceived prestige value of such weapons, and the declared value of such weapons in alliance.

The prescription for the future elimination of nuclear weapons implies the need to eliminate its superstructure, which includes all of these institutions and ideas that support it. Therefore, one has to address the weakness at the foundation of this superstructure. (Rydell 2010, 3)

Second, Amandeep Gill in his "Taking the path of delegitimization to nuclear disarmament," by employing the definition that delegitimization is to diminish or destroy the legitimacy, prestige, or authority of an entrenched idea or object, stated that if nuclear weapons are presently an established currency of politics and security, delegitimizing them would imply numerous actions or processes that devalue nuclear weapons and render them increasingly worthless. In Gill's paper, a "base camp" on the path to the "summit" of nuclear elimination in which the current tradition of nuclear non-use has been strengthened significantly so that nuclear use and nuclear threats are delegitimized as instruments of national power is described (Gill 2009).

Third, in 2006, Jack Mendelsohn, in his "Delegitimizing nuclear weapons," argued as a proposal for the next US Administration that the country should take the lead in making the use of nuclear weapons unacceptable under any but the most extenuating circumstances. He asserted that the next administration should declare that the US does not consider nuclear weapons to be a legitimate weapon of war and will not use them unless they are used by an adversary. A first-use policy of the US reinforces the value and prestige attributed to nuclear weapons and undermines the efforts of the US to persuade other nations to refrain from developing their own nuclear arsenals. As another important aspect of the delegitimization process, the US, rather than preserving and heralding the right of first use, should urge the international community to ban the use of nuclear weapons except in retaliation for nuclear use by others or particularly, in the case of small states such as Israel as a last resort if the survival of the nation is at risk. In addition, the next US administration should encourage the creation of nuclear weapon-free zones, the goal of which would be to make increasing areas or the globe off limits to nuclear weapons. Thus far, however, the United States has resisted the notion of new zones being created (Mendelsohn 2006, 14).

Fourth, the Reaching Critical Will argued that one way toward nuclear disarmament is the delegitimization of nuclear weapons. To delegitimize something means to diminish or destroy the legitimacy, prestige or authority of a given idea concept or object. In order to delegitimize anything, there is a critical need to change the perception of its role and utility; from a position in which it occupied a central strategic place to one in which its role is viewed as wholly unnecessary as well as undesirable. They expressed the view that the absence of any great catastrophe can be attributed to luck than to the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence, the indiscriminate nature of nuclear weapons would be a violation of international humanitarian law and nuclear weapons would have little or no utility as instruments of war. Therefore, they argued that in order to abolish nuclear weapons today, their role as a central strategic asset in a state's national security needs to be redefined and security issues have to principally focus on human security concerns (Reaching Critical Will 2012).

## AT: Doesn't Solve All Nuclear Issues

**NFU advocacy is a critical starting point --- the plan's demand is based on linked fate created by the nuclear threat which is a particular risk that intersects across a broader domain of oppressive structures, which enables anti-nuclear politics to spill out more broadly.**

Betsy Taylor 18. Helped found the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign and Iraq Peace Fund and is the president of Breakthrough Strategies & Solutions. "Nuclear Weapons Pose the Ultimate Threat to Mankind." <https://www.thenation.com/article/nuclear-weapons-pose-ultimate-threat-mankind/>.

Ever since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the peace movement has seemed moribund. But in the wake of the US–North Korean summit, there are glimmers of hope that something new is stirring, with a focus on the ultimate threat to humankind: the use of nuclear weapons.

This new momentum has been sparked by some of the dark times of the past 17 months. In January 2018, citing growing nuclear risks and unchecked climate dangers, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists set its iconic Doomsday Clock 30 seconds closer to midnight, the nearest to the symbolic point of annihilation that the clock has been since 1953, at the height of the Cold War. The world seems off its axis as new political forces have rekindled old animosities between nuclear rivals. The president's disastrous decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal has led to new dangers in the Middle East. Trump's choice of John Bolton as national-security adviser jeopardizes the prospect for enduring peace with North Korea; Bolton was one of the most rabid proponents for the invasion of Iraq and has pushed for regime change in North Korea, Iran, and Syria. Meanwhile, the nuclear-armed states are undertaking new weapons programs, and the possibility of stumbling into a calamitous war with North Korea and/or Iran has never been more real. There are nine nuclear-armed states with a combined arsenal of around 15,000 nuclear weapons. Another 59 countries possess nuclear materials and the capacity to create their own weapons programs. Even a small regional nuclear conflict could inflict catastrophic global damage. The probability of lost or stolen nuclear material, the accidental use of nuclear weapons (or terrorists acquiring them), and the threat of full-scale nuclear war all rise each time a new country decides to make weapons-grade nuclear materials.

Last year, President Trump declared that he wanted the US nuclear arsenal to be at the "top of the pack," asserting preposterously that the US military had fallen behind in its weapons capacity. In his 2018 State of the Union address, Trump again stated his determination to modernize the nation's nuclear stockpile. His appointments, statements, and actions—combined with the knowledge that the president has sole launch authority for these weapons—have raised global anxieties to a level not seen in a quarter-century. Google searches for "World War III" hit an all-time high in April 2017.

In response, movements for nuclear disarmament around the world are reviving the kind of activism that's been missing for a very long time. Take Korea: The American media make too little of the role of South Korean President Moon Jae-in and the domestic movements that propelled him into office. Moon did not emerge from a vacuum; he was backed by numerous progressive forces in South Korea. Women Cross DMZ and other Korean women's groups were

part of that electoral muscle. In 2015, on the 70th anniversary of Korea's division by the Cold War powers, Women Cross DMZ led 30 female peacemakers from 15 countries, including two Nobel Peace Prize laureates and the American feminist Gloria Steinem, across the Korean Demilitarized Zone. They held peace symposiums in Pyongyang and in Seoul, where hundreds of women discussed the impact of the unresolved Korean conflict on their lives and shared stories of mobilizing in their communities to end violence and war. They walked with 10,000 women on both sides of the DMZ, in the streets of Pyongyang, Kaesong, and Paju, calling for a formal peace treaty to end the Korean War, the reuniting of separated families, and a central role for women's leadership in the peace process. Women are still pushing with meetings, marches, and political engagement across the Korean Peninsula. Moon's election was partly a mandate to move forward with a new relationship with North Korea.

Peace movements in the non-nuclear states are on the rise too. In December 2017, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize for its efforts to advance a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear arms. In all, 122 countries have voted in favor of adopting the treaty thus far, and many are on the path to full ratification. On May 17, Vietnam became the 10th nation to ratify it; the treaty requires the ratification of 50 countries before it acquires legal standing. No nuclear state has expressed support for it yet, but the treaty stands as a moral document and is galvanizing peace movements in many countries.

Meanwhile, peace activists are taking a page from the fossil-fuel divestment movement. Don't Bank on the Bomb identifies corporations that produce key components for nuclear weapons and presses major institutions to divest from them. The Dutch pension fund ABP, the fifth-largest in the world, announced in January that it would divest from all nuclear-weapons producers. Twenty-two major global institutions have already done just that.

Back home in the United States, Beyond the Bomb is a new effort focused on grassroots advocacy to reduce the threat of nuclear conflict. To date, the campaign involves Win Without War and Women's Action for New Directions, but it aims to enlist a much broader network of groups. The primary focus is to pass emergency legislation that will curtail the president's sole authority to use nuclear weapons. Few things are more terrifying than Donald Trump's continual proximity to the so-called nuclear football—a briefcase with codes for launching nuclear missiles. When Trump threatened to rain "fire and fury like the world has never seen" on North Korea, Beyond the Bomb gained momentum. The campaign is also working with others to block the United States' proposed \$1.7 trillion nuclear-weapons modernization program, and to support the adoption of no-first-use declarations as well as increased funding to clean up nuclear contamination in frontline communities.

The current global dynamics of fear, dysfunctional governments, and capitalism run amok are helping to drive the nuclear-arms race. But long-standing groups like Nuclear Watch New Mexico and Tri-Valley Cares, located near nuclear labs and production facilities, are mobilizing with a new intensity against the restarting of industrial-scale plutonium-pit manufacturing. On May 8, the Rev. Dr. William J. Barber II, co-chair of the Poor People's Campaign, gave a groundbreaking speech in Washington, DC, that was reminiscent of Martin Luther King's 1967 anti-war speech at Riverside Church in New York City. Barber invoked the moral necessity to resist militarism, the war economy, and nuclear weapons. Iraq Veterans Against the War is

speaking forcefully against Trump's abandonment of the Iran nuclear deal, while Veterans for Peace has condemned the continuing US occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq. Young progressives are linking their concerns about the violence directed against women, immigrants, indigenous communities, and African Americans with their outrage over gun violence, ecological destruction, and US militarism. John Qua, senior campaigner for Beyond the Bomb, observes that "many young people see a seamless connection among these movements," including the need to address the ultimate form of violence—the use of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, many older Americans perceive a unifying theme here: the need to press for and protect a safe future for our children. Together, this incipient network of old and young alike is beginning to challenge government policies that have left us stranded for too long on the brink of nuclear conflict.

## **Con Contention Answers**

## Conventional Weans Shift Answers

### **Ratcheting down nuclear threats is key to conventional military draw-down.**

---Nuclear disarmament diffuses crisis situations which removes the impetus for conventional militarism

---Nuclear weapons worsen conventional wars due to the stability-instability paradox

---Nuclear deterrence desensitizes the public to loss of life by normalizing genocidal threats, AFF solves by providing a humanitarian discourse that spills over to other killing

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09/02/2017. "Tong Zhao, Fellow, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy." *The Nonproliferation Review*, vol. 24, no. 5–6, pp. 454–462.

There are important arguments that can prove the desirability of a nuclear-free world but have not been sufficiently understood. For example, people tend to separate the possession of nuclear weapons from the existence of major security problems among countries. They believe that there exist in the world bad regimes and serious security problems, and that nuclear weapons are needed to contain and manage them. However, they seem to underestimate that, in many cases, efforts to maintain nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence have themselves created serious international-security problems. The constant offense-defense competition around nuclear weapons generates much fear and distrust. To some extent, the possession of nuclear weapons creates the greatest threat perception and hostility between countries. In the long run, as economies have developed and the average standard of living has dramatically increased in most countries since World War II, people's tolerance of suffering major losses of life and damage to their property and environment appears to have dropped considerably. This increasing appreciation of the value of life is an indicator of a more civilized society. At the same time, it means there is less need to rely on the threat to kill hundreds of thousands of people to maintain peace. If this trend continues, the consequences of even a conventional war that would cost many fewer human lives may become unacceptable to most societies. In that case, using nuclear weapons as weapons of deterrence would be overkill, and conventional weapons may be increasingly capable of replacing nuclear weapons in this role. Some societies may already be moving in this direction. But the continued retention of nuclear deterrence and the lingering threat of potentially killing hundreds of thousands of people make the potential loss of fewer lives in a conventional war look comparatively acceptable. In this sense, the retention of nuclear weapons is delaying a progressive transformation toward a more advanced and civilized state of international relations in which countries no longer need to rely on nuclear weapons to maintain peace and stability. Furthermore, as the stability-instability paradox illustrates, mutual nuclear deterrence assures both parties that neither will launch a nuclear war and therefore they don't need to worry too much about the risk of nuclear wars.<sup>3</sup> This could actually encourage countries to behave more assertively at the conventional military level and thus increase the chances of conventional wars breaking out. In contrast, in a society where nuclear weapons were no longer present and the general public had become more appreciative of human lives, governments would be more cautious about initiating a conventional conflict. For the NWS, the greatest obstacle to self-restraint in maintaining and modernizing their nuclear

arsenals and to the implementation of a program of true disarmament is the tendency to conduct worst-case-scenario thinking. There are always extreme military scenarios in which even the most conventionally powerful country could find the use of nuclear weapons helpful, let alone those countries with much weaker and smaller conventional forces. When it comes to national-security matters, worst-case-scenario thinking prevents security strategists from taking any risk in preparing for extreme scenarios under which they think the use of nuclear weapons would be necessary, however unlikely such scenarios might be in practice. On the other hand, people tend to ignore the fact that the peace and stability provided by nuclear deterrence is not risk-free. The risk of nuclear deterrence failing to work always exists, and the consequences of such a failure would be catastrophic. In addition, there are risks of accidental nuclear launches due to technical or human errors. Close calls of this type have happened more than once in history. Ultimately, the decision to abolish nuclear weapons cannot be absolutely risk-free in terms of its potential implications for national security. If there is no willingness to take any risk in this process, nuclear disarmament will never be achieved. But, given the inherent security risks of using nuclear weapons to maintain peace and stability, there may be a strong argument for taking some risks to achieve the abolition of those weapons. This argument would have to overcome bureaucratic inertia and the tendency to preserve the status quo. Without some serious external pressure, particularly from a clearly stipulated deadline, the NWS will never willingly embrace the necessary risks or even conduct the necessary deep thinking about such fundamental issues. The Prohibition Treaty and Dunn's proposal for achieving strategic elimination in the medium-term future introduce such needed pressure. In addition, nuclear disarmament is not only a security argument; it is a moral argument, too. The reason China adopted an unconditional no-first-use (NFU) policy as early as 1964 was not that NFU offered the maximum security benefits for China. Given the inferiority of China's conventional military forces at that time and the serious conventional military threat it faced, China had every reason to maintain the option of using nuclear weapons to deter not only nuclear attacks but also conventional attacks. But, in addition to wanting to create a positive international image of their country and to reduce international criticism, the Chinese top leaders' adoption of unconditional NFU at that time was also motivated by a sense of moral responsibility to use nuclear weapons only for retaliating against nuclear attacks. Research shows that moral considerations did play an important role in China's nuclear decision making during the Cold War.<sup>4</sup> There is no reason to argue that moral considerations should not continue to be part of nuclear decision making in the future.

### **NFU wouldn't cause conventional rearm---removing crisis instability removes the impetus for arms buildups.**

Manpreet **Sethi** **18.** Senior Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi. 03-22-18. "Policy Brief No 60 - Towards a Nuclear Restraint Regime: From a Normative Ban Treaty to a Substantive Agenda." APLN. [http://a-pln.org/briefings/briefings\\_view/Policy\\_Brief\\_No\\_60\\_-\\_Towards\\_a\\_Nuclear\\_Restraint\\_Regime:\\_From\\_a\\_Normative\\_Ban\\_Treaty\\_to\\_a\\_Substantive\\_Agenda?ckattempt=3](http://a-pln.org/briefings/briefings_view/Policy_Brief_No_60_-_Towards_a_Nuclear_Restraint_Regime:_From_a_Normative_Ban_Treaty_to_a_Substantive_Agenda?ckattempt=3)

26. Another advantage of NFU is that it would allow the NWS to retain the notional sense of security that they derive from their nuclear arsenals. They would still be able to keep their nuclear weapons if abandoning them looks too big a leap to take. But pledging not to use them

first would **gradually lessen the desire to improve** an unusable weapon, making it **easier to give it up**. 27. Overall then, NFU has the potential to lessen inter-state tensions, increase mutual confidence and thus reinforce a cycle of positives. It would enhance the inclination towards non-proliferation by sending a strong signal of the diminishing utility of nuclear weapons. It would also lessen the drive of each NWS for new and modernized nuclear arsenals and thus lower inter-state insecurities. Therefore, this step would work towards enhancing the gradual irrelevance of the nuclear weapon, especially when reinforced by a ban on use or threat of use of the weapon, quite as on the pattern and experience of the 1925 Geneva Convention. 28. **One question**, however, **needs examination** when one considers the decision to accept no first use of nuclear weapons. **Would a decision/treaty that bans the first use of nuclear weapons lead to an arms race in conventional armaments** in order to bridge a perceived security deficit? While there are no empirical studies on the subject, **it well might be the case that in the short term**, countries divesting themselves of nuclear weapons might lean towards greater conventional acquisitions. However, **this trend is unlikely to last** if nuclear **disarmament** is either the result of or **results in more cooperative and secure inter-state relations**. Hence, **the possible spurt in conventional modernization could subside over a period of time**. This trend could be further **encouraged by a parallel process of conventional arms control** akin to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe model.<sup>9</sup>

## Allied Prolif Answers

### **Link threshold is VERY HIGH!**

**Bosack**, special adviser for government relations at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies. He previously served in the Japanese government as a Mansfield fellow and is a former officer in the U.S. Air Force, '19

(Michael McArthur, "Revisiting Japan's nuclear arms debate," November 28, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/11/28/commentary/japan-commentary/revisiting-japans-nuclear-arms-debate/#.XzcLqfhKib8>)

It should be clear that a firm commitment to develop a domestic nuclear arsenal is a “third rail” issue. Official government policy has always centered on the three non-nuclear principles, and bureaucrats involved in foreign policy and defense understand the sensitivities of the topic with regional partners and adversaries.

Even formally debating the idea among government officials would have ripple effects in the strategic environment, with China, South Korea and North Korea the most likely to issue strong rebuke. Actually pursuing a domestic nuclear arsenal would escalate responses exponentially.

Besides this practical strategic impact, the political costs are too great for politicians to weather. The Japanese public is traditionally wary of offensive military capabilities as it is, and the historical, cultural and social constructs since 1945 reinforce the country’s “nuclear allergy.” Formally raising the issue of producing nuclear weapons would throw the political landscape into disarray, and decisively pursuing development would be the move that breaks up the ruling coalition and fuels the opposition parties to topple the LDP.

To put this into context: We are currently seeing the Abe administration being targeted in the Diet and the media for how he selected guests to attend a cherry-blossom viewing party — imagine what would happen if Abe announced his intent to produce nuclear weapons. The reaction would be, well, atomic.

Because of this, no party has wished to tie its identity to this issue, and none will. Even within the LDP, nuclear weapons present an issue that is far different from other controversial security agenda items. Constitutional amendment, the other “third rail” policy objective, is written into the LDP charter while the non-nuclear principles have been the law of the land since 1967. As such, there are LDP heavyweights who strongly oppose even broaching the idea of an independent nuclear arsenal, let alone putting it to the Diet for discussion for changing the non-nuclear principles. For those that may be on the fence, when presented with the option of retaining control of the government or producing nuclear weapons, it is safe to assume that those lawmakers would prefer to keep their jobs, no matter what their individual beliefs may be.

Is there a threshold where Japan eschews political costs and pursues nuclear technology? In all things politics, it is foolish to answer “never” to anything, but the threshold here is extremely

high. In short, **there would have to be a complete abandonment by the U.S. as an ally.** Many observers will argue that uncertainty about the U.S. position toward North Korea or the debates over cost-sharing may be enough for Japan to consider it, **but that is not the case.** As long as the U.S. nuclear umbrella exists, the Japanese government **will not have the political impetus to change its course.**

So if it is an untenable policy position, **why the political rhetoric?** Of course, there are always the true believers who want a nuclear-armed Japan. However, **politicians are politicians, and some know that they can capture the attention of domestic and foreign audiences with talk of nuclear armament.** That attention and the leverage that comes from fear of Japanese nuclear proliferation presents opportunities for Japanese political leaders to shape current and near-term policy discourse, both foreign and domestic. **Even in those cases, however, it is a political tactic with little actionable weight behind it.**

**Low value alliances generate a commitment trap. Asymmetric interests pose insurmountable barriers for extended deterrence.**

**Shifrinson**, Joshua, Prof of IR @ BU, '17, "Time to Consolidate NATO?" *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 40, Issue 1.

The credibility of the U.S. commitment to its NATO allies has long been unclear. At root, **credibility hinges on the perception in the minds of foreign decisionmakers that a state has sufficient interest** in a given issue that it is willing to pay a certain—potentially large—cost to obtain or secure that objective. Owing to the exorbitant prospective costs of a U.S.–Soviet nuclear exchange during the Cold War, regular transatlantic crises revolved around the question of whether the United States would trade “Boston for Bonn” in the event of a general European war.<sup>8</sup> So long as the United States retained sole control of NATO’s decision to escalate past the nuclear threshold, U.S. policymakers faced a real problem in making Soviet policymakers and American allies alike believe that they would willingly take the nuclear plunge if events dictated.<sup>9</sup> As Thomas Schelling noted long ago, **it is inherently difficult to convince other actors that the United States will commit suicide for other states.**<sup>10</sup>

Still, **this problem was at least plausibly manageable during the Cold War.**<sup>11</sup> Despite the prospective costs, **the United States retained a large and pervasive interest in keeping Western Europe’s economic and military potential beyond Soviet control.** These objectives, in fact, heavily shaped the United States’ Cold War commitment to European security as the United States moved (1) to defend Western Europe from potential Soviet machinations, and (2) to deter Soviet adventurism against the area in the first place.<sup>12</sup> **The alternative was clear: if the Soviet Union were to dominate Europe’s war-making strength, it might tip the balance of power** against the United States, requiring a potentially ruinous counter-mobilization and global competition that an isolated United States might be unable to win. Geography reinforced this imperative, as failure to deter or defend against a Soviet assault across the inner-German border meant the USSR could quickly overrun the region. **The result was a concerted effort by the United States to make its promise to defend its NATO allies as credible as possible by forward-**

deploying large military force and seeking ways to escalate a contest with the USSR should it prove necessary.<sup>13</sup>

Today, the situation is reversed. The grand bargain in which Washington kept its finger alone on the nuclear button remains intact; if the United States is to fully honor its treaty commitments, it must ultimately be willing to engage in a nuclear exchange with Russia for the sake of its allies. However, where the United States could plausibly claim to trade Boston for Bonn prior to 1991, no amount of reassurance can make the promise to trade Toledo for Tallinn credible today—the stakes of the game are too low.

Alliances function when states decide that their mutual preservation adds to each side's national security and can be attained at a cost proportional to the benefit. For better or worse, NATO's post-Cold War enlargement altered this equation by notionally committing the United States to defend a host of states in Eastern Europe of questionable relevance to U.S. security. Indeed, those states most immediately threatened by Russia—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, followed by Poland—are among the least important allies in crude geopolitical terms. The three Baltic states combined accounted for only 0.13 percent of total NATO defense expenditures and 0.26 percent of NATO members' GDP as of 2016; Poland represented 1.17 and 1.54 percent, respectively.<sup>14</sup> American exchange with these states is similarly limited: trade with the Baltic states as a whole came to less than \$3 billion in 2015 against over \$3.75 trillion in total U.S. trade.<sup>15</sup> Baldly stated, these states could disappear without compromising the United States' economic security or NATO's military viability. The questionable value of these states alone thus renders the U.S. commitment to their defense highly contestable.<sup>16</sup> The American public, meanwhile, seems to recognize this very dynamic at some basic level, with 37 percent of U.S. citizens in a 2015 Pew Global Attitudes survey expressing reluctance with aiding a NATO ally threatened by Russia.<sup>17</sup>

Political geography further compounds NATO's problems. Not only can countries threatened by Russia be lost without compromising NATO's ability to defend the rest of Europe, but even an expanded Russia would be poorly placed to dominate the continent. Belarus and Ukraine, after all, lie across any Russian advance into Central Europe, while simply retaining control of a unified Germany affords NATO a defense-in-depth it never enjoyed during the Cold War. Add in the reality that Russia is an economic, political, and military pygmy compared to the Soviet Union everywhere except in the nuclear realm, and the United States' intrinsic interest in those states most immediately threatened by Russia is substantially less than during the Cold War.<sup>18</sup> Simply put, unlike the situation vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, Russian dominance over the Baltic states, Poland, and other new(er) NATO members would not result in the United States' eviction from Europe and concomitant loss of the region's economic or military strength.

Military pressures reinforce these dilemmas. Whereas a conventional defense of Western Europe was at least a possibility prior to 1989–1991, distance, reinforcement rates, and force-to-space ratios mean a conventional defense in Eastern Europe is not a realistic option today.<sup>19</sup> War games by the Rand Corporation highlight the problem in the Baltics context. To be sure, forces stationed in Eastern Europe can serve as a tripwire to deter Russian aggression by seemingly promising to bring NATO members' collective strength to bear.<sup>20</sup> If deterrence fails, however, and short of committing nearly all of NATO's conventional ground and air power to

the theater, even heavily-armored NATO forces can only slow down a Russian assault and promise a lengthy East–West conflict. Yet here, NATO again faces real limits to fighting in and around NATO’s East European members.<sup>21</sup> Though the United States can threaten conventional escalation, it cannot credibly commit to fighting for states of low strategic value if doing so risks a strategic nuclear exchange.

Nevertheless, the United States would undoubtedly face calls for precisely such steps that might lead to nuclear escalation in any losing conventional fight. Moreover, since any sustained effort to defend or retake the Baltics requires NATO conventional operations close to the Russian homeland, it risks attacks (accidental or otherwise) on Russian territory that invite an escalatory response. Russian antiaccess and area-denial (A2/AD) assets used against reinforcements flowing into the region—to say nothing of direct attacks on Poland—may also result in strikes on Russian-owned Kaliningrad, generating a similar escalation problem. In short, NATO cannot readily defend its Eastern flank through conventional means, faces implausibly large strategic risks if it tries, and so confronts an insoluble credibility crisis.<sup>22</sup> Indeed, that Estonia is now preparing to wage a lengthy guerilla war against a prospective Russian occupying force, while Lithuania is slowly moving to reinstate a military draft suggests vulnerable states recognize the United States’ credibility dilemma and are hedging their security bets as best they can.<sup>23</sup>

If anything, the main function of NATO deployments has been to antagonize a Russia that has far more at stake in Eastern Europe for geographic and historical reasons than the United States.<sup>24</sup> To be clear, NATO expansion in and of itself did not cause East–West relations to deteriorate.<sup>25</sup> However, U.S.-backed efforts to expand NATO eastward and subsequently deploy military forces to the region have been met with Russian pushback—Russian overflights of NATO airspace, diplomatic obfuscation, and military deployments have all accelerated in recent years.<sup>26</sup> Assuming NATO efforts in Eastern Europe continue, Russian leaders are prone to respond with further bellicosity that generates further strains in NATO–Russia relations.<sup>27</sup> Paradoxically, the resulting insecurity spiral increases the likelihood that efforts to deter Russia will result in deterrence failure.<sup>28</sup> Combined with the possibility that a NATO–Russia crisis may see Russia escalate the confrontation in order to de-escalate the situation, the risk of miscalculation is clear.<sup>29</sup> Collectively, this situation simultaneously invites Russian actions designed to discredit the United States in the eyes of its allies, gives threatened allies incentives to force events with Russia to tie American hands and deepen the United States’ involvement, and increases the risk of an action-reaction cycle.<sup>30</sup>

The net result is a dangerous standoff. To deter aggression, NATO relies on a collective security promise ultimately capped by the pledge that the United States will risk its own survival by putting its nuclear forces to use on behalf of its allies. For the Baltic states, Poland, and—potentially in the future—NATO’s other post Cold War additions, this pledge is no longer realistic on strategic or military grounds. The steps the United States and its allies are taking to reassure the most vulnerable members of NATO, however, increase the odds of a NATO–Russia crisis. Yet if and when a crisis erupts, the clarifying effect of a prospective nuclear exchange is apt to cause cooler heads to prevail and encourage U.S. efforts to restrain the dogs of war—revealing that American security guarantees to Eastern Europe were not credible in the first place. The more the United States continues pretending that its commitment to all NATO

members is created equal, the more it risks creating a situation that will reveal the shibboleth of the U.S. commitment

## Alliance commitments unevenly distribute the cost of war. Transition to multipolarity waning makes the risk of entrapment most likely.

David M. Edelstein, Foreign Studies @ Georgetown, and Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, IR @ BU, '18, "IT'S A TRAP! Security commitments and the risks of entrapment" in *US Grand Strategy in the 21st Century*, Routledge.

### Unipolarity

What of unipolarity, where one power is dominant, as is the case with the United States today? Prima facie, entrapment should be extremely rare in unipolarity. Allies are unlikely to materially affect the unipole's security given the presumed material predominance of a unipolar power; hence, the sole great power around does not need to go to war on its allies' behalf. If pressed, a unipolar power can simply cut the ally off and treat it as any other state.

On further investigation, however, the uniquely advantageous strategic situation that unipoles find themselves in can paradoxically increase the likelihood of entrapment. Because unipolarity is such an advantageous position for a state, a unipolar power has a powerful temptation to roam the system and prevent other great powers from rising and winnowing down its position. Assuming the unipole will not itself engage in preventive wars to stop future competitors, it can either ally with local actors in order to use them as proxies against a future threat, or ally with a prospective challenger itself in order to influence it (Gavin 2015; Ikenberry 2008). Such behavior may be particularly characteristic of waning unipoles that are increasingly wary of the threat posed by other rising great powers.

Both options allow the unipole's allies to gain leverage over its foreign policy, and therefore risk entrapment. In the first case, the unipole may need to back up allies in their disputes with other relatively small states in order to ensure their help against the prospective challenger. In the latter case, the unipole may need to work at the prospective challenger's behest to keep the potential challenger from opposing the unipole's dominance. In either case, shifting power can lead to a unipole's entrapment. On one level, shifting power dynamics can increase an ally's leverage over a unipole's foreign policy. In particular, if a unipole is on the verge of seeing its dominance disappear altogether, allies take on a growing importance in helping slow or stop the rise of new peer competitors. Hence, any given ally can threaten to defect from the unipole's coalition and hinder the unipole's ability to address the looming threat unless the waning unipole fights on behalf of the ally. Put differently, a prospective challenger's threat of defection may undermine a unipole's dominance, making costly sacrifices for an ally more attractive than would otherwise be the case. The more a unipole seeks to prevent the rise of new great powers – something most unipoles want – the greater the risk of entrapment (Monteiro 2014).

Shifting power also increases the risk of moral hazard – a situation in which an actor behaves recklessly, knowing that they have an insurance policy that will cover any losses they incur. In

the case of alliance politics, smaller allies may act aggressively if they know that their more powerful ally will come to their aid. Because some allies are uniquely powerful or important to their partners, many security commitments can end up being disproportionate to the threat they address. Though any alliance can face moral hazard problems – witness American concerns over European recklessness during the Cold War – they are likely to be particularly problematic in unipolar settings. Because unipoles are uniquely powerful, the security commitments they hold exist in the absence of a compelling military threat to the unipole itself. However, the same may not apply for the unipole's allies. For them, the international system remains a competitive environment in which other states may challenge their security and other interests. This asymmetry is asking for trouble. For a unipole's allies, the best way to guarantee victory in any conflict is to ensure the unipole enters the contest on their behalf. In this sense, **an alliance with a unipole is the best kind of insurance** policy, Allies of a unipole have strong incentives to lie, cheat, and steal to convince a unipole to come to their aid. Because the unipole itself may see through the smokescreen, they also have incentives to manipulate events to force a unipole's hand.

In turn, shifts in power increase the unipole's exposure to moral hazard. Because power shifts can also work to the disadvantage of a unipole's allies and – crucially – are likely to affect their security earlier than they affect a unipole's security, **the risks of an ally seeking to cash in the unipole's insurance** policy loom large. That is, since a **unipole's allies are unlikely to want to wait for a power shift to occur before the unipole comes to their aid**, they have reason both to try to convince the unipole that a rising state endangers international security and to create a situation that buttresses this line of reasoning. The goal of such efforts is to increase the value of **the alliance to the unipole and short-circuit the unipole's own calculations regarding the distribution of power. Moral hazard and power shifts can thus create a vicious cycle.**

The United States, the unipolar era, and the risk of entrapment

The preceding discussion (summarized in Table 2.1) has large implications for the United States. During the Cold War, bipolarity constrained the importance of allies, limiting the risk of entrapment. Moreover, the prospect of nuclear war discouraged risky behavior by the superpowers and their allies. Today, however, **the risk of entrapment** born of moral hazard and states' search for security is larger and possibly increasing. As long as the US continues to make commitments overseas and fear the emergence of a peer competitor, **American partners will be tempted to act in risky ways, expecting that Washington will feel compelled to come to their rescue should they get into trouble.**

Insofar as the United States opposes Chinese or Russian aggression, **smaller states will be tempted to provoke China or Russia to garner growing American support**. If the United States is opposed to the emergence of great power peer competitors, then it may well opt to come to the aid of smaller states threatened by those potential competitors. This also means that countries that have limited or no explicit security commitments from the United States may try to profit from the insurance policy offered by the United States by provoking conflicts and expecting the United States – whose interests are clear – to ride to their defense.

### **Entrapment is a process, not an event. Miscalculation occurs in escalatory steps.**

David M. Edelstein, Foreign Studies @ Georgetown, and Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, IR @ BU, '18, "IT'S A TRAP! Security commitments and the risks of entrapment" in *US Grand Strategy in the 21st Century*, Routledge.

Still, we should be careful not to think of entrapment as purely an either/or decision whereby one ally that was previously wholly at peace with a third state mobilizes and goes to war out of the blue for the sake of an ally that has a conflict with the third state. To be sure, existing studies of entrapment focus exclusively on the question of whether states are compelled to fight unwanted wars on behalf of allies solely to maintain the alliance. For these studies, entrapment thus occurs if and only if allies end up on the same side in a conflict with one another even if one or more members of that alliance does not share a preference for that conflict (see e.g., Beckley 2015). Such an event would indeed be noteworthy and an obvious case of entrapment, but we should also expect it to be relatively rare. Rational states are not expected to fight wars that are against their national interests, and as skeptics of entrapment have claimed, leaders of those states are more likely to walk away than commit national blood and treasure to a patently unwise war (Waltz 1964). This standard thus sets a theoretically problematic high bar, suggesting that states are sufficiently concerned about their security that they form alliances, yet sufficiently unconcerned about their security that they will roll the iron dice for non-vital interests. It virtually defines away the very phenomenon of interest.

Instead, it is worthwhile relating entrapment to the process by which states tend to end up in crises and war with one another. In the modern world, international events and matters of high politics that may lead to conflict are rarely discrete events. Decisions that lead to war often occur in a series of escalatory steps. In stylized fashion, we can think of this as, first, the emergence of international tensions between two or more states, followed by a response by the threatened states and/or their allies, followed by further escalation on the part of the parties to the dispute, followed by further intra-alliance negotiation, and so on. In the process, states are also likely to put their domestic houses in order by mobilizing public support and sidelining officials who disagree with expanding a confrontation with an opponent or deepening allied support. During and after the Cold War, for instance, the United States and its allies crafted a number of institutional pathways whereby, if and when tensions with the Soviet Union heated up, NATO members would be able to consult, coordinate, and graduate responses to Soviet moves and countermoves; thus, even if states are not entrapped into a war that policymakers decry as against their interests, the conflict itself may still witness entrapment as states are pushed by allies to fight at particular times and places, and for certain objectives, that they would otherwise avoid – entrapment can shape the nature of state participation in conflicts even without causing the underlying source of confrontation. Ultimately, if an ally acts in a way that forces the state to alter its behavior in a costly and meaningful way, then it is reasonable to conclude that the state was entrapped by the actions of its ally.

Accordingly, entrapment is both more likely to occur and more likely to be clearly manifested on finer-grained inter-allied decisions related to the use of force both before and during a conflict. These "entrapment dynamics" reflect the fact that allies, even if they share similar preferences

on which other states in the international system need to be opposed – and thus on whether war may be necessary – can still share divergent preferences over the nature of that opposition. More precisely, allies can differ profoundly across three key areas related to the use of force, namely (1) the timing of a war against a common threat, (2) the goals of that conflict, and (3) the relative size and nature of the contributions each state makes in the course of a conflict. Since allied preferences can diverge over these issues even though states value the alliance itself, they create propitious conditions for allies to entrap one another into fighting wars at times, in support of objectives, and with greater contributions over which they disagree with their partners. In short, by breaking war down into these different elements, entrapment becomes evident at different levels aside from the largest question of whether a state was drawn into a war it would otherwise have preferred to avoid. We treat each issue in turn.



## Japan Prolif Answers

### **First use threat isn't credible --- NFU solves**

Bruce G. Blair, 9/28/2016. Nuclear security expert and a research scholar at the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton and the co-founder of Global Zero. "The Flimsy Case Against No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons." <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/09/nuclear-weapons-no-first-use-debate-214300>.

President Barack Obama is said to be weighing the same question right now—with grave possible consequences for the world. With the delivery to the Oval Office 10 days ago of a high-level internal review of the pros and cons of adopting a policy of “no-first-use” of nuclear weapons, it’s finally up to Obama to give thumbs up or down, with just four months to go in his presidency. His inclination is to adopt the policy, as he nearly did several years ago during his Nuclear Posture Review. Several months ago, Obama had made up his mind in favor, or so I’ve been told, but ruling out first-use has stirred strong headwinds from some of our key allies and rear-guard attacks by key Cabinet officers. Japan, South Korea, United Kingdom and France reportedly oppose it on the grounds that it could embolden adversaries like North Korea, China and Russia to attack with conventional weapons. Secretaries Ash Carter, John Kerry and Ernest Moniz argue that that no-first-use could encourage our allies to build their own nuclear weapons, thus sparking a new wave of nuclear proliferation.

These arguments are unpersuasive. The available evidence in the public domain and surely special intelligence assessments completed during Obama’s deliberations as well do not support them.

Would taking a nuclear first strike off the table encourage conventional aggression? Hardly, given that potential adversaries already believe they could wage limited conventional warfare with the United States without triggering escalation to the nuclear level. The threat of nuclear escalation rings hollow; it is certainly not credible enough to dampen aggression at the low end of the conflict spectrum—such as cyberattacks, covert special operations like Russia’s stealthy incursion into Ukraine and likely infiltration of the Baltic NATO states, and North Korea’s routine assaults on South Korea. Nor have nuclear first-strike plans against countries like Iran, Syria, Iraq and Libya discouraged them from fighting the United States and our allies directly or through proxies.

One could imagine that nuclear first-use threats affect behavior at the high end of the spectrum. But again, the facts suggest otherwise. The threat of nuclear escalation has not weighed heavily on anyone’s readiness to wage limited conventional war if their vital interests or sovereignty are threatened. For instance, China undoubtedly would initiate head-to-head combat with U.S. forces protecting Taiwan if the latter declares independence with America’s approval. In the case of Russia, while it seeks to avoid a conventional war with NATO, it certainly envision a conventional phase of war with NATO. That its nuclear doctrine allows Russia to initiate the use of nuclear weapons, probably for demonstration purposes, if the survival of the state is threatened clearly indicates that Russia entertains waging war with NATO below the nuclear threshold.

A potential aggressor would be far more emboldened by its adversaries’ conventional weakness than by its nuclear no-first-use policy. Conversely, North Korea, China and Russia would not fail to appreciate that the conventional balance tilts heavily against them. North Korea, for instance, would be totally irrational to invade the South knowing that its opponents would decisively defeat it within a short period. A U.S. declaration of no-first-use would not change these facts on the ground that work to deter any rational adversary.

The opposition of U.S. senior officials also rests on scant evidence. A recent Global Zero study finds that neither elite nor public opinion among our 30 key allies believes that U.S. nuclear first use is critical to their defense. This threat has long been discounted, knowing that U.S. presidents would be very reluctant to carry out such a threat and that conventional forces are adequate to successfully defend the sovereignty and vital interests of these 30 nations against non-nuclear aggression, including chemical and biological threats. Nuclear forces, and nuclear first use, are simply not needed to protect them.

What counts far more to our allies is the credibility of the U.S. threat to retaliate against a nuclear aggressor by responding in kind with nuclear weapons. A consistent and growing majority in South Korea supports an independent nuclear weapons program because of eroding trust in U.S. extended deterrence—but it is the reliability of a second strike, not a first, that preoccupies the public. This is not a

baseless angst, which Trump has deepened by his questioning U.S. defense obligations, but it is not the same question as the credibility or necessity of resorting to U.S. nuclear weapons first. First use is beside the point.

## No chance Japan prolifs because of NFU – assumes security threats Global Zero, 16

(Founded by Bruce Blair – nuclear security expert and a research scholar at the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton International non-partisan group of 300 world leaders dedicated to achieving the elimination of nuclear weapons, “U.S. Adoption of No-First-Use and its Effects on Nuclear Proliferation by Allies”, Last Date Referenced is 2016,  
[http://www.globalzero.org/files/nfu\\_ally\\_proliferation.pdf](http://www.globalzero.org/files/nfu_ally_proliferation.pdf))

### Japan

● Unlike South Korea, Japan's public has minimal appetite for any modification of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles forbidding the manufacture, possession, or introduction of nuclear weapons to Japanese territory. This reflects significant normative barriers to nuclear development weapons that, because of Japan's unique historical relation to nuclear weaponry, are arguably higher for Japan than for any other state. Japanese leaders consistently and fervently reject an independent nuclear deterrent even in the context of the North Korean nuclear security threat. Japan regularly connects its role as an advocate for nonproliferation to its reliance on U.S. extended deterrence, such as in the debate over the impact of the Obama administration’s nuclear initiatives on the nuclear umbrella.<sup>22</sup> However, the specifics of nuclear retaliation are less important to Japanese perceptions of U.S. extended deterrence, which is shifting the basis of [confidence] away from narrow nuclear measures and toward a broader consensual conception of deterrence that views conventional capabilities as more effective than the threat of nuclear retaliation in deterring the kinds of lower level threats Japan actually faces in today’s security environment.<sup>23</sup> Polling further supports a sense of Japanese confidence in U.S. extended deterrence – a deterrence that is not necessarily nuclear: “in a December 2006 Yomiuri Shimbun poll, 71 percent predicted that the U.S. would help Japan militarily if Japan should come under armed attack by another country.”<sup>24</sup>

● Most Japanese security officials and experts prefer the U.S. to maintain strategic ambiguity rather than pursue a no-first-use policy, despite heavy doubts that first use would ever be employed. However, interviews in 2010 suggest that a no-first-use policy, if not preferred, would be tolerated.<sup>25</sup> There is no evidence that a no-first-use policy would alter the current Japanese position to abstain from nuclear weapons. Japan has shown no proliferation risk despite the nuclear threat represented by North Korea. More relevant than the nuclear umbrella to Japan’s non-nuclear status is an entrenched public and political commitment to nonproliferation and disarmament, as well as confidence in a U.S. extended deterrent in which conventional commitment is valued. There is no evidence that Japan assigns critical security importance to the first use of nuclear weapons or that a no-first-use policy would increase its risk of proliferation.

### No cascades. Cred theory false – states privilege the current balance of power.

John M. Schuessler, Professor of International Affairs @ A &M, and Joshua R. Shifrinson, Professor of IR @ BU, '19, "The Shadow of Exit from NATO," *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Fall.

Is reputation, in fact, worth fighting for? To a surprising degree, the evidence cuts against the notion that commitments are interdependent and thus that reputation deserves the importance that policy makers have ascribed to it. An exhaustive review of the literature is beyond the scope of this article, but a safe implication to draw from some of its seminal contributions is that reputation has been overvalued.<sup>51</sup>

Ted Hopf, for example, notes how the United States became involved in various Third World conflicts during the Cold War, more to deter the Soviet Union than to protect any specific interest. Hopf highlights the lessons the Soviets learned from their victories and defeats in these conflicts, finding that "not a single Soviet in twenty-five years inferred anything about American credibility" in the core based on events in the periphery.<sup>52</sup> Political scientist Jonathan Mercer leverages insights from social psychology to generate the counterintuitive argument that states are unlikely to get reputations for either lacking resolve among adversaries or for having resolve among allies. Bolstered by an examination of reputation formation in a series of pre-World War I crises, Mercer concludes, "It is wrong to believe that a state's reputation for resolve is worth fighting for."<sup>53</sup> Daryl Press, finally, pits the past actions theory, which says that the credibility of a state's threats depends on its history of keeping or breaking commitments, against the current calculus theory, which privileges the balance of power and interests. To evaluate these competing theories of credibility, Press examines decision-making during three sets of crises—the "appeasement" crises between Nazi Germany and Britain and France before World War II, as well as Cold War crises between the Soviet Union and the United States over Berlin and Cuba. The cases reveal, Press argues, that "the very same leaders who are so concerned about their own country's credibility that they are loath to back down reflexively ignore the enemy's history for keeping or breaking commitments."<sup>54</sup> Press, like Mercer, ends up concluding that states "should not fight wars for the sake of preserving their credibility."<sup>55</sup>

### Plan solves japan prolif. We'll rebalance to east asia to re-assure allies.

Ivan Eland, is a senior fellow at the Independent Institute and director of the Independent Institute's Center on Peace & Liberty, 2-21-20, "Trump Should Get Out of NATO Now, But Nicely," American Conservative, <https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/trump-should-get-out-of-nato-now-but-nicely/>

The NATO alliance was established to protect war-devastated Western European nations against a possible Soviet threat until they got on their feet economically again. Dwight Eisenhower even said that if American troops remained in Europe too long, NATO would have failed. Yet long after the European economic miracle—amazing prosperity achieved during a robust recovery in the decade or so after the war—and long after the Soviet Union collapsed, NATO, instead of going away, has expanded its territory and mission. The American military remains in Europe to guarantee the security of nations that have a combined GDP greater than that of the United States. Meanwhile, Russia, the successor "threat" to the Soviet Union, has a GDP equivalent to that of Spain. The overextended United States also has a staggering national debt of \$23 trillion

and eye-popping unfunded government mandates at all levels that amount to between \$150 and \$200 trillion.

One might conclude from this that Trump's policy of angrily haranguing and belittling his NATO allies into coughing up a few more dollars for their own defense is the right one. Trump crudely understands the problem but has come up with the wrong solution. The many Eurocentric analysts, who dominated the American foreign policy elite during the Cold War and are now trying to hang on to relevance, keep hyping the general Russia threat by excessively demonizing its president, Vladimir Putin, who is really just another tin-pot dictator.

A third way is still possible, one that avoids both placating the hand-wringing Eurocentric establishment and the nickel-and-diming of NATO allies that Trump desires.

The worst fear of the Eurocentrics is that Trump will, before leaving office, withdraw from the NATO alliance, much as he did with the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade pact, the international agreement on climate change, and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty. Yet this is the proper, though radical, approach. It needs to be done immediately, so that it can't be reversed by the next president. The problem is that Trump has been rude and obnoxious enough to the Europeans that the divorce might very well make Britain's exit from the European Union look like a walk in the park. The ideal would have been to have had a previously cordial relationship with Europe, followed by a U.S. statement that the European economic miracle has allowed them to withstand a stagnant Russia and they need to finally take primary responsibility for their own defense.

This would have allowed the United States rebuild its dissipated power by reducing government spending and debt and reallocating the remaining military forces to the Pacific to hedge against a rising China. Such a change is critical, and it remains to be seen whether it can be achieved.

### **Asian prolif coming now to respond to Chinese missile modernization. Its uniquely destabilizing compared to Europe.**

Stephen J. Cimbala, Political Science @ Penn State, '20, *The United States, Russia and Nuclear Peace*, Springer, ISBN 978-3-030-38088-5

Cold War experience mistakenly suggested to some that nuclear weapons were self-deterring or nearly so. The United States and the Soviet Union, after going through steep learning curves about crisis management and nuclear operations in the 1950s and 1960s, developed "rules of the road" for strategic interaction. These rules included Hot Lines for direct communication between heads of state; use controls over weapons dispersed to the military; "fail safe" and other standard operating procedures for nuclear forces to reduce the risk of accidental or inadvertent nuclear use; separation of the early warning and response functions into different bureaucratic compartments (e.g., North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and Strategic Air Command (SAC)); and, most important, direct involvement of the political levels of the Department of Defense in defining the objectives for nuclear war plans. Although with different structures and policy controls, the Soviets also took measures to ensure against military usurpation of political decision-making or accidental nuclear war.

These and other measures of nuclear control were intended to accomplish two apparently contradictory, but necessary, objectives. Leaders wanted to prevent the unauthorized or accidental firing of nuclear weapons; but, equally, they also wanted to ensure the prompt responsiveness of nuclear forces, if called upon to retaliate by duly authorized commands.<sup>7</sup>

Ensuring prompt responsiveness under attack meant, for US planners and policy makers, that the capability to retaliate would survive even the largest nuclear surprise attack. Only the US President could legally authorize the use of nuclear weapons, but the President might be killed or otherwise unavailable within the 15 minutes or so between missile launches from Soviet Central Asia and their arrival in North Dakota or Montana. Therefore, the chain of command had to be distributed or dispersed among variously located and redundant backups, in order to provide for surviving leaders who were both authorized and enabled to launch retaliatory strikes. The United States solved this problem by creating parallel structures for delegation of authority and devolution of command: the political line of succession under the Presidential Succession Act, and the military chain of command from the President to the Secretary of Defense, and then to various functional and regional unified and specified military commanders.

Will the Asian nuclear powers of the twenty-first century have similar political and institutional controls over military operations in time of crisis or conventional war with the possibility of nuclear escalation? We know distressingly little about the command and control systems for nuclear weapons among existing, and possible future, post-Cold War proliferators.

For the duration of the Cold War and most of the post-Cold War, until very recently, North Korea was an opaque target for intelligence collection and net assessment. Iran, although located in the Middle East, has potential geostrategic reach into Asia with its expanding ballistic missile program. Iran's future nuclear weapons could presumably be held under the political control of its supreme religious council and/or its government—with its military, intelligence and other security organs mostly controlled by the former.<sup>8</sup> Both Iran and Pakistan could be torn by political rivalries within their security and defense establishments that cut across bureaucratic lines of authority and responsibility. Conflict between Islamic fundamentalists and political reformers in both states could raise uncertainties about the crisis management of nuclear force and might leave commanders with de facto authority to fire or withhold weapons.

Unstable command and control over nuclear forces could be joined at the hip to nationalist or religious hostility in Asia. During the Cold War, the Americans and Soviets competed on the basis of political ideology: communism versus capitalism. Both of these ideologies were rooted in Western philosophy and history and neither, with the exception of lunatic fringes on both sides, anticipated an inevitable final day of judgment between the two systems. Despite significant differences in military strategic doctrine, the United States and the Soviet Union established an ongoing process of nuclear arms control that helped to stabilize their political relationship and to avoid conflicts based on misinformation and mistaken assumptions about one another's intentions. In a sense, more than four decades of "nuclear learning" occurred as between the two nuclear superpowers that lasted to the very end of the Cold War and even beyond the demise of the USSR.<sup>9</sup>

In Asia, the next decade or two may witness the combination of absolute weapons in the hands of leaders with apocalyptic motivations or regionally hegemonic objectives. To be clear: it is not

asserted here that the leaders of nuclear powers in Asia will be less “rational” than their European counterparts. Rationality is a loaded, and a subjective, term: in politics, it implies a logical or logically intended connection between political ends and means.<sup>10</sup> Leaders in Asia will have political objectives that differ from those of the Cold War Americans and Soviets: not illogical in their own terms, but less road tested against accidental, inadvertent or deliberate escalation to nuclear war under the stress of political crisis and ambiguous intelligence.

Military strategy is the realm of logical paradox and oxymoronic truths. Strategies and policies intended as defensive can, in this paradoxical world, appear provocative and offensive to other states. For example, leaders in Asia might misconstrue or apply mistakenly the strategy of preemption.

Preemption is not an offensive strategy but a defensive one. It is motivated by the expectation that the opponent has already launched an attack or is about to. Preemption is dangerous on account of its “defensiveness”: leaders misperceive that they are already under attack based on deficient and misleading indicators of warning, or on mistaken assumptions about enemy intentions and capabilities.<sup>11</sup>

## XT 2AC 1: Inevitable + plan stabilizes

**Extended deterrence – we won’t trade boston for berlin. That causes rearm.**

**Rhetoric matters.**

Susan J. Koch, PhD Political Science @ Harvard, Former White House National Security Council Staff, 5-3-20, "Extended deterrence and the future of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty," Comparative Strategy, 39:3

Sixty years ago, President de Gaulle questioned whether the United States would sacrifice New York for Paris. Now increasing numbers in South Korea, Japan and Australia—and worse, perhaps Pyongyang and Beijing—are asking the same about Seoul, Tokyo and Sydney. If recent U.S. Presidential statements are repeated, more Europeans—and Moscow—might echo de Gaulle’s doubts. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States might not even ask the question. Credible U.S. extended deterrence threats and commitments require strong policies and clear statements of intent. Not just about our commitments, but also about whom we call our friends and adversaries. That was something so obvious for so many decades that all concerned—protector, protected and potential adversary—could take it for granted. Unfortunately, that may no longer be the case

**Leadership – COVID, climate, iran, 5g all make the US unreliable. Biden can’t solve.**

Luke McGee, Senior Producer @ CNN, 10+ years in Journalism, 7-4-2020, "Cracks in the Trump-Europe relationship are turning into a chasm," CNN,  
<https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/04/europe/trump-europe-relationship-intl/index.html>

For more than 70 years, the transatlantic alliance has served as the unshakable foundation of European stability and underpinned the values of the US-led Western order. In 2020, it appears that relationship is being rethought on both sides of the Atlantic.

Earlier this week, the European Union declined to include US in its list of "safe countries," meaning that American travelers will be unwelcome inside the bloc for the foreseeable future, due to the eyewatering US coronavirus infection numbers. Controversially, the list includes China -- the country where the virus originated -- on the condition of reciprocal arrangements.

EU officials insist that the decision was not political and based entirely on epidemiological evidence, in the hope this would pacify US President Donald Trump, a man who has attacked the bloc on several occasions.

However, others privately concede that had Brussels wanted to make the pill more palatable for an American audience, they could have added a sugar coating. "In the past, I can see that we might have not included China in order to keep the US happy," says an EU diplomat not authorized to speak on record about how the decision was made.

It might seem a stretch to take this incident as evidence of a rupture in transatlantic relations, until you place it in the current geopolitical context. It's no secret that Washington takes less of an interest in European affairs these days. And it's well known that European nations actively

seek greater diplomatic autonomy from America. This is especially true for the 27 member states of the European Union.

One of the ways Brussels thinks it can distance itself from DC is by engaging with China as a strategic and economic partner, decreasing its reliance on one of the world's superpowers by balancing its relationship with the other.

In the past few years, Brussels has stuck to its guns on big, international matters as Trump tore everything up. Think of the Paris Climate Accord, the Iran Nuclear deal, 5G, and you start to see a pattern of behavior in which the EU could be perceived to have sided with China over its oldest ally. Sure, it might be a ungenerous read of the situation, given the deep, established bond between Europe and the US, but in this context, any perceived friendliness to Beijing punches a very real bruise.

"Knowing what we know about China's data, how it has behaved during the pandemic and the White House's stance, I think in another world we would have kept them off," says the diplomat. That other world he refers to isn't simply the world before Trump took office.

One Brussels official who works on EU foreign policy but is not authorized to speak on the record said the shift away from Europe as a geopolitical priority began under former US president Barack Obama.

"Obama didn't have as close an interest in the Middle East as previous presidents, which is geographically more of a European problem. And he was shifting his priorities from Europe to China and Asia," the official said.

However, longstanding observers of the alliance accept it has been strained over the past four years -- and will worsen still if Donald Trump beats former vice president Joe Biden in this year's US election. "Trump considers the EU, especially Germany, an economic and trade rival, which means tensions can be expected in the case he gets a second term," says Velina Tchakarova, from the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy.

She says that as the EU is taking steps toward "building stronger autonomy in the field of security and defence," Trump tries to "undermine such efforts through his attacks on the European NATO members as well as through economic and trade measures."

The Brussels official explains that Trump's "break from multilateralism" on big international matters like Iran, coupled with the US taking "less responsibility in European security" has accelerated European thinking to take a step away from America and "do our own thing on the world stage."

This characterization of a hostile US administration that goes out of its way to avoid working with Europeans is one that the EU diplomat recognizes. "The problem is, officials in DC who want to work with Europe, while in contact, don't have the mandate from the government to engage in any serious way. They have hung on as long as they can but if we get a second Trump term, then we are in real trouble."

This, according to Tchakarova, is why "EU institutions and leaders of the member states hope that Joe Biden will be elected in November ... he is in favor of multilateralism and the expectation is that he will strengthen the ties between the USA and Europe."

CNN approached numerous officials from the EU institutions and diplomats on both sides of the Atlantic for comment. Most declined to comment; several conceded that they believed this to be the case. One European diplomat said: "We'll dance with whoever is on the dance floor, but it doesn't take a genius to see that the EU-US cooperation is currently underperforming."

Asked to comment on a potential pivot by the EU away from its historical ties with the US, a State Department spokesperson said: "The United States and the EU share a strong, enduring partnership based on common democratic values and governance, respect for human rights and the rule of law, deep economic ties, and a commitment to Transatlantic prosperity and security. This longstanding partnership is vital as we coordinate on a host of international efforts."

However, a potential Biden victory would provide no quick fix for the transatlantic partnership. "The question is not really if you can get the relationship back to where it was, but if we can persuade the US to re-join the Western order," says the EU diplomat.

"The US and EU geopolitical pivots on Asia, the Middle East and trade have respectively already begun. The difference at the moment is we think the West should be pivoting as one."

And even if Biden did go back to Obama-era policy on Europe, there is no guarantee that in four years' time he wouldn't be replaced by someone even more radical than Trump. "The fundamental shifts going on in the US will probably remain and we have to adjust, making the best of the relationship we can. These shifts, they are structural and they are not just based on one person," says the Brussels official.

Of course, none of this means that the transatlantic alliance will stop being important. It will remain central to what the West represents, and the US will always be a more important ally to Europe than China ever could be. Besides, the EU's big plans to engage more with China were dealt a major blow by the Covid-19 outbreak.

However, that fading veneer of warmth -- with Europe seeking a new place on the world stage as the US's global role becomes inherently more unpredictable -- can only be seen as good news for those that these historic Western powers were united against not so long ago.

### **Normal means occurs in phases – avoids complete chaos.**

Andrew J. **Bacevich**, professor of history and international relations at Boston University and a retired Army colonel, **'13**, "Time for the United States to Leave NATO"  
<https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/04/23/has-nato-outlived-its-usefulness/time-for-the-united-states-to-leave-nato>

In Lord Ismay's classic formulation, NATO's founding purpose back in 1949 was "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down."

Sixty-some years later, the verdict is in: mission accomplished. The united and democratic Germany of the 21st century poses no security threat whatsoever. Meanwhile, the implosion of

the Soviet empire has yielded a Russia that no longer possesses the military or ideological wherewithal to threaten Europe.

The achievement of these two great objectives renders redundant the remaining item in Ismay's triad. The United States has done its job and ought to go home. Convert NATO into a European partnership, wholly owned and operated by Europeans, thereby allowing Washington to focus its attention and resources on more important priorities.

The devolution of NATO into a European alliance should occur in phases, but the place to begin is with this basic proposition: In 2023, the United States will withdraw from the alliance. That will give Europe an entire decade to figure out how to defend itself from the nearly non-existent threats that it faces and to get used to the fact that the Cold War has, in fact, ended. Somehow or other I think they'll be able to manage.

### **Populism – trump is the symptom not the cause. Especially post covid.**

William **Ruger**, Professor of IR @ CUNY, and Rajan **Menon** War and Peace Studies @ Columbia, 5-11-20, "NATO enlargement and US grand strategy: a net assessment," *International Politics*, Vol 57, Iss 3. Springer.

Some aver that alliance relations will revert to normal should President Trump depart the White House in 2021. But they forget that US concerns about the relative contribution of the Europeans are long-standing, harking back to the 1960s. Moreover, these concerns are likely to intensify as the USA faces economic constraints (the colossal national debt and soaring budget deficits—especially in the post-COVID-19 world) and long-neglected domestic problems increase disaffection among Americans. Since the early decades of NATO, European countries have become economic competitors of the USA and neomercantilists and populists in the USA have become more vocal—in Democratic as well as Republican ranks. US leaders will ratchet up pressure on NATO allies to assume more of the burden of collective defense—and NATO may not survive if Europe does nothing more than tinker in response. Moreover, the rise of China will inevitably divert US military resources from Europe. In short, Trump's departure in 2021 or 2025 won't restore the status quo ante for NATO, at least not for long (Becker 2017; Menon 2007; NATO 1995; Putin 2007; Ruger 2017, 2019; Shlapak and John

## South Korea Prolif Answers

### NFU doesn't cause South Korea prolif

#### Global Zero, 16

(Founded by Bruce Blair – nuclear security expert and a research scholar at the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton International non-partisan group of 300 world leaders dedicated to achieving the elimination of nuclear weapons, “U.S. Adoption of No-First-Use and its Effects on Nuclear Proliferation by Allies”, Last Date Referenced is 2016, [http://www.globalzero.org/files/nfu\\_ally\\_proliferation.pdf](http://www.globalzero.org/files/nfu_ally_proliferation.pdf))

- Highlighting that concerns about extended deterrence focus on the credibility of a second, not first, use of nuclear weapons, even more conservative Korean experts were not concerned about the effect of a no-first-use policy on extended deterrence at a July 2009 summit. Dr. Taewoo Kim wrote an essay in which he argued that “even if the U.S. were to come back to a no first use... and no first strike... policy, there may be no ripple effect for extended deterrence” because such a policy would not affect the scenario most central to South Korean fears, a North Korean first strike.<sup>7</sup>

### The plan strengthens the alliance

#### Global Zero, 16

(Founded by Bruce Blair – nuclear security expert and a research scholar at the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton International non-partisan group of 300 world leaders dedicated to achieving the elimination of nuclear weapons, “U.S. Adoption of No-First-Use and its Effects on Nuclear Proliferation by Allies”, Last Date Referenced is 2016, [http://www.globalzero.org/files/nfu\\_ally\\_proliferation.pdf](http://www.globalzero.org/files/nfu_ally_proliferation.pdf))

- High-level South Korean officials do not publicly advocate for a nuclear capability despite public support, consistently reaffirming a commitment to nonproliferation. Senior officials such as President Park Geun-hye, Prime Minister Hwang Kyo-ahn, and Defense Minister Han Min-koo consistently and publicly disavow an independent nuclear capability.<sup>8</sup> The resistance of South Korean leaders to public demands stems from the desire to protect the political and strategic advantages of its alliance with the United States, which would be greatly damaged by the pursuit of a nuclear capability.<sup>9</sup> Some members of the ruling Saenuri party have expressed support for a South Korean nuclear weapons program, but party leaders dismiss these calls, which may be intended to pressure the U.S. or China to address North Korea or to appease domestic constituencies.<sup>10</sup> No-first-use is unlikely to affect the extended deterrence dynamic between South Korea and the U.S. The South Korean public, which so broadly doubts a U.S. nuclear response to even a direct nuclear attack, would not be convinced that a first use response is on the table regardless of formal posture. Reassurance is needed regarding a pre-emptive strike in the event of a nuclear threat from North Korea, but conventional force could successfully perform that role much more credibly.<sup>14</sup> Further, South Korean leaders are practiced at resisting public demand for nuclear weapons and want to preserve political and strategic aspects of the U.S. alliance. Augmenting the extended deterrence relationship

between the U.S. and South Korea requires assurance of conventional and second strike commitments, not first use.

## Deterrence doesn't apply in the North Korean context

Brams 17 – professor of politics at New York University [Steven J. Brams, If Trump doesn't want a nuclear war with North Korea, a 'No First Use' pledge might work better than threats, October 16, 2017, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/10/16/if-trump-wants-to-prevent-nuclear-war-with-north-korea-a-no-first-use-pledge-might-work-better-than-threats/?noredirect=on&utm\\_term=.34f9560b85e5](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/10/16/if-trump-wants-to-prevent-nuclear-war-with-north-korea-a-no-first-use-pledge-might-work-better-than-threats/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.34f9560b85e5)]

Donald Trump has threatened to "totally destroy" North Korea with "fire and fury" should it cross some ambiguous tripwire. By being vague about where that tripwire lies, Trump seems to believe that his threat, coupled with harsher economic sanctions, will force Kim Jong Un to back down.

But just the opposite seems to have occurred. Instead, a war of words has broken out between Trump and Kim. This underscores the dangers that arise when there are no clear policy guidelines about what conditions constitute a threat to peace and can lead to war. It also tells us what may happen when each leader plays a "madman strategy" – pretending to be a madman to induce his antagonist to capitulate.

Game theorists such as Thomas Schelling have pointed out that the madman strategy can sometimes get results. It is equivalent to throwing the steering wheel out the window of your car in sight of your adversary, when playing a game of chicken – showing that you are not going to be able to swerve, so your adversary must do so to avoid a head-on collision. Clearly, chicken is a dangerous game.

On the one hand, disaster might strike if both players stick with the madman strategy of making irrevocable commitments. The personal invectives and threats that Trump and Kim have hurled at each other might eventually be sufficient to cause one of them to escalate to nuclear war. If their posturing becomes real, this strategy's logic leads to mutual catastrophe.

However, each player fears that it may lose – admittedly, in a less costly way than suffering nuclear attack – if it backs down by stepping away from the nuclear brink, thus undermining its future credibility. Each wants to win the confrontation, forcing the other to lose by backing down. This may end with both players refusing to back down and, consequently, crashing.

So what can be done?

One option is to continue more or less as is, posturing in the hope that it will not lead to nuclear war. A second is to be explicit about what tripwire might lead to a nuclear confrontation. A third is to create an externally observable "bright line" to reassure North Korea, and perhaps other adversaries, that there will be no escalation unless something untoward happens.

Clarity may be more helpful than ambiguity

Trump has been relentlessly ambiguous, sometimes inconsistent, about what might lead him to destroy North Korea. Kim has been inconsistent, too. This could create real problems should tensions continue to rise as a result of their blustering. Even before developing nuclear weapons, North Korea was a provocateur in some nasty military incidents with the United States — but none escalated into a major military confrontation.

If North Korea did launch an all-out military offensive, using only conventional weapons, against South Korea and U.S. forces stationed there, the damage inflicted would be horrendous, but relying on U.S. air and naval power would surely enable South Korea to repel such an attack. The problem is that North Korea could unleash its nuclear weapons as a last resort. With that in mind, the United States might preempt this attack by using its own nuclear weapons to limit damage to its own forces.

Alternatively, each side might clarify the conditions that would provoke a nuclear attack, making the tripwire extremely clear. Historically, that approach has undergirded the policy of mutual assured destruction, or MAD, the prevalent nuclear doctrine since the outbreak of the Cold War. Currently, at least one tripwire is clear: The United States has promised massive retaliation should a nuclear attack be detected, even before it hits U.S. territory.

**Some analysts claim that MAD prevented nuclear war between the superpowers**, although it did not prevent several non-nuclear proxy wars, supported by each side, elsewhere. The fact that none of the seven countries that have acquired nuclear weapons since the 1950s have used them — even between such rivals as India and Pakistan — would seem to validate MAD.

But this is a debatable claim. The world has seen several close calls, involving accidents and last-minute decisions not to launch nuclear weapons. We may just have been lucky so far.

Verifiable information provides an alternative

An alternative might be for the United States to draw a bright line, requiring verifiable information that a nuclear attack has occurred, before nuclear weapons would be used. Such a policy of No First Use, or NFU, of nuclear weapons has long been advocated by many prominent government officials and foreign policy analysts, both during and after the Cold War.

To be sure, this might undermine U.S. ability to respond to an imminent nuclear attack, including from a major power like Russia. But because it can so powerfully strike back, especially from its relatively invulnerable nuclear-armed submarine force, the United States could credibly promise to retaliate, even against a massive first strike, with devastating force.

What's more, North Korea is unlikely to be able to hit the continental United States with nuclear weapons. Sure, it might strike vulnerable targets in South Korea, Japan or the Pacific region – but it would do so knowing it could be utterly destroyed in return. Even if North Korea could penetrate U.S. anti-missile defenses, its leaders would have to fear the incalculable damage and destruction from the U.S. response. It is inconceivable that a North Korean sneak nuclear attack could wipe out the U.S. ability to retaliate.

It's true that a U.S. No First Use policy might send North Korea the wrong signal — letting Kim believe that the U.S. lacks the will to retaliate. Nor would such a policy induce North Korea to relinquish its nuclear weapons, which it claims as a deterrent against a South Korean or U.S. attack on its territory.

On the other hand, a NFU policy might allay North Korea's fear of imminent attack, reassuring Kim that nuclear attack would come only if he struck first. And it might make both sides less likely to rush hastily into a conventional attack that might escalate into nuclear war.

The logic of NFU has been recognized by three nuclear states: China, India, and Israel. Each has indicated, albeit with some qualifications, that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons in conflict.

If the United States declared an NFU policy, that might well induce other nuclear states to adopt one as well. Such a domino effect might even persuade North Korea that using nuclear weapons would threaten its very existence. If more and more nuclear states adopted NFU policies, the world might banish the threat of nuclear war, bringing a new global equilibrium.

No First Use won't prevent all conventional wars between states — but those have become fewer and less destructive over the years anyway. (Destructive civil wars are a different story). But now, for the first time, declaring an NFU policy might deter a small hostile country from using nuclear weapons.



## NATO Good/Russia Threat Contention Answers

### Commitment trap – makes deterrence failure inevitable.

Steve **Fetter**, School of Public Policy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA; **and Jon Wolfsthal** Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA, '18, "No First Use and Credible Deterrence",  
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/25751654.2018.1454257>

We are witnessing in real time how statements and veiled threats of nuclear use – “fire and fury such as the world has never seen” (Baker and Choe 2017) – can have lasting consequences. Statements by President Trump suggesting a willingness to use nuclear weapons first in a crisis with North Korea has exacerbated the risks of accidental nuclear escalation. But in even calmer times, such vague threats are ill advised. For example, US officials apparently believe that repeatedly stating or demonstrating America's willingness and ability to use nuclear weapons in response to many kinds of nonnuclear threats can be reassuring. Japan might imagine that references to nuclear weapons use, such as an American president announcing that “all options are on the table” in response to nonnuclear options might deter China or North Korea from initiating a conventional attack and make war less likely. But China and North Korea are well aware that the US has nuclear weapons; there is no need to make explicit threats. Anything that would be interpreted by them – or by Japan – as a direct commitment to make a nuclear threat in response to anything but the use of nuclear weapons create what has been called “a commitment trap” (Sagan, 2000). In these cases, the United States and Japan may feel compelled to follow through with a nuclear response, even if they believe it was unwise and might trigger a catastrophic an otherwise avoidable response. If we are fighting and likely to prevail in a conventional war on the Korean peninsula, using nuclear weapons could lead to a move devastating nuclear attack by the North on South Korea and stalemate any conventional conflict. Yet, failing to respond could expose past commitments to use nuclear weapons as a bluff and the call into question the credibility of the United States on all security and military matters

### Conventional deterrence low now – NATO is a paper tiger.

Paul **Taylor**, Editor At Politico Europe and Senior Fellow At Friends Of Europe, 30+ years as a NATO correspondent, '19, "Judy Asks: Is NATO Deterrence a Paper Tiger?," Carnegie Europe,  
<https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/78254>

Paper tiger? No, more cardboard elephant. Thomas Schelling said that deterrence is the power to hurt as bargaining and best held in reserve. NATO has become a collective deterrent rather than a collective defender. On the eve of a short but violent war NATO would be the last place the Americans would turn to. Rather, as NATO continued to talk deterrence, Washington would put together a high-end coalition under its command to do the fighting.

NATO is too slow of thought, decision, and foot to fight a contemporary war. The conduct of war will become far faster with new technologies appearing in a battlespace that will stretch across air, sea, land, cyber, space, information, and knowledge. The Russians understand this

and have built a thirty-day “wham, bam, thank you Vlad” war machine that would exploit NATO’s slowness of force generation and military mobility. NATO assumes at least thirty days of warning. Adaptation is thus buttressing deterrent value by accelerating NATO’s speed of response and extending its power to hurt. NATO could fight a short war if it had the warning, or a long war if it was given the chance. Hmmm . . .

**Baltics conflict is driven because Russia's influenced by past humiliation and NATO defense commitments – that stokes existential fear and spurs tension.**  
**Reject theories that don't assume the Great Patriotic War**

**Chakeres 17**, [MAJ Jonathan M. Chakeres US Army, Looking West: Russian Perspectives of the Baltics Through the Lens of the Great Patriotic War, School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1048580.pdf>]

Recent Russian military interventions in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria stoked fears in Europe and the United States that Vladimir Putin will attempt to attack one or more of the small geographically vulnerable Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Many Western analysts argue that Russia's so-called New Generation Warfare signals a revolutionary change in Russian strategic thinking and propose a wide array of explanations for Russia's aggressive actions. In contrast to many of these claims, this monograph argues that Russian policymakers are heavily influenced by the country's past humiliations, not future exploitative prospects. Russia attacked and occupied all three Baltic States twice in the twentieth century, a fact that many experts rarely discuss today. The period surrounding the Great Patriotic War is a valuable lens through which to view Russia's strategic outlook, and it retains extraordinary significance in Russia today. This monograph seeks to answer what lessons Russia learned from the Great Patriotic War, and how these lessons influence Russia's perspective of the Baltics. Many expert analyses of Russia and the Baltics portray a despicably bleak picture of Russian power and NATO helplessness. A 2016 RAND Corporation study predicted that in the event of a Russian incursion into the Baltics, NATO forces would be unable to prevent the Russian military from reaching Tallinn and Riga in sixty hours.<sup>1</sup> A recent book by the Jamestown Foundation claims that Russia's intent to annex the Baltic region is perfectly clear.<sup>2</sup> Other analysis focuses on the deployment of NATO battalions in the Baltics and Poland as well as the comparative strengths of NATO and Russian armor, aircraft and naval vessels. Numerous Western military and political journals regularly publish scholarly articles on Russian military developments and threats to Georgia, Ukraine, and the Baltics. None of these analyses of tactical outcomes, however, are based upon a strategic or operational framework, and most ignore any political objectives of the belligerents, which undermines many of the assessments. In other words, while studies such as RAND's forecast Russian tanks in Tallinn and Riga, no one seems to question why Russian tanks would be ordered to the Baltic capitals, or just what the tanks would do once they rolled in. A good framework to conceptualize Russian strategic thinking is World War II. Russia's lessons from the Great Patriotic War provide a lens through which to analyze the Kremlin's strategic thinking. The historic influence between Russia and the Baltics is long and bitter. The three Baltic nations were Soviet republics between the end of World War II and 1991, when they each gained their independence from the USSR. They each share a border with Russia and became full NATO members in 2004, deeply offending Russia. Today, they all have sizeable ethnic Russian minorities, and issues such as language education and war memorials continue to be divisive issues in both internal politics and diplomatically. Western leaders fear that Russia may rapidly overrun one or more of the small, indefensible countries before NATO had time to react or foment political instability that would paralyze any national or regional response. Although recent history suggests that conflict within this region may be likely, a deeper understanding of the dynamics is needed. To better understand the Russian strategic

and operational attitudes towards the Baltics, this monograph will examine the period surrounding the Great Patriotic War, which has influenced Moscow's attitude towards national security for seventy-five years. **Russia's perpetual fear of being isolated by hostile powers and suddenly attacked is deeply ingrained within the psyche of many Russian leaders.** Despite enormous political turmoil, **there has been continuity throughout the Soviet and post-Soviet periods about several key aspects of the war, and their significance to the Baltics.** **The most significant lessons from the Great Patriotic War that still resonate in Russia today are the threat to their western borders, the difficulty in securing and incorporating non-Slavic borderlands, and the danger from real or perceived destabilizing agents** in or around their country, such as modern day Color Revolutions. This monograph examines the Russian and Baltic political and military histories between 1938 and 1953, and the Soviet and post-Soviet Russian perceptions towards the Baltic region. The period surrounding the Great Patriotic War includes the pre-war political machinations that resulted in German entry onto Russia's doorstep in 1938 and 1939. The internal political struggles within the three small nations helped facilitate German and Soviet intrusion during the lead-up to World War II and highlighted to Soviet leaders how geographically and politically isolated the Baltics were. **Today,**

**Russia feels the same insecurity that it felt in 1941.** The Baltic States serve as an historic invasion route into Russia, and **NATO has replaced Nazi Germany as the arch-villain.** Where the United States and NATO observers see three tiny, militarily insignificant countries trapped under Russia's powerful grip, Moscow sees a vast staging area for a technologically superior military alliance that openly calls Russia an enemy. The loss of the Eastern European buffer zone after the fall of the USSR has only made Russian officials more paranoid about their security, not less. **Russia's "right flank" fell during the Great Patriotic War, and more than a million Russians died** in the ensuing siege of Leningrad. Today, Russia's right flank has been surrendered to NATO, and Russian policymakers fear what the consequences may be.

### Scenario 1 – Fait accompli

**Commitment drives Russian aggression designed to discredit the US – that goes nuclear and gets worse when we recommit**

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**Military pressures reinforce these dilemmas.** Whereas a conventional defense of Western Europe was at least a possibility prior to 1989–1991, **distance, reinforcement rates, and force-to-space ratios mean a conventional defense in Eastern Europe is not a realistic option today.**<sup>19</sup> War games by the Rand Corporation highlight the problem in the Baltics context. To be sure, forces stationed in Eastern Europe can serve as a tripwire to deter Russian aggression by seemingly promising to bring NATO members' collective strength to bear.<sup>20</sup> If deterrence fails, however, and **short of committing nearly all of NATO's conventional ground and air power to the theater, even heavily-armored NATO forces can only slow down a Russian assault and promise a lengthy East-West conflict.** Yet here, **NATO again faces real limits to fighting in and around NATO's East European members.**<sup>21</sup> Though the United States can threaten conventional escalation, it **cannot credibly commit** to fighting for states of low strategic value if doing so risks a strategic nuclear exchange.

Nevertheless, the United States would undoubtedly face calls for precisely such steps that might lead to nuclear escalation in any losing conventional fight. Moreover, since any sustained effort to defend or retake the Baltics requires NATO conventional operations close to the Russian homeland, it risks attacks (accidental or otherwise) on Russian territory that invite an escalatory response. Russian antiaccess and area-denial (A2/AD) assets used against reinforcements flowing into the region—to say nothing of direct attacks on Poland—may also result in strikes on Russian-owned Kaliningrad, generating a similar escalation problem. In short, NATO cannot readily defend its Eastern flank through conventional means, faces implausibly large strategic risks if it tries, and so confronts an insoluble credibility crisis.<sup>22</sup> Indeed, that Estonia is now preparing to wage a lengthy guerilla war against a prospective Russian occupying force, while Lithuania is slowly moving to reinstate a military draft suggests vulnerable states recognize the United States' credibility dilemma and are hedging their security bets as best they can.<sup>23</sup>

If anything, the main function of NATO deployments has been to antagonize a Russia that has far more at stake in Eastern Europe for geographic and historical reasons than the United States.<sup>24</sup> To be clear, NATO expansion in and of itself did not cause East–West relations to deteriorate.<sup>25</sup> However, U.S.-backed efforts to expand NATO eastward and subsequently deploy military forces to the region have been met with Russian pushback—Russian overflights of NATO airspace, diplomatic obfuscation, and military deployments have all accelerated in recent years.<sup>26</sup> Assuming NATO efforts in Eastern Europe continue, Russian leaders are prone to respond with further bellicosity that generates further strains in NATO–Russia relations.<sup>27</sup> Paradoxically, the resulting insecurity spiral increases the likelihood that efforts to deter Russia will result in deterrence failure.<sup>28</sup> Combined with the possibility that a NATO–Russia crisis may see Russia escalate the confrontation in order to de-escalate the situation, the risk of miscalculation is clear.<sup>29</sup> Collectively, this situation simultaneously invites Russian actions designed to discredit the United States in the eyes of its allies, gives threatened allies incentives to force events with Russia to tie American hands and deepen the United States' involvement, and increases the risk of an action-reaction cycle.<sup>30</sup>

### NATO commitment to the Baltics invites low level Russian aggression designed to discredit the West – Russia's interests in the region are entirely driven by NATO defense commitments

**Veebel 19** [Viljar Veebel is researcher of the Department of Political and Strategic Studies at the Baltic Defence College, "Why it would be strategically rational for Russia to escalate in Kaliningrad and the Suwalki corridor", 6/17/19,  
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To put it in a nutshell, Russia is ready to systematically and gradually—as much as the country's budget allows—increase tensions in the areas near Russia's mainland with historical and symbolic value to maintain and increase intrastate support, to respond to the imperialistic actions of NATO and the US. Every possible deployment in Russia's nearby regions can be responded to by doubling or tripling counteractions, with the hope that the Western countries will lose their nerve first, then propose negotiations and open the bargaining process. For Russia, this would mean

success in terms of both intrastate popularity and international reputation. From Russia's perspective, the only two risks using this strategy are related to the inability to keep constantly bidding in economic terms and to pushing NATO to the limit where the alliance initiates Article V and mobilizes its resources and capabilities to be involved in a real conflict situation.

The way that Russia has made its moves in the Baltic region the last decade demonstrates that Russian leadership has found the motivation, agility, and advantage in a regional balance-of-power game embedded in a symbolic and strategic-motivation narrative.

Drawing on its strategic ambitions, Russia needs an escalation and contact point to challenge NATO, for which it is ready to take significant risks.<sup>2</sup> What Russia needs is a location where its capability to mobilize and escalate in peacetime is more substantial than NATO's. In other words, the Kremlin needs regions where it can respond to each added NATO brigade with overwhelming force. An exception to this model is a hot war, as this would enable NATO to initiate their superior resources through NATO's slow, but large and in itself effective, mobilization model.

Additionally, the Kremlin needs a theater of limited scope, so the conflict will stay financially manageable. At the same time, the theater has to be of relevance to NATO in order for the latter not to ignore the opportunity to gamble (perceivable engagement). Suwalki Gap, Kaliningrad, and the Baltic States are well-suited to these conditions, being a limited theater dear to NATO but financially manageable for Russia. In general, for Russia, any theoretical solution leading to engagement for the opponent and thus path dependence is fitting, as they make further mobilization rational. These aspects are a cover for the "object" itself, wherein the realistic value has been exceeded some time ago.

After Crimean annexation, Russian leadership might even consider NATO vulnerable in the Baltic area next to Suwalki and Kaliningrad and it would be a wasted opportunity not to test and exploit these factors to its advantage. Russia has the ability and a permissive conscience in terms of domestic support to pave the way for it. Russia as the Third Rome and the savior of Western values is obligated to act in this crucial moment. Additionally, this offers a chance for payback to the West for what the latter has arguably done to Russia (i.e., Gerasimov's vision on the Western hybrid attack on Russia) and its interests.<sup>3</sup>

Russian regional challenge through escalation in Kaliningrad and the Baltic States would intend to fracture the Western coalition and to shake the stability of the Western international rule-based order. Those aims cannot be achieved by a hot war. It needs the West to get itself entangled in a local, low-stake escalation game with hidden strategic aims. Indeed, in this regional setting with its nonlinear logic, one can detect the presence of the escalate-to-de-escalate brinkmanship formula<sup>4</sup> proclaimed by the Kremlin. It appears as an attempt to maintain influence in its lost satellite states, colonial regions, and possibly beyond, as an important aspect of the game is prestige.

Economic conditions have clearly set significant restrictions on Russia in terms of choosing between escalation and de-escalation of a conflict. The size of the Russian economy (the country's nominal GDP in 2017 was USD 1.72 billion) is smaller than that of, e.g., Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy (respectively, USD 4.21 billion, 2.94 billion, 2.93 billion, and 2.18 billion in 2017) and almost on the same level as the nominal GDP of Spain (USD 1.51 billion in 2017).<sup>5</sup> Limited economic resources have forced Russia to set priorities, as there are not enough resources available for "half-hard" initiatives. Under these circumstances, Russia clearly pursues a highly concentrated security and defense policy, in which hesitation, morality, and questionable efficiency have no place.

From a purely military perspective, the geostrategic location of the Kaliningrad region is associated both with opportunities and challenges for Russia. On the one hand, it allows early warning and forward-area air defense options in combination with units from the mainland, especially from the Western Military District. The Baltic Fleet, with headquarters in Kaliningrad, allows control over the central Baltic Sea region and access to the Gulf of Finland, influencing not only the Baltic countries but also Finland's and Sweden's security and freedom of maneuver. On the other hand, the location of Kaliningrad as a specific federal subject of the Russian Federation poses a serious problem for Russia itself due to securitization and national pride. Russia has to be proactive whilst at the same time relatively open about its military capabilities in the Kaliningrad region.

In this case, over prioritization and securitization of certain regions is clearly exploited by Russia. The Russian political elite states that security along its borders is a “top priority,”<sup>6</sup> linking it with allocation of resources.

This means that the Western Military District is the most powerful one among all the four regular military districts of Russia, and the national models of mobilization and escalation were redesigned accordingly. The theory of securitization is particularly relevant in light of Russia's Military Doctrine from December 2014 defining external military threats as follows:

build-up of the military potential of NATO and endowing it with global functions carried out in violation of the rules of international law, bringing the military infrastructure of NATO member countries closer to the borders of the Russian Federation, including further expansion of the alliance, and destabilization of states or regions.”<sup>7</sup>

To sum up, Russia has already found both the rationale and the advantage in the game of regional balance of power when using the narrative of symbolic and strategic motivation. In this way, the rational importance of the area is only one aspect of the calculation of “costs,” whereas symbolic and strategic importance constitutes the second aspect of the bidding. Contributions and commitments already made by the parties to the conflict during the bidding process create the third aspect in this regional power struggle, and the role of these costs will constantly grow. So far, linear regional scenarios dominate in the cost-calculations of the Western countries—they react only when Russia has already made its move by deploying new weapon systems or conducting exercises. Russia knows how the Western world will act and responds in a way that puts the Western countries in a difficult position. For now, the steps of the Western countries have been easy for Russia to predict and respond to. However, for Russia, the game in the Baltic region has a potential to change the international order.<sup>8</sup>

From the alliance's perspective, as an argument of securitization, many military and civilian experts have pointed to the threat stemming from the Kaliningrad region and the Suwalki corridor. The Baltic countries could remain isolated from the allies in case of a conflict. For example, the former commander of the U.S. Army in Europe, General Ben Hodges, has warned, “Kaliningrad now has the ability to deny access of our [U.S.] Navy or any NATO Navy to come to the Baltic Sea. From Kaliningrad Russia can stop entering in to the Baltic Sea, and there we have three NATO allies—Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.”<sup>9</sup> According to the report of the RAND Corporation, in case of hostilities,

NATO forces would have to transit the “Kalinigrad corridor,” a 110- to 150-km-wide stretch of territory between the Russian enclave and Belarus that could be subject to long-range artillery and flank attacks from both sides and would require a commitment of (scarce) NATO forces to secure”<sup>10</sup>

Former Chief of the Estonian Defence Forces, General Riho Terras, has stated, “in the long term Russia's wish is to bring the Baltic Sea and the passages leading to it more and more under its control and to control it much like it does the Black Sea.”<sup>11</sup> Similar views have been shared also by General (ret) Wesley Clark, General (ret) Sir Richard Shirreff, the current Minister of Defence of Estonia Jüri Luik, and others.<sup>12</sup>

Up to now, both parties have sent each other costly signals in material terms. Russia has observed NATO's attempts to enlarge and, although Russia was not able to prevent NATO enlargement into Visegrad its leaders have informed the West with unmistakable clarity that they view the Baltic membership in NATO as “red line” that should not be crossed and will consider any NATO expansion into that region as direct threat to Russia's vital national interests.<sup>13</sup>

NATO has started some initiatives such as the establishment of the Baltic Air Policing mission in 2004 to guard the airspace over the three nations, joint exercises, investment into BALTNET (Baltic Air Surveillance Network and Control System), and military exchanges. Russia has constantly criticized them. As a response, Russian armed forces conducted large-scale “snap” exercises, violated airspace, and conducted navy maneuvers close to its exclusive economic zones to show its considerable capabilities to face NATO. The “answers” were, military exercises Zapad 2009, Zapad 2013, and “Zapad 2017” in the Western Military District of Russia,

which were interpreted as a political manifesto against the presence of NATO in Eastern Europe by the Western experts. Systematic military exercises in all regular military districts of Russia are quite obviously the country's reaction to the NATO military exercises; for example, the military exercise Zapad 2013 was a response to NATO's exercises Baltic Host 2013 and Steadfast Jazz 2013.

Game theory, behavioral exercises, and the theory of securitization explaining conflict escalation patterns

Theoretically, the strategic decision to escalate or deescalate the conflict should in most cases be associated with game-theory models, behavioral exercises, and the theory of securitization.

Generally, game theory discusses the strategic behavior of individual agents. The early modern game theory dates back to the 1920–1940s, when John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern published their works on zero-sum games with two players. However, the research from the 1950s onward, such as the works of the Nobel Prize winner John F. Nash and his followers, and the more recent research by Robert E Lucas, Jr., and John C Harsanyi have broadened the scope of game theory by introducing models that deal with dynamic interactions, incomplete information, and non-zero-sum games.<sup>14</sup> A non-cooperative game model called the dollar auction fits particularly well with the current circumstances in the Kaliningrad region and the Suwalki corridor in terms of showing the behavior of actors with relatively equal power in the region, which means that the outcome of the game-theory model is not predetermined by dominance.

The dollar auction game describes the behavioral pattern in a situation where the “loser” faces significant costs and strategic defeat by making tactically rational decisions when starting the game. A dollar banknote is auctioned off and goes to the highest bidder, while the second-highest bidder also has to pay the amount of their last bid. Thus, the second-highest bidder has to pay but gets nothing in return.<sup>15</sup> This game shows that under rational circumstances where there exists a potential profit and players are not forced to make a bid, the outcome of the game could turn out to be completely irrational. The fastest and cheapest way to win is to convince your opponent that you are not limited by rational considerations or foreseeable restrictions.

The confrontation’s trajectory illustrates this logic. Starting from the infamous Zürich speech through the more-or-less covert actions in Georgia and Ukraine, through the long and ever-more significant series of Zapad exercises, eventually to Kaliningrad, Suwalki, and the wider Baltic game, one can see how both parties raise their bids without taking into account the actual value or costs of the wider Baltic region. Indeed, one can see how the bids have raised the costs to a disproportionate level. Eventually, the costs will fall on both sides, with one being lucky to pay a little less, being “the winner” of the game.

Obviously, both players must have realized that and are still bidding. But the motivation has changed and this is exactly what the theory predicts. From a certain point onward, instead of winning, the rational motivation next changes to damage control, to see the other party losing. The irrationality threshold of the dollar auction game arrives at the one-dollar offer where player A’s motivation becomes primarily seeing player B losing 80 cents. The game’s character is transformed: instead of a real prize, a symbolic public victory and humiliation of the opponent becomes the focus. Here the idea is to see the other losing. Especially for a player that is 10 times wealthier (as the U.S. compares with Russia, a 10% loss would accordingly feel 10 times smaller) and losing 10% of its resources might be advantageous when there is an option that opponent will lose the equivalent of 100% of one’s available assets. Thus, we see a point where both players will ultimately lose, but are still motivated to raise the bids despite losing money with certainty. There are further aspects worth consideration. The farther the bids go from the nominal one-dollar level, the comparatively smaller bids will guarantee staying in the game. In short, not only will it be ever-more difficult to leave the game, it will be relatively cheaper to stay in the game. For the further the offers go, the smaller the bids become relative to the total sum. Once again, when one opponent is visibly more resourceful and when the additional bids are growing increasingly smaller compared to the bids already on the table, the inertia to stay in the game by moving new assets to playground is growing. As argued by Shubik,<sup>16</sup> “there is no neat game-theoretic solution to apply to the dynamics of the dollar auctions, or to the escalation between two nations in abstracto.” Poundstone<sup>17</sup> has suggested that the problem might stem from the difficulty in drawing a line between a rational bid and an irrational one.

The concept of path dependence relies on a view that “history and experience matters,”<sup>18</sup> as the probability of a subsequent event is linked to the earlier actions of stakeholders. Moreover, Ackermann explains path dependence as a cyclical process where current alternatives are limited or affected by past decisions.<sup>19</sup> Since it is difficult to withdraw or to “step aside from the well-known road” due to scale effects, positive externalities, or other factors,<sup>20</sup> this could lead to a “lock-in” situation where it would be impossible to escape without an intervention of some external force or shock.

To sum up, the dollar auction game together with path dependence could lead to fully irrational and costly choices with the aim to compensate for the damage already being caused with a potential victory in the future. The decision to reorient would require an explicit decision to immediately suffer the losses. Furthermore, the longer the game lasts, the bigger the impact of path dependence is compared to the actual value of an object (which is necessarily staying constant). The rationality of every single decision begins to be determined more from the consideration of damage control than the actual value of an object. This will eventually be devastating for both players, as one of them has to pay a very high “exit cost from the game” in economic terms and will also receive the reputation of the loser, while the other player even when winning is paying an extreme price for an object worth much less in objective terms.

The outcome of the modeled strategic behavior becomes even vaguer when variables and dynamics are added. The behavioral exercises distinguish between finitely repeated games (game is played for a finite and known number of rounds), indefinitely repeated games (game without a predetermined length), and infinitely repeated games (game with no known end), as well as games between players who play in finitely repeated games ("partners") and those who play in a repeated single-shot game, meaning that the same one-shot game is played again and again but by different combinations of players ("strangers"), etc. These exercises reveal intriguing but divergent results.

For example, Andreoni<sup>21</sup> finds that "strangers" cooperate significantly more than "partners"; however, recent studies are more controversial and show different results, as some studies have found more cooperation among strangers, some among partners, and some have failed to find any difference at all.<sup>22</sup> Next to that, most of the models of infinitely repeated games suggest that cooperation becomes easier and conflict less likely when players place a high value on future payoffs, meaning that future payoffs are discounted very little.<sup>23</sup> However, this has been disputed by McBride and Skaperdas,<sup>24</sup> who argue that in a conflict between countries, the winner gains relative strength for future encounters, which means that conflict is actually more likely when players place a high value on future payoffs. Repeated interaction in conflict games and post-conflict behavior is also analyzed by Lacomba,<sup>25</sup> who reached the interesting conclusion that players can avoid the contest altogether by not investing any resources in the conflict, which is particularly the case when players repeatedly interact with the same counterpart as a significant number of groups manage to establish long-lasting peaceful relationships, even after substantial initial conflict. To attain peace, players use costly signals to communicate their willingness to stop fighting. The most important signal is refraining from any investment in conflict....In contrast, using destruction as a punishment device does not promote peaceful relationships.

Furthermore, some exercises have found evidence that cooperation tends to increase with indefinitely and finitely repeated interactions.<sup>26</sup> However, Durham<sup>27</sup> argues that there is only little evidence of repeated interaction leading to sustained peaceful relations. Many authors also argue that destructive behavior occurs should the opponents have the opportunity to hurt each other in repeated interactions.<sup>28</sup>

The present case, referring to the potential confrontation between Russia and the NATO Alliance in Kaliningrad and the Suwalki corridor, coincides in several ways with these models of strategic behavior. For example, in the past both parties to the conflict have confronted each other already many times, referring to the repeated games where players repeatedly interact with the same counterpart; both parties constantly attempt to "win the game" to gain relative strength for future encounters; etc. This means that the expectations of both parties to the conflict to a large extent rely on previous experiences, both in regional terms and overall.

Moreover, both parties to the conflict would like to give the opponent a "painful lesson."

Last but not least, the conflict dynamics could be even more unpredictable should the argument of "securitization" come into play. In the theory of securitization, security is conceptualized as a speech act. To quote Ole Waever, "security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying the word, something is done",<sup>29</sup> or "it is by labeling something a security issue that it becomes one."<sup>30</sup> Rita Taureck explains that

By stating that a particular referent object is threatened in its existence, a securitizing actor claims a right to extraordinary measures to ensure the referent object's survival. The issue is then moved out of the sphere of normal politics into the realm of emergency politics, where it can be dealt with swiftly and without the normal (democratic) rules and regulations of policy-making.<sup>31</sup>

The probability of the conflict in Suwalki corridor: A cost-based analysis

From Russia's perspective, Kaliningrad and Suwalki corridor are favorable places where Russia's ability to mobilize in time of peace and to escalate the conflict is greater than that of the NATO Alliance. Russia has a maximum of three armies available in the Western Military District. Furthermore, Russia also has a clear advantage in additional deployment up to an additional 20 brigades in time of peace, as well as contributions from bigger territorial depth and more alternatives in terms of logistical routes than the NATO forces have in Baltic countries and around Suwalki. Since Russia could more easily and to the greater extent move its military resources to the region in comparison with the capabilities of the NATO Alliance, it would be reasonable to assume that the escalation of the conflict would most likely be an "enjoyable game" for Russia as long as direct conventional conflict is out of the question. Furthermore, Russia needs a "theater scene" that is affordable for Russia in financial terms and simultaneously substantial enough for NATO, so the alliance cannot ignore the circumstances and refuse to "play."

Based on the assumption that Russia is able to mobilize its capabilities faster and to the greater extent compared to NATO, the country copes, in principle, with almost all possible conflict scenarios, varying from moving toward more stability to direct conflict. Moreover, in this light also the irrational decision to escalate the conflict based on path dependence and previous involvement seems to be a rational choice for Russia, although the policy goal itself is worth significantly less than the "stakes on the board." At the same time, for the NATO Alliance all scenarios from increasing regional security to actual conventional mobilization are somewhat complicated. Additional deployments in the region under the auspices of increasing security would be both costly and

institutionally complicated. For example, bringing one additional brigade to Poland causes serious international debates, and in real terms it will not even contribute to the regional conventional balance, which would need an additional 18 brigades. At the same time, it would allow Russia to enjoy a moral “upper hand” and to justify its additional deployments in the region, based on the argument that NATO seems to be aggressive and offensive.

For both parties to the potential confrontation, Russia and the NATO Alliance, the “costs” of the conflict in the Suwalki corridor and Kaliningrad are first and foremost determined by geographical and ethnic factors. Geographical conditions of the area require specific capabilities and tactics to conduct both defense operations and offense operations. To quote Elak and Śliwa:<sup>32</sup>

The climate is specific as snow covers the ground for some 90 days per year; there are some 50 days with heavy frost and some 130 with ground frost temperature....There are some 3,000 lakes in the region (total space 150 thousand hectares) and moraine-dammed lakes are rather shallow, widely dispersed with soft embankment and ribbon lakes have steep and high banks and irregular bottoms. Rivers, flowing towards the north, are narrow and winding with steep and high heavily forested banks....The road system is poor, negatively influencing trafficability, which is further degraded by weather conditions....The combination of lakes, forests and intentionally destroyed road infrastructure supports blocking any movement using limited forces....The terrain creates natural avenues of approaches and mobility corridors which are predictable as road systems, forest and lake locations reinforced by climate and weather conditions.

They reach the conclusion that the terrain of the Suwalki corridor supports particularly defensive operations, “so when the area is lost, the challenge will be linked with conducting offensive operations to regain control over it.” To conclude, the potential costs associated with geographical factor would most likely be remarkable for both opponents.

As far as the ethnic factor in the Suwalki corridor is concerned, at first sight Russia seems to have a disadvantage. Elak and Śliwa<sup>33</sup> point out that the population in the Suwalki corridor is comprised of mainly Polish nationals (about two million people), whereas the ethnic minorities in the region are Ukrainians (65,000) and Lithuanians (about 25,000). There are only 11,000 Russians living in the Suwalki corridor. Thus, there is no significant Russian-minded community living in the area of the Suwalki corridor that could be used by Russia in a similar way Russia did during the annexation of the Crimea, allowing Russia to diminish the costs of the conflict. More complicated questions are whether the population of Kaliningrad could be exploited by Russia to initiate conflict in the region relying, for example, on the country’s “near neighborhood” argument or broad public support in the region. The majority of the population living in Kaliningrad region is, of course, Russian citizens (about 95% of the total population, or 896,000 people based on the survey from 2010).<sup>34</sup>

Furthermore, despite some expectations in the international arena that there is a potential for an independent regional identity formulation in the Kaliningrad region, recent developments reflect rather the opposite. Over the last 10–15 years, the share of people living in Kaliningrad and identifying themselves as “citizens of Russia” is significantly increasing: as a first choice it was 24.6% in 2001, 32.5% in 2004, 36% in 2011, and 41.4% in 2015.<sup>35</sup>

Economically, the Kaliningrad region is rather insignificant for Russia. Since 1996, the Kaliningrad region has enjoyed the privileges of a special economic zone (SEZ) which allowed the region to trade tax-free and to pay no duties to Russia. Thanks to this opportunity, the region showed, in the early 2000s and before the economic crisis, the fastest annual growth numbers among Russia’s regions.<sup>36</sup> In 2006, the SEZ was updated with the new federal law, allowing enterprises the right to export goods manufactured on the base of imported components to the territory of Russia without paying duties and taxes until April 2016, and the right to export such products until 2031.<sup>37</sup> These privileges have expired amid Western sanctions on Russia, and it was estimated that the end of the special economic zone is expected to have a negative impact on at least 785 local companies that currently employ 24% of local workforce.<sup>38</sup> Despite all the privileges the Kaliningrad region has gained, the federal subject has recently shown fluctuating growth numbers, and the region’s nominal GDP covers less than 1% of Russia’s total nominal GDP.<sup>39</sup> The average wage in the Kaliningrad region is significantly below Russia’s average wage (the region actually belongs to the three regions in the Severo-Zapadnyi Federal Okrug with the lowest average wage) and the share of population living below the minimum subsistence figure in the Kaliningrad region (percentage of total population in the region) is higher than in Russia overall.<sup>40</sup>

In the military domain, the discussion on mutual deterrence has particularly focused on anti-access/area denial capabilities (A2/AD), covering long-range capabilities both to prevent and degrade an advancing opponent’s ability to enter an operational area and to limit opponent’s freedom of actions within the operational area.<sup>41</sup> It is estimated that Russia owns a seemingly impressive array of long-range A2/AD systems that could interfere with NATO’s activities to conduct operations mostly in the Baltic Sea region, but also in the Black Sea, the eastern Mediterranean, and Barents Sea region. The threats from Russia’s multifaceted abilities have been stressed also by General (ret) Wesley Clark, General (ret) Sir Richard Shirreff, and Jüri Luik, the current Minister of Defence of Estonia, arguing that,

Russia would be capable not just of sealing off the Baltic states in the “bubble” that covers air, sea and land dimensions, but also of fiercely contesting other spaces of critical importance to military operations—in the electromagnetic spectrum, cyberspace, and even outer space (by using anti-satellite capabilities)<sup>42</sup>

In addition, a similar opinion is shared by General (ret.) Sir Richard Barrons, stating that Russia could be ready for action within 48 hours and “some land and control of airspace and territorial waters could be lost before NATO’s 28 member-states had even agreed how to respond.”<sup>43</sup> Also, senior NATO officials, including General Philip Breedlove, the supreme allied commander Europe, and General Frank Gorenc, commander allied air command, have raised concerns over A2/AD in a European context during 2015.<sup>44</sup> In this way, the NATO Alliance clearly feels threatened by the reinforcement of the Kaliningrad Oblast, as well as occupation of the Crimean peninsula and development of Arctic capabilities, which all contribute to the enhancement of Russia’s A2/AD shield. At the same time, there exists no clear threat assessment of whether the activities in the Kaliningrad region and the Suwalki corridor are in accordance with the idea of the A2/AD capabilities in the first place. So, it could easily happen that with all of Russia’s propaganda and informational disorientation, Russia has managed to deter the alliance using the conceptual framework the Western countries are familiar with. At least the current rhetoric of the members of the Western military community refers to the situation in which Western military circles are busy with self-deterrence and not focusing on the more realistic threats in the Kaliningrad region, such as Russia’s potential influence in Suwalki in the form of Russia’s attempts to attract Polish citizens to take part in militarized tournaments and other events, or supporting Lithuanian radicals to raise claims that Lithuania should regain the Suwalki corridor from Poland.

So, the “costs” of giving up the Kaliningrad region in **economic terms** to, hypothetically, avoid the conflict with the NATO Alliance would be rather **insignificant for Russia**. The only economic argument why Russia could prefer to “keep” the Kaliningrad region is that the Kaliningrad Sea Commercial Port is the only ice-free Russian port on the Baltic Sea, as well as the largest regional port complex in terms of volume, technical support, and services granted to the cargo owners. What is more, Russian major shipping and fishing industries are located in Kaliningrad.

To sum up, both **geographical** conditions in the Suwalki region and the **ethnic composition** of both the Suwalki corridor and the Kaliningrad region **make it definitely more difficult for Russia to achieve a rapid dominance in the regional conflict**, as happened in Ukraine some years ago. In economic terms, the “sacrifice” of the Kaliningrad region to the West to avoid the escalation of the conflict—**rational thinking**—could be another matter for consideration, assuming that the region’s economic potential is insignificant for Russia. Presented arguments speak in favor of the idea **that the outbreak of an expensive military conflict with an uncertain outcome in the Kaliningrad region and the Suwalki corridor would not be in the rational interests of Russia**. Basically the same applies to the NATO Alliance, which also has to struggle with difficult geographical conditions should conflict break out in the Suwalki gap.

Analyzing Russia’s strategic options and dilemmas

**The economic, political, and military importance** of Kaliningrad and the Suwalki area is only a **first part** of what could be seen as **committing to escalations**, while symbolic and strategic relevance play the second part. Third, **commitments** and costs that have **already been made** with **deploying assets** and **growing the symbolic importance** of area create an **ever-growing inertia to bid again to win the competition in the regional power competition**. Deciding by open-source data, **so far the Western calculation** consists of mainly linear and rational **regional scenarios**. As will be explained in more detail below, **the West responds by countermeasures that are easy for Russia to respond to and predict**. These measures are **bound to remain insufficient**, since Russia’s conventional advantage and the A2AD bubble will not be broken by the West. Indeed, the reaction of the West is predictably limited because it cannot know for sure whether Russia’s motivation is one of a **predator or a defender**.<sup>45</sup>

While Russia tends to act at a level of nonlinear preemptive logic, **the West is finding itself in a thoroughly reactive role**. **NATO** and the EU have so far been reactive related to Kaliningrad and Suwalki by acting only when the Kremlin has already moved, and **Kremlin leaders mostly know how the West will respond** as the latter are also limited by public control and moral limitations. And Russia will respond in a way which puts the West in an **ever-more complicated situation**. Here the nuanced logic of Russia’s **escalate-to-de-escalate** brinkmanship is exposed: it is not a linear logic of making the opponent withdraw from the game, but a way to **engage the**

**opponent in a bidding game where control over the situation remains with the initiator.** As will be argued, while it is not entirely risk-free for Russia, next to thwarting the West from making any bold moves in the ex-Soviet space, it is used to bring symbolic dividends.

What is more, **the Baltic region is an ideal playground for Russia** in its ambivalence. While **the Baltic States** are morally and culturally part of the West, they are **tiny and**—despite their success in creating their narrative—**relatively unimportant**. In military terms they lack strategic depth and are **difficult to defend**. And any such plan would need disproportionate resources. This makes **Baltic States** an **ideal victim**, the **poking** of which has a potential to **create an internal quarrel in the West**. Besides, the Baltics have their fears, reflexes, and weak points that are easy to press upon, such as a fear that **history repeats itself**, difficulties in integrating the large post-colonial Russophobe minorities, etc.

On top of that, **Russia has made the West believe that it needs to stay in the escalation game**. A lock-in mechanism of the dollar auction is founded on the belief that if the West ignores the Kremlin's threats toward the Baltic States, the outcome would be similar to Georgia and Ukraine. Russia would de facto occupy some regions. The question is if this is indeed unavoidable.

It is worth noticing that **there are very few options for Russia to lose in this game**. Due to its already existing and visible conventional advantage in this theater and due to historical and economic ties, **Russia is massively favored to accomplish some of its key objectives in the Baltic region**.<sup>46</sup> If the West steps back, Russia can present this outcome as its victory. However, **if the West goes along and escalates, it provides Russia many opportunities to escalate** in some sub-theatres such as Belarus and subject it to annexation like Crimea. It seems to be useful to divide its “near abroad” into two regions: non-NATO/EU states are its target to bring under its control as significant territories as possible, whereas NATO/EU member states are there to be internally fragmented and either divert from the democratic course or to create persistent cleavages among those nations.

What is more, when **Russia prefers almost all scenarios between stability and actual conflict**, a choice **nearly fully under its control in the Baltic area**, for NATO all scenarios between a secure regional one and an actual conventional mobilization are complicated. Additional deployments are costly and institutionally complicated: bringing a single brigade to Poland may cause a **hot international debate**, even public disapproval, while it does not contribute too much to regional conventional balance. This would need **an additional 18 brigades**, which would allow Russia the **moral upper hand** and going for additional deployments as **NATO seems aggressive**. While Russia has a maximum of three armies available in its Western Military District, it has a clear **advantage in peacetime of additional deployment of up to 20 additional brigades**. Russia can contribute also from a bigger territorial depth and wider alternatives of logistical lines than the **NATO forces in the Baltic States and around Suwalki**.

Altogether, the Kremlin's greatest strength in securitizing its nearby regions might be also its greatest weakness. As alluded to above, next to other similar layers of meaning, the Kremlin's rhetoric has placed its domestic prestige and thereby the entire existence of its regime under risk. And all this for a region that rationally understood is of marginal importance. If otherwise capturing the Kaliningrad region by NATO would seem absurd, the Kremlin's actions and rhetoric has made this possible for two reasons. First, by its threatening actions in creating precedencies in occupied or separatist regions of Georgia and Ukraine, and second, through its rhetoric that places all bids on Kaliningrad. This means that in some Western discussions<sup>47</sup> and most probably in military plans there has appeared capturing of Kaliningrad in order to counter Russia's attack in the Baltic theater.<sup>48</sup>

The above means that **it is not only the West that has been locked in the game. It is also the Kremlin that lacks a suitable exit strategy that saves face**. Still, **Putin could possibly exit should the West offer him something that would compensate his loss** in the eyes of the major interest groups. This could have to do with his status or be a strategic advantage conceded in another region. In these circumstances, **a positive aspect is**

undoubtedly the near impossibility of either side benefitting from the conflict in Baltic States. Likewise, the earlier practice between the adversaries has been rather cooperative. Hence, all it takes is to forget the bids already placed. For Russia it is more complicated.

## **Permanent extended deterrence invites Russia war – commitments to low value targets are inherently incredible.**

Ted Galen Carpenter, PhD, '19, NATO: The Dangerous Dinosaur. Cato Institute. P 108-110.

U.S. leaders relied on the assumption that the geostrategic assets at stake were large and important enough that extended deterrence to cover Western Europe was inherently credible to the Kremlin and would not be challenged. The assumption proved valid in the Cold War context. Even if the Soviets (and the West Europeans) may have wondered from time to time if Washington's professed willingness to commit national suicide to prevent the Red Army from conquering Europe was genuine, no rational person wanted to test that proposition.

In today's world, however, the inherent believability of the U.S. pledge is weaker. A vow to incur even grave risks to prevent a totalitarian superpower enemy from dominating such key international economic and strategic assets as Britain, France, Germany, and Italy had a reasonable degree of credibility. But the notion that the United States would honor such a security pledge to prevent a conventional, conservative regional power like post-Soviet Russia from reasserting imperial control over one or more weak neighboring states strains credulity to the breaking point. America's risks under Article 5 are at least as great as they were during the Cold War, while the stakes involved—and the benefits to America of retaining a bloated roster of allies—are much less.

The intrinsically weaker credibility of extended deterrence under these new circumstances cannot be overcome by pounding the table or increasing the number and intensity of America's security pledges to NATO allies. But NATO partisans blindly refuse to acknowledge that reality. Former U.S. ambassador to NATO Ivo H. Daalder, for example, argues that "the biggest threat today is not a deliberate war, as it was [in the Cold War], but the possibility of miscalculation. One worry is that Russia might not believe that NATO would actually come to the defense of its most exposed allies—which is why strong statements of reassurance and commitment by all NATO countries, and not least the United States, are so vital." Daalder even puts the verbal aspect on the same plane as tangible military deployments. The forward presence of NATO forces is an important signal of resolve, he states, "but they need to be backed by words that leave no doubt of the intention to use these forces to defend allies if they are attacked."<sup>41</sup> Daalder misses the crucial point: a potential adversary will more likely judge the credibility of a deterrence pledge based on the importance of the tangible interests at stake to the guarantor power compared to the risks the power incurs. Simply repeating assurances that "we really mean it" will not make a possible challenger believe an implausible guarantee. Washington's problem today is that promising to risk national suicide for small allies that have little economic or strategic importance looks like a bluff—one that Moscow may call in the midst of a crisis, if Russian leaders believe their country's vital interests are at stake. That is why expanding NATO and adding an assortment of marginally relevant, volatile dependents in Russia's immediate neighborhood merely weakens the credibility of Washington's long-standing security guarantee to more significant alliance partners farther west. Daalder's emphasis on the

need to repeat and emphasize the sanctity of the U.S. pledge to all European allies suggests just how much he and other NATO defenders worry that otherwise a Kremlin leader might call that bluff.

The greater disparity between risks and benefits virtually invites a challenge at some point. Despite the overwrought propaganda in much of the Western media about Putin being the new Hitler, his behavior indicates that he is a prudent risk taker, not a reckless one. But one of the worst aspects of a permanent military alliance is that it is permanent. We must assume that unknown Russian leaders a decade or a generation from now will not be gamblers. The questionable notion that the United States is really willing to risk thermonuclear war to protect minuscule states in Russia's neighborhood or on Russia's border itself must be reconsidered. It is an extremely imprudent assumption and a high-stakes bet on Washington's part.

Moreover, the willingness of current U.S. leaders to placate NATO's East European members by stationing American troops and warplanes and establishing permanent bases on their soil increases the likelihood of a future tragedy. The goal of European governments, now as during the Cold War, is to deny U.S. policymakers the element of choice about America becoming embroiled in any conflict that breaks out. U.S. forces there serve as tripwires to guarantee that Washington must honor the Article 5 pledge, even if doing so is self-destructive folly. The underlying perverse logic of insisting on U.S. tripwire forces is that the Kremlin, believing that the United States will have no choice but to intervene on behalf of an ally if American troops are among the initial casualties in a conflict, will never take the fateful first step of attacking a NATO member, even a small, vulnerable one. By collaborating in this denial of policy choice, American officials are engaging in the geostrategic equivalent of making a huge wager on one turn of the roulette wheel—except in this case, the lives of millions of Americans are at stake, rather than mere dollars. It is a foolish and irresponsible bet.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger reportedly once observed that great powers do not commit suicide on behalf of allies. But he should have said that great powers do not willingly commit suicide on behalf of allies. As the cataclysmic descent into war by Europe's rival blocs in 1914 demonstrated, great powers sometimes do end up, however inadvertently, committing suicide on behalf of allies. Washington must adopt important policy changes to make certain that America does not stumble into a similar tragedy in the 21st century.

### **Low value alliances generate a commitment trap. Asymmetric interests pose insurmountable barriers for extended deterrence.**

**Shifrinson**, Joshua, Prof of IR @ BU, '17, "Time to Consolidate NATO?" *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 40, Issue 1.

The credibility of the U.S. commitment to its NATO allies has long been unclear. At root, credibility hinges on the perception in the minds of foreign decisionmakers that a state has sufficient interest in a given issue that it is willing to pay a certain—potentially large—cost to obtain or secure that objective. Owing to the exorbitant prospective costs of a U.S.–Soviet nuclear exchange during the Cold War, regular transatlantic crises revolved around the question of whether the United States would trade "Boston for Bonn" in the event of a general European war.<sup>8</sup> So long as the United States retained sole control of NATO's decision to escalate past the

nuclear threshold, U.S. policymakers faced a real problem in making Soviet policymakers and American allies alike believe that they would willingly take the nuclear plunge if events dictated.<sup>9</sup> As Thomas Schelling noted long ago, it is inherently difficult to convince other actors that the United States will commit suicide for other states.<sup>10</sup>

Still, this problem was at least plausibly manageable during the Cold War.<sup>11</sup> Despite the prospective costs, the United States retained a large and pervasive interest in keeping Western Europe's economic and military potential beyond Soviet control. These objectives, in fact, heavily shaped the United States' Cold War commitment to European security as the United States moved (1) to defend Western Europe from potential Soviet machinations, and (2) to deter Soviet adventurism against the area in the first place.<sup>12</sup> The alternative was clear: if the Soviet Union were to dominate Europe's war-making strength, it might tip the balance of power against the United States, requiring a potentially ruinous counter-mobilization and global competition that an isolated United States might be unable to win. Geography reinforced this imperative, as failure to deter or defend against a Soviet assault across the inner-German border meant the USSR could quickly overrun the region. The result was a concerted effort by the United States to make its promise to defend its NATO allies as credible as possible by forward-deploying large military force and seeking ways to escalate a contest with the USSR should it prove necessary.<sup>13</sup>

Today, the situation is reversed. The grand bargain in which Washington kept its finger alone on the nuclear button remains intact; if the United States is to fully honor its treaty commitments, it must ultimately be willing to engage in a nuclear exchange with Russia for the sake of its allies. However, where the United States could plausibly claim to trade Boston for Bonn prior to 1991, no amount of reassurance can make the promise to trade Toledo for Tallinn credible today—the stakes of the game are too low.

Alliances function when states decide that their mutual preservation adds to each side's national security and can be attained at a cost proportional to the benefit. For better or worse, NATO's post-Cold War enlargement altered this equation by notionally committing the United States to defend a host of states in Eastern Europe of questionable relevance to U.S. security. Indeed, those states most immediately threatened by Russia—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, followed by Poland—are among the least important allies in crude geopolitical terms. The three Baltic states combined accounted for only 0.13 percent of total NATO defense expenditures and 0.26 percent of NATO members' GDP as of 2016; Poland represented 1.17 and 1.54 percent, respectively.<sup>14</sup> American exchange with these states is similarly limited: trade with the Baltic states as a whole came to less than \$3 billion in 2015 against over \$3.75 trillion in total U.S. trade.<sup>15</sup> Baldly stated, these states could disappear without compromising the United States' economic security or NATO's military viability. The questionable value of these states alone thus renders the U.S. commitment to their defense highly contestable.<sup>16</sup> The American public, meanwhile, seems to recognize this very dynamic at some basic level, with 37 percent of U.S. citizens in a 2015 Pew Global Attitudes survey expressing reluctance with aiding a NATO ally threatened by Russia.<sup>17</sup>

Political geography further compounds NATO's problems. Not only can countries threatened by Russia be lost without compromising NATO's ability to defend the rest of Europe, but even an

expanded Russia would be poorly placed to dominate the continent. Belarus and Ukraine, after all, lie across any Russian advance into Central Europe, while simply retaining control of a unified Germany affords NATO a defense-in-depth it never enjoyed during the Cold War. Add in the reality that Russia is an economic, political, and military pygmy compared to the Soviet Union everywhere except in the nuclear realm, and the United States' intrinsic interest in those states most immediately threatened by Russia is substantially less than during the Cold War.<sup>18</sup> Simply put, unlike the situation vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, Russian dominance over the Baltic states, Poland, and other new(er) NATO members would not result in the United States' eviction from Europe and concomitant loss of the region's economic or military strength.

Military pressures reinforce these dilemmas. Whereas a conventional defense of Western Europe was at least a possibility prior to 1989–1991, distance, reinforcement rates, and force-to-space ratios mean a conventional defense in Eastern Europe is not a realistic option today.<sup>19</sup> War games by the Rand Corporation highlight the problem in the Baltics context. To be sure, forces stationed in Eastern Europe can serve as a tripwire to deter Russian aggression by seemingly promising to bring NATO members' collective strength to bear.<sup>20</sup> If deterrence fails, however, and short of committing nearly all of NATO's conventional ground and air power to the theater, even heavily-armored NATO forces can only slow down a Russian assault and promise a lengthy East–West conflict. Yet here, NATO again faces real limits to fighting in and around NATO's East European members.<sup>21</sup> Though the United States can threaten conventional escalation, it cannot credibly commit to fighting for states of low strategic value if doing so risks a strategic nuclear exchange.

Nevertheless, the United States would undoubtedly face calls for precisely such steps that might lead to nuclear escalation in any losing conventional fight. Moreover, since any sustained effort to defend or retake the Baltics requires NATO conventional operations close to the Russian homeland, it risks attacks (accidental or otherwise) on Russian territory that invite an escalatory response. Russian antiaccess and area-denial (A2/AD) assets used against reinforcements flowing into the region—to say nothing of direct attacks on Poland—may also result in strikes on Russian-owned Kaliningrad, generating a similar escalation problem. In short, NATO cannot readily defend its Eastern flank through conventional means, faces implausibly large strategic risks if it tries, and so confronts an insoluble credibility crisis.<sup>22</sup> Indeed, that Estonia is now preparing to wage a lengthy guerilla war against a prospective Russian occupying force, while Lithuania is slowly moving to reinstate a military draft suggests vulnerable states recognize the United States' credibility dilemma and are hedging their security bets as best they can.<sup>23</sup>

If anything, the main function of NATO deployments has been to antagonize a Russia that has far more at stake in Eastern Europe for geographic and historical reasons than the United States.<sup>24</sup> To be clear, NATO expansion in and of itself did not cause East–West relations to deteriorate.<sup>25</sup> However, U.S.-backed efforts to expand NATO eastward and subsequently deploy military forces to the region have been met with Russian pushback—Russian overflights of NATO airspace, diplomatic obfuscation, and military deployments have all accelerated in recent years.<sup>26</sup> Assuming NATO efforts in Eastern Europe continue, Russian leaders are prone to respond with further bellicosity that generates further strains in NATO–Russia relations.<sup>27</sup> Paradoxically, the resulting insecurity spiral increases the likelihood that efforts to deter Russia will result in deterrence failure.<sup>28</sup> Combined with the possibility that a NATO–Russia crisis may

see Russia escalate the confrontation in order to de-escalate the situation, the risk of miscalculation is clear.<sup>29</sup> Collectively, this situation simultaneously invites Russian actions designed to discredit the United States in the eyes of its allies, gives threatened allies incentives to force events with Russia to tie American hands and deepen the United States' involvement, and increases the risk of an action-reaction cycle.<sup>30</sup>

The net result is a dangerous standoff. To deter aggression, NATO relies on a collective security promise ultimately capped by the pledge that the United States will risk its own survival by putting its nuclear forces to use on behalf of its allies. For the Baltic states, Poland, and—potentially in the future—NATO's other **post Cold War additions, this pledge is no longer realistic** on strategic or military grounds. The steps the United States and its allies are taking to reassure the most vulnerable members of NATO, however, increase the odds of a NATO–Russia crisis. Yet if and when a crisis erupts, the clarifying effect of a prospective nuclear exchange is apt to cause cooler heads to prevail and encourage U.S. efforts to restrain the dogs of war—revealing that American security guarantees to Eastern Europe **were not credible in the first place**. The more the United States continues pretending that its commitment to all NATO members is created equal, the more it risks creating a situation that will reveal the shibboleth of the U.S. commitment

### Alliance commitments unevenly distribute the cost of war. Transition to multipolarity waning makes the risk of entrapment most likely.

David M. Edelstein, Foreign Studies @ Georgetown, and Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, IR @ BU, '18, "IT'S A TRAP! Security commitments and the risks of entrapment" in *US Grand Strategy in the 21st Century*, Routledge.

#### Unipolarity

What of unipolarity, where one power is dominant, as is the case with the United States today? Prima facie, entrapment should be extremely rare in unipolarity. Allies are unlikely to materially affect the unipole's security given the presumed material predominance of a unipolar power; hence, the sole great power around does not need to go to war on its allies' behalf. If pressed, a unipolar power can simply cut the ally off and treat it as any other state.

On further investigation, however, the uniquely advantageous strategic situation that unipoles find themselves in can paradoxically **increase the likelihood of entrapment**. Because unipolarity is such an advantageous position for a state, a unipolar power has a powerful temptation to roam the system and prevent other great powers from rising and winnowing down its position. Assuming the unipole will not itself engage in preventive wars to stop future competitors, it can either ally with local actors in order to use them as proxies against a future threat, or ally with a prospective challenger itself in order to influence it (Gavin 2015; Ikenberry 2008). Such behavior may be particularly characteristic of waning unipoles that are increasingly wary of the threat posed by other rising great powers.

Both options allow the unipole's allies to gain leverage over its foreign policy, and therefore risk entrapment. In the first case, the unipole may need to back up allies in their disputes with other

relatively small states in order to ensure their help against the prospective challenger. In the latter case, the unipole may need to work at the prospective challenger's behest to keep the potential challenger from opposing the unipole's dominance. In either case, shifting power can lead to a unipole's entrapment. On one level, shifting power dynamics can increase an ally's leverage over a unipole's foreign policy. In particular, if a unipole is on the verge of seeing its dominance disappear altogether, allies take on a growing importance in helping slow or stop the rise of new peer competitors. Hence, any given ally can threaten to defect from the unipole's coalition and hinder the unipole's ability to address the looming threat unless the waning unipole fights on behalf of the ally. Put differently, a prospective challenger's threat of defection may undermine a unipole's dominance, making costly sacrifices for an ally more attractive than would otherwise be the case. The more a unipole seeks to prevent the rise of new great powers – something most unipoles want – the greater the risk of entrapment (Monteiro 2014).

Shifting power also increases the risk of moral hazard – a situation in which an actor behaves recklessly, knowing that they have an insurance policy that will cover any losses they incur. In the case of alliance politics, smaller allies may act aggressively if they know that their more powerful ally will come to their aid. Because some allies are uniquely powerful or important to their partners, many security commitments can end up being disproportionate to the threat they address. Though any alliance can face moral hazard problems – witness American concerns over European recklessness during the Cold War – they are likely to be particularly problematic in unipolar settings. Because unipoles are uniquely powerful, the security commitments they hold exist in the absence of a compelling military threat to the unipole itself. However, the same may not apply for the unipole's allies. For them, the international system remains a competitive environment in which other states may challenge their security and other interests. This asymmetry is asking for trouble. For a unipole's allies, the best way to guarantee victory in any conflict is to ensure the unipole enters the contest on their behalf. In this sense, an alliance with a unipole is the best kind of insurance policy, Allies of a unipole have strong incentives to lie, cheat, and steal to convince a unipole to come to their aid. Because the unipole itself may see through the smokescreen, they also have incentives to manipulate events to force a unipole's hand.

In turn, shifts in power increase the unipole's exposure to moral hazard. Because power shifts can also work to the disadvantage of a unipole's allies and – crucially – are likely to affect their security earlier than they affect a unipole's security, the risks of an ally seeking to cash in the unipole's insurance policy loom large. That is, since a unipole's allies are unlikely to want to wait for a power shift to occur before the unipole comes to their aid, they have reason both to try to convince the unipole that a rising state endangers international security and to create a situation that buttresses this line of reasoning. The goal of such efforts is to increase the value of the alliance to the unipole and short-circuit the unipole's own calculations regarding the distribution of power. Moral hazard and power shifts can thus create a vicious cycle.

The United States, the unipolar era, and the risk of entrapment

The preceding discussion (summarized in Table 2.1) has large implications for the United States. During the Cold War, bipolarity constrained the importance of allies, limiting the risk of

entrapment. Moreover, the prospect of nuclear war discouraged risky behavior by the superpowers and their allies. Today, however, the risk of entrapment born of moral hazard and states' search for security is larger and possibly increasing. As long as the US continues to make commitments overseas and fear the emergence of a peer competitor, American partners will be tempted to act in risky ways, expecting that Washington will feel compelled to come to their rescue should they get into trouble.

Insofar as the United States opposes Chinese or Russian aggression, smaller states will be tempted to provoke China or Russia to garner growing American support. If the United States is opposed to the emergence of great power peer competitors, then it may well opt to come to the aid of smaller states threatened by those potential competitors. This also means that countries that have limited or no explicit security commitments from the United States may try to profit from the insurance policy offered by the United States by provoking conflicts and expecting the United States – whose interests are clear – to ride to their defense.

### **Entrapment is a process, not an event. Miscalculation occurs in escalatory steps.**

David M. Edelstein, Foreign Studies @ Georgetown, **and** Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, IR @ BU, '18, "IT'S A TRAP! Security commitments and the risks of entrapment" in *US Grand Strategy in the 21st Century*, Routledge.

Still, we should be careful not to think of entrapment as purely an either/or decision whereby one ally that was previously wholly at peace with a third state mobilizes and goes to war out of the blue for the sake of an ally that has a conflict with the third state. To be sure, existing studies of entrapment focus exclusively on the question of whether states are compelled to fight unwanted wars on behalf of allies solely to maintain the alliance. For these studies, entrapment thus occurs if and only if allies end up on the same side in a conflict with one another even if one or more members of that alliance does not share a preference for that conflict (see e.g., Beckley 2015). Such an event would indeed be noteworthy and an obvious case of entrapment, but we should also expect it to be relatively rare. Rational states are not expected to fight wars that are against their national interests, and as skeptics of entrapment have claimed, leaders of those states are more likely to walk away than commit national blood and treasure to a patently unwise war (Waltz 1964). This standard thus sets a theoretically problematic high bar, suggesting that states are sufficiently concerned about their security that they form alliances, yet sufficiently unconcerned about their security that they will roll the iron dice for non-vital interests. It virtually defines away the very phenomenon of interest.

Instead, it is worthwhile relating entrapment to the process by which states tend to end up in crises and war with one another. In the modern world, international events and matters of high politics that may lead to conflict are rarely discrete events. Decisions that lead to war often occur in a series of escalatory steps. In stylized fashion, we can think of this as, first, the emergence of international tensions between two or more states, followed by a response by the threatened states and/or their allies, followed by further escalation on the part of the parties to the dispute, followed by further intra-alliance negotiation, and so on. In the process, states are also likely to put their domestic houses in order by mobilizing public support and sidelining

officials who disagree with expanding a confrontation with an opponent or deepening allied support. During and after the Cold War, for instance, the United States and its allies crafted a number of institutional pathways whereby, if and when tensions with the Soviet Union heated up, NATO members would be able to consult, coordinate, and graduate responses to Soviet moves and countermoves; thus, even if states are not entrapped into a war that policymakers decry as against their interests, the conflict itself may still witness entrapment as states are pushed by allies to fight at particular times and places, and for certain objectives, that they would otherwise avoid – entrapment can shape the nature of state participation in conflicts even without causing the underlying source of confrontation. Ultimately, if an ally acts in a way that forces the state to alter its behavior in a costly and meaningful way, then it is reasonable to conclude that the state was entrapped by the actions of its ally.

Accordingly, entrapment is both more likely to occur and more likely to be clearly manifested on finer-grained inter-allied decisions related to the use of force both before and during a conflict. These “entrapment dynamics” reflect the fact that allies, even if they share similar preferences on which other states in the international system need to be opposed – and thus on whether war may be necessary – can still share divergent preferences over the nature of that opposition. More precisely, allies can differ profoundly across three key areas related to the use of force, namely (1) the timing of a war against a common threat, (2) the goals of that conflict, and (3) the relative size and nature of the contributions each state makes in the course of a conflict. Since allied preferences can diverge over these issues even though states value the alliance itself, they create propitious conditions for allies to entrap one another into fighting wars at times, in support of objectives, and with greater contributions over which they disagree with their partners. In short, by breaking war down into these different elements, entrapment becomes evident at different levels aside from the largest question of whether a state was drawn into a war it would otherwise have preferred to avoid. We treat each issue in turn.

### Deterrence failure makes miscalculated nuclear war likely. Only withdrawal spurs burden sharing to stabilize deterrence.

Gil Barndollar, PhD History @ Cambridge, Director of Middle East Studies at the Center for the National Interest and Military Fellow-in-Residence at the Catholic University of America’s Center for the Study of Statesmanship, ‘19, “NATO Is 70 and Past Retirement Age,” National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/nato-70-and-past-retirement-age-51482?page=0%2C1>

It is appropriate to judge post-Cold War NATO a failure. The alliance is a paper tiger, beset with slashed European defense budgets and hollow forces. It has become a social club and an appetizer, a prelude to European Union membership for the formerly-communist states of eastern and southern Europe. What it is not is a credible military alliance. Nor is it making America more secure.

NATO’s performance in the foolish limited wars of the past two decades has demonstrated Europe’s failure to take either funding or fighting seriously. In the Kosovo air campaign of 1999, the Royal Air Force nearly ran out of bombs and spare parts. Moreover, it was U.S. aircraft that had to conduct about two-thirds of all sorties during the seventy-eight-day war.

By the 2011 Libya intervention, the situation had actually gotten worse. Only eight of NATO's then-twenty-eight members chose to fight, using their air forces. Additionally, most European countries ran out of smart bombs and had to be resupplied in a hurry by the United States.

In Afghanistan, some American servicemen muttered that NATO's ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) actually stood for "I Saw Americans Fighting." The more charitable would grant that it was "I Saw Anglos Fighting," including the British and Canadian troops who held ground in the violent south and southwest. Despite the undoubted valor of soldiers from all nations in the coalition, the reality was that most European contingents were hamstrung by risk aversion, restrictive rules of engagement, and national "caveats" that limited their ability to fight. Some were even worse: the Italians were credibly alleged to have bribed Taliban forces not to attack them.

NATO's relentless expansion has also long since passed the point of farce. The alliance, fifteen members strong throughout most of the Cold War, is about to add its thirtieth state, the newly-renamed North Macedonia. Macedonia boasts a tiny army of eight thousand men and a defense budget of \$120 million—a rounding error for the Pentagon. The previous mouse that roared, the 2017 addition of Montenegro, is even more militarily irrelevant. Montenegro's entire army has two thousand men—less than two U.S. battalions, or about 5 percent of the size of the New York City Police Department. These nations have been welcomed into a mutual defense alliance because that alliance is no longer serious about mutual defense.

These new NATO members provide virtually no military capability to help others, but they do bring one thing to the alliance: heightened tensions with Russia. There is ample evidence that the first Bush and Clinton administrations reassured Russian leaders that we would not expand NATO to their doorstep. We have done so, and now wonder why we are continually needing to "reset" relations with Russia.

We are told NATO's Baltic states face the existential threat of invasion and reabsorption into Russia, but they sure don't act like it. Despite a recent RAND Corporation war game that showed that Russian troops would reach the Baltic capitals in a maximum of sixty hours, the Baltic countries spend barely 2 percent of GDP on defense. Yet "E-stonia" can afford free internet throughout the nation.

NATO's heavyweights, the United States excepted, are nearly as impotent per capita as the alliance's Baltic and Balkan members. These countries have the money but they have chosen to shirk their Article 3 responsibilities and instead rely on the American taxpayer and the American soldier.

Britain, considered among the most capable NATO militaries, has slashed its defense spending to the bone since the 2008 financial crisis. The United Kingdom only clears the arbitrary 2 percent of GDP spending threshold through some pensions legerdemain. Britain can now fit its entire active duty army into Wembley Stadium, with room to spare. The Royal Navy is so short of personnel that it had a frigate and a destroyer tied to the pier in Portsmouth as "training ships" for most of 2017 and 2018.

Yet Germany manages to put Britain to shame in the free rider sweepstakes. With the fifth largest economy in the world, Germany dominates European politics. But its military, once a large and proud frontline force, is a laughingstock. Germany's air force has regularly had less than a third of its fighter aircraft ready for combat. Its defense spending has drawn chiding and, now, outright attacks from generations of U.S. presidents. In a story reminiscent of the post-Versailles Reichswehr, due to equipment shortages German troops on a 2015 exercise used black broomsticks to simulate machine guns.

Europe still has ample resources to defend itself, even if one accepts the claim that Putin's Russia is resolutely revanchist and not defensive or merely opportunistic in its conduct. Even without the United States, NATO has five hundred million people and a combined GDP of more than \$10 trillion, more than triple Russia's population and wealth. It also has two nuclear deterrent forces.

Only two possible reasons exist for European nations' failure to field credible military power: they have either decided they do not regard Russia as a serious security threat, or they are content to rely on U.S. defense welfare.

Again, even the frontline Baltic states do not treat their national defense seriously. Germany, a "dangerous pacifist," is the most unserious of all. In a fitting prelude to this week's celebration, on March 18 the Wall Street Journal reported that Germany would renege on its goal of reaching even the paltry spending level of 1.5 percent of GDP on defense by 2024. Two years of President Donald Trump's bluster and threats have achieved the same results as the efforts of his predecessors: nothing.

Germany's attitude towards NATO sums up the key, irresolvable problem facing the alliance: Its Western European members have consistently shown they are not interested in defending Europe, not even from Russia. Polls show that a majority of Europeans, especially in the West, expect the United States to fight for the alliance but do not think their own soldiers should do the same.

NATO's famed Article 5 is not an ironclad commitment to join hostilities. Though Article 5 states that member states "agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all," how each state responds is left to its own discretion. The commitment is to "such action as it deems necessary." In the event of a conflict with Russia in the Baltics, particularly if there is even a hint of ambiguity via "little green men," it is likely that western European states would offer only moral and maybe financial support to their allies.

The United States, meanwhile, is committing itself to fight—four thousand miles from home—for allies who won't fight for each other. This state of affairs, which has become increasingly clear to both friendly and hostile onlookers, does not create security or stability. Instead, this hollow alliance invites brinksmanship, escalation, and miscalculation that could lead to nuclear war. Will Americans fight and die to defend Europe, when Europeans won't? We may find out.

European collective defense should be built on a bedrock of shared sacrifice and credible deterrence. As long as the United States remains committed to defending Europe, Europe will

[lack the will and the means to defend itself](#). Nearly three decades of post–Cold War defense welfare has made Europe militarily weak and strategically unserious. American [pressure](#) for Europe to share more of the defense burden, going back to the Kennedy administration, [has had little effect](#). [Americans are increasingly fed up with this unsustainable state of affairs](#). [Only the shock of a U.S. withdrawal](#) from NATO can spur the European nations [to commit themselves to their own collective defense](#).

America is made less safe by remaining in NATO. The [opportunity costs of the United States' counter-productive commitment to European security](#) imperil real national-security interests, especially in Asia. [Giving Europe a few years](#) to get its house in order [before an American pullout is a reasonable hedge against miscalculation and escalation](#). That prudence aside, the United States should withdraw from the alliance as quickly as possible. NATO at seventy is decades past its retirement age.

**Limiting nuclear reliance causes precise, strategic conventional strike to bridge the gap. It's more usable and heightens Russian and Chinese nuclear fears by jeopardizing second strike – causes nuclear use, global shifts to nuclear first use doctrine, global instability, and Chinese accidental launch**

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Increased Emphasis on Conventional Forces

[To bridge the gap between](#) the [reduced reliance on nuclear weapons](#) and capabilities needed to meet us security needs, the [NPR proposed](#) that the United States continue [to strengthen](#) its unrivaled [conventional](#) capabilities.<sup>14</sup> Although the report declared that “the United States today has the strongest conventional military forces in the world [and that] our close allies and partners field much of the rest of the world’s military power,” [it proposed additional capabilities](#) to further increase the strength of US conventional forces.<sup>15</sup>

[One](#) of the conventional [enhancement](#)s [proposed was conventional long-range missiles](#). The United States began development of Conventional Prompt Global Strike ([CPGS](#)) doctrine in 2003 and continues to pursue it today, with plans to invest approximately \$2 billion between 2011 and 2016.<sup>16</sup> CPGS [could hit](#) targets [anywhere on the earth within an hour](#). Its weapons could be based either in the United States or on submarines at sea, giving the US military a conventional precision strike capability that could be delivered in a short amount of time.<sup>17</sup>

According to the Global Zero US Nuclear Policy Commission, the [increased lethality](#) and precision of advanced conventional weapons [allow the United States to hold at risk enemy targets](#) that, at one time, were susceptible [only to nuclear weapons](#). Furthermore, the commission observed that [these weapons](#) would have a greater deterrent effect because they [were more “usable” than nuclear weapons](#). Moreover, the commission’s research showed that a significant number of targets in [Russia and China](#), once vulnerable only to US nuclear weapons, [would be threatened](#) by precision conventional forces.<sup>18</sup> Additionally, as US capabilities and investments improve, more

targets would become vulnerable to conventional capabilities, enabling the administration to reduce the role of nuclear weapons even further.

The significance of the assertions of the commission's report is the suggestion that nuclear weapons could be replaced by advanced US conventional capabilities having the same strategic-level effects but with more usable weapons.<sup>19</sup> However, missing from the report was an assessment of how Russia or China would interpret such a change in US deterrence posture.

#### Foreign Perspective

The security environment has changed dramatically in the five years since the NPR's publication—but not for the better, as the policy document hoped for. Although the downturn in the security environment cannot be correlated to the change in US nuclear policy, some dangerous implications regarding both Russia and China are linked to the United States' decision to lower its emphasis on nuclear weapons in its security strategy. Arguably, the nuclear deterrent relationships with Russia and China are the ones most important to the United States, so it is imperative to continue to monitor their health and status.

As the NPR has been implemented over the last five years and the United States has decreased its emphasis on nuclear weapons while increasing its investment in advanced conventional weapons, Russia and China have responded in ways that the us government may not have anticipated. As outlined above, deterrence occurs in the mind of the adversary, and as adjustments to deterrence policy and strategy occur, they should be evaluated to determine their effect on the enemy's decision making.

#### Russian Perspective

Much was made in the NPR of the improved dealings between the United States and Russia. With the end of the Cold War rivalry, the United States no longer needed to rely on nuclear weapons to meet its security needs. Further, even though it recognized the policy differences that remained between both nations and that Russia continued to modernize its nuclear forces, the growing cooperation between the United States and Russia on shared interests as well as the low probability of conflict was enough for the NPR to declare that Russia was no longer an enemy.<sup>20</sup>

As glowingly as the NPR painted the affiliation between the United States and Russia, it is clear that Russia did not view the relationship in the same light. Anti-Americanism has a long tradition in the former Soviet Union and continues in modern Russia. Prior to the US-led “reset” in US-Russia relations in 2009, Russian leaders consistently referred to the United States as their principal adversary.<sup>21</sup> Further, the Russians believed they were under threat by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), led by the United States.<sup>22</sup> This perception of the United States remained consistent after the reset, and, in fact, the relationship has deteriorated.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's conventional military capabilities atrophied and deteriorated. In 2000 to compensate for perceived conventional weakness, Russian military doctrine potentially lowered the threshold for nuclear use, declaring that Russia “keep[s] the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear weapons or other WMD [weapons of mass destruction] against Russia or its allies, as well as in response to large-scale conventional aggression in critical situations for Russian national security.”<sup>23</sup> Russia released an updated nuclear doctrine just prior to the release of the NPR. It did not significantly raise the threshold for nuclear use, observing that Russia reserved the right to use nuclear weapons “in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation involving the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is under threat.”<sup>24</sup>

Russia has witnessed the United States and its allies use their conventional military power successfully and repeatedly since the first Gulf War in 1991. The dichotomy between the United States' and Russia's conventional military power has led Russia to depend on its nuclear forces to deter not only nuclear attack but also conventional conflict with the United States. Further, as the United States develops conventional weapons capable of executing strategic missions, coupled with missile defenses, Russian leaders fear that such developments would negate their ability to retaliate and successfully deter the United States.<sup>25</sup> The latest version of Russian military doctrine, released in 2014, articulates this fear: “The creation and deployment of global strategic antiballistic missile systems that undermines the established global

**stability and balance of power** in nuclear missile capabilities, the implementation of the ‘prompt strike’ concept, intent to deploy weapons in space **and** deployment of strategic conventional precision weapons” are among the **major foreign threats**.<sup>26</sup>

Russia places very high value on its nuclear arsenal. Without it, **Russia’s leadership recognizes** that **the nation is fundamentally weak**. Its status as a nuclear peer to the United States makes it “a state of significance, interest, or consequence.”<sup>27</sup> As such, **Russia has made modernizing its strategic forces one of the country’s highest priorities**. Part of this modernization program includes development of a class of nuclear weapons eliminated with the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 1987. Evidence of a Russian treaty violation dates back to 2007, but the United States did not formally charge Russia with misconduct until 2014.<sup>28</sup> The treaty banned ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 to 5,000 kilometers. Such missiles can execute short-warning attacks on strategic targets throughout European NATO countries.<sup>29</sup>

The value that Russia places on its status as a nuclear power was brought into sharp relief after its annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. On multiple occasions, Russian leadership used nuclear signaling, such as President Vladimir Putin declaring that “Russia is one of the most powerful nuclear nations” as a way of deterring the United States and NATO from intervening.<sup>30</sup> Further, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov stated that Russia could deploy nuclear weapons to Crimea without violating international law since the region was now part of Russia.<sup>31</sup> Russia continues to signal with its nuclear weapons, conducting large-scale nuclear exercises, probing the defenses of NATO allies with nuclear-capable bombers, and issuing statements regarding Russia’s nuclear readiness.

#### Chinese Perspective

The NPR paid much less attention to the deterrent relationship between the United States and China. Whether this tack was a function of asymmetry in the size of the two nuclear arsenals remains uncertain. China’s nuclear arsenal is significantly smaller than that of the United States, but the NPR did acknowledge that China lacks transparency regarding its nuclear programs and is undertaking a wholesale modernization, both in quality and quantity, of its nuclear weapons arsenal. The policy document points out that China’s future strategic intentions were unclear regarding both the strategy and doctrine that guide its nuclear deterrent force, as well as the eventual size and scope of those forces. The NPR addressed the interdependence between the United States and China, “their shared responsibilities for addressing global security threats,” and the need to promote strategic stability with China without ever defining the necessary ingredients for strategic stability or how it can be realized.<sup>32</sup>

**China maintains a “no-first-use” policy for its nuclear weapons.** That is, the country bases its deterrence on the ability to have a secure second-strike capability—a policy consistently in effect since China acquired nuclear weapons in 1964.<sup>33</sup> Although US policy makers debate the veracity of China’s no-first-use pledge, that nation’s small nuclear force supports a counterstrike capability.<sup>34</sup> However, the size and capability of that force are changing to meet China’s security needs. Further, **its No-first-Use promise appears under debate** in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). According to Maj Gen Yao Yunzhu, “Speculations on a possible change to the [nofirst-use] policy have not been conjured up without reason.”<sup>35</sup>

**Why the potential change** in China’s nuclear posture and doctrine? According to Chinese military writing, the United States is the main nuclear adversary that China must account for, and “China views advances in . . . [US] ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance], conventional precision strike, and missile defense capabilities as potential threats to the credibility of its nuclear deterrent.”<sup>36</sup> **It is not the United States’ advanced and superior nuclear capabilities that China perceives as undermining** its nuclear deterrent **but** US advances in **conventional** capabilities.

**How** then **did China react to the NPR’s call to reduce US reliance on nuclear weapons and invest in conventional capabilities to bridge that gap** in America’s security needs? Chinese **civilian and military strategists** have **regularly and consistently communicated** their **concern** about a US conventional attack negating China’s strategic deterrent prior to the US release of the NPR in 2010.<sup>37</sup> After publication of that document, Chinese analysts suggested that the US decision to invest in conventional capabilities such as **CPGS was part of the United States’ desire to seek “absolute security” and maintain its military supremacy. Chinese analysts fear** that **these** advanced conventional capabilities designed by the United States to meet its nuclear deterrence needs **are not constrained by the “nuclear taboo”** and, in fact, **are more usable**.

The Chinese believe that the very usability of advanced conventional weapons designed to perform a deterrence role actually undermines nuclear deterrence and causes other nations to rely more on their nuclear weapons arsenals because they cannot compete with the United States conventionally. Chinese analysts also fear a global conventional-weapons arms race, and some analysts warn that “a world free of nuclear weapons may open the door to the resumption of a large-scale conventional war.”<sup>39</sup>

The most worrisome development from China comes from The Science of Military Strategy (December 2013), published to inform Chinese military professionals of how the “People’s Liberation Army (PLA) perceives military development in China and around the world” and to offer a framework for the PLA to address them.<sup>40</sup> In that publication, the authors outline China’s concern that its limited nuclear force is vulnerable to a first strike that would negate any ability to execute a retaliatory strike. To address this issue, the authors suggest that China may decide to launch on warning of an impending nuclear attack.<sup>41</sup> Such a decision increases the possibility of an accidental nuclear launch given the difficulties in characterizing the type of incoming attack or the dangers of a malfunction in the early warning system.

Finally, the NPR repeatedly calls for the need to promote strategic stability with China. However, although that concept has been used in the context of nuclear relations for decades, it has no common, universally accepted definition.<sup>42</sup> Further, it also means that China’s concept of what constitutes strategic stability may be different than that of the United States, possibly leading to a misunderstanding. Chinese scholars have recognized this disconnect, noting that US “experts have not given serious consideration to what the true meaning of strategic stability is, and have not adequately prepared to achieve strategic stability with China.”<sup>43</sup>

Although it is not the only component of strategic stability, the Chinese perceive changes in the US nuclear posture as a threat to that stability.<sup>44</sup> Specifically, Chinese analysts have repeatedly insisted that US advanced conventional capabilities, including CPGS coupled with ballistic missile defense, represent a direct threat to China’s secure second-strike capabilities. Therefore, Chinese analysts perceive a major contradiction in the NPR. “Advocacy for military capabilities that are seen to be detrimental to strategic stability in the same document that promotes strategic stability ultimately represents a circular logic” that if not addressed will make it difficult for China to participate in talks meant to promote strategic stability.<sup>45</sup>

## NATO has sufficient capabilities to defend themselves, but coordination key.

Carpenter, Ted Galen, PhD, '19, NATO: The Dangerous Dinosaur. Cato Institute. P 120-123.

Several of the European countries are elite economic powers. According to the World Bank, Germany has the world’s fourth largest economy, behind only those of the United States, China, and Japan. Great Britain has the fifth largest; France, the seventh; and Italy, the ninth.<sup>18</sup> The most recent data from the International Monetary Fund put Germany’s annual GDP at \$4.21 trillion, Great Britain’s at \$2.94 trillion, and France’s just behind at \$2.93 trillion. Even Italy at \$2.18 trillion and Spain at \$1.51 trillion are serious economic players.<sup>19</sup> NATO Europe (the alliance membership minus the United States and Canada) has a collective GDP of more than \$19 trillion. Compare that total to Russia’s \$1.6 trillion: NATO Europe has an economic output literally more than 10 times that of its principal potential adversary. A significant disparity between the EU nations and Russia also exists in terms of military spending. Granted, the spending of NATO’s European members remains far more modest than the huge U.S. defense budget, which is projected to reach \$750 billion in 2019. Britain and France have defense budgets of \$56.1 billion and \$53.4 billion, respectively. Italy spends just \$24.9 billion annually,

and Germany, despite its status as the world's number four economic power, spends only \$45.7 billion on defense.<sup>20</sup> Still, the annual collective defense spending level of those leading European powers exceeds \$180 billion. That figure significantly eclipses Russia's \$63.1 billion.<sup>21</sup> Moreover, including the spending of the smaller members adds another \$84 billion, meaning that NATO Europe out-spends Russia by over a 4 to 1 margin. Moreover, as noted in Chapter 4, if the European nations consider Moscow a truly existential threat, they are fully capable of spending more—much more.

Even given their chronic parsimonious investments in defense, several of the European NATO countries can field militaries with significant conventional capabilities. Many of the newer members are mini-states with extremely small armed forces that would be of little use in a major conflict —especially one with Russia. Other members, though, have the ability to put up a credible resistance to an act of aggression. Turkey, for example, has 355,200 active duty military personnel with another 378,700 in reserve units, plus another 156,800 paramilitary personnel. The Turkish military is equipped with battle tanks, rocket launchers, attack helicopters, jet fighters, and sophisticated air defense batteries (ironically now including the Russian-supplied S-400).<sup>22</sup>

Germany, democratic Europe's natural economic and security leader, has unfortunately allowed its military to atrophy to a disturbing extent since the end of the Cold War, creating (among other problems) insufficient readiness levels and shortages of key spare parts. Nevertheless, Berlin's forces still would pose a barrier to any invader. Germany's active-duty military of 178,600 can deploy an array of modern weaponry, including Leopard battle tanks, AP-3C Orion anti-submarine aircraft, and 123 Eurofighter Typhoons.<sup>23</sup>

Before the bulk of an invasion force could even reach Germany, it would have to get through Poland. That task might not be all that easy. Although Warsaw only began a serious push to meet NATO's 2 percent GDP target for military spending after Russia's seizure of Crimea and support of separatism in eastern Ukraine in 2014, its spending has now reached that level. Polish leaders may be devoting considerable effort to securing a permanent U.S. military presence in their country, but they also are building up Poland's own military. Warsaw's 105,000 active-duty force is backed by 73,400 paramilitary fighters. As with Germany and several other NATO members, Polish ground forces deploy various models of the Leopard battle tank. In Poland's case, nearly 1,000 of those weapon systems are available. The air force jet fighters are more limited, but several dozen are available.<sup>24</sup>

Polish defenders certainly could not defeat an invading force on their own, but they seem capable of slowing it down substantially. The military capabilities on Germany's western flank are even more impressive, giving a European defense effort strategic depth. France's active-duty military numbers 202,700, augmented by 103,400 paramilitary forces. Land forces have available some 200 Leclerc battle tanks as well as dozens of front-line artillery pieces, rocket launchers, and other weapons. Air and naval forces are even more capable. In addition to an aircraft carrier, the Charles de Gaulle, France sports a small but significant navy with nearly a dozen modern destroyers. The French air force boasts Mirage 200 and Rafale fighters.<sup>25</sup>

Additional European countries, such as Italy, Spain, Romania, and others, could (and in the event of a continent-wide security crisis almost certainly would) throw their military weight into the

balance as well. Likewise, even if Brexit proceeds and Britain actually exits the EU, London would hardly remain indifferent to a major act of aggression in Europe. Its conventional capabilities are both modern and sizable. The UK's 85,000 ground force might not add that much to the capabilities of its Continental neighbors, but its naval forces and more than 200 combat aircraft are another matter. 26

The bottom line is that Russia (much less a smaller aggressor) would have to consider some serious difficulties and risks if it decided to launch a war of aggression—especially anything that went beyond Russia's immediate border regions. Even without the United States, the European nations would be capable of mounting a resistance that would not be easy to overcome. And if those countries improved their capabilities by increasing military spending and setting better priorities for that spending, they could mount a ferocious resistance. Any leader in the Kremlin would have to consider the risks and take into account prospects for success that are far from certain. That lack of certainty itself is a rather effective deterrent. A key challenge for the European powers in building an even more credible collective defense effort distinct from NATO is to increase the efficiency of their military spending, as well as the overall size. That means focusing more on useful, cutting-edge weapons systems and reducing spending on obsolete systems and glorified jobs programs for young, otherwise unemployed citizens. Finally, NATO Europe urgently needs to better coordinate the strategies and capabilities of the various national military forces. The current degree of duplication and waste means that the overall military spending of NATO Europe (or alternatively, the EU in alliance with post-Brexit Britain) does not come close to producing the potential military capability that the current amount of spending should produce.

With sufficient effort on the part of the European governments, those problems and limitations can be overcome or at least greatly diminished. Even in their current state, the collective militaries of democratic Europe would be a serious opponent for a revanchist Russia, if that menace ever emerged. And the existing forces are more than capable of dealing with any lesser threats that might arise from other sources.

## Russia is not an expansionist power – but they do want a limited sphere of influence.

Carpenter, Ted Galen, PhD, '19, NATO: The Dangerous Dinosaur. Cato Institute. P 73-79.

Those who contend that Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 proves that the Putin government is pursuing an aggressive, expansionist foreign policy are misreading the situation. Crimea was a special case for several reasons. First, the peninsula had been part of Russia between 1783 and 1954, during both the czarist and Soviet eras. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, for reasons that are not entirely clear, arbitrarily transferred Crimea to Ukraine in 1954. Since Ukraine and Russia were both part of the Soviet Union, that decision didn't seem to matter much at the time. When the Soviet Union dissolved at the end of 1991, however, Russia suddenly faced the reality that its key naval base at Sevastopol now was on the territory of a foreign country. Yet even that development didn't seem to alarm Russian officials, since Ukraine's government remained in the hands of generally pro-Russian political leaders

throughout the 1990s and the early years of the new millennium. Kiev provided further reassurance by granting Russia a 25-year lease on the facility shortly after gaining independence.

The situation became problematic, though, when Viktor Yushchenko, an anti-Russian, pro-Western figure, became Ukraine's president in 2004, leading the so-called Orange Revolution. Russian officials were noticeably nervous when Yushchenko indicated a renewal was unlikely when Moscow's lease at Sevastopol expired in 2017. That danger passed, however, once another pro-Russian politician, Viktor Yanukovych, won Ukraine's 2010 presidential election. Moscow's anxiety then receded.

Those worries resurfaced with a vengeance in 2014, though, when anti-Yanukovych demonstrators, encouraged if not actively aided by Washington and the European Union, overthrew the Ukrainian president nearly two years before his term expired.<sup>28</sup> Extremely nationalist, anti-Russian factions dominated the regime that emerged from the Maidan Revolution. Not only did the Crimean naval base now seem in jeopardy, but the new leaders avidly sought NATO membership for Ukraine—something that Washington had pushed for years.

The Kremlin responded quickly and decisively to the Ukraine developments. Barely disguised Russian special forces reinforced the normal garrison at Sevastopol and set up positions elsewhere on the peninsula. Pro-Russian political figures in Crimea immediately called for a referendum on secession from Ukraine, which was held days later and produced a predictably affirmative vote. Newly elected Crimean officials then asked that their territory be allowed to join the Russian Federation—a “request” that Moscow quickly granted.

U.S. anger at such a transparent territorial grab was volcanic. The Obama administration denounced the move, and Washington imposed an array of economic sanctions on Russia. The administration also induced and pressured its European allies to do the same. Such a response constituted an overreaction, and a hypocritical one. Much of the blame for the Crimea episode should be put at Washington’s door. The U.S.-EU meddling in Ukraine’s politics to encourage the ouster of a pro-Russian government—a democratically elected one at that—could hardly be seen as other than hostile and threatening to both Russian leaders and the Russian public. Indeed, polls indicated that Putin’s approval rating soared to over 80 percent following the annexation.<sup>29</sup>

The Crimea issue became the principal grievance that anti-Russia types in the United States cited to justify a confrontational policy—until the allegations of Russian interference in U.S. elections eclipsed that complaint. But one might ask why so many U.S. political leaders and policymakers elevated a parochial territorial dispute to such prominence, much less why they insist that the arbitrary edict made back in 1954 by the communist dictator of a defunct country must be treated with reverence.<sup>30</sup>

It would have been better if the successor republics collectively had addressed and implemented territorial adjustments involving Crimea and other potential problem areas when the USSR dissolved, but Moscow’s decision to resolve the Crimea question unilaterally was not necessarily a sign of broader territorial ambitions.

The conquest is not even unprecedented in the post–World War II era. Israel seized the Golan Heights from Syria in 1967 during the Six-Day War and later annexed that territory. Turkey seized a major portion of Cyprus and continues to occupy that land, establishing a puppet state as a façade. It is certainly an overstatement to contend, as does UCLA political science professor Daniel Treisman, that “By annexing a neighboring country’s territory by force, Putin overturned in a single stroke the assumption on which the post–Cold War European order had rested.”<sup>31</sup> One could make a stronger case that the first major blow to that post–Cold War European order came 15 years earlier when the Western powers amputated Kosovo from Serbia.

Yet Western opinion leaders routinely cite the Crimea annexation and Moscow’s subsequent assistance to secessionist factions in eastern Ukraine as proof that Russia has broad, perhaps even unlimited, expansionist goals. In February 2015, Gen. Sir Adrian Bradshaw, the senior British officer in NATO, asserted that Russia’s expansionism threatened to become an “obvious existential threat to our whole being.”<sup>32</sup> The following year, Leon Panetta, the former secretary of defense, expressed similar alarm. “Let’s not kid anybody,” Panetta stated, “Putin’s main interest is to try to restore the old Soviet Union.”<sup>33</sup>

When advocates of a confrontational policy toward Moscow were not alleging that Putin wanted to revive the Soviet Union, they accused him of seeking to restore the pre-Soviet Russian empire. That allegation even predicated the seizure of Crimea. Senator McCain made the accusation in 2008, at the time of the Russo-Georgian war. “I think it’s very clear that Russian ambitions are to restore the old Russian Empire,” McCain stated. “Not the Soviet Union, but the Russian Empire.”<sup>34</sup>

That line of argument at least implicitly acknowledged that Putin was not a doctrinaire communist, but it still was misplaced and exaggerated. As Harvard University professor Andrei Shleifer and his co-author Daniel Treisman observe in Foreign Affairs, “To many in the West, Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia seemed to prove the Kremlin’s land hunger.” Shleifer and Treisman argue that such a conclusion reflects poor logic. “Kremlin leaders bent on expansion would surely have ordered troops all the way to Tbilisi to depose [Georgia President Mikheil] Saakashvili. At the least, Russian forces would have taken control of the oil and gas pipelines that cross Georgia.” Instead, the Russians “left those pipelines alone and quickly withdrew to the mountains.”<sup>35</sup>

Shleifer and Treisman raise a very important point. If Putin is a rogue leader with massive expansionist objectives, why would he relinquish territory that Russian forces already occupied? Indeed, with very little additional effort, those forces could have captured Tbilisi and the rest of Georgia. Yet Moscow did not attempt to do so. Hitler never willingly gave up any of his conquests. And until the East European satellite empire collapsed in 1989–1991, the USSR disgorged only one occupied area—the portion of Austria it controlled at the end of World War II. Even that modest retreat took place only after laborious, multiyear negotiations for a treaty guaranteeing Austria’s strict neutrality. If Putin truly harbors malignant expansionist ambitions comparable to those of Hitler and Stalin, declining to conquer and absorb all of Georgia when that achievement was easily within reach is a curious step. His decision merely to maintain and consolidate Abkhazia and South Ossetia as Russian protectorates suggests much more restrained and limited ambitions.

Allegations that Putin wants to reconstitute the Soviet or the czarist empires are vastly overblown. Former NATO supreme commander Gen. Philip M. Breedlove is a little closer to the mark when he contends that “Moscow is determined to reestablish what it considers its rightful sphere of influence, undermine NATO, and reclaim its great power status.”<sup>36</sup> But wanting, indeed insisting upon, a sphere of influence has long been standard behavior for major powers. Indeed, the United States declared such a sphere when James Monroe’s administration proclaimed the Monroe Doctrine—and it did so at a time when the country was still far from attaining great power status. As for wishing to undermine NATO, it is more accurate to say that Moscow is belatedly trying to fend off the alliance’s seemingly inexorable advance east. Finally, Russian leaders would presumably like to reclaim great power status for their country; at the very least, they insist on a seat at the table when major decisions about Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia are made. That position is not unreasonable, and an especially clumsy aspect of Western policy toward Moscow has been the unwillingness to accord even basic respect to Russia and not trample on its core interests.

### **NATO made Russia into a revisionist power by backing them into a corner.**

Alexander Thalis, University of Sydney with First Class Honours in Government and International Relations, Masters of International Relations Theory at the London School of Economics, ’18, “Threat or Threatened? Russian Foreign Policy in the Era of NATO Expansion” <https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/threat-or-threatened-russian-foreign-policy-in-the-era-of-nato-expansion/>

Vladimir Putin is a brutal autocrat and the Kremlin’s actions in Ukraine undoubtedly constitute a gross violation of international law. However, the popular characterisation of Putin’s grand strategy as imperialist is erroneous. Russia’s primary foreign policy objective regarding the Ukraine has been to prevent the country joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the world’s most formidable military alliance, which Russia justifiably regards as dire threat to its security. In a Foreign Affairs article entitled, “Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault”, John Mearsheimer explains that “[Russian leaders] would not stand by while their strategically important neighbour turned into a Western bastion.”<sup>[5]</sup> Within the Australian media, Tom Switzer has been a rare voice of thoughtful moderation on Russia, observing that Putin has been, “protecting legitimate security interests”, and that his, “**objectives are limited.**”<sup>[6]</sup>

It is vitally important that the West understands that Russia’s conduct in the Ukraine is a rational response to the strategic pressure that has been placed on the country by an encroaching military alliance, NATO. The Kremlin’s foreign policies conform to the expectations of defensive realism. A defensive realist foreign policy prioritises state security, which is maximised when a stable balance of power is established in the international system.<sup>[7]</sup> Defensive realists advise against imperialism and aggression, but they do advocate power projection by threatened states to the extent that is necessary to restore the international system to a stable state of equilibrium.<sup>[8]</sup> As Robert Person argues, Putin has been pursuing a defensive realist strategy because his, “ultimate objective is to maximize his security, not his power.”<sup>[9]</sup> NATO’s hubristic expansion has destroyed the balance of power that existed in Europe during the Cold War and engendered feelings of insecurity and vulnerability in the minds of Russia’s leaders. These

attitudes are rooted in a rational conception of the international as a realm in which the threat of war is constant and each state must take responsibility for its own survival.

To say this is not to condone the Kremlin's actions in Ukraine on an ethical level. But the righteous condemnations of Russia in the Western media have only served to obscure the origins of the Ukraine crisis and potential strategies for mediating it. If peace and stability are to be re-established in Eastern Europe, then it is vital that we look past the scaremongering and hyperbole, and re-examine the origins of Russia-NATO antagonism.

#### New Russia, Same Old NATO Mentality: A Lost Opportunity for Détente

NATO was founded in 1948 to balance the power of the USSR and its communist allies in Eastern Europe. The organisation's founding members were the United States (US), Canada and ten Western European nations. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, it seemed that the nascent Russian state would soon be integrated into the US-led world order. NATO appeared obsolete and some predicted that it would be disbanded.[10] So how did we get to a situation where Russia and NATO are once again at loggerheads?

To understand the re-emergence of NATO-Russia antipathy, we have to return to the final years of the Soviet Union and a meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and then US Secretary of State, James Baker. On February 9, 1990 in the Kremlin's St. Catherine's Hall, Gorbachev made a stunning concession to Baker, agreeing to allow East Germany's incorporation into NATO. [11] The Soviet leader pledged to withdraw 380,000 troops from East Germany and approved the reunified, remilitarised Germany's incorporation into a hostile military alliance. In return for his cooperation, Baker promised Gorbachev that, "there would be no extension of NATO's jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the east." [12] But by 1993, the Clinton administration had already embarked on plans to renege on Baker's promise and extend NATO membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. [13] Whilst Baker's promise was not legally binding, NATO's willingness to disregard Russia's preferences and take advantage of the country's weakness would set the tone for future interactions between the two entities.

In 1994, Russia began trying to marginalise NATO by promoting the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) [14] as the continent's preeminent collective security body. Russia pushed for the deployment of CSCE peacekeepers within the post-Communist world and even allowed a CSCE force to be sent into Chechnya in 1995. [15] Though these actions did to an extent empower the CSCE, the organisation soon became subordinated to NATO when addressing large-scale issues of European security.

During the latter stages of the Bosnian War in 1994-5, NATO carried out airstrikes against Russia's allies, the Serbs, in spite of Russian protestations. [16] At the conclusion of the conflict, NATO insisted that it, rather than the UN, be charged with the implementation of the Dayton Accords. In 1999, NATO again intervened in Serbia, bombing the country for 78 days until Belgrade was forced to grant de facto independence to Kosovo. [17] NATO's war, which it dubiously justified as a humanitarian intervention, undoubtedly had much more to do with asserting the alliance's preeminence in Eastern Europe than assisting Serbia's oppressed Kosovar Albanian minority. [18] NATO's wanton use of force so close to Russia's border alarmed

the Kremlin, with Russia's Foreign minister Igor Ivanov warning NATO's actions risked ushering in a new Cold War.[19]

In 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were also incorporated into NATO, as the alliance moved ahead with plans to admit the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.[20] Whilst NATO has justified its expansion as a means for promoting freedom, democracy and human rights,[21] the alliance's enlargement had the effect of entrenching a formidable Western military presence in Central Europe.

Realising that NATO enlargement would antagonise Russia, the distinguished American diplomat **George Kennan opposed the strategy from the beginning**. As the chief architect of the Marshall Plan and one of the original advocates for US containment of the Soviet Union in the immediate aftermath of WWII, Kennan was nothing if not tough on Russia.[22] But in 1997 he wrote "expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the post cold-war era"[23] such a move might "impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking."[24] In a prescient 1998 interview Kennan explained that such a decision "shows so little understanding of Russian history and Soviet history. Of course there is going to be a bad reaction from Russia, and then [the NATO expanders] will say that we always told you that is how the Russians are – but this is just wrong."[25]

#### The Arrival of Putin: Conciliation Fails Amid NATO Provocations

When Vladimir **Putin came to power in January 2000**, relations between Russia and NATO were at a very low ebb. Yet far from exhibiting any anti-Western tendencies, Putin initially attempted to facilitate rapprochement between Russia and the West. Putin characterised NATO as a minimal threat to Russia's security, and even went as far as to suggest that Russia may still consider joining the alliance in the right circumstances.[26] NATO responded with a conciliatory gesture of its own, establishing the NATO-Russia Council in November 2001.[27] However, Putin's overtures failed to dampen the alliance's expansionist zeal.

From 2003 to 2005 the West extended its influence further into Eastern Europe by aiding revolutions against pro-Russian regimes in Georgia and the Ukraine. Between 1993 and 2003, \$700 million in US aid and \$420 million European Union (EU) aid was directed into Georgia.[28] Most of this money was channeled through Western NGOs and was used toward electoral and judicial reform and citizen mobilisation.

Vote rigging by Georgia's pro-Russian government in 2003 sparked widespread protests against the incumbent President Eduard Shevardnadze. Western NGOs played a key role in financing opposition parties and organising demonstrations.[29] When popular pressure forced Shevardnadze to resign, he was succeeded by the pro-NATO Mikhail Saakashvili. Voter fraud orchestrated by the Ukraine's pro-Russian President, Victor Yanukovich, in 2004 sparked similar protests in the Ukraine. Again, state-funded Western NGOs played a central role in mobilising anti-government demonstrators. Protestors were entertained with rock music, provided with free food and tent accommodation and even paid small amounts of money for attending rallies.[30] When popular pressure prompted Ukraine's Supreme Court to annul the election result and order a revote, the Western-backed Victor Yushchenko was elected President.

In March 2004 NATO accepted seven new member states including the three Baltic states. For the first time, NATO was right on Russia's border.[31] Twelve hundred miles had separated Saint Petersburg from NATO during the Cold War, but that distance had been reduced to less than one hundred miles. Later that year Georgia and the Ukraine signed Individual Partnership Action Plans, and joint NATO-Ukraine military exercises in Crimea soon followed.[32]

Whilst Putin downplayed the importance of these events, others in his administration expressed much alarm. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov warned "we cannot, of course, watch impartially the military structure of the alliance moving ever closer to our borders." [33] It was quite reasonable for the Kremlin to view NATO's incorporation of the Baltic States as an outright threat. Unlike the existing NATO members and former Warsaw Pact states, the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which was designed to prevent any country from amassing the weaponry required to launch an offensive war, didn't bind the Baltic nations.[34] NATO now held the legal right to deploy an unlimited quantity of troops and military hardware in the Baltic.[35] Plans were made for the Baltic states to accede to an adapted CFE treaty, but a series of diplomatic stalemates resulted in the US and its NATO allies refusing to ratify the new agreement.[36]

In 2007, the Bush Administration announced plans to construct a missile defence shield in Eastern Europe.[37] The pretext for this decision was that it was necessary to protect Europe from an Iranian nuclear attack. However, Moscow quickly realised that the shield would have the potential to undermine and perhaps even neutralise Russia's nuclear deterrent. Putin suggested an alternative, namely the construction of a joint Russia-US radar warning system in Azerbaijan, but the US rejected this proposal.[38] At this point, Putin was forced to abandon his conciliatory approach. In his 2007 State of the Nation Address, the Russian President characterised NATO as, "a real threat".[39] Russia formally suspended its observance of its CFE treaty obligations a month later.

At a summit in Bucharest in April 2008, NATO released a statement affirming that Georgia and the Ukraine would be offered membership.[40] US pressure was the chief driver of this decision, as several Western European alliance members expressed opposition to the plan.[41]

This was NATO's most threatening and provocative move towards Russia yet. Ukraine, as the biggest country in Europe, constitutes an important strategic buffer between Russia and NATO. Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany, and Nazi Germany all invaded Russia through southeastern Europe and consequently, the Kremlin is extremely reticent to allow the armies of those countries to once again be stationed there. Georgia borders Russia's volatile Caucasus region, already rife with minority nationalism and secessionist sentiment. Furthermore, both Georgia and the Ukraine are proximate to Russia's Volga region, its agricultural heartland and its access point for Caspian Sea oil. The Kremlin cannot and will not risk its control over these assets being compromised.

#### The Fight over Georgia and the Ukraine: Russia's Militarist Turn

It was only a matter of time before tension between Russia and NATO over the status of Georgia and the Ukraine spilled over into conflict. After winning wars of secession against Georgia in the

early 1990s, the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia had enjoyed de facto independence from Tbilisi.[42] Both had been reliant on Russia for strategic and financial support, though Russia still formally recognised them as part of Georgia. In May of 2008, when Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili requested that Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia be withdrawn and replaced by either EU or NATO forces, Russia responded by increasing the size of its force.[43] In June, Georgia detained Russian peacekeepers stationed in Abkhazia. Then on August 7 Georgia launched an attack on South Ossetia, killing numerous civilians and 12 Russian soldiers.[44] A day later, Russia sent ground troops into the secessionist territories and began bombing Georgian military and industrial targets. After five days of fighting, Moscow forced Tbilisi to agree to a ceasefire on Russian terms. Russia formally recognised the two breakaway polities as sovereign nations and announced that a force of 7,600 would remain in the territories indefinitely for their “protection”.[45]

Russia’s strong-arming of Georgia was the Kremlin’s way of signaling to NATO that it would not tolerate any further expansion of the alliance. Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev evoked a siege mentality, stating that “we do not have any illusion of partnership [with NATO]... Naturally we are not happy with being surrounded by military bases.”[46]

Russia’s war succeeded, as NATO’s plans to extend membership to Georgia were put on an indefinite hold. The alliance could hardly incorporate Georgia when Tbilisi had no sovereignty over 20 percent of its territory. Nonetheless, the West continued to put geostrategic pressure on Russia. NATO suspended the Russia-NATO Council, established a permanent military presence in the Baltic and, in December 2009, refused a Russian proposal to replace the CFE treaty.[47] In 2010 the US relocated a Patriot missile battery from Germany to Poland and, in 2012, opened phase one of its European Missile Defence Shield.[48]

With tensions high and the issue of Ukraine’s NATO membership still unresolved, another conflict always seemed likely. Ukrainian society is deeply divided between pro-Russian and pro-Western segments, and voting in the country tends to follow this division.[49] The Westernisation of Ukraine had been stalled by the election of the pro-Russian Victor Yanukovich in 2010. On 25 November 2013, Yanukovich delayed his decision to sign an Association Agreement with the EU which would have forced the Ukraine to sever all economic ties with Russia. Instead, Yanukovich signed a deal with Russia whereby the Kremlin would buy \$15 billion of Ukrainian bonds and cut its gas prices to the country by one third.[50] This decision angered pro-Western Ukrainians, who took to the streets in protest.

As civil unrest grew, police began to crack down violently on demonstrators.[51] On the 21 February 2014, after three months of protests, Yanukovich fled to Russia and, in what can only be described as a coup, a new pro-Western government took power in Kiev.[52] The full extent of US involvement in the coup is at this stage unknown, but a leaked conversation between US assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs Victoria Nuland and US Ambassador to the Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt suggests it could have been substantial. During the conversation, Nuland expressed her support for regime change in Ukraine and her desire to see Arseniy Yatsenyuk become the country’s new Prime Minister – which he did.[53]

Russian troops moved into the Crimean Peninsular on 22 February. Putin chose to take Crimea primarily because it contains the strategically important Black Sea port of Sevastopol, which

Russia had been leasing from the Ukraine since the end of the Cold War.[54] The annexation of Crimea was a warning that Moscow would not tolerate the Ukraine slipping out of its orbit. On the day of the Crimean annexation, Putin warned NATO not to "make itself at home in our backyard or in our historical territory."[55] Russia then orchestrated a proxy war in Eastern Ukraine, arming pro-Russian rebels and probably also deploying several hundred Special Forces soldiers in Eastern Ukraine to aid them.[56] In May, Ukraine elected a pro-Western government that renounced the country's non-aligned status and signaled its desire to join NATO.[57]

Russia's militarist tactics were once again successful in stalling NATO's advance. In March 2016, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker affirmed that the Ukraine would not gain NATO membership within the next two decades.[58] However, since 2014, NATO and the Ukraine have conducted numerous joint military exercises and NATO has committed \$5.4 million to assist with the modernisation of Ukraine's army.[59] The alliance has also increased its troop presence in the Baltic and conducted a military parade in Estonia less than a kilometer from Russian territory.[60] In 2016, the US completed phase two of its missile defence shield, opening a weapons system in Romania and announcing that a similar system will be opened in Poland in 2018.[61] Russia, meanwhile, has ensured that Eastern Ukraine remains in a state of frozen conflict and has effectively consolidated its control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia.[62]

#### Russia and NATO: Where to Next?

Winston Churchill once famously remarked that Russia is, "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma."<sup>[63]</sup> However, since the end of the Cold War at least, the Russian mindset has been remarkably easy to understand.

Russia regards NATO, the world's most powerful military alliance, as a dire threat to its security. Russia's goal of trying to halt NATO's eastward march is rooted in a defensive realist view of international politics. The Kremlin is attempting to safeguard its security; it is not looking to reclaim lost status or recapture an empire. Analysts such as Derk Eppink have contended that, "Putin's mind-set is largely rooted in the 19th century. Politics [for him] is about power."<sup>[64]</sup> Those who dismiss this worldview as outdated would do well to remember that Russia was almost destroyed twice in twentieth century by invasions through Eastern Europe. At least twenty-seven million Russians were killed during WWII, roughly one third of the war's overall death toll.<sup>[65]</sup> It should hardly be surprising that a sense of vulnerability still pervades Russian strategic thinking today.

#### **US-NATO alliance supports Russian hardliners and expands western border security fears.**

Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Moscow-based think tank Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, '19, "NATO is the obstacle to improving Russian-Western relations," Defense News, <https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/03/28/nato-is-the-obstacle-to-improving-russian-western-relations/>

In Russia, NATO is generally viewed as part of the American war machine and an instrument of U.S. global dominance. That view is shared by almost the entire Russian political spectrum. In

fact, the same view also prevails among NATO members from eastern Europe, where the alliance is seen as an instrument of U.S. influence and U.S. defense assurances.

That is why Russia is utterly baffled by U.S. accusations that the Kremlin — and President Vladimir Putin specifically — are trying to “drive a wedge between NATO partners.” No one in Moscow has ever regarded NATO as an independent entity that exists separately from the United States. There is a deep conviction in Russia that NATO is nothing more than an instrument of U.S. military policy, and that Washington will always be able to ram any decision through the NATO governing bodies, regardless of what its Western European partners might think of that decision.

That explains why any NATO enlargement is automatically regarded in Russia as a ruse to deploy U.S. forces in close proximity to Russian borders; NATO’s own role in that ruse is seen as a cover story — nothing more. The ongoing deployment of NATO forces in eastern Europe with the ostensible purpose of “containing and deterring Moscow” is seen in Russia as another piece of evidence to confirm that view. These new deployments are conducted under direct U.S. leadership, and most of the new forces deployed are American. The military presence of other NATO members in places such as the Baltic states is insignificant and purely symbolic.

Washington and NATO describe these deployments as a “clear signal to Moscow.” In Moscow itself, that signal is read as clear evidence that all the Russian criticisms and concerns about NATO have always been entirely justified, and that the moderate Russian reaction to NATO’s enlargement in the 1990s and early 2000s was a colossal strategic blunder.

The Russian hawks have always insisted that the only reason for admitting the Baltic states to NATO was to give the United States a new forward-staging post for military deployment against Russia. It now turns out that the hawks were right all along. That is why Russia is now determined not to make the same mistake again; it will do all it can to prevent any further NATO encroachment into former Soviet territory — namely, into Ukraine and Georgia. It’s only a matter of time until this unspoken “red line” drawn by Moscow becomes an official stance.

The West does not realize that Russia views NATO enlargement as a threat of U.S. forces (potentially including missile systems) deployed ever closer to critical Russian targets. As a result, Western decision-makers underestimate the strength of the Russian national consensus on this issue. There is a popular opinion in the West that Russia opposes NATO only because of President Putin’s personal animus. That opinion is a gross and primitive misreading of the situation.

The Russian political elite was actively opposed to NATO enlargement even during the era of former Soviet and Russian President Boris Yeltsin. That opposition was solidified by the hostile U.S. and Western reaction to the first Chechen campaign of 1994-1996. That reaction convinced Moscow that the West has no intention of accommodating Russian interests even on the most fundamental national security issues, including the protection of territorial integrity and the fight against terrorism.

It became clear that the Western approach to Russia was radically different from the approach to Germany and Japan after World War II: Those two nations were turned into U.S. satellites in exchange for U.S. security assurances and a recognition of their right to self-defense. But when

the Chechen crisis broke out in Russia in the 1990s, Moscow realized that Washington had no intention of offering it any security benefits or recognizing its **right to self-defense**, even as a theoretical proposition. Russia was required to become a loyal U.S. satellite without receiving anything in return. What is more, the situation gave rise to a deep and widespread Russian suspicion that Washington is seeking to assure Russian status as a loyal vassal by means of further disintegration, weakening and decline of the Russian state.

The gradual conversion of the Russian elites to such a view in the 1990s was the main reason for the collapse of Russia's pro-Western orientation in the 1990s. The proponents of a pro-Western Russian policy (which essentially implied Russia becoming a U.S. satellite) have since been completely marginalized because they cannot explain what tangible benefits such a course would bring Russia to outweigh the inevitable losses for Russian national security and statehood in general.

Even now, the few remaining Russian liberals tend to avoid any discussions on foreign policy and national defense issues. Much to the disappointment of their Western "friends," they make it clear by doing so that a well-articulated, pro-Western political platform has essentially ceased to exist in Russia.

Russia's efforts against NATO enlargement are a result of the foreign policy consensus that had coalesced even before the arrival of President Putin. Ever since the first Chechen crisis, the United States has come to be seen as a potential threat to the very foundations of Russian statehood, and as a foreign power that has no interest in supporting that statehood, even in return for Russian loyalty. That is why the deployment of American proxy forces in the shape of NATO are seen as a threat when they move ever closer to Russian borders without any security assurances being offered to Moscow.

Meanwhile, Washington never had any intention of offering Moscow any such assurances. It believed that sooner or later, Moscow would become a U.S. satellite in any case; it also wanted to preserve a certain freedom of maneuver with regard to Russia. Such a stance served only to deepen Russian suspicions and reinforce the vicious circle of mutual distrust.

As a result, NATO came to be seen by most Russians as a deeply hostile, anti-Russian military coalition long before the current crisis. Russians believe that NATO's sole task is to maintain a state of confrontation with Russia, and most would subscribe to the idea that "without Russia, there would be no NATO."

### **Western border insecurity independently causes Russian preemptive self defense – goes nuclear.**

Alexey Arbatov et al, head of the Center for International Security at the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Major General Vladimir Dvorkin, a principal researcher at the Center for International Security at the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations and Peter Topychkanov, fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center's Nonproliferation Program, '17 "Russian And Chinese Perspectives On Non-Nuclear Weapons And Nuclear Risks" Carnegie Endowment for

*International Peace Publications,*

[https://www.russiamatters.org/sites/default/files/media/files/Entanglement\\_interior\\_FNL.pdf](https://www.russiamatters.org/sites/default/files/media/files/Entanglement_interior_FNL.pdf)

Alternatively, if air-space war assumes a non-nuclear conflict, then the concept raises serious doubts of a different nature. Russian state and military leaders have regularly depicted terrifying scenarios of large-scale conflicts being won through non-nuclear means. Former deputy defense minister General Arkady Bakhin, for example, has described how “leading world powers are staking everything on winning supremacy in the air and in space, on carrying out massive air-space operations at the outbreak of hostilities, to conduct strikes against sites of strategic and vital importance all across the country.”<sup>15</sup> It is difficult to imagine, however, that such a conflict, in reality, would not quickly escalate to a nuclear exchange, especially as strategic forces and their C3I systems were continually attacked by conventional munitions.

Right up until the mid-1980s, the military leadership of the USSR believed that a major war would likely begin in Europe with the early use by Warsaw Pact forces of hundreds of tactical nuclear weapons “as soon as [they] received information” that NATO was preparing to launch a nuclear strike.<sup>16</sup> After that, Soviet armies would reach the English Channel and the Pyrenees in a few weeks, or massive nuclear strikes would be inflicted by the USSR and the United States on one another, and the war would be over in a few hours, or at most in a few days, with catastrophic consequences.<sup>17</sup>

After the end of the Cold War, the task of elaborating probable major war scenarios was practically shelved because such a war had become unthinkable in the new political environment. However, strategic thinking on the next high-technology global war apparently continued in secret (and probably not only in Russia). Now, at a time of renewed confrontation between Russia and the West, the fruits of that work are finally seeing the light of day. In all likelihood, the authors of the strategy imagine that over a relatively long period of time—days or weeks—the West would wage a campaign of air and missile strikes against Russia without using nuclear weapons. Russia, in turn, would defend against such attacks and carry out retaliatory strikes with long-range conventional weapons. Notably, in 2016, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stated that “by 2021, it is planned to increase by four times the combat capabilities of the nation’s strategic non-nuclear forces, which will provide the possibility of fully implementing the tasks of non-nuclear deterrence.”<sup>18</sup>

In other words, the basic premise is that the U.S.-led campaigns against Yugoslavia in 1999 or Iraq in 1990 and 2003 (which are often cited by experts in this context) may be implemented against Russia—but with different results, thanks to the operations of the Russian Air-Space Forces, the Strategic Rocket Forces, and the Navy against the United States and its allies.

The emphasis on defensive and offensive strategic non-nuclear arms does not exclude, but—on the contrary—implies the limited use of nuclear weapons at some point of the armed conflict. Sergei Sukhanov, one of the most authoritative representatives of the defense industries as the constructor general of the Vysmol Corporation, which is responsible for designing strategic defense systems, has exposed the whole panorama of Russia’s contemporary strategic logic on the interactions between offensive and defensive systems and between nuclear and non-nuclear systems:

If we cannot exclude the possibility of the large-scale use of air-space attacks by the U.S. and other NATO countries (i.e., if we accept that the Yugoslavian strategy might be applied against Russia), then it is clearly impossible to solve the problem by fighting off air-space attacks with weapons that would neutralize them in the air-space theater, since this would require the creation of highly effective air- and missile defense systems across the country. Therefore, the strategy for solving the air-space defense tasks faced in this eventuality should be based on deterring the enemy from large-scale air-space attacks by implementing the tasks facing air-space defense in this eventuality at a scale that would avoid escalation but force the enemy to refrain from further airspace attack.<sup>19</sup> (Emphasis added.) In other words, because of the inevitable limitations in Russia's ability to defend against air-space attacks, Sukhanov argues that Russia may have to resort to the limited use of nuclear weapons in order to compel the United States and its allies into backing down. This basic logic is widely accepted in Russia.

Judging by the available information, the United States does not have—and is not expected to have for the foreseeable future—the technological means or the operational plans to wage non-nuclear air-space warfare against Russia. However, the fact that a major war with the United States and NATO is seen in contemporary Russian strategic thinking as a prolonged endeavor involving an integrated technological and operational continuum of nuclear and non-nuclear operations, defensive and offensive capabilities, and ballistic and aerodynamic weapons creates a breeding ground for entanglement. The result could be the rapid escalation of a local non-nuclear conflict to a global nuclear war. The remainder of this chapter discusses how new and emerging military technologies might contribute to such an escalation.

### **Improving Russian status solves Russia war and opens up strategic realignment.**

Deborah Welch Larson, Professor of Political Science at the University of California-Los Angeles, 7-3-20, "Book Review Roundtable: Rising Titans, Falling Giants,"  
<https://tnsr.org/roundtable/book-review-roundtable-rising-titans-falling-giants/>

The question is whether this justification for the continued U.S. presence in Europe still stands, now that China is rising. Based on predation theory, Wohlforth deduces that the United States might want to bolster or strengthen Russia to obtain its help against China.

Taliaferro is more cautious about the benefits of predation, pointing out that Russia's current interference in Ukraine and its disinformation campaign in Western democracies have their origins in bitter and long-standing resentments over how the Cold War ended. Taliaferro observes, "while relegation in 1990 succeeded in pushing the Soviet Union out of the great power ranks, it could never guarantee that post-Soviet Russia would remain 'down' indefinitely." Refusing to accept the status claims of a declining power evokes strong emotions that can lead to an offensive reaction. Former great powers may, over time, recover some of their capabilities, and an aggrieved major power may be able to act as a spoiler, as Russia has done by interfering in Western elections and intervening in Syria.<sup>36</sup>

Treating the declining state with respect and offering it a chance to exercise leadership can go a long way toward diminishing the likelihood that it will adopt a policy of seeking revenge and increase the chances that it will cooperate with the rising state in preserving world order. Status

**incentives** are also less costly — and less risky — than efforts to **bolster the power of a declining state.**

## **COVID makes Russia amenable to strategic realignment. Breaking the Russia-China alliance solves Chinese fourth generation military modernization.**

Stanislaw **Skarzynski**, U.K.-based Polish journalist currently serving as the global affairs correspondent for Gazeta Wyborcza and Daniel **Wong**, Hong Kong national studying at Winchester College, U.K., **8-28-20**, "Is Putin's Russia Seeking a New Balance Between China and the West?", The Diplomat, <https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/is-putins-russia-seeking-a-new-balance-between-china-and-the-west/>

That **Russia might be looking for an escape route** would not be much of a surprise. The **COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated all the problems Moscow has with its relationship with Beijing** to such an extent that recently **Russia has often been described as being slowly devoured by its economically superior ally**. It would be one thing for Moscow to acknowledge that China is rather a threat than an ally. But to act on that would be an altogether different story.

Nevertheless, such a **precedent exists**. It has been described on countless occasions how, **since Vladimir Putin rose to power in 1999, Russia has made a U-turn from its aspiration to join the transatlantic alliance**. That objective largely governed Russian foreign policy in the 1990s and even resulted in Vladimir Putin's famous statements in 2000 regarding the possibility of Russia's access to NATO — something as unthinkable now as it was before the implosion of the Soviet Union.

The same two factors that contributed to Russia's reversal of its pro-Western stance 20 years ago are responsible for the fact that **Moscow might now be willing to significantly harden its stance toward China**. The first factor was Russia's fruitless experiment with Western liberal democracy after the Soviet Union imploded in 1991; the second consisted of concerning strategic shifts in Russia's vicinity — NATO expansion in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s and two subsequent U.S.-led wars in the Middle East in the 2000s being the most prominent examples. In the Kremlin, these were perceived as existentially threatening.

As these two issues are to some extent currently being replayed, it is important to elaborate on both before arriving at the conclusion that it is the West that has the upper hand in this game — and, by extension, that **allowing Putin's Russia to find a new balance between China and the West could turn out to be an important step toward containing China's aspiration to dictate terms on the global stage.**

### **The Origins of the Modern China-Russia Axis**

In November of the year 2000, Vladimir Putin published a programmatic article. He wrote:

Russia has always felt itself to be a Eurasian country. We have never forgotten that the main part of the Russian territory is in Asia. Frankly, we have not always made good use of that advantage. I think the time has come for us, together with the Asia-Pacific countries, to move on

from words to actions and to build up economic, political and other ties. Russia today has every opportunity for this.

This remark undoubtedly reflected on how deeply Russia was disillusioned with the results of its decade-long entanglement with the Western democratic system. Moscow now viewed Asia as offering Russia a path to regain its position of being a “first-tier country.” This had been Putin’s dream from the very moment he, as a lieutenant colonel of the KGB in the East German city of Dresden, witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Alexie D. Voskressenski (who contributed to the comprehensive “China and the World” published this year by Oxford University Press with a chapter on the development of the Sino-Russian relationship) described how the lack of genuine support for the Russian economy from the West in the 1990s had been used by Beijing. China correctly ascertained that destitute Russia was a missing ingredient in the potion that would allow China to transform itself into a genuine global superpower. Voskressenski documented how multibillion dollar military contracts allowed China “to upgrade the second post-war generation of armaments to the fourth (...) whereas Russia was able to preserve its military-industrial complex following the disintegration of the Soviet Union.”

This first military link enabled multifaceted economic and political cooperation to develop between Russia and China. Between 1996 and 2008, not only was the half-a-century long Sino-Russian border dispute gradually resolved, but trade exchange and Chinese investments in Russia also grew exponentially. The process even resulted in the creation and development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which, by 2017, had also accepted India and Pakistan as members.

Those in Russia who warned against close relations with China had in fact little support due to the paucity of their argument. China had, for a long period of time, refrained from using its power on the global stage, at least in comparison with what it was capable of doing given its economic, political, and military power.

#### An Assertive China, a Worried Russia

The situation is now vastly different as in recent years China has suddenly begun to pull all the strings at its disposal. The dispute in the South China Sea has become a major international concern; the row with regard to Hong Kong’s autonomy has already engaged half of the world; the recent military confrontation with India left several dozen soldiers dead or wounded on both sides.

Notably, China no longer refrains from getting openly involved in parts of the world that Russia perceives as its indisputable sphere of influence. There is a long list, but the most recent example occurred during post-election riots in Minsk, where the Belarusian security forces used armored trucks manufactured in China against peaceful demonstrators.

It is no secret that for years Xi Jinping’s China has increasingly provided support to Belarus’ Alexander Lukashenko in his attempts to maintain independence from Putin’s Russia, which pressed for deeper political and economic integration between Minsk and Moscow. It is important to underline that these processes have significantly strengthened since the Russian

invasion of Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimea – events that rendered Putin unable to use Europe and the West as a counterweight to Chinese influence.

However, the pendulum might have swung too far when China used the economic fallout of the coronavirus pandemic against Russia. Although we do not know whether Putin went on his infamous oil price war against the United States and Saudi Arabia with or without at least some backing from China, Beijing indisputably allowed Moscow to hemorrhage its precious reserves for long weeks before throwing a lifeline: China suddenly limited its purchase of oil in the Middle East and vastly (by 31 percent when compared with 2019) increased the share of oil it sources from Russia.

Moreover, this lifeline ended with a suspicious gambit: Wood Mackenzie's analysts quoted by Reuters predicted that low prices and abundance of oil had allowed China to expand its reserves to 1.15 billion barrels this year.

This is a strategic amount, as the possession of more than a billion barrels is enough for China to sustain itself for nearly three months – approximately the amount of time required for oil to be bought and shipped from any corner of the world. Effectively, Russia has not only lost clients and deepened its dependency on China, but Beijing also managed to remove from Moscow's hand the only asset it had when bargaining with China: the effect of geographical closeness combined with well-developed pipeline infrastructure.

In the future, it is Beijing that will dictate oil prices to Moscow. Given that oil production contributes about 16 percent of Russia's GDP and the bulk of its federal government's revenue, China will come out of the pandemic with its economic domination over Russia cemented as it has never been before.

This move much resembles the very thing that triggered Russia's reversal from the path that was intended to lead toward NATO membership nearly two decades ago. Back then, Putin considered U.S.-led attacks on Afghanistan, and particularly on Iraq, to be moves that would result in encircling Russia, rendering it incapable of defending itself and effectively removing Moscow from the list of first-tier countries.

#### A Poisoned Choice for the West

Arguably, China has now gone too far in the same way that the West did 20 years ago, making Moscow open to a significant re-adjustment of its position between China and the West, something signaled by the list of “cracks in the Russia-China relationship” by the South China Morning Post.

It is up to the West (given that Donald Trump's chances of re-election are somewhat doubtful, one could speak of “the West” without a question mark) whether it will elect to choose dialogue with Moscow in order to enable Russia to move away from China.

It would not be easy to do this without sacrificing the basic values the West holds dear. The list of issues that have accumulated since 2014 is huge, from Ukraine, Belarus, and Georgia, through numerous poisonings and political murders committed in Russia and other countries, to Russia's meddling in the democratic processes in the U.S., the U.K., and many other countries.

Yet at stake is an ability to limit China's capability to use Russia as a warehouse for raw materials and a source of military technologies. Furthermore, a less dependent Russia would be able to largely impede Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative and thus limit China's dominance in Asia, upon which the Chinese global offensive is founded.

Arguably, given the signals coming from the Kremlin, perhaps this is the opportune moment for the West to present Vladimir Putin with conditions that would enable Moscow to escape from between Beijing's jaws.

Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Moscow-based think tank Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, '19, "NATO is the obstacle to improving Russian-Western relations," Defense News, <https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/03/28/nato-is-the-obstacle-to-improving-russian-western-relations/>

In Russia, NATO is generally viewed as part of the American war machine and an instrument of U.S. global dominance. That view is shared by almost the entire Russian political spectrum. In fact, the same view also prevails among NATO members from eastern Europe, where the alliance is seen as an instrument of U.S. influence and U.S. defense assurances.

That is why Russia is utterly baffled by U.S. accusations that the Kremlin — and President Vladimir Putin specifically — are trying to “drive a wedge between NATO partners.” No one in Moscow has ever regarded NATO as an independent entity that exists separately from the United States. There is a deep conviction in Russia that NATO is nothing more than an instrument of U.S. military policy, and that Washington will always be able to ram any decision through the NATO governing bodies, regardless of what its Western European partners might think of that decision.

That explains why any NATO enlargement is automatically regarded in Russia as a ruse to deploy U.S. forces in close proximity to Russian borders; NATO’s own role in that ruse is seen as a cover story — nothing more. The ongoing deployment of NATO forces in eastern Europe with the ostensible purpose of “containing and deterring Moscow” is seen in Russia as another piece of evidence to confirm that view. These new deployments are conducted under direct U.S. leadership, and most of the new forces deployed are American. The military presence of other NATO members in places such as the Baltic states is insignificant and purely symbolic.

Washington and NATO describe these deployments as a “clear signal to Moscow.” In Moscow itself, that signal is read as clear evidence that all the Russian criticisms and concerns about NATO have always been entirely justified, and that the moderate Russian reaction to NATO’s enlargement in the 1990s and early 2000s was a colossal strategic blunder.

The Russian hawks have always insisted that the only reason for admitting the Baltic states to NATO was to give the United States a new forward-staging post for military deployment against Russia. It now turns out that the hawks were right all along. That is why Russia is now determined not to make the same mistake again; it will do all it can to prevent any further NATO encroachment into former Soviet territory — namely, into Ukraine and Georgia. It’s only a matter of time until this unspoken “red line” drawn by Moscow becomes an official stance.

The West does not realize that Russia views NATO enlargement as a threat of U.S. forces (potentially including missile systems) deployed ever closer to critical Russian targets. As a result, Western decision-makers underestimate the strength of the Russian national consensus on this issue. There is a popular opinion in the West that Russia opposes NATO only because of President Putin's personal animus. That opinion is a gross and primitive misreading of the situation.

The Russian political elite was actively opposed to NATO enlargement even during the era of former Soviet and Russian President Boris Yeltsin. That opposition was solidified by the hostile U.S. and Western reaction to the first Chechen campaign of 1994-1996. That reaction convinced Moscow that the West has no intention of accommodating Russian interests even on the most fundamental national security issues, including the protection of territorial integrity and the fight against terrorism.

It became clear that the Western approach to Russia was radically different from the approach to Germany and Japan after World War II: Those two nations were turned into U.S. satellites in exchange for U.S. security assurances and a recognition of their right to self-defense. But when the Chechen crisis broke out in Russia in the 1990s, Moscow realized that Washington had no intention of offering it any security benefits or recognizing its right to self-defense, even as a theoretical proposition. Russia was required to become a loyal U.S. satellite without receiving anything in return. What is more, the situation gave rise to a deep and widespread Russian suspicion that Washington is seeking to assure Russian status as a loyal vassal by means of further disintegration, weakening and decline of the Russian state.

The gradual conversion of the Russian elites to such a view in the 1990s was the main reason for the collapse of Russia's pro-Western orientation in the 1990s. The proponents of a pro-Western Russian policy (which essentially implied Russia becoming a U.S. satellite) have since been completely marginalized because they cannot explain what tangible benefits such a course would bring Russia to outweigh the inevitable losses for Russian national security and statehood in general.

Even now, the few remaining Russian liberals tend to avoid any discussions on foreign policy and national defense issues. Much to the disappointment of their Western "friends," they make it clear by doing so that a well-articulated, pro-Western political platform has essentially ceased to exist in Russia.

Russia's efforts against NATO enlargement are a result of the foreign policy consensus that had coalesced even before the arrival of President Putin. Ever since the first Chechen crisis, the United States has come to be seen as a potential threat to the very foundations of Russian statehood, and as a foreign power that has no interest in supporting that statehood, even in return for Russian loyalty. That is why the deployment of American proxy forces in the shape of NATO are seen as a threat when they move ever closer to Russian borders without any security assurances being offered to Moscow.

Meanwhile, Washington never had any intention of offering Moscow any such assurances. It believed that sooner or later, Moscow would become a U.S. satellite in any case; it also wanted

to preserve a certain freedom of maneuver with regard to Russia. Such a stance served only to deepen Russian suspicions and reinforce the vicious circle of mutual distrust.

As a result, NATO came to be seen by most Russians as a deeply hostile, anti-Russian military coalition long before the current crisis. Russians believe that NATO's sole task is to maintain a state of confrontation with Russia, and most would subscribe to the idea that "without Russia, there would be no NATO."

### **Western border insecurity independently causes Russian preemptive self defense – goes nuclear.**

Alexey Arbatov et al, head of the Center for International Security at the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Major General Vladimir Dvorkin, a principal researcher at the Center for International Security at the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations and Peter Topychkanov, fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center's Nonproliferation Program, '17 "Russian And Chinese Perspectives On Non-Nuclear Weapons And Nuclear Risks" *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Publications*,

[https://www.russiamatters.org/sites/default/files/media/files/Entanglement\\_interior\\_FNL.pdf](https://www.russiamatters.org/sites/default/files/media/files/Entanglement_interior_FNL.pdf)

Alternatively, if air-space war assumes a non-nuclear conflict, then the concept raises serious doubts of a different nature. Russian state and military leaders have regularly depicted terrifying scenarios of large-scale conflicts being won through non-nuclear means. Former deputy defense minister General Arkady Bakhin, for example, has described how "leading world powers are staking everything on winning supremacy in the air and in space, on carrying out massive air-space operations at the outbreak of hostilities, to conduct strikes against sites of strategic and vital importance all across the country."<sup>15</sup> It is difficult to imagine, however, that such a conflict, in reality, would not quickly escalate to a nuclear exchange, especially as strategic forces and their C3I systems were continually attacked by conventional munitions.

Right up until the mid-1980s, the military leadership of the USSR believed that a major war would likely begin in Europe with the early use by Warsaw Pact forces of hundreds of tactical nuclear weapons "as soon as [they] received information" that NATO was preparing to launch a nuclear strike.<sup>16</sup> After that, Soviet armies would reach the English Channel and the Pyrenees in a few weeks, or massive nuclear strikes would be inflicted by the USSR and the United States on one another, and the war would be over in a few hours, or at most in a few days, with catastrophic consequences.<sup>17</sup>

After the end of the Cold War, the task of elaborating probable major war scenarios was practically shelved because such a war had become unthinkable in the new political environment. However, strategic thinking on the next high-technology global war apparently continued in secret (and probably not only in Russia). Now, at a time of renewed confrontation between Russia and the West, the fruits of that work are finally seeing the light of day. In all likelihood, the authors of the strategy imagine that over a relatively long period of time—days or weeks—the West would wage a campaign of air and missile strikes against Russia without using nuclear weapons. Russia, in turn, would defend against such attacks and carry out retaliatory strikes with long-range conventional weapons. Notably, in 2016, Russian Defense

Minister Sergei Shoigu stated that “by 2021, it is planned to increase by four times the combat capabilities of the nation’s strategic non-nuclear forces, which will provide the possibility of fully implementing the tasks of non-nuclear deterrence.”<sup>18</sup>

In other words, the basic premise is that the U.S.-led campaigns against Yugoslavia in 1999 or Iraq in 1990 and 2003 (which are often cited by experts in this context) may be implemented against Russia—but with different results, thanks to the operations of the Russian Air-Space Forces, the Strategic Rocket Forces, and the Navy against the United States and its allies.

The emphasis on defensive and offensive strategic non-nuclear arms does not exclude, but—on the contrary—implies the limited use of nuclear weapons at some point of the armed conflict. Sergei Sukhanov, one of the most authoritative representatives of the defense industries as the constructor general of the Vympel Corporation, which is responsible for designing strategic defense systems, has exposed the whole panorama of Russia's contemporary strategic logic on the interactions between offensive and defensive systems and between nuclear and non-nuclear systems:

If we cannot exclude the possibility of the large-scale use of air-space attacks by the U.S. and other NATO countries (i.e., if we accept that the Yugoslavian strategy might be applied against Russia), then it is clearly impossible to solve the problem by fighting off air-space attacks with weapons that would neutralize them in the air-space theater, since this would require the creation of highly effective air- and missile defense systems across the country. Therefore, the strategy for solving the air-space defense tasks faced in this eventuality should be based on deterring the enemy from large-scale air-space attacks by implementing the tasks facing air-space defense in this eventuality at a scale that would avoid escalation but force the enemy to refrain from further airspace attack.<sup>19</sup> (Emphasis added.) In other words, because of the inevitable limitations in Russia's ability to defend against air-space attacks, Sukhanov argues that Russia may have to resort to the limited use of nuclear weapons in order to compel the United States and its allies into backing down. This basic logic is widely accepted in Russia.

Judging by the available information, the United States does not have—and is not expected to have for the foreseeable future—the technological means or the operational plans to wage non-nuclear air-space warfare against Russia. However, the fact that a major war with the United States and NATO is seen in contemporary Russian strategic thinking as a prolonged endeavor involving an integrated technological and operational continuum of nuclear and non-nuclear operations, defensive and offensive capabilities, and ballistic and aerodynamic weapons creates a breeding ground for entanglement. The result could be the rapid escalation of a local non-nuclear conflict to a global nuclear war. The remainder of this chapter discusses how new and emerging military technologies might contribute to such an escalation.

### **Improving Russian status solves Russia war and opens up strategic realignment.**

Deborah Welch **Larson**, Professor of Political Science at the University of California-Los Angeles, **7-3-20**, “Book Review Roundtable: Rising Titans, Falling Giants,” <https://tnsr.org/roundtable/book-review-roundtable-rising-titans-falling-giants/>

The question is whether this justification for the continued U.S. presence in Europe still stands, now that China is rising. Based on predation theory, Wohlforth deduces that the United States might want to bolster or strengthen Russia to obtain its help against China.

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Treating the declining state with respect and offering it a chance to exercise leadership can go a long way toward diminishing the likelihood that it will adopt a policy of seeking revenge and increase the chances that it will cooperate with the rising state in preserving world order. Status incentives are also less costly — and less risky — than efforts to bolster the power of a declining state.

## COVID makes Russia amenable to strategic realignment. Breaking the Russia-China alliance solves Chinese fourth generation military modernization.

Stanislaw Skarzynski, U.K.-based Polish journalist currently serving as the global affairs correspondent for Gazeta Wyborcza and Daniel Wong, Hong Kong national studying at Winchester College, U.K., 8-28-20, "Is Putin's Russia Seeking a New Balance Between China and the West?", The Diplomat, <https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/is-putins-russia-seeking-a-new-balance-between-china-and-the-west/>

That Russia might be looking for an escape route would not be much of a surprise. The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated all the problems Moscow has with its relationship with Beijing to such an extent that recently Russia has often been described as being slowly devoured by its economically superior ally. It would be one thing for Moscow to acknowledge that China is rather a threat than an ally. But to act on that would be an altogether different story.

Nevertheless, such a precedent exists. It has been described on countless occasions how, since Vladimir Putin rose to power in 1999, Russia has made a U-turn from its aspiration to join the transatlantic alliance. That objective largely governed Russian foreign policy in the 1990s and even resulted in Vladimir Putin's famous statements in 2000 regarding the possibility of Russia's access to NATO — something as unthinkable now as it was before the implosion of the Soviet Union.

The same two factors that contributed to Russia's reversal of its pro-Western stance 20 years ago are responsible for the fact that Moscow might now be willing to significantly harden its stance toward China. The first factor was Russia's fruitless experiment with Western liberal democracy after the Soviet Union imploded in 1991; the second consisted of concerning

strategic shifts in Russia's vicinity — NATO expansion in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s and two subsequent U.S.-led wars in the Middle East in the 2000s being the most prominent examples. In the Kremlin, these were perceived as existentially threatening.

As these two issues are to some extent currently being replayed, it is important to elaborate on both before arriving at the conclusion that it is the West that has the upper hand in this game – and, by extension, that allowing Putin's Russia to find a new balance between China and the West could turn out to be an important step toward containing China's aspiration to dictate terms on the global stage.

### The Origins of the Modern China-Russia Axis

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This remark undoubtedly reflected on how deeply Russia was disillusioned with the results of its decade-long entanglement with the Western democratic system. Moscow now viewed Asia as offering Russia a path to regain its position of being a "first-tier country." This had been Putin's dream from the very moment he, as a lieutenant colonel of the KGB in the East German city of Dresden, witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union.

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Those in Russia who warned against close relations with China had in fact little support due to the paucity of their argument. China had, for a long period of time, refrained from using its power on the global stage, at least in comparison with what it was capable of doing given its economic, political, and military power.

### An Assertive China, a Worried Russia

The situation is now **vastly different** as in recent years **China has suddenly begun to pull all the strings at its disposal**. The dispute in the South China Sea has become a major international concern; the row with regard to Hong Kong's autonomy has already engaged half of the world; the recent military confrontation with India left several dozen soldiers dead or wounded on both sides.

Notably, **China no longer refrains from getting openly involved in parts of the world that Russia perceives as its indisputable sphere of influence**. There is a long list, but **the most recent example occurred during post-election riots in Minsk**, where the **Belarusian security forces used armored trucks manufactured in China against peaceful demonstrators**.

It is no secret that for years Xi Jinping's China has increasingly provided support to Belarus' Alexander Lukashenko in his attempts to maintain independence from Putin's Russia, which pressed for deeper political and economic integration between Minsk and Moscow. It is important to underline that these processes have significantly strengthened since the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimea – events that rendered Putin unable to use Europe and the West as a counterweight to Chinese influence.

However, **the pendulum might have swung too far when China used the economic fallout of the coronavirus pandemic against Russia**. Although we do not know whether Putin went on his infamous oil price war against the United States and Saudi Arabia with or without at least some backing from China, **Beijing indisputably allowed Moscow to hemorrhage its precious reserves for long weeks before throwing a lifeline: China suddenly limited its purchase of oil in the Middle East and vastly (by 31 percent when compared with 2019) increased the share of oil it sources from Russia**.

Moreover, this lifeline ended with a suspicious gambit: Wood Mackenzie's analysts quoted by Reuters predicted that **low prices and abundance of oil had allowed China to expand its reserves to 1.15 billion barrels this year**.

This is a strategic amount, as **the possession of more than a billion barrels is enough for China to sustain itself for nearly three months** – approximately **the amount of time required for oil to be bought and shipped from any corner of the world**. Effectively, **Russia has not only lost clients and deepened its dependency on China, but Beijing also managed to remove from Moscow's hand the only asset it had when bargaining with China: the effect of geographical closeness combined with well-developed pipeline infrastructure**.

In the future, it is **Beijing** that **will dictate oil prices to Moscow**. Given that **oil production contributes about 16 percent of Russia's GDP** and the bulk of its federal government's revenue, **China will come out of the pandemic with its economic domination over Russia cemented** as it has never been before.

**This move much resembles the very thing that triggered Russia's reversal from the path that was intended to lead toward NATO** membership nearly two decades ago. Back **then**, Putin considered U.S.-led attacks on Afghanistan, and particularly on Iraq, to be moves that would

result in encircling Russia, rendering it incapable of defending itself and effectively removing Moscow from the list of first-tier countries.

#### A Poisoned Choice for the West

Arguably, China has now gone too far in the same way that the West did 20 years ago, making Moscow open to a significant re-adjustment of its position between China and the West, something signaled by the list of “cracks in the Russia-China relationship” by the South China Morning Post.

It is up to the West (given that Donald Trump’s chances of re-election are somewhat doubtful, one could speak of “the West” without a question mark) whether it will elect to choose dialogue with Moscow in order to enable Russia to move away from China.

It would not be easy to do this without sacrificing the basic values the West holds dear. The list of issues that have accumulated since 2014 is huge, from Ukraine, Belarus, and Georgia, through numerous poisonings and political murders committed in Russia and other countries, to Russia’s meddling in the democratic processes in the U.S., the U.K., and many other countries.

Yet at stake is an ability to limit China’s capability to use Russia as a warehouse for raw materials and a source of military technologies. Furthermore, a less dependent Russia would be able to largely impede Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative and thus limit China’s dominance in Asia, upon which the Chinese global offensive is founded.

Arguably, given the signals coming from the Kremlin, perhaps this is the opportune moment for the West to present Vladimir Putin with conditions that would enable Moscow to escape from between Beijing’s jaws.

#### Alliance collapse inevitable because of populism, debt and china. Phased withdrawal stabilizes the transition.

Walt, Stephen, IR @ Harvard, '18, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/26/nato-isnt-what-you-think-it-is/>

Even so, NATO’s present problems predate Trump and are largely the result of long-term structural forces. In the absence of a common, clear, and present danger, sustaining an elaborate multinational alliance was always going to be difficult, and it is in some ways a testimony to past diplomatic artistry that NATO has kept going as long as it has and despite the failures in Afghanistan and Libya and the divisions that erupted over the war in Iraq. Even if Trump had stuck with the status quo, reaffirmed the U.S. commitment, and played nicely with Europe’s leaders, it would not have reversed the gradual erosion of the trans-Atlantic partnership.

A better course would have been to start a gradual, constructive, and if possible amicable decrease of the U.S. security role in Europe, making it clear to U.S. allies that Washington no longer believed it needed to maintain a security presence there and that it planned to be either completely or nearly out in five to 10 years. The United States might conceivably remain a

formal member of NATO, but it would no longer station forces there, no longer insist that the supreme allied commander in Europe be a U.S. officer, and no longer expect the Europeans to fall obediently into line whenever Washington barked orders. Trade, investment, and tourism would continue, and U.S. arms manufacturers would be free to sell to European buyers if these states decided to bolster their defenses. Meanwhile, the United States would be free to focus on other problems.

Contrary to what you might think, I'm not anti-European, let alone anti-NATO. The alliance was a bold achievement for its time and one that served both the United States and Europe well in the past. But as I wrote back in 1998: "**[N]othing is permanent in international affairs**, and NATO's past achievements should not blind us to its growing fragility. **Instead of mindlessly extending guarantees to every potential trouble spot**, and instead of basing our foreign policy on a presumption of permanent partnership, it **is time for Europe and the United States to begin a slow and gradual process of disengagement**. **This is going to happen anyway**, and **wise statecraft anticipates and exploits the tides of history rather than engaging in a fruitless struggle to hold them back**." It was true back then and is even truer today.

### **Euro-deterrent checks and stabilizes extended deterrence.**

**Carpenter**, Ted Galen, PhD, '19, NATO: The Dangerous Dinosaur. Cato Institute. P 124-125.

Strategic arsenals of that size **are large enough to be credible deterrents**. Although Russia clearly would prevail in a nuclear exchange, Kremlin leaders know that their country would suffer massive damage from such a conflict. Therefore, only **the most reckless Russian leader would contemplate launching** an attack on its smaller nuclear rivals. Moreover, for the first time, a serious debate is emerging in Germany about that country joining the global nuclear weapons club.<sup>30</sup> Although the option has met with strong public resistance, it can no longer be dismissed as a possible development. Even a **modest German deterrent would add to the complications that the Kremlin would face if it contemplated aggression** against major European powers. Members of American and European political and opinion elites should at least be receptive to the possibility of a nuclear-armed Germany instead of acting as though that would be the most horrifying development imaginable.<sup>31</sup> **Germany is a stable, conservative, democratic country; it is not a candidate to launch wars of aggression.**

A more serious caveat is that while the British and French (and possibly future German) nukes might be sufficient to deter a Russian attack directly on their countries, they wouldn't necessarily deter an attack on the nonnuclear NATO members such as Poland, the Czech Republic, or Romania, much less the even more exposed and vulnerable Baltic republics. Extended deterrence inevitably has less credibility than direct deterrence, and it is a valid concern to wonder if Britain and France would risk their countries to defend nonnuclear European partners. Of course, **many of the same policymakers, scholars, and journalists who question the credibility of a British or French nuclear umbrella over the rest of NATO Europe seem to have no problem assuming that an extended deterrence commitment from an even more geographically distant United States is indisputably credible.**

**Even if there are credibility issues** with the belief that current British and French national nuclear capabilities could prevent Russian bullying of NATO's easternmost members, London and Paris could decide to enlarge the size and sophistication of their nuclear forces. Germany and other economically and technologically capable European powers also could opt to join the ranks of nuclear weapons powers—even though deciding to terminate their memberships in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty would certainly entail substantial diplomatic costs.

Moreover, **contrary to the conventional wisdom** that nuclear proliferation is inherently destabilizing and that all forms of proliferation are equally bad, prominent foreign policy scholars—including John Mearsheimer, Christopher Layne, and the late Kenneth Waltz—have made strong arguments that **proliferation**, by raising the potential costs and other adverse consequences of initiating even small conventional wars among major powers, **actually has stabilizing effects**.<sup>32</sup> That thesis is expressed in colloquial terms as “an armed society is a polite society.” As a variation on the proliferation of national arsenals, **democratic Europe can make a decision to use the British and French arsenals as the core for establishing a new, multilaterally controlled deterrent to protect all of the member states. None of those possibilities involves easy decisions, but the Europeans should have the responsibility to address the problems** and options **to move beyond the sterile policy of relying on the United States to preserve the security status quo. Such a reliance is especially unwise when conditions are eroding the credibility of the U.S. global extended deterrence guarantee by the day**

### No indigenous German deterrent – **fringe idea, violates ilaw, and no HEU.**

Olivia Meier, Senior Researcher @ University of Hamburg (IFSH), former Deputy Head of the International Security Division @ German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2-21-20, Why Germany won't build its own nuclear weapons and remains skeptical of a Eurodeterrent. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Vol 76, Iss 2.

#### **No German nukes**

By the end of 2019, it became clear that **there is no reason to be concerned about a nuclear-armed Germany. Only a few attention-seeking experts on the political fringe made the case for Berlin going nuclear.** One prolific proponent, the UK-based German academic Maximilian Terhalle, argued that “the answer to the lack of strategic protection for [Germany’s] national security must . . . be that Germany needs nuclear weapons” (Terhalle 2017, translation Oliver Meier). Like the retired history professor Christian Hacke (Hacke 2018), Terhalle maintains that the French and UK nuclear arsenals would be too small to effectively deter Russia and that, ultimately, decisions about the use of nuclear weapons must not and cannot be shared. So, these experts reasoned, Germany would need nuclear weapons to defend itself. **While a few other think tankers** (for example Benner 2017; Ischinger 2018) occasionally mused about the pros and cons of German nuclear weapons, **the argument got zero traction among decision makers.**

**German acquisition of nuclear weapons would require multiple costly and radical shifts of Berlin’s foreign and security policies. Germany would have to withdraw from the NPT and violate legal obligations under the 1990 2 + 4 Treaty on Unification**, in which it agreed not to possess nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons of mass destruction. That on hard security

issues Germany must “never act alone” is a theme to which German decision makers have been socialized ever since the end of World War II. **Germany’s constitution reflects Berlin’s internationalist orientation, stating that rules of international law take precedence over national laws** (Meier 2001). Establishing a nuclear fuel cycle to support a German nuclear weapons program would require a reversal of the national decision to phase out nuclear energy generation by 2022 – a policy that has been supported by all mainstream parties. Even Germany’s far-right national populists of the Alternative für Deutschland, which advocates a withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from Germany, **do not favor German nuclear weapons** (AfD 2017).

Three reasons why a Eurodeterrent does not fly in Berlin

Although the idea of German nuclear weapons turned out to be politically irrelevant, some mainstream analysts and pundits have considered the risks and benefits associated with a strengthened nuclear dimension to the EU’s security and defense policies. **The baseline for many analyses is the assumption that “[s]ince it would probably be beyond the means of [France and the United Kingdom] alone to extend a nuclear umbrella across all of Europe, the only feasible path appears to be to focus on an intra-European ‘nuclear sharing’”** (Thränert 2017, 2). With the United Kingdom’s June 2016 decision to leave the EU, the role of the 300 nuclear-warhead-strong French force de frappe has moved center stage.

Proposals for a “Eurodeterrent” come in a variety of guises. These include joint financing of a Eurodeterrent<sup>1</sup>; an inter-European division of labor for nuclear support operations; the basing of French dual-capable bombers (with or without nuclear weapons), on a rotating basis or permanently, in some European countries; and the joint development and/or operation of European nuclear forces (Tertrais 2018, 9–10). **There is also broad agreement that German-French convergence on the role of nuclear weapons in European security is a necessary – though not necessarily sufficient – precondition for movement in the direction of a Eurodeterrent.**

**This is by no means a new debate.** The question of closer French-German cooperation on nuclear issues has been revisited periodically since the end of the Cold War. It was usually Paris, rather than Berlin, that raised the issue of a European dimension of nuclear deterrence. In 1992, President François Mitterrand stated that the issue of a common European deterrent would “quickly become one of the major questions in the construction of a common European defence” (Quoted in Tertrais 1999, 56). At the time, there was little response from other European governments, including Germany’s. In September 1995, Prime Minister Alain Juppé used the concept of a “concerted deterrent” to argue that “we [French] should learn to make the collective dimension an integral part of our doctrine” (Quoted in Tertrais 1999, 56). In 1996, President Jacques Chirac went one step further, saying that discussions on a European dimension of nuclear deterrence are “about drawing all the consequences of a community of destiny, of a growing entanglement of our vital interests” (Chirac 1996).

In December 1996, the French and German governments attempted to open the path to dialogue on nuclear deterrence. But the tentative agreement to place the issue in the context of a European security and defense policy faltered, partly because of French sensitivities about preserving the independence of the force de frappe (Sloan 1997). In 2001, Chirac placed the

nuclear issue again in a European context, saying that any decision by France to use nuclear weapons "would naturally take into account the growing solidarity of European Union countries" (Quoted in Tertrais 2007, footnote 72). For the next 10 to 15 years, however, the issue was put on the shelf of German-French relations. As French analyst Bruno Tertrais observed, the concept of "Europeanization" of the French nuclear deterrent enjoyed broad political support in Paris but "there are very few concrete ideas about how to do that" (Tertrais 2007, 263).

In Berlin, the issue remained unattractive, not least because of a strong anti-nuclear sentiment in the public. Discussions in the 1990s rarely moved beyond the inner circles of security policy experts. Implicitly, the idea of giving nuclear deterrence a European dimension came up whenever the concept of an integrated "European army" was discussed. Rather than tackling the issue headon, however, decision makers carefully tiptoed around the nuclear question. All in all, nuclear deterrence largely remained a blind spot on the agenda of French-German consultations on security and defense for the first quarter of a century after the end of the Cold War.<sup>2</sup>

Despite the recent changes in Russian and US nuclear policies, Berlin has stuck to the division of labor between the two main institutions responsible for nuclear issues: NATO does deterrence and (sometimes) nuclear arms control; the EU is responsible for nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear security.<sup>3</sup> Germany continues to support NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements, being one of five European nations to host US nuclear weapons on its territory. Three underlying factors explain why even the shocks of a populist US president and an adventurist Russian president are unlikely to change these basic premises of Berlin's nuclear policy.

## NATO is useless in the ME – they're disorganized, overstretched and say no to the US.

John R. Deni, professor at the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, 1-13-2020, "Opinion," Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/01/10/why-expanding-nato-middle-east-is-terrible-idea/>

Two main problems immediately present themselves. First, the alliance is already stretched to its limit in conducting surveillance overflights in the region, facilitating intelligence-sharing on terrorism, promoting the development of counterterrorism capabilities and training Iraqi military personnel. Squeezing more out of an organization that is primarily focused on collective defense in Europe will necessarily mean other missions will suffer — an unhelpful outcome at a time when Russia remains aggressive as ever and fighting rages in Ukraine.

Second, NATO isn't resourced, manned, trained or equipped to take on the responsibilities of the United States in the Middle East, or even just in Iraq and Syria. Operation Inherent Resolve, as the U.S.-led military operation in Iraq and Syria is known, involves training and equipping Iraqi security forces, much as NATO does today. But it has also involved thousands of airstrikes as well as large-scale counterterrorism operations. Although all NATO member states are part of

the coalition against the Islamic State, only a small handful have conducted airstrikes or participated in ground operations — the United States has provided the lion's share of combat power. Meanwhile, there's reason to conclude the Islamic State is attempting to regroup.

Could NATO fill the gap created by a U.S. withdrawal and finish the job? Here it's important to note the difference between NATO as an organization and NATO as shorthand for American allies in Europe. As an organization, **NATO isn't the right tool** for this job. Beyond some surveillance aircraft, the alliance organization simply doesn't have combat power of its own — no fighter jets, no troops and no Special Forces. Instead, it relies on its member states to temporarily lend it these things for specific operations. Alliance members have zero appetite, however, for yet another large-scale military mission beyond Europe. Memories of NATO's 11-year combat operation in Afghanistan are still fresh.

If, when referencing NATO the president really means European allies and close partners, then he might be on to something. Clearly, Washington cannot ask Lithuania, Albania or Portugal to do much in the Middle East — they have neither the capacity nor the capability to operate there independently, and their interests in the region aren't sufficient enough to overcome these limitations. But some European allies and partners (Britain, Sweden) have the necessary capacity and/or capability, while others (Greece, Hungary) have vital interests at stake in preventing refugee flows from the turbulent Middle East. A few (Italy, France, Germany) have both.

Nonetheless, the president is unlikely to see many Europeans stepping forward as he calls for volunteers. First, few show any appetite for tangling with Turkey, which has forces on the ground in Syria and which Europe needs to keep happy, lest Ankara decide to loosen controls on millions of Syrian refugees and allow them to enter the continent. Second, apart from Boris Johnson, few European leaders are enamored of Trump, and they're unlikely to want to do him any favors during this U.S. election year. Third, European countries weren't consulted or warned of the strike that killed Iranian **Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani** last week, and they appear uninterested in getting involved in a conflict they believe has been instigated by the United States.

Finally, even among those allies with the greatest potential or rationale to do more in the Middle East, European military wherewithal remains in short supply given only modest defense budget increases of recent years. More pressing threats — such as Russian aggression, domestic terrorism and the risk of illegal migrant flows from Libya and sub-Saharan Africa — mean that Europe is unlikely to seriously heed the president's wishes.

### **Other institutions fill in – NATO not key.**

Dr. Sara Moller, Assistant Professor of International Security @ Seton Hall, **6-24-20**, “Will NATO still be relevant in the future?” atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/will-nato-still-be-relevant-in-the-future/#:~:text=“It%20boils%20down%20to%20whether,answer%20to%20that%20is%20no.”&ext=“Three%20areas%20of%20the%20world,Asia%2C%20and%20the%20Persian%20Gulf.”  
\*\*Transcription autogenerated by youtube.

goes back to my central point which is 26:49 that NATO can't be all things to all 26:51 members and it has to figure out what 26:53 kind of Alliance who wants to be doesn't 26:56 want to be a collective security 26:57 organization a political organization or 27:00 as it was initially intended and as John 27:02 pointed out a traditional military 27:05 alliance a collective defence 27:06 arrangement I would argue the EU could 27:08 be doing more and there are other 27:10 institutions as well NATO is not a 27:12 humanitarian agency and it shouldn't be 27:14 going into a business of infectious 27:17 disease either it's not an infectious 27:19 disease agency we have the WHO for 27:21 that so I would argue there are existing 27:24 institutions that can tackle some of 27:26 these other problems which we've seen in 27:29 recent decades NATO tackle okay

### Limited US-Russia co-op is possible even if Russia is revisionist – BUT assuring Russia of their great power status and decreasing threat perceptions of the West is key

**O'Hanlon 17** [Michael Edward O'Hanlon is a senior fellow at The Brookings Institution, specializing in defense and foreign policy issues. "Beyond NATO: A New Security Architecture for Eastern Europe", [https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/full-text\\_-beyond-nato.pdf](https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/full-text_-beyond-nato.pdf)]

Even if it is incredulous that a future Russia would seek to join NATO, it is not beyond belief that a post-Putin Russian state could look to mend fences and develop a modus vivendi with the Western world. Several motivations could drive Russians toward such an outcome. Russia could seek to improve its economic growth and prosperity through more robust trade. It could also see a strong association with the EU or NATO as a useful hedge against Islamist extremism and China's rise. To reach this mindset, Russia would not necessarily have to abandon all security fears, real or imagined, but would have to conclude that the greater dangers came from the south or east (or within) and could be more effectively checked with Western help.

The effect of this kind of policy could be something of a return to the calmer days of NATO-Russian relations of the 1990s—but in the context of a confident and stable Russia. New institutional mechanisms might be created to address matters of common concern; alternatively, existing vehicles such as the OSCE, NATO-Russia Council, restored G8, and UN Security Council might be strengthened. Nuclear arms control might resume, missile defense issues could become less acrimonious, and strategic cooperation on counterterrorism, Iran, North Korea, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria could become more standard.

Perhaps more realistic in the foreseeable future, however, is a more modest goal, what Clifford Gaddy and I coined as a "Reaganov Russia." This vision would assume a proud, nationalistic state with a strong military. If the Russian Federation could take pride in reestablishing itself as a successful status-quo power, it might not see the need for revanchism or other aggression.<sup>39</sup> It could pragmatically weigh its own interests across a wide range of policy options, often concluding that it should cooperate with the West on key strategic issues for its own well-being. Freed by greater selfconfidence from the kind of anger and embitterment that has characterized recent years, it could cooperate with the West when interests aligned—probably most of the time— and contain the fallout from those situations where interests diverged.

This framework for the future Russian state might envision the defense sector providing technological innovations that could be spun off to help revive the Russian scientific and manufacturing sectors more broadly. Such spinoffs happened often in the United States under Reagan and other Cold War presidents, and in the Soviet Union, too. It is also an idea advanced by people such as defense official Dmitry Rogozin in the modern Russian context.<sup>40</sup>

Of these two categories of possibilities—a generally friendly or pro-Western Russia of some type, and a “Reaganov Russia”—the latter may be the most realistic aspiration we should hold in the West. It may not fit the model of a liberal, genuinely Western Russia that many in the West (and many intellectuals and reformers in Russia itself) might prefer, but a Reaganov Russia could be a more self-confident and selfsatisfied and, therefore, less truculent, nation than what we see today.

This outcome could be good news, and a desirable result, for Washington. The West and Russia would appear, in objective terms, to share most global interests on matters ranging from nuclear nonproliferation to counterterrorism to shaping China’s rise in benign ways. A Russian strategic perspective that cleared away emotional baggage and allowed a relatively clear-eyed assessment of when and where to cooperate with outside powers should produce a Russia that is easier to deal with. If the highly sensitive issue of NATO can be managed, this could lead to a world in which the Russian state retained a distinctly different character than Western nations, but one with which core interests could be mutually pursued and the threat of direct conflict virtually eliminated. It may be the best we can hope for, and it would be a major improvement over today.

### **Accepting a modest Russian sphere of influence in East Europe mitigates aggression and solves relations**

**Carpenter 19** [Ted Galen Carpenter, a senior fellow in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and a contributing editor at the National Interest, is the author of 10 books and more than 750 articles on international affairs. “Trump Should Have Already Left NATO”, April 17<sup>th</sup>, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/trump-should-have-already-left-nato-52997>]

Whatever the motive, the strategy is both dangerous and unnecessary. A willingness on the part of the Western powers to accept a modest Russian sphere of influence and treat that country’s government with greater respect would solve most of the current problems in East-West relations and markedly reduce tensions. Adopting a less confrontational course, however, requires more realistic thinking on the part of U.S. policymakers. In particular, it means recognizing that spheres of influence are still very much a part of the international system and that major powers are likely to insist on enjoying that prerogative.

Unfortunately, too many U.S. officials seemingly regard the idea that major powers will insist on maintaining spheres of influence as distasteful and illegitimate. Both Condoleezza Rice, George W. Bush’s second secretary of state, and John Kerry, Barack Obama’s second secretary of state, made that argument explicitly. They clearly were not willing to acknowledge that Russia could have such a zone of preeminence. Indeed, Rice condemned the entire concept of spheres of influence as “archaic.”

Adopting a more realistic, nuanced position also would require modifying the professed faith of U.S. officialdom that the United States is the leader—and has been since the end of World War II—of a liberal, “rules-based,” international order. Under that system, all countries are supposed to abide by the strictures of international law and not threaten, intimidate or attack other countries.

The history of the post-World War II era, however, confirms that the United States and its allies have violated those principles whenever it seemed convenient to do so. It is very hard to square a liberal, rules-based international system with episodes such as the U.S.-led military interventions in Vietnam and Iraq, NATO’s military missions in the Balkans during the 1990s, the NATO-assisted overthrow of Libya’s Muammar el-Qaddafi, or the ongoing military meddling by the United States and several allies in Syria.

Respecting spheres of influence would require a **reduced definition of Washington's own power prerogatives**. U.S. leaders **implicitly assert the right to intervene anywhere in the world to advance the country's foreign policy objectives**. In practice, recent generations of policymakers have globalized the Monroe Doctrine; to them, America's rightful sphere of influence is "the sphere"—planet Earth.

But **Russia and other major powers are not willing to accord the United States the status of global hegemon**. They are **digging-in their heels and insisting that Washington respect their own (much more modest) spheres of influence**. For Russia, that means **asserting preeminence regarding nations along its borders in both Eastern Europe and Central Asia**. Moscow is not alone in pushing back against Washington's attempts at asserting global hegemony. China's actions in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait provide ample indications that Beijing is setting limits to what it will tolerate from the United States.

To prevent the **escalation of dangerous tensions with Moscow** (and Beijing), U.S. leaders must dial-back their insistence that all nations, even great powers, adhere to the principles of a U.S.-led liberal, rules-based, international order. That system has been more fictional, or at least aspirational, than factual in any case. To maintain peace, **American policymakers must accept that Russia and other great powers will insist upon and act according to the reality of spheres of influence**. The objective of the EU powers, with Washington's quiet, limited support, should be to place some **limits** on the extent of the Russian sphere of influence, since **at some point**, Russia's concept will **impinge on significant EU interests**. It is the mission of effective diplomacy to sort out such matters and set workable, recognizable limits on the ambitions of contending parties. But **seeking to delegitimize the entire concept of spheres of influence is a nonstarter for even reasonably cordial East-West relations**.

### **Denial of SOI is interpreted as status denial**

**Ward 20** [Steven Michael Ward, Assistant Professor, Department of Government, Cornell University, "Status, Stratified Rights, and Accommodation in International Relations", Journal of Global Security Studies, Volume 5, Issue 1, January 2020, Pages 160–178, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogz014>]

At the third level (Figure 1's top box), **status becomes concrete** in the form of **accommodation**. **Acts of accommodation are actions or practices that have taken on meaning as a result of being linked to particular status positions**. Status is accessible to observers through sets of practices that are understood as meaningful indicators or symbols of position. **These often take the form of actions that either ratify or deny a claim to a stratified right**. It is by observing the manner in which relevant others treat demands for status-implicated stratified rights that **status seekers learn about the validity of their positional claims**. This is why the Chinese denial of Tokugawa and British demands for the right to exemption from participation in the practices of Chinese hegemony caused conflict over status; it is why London's apparent denial of Germany's demand for the right to naval equality caused status anxiety in Berlin, and it is why the United States' apparent **denial of Russian claims for the right to a sphere of influence encompassing post-Soviet Eastern Europe has been interpreted as a failure to accommodate Moscow's ambition to be recognized as a great power** (Larson and Shevchenko 2014b).

**Buffer states matter most to Russian threat perception – divergence is inevitable but Russia only views them as security threats to their sphere because of NATO defense planning**

**Kaukas 19** [Dr. Maj. Eriks Kaukas is an Adviser, Euro-Atlantic Cooperation Department, Ministry of National Defence and a Lecturer, political Science Department, the General Jonas

Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania, Analysis of Securitization of the Baltic States in the Rhetoric of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, LITHUANIAN ANNUAL STRATEGIC REVIEW 2019 Volume 17]

The Baltic States are a recurrent theme in the rhetoric of the Russian Foreign Minister in the context of NATO. This was mainly due to NATO's fifth enlargement in 2004, which opened up the door for seven new European members: Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. **NATO came physically closer to Russia's borders, and the Baltic States - the only states from the post-Soviet block - separated from Russia's sphere of influence and became part of Western Europe.** The current **Russian authorities see the integration of the Baltic States into the European Union and NATO as part of the loss of Russian identity in the former buffer zone** between the West and the Soviet Union. 226 227 In his public remarks, **Lavrov mentioned the Baltic States in various NATO-related contexts:** discussions on the deployment of **anti-missile systems** in the Baltic States, the **development of NATO defense plans and** of **NATO military capabilities**, and international military exercises. In the beginning of the reference period, Lavrov relatively rarely mentioned the Baltic States in the NATO context. In 2008, the Baltic States came up in the rhetoric in relation to US plans to deploy anti-missile systems in the region. Later, however, the issue was no longer raised in the context of the Baltic States, as the US abandoned its plans to deploy anti-missile systems in the Baltic States. In 2011, **Lavrov talked about NATO's plans to defend the Baltic States and expand NATO military presence nearby Russia.** This narrative was **prompted by** the disclosure by a non-profit investigative journalism organization **WikiLeaks about** decisions taken at **the NATO Summit in Lisbon on the defense of the Baltic States and the military threat posed by Russia.** In this regard, **Lavrov pointed out that NATO was spreading a misleading information as Russia's military doctrine** was purely defensive. In doing so, he started constructing an opinion about NATO being hostile towards Russia. In 2013, Lavrov was triggered to bring up the subject of the Baltic States again as a result of NATO military exercise Steadfast Jazz, which was in fact a response to Russia's strategic military exercise Zapad 2013. **Lavrov's rhetoric about NATO activities in the Baltic States became much more intensive, harsher and more intimidating** ever since 2014. Russia's attention to the Baltic States increased notably after the annexation of Crimea, when Baltic leaders, anxious about the security of their countries, began to seek closer involvement of NATO and particularly US in the regional security. The decisions taken by NATO at the Welsh (2014) and Warsaw (2016) summits on NATO's reassurance, deterrence and defense measures were met by Russia's ruling regime with a particularly harsh criticism. These decisions significantly strengthened the security of the Baltic States, at the same time changing, according to Russia, the **balance of power** in the region. **Lavrov and other high-level Russian officials saw it as an increased threat to Russia's national interests.** It is notable that the **national military capabilities** of the Baltic States, who stepped up the buildup of these capabilities after the annexation of Crimea, **were never mentioned** in the **rhetoric of the Russian Foreign Minister.** This aspect **was probably not seen as** a factor that could have a **significant impact** on Russia's foreign and **security policy.** Furthermore, it is worth noting that until 2015, Lavrov declared that Russia did not see NATO as a threat but only as a danger. But in 2016 the rhetoric changed, and Lavrov clearly and unambiguously named NATO's actions as threatening Russia's national security. Using securitizing rhetoric, Lavrov has constructed the image of a 'Russian fortress' surrounded by NATO. To address this constructed security problem, Russia is legitimizing its political decisions regarding the build-up and use of military power. In this context, it could be argued that rhetorically securitizing NATO Russia would have grounds (political and public support) for military action against the Baltic States. Conclusions Carried out on the basic of the principles of the theory of constructivism, the **analysis of** Russian Foreign Minister **Lavrov's public rhetoric demonstrates** how the **Baltic countries are being moved from the conventional policy agenda to the security policy agenda**, i.e. how they are securitized through the act of speech. The outcomes of this analysis help to seek broader goals: to reveal the context in which the Baltic States are mentioned most frequently (to identify the main themes of securitization and frequency of mention), and to clarify the goals pursued in the securitization of the Baltic States (to define the reasons). The theory of constructivism maintains that the object of securitization is what securitizing actor specifies as one. For this reason, **Lavrov's public remarks about the Baltic States as the states that pose threat to the Russian state, nation and national interests** construct an object of security. In other words, Lavrov's politicized interpretation of the security environment in the Baltic States socially constructs threats coming from the Baltic States. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia occupy a relatively small part in Lavrov's rhetoric. However, Lavrov pays particular attention to the US, NATO and the EU in his speeches. In this context, it is important to note that

the Baltic States are members of these organizations and the US is a strategic partner of these countries. Therefore, it can be concluded that in most cases the Baltic States are mentioned indirectly, i.e. as a constituent part of the West. On the one hand, Lavrov's analysis supports the assumptions that Russia attributes the Baltic States to the Western international system. On the other hand, from a socio-cultural and historical perspective, Russia sees these countries as part of Russia's identity. It can be stated that the themes of Lavrov's rhetoric vis-a-vis the Baltic States during the reference period - divergent interpretation of Soviet history; Baltic nationalism and the situation of Russian national minority in the Baltic States; increasing NATO military presence at Russia's state border - have remained unchanged. Only the level of 'demonization' and frequency of mention differed between these themes. The strong growth of the last two parameters 228 229 started in 2014 and reached its peak in 2017. All Lavrov's themes of securitization are constructed on the basis of the difference in identity. Accordingly, Russia's security problems with the Baltic States do not arise from the balance of power, but from different worldview and political visions of the states.

### **Not all important interests are vital.**

Daryl Press, Professor of Political Science at DARTMOUTH, '**5, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats**', Cornell University Press, p 26-27.

Countries have a myriad of "important interests"; though they fall short of being "vital," countries care about them dearly and will pay real costs to defend them. The category of "important interests" encompasses a broad set of material concerns that are not vital to a country's survival. For example, the United States has many longstanding allies, such as South Korea, whose security is an important U.S. interest. South Korea has been an American ally for decades and helps the United States frequently, most memorably in Vietnam and, more recently, in Afghanistan. But South Korean sovereignty is not vital to America: even if China conquered South Korea, the shift in the regional balance of power would be small, and there would be even less effect on the global balance of power.<sup>65</sup> A country's important interests—e.g., defending allies, protecting trade partners, protecting the rights of commercial shipping to navigate through international waters—are material concerns that matter but do not directly threaten its sovereignty or overturn the balance of power in a key industrial region.

**Moral hazard makes the impact inevitable – unipolar decline encourages states to cash out on their alliance insurance to accomplish geopolitical objectives.**

**The number of flashpoints is too great to contain a conflict.**

Stephen J. Cimbala, Political Science @ Penn State, '**20, The United States, Russia and Nuclear Peace**', Springer, ISBN 978-3-030-38088-5

US-Russian nuclear arms control is in imminent danger of collapse—or even worse, of obsolescence overtaken by events.<sup>1</sup> Arms control, like other aspects of security policy, is subject to the priority of politics over technology. Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and ongoing destabilization of eastern Ukraine violated the precedents and prior expectations against imposed border changes in post-Cold War Europe. As Russian nuclear expert Alexei Arbatov has noted:

Since the events of 2014 in Ukraine, intense military confrontation between Russia and NATO has been renewed in Eastern Europe, the Baltic and Black Seas, and the Arctic. Regular large-scale military exercises (including with the participation of strategic systems and the imitation of nuclear weapon use) are frequent demonstrations of force.

Dangerous close encounters of combat ships and aircraft are a common occurrence. The possibility of a major war between Russia and NATO, which seemed irrevocably consigned to the past just a few years ago, hangs over Europe and the world.<sup>2</sup>

### Hybrid tactics are ineffective.

**Lanoszka 20** -- Alexander Lanoszka, International Relations Professor at the University of Waterloo. [Thank goodness for NATO enlargement, International Politics, <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00234-8>]//BPS

Even the use of so-called hybrid tactics may have limited efficacy in the Baltic region. The three Baltic countries have been subject to an intense Russian disinformation campaign since at least 2014. Nevertheless, local public opinion remains largely supportive of NATO and other defense policy measures aimed at boosting deterrence. One reason why these societies may be inoculated against Russian disinformation is that they have grown accustomed to seeing Russia in adversarial terms, thus making average citizens critical of pro-Kremlin narratives (Lanoszka 2019). In addition, the Baltic states have integrated their minority populations far better than is often assumed. Although many Russophones may still lack citizenship rights in Estonia and Latvia and so are more likely to experience political discrimination and economic hardship, they nevertheless retain key benefits associated with living in the European Union (Trimbach and O'Lear 2015). They may have sympathies for aspects of Russian foreign policy, but these sympathies do not translate into a preference to be reunited with Russia (Kallas 2016). Accordingly, Russia faces serious obstacles replicating what it did in Crimea. Russians living in Crimea were generally sympathetic to being part of Russkiy Mir ('Russian World'), making them more willing to be the objects of an annexation effort (O'Loughlin, Toal, and Kolosov 2016, 761). Further, Russia does not have an existing military presence in the Baltic countries—as it did with the Black Sea Fleet stationed in Sevastopol—that it could leverage to achieve easy faits accomplis and dissuade

### Defense pacts don't solve. US will intervene regardless of its defense pact.

Mike Sweeney, 13+ Year Think Tank Analyst, Writes for Real Clear Defense, 1-6-2020, "What Is NATO Good For?", Real Clear Defense, [https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2020/01/06/what\\_is\\_nato\\_good\\_for\\_114961.html](https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2020/01/06/what_is_nato_good_for_114961.html)

Why arbitrarily remove the structure that provides that stability—both with Russia and also among NATO's many disparate members? Withdrawing NATO protection from the Baltic states or the smaller Balkan members, for example, will not preclude the possibility of their becoming involved in a war with Russia or Serbia; just the opposite, it could make it more likely. Once such a conflict begins, is it certain the United States will not be entangled or affected even if it is no longer actively participating in NATO?

### NATO commitments unsustainable because of the rise of china.

William Ruger, Professor of IR @ CUNY, and Rajan Menon War and Peace Studies @ Columbia, 5-11-20, "NATO enlargement and US grand strategy: a net assessment," *International Politics*, Vol 57, Iss 3. Springer.

Some aver that alliance relations will revert to normal should President Trump depart the White House in 2021. But they forget that US concerns about the relative contribution of the Europeans are long-standing, harking back to the 1960s. Moreover, these concerns are likely to intensify as the USA faces economic constraints (the colossal national debt and soaring budget deficits—especially in the post-COVID-19 world) and long-neglected domestic problems increase disaffection among Americans. Since the early decades of NATO, European countries have become economic competitors of the USA and neomercantilists and populists in the USA have become more vocal—in Democratic as well as Republican ranks. US leaders will ratchet up pressure on NATO allies to assume more of the burden of collective defense—and NATO may not survive if Europe does nothing more than tinker in response. Moreover, the rise of China will inevitably divert US military resources from Europe. In short, Trump's departure in 2021 or 2025 won't restore the status quo ante for NATO, at least not for long (Becker 2017; Menon 2007; NATO 1995; Putin 2007; Ruger 2017, 2019; Shlapak and Johnson 2016; US Department of Defense 2011).



## CBW Threat Contention Answers

No motivation for a CBW attack, conventional deterrence solves, and nuclear threats are incredible

**Franklin 10** (Lieutenant Colonel David M. Franklin, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES AIR UNIVERSITY MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA, June 2010. "MISCALCULATED AMBIGUITY: THE EFFECTS OF US NUCLEAR DECLARATORY POLICY ON DETERRENCE AND NONPROLIFERATION." <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi/tr/fulltext/u2/1019187.pdf>)

Ultimately the unquantifiable threats posed by BW warrant prudent consideration regarding the role of nuclear weapons in response to their use. Ambiguity surrounding the potential effects of these types of attacks necessitates caution in removing nuclear weapons as a viable option available to the president. However, as previously addressed, there are exceedingly few plausible scenarios where the US would need to use nuclear weapons in light of its overwhelming conventional capabilities—both prompt and with global reach. Additionally, the problems associated with intelligence shortfalls, the non-discriminating nature of nuclear weapons, proportionality concerns, and attribution problems make nuclear use in response to a BW attack incredible. Furthermore, increasingly sophisticated and effective consequence management capabilities diminish the benefits of such an attack while imposing unacceptable costs to a perpetrator. All of these factors serve to negate the need to retain ambiguity in declaratory policy and gives credence to the efficacy of a sole-use policy.



## Democracy Good Disadvantage Answers

**Turn: NATO out of area operations fail and cause Russia-China-Iran war.**

ULRICH KÜHN, HEAD OF ARMS CONTROL AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF HAMBURG, **1-16-20**, “Judy Asks: Should NATO Stay Away From the Middle East?”  
<https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/80815>

First of all, one should differentiate between two potential missions for NATO in the Middle East: intervention and enlargement.

NATO’s success in terms of crisis intervention and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq is already mixed at best—some would say it is a failure and a costly one at that. Speaking of enlargement, not a single state in the Middle East would fulfil NATO membership criteria in terms of good governance, rule of law, and the democratic control of armed forces. Politically, NATO enlargement would open a Pandora’s box, since Iran, Russia, a host of extremist groups, and most likely even China would view NATO’s foray as a hostile policy.

Having said that, would I wish for a multilateral, sustained effort to pacify and stabilize the Middle East? Absolutely! But that would only be possible if all major stakeholders were on board and if the military effort led by NATO were supported by a political-economic effort akin to the EU’s mission. Right now, that is a pie in the sky.

Unfortunately, the Middle East seems to enter an oriental version of the Thirty Years’ War instead.

**Collective security is ineffective and collapses the alliance – lack of strategic focus undermines cohesion and trades off with collective defense.**

Dr. Sara Moller, Assistant Professor of International Security @ Seton Hall, **6-24-20**, “Will NATO still be relevant in the future?” atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/will-nato-still-be-relevant-in-the-future/#:~:text=It%20boils%20down%20to%20whether,answer%20to%20that%20is%20no.”&ext=“Three%20areas%20of%20the%20world,Asia%2C%20and%20the%20Persian%20Gulf.  
\*\*Transcription autogenerated by youtube.

Thank You Corey and thanks to the Atlantic Council and Charles Koch Institute is NATO still relevant relevant to whom I would ask and so I want to make clear that I'm arguing about NATO's collective relevancy for all of its members and I would argue that NATO is in danger of becoming irrelevant because it lacks a strategic focus already you can probably tell that my argument in my decision shares much in common with the French president's brain death sentiments from last winter a club whose members can't agree on the purpose of the club who each want and expect different things from the club is a club that is in trouble so NATO is in danger of losing its collective relevancy for all of its members I would argue because it suffers from a strategic deficit the central question as I see it is what is NATO's purpose today during the Cold War it had a very clear and defined purpose it was to deter and defend against the Soviet Union since the 1990s NATO has been engaged in never-ending transformations starting with the 1991 strategic concept where we saw the adoption of two new security mandates for

NATO we get projecting stability and crisis management cooperative security along with an open door to enlargement and I would argue that the net result has been mission creep for NATO so NATO gets into the peacekeeping business NATO gets into admittedly at the request of the Americans that counterterrorism the nation-building business NATO gets into the security suspect er reform business you know gets into the counter piracy and fighting illegal migration business there are even those who now argue that NATO is ideally situated for tackling organised crime and corruption so the result is that members want and expect different things from NATO they no longer see eye to eye and here I think the clearest example of this is with respect to Russia we have the classic split in the alliance between the eastern and southern flank but we also have a NATO member Turkey who's purchasing men weapon systems from Russia and attempting to block the defense plan for the Baltics on the other hand we have countries like France which is exploring rapprochement with the Russians so there's a lack of consensus about the strategic purpose and this lack of consensus about NATO strategic purpose jeopardizes its future relevancy I would argue the last point I want to make here is that the strategic crisis the strategic deficit that NATO faces today predates President Trump and his administration so I think it's a mistake to assume that come January 2021 if there's a change in occupancy in the White House that NATO can just go back to normal a return to normal back to business as usual I don't see that happening because for me \$question NATO needs to deal with that the members need to address is what is it NATO's purpose.

### **NATO not key to democratization, hurts Russia democratization and EU alt cause.**

Paul Poast, Political Sciene @ UChicago, and Alexandra Chinchilla, Political Science @ UChicago, 4-30-20, "Good for democracy? Evidence from the 2004 NATO," *International Politics*, Volume 57, Issue 3.

NATO has a curious view of itself. The preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty listed 'democracy' as a 'founding principle' even though Portugal, a founding member, was under the authoritarian Estado Novo regime when the treaty was signed. Neither Turkey nor Greece, the frst two countries to join NATO following its formation, was suspended from the alliance during periods of authoritarian backsliding. One might assert that these seemingly hypocritical exceptions to the democratic principle were driven by Cold War necessities. Indeed, compare the language used in the 1968 NATO Strategic Concept—a periodically revised document of NATO's strategic priorities—and the post-Cold War 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts. Whereas the 1968 document contains zero uses of the word 'democracy' (or variations, such as 'democratic'), it has 28 uses of the word 'deterrence.' In contrast, the 1991 document contains 5 mentions of 'democracy' and just 6 of 'deterrence,' and the 1999 document contains 12 mentions of both terms. When NATO countries agreed to expand the alliance, NATO's 1995 'Study on Enlargement' noted 'encouraging and supporting democratic reforms' as a core tenet of expansion (NATO 1995). Hence, it appears that one of NATO's post-Cold War strategies was to finally take seriously its democratic principles (NATO 2018).

Given that NATO documents clearly demonstrate that democratic development became a core mission of NATO after the Cold War, how well has it fulfilled this mission? Although some key post-Cold War expansion members, notably Poland and Hungary, have backslid on democratic

reforms, has the post-Cold War NATO expansion fostered democratic development more broadly in Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space? The existing scholarship on this question offers mixed answers. Gibler and Sewell (2006, 429) maintain that ‘the expansion of NATO eastward... aided the creation of a peaceful environment for democracy to survive.’ According to them, NATO reduced levels of external threat and provided much-needed bargaining leverage with Russia to resolve border issues and remove Russian troops from Eastern European states. In contrast, Dan Reiter (2001) expressed skepticism nearly two decades ago: ‘NATO membership has not and will not advance democratization in Europe.... [E]nlargement did not contribute much to democratization in the three East European states admitted in 1999, and the promise of NATO membership is unlikely to speed democracy within any of the nine countries currently awaiting a decision on their request for membership.’ Reiter then highlighted the ‘risks of further enlargement’ vis-a-vis Russia as pointing toward holding off on further expansion.

Mearsheimer (2014) argues similarly that by antagonizing Russia, NATO expansion threatened the prospects for democratic development in Ukraine. Poast and Urpelainen (2018) offer a middle-of-the-road argument. Exploring the post-Cold War experience of the Baltic states, they argue that these states’ nascent democratic regimes were underpinned by actions and efforts taken by the states themselves, along with Nordic assistance, well before NATO membership was even a possibility. NATO membership did not harm the prospects of democratic development, but it also did not directly foster the peaceful environment necessary for democracy to flourish. NATO’s role was, at best, indirect.

We seek to adjudicate among these three views on the NATO–democracy relationship. We do so by focusing on the 2004 NATO expansion that brought in the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. We focus on the states that joined NATO in 2004 because they represent the ideal test of NATO’s influence on democracy. The states that joined NATO in 1999—the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland—could be hard tests of the democratization theory, given that they were selected for membership ahead of their peers partly because they were more democratic and therefore more ready for membership than other states. Reiter (2001) argued, for example, that these three states democratized quickly well before the prospect of NATO membership. The states that did not make the first cut at NATO enlargement but were later brought into the alliance should be where NATO would have the strongest effect on democracy in prospective members. In addition, now is an ideal time to reevaluate these claims, for two reasons related to data availability. First, for the seven states that joined NATO in 2004, more years have now passed since NATO entry than passed between their regime transition and NATO entry. Second, the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project is now producing measures of regime type that not only well capture the core components of democratic systems, but also offer a measure that is more refined than the commonly applied Polity Project data. We leverage these two data advancements to consider a tricky empirical counterfactual: Was NATO expansion critical to the development and survival of democracy in the 2004 expansion states?<sup>1</sup> This is an enormous question with too many angles to be fully explored in a brief article. But we can show how the available data offer insights into it.

We begin by reviewing the process of post-Cold War NATO expansion, and the way in which it relates to democratic development, by reviewing the main arguments for NATO influence on

democratization drawn from the literature. Throughout this section, we refer to examples from the experience of new NATO member states, with a lengthier example drawn from the Baltic states' experience of gaining NATO membership. Reviewing the Baltic states' experience introduces terms and concepts, such as the Membership Action Plan (MAP), that will be used in our main analysis. The Baltics are also representative cases of how NATO's security guarantee provided a powerful incentive for new regimes to seek membership in NATO. The next section presents our analysis of how NATO membership influenced democratic development within the 2004 expansion states. We begin by explaining why we use the Liberal Democracy Index score from the V-Dem Project to capture the state of democratic development within a country. We then present regression analysis suggesting that gaining NATO membership had little influence on a country acquiring or keeping democratic institutions. Instead, we find the anticipation of European Union (EU) membership, not NATO membership, had the largest influence on democratic development.

**Shifrinson**, PhD Joshua R. Itzkowitz. Prof @ BU, Rising Titans, Falling Giants: How Great Powers Exploit Power Shifts. Cornell University Press, 2018. JSTOR, [www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt21h4vx1](http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt21h4vx1).

Rising state strategies vary along two dimensions: the goals a rising state pursues toward a declining state, and the means employed to attain these goals. In principle, of course, rising state strategies can be differentiated according to any number of criteria. Often, this involves classifying rising states by whether they pursue revisionist or status quo objectives toward the international system writ large, and whether they are willing to use force to attain these objectives. Missing from the discussion, however, is a deductive approach to the strategies employed specifically toward declining powers. After all, rising states can hold revisionist or status quo goals while treating declining states more or less benignly; some way to capture variation in the benign or competitive nature of these strategies is necessary. Focusing on a rising state's basic preference for the declining state's place as a great power and the tools used to obtain that outcome helps address this issue.

Goals **Rising state goals** refer to a rising state's basic preference for a declining state's place among the great powers. Just as declining states fear that rising states may try to weaken them yet hope for a better outcome, so do rising states have two basic options (table 1.2).

First, a rising state can try to **shift the distribution of power** further against a decliner, undermining the declining state as a great power and ultimately hoping to push it from the great power ranks—pursuing what I term a **predatory goal**. **Predation** does not necessarily mean snuffing out a declining state's existence as a sovereign actor. **Rather**, rising states focus on the significant, but less ambitious, goal of **exacerbating ongoing shifts in power** and, eventually, removing the decliner from the game of high politics. Here, **rising states design policies to challenge a declining state's territorial, economic, political, and military interests**, requiring the decliner to work harder and consume more resources to protect itself or to surrender its interests, all while seeking ways to make the declining state's international position increasingly difficult. As Robert Jervis argues, this dynamic dominated the Cold War as both the United States and Soviet Union sought to bankrupt and undermine the other (although, as I show in chapter 5, it was only in the 1980s and early 1990s that the United States had opportunities to make this goal a reality). The hallmark of predation, then, is that a **rising state seeks changes to the distribution of power in its favor and to the decliner's detriment**. Of course, rising states may not actually attain these objectives, and their efforts play only a limited role in harming a declining state's relative position. Nevertheless, rising states that pursue predation still seek to foster meaningful shifts in the distribution of power that improve their relative position and worsen that of the decliner.

Second, a rising state can **pursue a supportive goal**. In this case, **a rising state seeks to slow or prevent additional losses to a declining state's power position and sustain the decliner as a great power**.

A rising state does this by limiting threats to the decliner, reducing the resources the decliner must use and the risks it must run to

provide security for itself. The United States, for example, supported the United Kingdom after World War II by offering economic and military assistance against the Soviet Union, just as Wilhelmine Germany backed Austria-Hungary politically and militarily against Russia before 1914. Thus, policymakers pursuing supportive goals craft policies to prevent a declining state from slipping any further and, by definition, ignore calls to grow at a decliner's expense. These steps may not actually stop a declining state's fall, but they still leave the decliner better off than if it were operating on its own.

Means After deciding to weaken or sustain a declining state, rising states must still determine how to achieve their goals. This may not be easy, as states often have other objectives that demand time, resources, and attention. States therefore need to decide the level of effort and what tools to use to affect the declining state's position as a great power.

Accordingly, the second dimension of rising state strategy consists of what Kevin Narizny calls the "assertiveness" of their means. Assertiveness refers to whether a rising state is willing to expend economic, military, and political resources while bearing the risks of attempting to bring about a large and immediate change in the declining state's position as a great power. In doing so, it reflects a rising state's answers to three questions on the relationship among its rise, its desire for the declining state's continuation as a great power, and any other interests the rising state may have. First, when a rising state encounters opposition from a declining state, does it modify its policies in accordance with the decliner's wishes? Supportive strategies require taking the decliner's wishes to heart; predatory strategies, by definition, do not. Second, is the rising state willing to accept a meaningful trade-off or to sacrifice other interests in pursuit of its preferred outcome vis-à-vis the decliner? Finally, is the rising state willing to engage in meaningful consultations with third parties and scope what tools and policies it adopts in its relationship with the decliner in accordance with their interests?

Using this framework, I distinguish between two basic types of means: those that are intense, and those that are limited. A rising state employs intense means when it uses tools optimized to cause (or prevent) a rapid, fundamental shift in the distribution of power that will seriously threaten (or help) the declining state's continuation as a great power. In such situations, a rising state implicitly or explicitly concludes that pursuing its goal vis-à-vis a decliner requires (1) systematically and meaningfully responding to a declining state's concerns when engaged in a supportive strategy, or bypassing a decliner's opposition when engaged in predation; (2) making large sacrifices to other values such as economic growth or diplomatic autonomy to affect the declining state's position; or (3) ignoring or sidestepping input from other actors. To be sure, the different domestic and international circumstances of individual states can lead them to adopt different economic, military, and diplomatic policies even when employing intense means. For instance, democracies may find it normatively unpalatable to wage war against a declining state, just as nuclear armed great powers may not go to war against other nuclear states. All things being equal, however, states employ intense means when they use tools that challenge or reinforce the foundations of a declining state's political order; remove large swaths of strategically important territory from the decliner's control or help the decliner to keep them; initiate or end large-scale challenges to a declining state's core interests; and/or significantly increase or decrease the economic costs and military risks a declining state runs to obtain security.

Intense means, in short, are designed to cause or forestall major revision to the status quo even if these steps are costly to rising states and generate significant external opposition. Baldly stated, they represent hard-line policies that provide either significant assistance or threaten significant harm to declining states. Prussia's decision to go to war with France in 1870 epitomizes the approach, as Prussia furthered its rise and accelerated France's decline by upending Europe's existing distribution of power.

In contrast, limited means cause gradual changes that moderately improve or undermine a declining state's position. They thus reflect a situation in which a rising state is (1) hesitant to precipitate a crisis with a decliner when preying on it or responds with ambivalence to a decliner's concerns when pursuing support; (2) unwilling to accept significant trade-offs vis-à-vis other interests to aid or undermine a decliner; or (3) reluctant to ignore the concerns of other states in pursuit of its preferred outcome, such that other states meaningfully influence its policies. If intense means quickly and directly affect the status quo, then limited means are symbolic or low-cost actions that only slowly affect the decliner's position.

Limited means can manifest in several ways. When pursuing predation, rising great powers may seek to slow a declining state's growth rate through economic sanctions; cautiously promote secessionist movements or political opposition movements that can affect the decliner's domestic stability; question the decliner's credibility, prestige, or political legitimacy to reduce its influence over allies and security against opponents; engage in efforts such as arms races or asymmetric arms control that shift the military balance against the decliner; and challenge its control over areas of secondary importance or probe its

**willingness to fight over core areas. China's effort to expand its reach over the South and East China Seas while slowly expanding its military is arguably a present-day example of this approach:**

Chinese efforts are not challenging core U.S. interests or immediately upsetting the military balance, but they are causing the United States to work harder to maintain the extant power structure. When supporting a declining state, meanwhile, rising great powers reduce or avoid steps that challenge a decliner's control over territory; offer symbolic diplomatic concessions to signal their interest in the decliner's well-being to other states; provide the decliner with moderate financial aid to slow or prevent further economic losses; and limit or end military challenges to the decliner. In the process, rising states also pace their efforts to avoid antagonizing other great powers: they generally reduce even constrained efforts to help or harm declining states if others voice opposition, calculating that they can always renew their efforts at a later date. A classic example is British support for Austria-Hungary against a rising Prussia in the 1860s: although British strategists did not want Prussia to eliminate Austria-Hungary as a factor in European great power politics, they kept Britain officially neutral and restricted British backing to private diplomatic encouragement for Austria-Hungary and infrequent warnings to Prussia that Britain would disapprove of efforts to "destroy the present equilibrium of power."<sup>34</sup>

## China Threat Contention Answers

Turn - Entrapment is caused by lack of U.S. commitment – they have it backwards.

**French 18** (August 2018, Erik French has an MA from Syracuse and this is his dissertation for a PhD in Political Science, “THE US-JAPAN ALLIANCE AND CHINA’S RISE Alliance Strategy and Reassurance, Deterrence, and Compellence”, Syracuse University)

The US experience in managing the Senkakus provides disconfirming evidence for the strategic arguments in favor of distancing. While some strategists contend that a coordination strategy toward Japan will only encourage it to escalate disputes with China, the opposite has largely proved true in practice. Indeed, the dispute has escalated the farthest and risked US entrapment the most when Japan believes that it cannot depend on a firm US commitment to its defense. As such, H3 and H4a are not supported by these cases. Furthermore, Japanese hedging behavior has not been associated with improved deterrence and reassurance outcomes for the US, contrary to the predictions of H4b. Finally, increases in US coordination with Japan do not seem to have imposed significant constraints on the US ability to deter or reassure China, contrary to the predictions of H5.

These anti-access/ area denial (A2/ AD) capabilities offer a relatively low-cost means of confounding US alliance strategy. Because they increase the risks of joining a conflict near China's shores and of maneuvering within the First Island Chain, these capabilities place US security guarantees and therefore allied assurance in doubt.<sup>48</sup> China is now powerful enough in conventional and nuclear terms that escalation could be increased.

### **Multiple checks on US China conflict**

**Leon 17** (David Pak Yu - Assistant Professor Department of Political Science & History, Keuka College, “Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: Situating China's Economic and Military Rise,” Asian Politics & Policy, vol 9, is 1, January 2017, Wiley //Red)

China has, in the past 30 years, experienced economic growth and military modernization to such an extent as to position itself as a power capable of shaping the Asian regional order and, potentially, the rules and institutions governing the international system.<sup>1</sup> In the existing literature, various policy analysts and international relations scholars have argued that, historically, systemic risks of conflicts tend to increase at critical junctures of power transitions or major power shifts when the power gap narrows between a hegemon and a rising challenger, especially a revisionist one committed to overturning the established set of institutional arrangements (see Copeland, 2000; Gilpin, 1983; Kugler & Lemke, 1996; Organski, 1958; see also Chan, 2008; Harris, 2014). An increasingly powerful China in the context of the relative decline of the United States (Layne, 2012; Zakaria, 2008; although see Beckley, 2011) has brought these debates into sharper relief because whether or not China can rise peacefully and whether or not it will challenge the United States in its dual role as the premier global power and traditional underwriter of global governance institutions will have major implications for both theory and policy as analytical apparatuses are reexamined and reworked, and policy prescriptions developed and dispensed. This article first suggests that neither theoretical nor policy questions pertaining to China's rise can be properly addressed without examining the nature and meaning of any power shifts that are said to be in process, or the balance of economic and military forces within the intersecting global and East Asian regional systems. Clarifying these issues in turn requires an analysis of such factors as the trajectories, reversibility, and distributional consequences of differential growth; the possibilities and constraints of China's current and expected military capabilities,

especially in relation to power projection and strategic means of coercion (i.e., naval and air forces capable of long-range operations, as well as nuclear forces and the capabilities and ranges of delivery vehicles); **economic interdependence; and China's dispositions toward rule-based international institutional complexes.** This article argues that while China has seen tremendous economic growth and substantial military modernization, **sustaining its economic prosperity depends to a large extent on global trade, internal and external stability, and the ability to access natural resources. A deep level of international institutional engagement that it has exhibited while rising in wealth and power is quite dissimilar to aggressive rising challengers in the past** (e.g., Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany) where autarky or economic self-sufficiency and aloofness from rule-based institutions tended to mark their behavior. Inasmuch as engagement and enmeshment continue to be prioritized in Chinese foreign policy, **China will likely have strong disincentives to initiate conflicts** that may disrupt trade and resource flows and essentially slow its own rise. For the foreseeable future, **its military also does not have the kind of power projection capability** and its foundational sources—or what can be called the command of the commons (Pose, 2003)—**that would allow it to mount a serious challenge to U.S. military primacy in the Western Pacific, much less to initiate a revisionist war** to reorder the core systemic arrangements; on the contrary, **it has seldom been more involved and engaged in such arrangements in modern times.** This relatively benign conclusion, however, is conditional on China's continued access to the resources necessary for further development and growth by means of trade or acquisition, which also serves as a linchpin of domestic regime stability. This can be attributed to Deng Xiaoping's admonition for China to "hide its capabilities and bide its time" in international politics, a concept traceable to Sun Tzu's classic notion that high strategic virtue lies in winning without a fight (see Sun, 2009; see also Friedberg, 2011; Kissinger, 2011). It is still too early to tell if tensions in China's geographical periphery and China's more recent assertiveness in international affairs indicate a fundamental reorientation or an adjustment in policy, but in any case, such tensions and the possibility of escalation should not be taken lightly. In short, **China has been rising within a rule-based system** characterized by the institutionalization of world trade and politics (Baviera, 2016; Ikenberry, 2011), conceived initially as U.S.-led institutional design, and more broadly intensified in the closing decades of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century. **If this institutional architecture proves not to be robust and resilient enough to ensure reasonably unhindered access to the lifeblood of growth, dangers may still loom** for a concerted drive for autarky that in earlier times had emanated from great power anxieties and heralded international conflicts. **The very existence and pervasiveness of contemporary global institutions, however, do present China with the possibility to rewrite or create its own set of global institutions, something** that **totalitarian rising powers in the first half of the 20th century did not seriously attempt to do.**

## Baltics Invasion Contention Answers

**They conflate capability and intention. It doesn't matter what we threaten with, it matters what we threaten over.**

Dianne R. **Pfundstein**, PhD Candidate, Columbia University, '11, "Compelling Compliance with the International Order: The United States, the Threat of Force, and Resolve in the Era of Unipolarity" [http://blogs.cuit.columbia.edu/dr2109/files/2011/03/pfundstein\\_isa\\_2011\\_2.pdf](http://blogs.cuit.columbia.edu/dr2109/files/2011/03/pfundstein_isa_2011_2.pdf)

The absence of any real threat to the United States' vital interests in the post Cold War period means that, when the United States issues a threat of military action against a weak target, the threat itself conveys little information about how committed the United States is to go beyond the limited action threatened to achieve the objectives in question.<sup>20</sup> Press is correct in arguing that the target state evaluates whether the coercer's interests are vitally engaged by the issue over which it is threatening to use force: "Because America's enemies frequently recognize that America's core interests are not at stake in their disputes, it will be hard to convince them that the United States will 'go to the mattresses' to prevail in these conflicts."<sup>21</sup> Knowing that the threat to escalate does not convey any information about the United States' resolve on the other two dimensions—the willingness to suffer and the willingness to destroy—a target state may resist U.S. threats in the hope that it can outlast an arrogant but cost-shy superpower in a military contest. This may make resistance an attractive option for a highly motivated target, even if the target believes that the United States' threat of escalation is credible.

### **Baltic war won't go nuclear.**

Viljar **Veebel**, PhD Baltic Defence College and Illimar **Ploom**, PhD Estonian National Defence College, '18, "The Deterrence Credibility of NATO and the Readiness of the Baltic States to Employ the Deterrence Instruments" LITHUANIAN ANNUAL STRATEGIC REVIEW 2017-2018 Volume 16

However, the authors of the current study disagree with the idea that the Baltic countries could be under potential nuclear attack, which could evolve to a nuclear war. This conviction relies on the argument that although both potential conflict parties, i.e. NATO and Russia, have striking capability, there exists no rational reasoning to execute a nuclear strike even as a measure of last resort. In fact, it is hard to believe in Russia having any rational motivation to use nuclear weapons in the Baltic countries while a large share of the population in the Baltic countries are Russian-speaking. Likewise, territorial proximity and Russia's most likely further ambition to legitimate the annexation come into play. However, the same arguments also refer to the fact that nuclear deterrence, which is considered to be a core component of NATO's credible deterrence strategy, does not provide any additional value for the Baltic countries either. On the one hand, there is a question of morality and escalation for the Alliance should NATO weigh using nuclear attack as a preventative measure. On the other hand, there are several logical gaps in the chain of argument justifying the Alliance to authorise usage of nuclear weapons against Russia in case the latter has fully or partially invaded the Baltic countries. First, there is a question of how could the strategic use of nuclear weapons against Russia be believable in a regional conflict? Second, how would it help to solve the conflict which has already started? Third,

what would be the possible positive outcome for NATO, having initiated Mutually Assured Destruction with Russia to stop the occupations of Baltics?

## Turkey Prolif contention Answers

**No cascades. Cred theory false – states privilege the current balance of power.**

John M. Schuessler, Professor of International Affairs @ A &M, and Joshua R. Shifrinson, Professor of IR @ BU, '19, "The Shadow of Exit from NATO," *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Fall.

Is reputation, in fact, worth fighting for? To a surprising degree, the evidence cuts against the notion that commitments are interdependent and thus that reputation deserves the importance that policy makers have ascribed to it. An exhaustive review of the literature is beyond the scope of this article, but a safe implication to draw from some of its seminal contributions is that reputation has been overvalued.<sup>51</sup>

Ted Hopf, for example, notes how the United States became involved in various Third World conflicts during the Cold War, more to deter the Soviet Union than to protect any specific interest. Hopf highlights the lessons the Soviets learned from their victories and defeats in these conflicts, finding that "not a single Soviet in twenty-five years inferred anything about American credibility" in the core based on events in the periphery.<sup>52</sup> Political scientist Jonathan Mercer leverages insights from social psychology to generate the counterintuitive argument that states are unlikely to get reputations for either lacking resolve among adversaries or for having resolve among allies. Bolstered by an examination of reputation formation in a series of pre-World War I crises, Mercer concludes, "It is wrong to believe that a state's reputation for resolve is worth fighting for."<sup>53</sup> Daryl Press, finally, pits the past actions theory, which says that the credibility of a state's threats depends on its history of keeping or breaking commitments, against the current calculus theory, which privileges the balance of power and interests. To evaluate these competing theories of credibility, Press examines decision-making during three sets of crises—the "appeasement" crises between Nazi Germany and Britain and France before World War II, as well as Cold War crises between the Soviet Union and the United States over Berlin and Cuba. The cases reveal, Press argues, that "the very same leaders who are so concerned about their own country's credibility that they are loath to back down reflexively ignore the enemy's history for keeping or breaking commitments."<sup>54</sup> Press, like Mercer, ends up concluding that states "should not fight wars for the sake of preserving their credibility."<sup>55</sup>

**Leadership – COVID, climate, iran, 5g all make the US unreliable. Biden can't solve.**

Luke McGee, Senior Producer @ CNN, 10+ years in Journalism, 7-4-2020, "Cracks in the Trump-Europe relationship are turning into a chasm," CNN,  
<https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/04/europe/trump-europe-relationship-intl/index.html>

For more than 70 years, the transatlantic alliance has served as the unshakable foundation of European stability and underpinned the values of the US-led Western order. In 2020, it appears that relationship is being rethought on both sides of the Atlantic.

Earlier this week, the European Union declined to include US in its list of "safe countries," meaning that American travelers will be unwelcome inside the bloc for the foreseeable future, due to the eyewatering US coronavirus infection numbers. Controversially, the list includes China -- the country where the virus originated -- on the condition of reciprocal arrangements.

EU officials insist that the decision was not political and based entirely on epidemiological evidence, in the hope this would pacify US President Donald Trump, a man who has attacked the bloc on several occasions.

However, others privately concede that had Brussels wanted to make the pill more palatable for an American audience, they could have added a sugar coating. "In the past, I can see that we might have not included China in order to keep the US happy," says an EU diplomat not authorized to speak on record about how the decision was made.

It might seem a stretch to take this incident as evidence of a rupture in transatlantic relations, until you place it in the current geopolitical context. It's no secret that Washington takes less of an interest in European affairs these days. And it's well known that European nations actively seek greater diplomatic autonomy from America. This is especially true for the 27 member states of the European Union.

One of the ways Brussels thinks it can distance itself from DC is by engaging with China as a strategic and economic partner, decreasing its reliance on one of the world's superpowers by balancing its relationship with the other.

In the past few years, Brussels has stuck to its guns on big, international matters as Trump tore everything up. Think of the Paris Climate Accord, the Iran Nuclear deal, 5G, and you start to see a pattern of behavior in which the EU could be perceived to have sided with China over its oldest ally. Sure, it might be a ungenerous read of the situation, given the deep, established bond between Europe and the US, but in this context, any perceived friendliness to Beijing punches a very real bruise.

"Knowing what we know about China's data, how it has behaved during the pandemic and the White House's stance, I think in another world we would have kept them off," says the diplomat. That other world he refers to isn't simply the world before Trump took office.

One Brussels official who works on EU foreign policy but is not authorized to speak on the record said the shift away from Europe as a geopolitical priority began under former US president Barack Obama.

"Obama didn't have as close an interest in the Middle East as previous presidents, which is geographically more of a European problem. And he was shifting his priorities from Europe to China and Asia," the official said.

However, longstanding observers of the alliance accept it has been strained over the past four years -- and will worsen still if Donald Trump beats former vice president Joe Biden in this year's US election. "Trump considers the EU, especially Germany, an economic and trade rival, which means tensions can be expected in the case he gets a second term," says Velina Tchakarova, from the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy.

She says that as the EU is taking steps toward "building stronger autonomy in the field of security and defence," Trump tries to "undermine such efforts through his attacks on the European NATO members as well as through economic and trade measures."

The Brussels official explains that Trump's "break from multilateralism" on big international matters like Iran, coupled with the US taking "less responsibility in European security" has accelerated European thinking to take a step away from America and "do our own thing on the world stage."

This characterization of a hostile US administration that goes out of its way to avoid working with Europeans is one that the EU diplomat recognizes. "The problem is, officials in DC who want to work with Europe, while in contact, don't have the mandate from the government to engage in any serious way. They have hung on as long as they can but if we get a second Trump term, then we are in real trouble."

This, according to Tchakarova, is why "EU institutions and leaders of the member states hope that Joe Biden will be elected in November ... he is in favor of multilateralism and the expectation is that he will strengthen the ties between the USA and Europe."

CNN approached numerous officials from the EU institutions and diplomats on both sides of the Atlantic for comment. Most declined to comment; several conceded that they believed this to be the case. One European diplomat said: "We'll dance with whoever is on the dance floor, but it doesn't take a genius to see that the EU-US cooperation is currently underperforming."

Asked to comment on a potential pivot by the EU away from its historical ties with the US, a State Department spokesperson said: "The United States and the EU share a strong, enduring partnership based on common democratic values and governance, respect for human rights and the rule of law, deep economic ties, and a commitment to Transatlantic prosperity and security. This longstanding partnership is vital as we coordinate on a host of international efforts."

However, a potential Biden victory would provide no quick fix for the transatlantic partnership. "The question is not really if you can get the relationship back to where it was, but if we can persuade the US to re-join the Western order," says the EU diplomat.

"The US and EU geopolitical pivots on Asia, the Middle East and trade have respectively already begun. The difference at the moment is we think the West should be pivoting as one."

And even if Biden did go back to Obama-era policy on Europe, there is no guarantee that in four years' time he wouldn't be replaced by someone even more radical than Trump. "The fundamental shifts going on in the US will probably remain and we have to adjust, making the best of the relationship we can. These shifts, they are structural and they are not just based on one person," says the Brussels official.

Of course, none of this means that the transatlantic alliance will stop being important. It will remain central to what the West represents, and the US will always be a more important ally to Europe than China ever could be. Besides, the EU's big plans to engage more with China were dealt a major blow by the Covid-19 outbreak.

However, that fading veneer of warmth -- with Europe seeking a new place on the world stage as the US's global role becomes inherently more unpredictable -- can only be seen as good news for those that these historic Western powers were united against not so long ago.

**NATO collective defense creates a moral hazard for Turkey. Removing article five commitments forces Turkey to reverse its nonaligned actions. That's key to signal democracy, prevent intra NATO warfare, air defense, and achieve nearly every strategic objective NATO has in MENA.**

Steven Erlanger, chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe, 8-3-20, "Turkish Aggression Is NATO's 'Elephant in the Room,'" NYT,  
<https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/03/world/europe/turkey-nato.html>

BRUSSELS — The warships were escorting a vessel suspected of smuggling weapons into Libya, violating a United Nations arms embargo. Challenged by a French naval frigate, the warships went to battle alert. Outnumbered and outgunned, the French frigate withdrew.

But this mid-June naval showdown in the Mediterranean was not a confrontation of enemies. The antagonists were France and Turkey, fellow members of NATO, sworn to protect one another.

A similarly hostile encounter between Turkey and a fellow NATO member happened just two weeks ago, when Turkish warplanes buzzed an area near the Greek island of Rhodes after Greek warships went on alert over Turkey's intent to drill for undersea natural gas there.

Turkey — increasingly assertive, ambitious and authoritarian — has become "the elephant in the room" for NATO, European diplomats say. But it is a matter, they say, that few want to discuss.

A NATO member since 1952, Turkey is too big, powerful and strategically important — it is the crossroads of Europe and Asia — to allow an open confrontation, alliance officials suggest.

Turkey has dismissed any criticism of its behavior as unjustified. But some NATO ambassadors believe that Turkey now represents an open challenge to the group's democratic values and its collective defense.

A more aggressive, nationalist and religious Turkey is increasingly at odds with its Western allies over Libya, Syria, Iraq, Russia and the energy resources of the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey's tilt toward strongman rule after 17 years with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan at the helm also has unsettled other NATO members.

"It's getting hard to describe Turkey as an ally of the U.S.," said Philip H. Gordon, a foreign policy adviser and former assistant secretary of state who dealt with Turkey during the Obama administration.

Despite that, Turkey is getting a kind of free pass, analysts say, its path having been cleared by a lack of consistent U.S. leadership, exacerbated by President Trump's contempt for NATO and his clear admiration for Mr. Erdogan.

"You can't say what U.S. policy on Turkey is, and you can't even see where Trump is," Mr. Gordon said. "It's a big dilemma for U.S. policy, where we seem to disagree strategically on nearly every issue."

Those strategic divides are proliferating. They include Turkey's support for different armed groups in Syria; its 2019 purchase of a sophisticated Russian antiaircraft system over fierce objections by the United States and other NATO members; its violation of the arms embargo in Libya; its aggressive drilling in the eastern Mediterranean; its constant demonization of Israel and its increasing use of state-sponsored disinformation.

But NATO officials' general meekness in standing up to Turkey has not helped, analysts say, pointing to the group's secretary-general, Jens Stoltenberg, whose job is to keep the 30-nation alliance together, but who is considered excessively tolerant of both American and Turkish misbehavior.

The last serious discussion of Turkey's policies among NATO ambassadors was late last year, despite the purchase of the antiaircraft system, the S-400.

Other countries, like Hungary and Poland, also fall short on the values scale, argued Nicholas Burns, a former NATO ambassador now at Harvard. But only Turkey blocks key alliance business.

NATO operates by consensus, so Turkish objections can stall nearly any policy, and its diplomats are both diligent and knowledgeable, "on top of every ball," as one NATO official said. France has also used its effective veto to pursue national interests, but never to undermine collective defense, NATO ambassadors say. But Turkey has blocked NATO partnerships for countries it dislikes, like Israel, Armenia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates.

More seriously, for many months Turkey blocked a NATO plan for the defense of Poland and the Baltic nations, which all border Russia. And Turkey wanted NATO to list various armed Kurdish groups, which have fought for their independence, as terrorist groups — something that NATO does not do.

Some of these same Kurdish groups are also Washington's best allies in its fight against Islamic State and Al Qaeda in Syria and Iraq.

A deal was supposedly worked out at the last NATO summit meeting in December in London, but Turkey created bureaucratic complications, and it was only in late June that Turkey relented — after considerable pressure from official Washington, which has lost patience with Mr. Erdogan and is infuriated by his insistence on buying the S-400.

If deployed, the S-400 would put Russian engineers inside a NATO air defense system, giving them valuable insights into the alliance's strengths while threatening to diminish the capability of the expensive fifth-generation fighter, the F-35.

The assumption is that Mr. Erdogan, who has grown significantly more suspicious since a failed 2016 coup against him, wants to be able to shoot down American and Israeli planes like the ones his own air force used in the coup attempt.

"Every time we discuss Russia" in NATO, "everyone thinks of the S-400 and no one says anything," said one European diplomat, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive matter. "It's a major breach in NATO air defense, and it's not even discussed."

Instead, NATO assumes that talks between Washington and Ankara will somehow handle the problem. But Washington is divided, and Mr. Erdogan talks only to Mr. Trump.

Yet the confusion is not simply Washington's, said Amanda Sloat, a former deputy assistant secretary of state who dealt with Turkey in the Obama State Department and wrote a recent essay with Mr. Gordon. The European Union also has no clear policy on Turkey or Libya, she said.

Turkey has pursued its own national interests in northern Syria, where it now has more than 10,000 troops, and in Libya, where its military support for a failing government helped turn the tide in return for a share in Libya's rich energy resources.

It was near Libya in June that three Turkish warships confronted the French frigate.

While the European Union has a mission to help enforce the arms embargo on Libya, NATO does not. The frigate, the Courbet, was engaged in a different NATO mission aimed at migration flows, but since Turkey and France support different sides in the Libyan civil war, the confrontation between NATO allies was troubling.

Turkey said the ship was carrying aid rather than arms, and has denied harassing the Courbet. NATO officials say that its military committee is investigating and that the evidence is not as clear-cut as the French suggest.

Still, President Emmanuel Macron of France has used the clash as another moment to assert that NATO is nearing "brain death," because it seems incapable of reining in Turkey or acting in a coordinated political way.

His first accusation also involved Turkey, when Mr. Trump, after a call with Mr. Erdogan last October, unilaterally decided to pull U.S. troops out of northern Syria, where NATO is fighting the Islamic State, leaving the French and other allies exposed. Ultimately, the Pentagon persuaded Mr. Trump to leave some American troops there.

French-Turkish tensions at NATO date to the 2011 decision to intervene against Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya, noted Ivo Daalder, who was then the American ambassador to NATO.

France, with its policy of secularism, fears that Mr. Erdogan's reinsertion of Islam into politics will spread in North Africa, encourage Islamist militias and damage France's "sphere of influence," said Soner Cagaptay, the director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. "They are quite worried."

The latest flash point is over Turkey's demand to share in discoveries of natural gas made in 2015 in the eastern Mediterranean, which led to deals and alliances among Greece, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt.

Maritime claims are disputed, and Mr. Erdogan complained in June that "their aim was to imprison our country, which has the longest coastline in the Mediterranean, into a coastal strip from which you can only catch fish with a rod."

He then sent survey and drilling ships to explore off Cyprus, prompting European sanctions, and said he would do the same near Rhodes, bringing the Greeks to threaten warfare. Last week, Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany got Mr. Erdogan to hold off while talks proceed.

While many looked to Turkey as a moderate democratic model during the Arab spring a decade ago, Turkey is a different country under Mr. Erdogan, who has mobilized the more religious voters in the countryside.

A devout Muslim, Mr. Erdogan has become more nationalist and authoritarian, especially in the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt, when he purged and jailed many Turkish secularists, judges, journalists and military commanders.

He has broken definitively with Turkish secularism, symbolized by his recent decision to turn Hagia Sophia from a museum back into a mosque. He has pushed hard into the region with a neo-Ottoman ambition, downgrading older alliances to press Turkish interests.

Ibrahim Kalin, Mr. Erdogan's spokesman, brushes off criticism and says Mr. Trump and Mr. Macron are the ones questioning NATO's value.

"I guess Macron is trying to assert some sort of leadership in North Africa, the kind he doesn't have in Europe," Mr. Kalin said. "He called Turkey criminal, and it is incredible for France to call that to another NATO member."

As for Brussels, Mr. Kalin said, "the E.U. should look into the mirror." Greece "uses E.U. membership as a way to pressure Turkey, but this language of sanctions will not work," he said, arguing that Turkey wants only "an equitable and fair sharing of energy resources."

The public American position is essentially to urge Turkey "to halt operations that raise tensions," Philip T. Reeker, the acting U.S. assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasia, said of the eastern Mediterranean.

"We want our friends and allies — and let's remember, we're all, Turkey, Greece and the United States, all NATO allies — we want friends and allies in the region to approach these issues in a spirit of cooperation," he said.

"There is a big conversation to have about what to do about Turkey," a senior European diplomat said. "But it's not for now."

## **Now is key. Turkish aggression is escalating, causes US-NATO-Russia war in Syria.**

Evan Maguire, Development Manager @ American Spectator, 3-4-2020, "Clashes at Greek Border and in Syria Highlight Turkey's Status as Unreliable Ally," American Spectator, <https://spectator.org/clashes-at-greek-border-and-in-syria-highlight-turkeys-status-as-unreliable-ally/>

The clashes among the Greek government, its residents, and migrants are a recipe for disaster and anarchy, brought on by Turkey's treacherous reneging. NATO allies, Greece, and Turkey

already have strained relations as Turkey regularly violates Greek airspace and backs Turkish separatists in Northern Cyprus. This flareup over migration and refugees is just the latest example of Greco-Turkish animosity, and Greece isn't the only NATO ally that Turkey is currently jeopardizing.

NATO is committed to protecting its members, "the West," from foreign aggression, securing democracy, and generally promoting a peaceful world order. Turkey is committed to none of this. Erdogan is prioritizing his own interests, ignoring those of Europe. Turkey has strategic reasons for its decision to allow migrants to cross into Europe; it currently hosts around four million refugees and economic migrants. Allowing refugees into Europe would alleviate pressure on its infrastructure and resources. Turkey can focus these resources elsewhere, including its military objectives in Syria, which run counter to NATO interests.

Turkey has always had a bad relationship with the Assad regime, but the situation went cold to hot over the weekend. Any shared goals between Turkey and Syria, largely in combatting Kurdish rebels, have eroded in recent months, as the Kurds have been weakened by the withdrawal of U.S. support. The Assad regime has been defeating opposition throughout war-torn Syria, notably with the capture of Aleppo two weeks ago, and a current offensive on the Idlib province. Last week, 34 Turkish soldiers in Idlib were killed by Syrian forces, backed by Russian airstrikes. While Turkish troops were operating outside of their jurisdiction and did not properly communicate their position to either Assad or Putin, the deaths were likely not intentional. Erdogan responded with escalation, killing over 100 pro-regime fighters and downing Syrian jets. Increased casualties, creating greater hatred between Syria and Turkey, increase the chances of an all-out war, which neither NATO nor Russia wants to see happen.

Erdogan and Putin are scheduled to meet later this week to ease tensions, but Erdogan has stated that the recent retaliation is "just the beginning," a mindset that diminishes prospects of a stable peace. Of course, Assad and Putin are not good-faith actors, but neither is Turkey. Turkey's tendency towards violence against those it opposes, from Kurdish rebels to the Assad regime, poses a threat to regional and global peace.

Turkey continues to act as a rogue state, a thorn in the side of both the free world and unfree world. Gone are the days of Ataturk's secular republicanism. An undemocratic Turkey creates tensions with its own NATO allies through undemocratic behavior and failure to honor established agreements, while at the same time as it creates tensions with autocrats through military action. Turkey's betrayal of the migration agreement and its aggression in Syria should be a wakeup call for any of those in Europe and NATO who still believe that Turkey is a worthy ally.

While Turkey hosts the Incirlik and Izmir strategic airbases and controls access to the Black Sea by way of the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, the advantages of working with Turkey are rapidly being outweighed by the disadvantages. NATO's Article Five states that an attack on one is an attack on all, establishing a collective defense. Is an autocratic and Islamist Turkey, which lashes out at both friends and enemies, worthy of American support?

## US-Turkey alliance low now

**Gordon 20** – Philip H. Gordon, Mary and David Boies Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, “The Dangerous Unraveling of the U.S.-Turkish Alliance,” 1/10/20, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2020-01-10/dangerous-unraveling-us-turkish-alliance>

The United States and Turkey are on a collision course. Although the two countries have been NATO allies for nearly 70 years, that partnership has gradually deteriorated over the past few years, as Washington wondered if it could rely on Turkey and Ankara feared that the United States didn't take its security concerns seriously. In the last six months, however, relations have taken a real nose-dive.

In July, Turkey acquired advanced Russian air defense systems over U.S. objections, and in October, it targeted Syrian Kurdish militias allied with the United States as part of an incursion into northern Syria. The United States responded to both developments with indignation and a raft of punitive measures: the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump refused to deliver advanced F-35 fighter jets to Turkey, sanctioned senior Turkish officials, and raised tariffs on Turkish steel exports, while Congress advanced legislation that would impose powerful sanctions on Turkey's defense industry, called for an investigation of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's finances, and overwhelmingly passed a resolution—for the first time in both houses of Congress—recognizing the 1915 massacre of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire as a genocide. Some in Washington are now questioning Turkey's continued membership in NATO, even though the alliance has no mechanism for expelling a member.

Turkey, in turn, has angrily insisted that it will not back down. It has threatened to buy even more Russian defense equipment, retaliate against U.S. tariff increases, and expel U.S. forces from two critical military bases in Turkey. The latter threat has prompted the United States to explore moving strategic assets out of Turkey and expanding defense cooperation with Greece and some of Turkey's Gulf rivals, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Less than a decade ago, the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama—in which we served—aspired to build a “model partnership” with Turkey. There are high costs to now treating Turkey like a rival, including pushing Ankara closer to U.S. adversaries such as Iran and Russia. To prevent such a disastrous outcome, the Trump administration and Congress both need to better understand the roots of the clash between Turkey and the United States and avoid counterproductive actions that will only drive the two countries further apart. Some level of tension with Ankara is inevitable, given current disagreements, accumulated resentments, and the nationalist sentiments of citizens and legislators in both countries. But smart policies can limit damage and preserve the possibility of better relations in the future.

### GROWING APART

Although both countries have long lists of grievances, the two most immediate sources of tension are Turkey's purchase of military equipment from Russia and its invasion of northern Syria. The U.S. desire to punish Ankara for these actions is certainly understandable. Erdogan consistently blamed the Obama administration for neglecting Turkish air defense needs and “refusing” to sell Patriot missiles to Turkey, myths that helped him build domestic support for the purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system and enabled U.S. President Donald Trump to accuse his predecessor of negligence. Neither claim is accurate.

Under the aegis of NATO, the United States and its allies deployed Patriots—covering the deployment costs at their own expense—along Turkey's southern border in 2013, even though the threat of missile attacks from Syria was limited. Washington also offered to sell Turkey Patriots on terms as favorable as it has offered to any other country, but then balked at Erdogan's demands on pricing and the transfer of technology.

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Evan Maguire, Development Manager @ American Spectator, 3-4-2020, "Clashes at Greek Border and in Syria Highlight Turkey's Status as Unreliable Ally," American Spectator, <https://spectator.org/clashes-at-greek-border-and-in-syria-highlight-turkeys-status-as-unreliable-all/>

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## Turkey prolif is impossible

**Iddon 19** – Paul Iddon, writer for Ahval, citing Aaron Stein, Director of the Middle East Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, “Turkey’s nuclear future,” 10/21/19, [https://ahvalnews.com/turkey-nuclear-power/turkeys-nuclear-future?language\\_content\\_entity=en](https://ahvalnews.com/turkey-nuclear-power/turkeys-nuclear-future?language_content_entity=en)

Turkey is not presently pursuing a nuclear weapons programme and also lacks the basic infrastructure to build one even if it decides to do so.

The only nuclear-related technology being developed in Turkey today is the Akkuyu nuclear power plant on its Mediterranean coast. Russia won the contract to build the facility in 2010 and construction work began in April 2018.

Erdoğan hopes the \$20 billion project will be completed by the 2023 centennial. But it will likely take longer since Rosatom, the Russian manufacturer, has had trouble finding Turkish partners to take a 49 percent stake in the project.

Also, the plant is being built in an area prone to earthquakes. This, along with reportedly recurring cracks in the concrete foundation of the site, has led to concerns and questions about its safety.

Even if Akkuyu is completed soon and Turkey procures all the technical knowhow to build reactors of its own, neither of which is likely, it still would not have the means to make nuclear weapons.

“Developing nuclear power is one thing,” Dr. Ali Bakeer, a political analyst and consultant, told Ahval. “Developing nuclear weapons is quite another.”

He said that while Moscow is helping Ankara in the Akkuyu project it has no interest in a nuclear-capable Turkey and certainly will not help a NATO member to develop nuclear weapons or the means to do so.”

**“This just does not add up.”**

Aaron Stein, Director of the Middle East Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, also saw no way the Akkuyu project could help Turkey even begin to develop nuclear weapons.

“Akkuyu is a bizarre reactor project,” Stein told Ahval.

“Russia is going to build it, own it, and operate it,” he said. “Rosatom has also included a fuel supply contract and will reprocess spent fuel from the plant and then return the vitrified waste to Turkey for permanent storage.”

Consequently, this arrangement makes Akkuyu “one of the most proliferation-resistant agreements on the planet” because “Russia is essentially operating a national reactor inside Turkey because of how Ankara has set up the financing arrangements.”

Turkish students studying nuclear engineering in Russian universities are not taught about critical technology in this field, according to Moscow-based Russian-Turkish affairs analyst Kerim Has.

This underscores Russia's unwillingness to help Turkey become self-sufficient in the development of nuclear technology.

Turkey does have an arsenal of conventional tactical ballistic missiles, most notably the J-600T Yıldırım it developed with Chinese assistance and the Bora-1, which saw its combat debut against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Iraqi Kurdistan in May.

Neither of these missiles is currently capable of delivering a nuclear warhead to a target.

"With the exceptions of some of the F-16s it possesses, that have been modified to be able to carry the US B-61s, Turkey does not have the means to deliver nuclear warheads," Bakeer said.

### Alliance collapse inevitable because of populism, debt and china. Phased withdrawal stabilizes the transition.

Walt, Stephen, IR @ Harvard, '18, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/26/nato-isnt-what-you-think-it-is/>

Even so, NATO's present problems predate Trump and are largely the result of long-term structural forces. In the absence of a common, clear, and present danger, sustaining an elaborate multinational alliance was always going to be difficult, and it is in some ways a testimony to past diplomatic artistry that NATO has kept going as long as it has and despite the failures in Afghanistan and Libya and the divisions that erupted over the war in Iraq. Even if Trump had stuck with the status quo, reaffirmed the U.S. commitment, and played nicely with Europe's leaders, it would not have reversed the gradual erosion of the trans-Atlantic partnership.

A better course would have been to start a gradual, constructive, and if possible amiable decrease of the U.S. security role in Europe, making it clear to U.S. allies that Washington no longer believed it needed to maintain a security presence there and that it planned to be either completely or nearly out in five to 10 years. The United States might conceivably remain a formal member of NATO, but it would no longer station forces there, no longer insist that the supreme allied commander in Europe be a U.S. officer, and no longer expect the Europeans to fall obediently into line whenever Washington barked orders. Trade, investment, and tourism would continue, and U.S. arms manufacturers would be free to sell to European buyers if these states decided to bolster their defenses. Meanwhile, the United States would be free to focus on other problems.

Contrary to what you might think, I'm not anti-European, let alone anti-NATO. The alliance was a bold achievement for its time and one that served both the United States and Europe well in the past. But as I wrote back in 1998: "Nothing is permanent in international affairs, and NATO's past achievements should not blind us to its growing fragility. Instead of mindlessly extending guarantees to every potential trouble spot, and instead of basing our foreign policy on a presumption of permanent partnership, it is time for Europe and the United States to begin a slow and gradual process of disengagement. This is going to happen anyway, and wise statecraft anticipates and exploits the tides of history rather than engaging in a fruitless struggle to hold them back." It was true back then and is even truer today.

### If else, commitment trap turns it.

Steve **Fetter**, School of Public Policy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA; **and** Jon **Wolfsthal** Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA, '18, "No First Use and Credible Deterrence",  
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/25751654.2018.1454257>

We are witnessing in real time how statements and veiled threats of nuclear use – “fire and fury such as the world has never seen” (Baker and Choe 2017) – can have lasting consequences. Statements by President Trump suggesting a willingness to use nuclear weapons first in a crisis with North Korea has exacerbated the risks of accidental nuclear escalation. But in even calmer times, such vague threats are ill advised. For example, US officials apparently believe that repeatedly stating or demonstrating America's willingness and ability to use nuclear weapons in response to many kinds of nonnuclear threats can be reassuring. Japan might imagine that references to nuclear weapons use, such as an American president announcing that “all options are on the table” in response to nonnuclear options might deter China or North Korea from initiating a conventional attack and make war less likely. But China and North Korea are well aware that the US has nuclear weapons; there is no need to make explicit threats. Anything that would be interpreted by them – or by Japan – as a direct commitment to make a nuclear threat in response to anything but the use of nuclear weapons create what has been called “a commitment trap” (Sagan, 2000). In these cases, the United States and Japan may feel compelled to follow through with a nuclear response, even if they believe it was unwise and might trigger a catastrophic an otherwise avoidable response. If we are fighting and likely to prevail in a conventional war on the Korean peninsula, using nuclear weapons could lead to a move devastating nuclear attack by the North on South Korea and stalemate any conventional conflict. Yet, failing to respond could expose past commitments to use nuclear weapons as a bluff and the call into question the credibility of the United States on all security and military matters

### Nonunique and plan solves.

Aykan **Erdemir**, former member of the Turkish parliament and senior director of the Turkey Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, **and** John A. **Lechner**, former financial analyst with Lazard and Deutsche Bank, who is currently a graduate student at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, '18, "Trump's Gifts to Turkey Repeat Mistakes and Set Bad Precedents," Defense One, <https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/12/trumps-gifts-turkey-repeat-old-mistakes-and-set-bad-precedents/153712/>

This dual accommodation of Erdogan through a pullout of U.S. forces from Syria and appeasement of his move to procure Russian military equipment is a windfall in the run up to Turkey's local elections. Erdogan, desperate to divert the Turkish electorate's attention from the country's economic tailspin, has been reviving old enemies to appeal to his base, including George Soros, Gezi Park protesters, and Kurds. A military campaign targeting Syrian Kurdish rebels would provide the perfect “wag the dog” distraction from bankruptcies and currency devaluation at home.

By appeasing Erdogan when he is at his weakest and most vulnerable in the run up to elections, Trump is repeating old mistakes made with previous troop withdrawals, while increasing moral hazard. Such acts are dangerous not only for the Middle East, but also for the transatlantic alliance itself.

In order to placate an uncooperative and unreliable strongman, the Trump administration is choosing to ignore his immediate predecessor's errors, not learn from them. Contrary to the administration's claims, the Islamic State is not defeated, but rather returning to its insurgent roots. In November, the Pentagon stated that eliminating ISIS from the region "could take years." The key political and economic components of ISIS' rise to power in Syria and Iraq are still present, if not more so given Russian and Iranian military aggression in the region.

At a minimum, U.S. withdrawal from the country will allow the terror network to regroup. Most likely, such a move will also render America unprepared for the next violent manifestation of Islamic radicalism, i.e., Islamic State 2.0. Sacrificing future American security from terrorist threats, in exchange for no hint of change of attitude from Erdogan, is simply bad policy.

Appeasing Erdogan also weakens Washington's Iran policy. The Trump administration has committed to keeping Iran within its borders – pulling out of Syria will do the opposite. Deserting Kurdish, Arab, and Syriac partners among the ranks of the SDF in northern Syria also sends the message to both America's friends and enemies that the U.S. is an unreliable partner.

If those costs are not enough, the S-400 crisis will continue, despite attempts to reward an autocrat for bad behavior. Erdogan is committed to the Russian weapons system, which will destabilize NATO's southern flank and set alarming precedents for future Russian interference and expansionism in Europe.

What happens now if Hungarian President Viktor Orban decides to buy the S-400 "closer to home?" While others, such as Slovakia, are proactively "cutting off" Russian hardware, there are rumors that Budapest plans to buy more. As the Chief of Staff of the Hungarian Defense Forces noted, "[we] are not obliged to buy military equipment exclusively from NATO member states." As Central Europe slides backwards democratically and re-enters Moscow's orbit, appeasing a wayward NATO member-state sends the wrong signal.

The United States must stay the course in Syria. As the President of the Council on Foreign Relations Richard Haas put it, America has a moral obligation to its allies and the citizens of Syria, who fight for survival amidst Russian airpower, Iranian ground troops, and war crimes committed by its own government. The costs of withdrawal are simply too huge; instead of just ISIS filling the vacuum, this time it will be Russia and Iran filling the void. The ensuing vortex could also pull Erdogan further into the authoritarian bloc, flipping Turkey geopolitically.

America has to send clear signals to the world, not conflicting messages from different officials and branches of government. Washington should not reward Erdogan who is committed to purchasing Russian military hardware. The moral hazard this creates will allow other potential NATO spoilers of the future to argue for multi-polarity in Europe, a direct threat to the transatlantic alliance and its values. The last thing the alliance needs is to wake up one day to an argument for S-400 systems in Hungary or elsewhere in Europe.

The current crisis is not just a Syria, Turkey, or Middle East issue, it is also about the future of the transatlantic alliance, and hence the future of liberal democracy, free markets, and open societies. Russia, China, and Iran do not differentiate between artificial regions when looking at the map. If liberal democratic values are to persist, America must do the same.

### NFU doesn't cause Turkey prolif – no capability, Pakistan won't share, IAEA investigators confirm

**Hibbs 15** – Mark Hibbs, senior associate in Carnegie's Nuclear Policy Program, "The IAEA's Conclusion about Turkey," 4/16/15, <https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1103240/the-iaeas-conclusions-about-turkey/>

[Italics in original]

Away from the op-ed pages, during the 2015 Carnegie Nuclear Policy Conference last month I had conversations in which serious people with government intelligence backgrounds asserted that Turkey's military is all about keeping open or even exercising an option to make nuclear weapons. During a track-1.5 meeting in Moscow three months before, someone who has been in and out of the United States government also put Turkey on the short list of usual suspects.

In 2004, Leon Fuerth's chapter in The Nuclear Tipping Point suggested that Turkey could go nuclear if certain things happened. Today many or even most of the items he mentioned are, at least to some extent, realities: Turkish doubts about NATO's resolve; failure to prevent a nuclear-armed North Korea; a "shift in Turkish public opinion toward a more Islamic or nationalist orientation"; resurgent Russian expansionism; and—nota bene—the "creation of a power vacuum in the Middle East as the result of the multiple failures of American policy for the post-war reconstruction of Iraq or the failure of the U.S. to make progress toward resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict."

All of the above notwithstanding, last week two Carnegie colleagues argued that Turkey will not go nuclear. They pushed back for sound reasons but they drew their conclusions from an altitude of 30,000 feet.

What's on the Ground?

My problem instead with all the recent loose Turkey talk is that it is out of sync with the facts on the ground in Turkey's atomic physics installations, uranium purification and processing labs, hot cells, and nuclear training centers.

If Turkey were to aim for a nuclear-weapons capability, it would have quite a long road to travel. I say that because there's nothing on record—not in the open literature, not on file at the IAEA Department of Safeguards, and apparently not in current U.S. government intelligence dossiers—that documents any Turkish undeclared nuclear activities.

Let's start with what the U.S. government knows. Right after my Moscow meeting, I asked people who matter if there was anything happening in Turkey as reported to the Executive Branch in real time that would substantiate concern that Turkey is—as this frequently cited German media report insists is the case—following Iran's example from the 1990s. The answer was categorical: No, there isn't. The U.S. has asked Turkey about its interest in uranium enrichment. Turkey has reiterated that uranium enrichment is a future long-term option should Turkey build a lot of power reactors—but is not currently being pursued.

For about twenty years before 2000, Washington repeatedly urged Ankara to shut down a stream of nuclear dual-use exports to Pakistan's centrifuge enrichment program. This matter is mentioned in Fuerth's chapter, alongside some speculation by the author about a Turkish nuclear weapons option, supported in part by mostly Greek and Indian press reports vaguely suggesting that Turkey was getting some kind of nuclear baksheesh from Pakistan.

I have looked into this.

When the United States government during the 1980s investigated those Turkish dual-use exports to Pakistan, the intelligence did not conclude that this commerce was part of any broader and secret bilateral relationship

## Guns and Butter DA Answers

**NATO spending causes U.S. populism – fuels Trump rhetoric of America being “ripped off”**

**Gould 20** (August 28, 2020, Joe Gould is a reporter for Defense News, “Trump repeats questionable NATO funding claims in GOP convention speech”, DefenseNews, <https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2020/08/28/trump-boasts-questionable-nato-funding-claims-in-gop-convention-speech/>)

WASHINGTON — U.S. President Donald Trump again claimed credit for an agreement by NATO members to increase spending on their own defense during his Republican convention speech on Thursday night, repeating a consistent but somewhat misleading talking point from his campaign rallies.

“Our NATO partners, as an example, were very far behind in their defense payments, but at my strong urging, they agreed to pay \$130 billion more a year,” Trump said. “And this \$130 billion will ultimately go to \$400 billion a year.”

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, Trump said to applause, “was amazed, after watching for so many years and said that President Trump did what no-one else was able to do.”

The speech doubled as Trump’s formal acceptance of his re-nomination to serve as president and an argument that he deserves four more years. In it, he said that other countries had been “taking advantage” of the United States on foreign policy and national defense before he became president.

Trump also repeated a mischaracterization of NATO members as delinquent in payments to the alliance and enlarged his role in convincing members to increase their defense spending.

Under NATO commitments forged 2014 — two years before Trump took office, and coinciding with Russia’s annexation of Crimea — each ally has until 2024 to reach their goal to spend 2 percent of its gross domestic product on its own defense.

Trump has used those pledges to make a vigorous push for allies to share more of the costs for their own protection. And Stoltenberg has given Trump some credit for Canada and European allies adding \$130 billion to their defense budgets, on the way to \$400 billion by 2024.

“President Trump has been very clear,” Stoltenberg told Fox News in 2019. “He is committed to NATO. He stated that clearly just a few days ago and also at the NATO summit in July. But at the same time, he has clearly stated that NATO allies need to invest more. And therefore at the summit in July last year, we agreed to do more to step up — and now we see the results.”

“By the end of next year, NATO allies will add hundred – 100 billion extra U.S. dollars toward defense. So we see some real money and some real results. And we see that the clear message from President Donald Trump is having an impact.”

Under a second term, Trump's reelection campaign promises there would be more money to come.

Trump's 50 "core priorities," unveiled ahead of the four-day Republican convention, included vows to maintain American military might, "wipe out" terrorist groups overseas and stop the country's involvement in "endless wars" — but also a pledge to "get allies to pay their fair share."

Former Vice President Joe Biden and his advisors have drawn a contrast with Trump, pledging to rehabilitate frayed alliances, and Biden is thought to view those relationships more conventionally, as mutually beneficial, without Trump's transactional lens and provocative rhetoric.

In a recent Fox interview, Trump accused Germany of "making a fortune" off U.S. soldiers, and that Germany, "owed us billions of dollars, billions of dollars to NATO."

Trump has said Germany's inability or unwillingness to commit 2 percent of its budget to defense spending fueled a contentious decision to cut deployments in Germany by nearly 12,000 troops and relocate some to Belgium and Italy. (U.S. defense officials insist it was a strategic decision.

### **Defense spending increasing now**

**Stearns 3-19** (Jonathan writes for Bloomberg, "Europe Moves Closer to Meeting Trump Demand on Defense Spending"<https://www.bloombergquint.com/politics/europe-moves-closer-to-meeting-trump-demand-on-defense-spending>)

(Bloomberg) -- The North Atlantic Treaty Organization said Europe moved closer last year to meeting a defense-spending target championed by the U.S., a trend that could ease transatlantic tensions as the world battles the coronavirus pandemic. The military" budgets of NATO's European member countries and Canada increased to 1.57% of gross domestic product on average in 2019 from 1.52% in 2018, the alliance said in an annual report released on Thursday in Brussels. With Canada's outlays unchanged at 1.31% of GDP, European nations led by Germany produced the boost toward the 2% goal for NATO nations as a whole. German defense expenditure expanded to 1.38% of GDP last year from 1.24%, according to the alliance. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg presented the annual report in a virtual press conference for the first time as a result of the health scare caused by the deadly coronavirus outbreak in more than 100 countries. With the U.S. accounting for around 70% of defense expenditure by NATO's 29 nations, U.S. President Donald Trump has vocally -- and sometimes angrily -- pressed Europe to boost its share. Transatlantic "burden-sharing" tensions were set aside in December at a London summit to celebrate the 70th anniversary of NATO's founding. But they have marred previous talks among the alliance's leaders and gotten entangled in trade disputes triggered by Trump's "America First" agenda. In 2014, NATO members pledged to spend at least 2% of GDP on defense by 2024. Eight European countries -- Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and the U.K. -- achieved the target last year, according to the alliance. The military budgets of NATO nations as a whole increased to 2.52% of GDP in 2019 from 2.42%, according to the alliance. U.S. defense outlays last year amounted to 3.42% of GDP, up from 3.3%, NATO said.

### **NATO military spending already trades off with social services.**

**Slijper 13** (April 2013, Rank Slijper is an economist at the Campagne tegen Wapenhandel, "GUNS, DEBT AND CORRUPTION Military spending and the EU crisis", Campagne tegen Wapenhandel, Military spending and the EU crisis

Five years into the financial and economic crisis in Europe, and there is still an elephant in Brussels that few are talking about. The elephant is the role of military spending in causing and perpetuating the economic crisis. As social infrastructure is being slashed, spending on weapon systems is hardly being reduced. While pensions and wages have been cut, the arms industry continues to profit from new orders as well as outstanding debts. The shocking fact at a time of austerity is that EU military expenditure totalled €194 billion in 2010, equivalent to the annual deficits of Greece, Italy and Spain combined.

Perversely, the voices that are protesting the loudest in Brussels are the siren calls of military lobbyists, warning of "disaster" if any further cuts are made to military spending. This paper shows that the real disaster has emerged from years of high European military spending and corrupt arms deals

. This dynamic contributed substantially to the debt crisis in countries such as Greece and Portugal and continues to weigh heavy on future budgets in all of the crisis countries. The power of the military-industrial lobby also makes any effective cuts less likely. This is perhaps most starkly shown in how the German government, while demanding ever higher sacrifices in social cuts, has been lobbying behind the scenes against military cuts because of concerns this would affect its own arms industry.

The paper reveals how:

High levels of military spending in countries now at the epicentre of the euro crisis played a significant role in causing their debt crises. Greece has been Europe's biggest spender in relative terms for most of the past four decades, spending almost twice as much of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence as the EU average. Spain's military expenditure increased 29% between 2000 and 2008, due to massive weapon purchases. It now faces huge problems repaying debts for its unnecessary military programmes. As a former Spanish secretary of state for defence said: "We should not have acquired systems that we are not going to use, for conflict situations that do not exist and, what is worse, with funds that we did not have then and we do not have now." Even the most recent casualty of the crisis, Cyprus owes some of its debt troubles to a 50% increase in military spending over the past decade, the majority of which came after 2007.

The debts caused by arms sales were often a result of corrupt deals between government officials but are being paid for by ordinary people facing savage cuts in social services.

Investigations of an arms deal signed by Portugal in 2004 to buy two submarines for one billion euros, agreed by then-prime minister Manuel Barroso (now President of the EU Commission) have identified more than a dozen suspicious brokerage and consulting agreements that cost Portugal at least €34 million. Up to eight arms deals signed by the Greek government since the late 1990s are being investigated by judicial authorities for possible illegal bribes and kickbacks to state officials and politicians.

Military spending has been reduced as a result of the crisis in those countries most affected by the crisis, but most states still have military spending levels comparable to or higher than ten

years ago. European countries rank 4th (UK), 5th (France), 9th (Germany) and 11th (Italy) in the list of major global military spenders. Even Italy, facing debts of €1.8 trillion, still spends a higher proportion of its GDP on military expenditure than the post-Cold War low of 1995.

The military spending cuts, where they have come, have almost entirely fallen on people – reductions in personnel, lower wages and pensions – rather than on arms purchases. The budget for arms purchases actually rose from €38.8 billion in 2006 to €42.9 billion in 2010 – up more than 10% - while personnel costs went down from €110.0 billion in 2006 to €98.7 billion in 2010, a 10% decrease that took largely place between 2008 and 2009.

While countries like Germany have insisted on the harshest cuts of social budgets by crisis countries to pay back debts, they have been much less supportive of cuts in military spending that would threaten arms sales. France and Germany have pressured the Greek government not to reduce defence spending. France is currently arranging a lease deal with Greece for two of Europe's most expensive frigates; the surprising move is said to be largely "driven by political considerations, rather than an initiative of the armed forces". In 2010 the Dutch government granted export licences worth €53 million to equip the Greek navy. As an aide to former Greek prime minister Papandreu noted: "No one is saying 'Buy our warships or we won't bail you out.' But the clear implication is that they will be more supportive if we do".

Continued high military spending has led to a boom in arms companies' profits and an even more aggressive push of arms sales abroad ignoring human rights concerns. The hundred largest companies in the sector sold arms to the value of some €318 billion in 2011, 51% higher in real terms compared to 2002. Anticipating decreased demand at home, industry gets even more active political support in promoting arms sales abroad. In early 2013 French president François Hollande visited the United Arab Emirates to push them to buy the Rafale fighter aircraft. UK prime minister David Cameron visited the Emirates and Saudi Arabia in November 2012 to promote major arms sales packages. Spain hopes to win a highly controversial contract from Saudi Arabia for 250 Leopard 2 tanks, in which it is competing with Germany – the original builder of the tank.

Many research studies show that investment in the military is the least effective way to create jobs, regardless of the other costs of military spending. According to a University of Massachusetts study, defence spending per US\$ one billion creates the fewest number of jobs, less than half of what it could generate if invested in education and public transport. At a time of desperate need for investment in job creation, supporting a bloated and wasteful military can not be justified given how many more jobs such money would create in areas such as health and public transport.

Despite the clear evidence of the cost of high military spending, military leaders continue to push a distorted and preposterous notion that European Union's defence cuts threaten the security of Europe's nations. NATO's secretary general, Anders Fogh Rasmussen "has used every occasion to cajole alliance members into investing and collaborating more in defense." Gen. Patrick de Rousiers, the French chairman of the EU Military Committee, at a hearing in the European Parliament, even suggested Europe's future was at stake if military spending was not increased. "What place can a Europe of 500 million inhabitants have if it doesn't have credible capacity to ensure its security?", he asked rhetorically.

## **European Welfare Unsustainable – ageing population and globalization.**

**Begg 15** (September 17, 2015, Iain Begg is a professorial research fellow at the European Institute, "Can EU countries still afford their welfare states?", BBC News, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34272111>)

As German Chancellor Angela Merkel is fond of repeating, the EU accounts for just 7% of the world's population and a quarter of its gross domestic product (GDP) but as much as half of its welfare spending.

Her underlying message is that Europe spends too much on social policies and thus has no choice but to retrench.

Austerity is one reason for cuts, but other threats to the sustainability of the welfare state are more fundamental.

They include dealing with an ageing population and adapting to evolving societal expectations.

Intensifying competition from emerging markets has also seen globalisation become a threat, because the cost of welfare policies has undermined the competitiveness of companies.

However, as I and my colleagues argue in a new paper, it would be wrong to view the welfare state mainly as a burden and it is undeniable that welfare states encapsulate values that people across the EU cherish.

How much is spent on the welfare state?

Social expenditure per person in the EU in 2012 (the most recent year available, using a harmonised definition) was €7,600 (£5,540), but with a range from €18,900 (£13,800) in Luxembourg to just €927 (£675) in Bulgaria. The UK figure was €8,700 (£6,340).

Interestingly, average EU spending per citizen is almost the same as in the United States and well below that in Switzerland, after adjusting for price differences. Typically, poverty relief, health and pensions are much the biggest components of welfare spending, whereas unemployment benefits cost relatively less.

How do changing demographics affect the sustainability of the current welfare models?

The ageing of the EU population is the result of two phenomena:

a low birth rate, which results in a falling working population

a longer life expectancy

But there are also marked differences among the EU countries. Over the past 15 years, the average fertility rate (children per woman) in the EU has been 1.54, ranging from barely over 1.3 in Hungary and Spain, and 1.36 in Germany, to 1.8 in the UK and just under two in Ireland, France and Sweden.

According to the "main scenario" of the latest Eurostat population projections, Germany's population has already started to shrink and is expected to fall from 82 million in 2013 to 74 million by 2050.

The UK's population, by comparison, will rise from 64 million to 77 million over the same period.

This scenario includes substantial net migration into the EU, although the likelihood is that the exceptional influx of refugees and migrants this year will result in even higher totals for countries seen as favoured destinations.

What is most striking is the steady increase in the ratio of elderly dependants (over-65s) to working-age citizens (those aged 15-64).

The number of working-age people supporting each elderly person will fall sharply, from 3.5 today to just two in 2050 in the EU as a whole and just 1.7 in Germany.

How does the influx of migrants this year affect welfare policies?

The refugees and migrants entering the EU will put short-term pressures on social security budgets and social housing, but the numbers do need to be put into perspective.

Even as many as one million migrants would be just 0.2% of the EU population and well under 1% of the number of people dependent in the EU on welfare budgets.

In the longer term, migrants tend to move into jobs and become net contributors to the coffers of states.

Moreover, with many European countries facing a decline in the working population, the arrival of younger dynamic workers is likely to prove helpful.

Without immigration, the EU as a whole would see its population fall by 8% up to 2050, instead of a small rise of 3.6%.

What has been the effect of globalisation and other big changes in recent decades?

Labour costs are among the key factors for companies in deciding where to invest and produce.

High wages can be afforded if workers are productive, but in many EU countries welfare states are funded in part by taxes on labour.

This creates what economists call a "wedge" between the labour cost and the wage, or put another way, the difference between what the employee receives and what the employer pays.

It causes difficulties if competitors from emerging market economies are able to undercut their European counterparts.

## **Turn: NATO out of area operations fail and cause Middle East war.**

ULRICH KÜHN, HEAD OF ARMS CONTROL AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF HAMBURG, **1-16-20**, “Judy Asks: Should NATO Stay Away From the Middle East?”  
<https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/80815>

First of all, one should differentiate between two potential missions for NATO in the Middle East: intervention and enlargement.

NATO's success in terms of crisis intervention and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq is already **mixed at best**—some would say it is a **failure** and a costly one at that. Speaking of enlargement, not a single state in the Middle East would fulfil NATO membership criteria in terms of good governance, rule of law, and the democratic control of armed forces. Politically, NATO enlargement would open a Pandora's box, since Iran, Russia, a host of extremist groups, and most likely even China would view NATO's foray as a **hostile policy**.

Having said that, would I wish for a multilateral, sustained effort to pacify and stabilize the Middle East? Absolutely! But that would only be possible if all major stakeholders were on board and if the military effort led by NATO were supported by a political-economic effort akin to the EU's mission. Right now, that is a pie in the sky.

Unfortunately, the Middle East seems to enter an oriental version of the **Thirty Years' War** instead.

### Nonunique and plan solves.

**Carpenter**, Ted Galen, PhD, '19, NATO: The Dangerous Dinosaur. Cato Institute. 91-103.

#### TURKEY: A DANGEROUS, ROGUE ALLY

The danger that Turkey could drag the United States and other NATO members into a perilous confrontation with Russia is even greater than the ability or inclination of the Baltic republics to do so. A 2015 episode highlights Ankara's willingness to engage in reckless actions that pose a danger to its alliance partners.

On November 24, 2015, a Turkish air force F-16 shot down a Russian Sukhoi Su-24 fighter near Turkey's border with Syria, killing the pilot. An especially troubling aspect of the incident was the needlessly harsh and provocative nature of the Turkish action. Evidence indicated that the Russian plane had crossed into Turkish airspace for a trivial 17 seconds.<sup>14</sup> Indeed, even the exact demarcation of the border between Turkey and Syria in that area is not clear. Moscow could plausibly claim that its jet was still in Syrian airspace. Since Russian air and ground forces were in Syria at the invitation of the Syrian government to help suppress the armed rebellion against President Bashar al-Assad, the presence of Russian combat aircraft on that side of the border was legitimate under international law. Ankara's reckless belligerence was exceeded only by its hypocrisy. Turkish planes had violated the airspace of Greece more than 2,200 times in 2014 alone, and 2014 was a typical year for such incidents.<sup>15</sup>

Greek officials have long complained that the country must devote an annoyingly large portion of its defense budget to intercepting Turkish aircraft engaging in such violations. Fortunately, though, Athens has not adopted Turkey's apparent standard and blasted offending aircraft out of the sky. The Turkish incident with Russia is the harbinger of potential peril. Fortunately, Vladimir Putin's government responded to the November 2015 incident with restraint, merely imposing some economic sanctions. Even those penalties proved only temporary. Talks between Putin and Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan soon produced a rapprochement between the two governments. Indeed, bilateral relations have warmed so much that U.S. leaders worry that Russia and Turkey are becoming too cozy. The growing compatibility between the two

autocratic leaders eventually produced a crucial arms sale in December 2017, with Russia selling Turkey S-400 air defense missiles over Washington's objections.<sup>16</sup>

Given the bilateral rapprochement since the 2015 crisis, worries about war between Turkey and Russia might seem irrelevant. Yet as events throughout history have demonstrated, circumstances can change quickly, and nations on friendly terms one moment can become staunch adversaries the next. The 2015 incident still highlights disturbing issues about Turkey's behavior and the Article 5 obligation to regard an attack on one NATO member as an attack on all. The risks entailed in that obligation multiply as the number of members increases.

Maintaining a commitment to defend the relatively stable nations of Western Europe during the Cold War is one thing—although the tensions between Greece and Turkey indicate the problems involved with even those obligations. Doing so on behalf of nearly twice that number of NATO countries, some of which are far less stable and predictable, is more perilous.

Even the task of sorting out which party to a conflict is the aggressor is not always easy. For example, it was far from clear whether the 2015 incident was a case of Russian aggression or a clumsy Turkish overreaction and provocation. Yet if Russia had responded to the downing of its plane by launching strikes against the Turkish missile batteries, it is a safe bet that Ankara would have demanded that its NATO partners, especially the United States, help repel such aggression—despite the potentially dire consequences of escalating a conflict with a nuclear-armed adversary. Wise American leaders should be wary of alliance commitments that enable any supposed ally to put the republic in such a quandary.

**NATO collective defense creates a moral hazard for turkey – it shields them from the consequences of aggression. Removing article five commitments forces Turkey to reverse its nonaligned actions. That's key to signal democracy, prevent intra NATO warfare, air defense, and achieve nearly every strategic objective NATO has in MENA.**

Steven Erlanger, chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe, 8-3-20, “Turkish Aggression Is NATO’s ‘Elephant in the Room,’” NYT,  
<https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/03/world/europe/turkey-nato.html>

BRUSSELS — The warships were escorting a vessel suspected of smuggling weapons into Libya, violating a United Nations arms embargo. Challenged by a French naval frigate, the warships went to battle alert. Outnumbered and outgunned, the French frigate withdrew.

But this mid-June naval showdown in the Mediterranean was not a confrontation of enemies. The antagonists were France and Turkey, fellow members of NATO, sworn to protect one another.

A similarly hostile encounter between Turkey and a fellow NATO member happened just two weeks ago, when Turkish warplanes buzzed an area near the Greek island of Rhodes after Greek warships went on alert over Turkey's intent to drill for undersea natural gas there.

Turkey — increasingly assertive, ambitious and authoritarian — has become “the elephant in the room” for NATO, European diplomats say. But it is a matter, they say, that few want to discuss.

A NATO member since 1952, Turkey is too big, powerful and strategically important — it is the crossroads of Europe and Asia — to allow an open confrontation, alliance officials suggest.

Turkey has dismissed any criticism of its behavior as unjustified. But some NATO ambassadors believe that Turkey now represents an open challenge to the group’s democratic values and its collective defense.

A more aggressive, nationalist and religious Turkey is increasingly at odds with its Western allies over Libya, Syria, Iraq, Russia and the energy resources of the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey’s tilt toward strongman rule after 17 years with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan at the helm also has unsettled other NATO members.

“It’s getting hard to describe Turkey as an ally of the U.S.,” said Philip H. Gordon, a foreign policy adviser and former assistant secretary of state who dealt with Turkey during the Obama administration.

Despite that, Turkey is getting a kind of free pass, analysts say, its path having been cleared by a lack of consistent U.S. leadership, exacerbated by President Trump’s contempt for NATO and his clear admiration for Mr. Erdogan.

“You can’t say what U.S. policy on Turkey is, and you can’t even see where Trump is,” Mr. Gordon said. “It’s a big dilemma for U.S. policy, where we seem to disagree strategically on nearly every issue.”

Those strategic divides are proliferating. They include Turkey’s support for different armed groups in Syria; its 2019 purchase of a sophisticated Russian antiaircraft system over fierce objections by the United States and other NATO members; its violation of the arms embargo in Libya; its aggressive drilling in the eastern Mediterranean; its constant demonization of Israel and its increasing use of state-sponsored disinformation.

But NATO officials’ general meekness in standing up to Turkey has not helped, analysts say, pointing to the group’s secretary-general, Jens Stoltenberg, whose job is to keep the 30-nation alliance together, but who is considered excessively tolerant of both American and Turkish misbehavior.

The last serious discussion of Turkey’s policies among NATO ambassadors was late last year, despite the purchase of the antiaircraft system, the S-400.

Other countries, like Hungary and Poland, also fall short on the values scale, argued Nicholas Burns, a former NATO ambassador now at Harvard. But only Turkey blocks key alliance business.

NATO operates by consensus, so Turkish objections can stall nearly any policy, and its diplomats are both diligent and knowledgeable, “on top of every ball,” as one NATO official said. France has also used its effective veto to pursue national interests, but never to undermine collective

defense, NATO ambassadors say. But Turkey has **blocked NATO partnerships** for countries it dislikes, like Israel, Armenia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates.

More seriously, for many months Turkey blocked a NATO plan for the defense of Poland and the Baltic nations, which all border Russia. And Turkey wanted NATO to list various armed Kurdish groups, which have fought for their independence, as terrorist groups — something that NATO does not do.

Some of these same Kurdish groups are also Washington's best allies in its fight against Islamic State and Al Qaeda in Syria and Iraq.

A deal was supposedly worked out at the last NATO summit meeting in December in London, but Turkey created bureaucratic complications, and it was only in late June that Turkey relented — after considerable pressure from official Washington, which has lost patience with Mr. Erdogan and is infuriated by his insistence on buying the S-400.

If deployed, the S-400 would put Russian engineers inside a NATO air defense system, giving them valuable insights into the alliance's strengths while threatening to diminish the capability of the expensive fifth-generation fighter, the F-35.

The assumption is that Mr. Erdogan, who has grown significantly more suspicious since a failed 2016 coup against him, wants to be able to shoot down American and Israeli planes like the ones his own air force used in the coup attempt.

“Every time we discuss Russia” in NATO, “everyone thinks of the S-400 and no one says anything,” said one European diplomat, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive matter. “It’s a major breach in NATO air defense, and it’s not even discussed.”

Instead, NATO assumes that talks between Washington and Ankara will somehow handle the problem. But Washington is divided, and Mr. Erdogan talks only to Mr. Trump.

Yet the confusion is not simply Washington’s, said Amanda Sloat, a former deputy assistant secretary of state who dealt with Turkey in the Obama State Department and wrote a recent essay with Mr. Gordon. The European Union also has no clear policy on Turkey or Libya, she said.

Turkey has pursued its own national interests in northern Syria, where it now has more than 10,000 troops, and in Libya, where its military support for a failing government helped turn the tide in return for a share in Libya’s rich energy resources.

It was near Libya in June that three Turkish warships confronted the French frigate.

While the European Union has a mission to help enforce the arms embargo on Libya, NATO does not. The frigate, the Courbet, was engaged in a different NATO mission aimed at migration flows, but since Turkey and France support different sides in the Libyan civil war, the confrontation between NATO allies was troubling.

Turkey said the ship was carrying aid rather than arms, and has denied harassing the Courbet. NATO officials say that its military committee is investigating and that the evidence is not as clear-cut as the French suggest.

Still, President Emmanuel Macron of France has used the clash as another moment to assert that NATO is nearing “brain death,” because it seems incapable of reining in Turkey or acting in a coordinated political way.

His first accusation also involved Turkey, when Mr. Trump, after a call with Mr. Erdogan last October, unilaterally decided to pull U.S. troops out of northern Syria, where NATO is fighting the Islamic State, leaving the French and other allies exposed. Ultimately, the Pentagon persuaded Mr. Trump to leave some American troops there.

French-Turkish tensions at NATO date to the 2011 decision to intervene against Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya, noted Ivo Daalder, who was then the American ambassador to NATO.

France, with its policy of secularism, fears that Mr. Erdogan’s reinsertion of Islam into politics will spread in North Africa, encourage Islamist militias and damage France’s “sphere of influence,” said Soner Cagaptay, the director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “They are quite worried.”

The latest flash point is over Turkey’s demand to share in discoveries of natural gas made in 2015 in the eastern Mediterranean, which led to deals and alliances among Greece, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt.

Maritime claims are disputed, and Mr. Erdogan complained in June that “their aim was to imprison our country, which has the longest coastline in the Mediterranean, into a coastal strip from which you can only catch fish with a rod.”

He then sent survey and drilling ships to explore off Cyprus, prompting European sanctions, and said he would do the same near Rhodes, bringing the Greeks to threaten warfare. Last week, Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany got Mr. Erdogan to hold off while talks proceed.

While many looked to Turkey as a moderate democratic model during the Arab spring a decade ago, Turkey is a different country under Mr. Erdogan, who has mobilized the more religious voters in the countryside.

A devout Muslim, Mr. Erdogan has become more nationalist and authoritarian, especially in the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt, when he purged and jailed many Turkish secularists, judges, journalists and military commanders.

He has broken definitively with Turkish secularism, symbolized by his recent decision to turn Hagia Sophia from a museum back into a mosque. He has pushed hard into the region with a neo-Ottoman ambition, downgrading older alliances to press Turkish interests.

Ibrahim Kalin, Mr. Erdogan’s spokesman, brushes off criticism and says Mr. Trump and Mr. Macron are the ones questioning NATO’s value.

“I guess Macron is trying to assert some sort of leadership in North Africa, the kind he doesn’t have in Europe,” Mr. Kalin said. “He called Turkey criminal, and it is incredible for France to call that to another NATO member.”

As for Brussels, Mr. Kalin said, “the E.U. should look into the mirror.” Greece “uses E.U. membership as a way to pressure Turkey, but this language of sanctions will not work,” he said, arguing that Turkey wants only “an equitable and fair sharing of energy resources.”

The public American position is essentially to urge Turkey “to halt operations that raise tensions,” Philip T. Reeker, the acting U.S. assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasia, said of the eastern Mediterranean.

“We want our friends and allies — and let’s remember, we’re all, Turkey, Greece and the United States, all NATO allies — we want friends and allies in the region to approach these issues in a spirit of cooperation,” he said.

“There is a big conversation to have about what to do about Turkey,” a senior European diplomat said. “But it’s not for now.”

### **COVID fractures Europe’s social welfare**

**Charlton et al. 20** (May 29, 2020, Angela Charlton, Colleen Barry, and Nick Perry are writers for the Associated Press, “Europe’s social welfare net shows signs of wear from virus”, PBS, <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/europe-social-welfare-net-shows-signs-of-wear-from-virus>

PARIS — Europe’s extensive social welfare net was showing signs of fraying under economic strain from the coronavirus, as protests erupted Friday for a second day in Spain against layoffs by French carmaker Renault, while Italy’s chief central banker warned that “uncertainty is rife.”

Elsewhere, New Zealand has all but eradicated the coronavirus with just one person in the nation of 5 million known to be infected. But developments were grim in other nations, with India reporting a record increase in cases, and Pakistan and Russia a record number of deaths.

As cases steadily rose across Africa, officials who are losing the global race for equipment and drugs scrambled for homegrown solutions.

In the first major increase since it started gradually reopening on May 11, France reported more than 3,000 new daily virus infections. It was not immediately clear if the spike was due to a greater availability of testing.

In the U.S., the virus threw more than 2 million people out of work last week despite the gradual reopening of businesses, stoking fears it is doing deep and potentially long-lasting damage to the world’s largest economy.

The latest job-loss figures from the U.S. Labor Department bring to 41 million the running total of Americans who have filed for unemployment benefits since the coronavirus shutdowns took hold in mid-March.

Strong safety-net programs in many European countries have been underwriting the wages of millions of workers and keeping them on the payroll instead of adding them to the ranks of the unemployed. But the limits were starting to show.

In Britain, Treasury chief Rishi Sunak was expected to tell employers that starting in August, they'll have to share the costs of a program that has effectively placed furloughed workers on the government payroll.

Sunak said the government can't pay indefinitely for a program that has cost 15 billion pounds (\$18.4 billion) to cover 80% of wages of some 8.5 million people. It is in place until October, although the final months will require employer input.

Even as it sought a government loan from France, struggling carmaker Renault announced 15,000 job cuts worldwide as part of a 2 billion-euro cost-cutting plan over three years, as demand for cars plunged around the globe.

Renault said nearly 4,600 jobs will be cut in France and more than 10,000 in the rest of the world.

That had a knock-on effect in Spain, where Nissan is rolling back production in a move Madrid said would mean 3,000 direct job cuts and as many as 20,000 additional jobs in the supply chain.

Spanish workers took to the streets for a second day to protest the closure of three Barcelona plants. Hundreds of workers surrounded at least four Nissan car dealerships in or around the northeastern city, covering their windows with leaflets reading "Nissan betrays 25,000 families" and "We will keep fighting."

The governor of the Bank of Italy, Ignazio Visco, in his annual address, said Europe's fourth-largest economy could contract by as much as 13% this year under a pessimistic scenario that foresees a huge drop in world trade and an intense deterioration of financial conditions.

"Today uncertainty is rife, not only about the course of the pandemic but also about the repercussions on behavioral patterns, on consumption and on investment decisions," Visco said, adding that "after the pandemic wanes, the world will be a different place."

How different will depend on how leaders manage rising unemployment, lower consumption and the prospect of social unrest, he said.

The 27 EU nations this week started discussing what was once unthinkable — the notion of the EU pooling debt and raising some 750 billion euros to fund the recovery from the pandemic.

"European economies are suffering," EU Commission Vice President Margrethe Vestager said in Brussels. "A lot of people are at risk of losing their jobs. Our lives and livelihoods still depend on us working together – not least, by pooling Europe's resources, to help our economy get through this crisis."

In New Zealand, health authorities have reported no new virus cases for a week. Of the 1,504 people who were infected, 22 have died but all but one have now recovered. The nation's borders remain closed, and staying virus-free when they reopen poses a big challenge.

India registered another record daily increase of 7,466 cases just before its two-month lockdown ends Sunday.

Pakistan reported 57 deaths, its highest single-day increase since the outbreak began. That increased the overall death toll to more than 1,300 while the number of confirmed cases rose to over 64,000.

Russia again reported the highest daily spike in coronavirus deaths, with health officials registering 232 in the last 24 hours, bringing the country's total to 4,374 — considered by experts a significant under count for a country where confirmed cases exceed 387,000.

Israel's Health Ministry, meanwhile, warned people not to "slip into complacency" after recording a spike in new cases, with outbreaks linked to schools, which recently reopened.

South Africa says it has a backlog of nearly 100,000 unprocessed tests for the coronavirus, a striking example of the painful shortage of testing materials across Africa as cases steadily rise.

In the U.S., where the death toll is the world's highest, surpassing 101,000, there were some encouraging signs in the economic data.

The number of Americans currently drawing jobless benefits dropped for the first time since the crisis began, from 25 million to 21 million. And first-time applications for unemployment benefits have fallen for eight straight weeks as states gradually let stores, restaurants and other businesses reopen and the auto industry starts up factories again.

But the number of U.S. workers filing for unemployment benefits is still extraordinarily high by historical standards, and that suggests businesses are failing or permanently downsizing, not just laying off people until the crisis can pass, economists warn.

"That is the kind of economic destruction you cannot quickly put back in the bottle," said Adam Ozimek, chief economist at Upwork.

The U.S. unemployment rate was 14.7% in April, a level not seen since the Depression, and many economists expect it will be near 20% in May.

Worldwide, the virus has infected more than 5.8 million people and killed about 360,000, according to a tally by Johns Hopkins University. The true dimensions of the disaster are widely believed to be significantly greater, with experts saying many victims died without ever being tested.

## **Defense spending increasing now**

### **Stearns 3-19**

(Jonathan, <https://www.bloombergquint.com/politics/europe-moves-closer-to-meeting-trump-demand-on-defense-spending>)

(Bloomberg) -- The North Atlantic Treaty Organization said Europe moved closer last year to meeting a defense-spending target championed by the U.S., a trend that could ease transatlantic tensions as the world battles the coronavirus pandemic. The military" budgets of NATO's European member countries and Canada increased to 1.57% of gross domestic product on average in 2019 from 1.52% in 2018, the alliance said in an annual report released on Thursday in Brussels. With Canada's outlays unchanged at 1.31% of GDP, European nations led by Germany produced the boost toward the 2% goal for NATO nations as a whole. German defense expenditure expanded to 1.38% of GDP last year from 1.24%, according to the alliance. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg presented the annual report in a virtual press conference for the first time as a result of the health scare caused by the deadly coronavirus

outbreak in more than 100 countries. With the U.S. accounting for around 70% of defense expenditure by NATO's 29 nations, U.S. President Donald Trump has vocally -- and sometimes angrily -- pressed Europe to boost its share. Transatlantic "burden-sharing" tensions were set aside in December at a London summit to celebrate the 70th anniversary of NATO's founding. But they have marred previous talks among the alliance's leaders and gotten entangled in trade disputes triggered by Trump's "America First" agenda. In 2014, NATO members pledged to spend at least 2% of GDP on defense by 2024. Eight European countries -- Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and the U.K. -- achieved the target last year, according to the alliance. The military budgets of NATO nations as a whole increased to 2.52% of GDP in 2019 from 2.42%, according to the alliance. U.S. defense outlays last year amounted to 3.42% of GDP, up from 3.3%, NATO said.

### **Pentagon budget reduction forces NATO to invest in their own defenses.**

**Sisk 20** (February 18, 2020, Richard Sisk is a journalist for United Press International, "European Defense Funding Takes \$1.5 Billion Hit in Pentagon Budget Request", Military News, <https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/02/18/european-defense-funding-takes-15-billion-hit-pentagon-budget-request.html>)

Funding for European defense against Russia faces a sizable reduction in the Pentagon's fiscal 2021 budget request as the administration continues to push for NATO allies to invest more deeply in their own defense.

Under the Defense Department's budget plan rolled out Feb. 10, funds for the European Defense Initiative would be cut from \$6 billion to \$4.5 billion. But Elaine McCusker, acting under secretary of defense (comptroller), said the reduction did not reflect any lessening of U.S. commitment to the alliance. She also noted that funding for the Ukraine Security Initiative, within that, was the same as this year's enacted amount.

"We have \$250 million for Ukraine security initiative in the budget request, which is actually the same as what we had last year," she said.

Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky has appeared eager to get past the charges and counter-charges that emerged from the President Donald Trump impeachment process in order to focus on ending the war with the Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine with continued U.S. support.

At the Munich Security Conference over the weekend, Zelensky said he looked forward to an eventual White House visit, and said Trump was welcome to come to Ukraine.

McCusker noted that the U.S. this month began participation in the NATO "Defender Europe 2020" training exercise, involving the largest deployment of U.S.-based forces to Europe in 25 years.

More than 20,000 U.S. troops will deploy from the U.S. for the exercise, including units from the 1st Cavalry Division, 1st Armored Division, 1st Infantry Division, 3rd Infantry Division and 82nd Airborne Division, according to U.S. Army Europe.

The proposed funding cut for EDI coming out of the White House and the Pentagon will likely not be the final word. Since EDI was enacted in 2014, Congress has shown a tendency to bump up the administration's initial request.

EDI began as a \$1 billion program in 2014, and grew to \$3.4 billion in the last year of the Obama administration. EDI funding reached a high of \$6.5 billion in Trump's first year in office, but the administration has sought to cut the funding in the last two years.

Begun as the European Reassurance Initiative in June 2014 in response to Russia's annexation of Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine, the program was meant to reassure NATO allies in Central and Eastern Europe "of a continued U.S. commitment to their national security," according to a 2018 Congressional Research Service report.

In addition, EDI has enabled the continuous nine-month rotational deployment of an Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) in Europe of about 3,300 personnel since February 2017, along with a Combat Aviation Brigade of about 1,700 personnel, the report said.





**CON**

## NFU Generally Fails

### **Nobody would trust an American NFU---realism**

**Payne 15** [Keith PhD, Professor and Head of the Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University, “US Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence”, [https://www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Volume-29\\_Issue-4/V-Payne.pdf](https://www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Volume-29_Issue-4/V-Payne.pdf)]

Realists in this regard are from Missouri, the “show me” state, and ask utopians to explain how, why, and when a powerful new cooperative international norm with corresponding international institutions will become a reality. Realists point to the unhappy history of the unmet claims and dashed hopes of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact (intended to prevent offensive war by global legal agreement), the League of Nations, and the United Nations. To be sure, the future does not have to be bound by the past, but before moving further toward nuclear disarmament, realists want to see some clear evidence of the emerging transformation of the global order—not just the claim that it can occur if all key leaders are so willing, faithful, and visionary and can “embrace a politics of impossibility.”<sup>12</sup> As the old English proverb says, “If wishes were horses, then beggars would ride.” But has not everything changed in the twenty-first century? Has not the end of the Cold War ushered in a new global commitment to cooperation, the rule of law globally, and benign conflict resolution? The unarguable answer is no. Russian military actions against Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine since 2014 (the latter in direct violation of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum signed by Russia, Great Britain, and the United States) are sufficient empirical evidence to demonstrate that Thucydides' stark description of reality is alive and well. China's expansionist claims and military pressure against its neighbors in the East and South China Seas teach the same lesson. Why is this reality significant in the consideration of nuclear weapons? Because in the absence of reliably overturning the powerful norm of raison d'État and Thucydides' explanation of international relations, states with the capability and felt need will continue to demand nuclear capabilities for their own protection and, in some cases, to provide cover for their expansionist plans. To wit, if Ukraine had retained nuclear weapons, would it now fear for its survival at the hands of Russian aggression? Former Ukrainian defense minister Valeriy Heletey and members of the Ukrainian parliament have made this point explicitly, lamenting Ukraine's transfer of its nuclear forces to Russia in return for now-broken security promises of the Budapest Memorandum.<sup>13</sup> This lesson cannot have been lost on other leaders considering the value of nuclear weapons. Nor is it a coincidence that US allies in Central Europe and Asia are becoming ever more explicit about their need for US nuclear assurances under the US extended nuclear deterrent (i.e., the nuclear umbrella). They see no new emerging, powerful global collective security regime or cooperative norms that will preserve their security; thus, they understandably seek the assurance of power, including nuclear power. The Polish Foreign Ministry observed in a recent press release that “the current situation reaffirms the importance of NATO's nuclear deterrence policy.”<sup>14</sup> This reality stands in stark contrast to utopian claims that powerful new global norms and international institutions will reorder the international system, overturn Thucydides, and allow individual states to dispense with nuclear weapons or the nuclear protection of a powerful ally. As the Socialist French president Francois Hollande has said, “The international context does not allow for any weakness. . . . The era of nuclear deterrence is therefore not over. . . . In a dangerous world—and it is dangerous—France does not want to let down its guard. . . . The possibility of future state conflicts concerning us directly or indirectly cannot be excluded.”<sup>15</sup> There could be no clearer expression of Thucydides' description of international relations and its contemporary implications for nuclear weapons. Opponents of the administration's plan to modernize the US triad now double down on the utopian narrative by insisting that the United States instead lead the way in establishing the new global norm by showing that Washington no longer relies on nuclear weapons and does not seek new ones. Washington cannot expect others to forgo nuclear weapons if it retains them, they say, and thus it must lead in creation of the new norm against nuclear weapons by providing an example to the world. For instance, “by unilaterally reducing its arsenal to a total of 1,000 warheads, the United States would encourage Russia to similarly reduce its nuclear forces without waiting for arms control negotiations.”<sup>16</sup> A good US example supposedly can help “induce parallel” behavior in others.<sup>17</sup> If, however, the United States attributes continuing value to nuclear weapons by maintaining its arsenal, “other countries will be more inclined to seek” them.<sup>18</sup>

Nuclear realists respond, however, that the United States already has reduced its nuclear forces deeply over the last 25 years. America cut its tactical nuclear weapons from a few thousand in 1991 to a “few hundred” today.<sup>19</sup> Moreover, US-deployed strategic nuclear weapons have been cut from an estimated 9,000 in 1992 to roughly 1,600 accountable warheads today, with still more reductions planned under the New START Treaty.<sup>20</sup> The United States has even decided to be highly revealing of its nuclear capabilities to encourage others to do so, with no apparent effect on Russia, China, or North Korea.<sup>21</sup> America has adhered fully to the reductions and restrictions of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty—the “centerpiece of arms control”—but the Russians now are in open violation. As former undersecretary of state Robert Joseph stated recently, decades of deep US reductions “appear to have had no moderating effect on Russian, Chinese or North Korean nuclear programs. Neither have U.S. reductions led to any effective strengthening of international nonproliferation efforts.<sup>22</sup> Utopians want the United States to lead the world toward nuclear disarmament by its good example, but no one is following. The basic reason, realists point out, is that foreign leaders make decisions about nuclear weaponry based largely on their countries’ strategic needs, raison d’Etat, not in deference to America’s penchant for nuclear disarmament or some sense of global fairness. A close review of India by S. Paul Kapur, for example, concluded that “Indian leaders do not seek to emulate US nuclear behavior; they formulate policy based primarily on their assessment of the security threats facing India.”<sup>23</sup> The same self-interested calculation is true for other nuclear and aspiring nuclear states. Nations that are a security concern to the United States seek nuclear weapons to intimidate their neighbors (including US allies), to counter US conventional forces, and to gain a free hand to press their regional military ambitions. They see nuclear weapons as their trump cards and do not follow the US lead in nuclear disarmament. A bipartisan expert working group at the Center for Strategic and International Studies concluded accordingly that “U.S. nuclear reductions have no impact on the calculus of Iran and North Korea.”<sup>24</sup>

### No adversary would trust the NFU, but it would still cause allied prolif – first use is credible now

Panda 18 [Ankit adjunct senior fellow at the Federation of American Scientists, 07-17-18, “No first use” and Nuclear Weapons,” Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/no-first-use-and-nuclear-weapons>]

Most states with nuclear weapons maintain policies that would permit their first use in a conflict. Pledges to only use these weapons in retaliation for a nuclear attack—or a no-first-use (NFU) policy—are rare. Where these pledges have been made by nuclear states, their adversaries generally consider them not credible.

Strategic planners for nuclear weapons powers see the credible threat of the first use of nuclear weapons as a powerful deterrent against a range of significant nonnuclear threats, including major conventional, chemical, and biological attacks, as well as cyberattacks. Even states with significant conventional military forces, such as the United States, consider it necessary to retain nuclear first use as an option. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, under the administration of President Donald J. Trump, retains the option of nuclear first use.

What is an NFU pledge?

A so-called NFU pledge, first publicly made by China in 1964, refers to any authoritative statement by a nuclear weapon state to never be the first to use these weapons in a conflict, reserving them strictly to retaliate in the aftermath of a nuclear attack against its territory or

military personnel. These pledges are a component of nuclear declaratory policies. As such, there can be no diplomatic arrangement to verify or enforce a declaratory NFU pledge, and such pledges alone do not affect capabilities. States with such pledges would be technically able to still use nuclear weapons first in a conflict, and their adversaries have generally not trusted NFU assurances. Today, China is the only nuclear weapon state to maintain an unconditional NFU pledge.

What is the U.S. declaratory nuclear use policy?

During the Cold War and even today, the credible threat of the United States using its nuclear weapons first against an adversary has been an important component of reassuring allies. At the height of the Cold War, the threat of U.S. tactical nuclear use was conceived of as a critical bulwark against a conventional Soviet offensive through the Fulda Gap, a strategically significant lowland corridor in Germany that would allow Warsaw Pact forces to enter Western Europe. A nuclear first-use policy was thought to be a cornerstone of the defensive posture of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), given the large number of bases of Warsaw Pact conventional military forces. Accordingly, NATO has always opposed a U.S. NFU declaration and has never ruled out U.S. first use under its “flexible response” posture since 1967. Today, U.S. allies in East Asia and Europe alike rely on credible commitments from the United States to use nuclear weapons first to deter major nonnuclear threats against them.

The United States has considered but has never declared an NFU policy and remains the only country to have ever used nuclear weapons in war—twice against Japan, in 1945. The Trump administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review expands the range of significant nonnuclear strategic scenarios in which the United States may contemplate nuclear weapons use. Notably, it does not rule out the first use of nuclear weapons in response to cyberattacks. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, under the administration of President Barack Obama, reiterated an assurance in place since 1978 that the United States would not use nuclear weapons against compliant members of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The Obama administration still maintained the option to use nuclear weapons first while stating that the role of these weapons to deter and respond to nonnuclear attacks had declined and that it would continue to reduce that role. It additionally emphasized that the “fundamental” role of U.S. nuclear weapons was to deter nuclear use against the United States and its allies. In 2002, during the administration of President George W. Bush, the classified Nuclear Posture Review emphasized the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in deterring nonnuclear threats, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and large conventional military forces, ostensibly through nuclear first use.

What is the debate in the United States on NFU?

Though the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review did not include an NFU pledge, the Obama administration considered the idea during its second term. It ultimately left U.S. nuclear declaratory policy unchanged from its 2010 iteration, which stated that the United States reserved the right to use nuclear weapons to deter nonnuclear attacks while strengthening conventional capabilities to gradually reduce the role of nuclear weapons to that of solely deterring nuclear attacks. Nevertheless, the Obama administration’s final year in office saw animated debate among proponents and opponents of an NFU declaration.

Arguments in favor of a U.S. NFU pledge. Proponents of a U.S. NFU declaration have argued that not only does the United States already maintain a de facto NFU policy but that U.S. superiority in conventional weapons is sufficient to deter significant nuclear, biological, chemical, and conventional threats. Additionally, as Kingston Reif of the Arms Control Association has argued, “a clear U.S. no-first-use policy would reduce the risk of Russian or Chinese nuclear miscalculation during a crisis by alleviating concerns about a devastating U.S. nuclear first-strike.” In nuclear strategy, a first strike refers to a nuclear attack that seeks to disarm a nuclear-armed enemy before it can employ its weapons.

Other proponents pointed to an NFU policy declaration being a necessary step on the road to global nuclear disarmament, an aspirational goal of the Obama administration and a requirement for all recognized nuclear weapon states under Article VI of the NPT. Proponents also argue that U.S. resistance to an NFU declaration has harmed U.S. nonproliferation efforts.

Arguments against a U.S. NFU pledge. Critics, meanwhile, have suggested that U.S. allies in East Asia and Europe alike would not accept a unilateral U.S. NFU declaration, because it could encourage adversaries to attack with conventional weapons or to use chemical, biological, or cyber weapons. Russian conventional military advantages over U.S. allies in Europe have amplified these concerns. Critics argue that such a declaration could undercut allied commitments and encourage U.S. allies to develop their own nuclear weapons.

Within the Obama administration in 2016, Secretary of State John Kerry, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, and Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz opposed an NFU declaration, primarily along these lines. These officials shared the view of NFU skeptics that a U.S. declaration would embolden adversaries, weaken allied commitments, and invite brinkmanship.

# Modeling Answers

**US NFU doesn't get modeled**

**Payne 16** (Keith B. - President of National Institute for Public Policy and head of the Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University & Franklin C. Miller - principal of The Scowcroft Group, "The dangers of no-first-use," 8/22/16, <https://thebulletin.org/2016/08/the-dangers-of-no-first-use/>)

In light of this, adopting a policy of no-first-use would have to bring powerful benefits to offset the likely harm done to stability. What might these be? Advocates of a US no-first-use policy claim that US adoption of no-first-use would lead other nuclear powers to similarly do so, and thus contribute to nuclear stability. In truth, however, there is zero evidence that US adoption of a no-first-use policy would lead others to mimic the United States. The idea that the rest of the world follows the United States in this way is itself outdated, arrogant, and contrary to considerable evidence. The failure of President Obama's Prague Agenda to convince Russia, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, or other nuclear powers to reduce the role nuclear weapons play in their respective security policies is a powerful testament to this fact. Russia by its own open statements is now committed to a policy of coercive and unambiguous nuclear first-use threats and possible employment to support an expansionist agenda in Europe—which means it **hardly would follow a US no-first-use agenda.** Indeed, a senior Russian official recently responded to US arms control overtures by observing that Russian nuclear policies are driven strictly by Russian security needs, not by “mythical universal human values.” Other nuclear powers similarly pursue their own paths and “do not seek to emulate” the United States. And, based on China’s own open statements about its potential use of nuclear weapons, China’s existing supposed no-first-use policy is wholly ambiguous and uncertain; China cannot seriously be considered to have a no-first-use policy. In 2009, the high level and bipartisan Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, also known as the Perry-Schlesinger Commission, concluded that the United States should not adopt no-first-use. In 2010, the Obama administration’s own Nuclear Posture Review reached the same conclusion. Since then, the international security situation has deteriorated. The spectrum of military threats to the United States and our allies has expanded considerably as Russia and China have pursued military buildups and aggressive policies in Europe and Asia respectively. US adoption of a no-first-use policy now would only reflect willful US detachment from these global realities, and would be perceived as such by friends and foes alike.

### **Schull says Russia needs to model**

Todd C. Shull 5, Major, U.S. Air Force, MS from the University of North Dakota, September 2005, "CONVENTIONAL PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE: VALUABLE MILITARY OPTION OR THREAT TO GLOBAL STABILITY," <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=GetTRDoc&docname=GetTRDoc.pdf&docid=u2/a439830>

**LBSD = land-based strategic deterrent, i.e., ICBMs**

## 5. Nuclear ICBM Divestiture

An opportunity was missed in 1994 for the Air Force to divest itself from land-based nuclear ICBMs which resulted in the estimated \$5.5 billion programs to refurbish various components of the Minuteman III.<sup>439</sup> In the near future, the Air Force will be face a similar decision, this time on whether to proceed with the Land Based Strategic Deterrent (LBSD). The Air Force should take this opportunity to pursue land-based conventional PGS capabilities in accordance with the New Triad. Funding for LBSD should be reprogrammed into providing a responsive space launch capability for that supports PGS and launch-on-demand. Nuclear deterrence is best performed by the virtually invulnerable ballistic missile submarine and the Trident II (D-5). It has the survivability and the accuracy to strike any desired target. The Air Force can then focus on providing responsive conventional deterrence and strike against the new threats of the twenty first century instead of perpetuating the shadows of the twentieth century.

## 6. De-Alerting

In order to fully exploit the potential of conventional PGS capabilities, the United States must pursue an end to the Cold war nuclear force postures maintained by itself and Russia. Procedural and technical mitigation measures may work adequately against the threat of an inadvertent nuclear exchange for a small, “silver bullet” conventional PGS system, but in order to provide meaningful support to major theater contingency operations, a

more reliable solution is required. **Force postures of both the United States and Russia must be altered so that the launch of nuclear weapons “on warning” is no longer possible or necessary.**

D. CONCLUSION

The most significant finding of this thesis is that conventional PGS weapons are not in and of themselves destabilizing, but when they are combined with the enduring Cold War postures of American and Russian nuclear forces they become a valid cause for concern. The possible implications of conventional PGS capabilities simply highlight the danger we quietly face everyday. The continued presence of American and Russian nuclear forces on “hair trigger” alert poses a risk to our nations inconsistent with the other aspects of our relationship. To not deploy conventional PGS capabilities because of perceptions of a renewed nuclear arms race or inadvertent nuclear war, allows us to dodge the tough decision. We must finally clear away the last vestiges of the Cold War in order to be able to deploy capabilities necessary to protect American security interests in the post-Cold War world.

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may still loom for a concerted drive for autarky that in earlier times had emanated from great power anxieties and heralded international conflicts. The very existence and pervasiveness of contemporary global institutions, however, do present China with the possibility to rewrite or create its own set of global institutions, something that totalitarian rising powers in the first half of the 20th century did not seriously attempt to do.

## NFU Increases War Risks

**Limited nuke warfighting is key to deter Russia and China---NFU flips the balance of power to favor adversaries, which causes nuke war.**

Elbridge Colby 18. Director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security; U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development in 2017–18. “If You Want Peace, Prepare for Nuclear War.” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2018.

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/if-you-want-peace-prepare-nuclear-war>

Immediately after the Cold War, when the United States enjoyed unprecedented global power, this approach seemed reasonable. Washington didn't need much of a nuclear strategy against Iraq or Serbia. But now, **great-power competition has returned**. **Russia wants to upend the post-Cold War status quo in Europe**. **A rising China seeks ascendancy**, first over Asia and ultimately beyond. To accomplish this, **each country has developed military forces** ideally suited to fight and defeat the United States in a future war. And **modern, mobile nuclear capabilities are a key part of their strategies**. These capabilities could allow Russia or China to pressure or attack U.S. allies and to block any efforts by the United States to fight back. **This should cause great alarm among U.S. policymakers**: American grand strategy is rooted in a network of alliances designed to maintain favorable regional balances of power and protect U.S. access and trade across the globe. These alliances work as long as they can be credibly defended against outside challengers. But **if Russia and China can win wars against the United States in Europe and Asia**, respectively, then these **revisionist states will press their advantage with** painful and possibly **disastrous consequences** for U.S. interests in the world. **Washington's** task is clear. It **must demonstrate to Moscow and Beijing that any attempt to use force** against U.S. friends and allies **would likely fail and** would certainly **result in costs and risks well out of proportion** to whatever they might gain. **This requires** conventional military power, but it also means having **the right strategy and weapons to fight a limited nuclear war and come out on top**. For the first time in a generation, then, **getting U.S. defense strategy right means getting nuclear strategy right**. This requires more than just **modernizing** the current arsenal of immensely destructive strategic nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. This arsenal, designed to inflict unimaginable damage in an apocalyptic war, is **necessary to deter the gravest forms of attack**. But threatening to use such weapons in a limited war in defense of allies thousands of miles from U.S. shores is just too extreme to be convincing and therefore unlikely to work. Instead, **the United States needs weapons systems that can bridge the wide gulf between conventional and all-out nuclear war**. In particular, Washington should step up its efforts to develop **low-yield tactical nuclear weapons and associated strategies** that could **help blunt or defeat a Russian or Chinese attack** on U.S. allies **without provoking a nuclear apocalypse**. **Demonstrating** to potential opponents that the United States has **this ability is the best way to avoid ever having to put it into practice**.

DOING GOOD WHILE DOING WELL During the Cold War, nuclear weapons formed the centerpiece of U.S. strategy. Initially, when the United States enjoyed vast nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union, it relied on the threat of an immediate and decisive nuclear attack to deter aggression in Europe. By the early 1960s, U.S. strategic forces dwarfed the Soviet Union's. NATO's defenses in Western Europe bristled with nuclear weapons, while conventional forces largely played second fiddle. As the Soviet nuclear arsenal ballooned and the United States' advantage faded, however, Washington decided that this strategy was no longer enough to credibly defend Western Europe. As a result, it reinvigorated its conventional forces and devised strategies for limited nuclear use designed to blunt a Soviet invasion and persuade Moscow to end any war short of nuclear Armageddon. Thus, although Washington continued investing in strategic nuclear forces, it also developed tactical nuclear weapons and capabilities designed to offset the Warsaw Pact's much larger conventional forces. Thankfully, these strategies never had to be put to use, probably because they were credible enough to dissuade the Soviet Union from risking a major offensive—a testament to their value for deterrence. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States turned its focus to the rogue states that now posed the main, if far more modest, threat to its interests. U.S. conventional forces demonstrated their ability to quickly defeat such foes, whether Saddam Hussein's army in Iraq in 1990–91, Serbian forces in 1998–99, or the Taliban government in Afghanistan in 2001. If nuclear strategizing had seemed morbidly excessive during the Cold War, it seemed positively absurd in this world of U.S. dominance. Accordingly, Washington's emphasis shifted to conventional forces that could be used for preventive attacks and regime change abroad. The United States dramatically downsized its nuclear forces and reduced their role in its defense strategy. Concerns about nuclear weapons now focused on fears about their acquisition by rogue states or terrorists. As a result, successive administrations worked to contain proliferation and to delegitimize the use of nuclear weapons except in the narrowest of circumstances. This approach was appealing: given the United States' unrivaled conventional military might, pushing nuclear weapons out of the picture seemed like it would only solidify U.S. power. Moreover, the strategy enjoyed support from across the political spectrum. It was no surprise that doves applauded **getting rid of the weapons** they so loathed, but even hawks welcomed the shift. Nuclear weapons, after all, tend to raise the threshold for military action. Thus, President George H. W. Bush cut over 5,000 warheads from the stockpile in 1992. Every administration after him—Democratic and Republican—continued the drawdown. All in all, the U.S. nuclear arsenal has shrunk to a fraction of its Cold War size. A RUDE AWAKENING But **if this approach once made sense, it no longer does**. **Russia and China have made impressive strides toward building militaries that can take on the United States and its allies** over key strategic interests. **Gone are the days when the United States could easily swat away a Chinese attack on Taiwan or**

when it did not even have to contemplate a **Russian assault on the Baltics**. The problem is not just that Russia's and China's increasingly sophisticated and powerful conventional militaries are well poised to strike U.S. allies and partners (think Poland or the Baltics in Europe and Japan or Taiwan in Asia). It is also that **any future confrontation with Russia or China could go nuclear**. First, **in a harder-fought, more uncertain struggle, each combatant may be tempted to reach for the nuclear saber** to up the ante and **test the other side's resolve**, or even just to keep fighting. Second, **should Moscow seize the Baltics or Beijing invade Taiwan, both U.S. foes are likely to threaten to use or actually use nuclear weapons to close the door on U.S. counterattacks, or** to drastically **curtail their effectiveness**. In fact, this forms a central pillar of their theories of victory—the potential playbooks they could use to take on the United States and come out the better for it. **This threat is not a figment of the imagination.** Russia has spent much of its limited money building a modern and varied **nuclear weapons arsenal**. Much of this arsenal is **designed to attack specific military targets** rather than to wipe out major cities in one fell swoop. For instance, Russia fields a substantial number of naval nuclear weapons, including antiship cruise missiles, nuclear torpedoes, and nuclear depth charges. As Russian **exercises and military journals suggest, the idea behind Moscow's nuclear strategy is to use tailored nuclear weapons to settle a war** on Russia's terms, gambling that going nuclear will intimidate the United States into backing down—a strategy known as **"escalate to de-escalate."** If Russia wished to challenge NATO, it could deploy "little green men"—soldiers or intelligence officers in disguise or unmarked uniforms—to Poland or the Baltics in an attempt to sow confusion and shape opinion in Moscow's favor, as it did in Crimea in 2014. It could then send in lethal conventional forces, which could rapidly seize ground, dig in, and set up a formidable defensive position. Threatened or real nuclear attacks designed to knock back any conventional counterattack that U.S. and NATO forces might launch in defense of their allies would seal the deal. Moscow could, for example, hit key U.S. bases in western Europe or U.S. flotillas in the Atlantic. Washington would be left with a simple choice: a **settlement or a major nuclear war.** China has been more restrained than Russia in its nuclear buildup, but it is also developing modern, nuclear-capable forces that could be used in a regional conflict, such as the DF-21 and DF-26 ballistic missiles. These are just the type of weapons China would need to **checkmate the United States in Asia**. In the event that it wanted to force the Taiwan question or dictate the terms of a settlement of territorial disputes with Japan, Beijing could rely on its newfound wealth and power to politically isolate one of these states. If the situation escalated, **China's conventional forces could try to seize Taiwan or the disputed territories and prepare to block an effective response from U.S. and allied troops.** If this didn't prove enough, **China's increasingly accurate and flexible nuclear forces could hit U.S. air and naval bases** in the western Pacific, testing how far the United States would be willing to go in defense of its allies and partners. The bottom line is that if the United States wants to sustain its alliance architecture in Europe and Asia, it must adapt its strategy to face an opponent prepared to escalate with nuclear weapons. GETTING THE THREAT RIGHT Above all, this requires jettisoning **the outdated assumptions that** continue to shape current debates on U.S. nuclear strategy. On one side are the doves, who argue that nuclear war simply cannot be limited or controlled and **that the specter of nuclear devastation is enough to deter a major war.** The key, as they see it, is to make sure that no one thinks otherwise and to avoid rocking the boat lest things get out of hand. In the meantime, all the United States needs to deter Russia or China is a relatively small arsenal of nuclear weapons with little purpose other than to destroy highly valued but unprotected targets such as cities. This threat is enough, the argument goes, pro-vied that all parties maintain powerful but carefully constrained conventional forces and avoid unnecessary skirmishes. This line of reasoning has influential supporters. In 2012, a study group chaired by James Cartwright, the former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concluded that "there is no conceivable situation in the contemporary world" in which a nuclear attack would be in the United States' or Russia's interest. The group's report urged the United States to reduce its nuclear arsenal substantially and eliminate its tactical nuclear weapons altogether. In the same vein, a letter signed this year by former Secretary of Defense William Perry and other heavy-weights contended, "It is unlikely that there is such a thing as a limited nuclear war; preparing for one is folly." Unfortunately, this view **ignores the incentives that U.S. foes would face in a war and the evidence about how they would likely behave.** Russia and, to a lesser extent, China field increasingly accurate, lower-yield nuclear weapons that would add little in an all-out nuclear conflagration but would be **useful in a limited nuclear exchange.** It appears that **they believe that limited nuclear escalation is possible—and that it may even represent their winning move against the United States.** This shouldn't come as a surprise to Washington. **The risks of nuclear brinkmanship may be enormous, but so is the payoff from gaining a nuclear advantage over an opponent.** Nuclear weapons are, after all, **the ultimate trump card:** if you can convince your enemy that you have a way to play the card and are **actually prepared to go through with it, nothing is more powerful.** And **the best way to do that is to have palatable options for the limited and effective use of nuclear weapons.** Americans should know: they **perfected this**

approach against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The doves' strategy, however, would leave the United States without any means to do this, encouraging adversaries to exploit this gap and making war—including nuclear war—more likely.

### Conventional conflicts with Russia and China go nuclear---Russia will attempt to escalate to deescalate, and China fears a legitimacy crisis.

Kevin P. Chilton 17. Retired Former commander, US Strategic Command. "On US Nuclear Deterrence." *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 11(4): 2-14.

Between the United States and Russia the credibility of each respective deterrent force is well understood. Both face an existential threat to this day, which is held at bay by similar stakes and risks. The strategic nuclear relationship is stable because there is no huge imbalance in strategic forces, nor is there a particular vulnerability either side has that would invite the other to strike first. This is the essence of strategic stability. Consequently, there is not a single day that our adversaries wake up and calculate that it would be a good day to launch a nuclear attack on the United States or its allies. However, a change in Russia's declaratory nuclear policy in the past few years may in fact reflect a lowered threshold for the first use of a nuclear weapon in an otherwise conventional theater conflict for the first time since the Cold War. Russia's new declaratory policy is to threaten to escalate to limited nuclear use to coerce Western capitulation in a conventional conflict they see as not going in their favor and to actually launch limited nuclear strikes for this reason if necessary. The Russians may have always thought this way, but now they have declared it. This expectation of advantage from coercive nuclear threats or use could potentially lead to future miscalculation on the part of the Russians about how the United States might respond. Russian President Putin has boasted that he could have Russian troops in five NATO capitals in two days. So, here is a hypothetical miscalculation: After early success in a conflict initiated by invading Russian forces against NATO forces in the Baltic states, the Russians find themselves on the defensive and in retreat. It would seem reasonable that they would consider using the low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons that they are currently fielding to stand firm in their declaratory policy of "escalate to de-escalate," in the belief that the United States would not respond with higher collateral-damage nuclear weapons because it no longer has similar low-yield weapons in its inventory. But this is precisely what the United States might feel it has to do to preserve the long-term credibility of the nuclear deterrent and commitment to the alliance. Clearly we must address the potential for such Russian miscalculation. Unlike Russia, China has declared a no-first-use policy. But if read carefully, the policy is rife with caveats and exceptions that suggest in a losing position in a conventional fight they too would consider nuclear first use. History teaches that various dynasties throughout China's history have typically collapsed not from external invasion but from internal revolt. It would stand to reason given China's current military power and its weaker neighbors (arguably with the exception of Russia), the most likely threat to the sustainment of the current dynasty (the Communist Party) is from internal revolt. In most of the last century, the unifying factor in post-World War II China was Communist ideology and the deified figure of Mao Tse-tung. Today, no one in China wears Mao suits or carries his little red book. Today, there appears to be a fervent rise in nationalism encouraged by the Communist Party. The party is not deified. Instead, pride in the party's promise ("We are back—150 years of shame are behind us. We are a great power and a great nation. We not only deserve but demand and command respect")

may be the underpinning of the Communist Party's legitimacy. So here is another hypothetical miscalculation: one could envision that if China were to find itself in a conflict with the United States in a fight over the South China Sea, it would consider crossing the nuclear threshold to prevent defeat and the prospect of being "dethroned" by its own populace should the Potemkin village of its promises be realized. And, further, might they calculate (or miscalculate) that the United States would not dare cross the threshold in response out of fear of a Chinese nuclear attack on the US mainland?

### The plan makes the world safe for conventional war---flips miscalc and causes nuke escalation.

Jennifer Bradley 15. Analyst, Deterrence Analysis Plans Support group, United States Strategic Command in the Plans and Policy Directorate; Analyst, National Institute for Public Policy. "Increasing Uncertainty: The Dangers of Relying on Conventional Forces for Nuclear Deterrence." Air & Space Power Journal, July-August.

[https://www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Volume-29\\_Issue-4/V-Bradley.pdf](https://www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Volume-29_Issue-4/V-Bradley.pdf)

How then did China react to the NPR's call to reduce US reliance on nuclear weapons and invest in conventional capabilities to bridge that gap in America's security needs? Chinese civilian and military strategists have regularly and consistently communicated their concern about a US conventional attack negating China's strategic deterrent prior to the US release of the NPR in 2010.<sup>37</sup> After publication of that document, Chinese analysts suggested that the US decision to invest in conventional capabilities such as CPGS was part of the United States' desire to seek "absolute security" and maintain its military supremacy. Chinese analysts fear that these advanced conventional capabilities designed by the United States to meet its nuclear deterrence needs are not constrained by the "nuclear taboo" and, in fact, are more usable.<sup>38</sup> The Chinese believe that the very usability of advanced conventional weapons designed to perform a deterrence role actually undermines nuclear deterrence and causes other nations to rely more on their nuclear weapons arsenals because they cannot compete with the United States conventionally. Chinese analysts also fear a global conventional-weapons arms race, and some analysts warn that "a world free of nuclear weapons may open the door to the resumption of a large-scale conventional war."<sup>39</sup> The most worrisome development from China comes from The Science of Military Strategy (December 2013), published to inform Chinese military professionals of how the "People's Liberation Army (PLA) perceives military development in China and around the world" and to offer a framework for the PLA to address them.<sup>40</sup> In that publication, the authors outline China's concern that its limited nuclear force is vulnerable to a first strike that would negate any ability to execute a retaliatory strike. To address this issue, the authors suggest that China may decide to launch on warning of an impending nuclear attack.<sup>41</sup> Such a decision increases the possibility of an accidental nuclear launch, given the difficulties in characterizing the type of incoming attack or the dangers of a malfunction in the early warning system. Finally, the NPR repeatedly calls for the need to promote strategic stability with China. However, although that concept has been used in the context of nuclear relations for decades, it has no common, universally accepted definition.<sup>42</sup> Further, it also means that China's concept of what constitutes strategic stability may be different than that of the United States, possibly leading to a misunderstanding. Chinese scholars have recognized this disconnect, noting that US "experts have not given serious

consideration to what the true meaning of strategic stability is, and have not adequately prepared to achieve strategic stability with China.”<sup>43</sup> Although it is not the only component of strategic stability, the Chinese perceive changes in the US nuclear posture as a threat to that stability.<sup>44</sup> Specifically, Chinese analysts have repeatedly insisted that US advanced conventional capabilities, including CPGS coupled with ballistic missile defense, represent a direct threat to China’s secure second-strike capabilities. Therefore, Chinese analysts perceive a major contradiction in the NPR. “Advocacy for military capabilities that are seen to be detrimental to strategic stability in the same document that promotes strategic stability ultimately represents a circular logic” that if not addressed will make it difficult for China to participate in talks meant to promote strategic stability.<sup>45</sup> Implications for Nuclear Deterrence A gulf exists between how the United States and Russia/China view the value of nuclear weapons. These adversarial perceptions are well documented, predating the development and release of the NPR, but were not taken into account during drafting of the new policy. The US decision to rely less on nuclear weapons to meet its national security needs, instead bridging the gap with advanced conventional capabilities, did not have the desired effect on our adversaries. Instead of inspiring confidence, it reinforced some of their worst fears. The NPR overstated the improvement in US-Russia relations, and the US declaration that Russia was not an enemy did not consider how Russia viewed the relationship. Failure to take into account that country’s deep-seated suspicion of the United States invalidated the NPR’s assumption that improved ties would allow the United States to rely less on nuclear weapons. Further, US policy and Russian policy do not agree on the usability of nuclear weapons. The US desire to decrease the role of nuclear weapons and compensate with conventional weapons suggests that US policy makers do not feel that nuclear weapons are usable. However, this perception contrasts with Russia’s nuclear doctrine and statements, which have been consistent for well over a decade, that these weapons are quite usable. These differences are further emphasized as the United States debates unilateral reduction in nuclear capabilities while Russia violates a landmark arms-control treaty to increase the types and capabilities of its nuclear arsenal to gain a strategic advantage.<sup>46</sup> This situation creates a dangerous divide that has the potential for miscalculation and deterrence failure. Both Russia and China are concerned with US use of advanced conventional capabilities in a strategic manner to negate their nuclear deterrent. According to the NPR, the United States has the strongest conventional capabilities in the world and an alliance system that further augments those capabilities. America has also demonstrated its willingness to use conventional power repeatedly over the last 25 years. The very usability of conventional precision-strike weapons capable of creating effects once reserved only for nuclear forces undermines deterrence by creating or reinforcing perceptions in our adversaries that their nuclear forces are vulnerable and that the United States may have an incentive to strike them. Both China and Russia are reevaluating their nuclear doctrines and relying more on nuclear weapons to counter this perceived threat. Conclusion From nuclear weapons’ pinnacle of importance at the end of the Cold War to today, the United States has steadily decreased the attention paid to its nuclear arsenal and strategy, but nuclear deterrence has not decreased in its overall importance. It is clear that our adversaries place much more value in their nuclear arsenals than does the United States, precisely to deter America’s unmatched conventional power. The US decision to rely more on conventional weapons to achieve nuclear deterrence has created dangerous potential for miscalculation in its deterrent relationships with Russia and

China. The United States has fallen into a “mirror imaging” trap by assuming that other nations place the same low value on nuclear weapons that it does and that they have the same priority of reaching “Global Zero.” The Obama administration has even gone so far as to recommend unilateral nuclear reductions, which were made outside arms-control negotiations with Russia.<sup>47</sup> Part of this policy is that other nuclear-armed nations will follow the US example and choose to reduce the size of their nuclear arsenal. This assumption does not take into account how our opponents interpret their security environment and the role that nuclear weapons play in safeguarding their interests. Relations with other nuclear powers have been fairly cooperative and benign since the end of the Cold War. Crises that arose were managed, and peaceful solutions have been negotiated, contributing to the mistaken belief that nuclear weapons are no longer relevant. However, could it be that those weapons encourage leaders to be benign and cooperative?<sup>48</sup> In 1946 J. Robert Oppenheimer reflected that “it did not take atomic weapons to make man want peace. But the atomic bomb was the turn of the screw. It has made the prospect of war unendurable.”<sup>49</sup> That is, far from being unusable, nuclear weapons are used every day to encourage compromise in international relations because failure to compromise may lead to the unthinkable. In drafting the NPR, the US government failed to consider the perceptions of our adversaries or to tailor strategy to the unique threat that each poses. As we have pointed out, deterrence is a psychological function in the mind of the adversary. Failure to acknowledge and account for how our enemies view their security environment, their relationship with the United States, their unique history and culture, or the value they place on nuclear weapons to meet their security needs has made our deterrence relationships potentially less stable. Increasing our emphasis on conventional weapons that adversaries view as more usable and a threat to their nuclear arsenals has caused them to feel insecure. To counter this trend, they have modernized and increased the size of their arsenals and rely more on nuclear weapons to meet their security needs. Nuclear deterrence has always been a risky proposition, and the fact that it has not failed in the past 70 years may have as much to do with our deterrence strategy as plain luck. But as risky as relying on nuclear deterrence is, it is still the “least bad” option and has not lost its relevance. Therefore, it is important that we strive to understand our adversaries as we develop and implement our nuclear-deterrent strategies so that we do not undermine its effectiveness. Nuclear deterrence may be much more fragile than any of us realize. It is imperative that we do not take the “nuclear taboo” for granted by assuming that our adversaries place the same value on the relevance of nuclear weapons that we do.

### Turns case---hallow promises increase the risk of miscalc.

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Nuclear no first-use policies are often seen as a quick and cheap pathway to nuclear restraint. But even assuming all nuclear countries would be ready to adopt them without diminishing their security (which most do

not believe is feasible today, and even if all of them did in good faith, it is hard to see how a global no-first-use would stabilise anything. It takes only a few seconds to reverse such a policy. During a crisis, anticipations of reversal might aggravate, rather than dampen, the risks of escalation.

### Ambiguity is net-better---adversaries are used to it.

Christopher Ford 11. Senior Director for WMD and Counterproliferation, National Security Council, "The Catch-22 of NFU", Hudson Institute, <https://www.hudson.org/research/9109-the-catch-22-of-nfu>

By this logic, anyone who fundamentally dislikes and distrusts us might still be relied upon usefully to fear our nuclear weaponry, because they would never believe our NFU sincerity in the first place. At the same time, however, the fact that an American NFU pledge might be believed by at least some other countries could win us diplomatic kudos and improve our nuclear disarmament "street cred." This argument, in effect, seeks to put us in the position of the Soviet Union in the days when it sought to reap diplomatic benefits by merely pretending to have an NFU policy or, arguably, in the position of China or India today. Yet even if one were willing to endorse an approach of such cynical dishonesty when it comes to grave matters of public policy concerning the potential incineration of millions of persons which I am not I worry that such a too-clever-by-half approach could have undesirable side effects. The propagandistic approach to NFU already presumes that potential adversaries wouldn't credit a declaratory policy of unqualified restraint in the first place. But how credulous would third parties really be, or remain? How long could we maintain the fiction that one were truly serious about NFU? And what might it do to deterrence, in a more general sense, to adopt a policy built on the implicit assumption that what we say cannot always be trusted? There is a role for signaling in deterrence, and in fact, most of deterrence could be thought of as an exercise in signaling intentions and capabilities in such as way as to convince a potential adversary that aggression would be unprofitable and dangerous. Deliberate ambiguity can play a role in this, as can efforts to convey clarity and resolution. Indeed, dishonesty can even be an important part of the process, in the sense that one might claim to be and want an opponent to believe one is more resolute than one actually feels. But dishonest positions, in this regard, are useful only to the extent that they are in fact given credence. This is one danger of a blatantly propagandistic NFU strategy: being seen to be duplicitous may undermine one's ability to use signaling (including sending false signals!) in other respects when one really needs to. What if, for instance, one wanted to send a truthful signal of one's own likely restraint e.g., as part of an effort to tamp down the escalatory dynamics of an action-response cycle in a crisis but had become known for sending false signals of likely restraint in the past, pursuant to NFU propaganda games? I don't want to overplay this "distrust" objection, for I think the strongest reason to eschew the disingenuous "have our cake and eat it too" approach to NFU is instead a moral one. Potential nuclear war is too serious a business for us to make propagandistic games man ship the basis of our declaratory policy. With regard to practical consequences, the sky doubtless would not immediately fall if we took such an approach. The Soviets had a propaganda-based NFU posture for years, after all, and some observers today question the foundations of the Chinese and Indian pledges. Deterrence did not fail for them just because they advanced a NFU policy that others only half believed. (If we worried about NFU undercutting the "extended" nuclear deterrence we offer our allies in the face of regional and sometimes non-nuclear threats, I suppose we could privately reassure our allies that we didn't really mean it in the first place and that we don't think their adversaries believe us either. If one has the stomach for such things, cynical NFU pronouncements no doubt provide endless opportunities for deviousness.) Nevertheless, acquiring a reputation for dishonesty in deterrent signaling games could at some point be perilous, and I'm not sure one would get enough propaganda benefit from a duplicitous NFU posture to outweigh the potential risk from entering some future nuclear crisis with a credibility problem.

## **Pro Contention Answers**

## Crisis Stability Answers

NFU fails—it devolves crisis-management to conventional forces which are never in parity

Lanoszka and Scherer 2018

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“Nuclear ambiguity, no-first-use, and crisis stability in asymmetric crises” <https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/abs/10.1080/10736700.2018.1430552>

At first glance, the case for NFU appears strong. Advocates argue that NFU enhances crisis stability by reducing incentives for a pre-emptive first strike. In a forceful exposition of the pro-NFU position, Michael S. Gerson claims that AFU is both unnecessary for the security challenges facing the United States today and dangerous because it undermines crisis stability through multiple pathways.<sup>9</sup> As evidence, NFU supporters point to Saddam Hussein’s decision making in the early 1990s to highlight the dangers of issuing nuclear threats. They claim that US nuclear threats led Saddam to undertake policies that risked inadvertent escalation during the 1991 Gulf War.<sup>10</sup>

From examining the reasoning and evidence, we argue that both the benefits of NFU and the dangers of AFU may be overstated, at least concerning crisis stability—that is the danger of escalation—in asymmetric crises. These crises are those that unfold between pairs of states that feature greatly disparate military capabilities, such as the United States, on the one hand, and Iraq or North Korea, on the other. Asymmetrical conditions may apply to the United States and Russia given the former’s relative superiority in its conventional and nuclear arsenal.<sup>11</sup> We do not believe that these conditions apply to China, which appears increasingly able to compete with the United States in the conventional military sphere. We find that each of the destabilizing pathways attributed to AFU—the downward spiral, accidental war, and a use-it-or-lose-it mentality—involves inconsistencies or questionable assumptions about state behavior. Briefly put, US conventional military superiority can “destabilize” asymmetric crises in the same manner as AFU, thereby making US nuclear doctrine moot. Empirically, we find little evidence supporting the alleged danger of AFU. Saddam Hussein’s risk-taking actions in the Gulf War had less to do with US nuclear threats and more to do with Iraq’s pre-existing military policy.

## Norm Answers

### **Norm arguments are false; other countries won't**

Josh Rogin August 14, 2016 [https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/allies-unite-to-block-an-obama-legacy/2016/08/14/cdb8d8e4-60b9-11e6-8e45-477372e89d78\\_story.html?utm\\_campaign=Defense%20EBB%2008-15-16&utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_source=Sailthru&utm\\_term=.98a2100e9a00](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/allies-unite-to-block-an-obama-legacy/2016/08/14/cdb8d8e4-60b9-11e6-8e45-477372e89d78_story.html?utm_campaign=Defense%20EBB%2008-15-16&utm_medium=email&utm_source=Sailthru&utm_term=.98a2100e9a00)

U.S. allies unite to block Obama's nuclear 'legacy'

**Moreover, allied governments don't believe that a unilateral "no first use" declaration would necessarily help to establish an international norm, because there's no guarantee that other countries would follow suit. They also believe that nuclear weapons play a role in deterring chemical and biological attacks.**

### **Trump would hate the aff—he'd lashout in a way that wrecks the signal of the aff**

**Bernstein 17** (Jonathan, Columnist @ Bloomberg News, 2/24, "Commentary: The dangers of having a weak president," <http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-donald-trump-weak-president-dangerous-20170224-story.html>)

Since Trump tends to lash out when losing, he remains a danger to democracy even if he is weakened, Ezra Klein argues. He could do plenty of lashing out in ways that tend to de-legitimize important democratic institutions such as the courts, Congress, the media and political parties.

On the other hand: As Politico's Tara Palmeri reports, while Trump needs to be carefully managed in order to keep him from saying and doing inappropriate things, it's not especially difficult to manipulate him. Former campaign staff explain that Trump merely needed to be fed a constant diet of positive news clips, easily generated from friendly news outlets, in order to keep him from his worst instincts. What's striking is how easy the process sounds: Trump needs good reviews, but is satisfied even if they appear in the Republican-aligned media which virtually every normal politician would discount as validation. And since, beyond the cable news networks he obsessively monitors, he doesn't search out information on his own, his staff can control what he reads. Does this mean

Trump isn't really a danger? Well, no. And not only because we know he can, as Klein points out, poison the public sphere with illiberal comments. For one thing, presidential weakness is bad for the nation. Without a strong president to push hard on executive branch departments and agencies, they're liable to atrophy. It's not that individual bureaucrats aren't capable and well-meaning; many of them are. But bureaucratic incentives can lead agencies to ignore pressing problems, especially new ones, if they're not prodded.

And those who can be tempted by laziness or flat-out corruption will be more likely to give in to that temptation when the agency isn't being challenged to fulfill presidential requests (or if it feels safe to ignore them). President Trump criticized the news media and denounced the use of anonymous sources during his speech at the Conservative Political Action Conference, Feb. 24, 2017 (C-SPAN) For another,

presidents who get frustrated because they can't get Congress, the courts or even the executive branch to do what they want may turn to those within the presidential branch (that is, the White House staff and other agencies within the Executive Office of the President) to do their bidding. That's the story of Watergate, in which a president attempted to use those who would follow his orders to do things that normally take persuasion. It's not clear how big a threat that may be with President Bluff and Bluster, who rarely seems interested in following up on any of his threats. But it's possible. More likely, however, is the possibility that one or another faction within the administration will be able to manipulate the president into doing something destructive, or carry out big policy initiatives without his knowledge.

The former is the story of the George W. Bush administration's Iraq policy; the latter, Iran-Contra. That's particularly a problem given the seemingly random way in

which Trump hires people, meaning that there are plenty of odd agendas floating around the presidential branch (fewer now, to be sure, with Michael Flynn gone) and among his executive branch appointees. With an influential president, odd agendas aren't a huge problem, and can even be a plus in that they can work against groupthink and complacency. **With a weak president, however, ambitious or reckless people with crackpot ideas may run wild, with potentially catastrophic outcomes. All of these are threats to the nation.** All have subsets which are potential threats to democratic government.

## Miscalculation Answers

### Best models prove crisis stability theory incorrect – imbalances are more likely to cause war and superiority prevents it

Matthew Kroenig 1/25/18 -- Associate Professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters, Oxford University Press, pages 127-133

We begin in this chapter with a discussion of strategic stability. Many nuclear deterrence theorists and policy advocates have argued for decades that nuclear superiority has a glaring downside: it increases the risk of nuclear war.<sup>1</sup> They argue that the nuclear balance of power is most stable when both states possesses a secure, second-strike capability and rough nuclear parity. In this condition, they argue, neither state has an incentive to intentionally launch a nuclear war. The acquisition of a military nuclear advantage, however, is “destabilizing” and may give both states new incentives to contemplate nuclear first use. Clearly, the benefits of nuclear superiority demonstrated to this point might pale in comparison to the increased risk of suffering a devastating nuclear exchange. This raises a key question: does nuclear superiority undermine strategic stability?

This chapter examines the question in detail and finds that this conventional wisdom is incorrect. It argues that nuclear superiority likely contributes to greater levels of strategic stability. Moreover, it maintains that traditional arguments about strategic stability fail to differentiate between good instability, that which might favor US interests, and bad instability, which works to the disadvantage of Washington and its allies. When this distinction is taken into account, we see that US superiority enhances positive instability and dampens negative instability. In short, strategic stability should be listed among the benefits, not the possible costs, of an American nuclear advantage.

The rest of the chapter continues in four parts. First, it reviews the conventional wisdom about strategic stability that exists in some policy advocacy circles. Second, it turns to international relations scholarship on the causes of war to examine the existing state of knowledge about imbalances in military power and war. Third, it conducts an examination of the logic of traditional strategic stability arguments in the nuclear-specific context. Fourth, it examines the existing empirical evidence on the nuclear balance of power and escalation risks. Finally, the chapter concludes with a review of the findings and their implications for the central argument of the book.

#### Strategic Stability: The Conventional Wisdom

Stability may be the most discussed and possibly defined concept in the policy community. In the broadest sense, it means an absence of strategic instability, for example, Thomas Schelling begins by writing, “What then questions on approaching this volume was, ‘What is strategic stability?’”<sup>2</sup> Stability clearly has a positive valence and instability a negative one, as given the choice in the abstract, most people would intuitively choose stability. For this reason, policy advocates often parity precept by arguing that their preferred course of action would contribute to stability and their opponent’s policies would be “destabilizing.” As the Schelling quote demonstrates, however, what precisely is meant by stability and how various policy proposals contribute to it, is not always entirely clear. Stability has been variously used to mean peace, a lack of tension in bilateral relations, the absence of an arms race, the absence of pressure to escalate a crisis, and just about everything else other than conflict and strife.

Fortunately for our purposes, we have been more careful in defining these terms, and we will base our analysis on these more concrete concepts. In international relations scholarship, stability generally means the absence of war among great powers.<sup>3</sup> Stability factors, therefore, are those that reduce the probability of great power war. Similarly, in the nuclear policy realm, the closest definition of strategic stability is a situation in which nuclear-armed states lack incentives to intentionally launch a nuclear first strike against a nuclear-armed state. Policies that reduce nuclear first-strike incentives, therefore, are considered to be stabilizing, and those that increase the risk of nuclear war are destabilizing. (More on stability, another possible definition of strategic stability, is considered in the next chapter).

The origins of the term “strategic stability,” like much else in this field, can be traced to the first generation of American nuclear strategists. Morris DeGress was dropped, defense intellectuals like Bernard Brodie realized that nuclear weapons, due to their massive destructive capabilities, had the potential to deter great power war.<sup>4</sup> They also believed that the development of nuclear forces in both the United States and the Soviet Union could lead to a broader international stability due to the symmetrical balance of terror between the superpowers.

Shortly thereafter, however, the RAND analyst Alfred Wohlgemuth pointed out that the balance of terror may be more “destabilizing” than believed.<sup>5</sup> In what began as a bitter debate within the US Department of Defense, Wohlgemuth began to worry that the US bomber force would be vulnerable to a Soviet nuclear first strike. He thought that if Moscow thought that it could get away with a successful nuclear first strike against the United States’ primary means of delivery, then it might be tempted to do so. Wohlgemuth’s study prompted a panel among US defense officials and analysts, who feared that the Soviet Union might be inclined to launch a nuclear surprise attack on American strategic forces. To avert this fate, Washington’s immediate response was to alter its nuclear plans to ensure that its strategic-bomber force could be alerted quickly in a crisis if Moscow armed aircraft got off the ground before the initiation of any hostilities, then the Soviet Union would not be able to destroy them en masse and in hangars at a small number of air bases in Europe or the Soviet Union. Moreover, American leaders had the option of destroying all of their strategic bombers in a single, all-out nuclear war.

In subsequent years, the United States took additional steps to ensure a survivable nuclear force, including burying delivery weapons on ICBS in hardened silos and submarine at sea. Indeed, these steps to ensure the survivability of the force hopefully to us the nuclear threat that forms the backbone of US nuclear posture to this day.

Given this experience, it was not a large logical leap for some US analysts to assume that Moscow might have similar fears if America ever developed a nuclear capability against the Soviet Union, then Moscow might panic and respond in ways potentially contrary to American interests. For example, it too might decide to launch its nuclear forces in the early stages of a crisis before they could be destroyed in an American nuclear attack. Many US analysts came to the conclusion, therefore, that there may actually be benefits for the United States to ensure that its nuclear forces were also survivable against a nuclear war.

It is interesting that this logic of “destabilizing” agrees with the defense planners fearing that their nuclear security compromised in the conventional wisdom. Generally, it is believed that one power can protect itself by increasing military power and reducing vulnerabilities in its opponent’s forces. To ensure its safety as a nuclear war, on the other hand, strategic stability requires reassessing the argument that states are more secure when they possess a nuclear first-strike capability, according to the logic, one needs to consider whether they might be rendered less safe if they are unable to balance power, or otherwise, balance of power. In other words, strategic stability could only be achieved through mutual vulnerability to nuclear war.

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Over the years, the idea that military nuclear advantages might increase the risk of war to further fuel instability, fuel the development of the right to use nuclear weapons in counterforce capacities or limit one’s vulnerability to nuclear war. Quantitative nuclear warfighting, missile warheads, accurate or prompt delivery systems, counterforce doctrine, air power, missile-defense, civil defense, conventional prompt global strike, and hypersonic glide vehicles have all been opposed for this reason in the belief that the very existence of the very elements of a robust nuclear posture that the United States has maintained and pursued are enough to “destabilize” according to strategic stability theory.

These criticisms continue to the present day. For example, in 2010, Michael Gerson argued that the United States should adopt a nuclear “no first use” policy because if it advances fear of a US nuclear first strike, then they might have an incentive to go first, undermining strategic stability.<sup>6</sup> In 2016, Charles Glaser and Daryl Fenton argued that the United States should abandon counterforce strategy for China, because “US damage-limitation capabilities and efforts to prevent and enhance them are likely to create pressure that increase the strategic probability of nuclear war between the United States and China.”<sup>7</sup> In 2017, Zeffirin Tsang argued that Chinese fears of US counterforce strikes could lead to Chinese nuclear retaliation.<sup>8</sup> In the New York Times reported in August 2017 that President Trump’s plan to modernize the US nuclear arsenal could be “destabilizing.”<sup>9</sup> These arguments have always been controversial. Indeed, perhaps the central divide in debate over US strategic policy is often over the question of whether the desired and/or intended outcomes are consistent with the use of the political process. On the one hand, one general finding requires the Department of Defense, the National Security Council, and the White House to work together to make sure that the use of nuclear weapons is consistent with the political process.

Yet, despite these debates, the United States has tried to develop and maintain a robust nuclear force in the face of mounting criticisms from opponents. We see these fights playing out again today as Washington continues to improve its missile defense capabilities, test hypersonic weapons, and undermine its nuclear arsenal in spite of outside pressure to stop.

This then returns us to the central question of the book: Is US nuclear strategy logical? Is Washington increasing the risk of nuclear war in a quest for military strategic advantage? Or is it rather notions of strategic stability themselves that are unusual?

#### International Relations Theory, Causes of War, and Nuclear Strategic Stability

This section explores the concept of strategic stability through the prism of international relations theory. It shows that, contrary to the claims of strategic stability theorists, state-of-the-art international relations research would suggest that nuclear superiority is stabilizing and it is in fact nuclear parity that is destabilizing.

When considering a specific problem, a good international relations scholar will often ask: what is this case of? When trying to understand the ongoing insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan in the mid-2000s, for example, many smart analysts recognized these as cases of the broader phenomenon of interethnic civil war and turned to the academic literature on this subject for guidance.<sup>15</sup> This section makes a similar move. Arguments about military nuclear advantages and nuclear strategic stability are essentially arguments about how the military balance of power affects the likelihood of war. What then does the international relations scholarship tell us about this subject?

International relations scholars have long debated the effects of balances of power or preponderances of power for international stability. Traditional realist arguments have maintained that the balance of power is a near law-like phenomenon in international politics. As Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote, “it maintains itself without effort, in such a manner that if it sinks on one side, it reestablishes itself very soon on the other.”<sup>16</sup> Taking the balance of power as a given, structural realists have theorized about whether different distributions of power balances are more or less stable. Kenneth Waltz, for example, theorized that multipolar worlds, with several great powers, are less stable than bipolar worlds, made up of only two major powers.<sup>17</sup>

Other international relations scholars, however, did not take the balance of power for granted. They theorized that preponderances of power are possible and may be more stabilizing than power balances. In 1973, for example, Geoffrey Blainey famously argued that the fundamental cause of war was in fact disagreements about the balance of power.<sup>18</sup> He argued that in order for two states to choose to go to

**war leaders on both sides must believe that they have at least some shot of winning.** And he argued that both sides were likely to believe they had a shot of winning when they were close to evenly matched.

On the other hand, according to Blainey, a clear preponderance of power is the surest guarantor of peace.

James Fearon has further developed this line of thinking in what has become the dominant theoretical paradigm for understanding international conflict in contemporary international relations theory: the bargaining model of war.<sup>19</sup> Fearon conceives of war, and much of international politics, as a bargaining problem. Two states have a significant disagreement over some issue (whether it be territory, policy, or something else), but fighting a war over the dispute is suboptimal, because wars are costly and states would be destroying some of what they are fighting over. It would be much better to simply come to a negotiated settlement and avoid the costs of conflict. War, therefore, according to Fearon, should be understood as a breakdown in bargaining. He argues that among rational states there are three causes of bargaining failure: private information and incentives to misrepresent that information, issue incommensurability, and problems of credible commitment.

The first cause, private information and incentives to misrepresent, is most relevant to the question of strategic stability. Fearon maintains that if the balance of military power and the balance of resolve were perfectly known, then war would never occur. States would assess the likely outcome of conflict based on which side was stronger and which side cared more about the issue at stake. Then they would cut an appropriate deal that reflected the bargaining power of the two sides as determined by the underlying balances of power and resolve. Rather than fight a costly war in what was bound to be a losing effort, the weaker state would simply concede the contested issue. It would be better off with the bargain than it would be to fight and lose a war only to arrive at a similar outcome. According to this perspective, therefore, in a world with perfect information and rational states, war would never occur. The problem is that states do not have perfect information about the power and resolve of their adversaries, and this can lead to bargaining failure. As Blainey argued decades before, wars result from disagreements about which side will win.

Even the imperfect information problem could be resolved in theory, according to Fearon, because states could simply reveal information about their power and resolve in order to clear up any misperceptions. The problem with this solution, however, is that both sides have an incentive to misrepresent their power and resolve. In order to get the best possible bargain short of war, states have an incentive to portray themselves as more powerful and more willing to fight over the contested issues than they actually are. How many times have leaders promised that "all options are on the table" when they really had no intention of ever using force? This prevents states from accurately revealing true information about their power and resolve and obstructs peaceful resolutions to conflicts. Since all states have an incentive to say they are willing and able to fight if necessary to get their way, their opponents have no way of knowing who is sincere and who is bluffing. So, if a state assumes wrongly that its opponent is bluffing, then bargaining can break down and war can occur even among "rational" states. In sum, according to Fearon, private information about the balance of power and the balance of resolve and incentives to misrepresent that information are a cause of war.

When are states most likely to make mistakes about the balance of power (our focus in this chapter)? Holding other factors constant, war is most likely when there is military parity. When there is a rough balance of power, the outcome of conflict is less certain and bargaining failure more likely. When, on the other hand, there is a clear preponderance of power, the outcome of conflict can be predicted with greater confidence. The more lopsided the balance of power, the less likely states are to misperceive it, and the more likely they will be to reach a bargain short of military conflict.

This theoretical logic has also been supported in recent empirical research. Scholars have consistently shown a tight correlation between rough parity in the balance of power and the frequency of militarized interstate disputes. Contrariwise, imbalances of power are associated with peace.<sup>20</sup> As Douglas Gildor writes in a recent issue of the American Political Science Review, "study after study finds that equally-capable states experience higher rates of conflict."<sup>21</sup>

Bringing this discussion back to the question of strategic stability, therefore, **contemporary international relations theory suggests that a lopsided nuclear superiority should enhance strategic stability and nuclear parity should be destabilizing.** Would China's leaders be more likely to believe that they could prevail in a nuclear conflict with Washington if Beijing possessed 2,000 nuclear weapons capable of reaching the United States, rather than the 65 or so it possesses today?

Intuition would suggest that **they would**, but this is diametrically opposed to the arguments of strategic stability theorists. This suggests either that traditional arguments about strategic stability are mistaken, or that nuclear conflict operates according to its own special logic. It has been argued, for example, the high cost of nuclear war convinces leaders facing a nuclear-armed opponent that they have no shot of winning at an acceptable cost, thus eliminating uncertainty about the balance of power. This is plausible, but it is not the case made by strategic stability theorists. Rather, strategic stability theorists argue the exact opposite. They claim that nuclear-armed states may intentionally choose to start nuclear wars with nuclear-armed states when there is an imbalance of nuclear power. As we will see in the next section, this argument does not hold up under interrogation, even in a nuclear specific context.

## Strategic ambiguity is not destabilizing---risks are overstated

Alexander Lanoszka **18**, Ph.D. from Princeton, Assistant professor of Political Science at University of Waterloo, Thomas Leo Scherer, Ph.D. from Princeton in politics, program Officer at the US Institute of Peace, 02-06-18, "Nuclear ambiguity, no first use, and crisis stability in asymmetric crises," The Nonproliferation Review,  
[https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Alexander\\_Lanoszka/publication/322962076\\_Nuclear\\_ambiguity\\_no-first-use\\_and\\_crisis\\_stability\\_in\\_asymmetric\\_crises/links/5a7d62570f7e9b9da8d78aa2/Nuclear-ambiguity-no-first-use-and-crisis-stability-in-asymmetric-crises.pdf](https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Alexander_Lanoszka/publication/322962076_Nuclear_ambiguity_no-first-use_and_crisis_stability_in_asymmetric_crises/links/5a7d62570f7e9b9da8d78aa2/Nuclear-ambiguity-no-first-use-and-crisis-stability-in-asymmetric-crises.pdf))

In statements since his successful presidential campaign, Donald J. Trump has embraced calculated ambiguity regarding the conditions under which his administration might use nuclear weapons.<sup>1</sup> This ambiguity is standard in the grand sweep of US nuclear strategy. Still, Trump's approach differs from his predecessor's in some ways. While in office, President Barack Obama called for a nuclear-weapons-free world and committed to the reduction of US nuclear weapons in speeches delivered in Prague in 2009 and Berlin in 2013, respectively. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) announced that the United States "will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT [1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations," thereby suggesting it retains the right to introduce nuclear weapons in conflicts involving nuclear-armed states, such as North Korea.<sup>2</sup> This NPR pledge meant that US leaders forswore the use of nuclear weapons in situations other than "to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners" in "extreme circumstances."<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, despite stopping short of "a universal policy" whereby "deterring nuclear attack is the sole

purpose of nuclear weapons,” the 2010 NPR stated that the Obama administration “will work to establish conditions under which such a policy could be safely adopted.”

Toward the end of his presidency, rumors circulated that Obama was contemplating adoption of a nuclear no-first-use (NFU) policy, but, like every previous administration, the Obama administration ultimately did not adopt NFU.<sup>5</sup> The Trump administration seems to prefer renewing the United States’s longstanding commitment to a flexible declaratory policy. Yet, even though its adoption appears improbable, NFU is still discussed in policy circles. Amid worries over the fitness of President Trump, Democratic House Representative Adam Smith (Democrat, Washington) introduced a bill to establish an NFU policy in November 2017.<sup>6</sup> This bill went even further than the bill that Senator Ed Markey (Democrat, Massachusetts) introduced in the Senate, which would have forbidden the conduct of a first-use nuclear strike absent a declaration of war by Congress.<sup>7</sup> Trump’s preference for a flexible declaratory policy may worry those who fear inadvertent nuclear escalation and the spread of nuclear weapons, which they had hoped to counter with an NFU policy in place. Yet how valid are these arguments? Would a renewal of what we call an ambiguous first-use (AFU) declaratory policy be destabilizing? Setting aside issues of norms and symbolic politics, what are the potential risks of an AFU policy?<sup>8</sup> Specifically, what difference would it make if Trump’s NPR renounces the qualifications upon nuclear use articulated in the 2010 NPR?

At first glance, the case for NFU appears strong. Advocates argue that NFU enhances crisis stability by reducing incentives for a pre-emptive first strike. In a forceful exposition of the pro-NFU position, Michael S. Gerson claims that AFU is both unnecessary for the security challenges facing the United States today and dangerous because it undermines crisis stability through multiple pathways.<sup>9</sup> As evidence, NFU supporters point to Saddam Hussein’s decision making in the early 1990s to highlight the dangers of issuing nuclear threats. They claim that US nuclear threats led Saddam to undertake policies that risked inadvertent escalation during the 1991 Gulf War.

From examining the reasoning and evidence, we argue that both the benefits of NFU and the dangers of AFU may be overstated, at least concerning crisis stability—that is, the danger of escalation—in asymmetric crises. These crises are those that unfold between pairs of states that feature greatly disparate military capabilities, such as the United States, on the one hand, and Iraq or North Korea, on the other. Asymmetrical conditions may apply to the United States and Russia given the former’s relative superiority in its conventional and nuclear arsenal.<sup>11</sup> We do not believe that these conditions apply to China, which appears increasingly able to compete with the United States in the conventional military sphere. We find that each of the destabilizing pathways attributed to AFU—the downward spiral, accidental war, and a use-it-or-lose-it mentality—involves inconsistencies or questionable assumptions about state behavior. Briefly put, US conventional military superiority can “destabilize” asymmetric crises in the same manner as AFU, thereby making US nuclear doctrine moot.

Empirically, we find little evidence supporting the alleged danger of AFU. Saddam Hussein’s risk-taking actions in the Gulf War had less to do with US nuclear threats and more to do with Iraq’s pre-existing military policy.

We remain agnostic about how useful nuclear weapons may be for deterrence, compellence, and other political–military strategies, in an asymmetrical setting or otherwise. Nor do we argue in favor of nuclear ambiguity. We simply argue that the case for NFU—and fears regarding nuclear ambiguity—appear exaggerated. This article proceeds with a review of the NFU debate in the United States. We then critically review the proposed pathways by which an AFU policy is expected to contribute to escalation in an asymmetric crisis or conflict. We address the case evidence NFU advocates use to show that AFU is dangerous: Saddam’s decision making during the Gulf War. We conclude by noting the implications of our study for understanding nuclear policy in the age of Trump as well as for conducting further research.

**No miscalc impact – both sides have to have incentive to escalate even with ambiguous posture, and prefer nukes to conventional escalation which is obviously how people would start conflicts – weak states wont attack even under use it or lose it**

**No escalation from miscalc or instability and conventional weapons cause it just as much**

**Lanoszka 18** [Alexander Lanoszka and Thomas Leo Scherer, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science University of Waterloo, and Program Officer for Economics and Peacebuilding at the U.S. Institute of Peace, “Nuclear ambiguity, no-first-use, and crisis stability in asymmetric crises,” *The Nonproliferation Review*, forthcoming 2019, DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2018.1430552]

#### Proposed pathways of AFU instability

Here we examine how NFU is expected to have salutary effects on asymmetric crisis stability. Following standard treatments of the concept, we define “crisis stability” as a “measure of the countries’ incentives not to preempt in a crisis, that is, not to attack first in order to beat the attack of the enemy.”<sup>27</sup> NFU proponents have argued that “the continued option to use nuclear weapons first risks creating instabilities in a severe crisis that increase the chances of accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate nuclear use.”<sup>28</sup> In examining the assumptions underlying this argument, we find several inconsistencies. NFU advocates have identified three pathways by which an AFU policy creates instability and makes conflict more likely: the downward-spiral pathway, the accidental-war pathway, and the use-it-or-lose-it pathway.<sup>29</sup> There are many paths a nuclear crisis could take, but NFU advocates focus on these because they argue these paths lead to war only with AFU and not with NFU. Below we explain each and scrutinize the validity of their logic in an asymmetric crisis. Here, “major power” refers to the strong state that chooses to adopt NFU (e.g., the United States), whereas “adversary” refers to the weaker opponent.

Our assessment relies on three assumptions. First, we do not assume complete information; we examine beliefs the weak adversary must have in order for the pathway to be possible, regardless of objective circumstances. Second, we assume that NFU is credible to the adversary and dutifully implemented by the major power. Third, we treat each pathway as a specific sequence of decisions designed to best capture the concerns of NFU advocates. For example, in our use-it-or-lose-it pathway, we assume the weak adversary decides whether to attack and the major power cannot strike first, whereas, in the downward-spiral pathway, we assume the major power decides whether to attack based on the adversary’s actions.

#### The downward spiral

The first pathway that makes AFU dangerous arises from features of the classic security dilemma through the “spiral model.” In the downward-spiral pathway, the adversary pursues measures to increase its strategic capabilities because it fears a first strike by a nuclear-armed major power. These measures can include a launch-on-warning posture, raising alert levels, or pre-delegating launch authority. The adversary intends for these actions to deter a nuclear first

strike by reducing the major power's ability to eliminate the adversary's strategic capabilities outright. Although defensive motives underlie these actions, the major power may misinterpret these actions as preparations for an offensive strike.<sup>30</sup> Apprehensive of an imminent attack, the major power may proceed with the preemptive attack that the adversary had originally feared. Thus, NFU advocates argue that, if the United States credibly declares NFU, adversaries would be less inclined to take the destabilizing escalatory measures described above. Because ambiguity in military postures may precipitate spiral effects, NFU would clarify US intentions and discourage states from acting upon worst-case assumptions.<sup>31</sup>

In making this argument, NFU proponents must show that the payoffs are such that the major power and the weaker adversary would both have incentives to escalate. Consider the Prisoner's Dilemma, whose incentive structure appears in Table 1. The reason that each prisoner is expected to defect is that this action constitutes the better response to either action undertaken by the other party. By cooperating, for example, a prisoner risks accepting the sucker's payoff if the other chooses to defect.

Now consider a variation of the Prisoner's Dilemma in which each actor faces the choice of whether to adopt a strategic posture that could be perceived as aggressive. Specifically, the major power chooses between adopting AFU and a credible NFU, whereas the adversary chooses whether to adopt measures to increase second-strike capabilities. We assume that the major power is more likely to attack if the adversary adopts those measures to increase second-strike capabilities.

The question then concerns whether the weaker adversary will escalate. This choice depends on the war payoffs, defined as the probability of victory times the value of the prize, minus the cost of war. As we are concerned about a war that neither side desires, we assume that peace payoffs for both sides are greater than any war payoff for either side. The adversary then should only escalate if the additional risk of costly war is offset by improved war payoffs.

Yet two other assertions by NFU supporters suggest that the war payoffs do not vary with the major power's decision to declare NFU or not. The first assertion is that AFU is unnecessary because the United States enjoys such conventional military superiority that it can prevail in any armed conflict without the use of nuclear weapons.<sup>32</sup> The second assertion is that "the threat to use nuclear weapons first may lack credibility in the minds of many current and potential adversaries."<sup>33</sup> AFU lacks credibility to the point that adversaries may feel sure that the major power will not use nuclear weapons. Both assertions imply that the adversary's war payoffs remain unchanged if the major power chooses NFU. By the first assumption, the adversary will lose regardless of nuclear policy thanks to US conventional military superiority. By the second, the adversary has already calculated that nuclear weapons will not be used, again regardless of nuclear policy.

Thus, by the assertions made by NFU advocates, the downward-spiral pathway is not possible. For a rational adversary to take only such survivability measures under AFU, it must believe that these measures are beneficial against a nuclear strike but not against a conventional strike. The downward spiral is only a valid concern if the adversary's payoffs decrease in the event that the major power declares AFU. A scenario that features this payoff structure could be one in which the adversary escalates due to the belief that its forces are more vulnerable to a nuclear strike

than to a non-nuclear strike. In such a case, pre-emption to limit damage may be the best option. However, the destructive power of conventional military weapons (especially in the US arsenal) in the contemporary world makes this scenario debatable. It is thus unclear how the adversary's incentives to escalate should change when facing different nuclear policies.

### Accidental war

The accidental-war pathway resembles the downward-spiral pathway, but it is instead predicated on organizational and human fallibility. In this situation, the adversary takes measures to increase the survivability of its forces and deter an attack by the major power.<sup>34</sup> These measures may include bringing weapons closer to launch by raising their readiness and adopting a launch-on-warning posture, as well as policies to prevent leadership decapitation, such as pre-delegating launch authority. By implementing them, the adversary raises the probability of accidentally launching an attack. This unintentional first strike can occur in the presence of uncoordinated decision making, poor information flows between various government departments, technical failures, or even rogue bureaucratic agents acting without authorization from top leadership.<sup>35</sup> Had the major power credibly declared NFU, the adversary would not undertake the risky measures that could produce the accident.

But, for a rational adversary to take only such survivability measures under AFU, it must believe that these measures are beneficial against a nuclear strike but not against a conventional strike. We can apply the same logic as before, the difference being that the probability of war represents an accidental initiation by the adversary. We can say that AFU may be dangerous, but under conditions of overwhelming conventional superiority we can also say that NFU may be dangerous.

We are not arguing that crisis fears cannot produce accidental war. Other explanations of accidental war are quite compelling, but they differ in two ways from the pathway outlined here.<sup>36</sup> First, the adversary's fear springs not from US nuclear doctrine per se, but rather from US counterforce capabilities. Indeed, growing evidence from the Cold War suggests that the Soviet leaders grew apprehensive of these capabilities in the 1980s.<sup>37</sup> Second, the adversary's measures are able to increase survivability. With these stipulations, the threat of any kind of first strike is dangerous.

### Use-it-or-lose-it

The previous two pathways considered an intentional attack by the major power and an accidental strike by the adversary, but what if the adversary intentionally strikes first? If the adversary is convinced that a major power will attempt a disarming first strike, perhaps with nuclear weapons, an adversary could choose to attack first. This desperate, use-it-or-lose-it attack occurs when the adversary believes that it will suffer similar costs regardless of whether it strikes first. In this scenario, the indifferent adversary becomes just as likely to launch an attack, or perhaps even more likely if it believes it could inflict enough pain to get the major power to stand down. If the major power declares NFU, however, then its adversary would not fear a disarming strike and would not feel the need to use its weapons while it still can.<sup>38</sup>

A hypothetical example true to this pathway highlights the scope conditions. Imagine a weak state deciding whether to use its weapons before it would lose them in a war with a major power. Its choice involves whether to use them. If the adversary uses them, then war occurs. If they are unused, then the major power attacks with some probability less than 1 and again war occurs; otherwise, no conflict occurs. If war has the same payoff for the weak state regardless of whether it attacks first, then the weak state will not attack. Put differently, the use-it-or-lose-it pathway requires that the weak state believe that an attack by the major power is absolutely certain.

The use-it-or-lose-it pathway confronts the same logical problem as the downward-spiral pathway in terms of the assertions made by NFU supporters. If nuclear weapons are unnecessary for the major power to prevail, as some NFU supporters claim, and if AFU lacks credibility such that the adversary disregards it, then why would that same adversary feel pressure to “use it or lose it” against an NFU state and not an AFU state?<sup>39</sup> The argument that AFU is unnecessary contradicts the argument that AFU is dangerous. The weak state is ultimately choosing between likely annihilation if it does not attack first and certain annihilation if it does. Why would it ever choose the certain suicide of the latter remains unclear.<sup>40</sup>

We may suppose that if a weaker adversary believes that it is about to be hit first with nuclear weapons and wiped out, then it may take a chance on striking first to try to inflict pain on the major power in order to compel that major power to back down. But why would the major power back down if the adversary has already expended its arsenal, making it more vulnerable to a devastating riposte? There are cases where the weak state tried to impose costs against a stronger opponent to compel the major power to back down, such as Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War, as we discuss later. However, in these cases, the weaker state does not attempt to impose costs until after the major power has initiated the conflict. Once the conflict has started, the adversary indeed has nothing to lose by attacking, but until then the adversary will have much to lose.

These points raise an interesting question: might a weak state choose to attack first and sacrifice the possibility of better material outcomes for some emotional or psychological utility gained by imposing costs on the major power. Though plausible, such an assumption raises the additional question of whether the state can enjoy this immaterial benefit if it has successfully self-destructed. Similarly, in the event that the state somehow survives the conflict, would it still receive the same benefits?

The use-it-or-lose-it pathway is thus empirically very rare. One study finds that preemptive wars—that is, wars either fought to exploit military advantages before they disappear or caused by fear of surprise attack—“almost never happen.”<sup>41</sup> In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, cases that seem *prima facie* to have been pre-emptive wars were World War I, China’s entry into the Korean War, and the 1967 Arab–Israeli War. Although World War I does not meet the asymmetrical conditions that our analysis emphasizes, it suggests that use-it-or-lose-it pressures embodied by mobilization schedules can exist in a purely conventional world, where nuclear doctrines are absent. Still, the case of the United States and China in 1950 better approximates the asymmetrical conditions explored by our analysis. According to the pre-emptive-war version of events, China intervened in the Korean War out of concern that the US-

led forces moving toward the Yalu River were striving to reunify the peninsula under non-Communist control. By taking over all of Korea, these forces would pose an imminent threat to China's security.<sup>42</sup> Yet Chinese decision makers were not necessarily facing a use-it-or-lose-it conundrum even in this case. Other motivations—promoting the world Communist revolution and forestalling an indefinite US presence on the border—were also present.<sup>43</sup> To be sure, China did go on to acquire nuclear weapons, but the evidence suggests that it did so in order to be self-reliant following its dissatisfaction with the support it was receiving from the Soviet Union during the 1950s.<sup>44</sup>

### US nukes aren't on hair trigger

**Maaroni and Jonas 16** (Al Maaroni and David Jonas, Al Maaroni is the Director of the U.S. Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies. David S. Jonas is a partner at FH+H firm, a DC area national security law firm. He is also an adjunct professor at Georgetown and George Washington University Law Schools where he teaches nuclear nonproliferation law and policy, All Cards on the Table: First-Use of Nuclear Weapons, 7-25-2016 War on the Rocks, <https://warontherocks.com/2016/07/all-cards-on-the-table-first-use-of-nuclear-weapons/>, accessed 7-24-2018)

Writing at War on the Rocks, Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association believes it is time for the United States to take the pledge of no first-use of nuclear weapons, calling a first-use policy part of “dangerous, Cold War-era nuclear thinking” that could lead to early use of nuclear weapons by adversaries such as Russia or China. He decries the possible scenario of “launch under attack” – e.g., a massive U.S. nuclear weapons launch in response to early satellite warnings of an adversarial missile launch – as something that increases the risk of catastrophic accidents or miscalculation between states. While the U.S. military has a “launch under attack” capability, the U.S. government does not have a written policy to “launch on attack” or “launch on warning.” The option is available to the president if he chooses to use it, again under the principle of strategic ambiguity. Since at least 1997, if not earlier, the tendency of U.S. presidents has been to increase the time to make any decision to respond to an attack with nuclear weapons. The president always has the option to not order an attack upon receiving confirmation that another nuclear power is attacking the United States with strategic nuclear forces. U.S. nuclear forces are not on “hair triggers” — evoking an image of Colt pistols set for release at the slightest pressure — that would lead to an accidental launch during an international crisis.

### Multiple checks solve accidental use.

**Kehler 17** — Former Commander of Stratcomm - Retired US Air Force General [Robert Kehler, Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 11/14/17, [https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/111417\\_Kehler\\_Testimony.pdf](https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/111417_Kehler_Testimony.pdf)]

US nuclear forces operate under strict civilian control. Only the President of the United States can authorize the use of US nuclear weapons, and the President's ability to exercise that authority and direction is ensured by the people, procedures, facilities, equipment, and communications capabilities that comprise the Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS). The NCCS has been designed with resilience, redundancy, and survivability to ensure that an adversary cannot hope to neutralize our deterrent by successfully attacking any of its elements and thereby “disconnecting” the President and other civilian and military leaders from one another or from the nuclear forces—even in the most stressing scenarios. These features enhance deterrence and contribute to crisis stability. NCCS capabilities and procedures are designed to enable the authorized use of nuclear weapons while also preventing their unauthorized, accidental, or inadvertent use. Operations and activities involving US nuclear weapons are surrounded by layers of safeguards. While many of the specifics are highly classified, general methods range from personnel screening and monitoring to codes and use controls. In addition, sensors and communications links that contribute to nuclear decision making are specially certified, and tests and exercises are frequently held to validate the performance of both systems and people. Before I retired in late 2013, we had also begun to evaluate networks and systems for potential or actual cyber intrusions. Other factors contribute to

the prevention of unauthorized, inadvertent, or accidental use. “Today’s triad of nuclear forces **is far smaller and postured much less aggressively** than its Cold War ancestor”.<sup>ii</sup> Not only are the long-range bombers and supporting aerial tankers no longer loaded and poised to take off with nuclear weapons (unless ordered back into a nuclear alert configuration), **but ballistic missiles are aimed at open areas** of the ocean. Also, while the possibility of a massive surprise nuclear attack still exists (and must be deterred), **decision time is longer in many other potential nuclear scenarios** that may prove more likely in today’s global security environment.

### The quo is stable---nuke superiority prevents miscalc---conflict only happens when power imbalances emerge.

Matthew Kroenig **18**. Associate Professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. *The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters*. Oxford University Press. 131-142.

Over the years, **the idea that military nuclear advantages might increase the risk of war has come to be applied not only to a perfect first-strike capability but to any development that might improve one’s counterforce capabilities or limit one’s vulnerability to nuclear war**. Quantitative nuclear warhead advantages, MIRV warheads, accurate or prompt delivery systems, counterforce doctrines and policies, missile defenses, civil defenses, conventional prompt global strike, and hypersonic glide vehicles have all been opposed for this reason.<sup>9</sup> In short, **many of the very elements of a robust nuclear posture that the United States has long maintained and pursued are thought to be “destabilizing”** according to strategic stability theorists. These criticisms continue to the present day. For example, in 2010, Michael **Gerson argued that the United States should adopt a nuclear “no first use” policy because if adversaries fear a US nuclear first strike, then they might have an incentive to go first**, undermining strategic stability.<sup>10</sup> In 2016, Charles Glaser and Steve Fetter argued that the United States should abandon a counterforce strategy for China, because “U.S. damage-limitation capabilities and efforts to preserve and enhance them are likely to create pressures that increase . . . the overall probability of nuclear war between the United States and China.”<sup>11</sup> In 2017, Caitlin Talmadge argued that Chinese fears of US counterforce strikes could lead to Chinese nuclear escalation.<sup>12</sup> And The New York Times reported in August 2017 that President Trump’s plans to modernize the US nuclear arsenal could be “destabilizing.”<sup>13</sup> These arguments have always been controversial. Indeed, perhaps the central divide in debates over US strategic policy is often over the question of whether the desired end state is superiority or mutual vulnerability. On the side of vulnerability, one often finds Democrats, the US Department of State, arms control advocacy (p.131) groups, and a majority of international relations scholars (who, it bears noting, also tend to be on the left side of the political spectrum). On the side of superiority, one generally finds Republicans, the US Department of Defense, the national laboratories in the Department of Energy, the defense industry, and right-leaning think-tank experts. Yet, **despite these debates, the United States has tended to develop and maintain a robust nuclear force in the face of unrelenting criticism** from opponents. We see these fights playing out again today as Washington continues to improve its missile defense capabilities, test hypersonic weapons, and modernize its nuclear arsenal in spite of outside pressures to stop.<sup>14</sup> This then returns us to the central question of the book: **is US nuclear strategy illogical? Is Washington increasing the risk of nuclear war** in a quixotic quest for illusory strategic advantages? Or is it rather notions of strategic stability themselves that are unsound? International Relations Theory, Causes of War, and Nuclear Strategic Stability This section explores the concept of strategic stability through the prism of international relations theory. It shows that, **contrary to the claims of strategic stability theorists, state-of-the-art international relations research would suggest that nuclear superiority is stabilizing and it is in fact nuclear parity that is destabilizing**. When considering a specific problem, a good international relations scholar will often ask: what is this a case of? When trying to understand the ongoing insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan in the mid-2000s, for example, many smart analysts recognized these as cases of the broader phenomenon of interethnic civil war and turned to the academic literature on this subject for guidance.<sup>15</sup> This section makes a similar move. Arguments about military nuclear advantages and nuclear strategic stability are essentially arguments about how the military balance of power affects the likelihood of war. What then does the international relations scholarship tell us about this subject? International relations scholars have long debated the effects of balances of power or preponderances of power for international stability. Traditional realist arguments have maintained that the balance of power is a near law-like phenomenon in international politics. As Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote, “It maintains itself without effort, in such a manner that if it sinks on one side, it reestablishes itself very soon on the other.”<sup>16</sup> Taking the balance of power as a given, structural realists have theorized about whether different distributions of power balances are more or less stable. Kenneth Waltz, for example, theorized that multipolar (p.132) worlds, with several great powers, are less stable than bipolar worlds, made up of only two major powers.<sup>17</sup> Other international relations scholars, however, did not take the balance of power for granted. They theorized that preponderances of power are possible and may be more stabilizing than power balances. In 1973, for example, Geoffrey Blainey famously argued that **the fundamental cause of war was, in fact, disagreements about the balance of power**.<sup>18</sup> He argued that in order for two states to choose to go to war, leaders on both sides must believe that they have at least some shot of winning. And he argued that both sides were likely to believe they had a shot of winning when they were close to evenly matched. On the other hand, according to Blainey, **a clear preponderance of power is the**

**surest guarantor of peace.** James Fearon has further developed this line of thinking in what has become the dominant theoretical paradigm for understanding international conflict in contemporary international relations theory: the bargaining model of war.<sup>19</sup> Fearon conceives of war, and much of international politics, as a bargaining problem. Two states have a significant disagreement over some issue (whether it be territory, policy, or something else), but fighting a war over the dispute is suboptimal, because wars are costly and states would be destroying some of what they are fighting over. It would be much better to simply come to a negotiated settlement and avoid the costs of conflict. War, therefore, according to Fearon, should be understood as a breakdown in bargaining. He argues that among rational states there are three causes of bargaining failure: private information and incentives to misrepresent that information, issue indivisibility, and problems of credible commitment. The first cause, private information and incentives to misrepresent, is most relevant to the question of strategic stability. Fearon maintains that **if the balance of military power and the balance of resolve were perfectly known, then war would never occur.** States would assess the likely outcome of conflict based on which side was stronger and which side cared more about the issue at stake. Then they would cut an appropriate deal that reflected the bargaining power of the two sides as determined by the underlying balances of power and resolve. **Rather than fight a costly war in what was bound to be a losing effort, the weaker state would simply concede the contested issue.** It would be better off with this bargain than it would be to fight and lose a war only to arrive at a similar outcome. According to this perspective, therefore, in a world with perfect information and rational states, war would never occur. **The problem is that states do not have perfect information about the power and resolve of their adversaries, and this can lead to bargaining failure.** As Blainey argued decades before, **wars result from disagreements about which side will win.** Even the imperfect information problem could be resolved in theory, according to Fearon, because **states could simply reveal information about their power** (p.133) **and resolve in order to clear up any misperceptions.** The problem with this solution, however, is that **both sides have an incentive to misrepresent their power and resolve.** In order to get the best possible bargain short of war, **states have an incentive to portray themselves as more powerful and more willing to fight** over the contested issues than they actually are. How many times have leaders promised that “all options are on the table” when they really had no intention of ever using force? This prevents states from accurately revealing true information about their power and resolve and obstructs peaceful resolutions to conflicts. Since all states have an incentive to say they are willing and able to fight if necessary to get their way, their opponents have no way of knowing who is sincere and who is bluffing. So, if a state assumes wrongly that its opponent is bluffing, then bargaining can break down and war can occur even among “rational” states. In sum, according to Fearon, **private information about the balance of power and the balance of resolve and incentives to misrepresent that information are a cause of war.** When are states most likely to make mistakes about the balance of power (our focus in this chapter)? Holding other factors constant, **war is most likely when there is military parity.** When there is a rough balance of power, the outcome of conflict is less certain and **bargaining failure more likely.** When, on the other hand, **there is a clear preponderance of power,** the outcome of conflict **can be predicted with greater confidence.** **The more lopsided the balance of power, the less likely states are to misperceive it,** and the more likely they will be to reach a bargain short of **military conflict.** This theoretical logic has also been supported in recent empirical research. Scholars have consistently shown a tight correlation between rough parity in the balance of power and the frequency of militarized interstate disputes. Contrariwise, **imbalances of power are associated with peace.**<sup>20</sup> As Douglas Gibler writes in a recent issue of the American Political Science Review, “**study after study finds** that equally-capable states experience higher rates of conflict.”<sup>21</sup> Bringing this discussion back to the question of strategic stability, therefore, contemporary international relations theory suggests that **a lopsided nuclear superiority should enhance strategic stability and nuclear parity should be destabilizing.** Would China’s leaders be more likely to believe that they could prevail in a nuclear conflict with Washington if Beijing possessed 2,000 nuclear weapons capable of reaching the United States, rather than the 65 or so it possesses today? Intuition would suggest that **they would,** but this is diametrically opposed to the arguments of strategic stability theorists. This suggests either that traditional arguments about strategic stability are mistaken, or that nuclear conflict operates according to its own special logic. It has been argued, for example, the high cost of nuclear war convinces leaders facing a nuclear-armed opponent that they have no shot of winning at an acceptable cost, thus eliminating (p.134) uncertainty about the balance of power. This is plausible, but it is not the case made by strategic stability theorists. Rather, **strategic stability theorists** argue the exact opposite. They claim that nuclear-armed states may intentionally choose to start nuclear wars with nuclear-armed states when there is an imbalance of nuclear power. As we will see in the next section, **this argument does not hold up under interrogation, even in a nuclear specific context.** why **Strategic Instability Is Not a Cost of US Nuclear Superiority** This section will reevaluate the traditional notions of nuclear strategic stability and show that the logic of these arguments is quite weak and rests on many questionable assumptions. Moreover, a more careful consideration suggests that, if anything, **US nuclear superiority enhances instability that works in Washington’s favor and diminishes problematic instability.** In sum, therefore, **strategic instability is not a cost of US strategic superiority.** In theory, **there are**

two possible pathways by which US nuclear superiority could increase the risk of nuclear war: either a nuclear superior United States may strike first, or a nuclear inferior US adversary may have an incentive to initially pull the nuclear trigger. We explore each of these possibilities in turn. A Nuclear Superior United States

Strikes First Strategic stability theorists argue that a US first-strike advantage is destabilizing, but this section shows that, in fact, **a US first-strike advantage is just that: an advantage**. Typically, strategic stability theorists argue that a US nuclear advantage is destabilizing because it could entice an enemy to strike first. I will cover this argument later in the chapter. Logically, however, the first reason that nuclear superiority might increase the risk of nuclear war is that the side with nuclear superiority (in this case the United States) might initiate a nuclear war because its leaders assess that they could initiate a "splendid" first strike.<sup>22</sup> In other words, they may believe that they could conduct a nuclear attack that would succeed in disarming an adversary, allowing them to fight and win a nuclear war while avoiding retaliation altogether, or suffering only acceptable levels of damage in return. **The strategic stability paradigm assumes that first-strike advantages are destabilizing** regardless of which side possesses it, **but from Washington's point of view, there is a clear difference between a US ability to conduct a first strike and (p.135) an adversary's ability to conduct a first strike on the United States.** Namely, **the latter is much more threatening**. It is obvious that **a US nuclear posture that renders the United States vulnerable to an enemy first strike would be dangerous for the United States. That position of extreme weakness could invite an enemy nuclear attack** on the United States and its allies, **or render them vulnerable to nuclear coercion**. Fortunately, as the first state to develop nuclear weapons, the United States has never faced this situation, and, if it did, it would be motivated to take whatever steps necessary to expand and strengthen its nuclear forces in order to deter potential enemy nuclear attacks. On this point, therefore, strategic stability theorists and I agree: an extreme imbalance of power (in favor of US enemies) is problematic (for the United States). Let us then consider the possibility of a US first strike. **The United States currently possesses a splendid first-strike advantage against roughly 190 states.** This list includes all of the nonnuclear weapon states in the international system and the three nuclear-armed states (Israel, Pakistan, and India) whose nuclear delivery systems currently prevent them from launching a nuclear attack against the US homeland. (Of course, it is nearly impossible to imagine the United States conducting a nuclear attack on any of these countries, but it does have the capability.) At present, **the United States can conduct, or threaten to conduct, a nuclear attack against these countries without worrying about the possibility of nuclear retaliation against US territory.** As we saw in the first part of the book, **this nuclear superiority provides a significant source of strategic advantage.**

**Would the United States be more secure if it possessed a more "stable" nuclear deterrence relationship with North Korea, Venezuela, Iran, or other states?** Would the United States be better off if Iran had a reliable means of holding US cities hostage with nuclear threats? It is hard to answer this question in the affirmative. The United States would be worse off in such a scenario. The United States would have less leverage over these states and be vulnerable to nuclear coercion and even nuclear attack. For decades, therefore, there has been a bipartisan consensus that the United States must work to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states. Some scholars, known as proliferation optimists, challenge these views, but as I have argued at length elsewhere, they work from an unsophisticated understanding of deterrence theory and their arguments contain internal, logical contradictions.<sup>23</sup> Moreover, their arguments have never found favor in the corridors of power.<sup>24</sup> To be sure, US superiority may tempt Washington to use nuclear weapons first, undermining stability as defined in this chapter. Indeed, the United States was the only country to use nuclear weapons in wartime, against a nonnuclear (p.136) Japan in World War II. For this reason, a US first strike advantage likely does increase the risk of US nuclear use, but this is not a problem for the United States. After all, the United States won a world war with the help of its nuclear superiority over Japan. Instability due to the possibility of US first use is, therefore, instability that is desirable from Washington's perspective. It is good instability. It certainly is not a reason for Washington to refrain from pursuing military nuclear advantages.// **The same is true when considering America's relations with** established nuclear powers, such as **Russia and China.** With a large margin of superiority over these rivals, Washington might be tempted to launch a splendid first strike. This would certainly be "destabilizing" in the sense that it would increase the risk of nuclear war, but, again, this is a nuclear war of the United States' choosing. **The purpose of US national security policymaking is often, and should be, to provide the president with a range of options.** While any US president should be extremely cautious about employing nuclear weapons, there are conceivable scenarios in which **a US president might want the ability to conduct a nuclear first strike.** Indeed, the 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review explicitly

states that **the United States reserves the right to use nuclear weapons against nuclear weapon states and against nonnuclear weapon states in noncompliance with their nonproliferation obligations.**<sup>25</sup> In the event that these states engage in **major conventional aggression, or a chemical or biological weapons attack against the United States or its allies**, for example, **a US president might decide to use nuclear weapons first.** Moreover, even **if the president never chooses to conduct a nuclear first strike, the ability to credibly do so is necessary in order to deter adversaries and reassure allies.**

Although the United States does not possess a splendid first strike capability over Russia and China, such a capability would very much be in the US national interest. A possible objection may be that a US nuclear attack on a nuclear power would be dangerous because it might not fully succeed in disarming its opponent. Since Russia and China have delivery vehicles capable of reaching the United States, any US nuclear first strike that failed to destroy every single Russian or Chinese warhead could result in nuclear retaliation against the US homeland. This is an important consideration and the primary reason why **any US president would be extremely hesitant to conduct a nuclear first strike against a nuclear-armed country.** Indeed, **it is nearly impossible to imagine a US president launching a nuclear first strike on Russia or China.** But, if in an

extreme scenario, a US president still chose to launch a nuclear attack knowing full well the likely consequences, this would be a deliberate choice because he or she believes the attack is in America's interests and that the alternatives are even worse. Furthermore, and as demonstrated throughout this book, **the ability to credibly do so, even if the option is never employed, enhances Washington's bargaining leverage** in scenarios short of war.<sup>(n137)</sup> The fear of possible retaliation following a US nuclear first strike

therefore, is not a good reason why the United States should not maintain a nuclear advantage over

rivals. Indeed, the principal fear in this scenario is that a disarming strike might not work. The concern, therefore, is one of insufficient US superiority, not too much. In sum, a nuclear balance of power that provides the United States with a first-strike capability may very well be destabilizing, but it is instability in America's favor and, therefore, not a good reason why Washington should not pursue the capability. A Nuclear Inferior Adversary Strikes First  
The second, and more common, argument as to why nuclear superiority might be destabilizing is because the state in the position of nuclear inferiority (in this case, America's adversaries) may feel "use 'em or lose 'em" (UELE) pressures but this argument also withers under interrogation.<sup>26</sup> According to strategic stability theorists, a US nuclear advantage increases the danger of nuclear war because the inferior opponent may fear that its nuclear arsenal is vulnerable to a first strike.

Rather, than wait for the adversary (in this case the United States) to move first and wipe out, or seriously blunt, its strategic forces, the argument goes, the inferior state may decide to intentionally launch a nuclear war early in a crisis in order to avoid suffering a disarming first strike. This is the logic most often invoked by strategic stability theorists when they claim that US nuclear advantages are destabilizing. This is also the precise problem identified at

inspired by Wohlstetter's basing studies. Use 'em or lose 'em enjoys a certain superficial plausibility, but, upon closer inspection, there are two fundamental reasons why the logic simply does not hold up. First, it ignores the fact that the superior state retains a healthy ability to retaliate, so, even if the inferior state is worried about having its nuclear weapons eliminated in a first strike, the decision to launch its nuclear weapons first as a coping mechanism would be a decision to intentionally launch a nuclear war against a state with at least a secure, second-strike capability. This means that even if the inferior state launches its nuclear weapons first, it will be virtually guaranteed to suffer devastating nuclear retaliation. Moreover, given that it is in a situation of extreme inferiority (so extreme that it might even be vulnerable to a preemptive nuclear strike), this would mean intentionally launching a devastating nuclear war that will likely turn out much worse for itself than for its opponent. It would

simply be irrational for a state to intentionally launch a nuclear war against a state with an assured retaliatory capability. Let us consider a concrete example. The United States **maintains nuclear superiority over China**, as we have seen in previous chapters. Strategic stability (p.138) theorists want us to believe that if the United States takes additional steps to further enhance its superiority, then **China would face even greater temptations to launch a nuclear first strike against the US homeland** in the event of a serious crisis. In other words, strategic stability theorists hold **that China would be so worried about losing a devastating nuclear war against United States that it would intentionally choose to start a devastating nuclear war against the United States**. The argument does not make sense.

If the UEL argument from strategic stability theory is correct, then we should expect that nuclear inferior states will intentionally launch nuclear wars against states with superior nuclear arsenals. We should also expect that inferior states will engage in risky behavior in high-stakes crises to ensure that their nuclear weapons can be launched before they are destroyed. If, on the other hand, the argument of this book is correct, then we should expect that nuclear inferior states should never intentionally launch nuclear wars and they should be hesitant to run risks of nuclear war against nuclear superior adversaries. Turning back to the empirical record reviewed in the first half of the book, we see that nuclear inferior states have frequently backed down in high-stakes crises with nuclear superior opponents. Nuclear inferior states have placed forces on alert in crises and have otherwise run risks of nuclear war, but they have been less likely to do so than their superior opponents.

Nuclear inferior states have never issued a compelling threat against a nuclear superior opponent. (p.142) And nuclear inferior states have never intentionally launched a nuclear war against a superior opponent due to UELE fears or for any other reason. It is certainly possible that some future leader may intentionally launch nuclear weapons in order to avoid the risk that they will be destroyed in a nuclear attack. But logic and over 70 years of evidence give us strong reason to be skeptical that this is a likely outcome. Conclusion This chapter examined the effect of the nuclear balance of power on strategic stability. Specifically, it examined past arguments about how US nuclear superiority might undermine strategic stability and increase the risk of nuclear war. By reviewing international relations theories on the causes of war, examining the specific logic of strategic stability theory, and considering the available evidence, this chapter did not find any support for the idea that imbalances in nuclear power cause dangerous strategic instability. In fact, if anything, theory and evidence suggested that a preponderance of power reduces the risk of war. Moreover, this chapter showed that US nuclear superiority increases instability that works in Washington's favor and dampens problematic instability. As it relates to US nuclear strategy, therefore, this chapter suggests Extens

## US nukes aren't on hair trigger

**Mauroni and Jonas 16** (Al Mauroni and David Jonas, Al Mauroni is the Director of the U.S. Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies. David S. Jonas is a partner at FH+H firm, a DC area national security law firm. He is also an adjunct professor at Georgetown and George Washington University Law Schools where he teaches nuclear nonproliferation law and policy, All Cards on the Table: First-Use of Nuclear Weapons, 7-25-2016 War on the Rocks, <https://warontheroocks.com/2016/07/all-cards-on-the-table-first-use-of-nuclear-weapons/>, accessed 7-24-2018)

Writing at War on the Rocks, Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association believes it is time for the United States to take the pledge of no first-use of nuclear weapons, calling a first-use policy part of "dangerous, Cold War-era nuclear thinking" that could lead to early use of nuclear weapons by adversaries such as Russia or China. He decries the possible scenario of "launch under attack" – e.g., a massive U.S. nuclear weapons launch in response to early satellite warnings of an adversarial missile launch – as something that increases the risk of catastrophic accidents or miscalculation between states. While the U.S. military has a "launch under attack" capability, the U.S. government does not have a written policy to "launch on attack" or "launch on warning." The option is available to the president if he chooses to use it, again under the principle of strategic ambiguity. Since at least 1997, if not earlier, the tendency of U.S. presidents has been to increase the time to make any decision to respond to an attack with nuclear weapons. The president always has the option to not order an attack upon receiving confirmation that another nuclear power is attacking the United States with strategic nuclear forces. U.S. nuclear forces are not on "hair triggers" — evoking an image of Colt pistols set for release at the slightest pressure — that would lead to an accidental launch during an international crisis.

## AT: Accidents

### **A bevy of checks prevent accidental or deliberate misuse – de-prioritizing launch increases miscalc risks**

**Kehler 17** (November 14<sup>th</sup>, 2017, Robert; Former Commander at the U.S. Strategic Command Base in Offutt; Senate Testimony, "Statement of General C. Robert Kehler United States Air Force (Retired) Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee," [https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/111417\\_Kehler\\_Testimony.pdf](https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/111417_Kehler_Testimony.pdf))

The United States now faces far more complex security problems and greater uncertainty than it did during the Cold War. Threats to our security are diverse, can arrive at our doorsteps quickly, and can range from small arms in the hands of extremists to nuclear weapons in the hands of hostile foreign leaders. Yesterday's regional battlefield is becoming tomorrow's global battle-space where conflicts may begin in cyberspace and quickly extend to space...most likely before traditional air, land, and sea forces are engaged. Violent extremists continue to threaten us, and we must remain vigilant to prevent the intersection of violent extremism with weapons of mass destruction. Russia's and North Korea's explicit nuclear threats (to include the threat of nuclear firstuse) remind us that nuclear weapons are not gone, and it appears they will not be eliminated from world affairs anytime soon. Russia and China are modernizing their nuclear forces as the basis of strategies designed to expand their positions at our expense and that of our allies. In addition, North Korea's nuclear capabilities now threaten our regional allies and eventually could threaten us directly. India and Pakistan threaten nuclear use in their disputes, and Iran will remain a country of interest as time passes. Despite significant differences from the Cold War, the ultimate paradox of the nuclear age is still with us—to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, the US must remain prepared to use them. Deterrence and US Nuclear Weapons While the end of the Cold War allowed the US to diminish the role and prominence of nuclear weapons in our defense planning and to dramatically reduce both the number of deployed weapons and the overall size of the stockpile, nuclear deterrence remains "crucial to our nation's defense and to strategic stability". Although no longer needed to deter a conventional attack from the massed armored formations of the now extinct Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, nuclear weapons continue to prevent both the coercive and actual use of these weapons against the US and its allies (their primary purpose), constrain the scope and scale of conflict, compel adversary leaders to consider the implications of their actions before they act, and (via extended deterrence) obviate the need for additional allies and partners to acquire their own. Nuclear weapons are only one of many important instruments that must be orchestrated for maximum deterrent credibility and effect in the 21st Century; however, today no other weapon can replace their deterrent value. To remain a credible deterrent tool, the US nuclear force must present any would-be attacker with little confidence of success and the certainty of an assured response against his highest value targets. Therefore, the US must continue to take the necessary steps to field a modern nuclear force that presents an adversary with insurmountable attack and defensive problems, demonstrates resolve and commitment to allied security guarantees, provides the president with a range of options to deal with crisis or conflict, and serves as an effective hedge against technical failures or geopolitical uncertainty. Central to this force is an upgraded nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) system that ensures the president always remains linked to his critical advisors and the nuclear forces for positive control. Nuclear Command and Control (NC2) US nuclear forces operate under strict civilian control. Only the President of the United States can authorize the use of US nuclear weapons, and the President's ability to exercise that authority and direction is ensured by the people, procedures, facilities, equipment, and communications capabilities that comprise the Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS). The NCCS has been designed with resilience, redundancy, and survivability to ensure that an adversary cannot hope to neutralize our deterrent by

successfully attacking any of its elements and thereby “disconnecting” the President and other civilian and military leaders from one another or from the nuclear forces—even in the most stressing scenarios. These features enhance deterrence and contribute to crisis stability. NCCS capabilities and procedures are designed to enable the authorized use of nuclear weapons while also preventing their unauthorized, accidental, or inadvertent use. Operations and activities involving US nuclear weapons are surrounded by layers of safeguards. While many of the specifics are highly classified, general methods range from personnel screening and monitoring to codes and use controls. In addition, sensors and communications links that contribute to nuclear decision making are specially certified, and tests and exercises are frequently held to validate the performance of both systems and people. Before I retired in late 2013, we had also begun to evaluate networks and systems for potential or actual cyber intrusions. Other factors contribute to the prevention of unauthorized, inadvertent, or accidental use. “Today’s triad of nuclear forces is far smaller and postured much less aggressively than its Cold War ancestor”.<sup>ii</sup> Not only are the long-range bombers and supporting aerial tankers no longer loaded and poised to take off with nuclear weapons (unless ordered back into a nuclear alert configuration), but ballistic missiles are aimed at open areas of the ocean. Also, while the possibility of a massive surprise nuclear attack still exists (and must be deterred), decision time is longer in many other potential nuclear scenarios that may prove more likely in today’s global security environment. As I mentioned earlier, the decision to employ nuclear weapons is a political decision requiring an explicit order from the President. The process includes “assessment, review, and consultation”... (via) secure phone and video conferencing to enable the President to consult with his senior advisors, including the Secretary of Defense and other military commanders.<sup>iii</sup> Once a decision is reached, the order is prepared and transmitted to the forces using procedures... equipment, and communications that ensure the President’s nuclear control orders are received and properly implemented...<sup>iv</sup> The law of war governs the use of US nuclear weapons. Nuclear options and orders are no different in this regard than any other weapon. Here, US policy as articulated in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) provided important context regarding the consideration of US nuclear use (i.e., extreme circumstances when vital national interests are at stake). The 2010 NPR also restated the “negative security guarantee” (i.e., the US will not consider using nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapons state that is party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations). In addition, the legal principles of military necessity, distinction, and proportionality also apply to nuclear plans, operations, and decisions. Legal advisors are deeply involved with commanders at all steps of the deliberate and crisis action processes to offer perspective on how force is to be used as well as the decision to use force. The decision to use nuclear weapons is not an all or nothing decision. Over the years, successive Presidents have directed the military to prepare a range of options designed to provide flexibility and to improve the likelihood of controlling escalation if deterrence fails. Options are clearly defined in scope and duration and the President retains the ability to terminate nuclear operations when necessary. Military members are bound by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to follow orders provided they are legal and come from appropriate command authority. They are equally bound to question (and ultimately refuse) illegal orders or those that do not come from appropriate authority. As the commander of US Strategic Command, I shared the responsibility with the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other senior military and civilian leaders to address and resolve any concerns and potential legal issues on behalf of the men and women in the nuclear operating forces during the decision process. It was our duty to pose the hard questions, if any, before proceeding with our military advice. Nuclear crew members must have complete confidence that the highest legal standards have been enforced from target selection to an employment command by the President. Conclusion Mr. Chairman, I applaud your and the committee’s interest in these matters. However, I urge Congress to carefully consider the potential impacts to deterrence and extended deterrence that any potential changes to nuclear command and control might have. I also urge you to consider that conflicting signals can result in loss of confidence, confusion, or paralysis in the operating forces at a critical moment. Some of the lapses in discipline and performance we saw in the nuclear forces several years ago were attributed to conflicting signals regarding the importance of and support for the nuclear deterrence mission. Clarity and commitment regarding nuclear weapons, their continued foundational role in US and allied defense strategy, and confidence in our nuclear command and control processes are as important now as they ever were during the Cold War. Deterrence credibility and national security demand it.

## No accidental launch

**Williscroft 10** (Six patrols on the *John Marshall* as a Sonar Technician, and four on the *Von Steuben* as an officer – a total of twenty-two submerged months. Navigator and Ops Officer on *Ortolan & Pigeon* – Submarine Rescue & Saturation Diving ships. Watch and Diving Officer on *Oceanographer* and *Surveyor*. “Accidental Nuclear War”

<http://www.argee.net/Thrawn%20Rickle/Thrawn%20Rickle%2032.htm>)

Is there a realistic chance that we could have a nuclear war by accident? Could a ballistic submarine commander launch his missiles without specific presidential authorization? Could a few men conspire and successfully bypass built-in safety systems to launch nuclear weapons? The key word here is “realistic.” In the strictest sense, yes, these things are possible. But are they realistically possible? This question can best be answered by examining two interrelated questions. Is there a way to launch a nuclear weapon by accident? Can a specific accidental series of events take place—no matter how remote—that will result in the inevitable launch or detonation of a nuclear weapon? Can one individual working by himself or several individuals working in collusion bring about the deliberate launch or detonation of a nuclear weapon? We are protected from accidental launching of nuclear weapons by mechanical safeguards, and by carefully structured and controlled mandatory procedures that are always employed when working around nuclear weapons. Launching a nuclear weapon takes the specific simultaneous action of several designated individuals. System designers ensured that conditions necessary for a launch could not happen accidentally. For example, to launch a missile from a ballistic missile submarine, two individuals must insert keys into separate slots on separate decks within a few seconds of each other. Barring this, the system cannot physically launch a missile. There are additional safeguards built into the system that control computer hardware and software, and personnel controls that we will discuss later, but—in the final analysis—without the keys inserted as described, there can be no launch—it’s not physically possible. Because the time window for key insertion is less than that required for one individual to accomplish, it is physically impossible for a missile to be launched accidentally by one individual. Any launch must be deliberate. One can postulate a scenario wherein a technician bypasses these safeguards in order to effect a launch by himself. Technically, this is possible, but such a launch would be deliberate, not accidental. We will examine measures designed to prevent this in a later column. Maintenance procedures on nuclear weapons are very tightly controlled. In effect always is the “two-man rule.” This rule prohibits any individual from accessing nuclear weapons or their launch vehicles alone. Aside from obvious qualification requirements, two individuals must be present. No matter how familiar the two technicians may be with a specific system, each step in a maintenance procedure is first read by one technician, repeated by the second, acknowledged by the first (or corrected, if necessary), performed by the second, examined by the first, checked off by the first, and acknowledged by the second. This makes maintenance slow, but absolutely assures that no errors happen. Exactly the same procedure is followed every time an access cover is removed, a screw is turned, a weapon is moved, or a controlling publication is updated. Nothing, absolutely nothing is done without following the written guides exactly, always under two-man control. This even applies to guards. Where nuclear weapons are concerned, a minimum of two guards—always fully in sight of each other—stand duty. There is no realistic scenario wherein a nuclear missile can be accidentally launched...ever...under any circumstances...period!

## Multiple checks solve accidental use.

**Kehler 17** — Former Commander of Stratcomm - Retired US Air Force General [Robert Kehler, Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 11/14/17, [https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/111417\\_Kehler\\_Testimony.pdf](https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/111417_Kehler_Testimony.pdf)]

US nuclear forces operate under strict civilian control. Only the President of the United States can authorize the use of US nuclear weapons, and the President's ability to exercise that authority and direction is ensured by the people, procedures, facilities, equipment, and communications capabilities that comprise the Nuclear Command and

Control System (NCCS). The NCCS has been designed with resilience, redundancy, and survivability to ensure that an adversary cannot hope to neutralize our deterrent by successfully attacking any of its elements and thereby “disconnecting” the President and other civilian and military leaders from one another or from the nuclear forces—even in the most stressing scenarios. These features enhance deterrence and contribute to crisis stability. NCCS capabilities and procedures are designed to enable the authorized use of nuclear weapons while also preventing their unauthorized, accidental, or inadvertent use. Operations and activities involving US nuclear weapons are surrounded by layers of safeguards. While many of the specifics are highly classified, general methods range from personnel screening and monitoring to codes and use controls. In addition, sensors and communications links that contribute to nuclear decision making are specially certified, and tests and exercises are frequently held to validate the performance of both systems and people. Before I retired in late 2013, we had also begun to evaluate networks and systems for potential or actual cyber intrusions. Other factors contribute to the prevention of unauthorized, inadvertent, or accidental use. “Today’s triad of nuclear forces is far smaller and postured much less aggressively than its Cold War ancestor”.ii Not only are the long-range bombers and supporting aerial tankers no longer loaded and poised to take off with nuclear weapons (unless ordered back into a nuclear alert configuration), but ballistic missiles are aimed at open areas of the ocean. Also, while the possibility of a massive surprise nuclear attack still exists (and must be deterred), decision time is longer in many other potential nuclear scenarios that may prove more likely in today’s global security environment.

## AT: NFU Solves Accidents

### NFU doesn't solve the spiral model or accidental war—conventional forces make arms build-up inevitable

**Lanoszka 18** (February 6<sup>th</sup>, 2018, Alexander Lanoszka is a Assistant professor of Political Science at University of Waterloo; and Thomas Leo Scherer, Ph.D. from Princeton in politics, program Officer at the US Institute of Peace, “Nuclear ambiguity, no first use, and crisis stability in asymmetric crises,” The Nonproliferation Review)

The first pathway that makes AFU dangerous arises from features of the classic security dilemma through the “spiral model.” In the downward-spiral pathway, the adversary pursues measures to increase its strategic capabilities because it fears a first strike by a nuclear-armed major power. These measures can include a launch-on-warning posture, raising alert levels, or pre-delegating launch authority. The adversary intends for these actions to deter a nuclear first strike by reducing the major power’s ability to eliminate the adversary’s strategic capabilities outright. Although defensive motives underlie these actions, the major power may misinterpret these actions as preparations for an offensive strike.<sup>30</sup> Apprehensive of an imminent attack, the major power may proceed with the pre-emptive attack that the adversary had originally feared. Thus, NFU advocates argue that, if the United States credibly declares NFU, adversaries would be less inclined to take the destabilizing escalatory measures described above. Because ambiguity in military postures may precipitate spiral effects, NFU would clarify US intentions and discourage states from acting upon worst-case assumptions.<sup>31</sup> In making this argument, NFU proponents must show that the payoffs are such that the major power and the weaker adversary would both have incentives to escalate. Consider the Prisoner’s Dilemma, whose incentive structure appears in Table 1. The reason that each prisoner is expected to defect is that this action constitutes the better response to either action undertaken by the other party. By cooperating, for example, a prisoner risks accepting the sucker’s payoff if the other chooses to defect. Now consider a variation of the Prisoner’s Dilemma in which each actor faces the choice of whether to adopt a strategic posture that could be perceived as aggressive. Specifically, the major power chooses between adopting AFU and a credible NFU, whereas the adversary chooses whether to adopt measures to increase second-strike capabilities. We assume that the major power is more likely to attack if the adversary adopts those measures to increase second-strike capabilities. The question then concerns whether the weaker adversary will escalate. This choice depends on the war payoffs, defined as the probability of victory times the value of the prize, minus the cost of war. As we are concerned about a war that neither side desires, we assume that peace payoffs for both sides are greater than any war payoff for either side. The adversary then should only escalate if the additional risk of costly war is offset by improved war payoffs. Yet two other assertions by NFU supporters suggest that the war payoffs do not vary with the major power’s decision to declare NFU or not. The first assertion is that AFU is unnecessary because the United States enjoys such conventional military superiority that it can prevail in any armed conflict without the use of nuclear weapons.<sup>32</sup> AFU lacks credibility to the point that adversaries may feel sure that the major power will not use nuclear weapons. Both assertions imply that the adversary’s war payoffs remain unchanged if the major power chooses NFU. By the first assumption, the adversary will lose regardless of nuclear policy thanks to US conventional military superiority. By the second, the adversary has already calculated that nuclear weapons will not be used, again regardless of nuclear policy. Thus, by the assertions made by NFU advocates, the downward-spiral pathway is not possible. For a rational adversary to take only such survivability measures under AFU, it must believe that these measures are beneficial against a nuclear strike but not against a conventional strike. The downward spiral is only a valid concern if the adversary’s payoffs decrease in the event that the major power declares AFU. A scenario that features this payoff structure could be one in which the adversary escalates due to the belief that its forces are more vulnerable to a nuclear strike than to a non-nuclear strike. In such a case, pre-emption to limit damage may be the best option. However, the destructive power of conventional military weapons (especially in the US arsenal) in the contemporary world makes this scenario debatable. It is thus unclear how the adversary’s incentives to escalate should change when facing different nuclear policies. The accidental-war pathway resembles the downward-spiral pathway, but it is instead predicated on organizational and human fallibility. In this situation, the adversary takes measures to

**increase the survivability** of its forces and deter an attack by the major power.<sup>34</sup> These measures may include bringing weapons closer to launch by raising their readiness and adopting a launch-on-warning posture, as well as policies to prevent leadership decapitation, such as pre-delegating launch authority. By implementing them, **the adversary raises the probability of accidentally launching an attack**. This unintentional first strike can occur in the presence of uncoordinated decision making, poor information flows between various government departments, technical failures, or even rogue bureaucratic agents acting without authorization from top leadership.<sup>35</sup> **Had the major power credibly declared NFU, the adversary would not undertake the risky measures** that could produce the accident. But, for a rational adversary to take only such survivability measures under AFU, **it must believe that these measures are beneficial against a nuclear strike** but not against a conventional strike. We can apply the same logic as before, the difference being that the probability of war represents an accidental initiation by the adversary. We can say that AFU may be dangerous, but **under conditions of overwhelming conventional superiority we can also say that NFU may be dangerous**. We are not arguing that crisis fears cannot produce accidental war. **Other explanations of accidental war are quite compelling, but they differ in two ways** from the pathway outlined here.<sup>36</sup> First, **the adversary's fear springs** not from US nuclear doctrine per se, **but rather from US counterforce capabilities**. Indeed, growing evidence from the Cold War suggests that the Soviet leaders grew apprehensive of these capabilities in the 1980s.<sup>37</sup> Second, the adversary's measures are able to increase survivability. With these stipulations, the threat of any kind of first strike is dangerous.

## AT: Group Think

**No groupthink in the executive – its not a monolith and congress is worse.**

**Posner and Vermeule, 7** – \*Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School AND \*\*professor at Harvard Law School (Eric and Adrian, Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty, and the Courts p. 46-47)

The idea that Congress will, on net, weed out bad policies rests on an institutional comparison.

The president is elected by a national constituency on a winner-take-all basis (barring the remote chance that the Electoral College will matter), whereas Congress is a summation of local constituencies and thus affords more voice to political and racial minorities. At the level of political psychology, decisionmaking within the executive is prone to group polarization and other forms of groupthink or irrational panic,<sup>51</sup> whereas the internal diversity of legislative deliberation checks these forces. At the level of political structure, Congress contains internal veto gates and chokepoints—consider the committee system and the filibuster rule—that provide minorities an opportunity to block harmful policies, whereas executive decisionmaking is relatively centralized and unitary.<sup>¶</sup> The contrast is drawn too sharply, because in practice the executive is a they, not an it. Presidential oversight is incapable of fully unifying executive branch policies, which means that disagreement flourishes within the executive as well, dampening panic and groupthink and providing minorities with political redoubts.<sup>52</sup> Where a national majority is internally divided, the structure of presidential politics creates chokepoints that can give racial or ideological minorities disproportionate influence, just as the legislative process does. Consider the influence of Arab Americans in Michigan, often a swing state in presidential elections.<sup>¶</sup> It is not obvious, then, that statutory authorization makes any difference at all. One possibility is that a large national majority dominates both Congress and the presidency and enacts panicky policies, oppresses minorities, or increases security in ways that have ratchet effects that are costly to reverse. If this is the case, a requirement of statutory authorization does not help. Another possibility is that there are internal institutional checks, within both the executive branch and Congress, on the adoption of panicky or oppressive policies and that democratic minorities have real influence in both arenas. If this is the case, then a requirement of authorization is not necessary and does no good. Authorization only makes a difference in the unlikely case where the executive is thoroughly panicky, or oppressively majoritarian, while Congress resists the stampede toward bad policies and safeguards the interests of oppressed minorities.<sup>¶</sup> Even if that condition obtains, however, the argument for authorization goes wrong by failing to consider both sides of the normative ledger. As for majoritarian oppression, the multiplicity of veto gates within Congress may allow minorities to block harmful discrimination, but it also allows minorities to block policies and laws which, although targeted, are nonetheless good. As for panic and irrationality, if Congress is more deliberative, one result will be to prevent groupthink and slow down stampedes toward bad policies, but another result will be to delay necessary emergency measures and slow down stampedes toward good policies. Proponents of the authorization requirement sometimes assume that quick action, even panicky action, always produces bad policies. But there is no necessary connection between these two things; expedited action is sometimes good, and panicky crowds can stampede either in the wrong direction or in the right direction. Slowing down the adoption of new policies through congressional oversight retards the adoption not

only of bad policies, but also of good policies that need to be adopted quickly if they are to be effective.

## Groupthink theory is wrong

Anthony **Hempell 4**, User Experience Consulting Senior Information Architect, "Groupthink: An introduction to Janis' theory of concurrence-seeking tendencies in group work., <http://www.anthonyhempell.com/papers/groupthink/>, March 3

In the thirty years since Janis first proposed the groupthink model, there is still little agreement as to the validity of the model in assessing decision-making behaviour (Park, 2000). Janis' theory is often criticized because it does not present a framework that is suitable for empirical testing; instead, the evidence for groupthink comes from largely qualitative, historical or archival methods (Sunstein, 2003). Some critics go so far as to say that Janis's work relies on "anecdote, casual observation, and intuitive appeal rather than rigorous research" (Esser, 1998, cited in Sunstein, 2003, p.142). While some studies have shown support for the groupthink model, the support tends to be mixed or conditional (Esser, 1998); some studies have revealed that a closed leadership style and external threats (in particular, time pressure) promote groupthink and defective decision making (Neck & Moorhead, 1995, cited by Choi & Kim, 1999); the effect of group cohesiveness is still inconclusive (Mullen, Anthony, Salas & Driskel, 1994, cited by Choi & Kim, 1999). Janis's model tends to be supported by studies that employ a qualitative case-study approach as opposed to experimental research, which tends to either partially support or not support Janis's thesis (Park, 2000). The lack of success in experimental validation of groupthink may be due to difficulties in operationalizing and conceptualizing it as a testable variable (Hogg & Hains, 1998; Park, 2000). Some researchers have criticized Janis for categorically denouncing groupthink as a negative phenomenon (Longley & Pruitt, 1980, cited in Choi & Kim, 1999). Snizek (1992) argues that there are instances where concurrence-seeking may promote group performance. When used to explain behaviour in a practical setting, groupthink has been framed as a detrimental group process; the result of this has been that many corporate training programs have created strategies for avoiding groupthink in the workplace (Quinn, Faerman, Thompson & McGrath, 1990, cited in Choi & Kim, 1999). Another criticism of groupthink is that Janis overestimates the link between the decision-making process and the outcome (McCauley, 1989; Tetlock, Peterson, McGuire, Chang & Feld, 1992; cited in Choi & Kim, 1999). Tetlock et al argue that there are many other factors between the decision process and the outcome. The outcome of any decision-making process, they argue, will only have a certain probability of success due to various environmental factors (such as luck). A large-scale study researching decision-making in seven major American corporations concluded that decision-making worked best when following a sound information processing method; however these groups also showed signs of groupthink, in that they had strong leadership which attempted to persuade others in the group that they were right (Peterson et al, 1998, cited in Sunstein, 2003). Esser (1998) found that groupthink characteristics were correlated with failures; however cohesiveness did not appear to be a factor: groups consisting of strangers, friends, or various levels of previous experience together did not appear to effect decision-making ability. Janis' claims of insulation of groups and groups led by autocratic leaders did show that these attributes were indicative of groupthink symptoms. Moorhead & Montanari conducted a study where they concluded that groupthink symptoms had no significant effect on group performance, and that "the relationship between groupthink-induced decision defects and outcomes were not as strong as Janis suggests" (Moorhead & Montanari, 1986, p. 399; cited by Choi & Kim, 1999).

## No Escalation

**Trump can't launch now because he'd consult with internal checks – but, congressional restrictions have unintended consequences down the line and can still be circumvented**

**Illing interviewing Feaver 17** [Sean Illing, Vox, interviewing Peter Feaver, a political science professor at Duke University and a former special adviser on the National Security Council. Trump can't start a nuclear war by himself, but there's not much stopping him. November 17, 2017. <https://www.vox.com/world/2017/11/17/16656856/trump-congress-nuclear-weapons-war>]

Senators held a congressional hearing on Tuesday to discuss the US president's authority to launch a nuclear strike. It was the first hearing to overtly address this issue in more than four decades.

The hearing was not explicitly about President Trump, but rather about the general question of whether the president currently has too much power over our nuclear arsenal. But the fact that Trump is swapping Twitter insults with North Korea's Kim Jong Un and has threatened to use "fire and fury" against the regime was clearly a motivating factor.

"We are concerned that the president of the United States is so unstable, is so volatile, has a decision-making process that is so quixotic, that he might order a nuclear strike that is wildly out of step with US interests," said Sen. Chris Murphy, a Democrat from Connecticut.

Even Bob Corker, a Republican senator from Tennessee, warned that Trump's reckless threats could put the country on a "path to World War III."

One of the experts who testified at the hearing was Peter Feaver, a political science professor at Duke University and a former special adviser on the National Security Council. I reached out to Feaver with two big questions: Can the president unilaterally launch a nuclear strike? And what are the checks in place to stop an unlawful order from the president?

The answer, it turns out, is complicated. You can read my lightly edited conversation with Feaver below.

Sean Illing

Let me start with a simple but important question: Can the president unilaterally launch a nuclear strike?

Peter Feaver

No. But the wording of your question is very precise. Can he launch a strike "unilaterally"? No. He requires other people to carry out an order, so he can't just lean on a button and automatically the missiles fly. But he has the legal and political authority on his own to give an order that would cause other people to take steps which would result in a nuclear strike. That's the system we currently have.

Sean Illing

So there's no magic lever the president can pull to send us into nuclear war, but I'm trying to imagine the contexts in which the president might give the order.

Peter Feaver

Well, there are two that come to mind. One is that the president is woken up in the middle of the night and told he has only 30 minutes or less to make a decision because we are under attack or about to be attacked, and of course that means hundreds if not thousands of people in the national security complex who've been monitoring world events and passed through various protocols have concluded this is what's happening, and we need an answer from the president. In that context, the system is designed to be able to carry out an order in that narrow time span, and he alone would have the legal authority to give that order if he's still alive.

The other scenario is that the president wakes the military up in the middle of the night and says, "Hey, I wanna do a nuclear strike," and in that setting, he would raise a lot of alarms throughout the chain of command. People would be saying, "Well, what is this? Why are we doing this?" It would require a lot more people to say, "Yes. This is the right decision."

Sean Illing

That is somewhat encouraging, but you're basically saying that even in the second scenario, the only thing that would stop a nuclear strike would be a few soldiers deciding to disobey an order from the president.

Peter Feaver

Well, they're trained to disobey illegal orders, so context matters. If they've woken up the president because they believe they're under attack, there's a presumption of legality if the president orders a strike. But if the president wakes them up in the middle of the night and orders a nuclear strike with no context, no crisis, no alert, then there's not a presumption that that order is legal. They would raise serious questions.

Sean Illing

Still, what you're saying is that if a reckless or illegal strike was ordered, we're relying upon the real-time judgment of a few generals to stop it?

Peter Feaver

Basically. The piece you're missing is that in the process of doing this, it would raise lots of alarms throughout the system, so the chief of staff of the White House, the national security adviser, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff — they would all ask, "What's happening? We just got this crazy order. What's going on?"

If they were given reliable information that we're really under attack, that something is really happening, then you would expect the order to be carried out. But if they're saying, "We don't know what's going on. No one's alerted us," they would likely halt the process and get some clarity.

And remember that **time constraints would not be severe** under the second scenario, where the president wakes up the military. When the military wakes up the president, then time constraints are very short and there's not a lot of time to check and double-check. But there's plenty of time in the other scenario, so that means implicitly a lot of people would have to go along with it.

Sean Illing

As you know, there are some people in Congress who are looking to pass a law that would diminish the president's authority to launch a nuclear strike. Do you think that's a good idea?

Peter Feaver

I think it's wise to take a close look at nuclear command and control. It's been a while since it's been scrutinized at the level I'm talking about, not just from people inside but also from people outside asking tough questions. I think the time is ripe for that. The threat environment is vastly different today than it was even seven years ago when President Obama conducted a nuclear posture review, and now we've got cyberthreats that are much more severe than when Congress last looked at it.

But to answer your question more directly, **I'm wary about** looking for simple **legislative fixes**, because **they're not likely to work** and also because they're likely to **have unintended consequences** that we'd have to think through

Sean Illing

Why wouldn't legislative solutions work? And what sort of unintended consequences are you worried about?

Peter Feaver

Well, I don't think you're going to pass a resolution that requires the president to get a vote from Congress. First of all, I don't think Congress is going to pass a law that would be that severe. Throughout the Cold War they never passed that law, and I see no reason to think they would pass it today.

Second, **there would be grave doubt whether Congress could act in times of crisis. The law would almost certainly have to be written so as to leave substantial discretion up to the president. In times of crisis, this law doesn't apply. In times of urgency, this law doesn't apply.** In other words, **you are reproducing some of the same discretion and reliance on the good faith and professionalism of the people implementing it in order for even that law to work.**

Sean Illing

Do you have any suggestions about what we can or should do short of major legislative solutions?

Peter Feaver

There are several ideas that are worth considering. I think in some cases **they would just codify what is de facto practice**, namely that **the president should be consulting with his national**

security team, which I think is already the practice, but it would not hurt to make that more explicit. That's not affecting the chain of command, per se. That's just clarifying that the president should be seeking advice and counsel when time permits.

But here's the thing: There really is no way around the human element. Hardware is trumped by software, hardware being the technology and software being the rules and procedures that govern it. But software is trumped by wetware, which is the human element. The human element is the key element, and the professionalism of the senior commanders and the president's advisory team will always be a crucial part of the picture.

Sean Illing

Are you confident that the structures and the systems and the protocols that we have in place are sufficient to guard against an accidental nuclear conflict or an irresponsible deployment of nuclear weapons?

Peter Feaver

I think the systems are pretty good, but no system is so good that it wouldn't benefit from a close scrutiny and a full review, and I think a full review is overdue, for all the reasons I mentioned earlier in our interview. This is definitely not a "Nothing to see here, move along" scenario. There are real concerns, and we need to look closely at them.

On the other hand, I've read very carefully the most dire warnings of some of the specialists, and I think they are based on some misleading conflations of different contexts. They describe how the system works in a crisis and then wrongly state that this is how it would operate if the president woke up in the middle of the night and wanted to do something, and of course that's not true. It would not operate that way if the president went to the military and called for a nuclear strike. So I do think some of the worst fears have been overstated.

Sean Illing

So we needn't be terrified by the prospect of President Trump deciding, on a whim, to fire a nuclear missile?

Peter Feaver

It's a legitimate concern — I don't want to dismiss it. But there are more checks in place than people realize. And while the system needs serious reconsideration, I'm not telling my family

## China Miscalc Answers

### **High level dialogue and mutual interests deter miscalculation**

**Yang 11**—Minister of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China (Jiechi, 6 January 2011, A Conversation with Yang Jiechi,  
[http://www.cfr.org/publication/23777/conversation\\_with\\_yang\\_jiechi.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/23777/conversation_with_yang_jiechi.html))

We have good reason to believe that with the efforts of both sides, President Hu's state visit this time will forcefully move forward the positive, cooperative and comprehensive China-U.S. relationship in the new era. It will take our practical cooperation to a new high and enhance the mutual understanding and friendship between the two peoples. And it will demonstrate the will of China and the United States to act together for world peace, stability and development.

Ladies and gentlemen, President Hu's upcoming visit to the United States will take place when the Obama administration concludes its second year in office. We commend the good progress the China-U.S. relations have made over the past two years. The China-U.S. relationship is an extremely important bilateral relationship in today's world. We believe that though China-U.S. relationship has seen some difficulties in the past two years, it has made important overall progress, particularly in the following areas. First, the exchanges and communication between the two countries at the high level and various other levels have never been closer. China-U.S. relations achieved a smooth transition shortly after President Obama took office. In the past 24 months, the two presidents have had seven successful meetings. I had the good fortune to be present at all the seven meetings. And I always came away with a deep impression of the sincerity of the leaders in their discussion about how to move forward the relationship, how to face the challenges and how to work for the common good of our two peoples and the people of the world. President Obama paid a state visit to China, and now President Hu will come to the United States for a state visit. Officials of the two countries at various levels have had frequent contacts in diverse forms. The two sides have established the China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogues and the high-level consultation on people-to-people exchange. This time in Washington, we discussed when to have the third round of SED, Strategic and Economic Dialogues. I think it will happen sometime in mid-2011. Setting up unique and effective -- I mean, these exchanges are setting up unique and effective platforms to enhance mutual trust and cooperation between China and the United States. Second, the desire and resolve of the two countries to strengthen their cooperation have never been stronger. In April 2009, President Hu and President Obama reached an important agreement when they met in London that the two sides should work together to build a positive, cooperative and comprehensive China-U.S. relationship for the 21st century. This has charted the course for the growth of China-U.S. relations in the new era. President Hu emphasizes on many occasions that a sound China-U.S. relationship is in the fundamental interests of the two countries and serves peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large. He stressed that the Chinese government places high importance on its relations with the United States it and will work to promote cooperation with the United States. Likewise, President Obama attaches a great deal of importance to China-U.S. relations. The U.S. government has stressed its commitment to stronger cooperation between the two countries. Third, the Chinese and American interests

have converged as never before. Today, we have tackled the international financial crisis, pushed forward the reform of global economic governance and played an important role in spurring world economic recovery. The China-U.S. business ties have been taken to a new level. Two-way trade is expected to top \$380 billion U.S. dollars in 2010. China has been the fastest-growing major export market of the United States for nine consecutive years. Investment by Chinese enterprises in the United States has rapidly increased. By the end of November 2010, Chinese businesses had made over 4.4 billion U.S. dollars of non-financial direct investment in the United States. All this has contributed to the economic recovery and the protection of jobs in the United States. Our bilateral exchanges and cooperation in a wide range of areas, including energy and the environment, have been growing in breadth and depth. Fourth, the two peoples have never been engaged in China-U.S. relations in such a broad and in-depth manner. Today, around 120,000 Chinese students are studying in the United States and more than 20,000 American students are studying in China. According to Chinese statistics, over 3 million tourists visit each others' countries every year and 110 plus passenger flights fly between the two countries every week. China and the United States have forged 36 pairs of friendship, province-state and 161 sister-city relationships. Such close interactions have built countless bridges of friendship and cooperation between the two countries. Fifth, the communication and coordination between China and the United States on major regional and international issues have never been better. The two countries have maintained effective coordination on regional hotspot issues, such as the situation on the Korean Peninsula, the Iranian nuclear issue and South Asia. And now during this visit of mine, we discussed these issues. We also discussed the situation in Sudan, which figures prominently in the coming weeks. Also, on global issues, including climate change, G-20, the U.N. reform and fighting transnational crimes, working together the two countries have played an important and positive role in upholding world peace and security and promoting global sustainable development. The China-U.S. cooperation has become more strategic in terms of substance and more important in terms of global impact. What is it that has brought China and the United States closer to each other in the course of cooperation in the past two years? I believe that it is our growing common interests. It is the growing sense of any important reality that China-U.S. relations in the 21st century should be anchored in joint efforts to seize common opportunities and address common challenges for the welfare of our two peoples and the people of the world. With regard to issues in China-U.S. relations, whatever the differences, there is a basic consensus between China and the United States: namely, the China-U.S. relationship is far too important. The two countries have far more common interests than disagreements and cooperation is always the defining feature of this relationship.

## NPT Good Contention Answers

### NPT constrains effective diplomacy with illegitimate proliferators – spills over to other issues and causes prolif

**Miller 18** [Nicholas L. Miller is an assistant professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. His book, Stopping the Bomb: The Sources and Effectiveness of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy, is forthcoming with Cornell University Press in April. North Korea and the Problem of Managing Emerging Nuclear Powers. March 25, 2018.<https://www.lawfareblog.com/north-korea-and-problem-managing-emerging-nuclear-powers>]

Yet there is an unintended downside to the NPT regime. By freezing the roster of legitimate nuclear powers at the five that existed in 1968, the NPT makes it difficult for the United States to adopt realistic policies toward countries that have subsequently acquired nuclear weapons. This includes countries that did so outside the treaty (Israel, South Africa, India, and Pakistan) as well as those who acquired weapons after withdrawing from the treaty (North Korea). In each of these cases, efforts to uphold the nonproliferation regime by not legitimizing the state's nuclear arsenal have seriously complicated U.S. foreign policy—providing the proliferator with coercive leverage over the United States, limiting the possibility of cooperation on other issue areas, or incentivizing risky efforts at rollback rather than realistic arms control efforts. The current dynamics between the United States and North Korea may be the most extreme example of this phenomenon, but they are part of a broader pattern of the challenges Washington faces in dealing with emerging nuclear powers in the shadow of the NPT.

### Sanction easing and financial inducements for restraints on nuclear arsenal solves nonprolif better, mitigates charges of hypocrisy, and prevents catastrophic preemptive wars

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### An Alternative U.S. Post-Proliferation Policy

The fact that the nonproliferation regime has generated unintended negative consequences for U.S. foreign policy does not mean that Washington should abandon its efforts to prevent additional states from acquiring nuclear weapons, especially given that there is mounting evidence of its success in these efforts. Instead, the United States should continue these policies while reconsidering how it approaches the very few countries that successfully overcome the hurdles of the nonproliferation regime.

One potentially attractive option moving forward would be for the United States to give up on the notion of rolling back emerging arsenals or keeping them secret. Instead, the U.S. government could offer to lift certain nonproliferation sanctions or offer other inducements in exchange for the proliferator publicly agreeing to limits on its nuclear program—for example, no testing, no transfer of sensitive nuclear technologies to other countries, and/or limits on the size and

sophistication of the arsenal. As Mark Bell has noted in his analysis of current U.S. policy toward North Korea, negotiation may indeed lead Pyongyang to make significant concessions, but “[i]f the United States demands denuclearization at all costs, it will likely fail to get anything.”

This sort of pragmatic policy would have at least five benefits. First, by conditioning any sanctions relief or inducements on clear limits to the proliferator’s nuclear program short of rollback, this policy would limit the damage to the nonproliferation regime. Second, abandoning rollback as an objective in dealing with adversary and unaligned states would decrease temptations for launching potentially catastrophic preventive wars and focus policymakers’ attention on achieving stable deterrent balances. Third, it would open up the possibility of cooperating more fully with the proliferator on issues outside the nuclear arena. Fourth, discarding the idea of keeping the arsenals of friendly proliferators secret would reduce the latter’s leverage over the United States and mitigate charges of hypocrisy. Fifth and finally, such a policy would not require the United States or international community to formally recognize the proliferator’s nuclear status, thus denying them the prestige benefits of being an NPT-recognized nuclear power.

The NPT just incentivizes secret prolif – it inevitably gets revealed which turns norm-setting and hypocrisy, but also lets proliferators coerce the US in the process. The cp solves better – UK and France prove – but the NPT makes it unthinkable

**Miller 18** [Nicholas L. Miller is an assistant professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. His book, Stopping the Bomb: The Sources and Effectiveness of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy, is forthcoming with Cornell University Press in April. North Korea and the Problem of Managing Emerging Nuclear Powers. March 25, 2018.<https://www.lawfareblog.com/north-korea-and-problem-managing-emerging-nuclear-powers>]

For example, in dealing with friendly states that have developed nuclear weapons since the NPT was signed in 1968—Israel, South Africa, and Pakistan—the United States has often pursued a policy of concealment, seeking to convince its partners to keep their nuclear capabilities secret or under the radar in an effort to limit the odds of triggering proliferation elsewhere. This has at least two unintended downsides, however. First, it gives the proliferator leverage over the United States, as they can threaten to publicly reveal their nuclear capabilities and thereby undermine the nonproliferation regime further if the United States does not offer them concessions—for example, political or military support in a crisis. Indeed, Israel, South Africa, and Pakistan all initially adopted such a catalytic strategy with their nuclear weapons, and at least Israel and Pakistan used this strategy to significant effect. Specifically, in the early days of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israel hinted to Washington that it might be forced to unveil its nuclear capabilities, helping to spur the United States to resupply Israel with conventional arms. Likewise, during a crisis with India in 1990, Pakistan deliberately signaled to Washington that it was mobilizing its nuclear assets, leading U.S. policymakers to step in and defuse the situation. Second, when these efforts at concealment are inevitably revealed, they lead to charges of hypocrisy. This is just one example of what Joseph Nye has termed the “compromise/hypocrisy” dilemma, whereby any U.S. effort at cooperation with countries that successfully acquire nuclear weapons leads to accusations of hypocrisy, potentially eroding the broader nonproliferation mission.

This dilemma existed before the NPT, but was not nearly as acute because there was no nonproliferation regime to uphold. Although the United States did not support the United

Kingdom or France acquiring nuclear weapons, once they did so the United States offered them direct assistance in improving their weapons and missile capabilities, as part of an effort to improve alliance relations and increase U.S. control over their nuclear plans. Such a policy may make good strategic sense but it is essentially unthinkable today due to the strictures of the NPT.

### We'd revert to the cp in the squo after NPT collapse – historical analysis of US strategy proves

**Miller 18** [Nicholas L. Miller is an assistant professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. His book, Stopping the Bomb: The Sources and Effectiveness of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy, is forthcoming with Cornell University Press in April. North Korea and the Problem of Managing Emerging Nuclear Powers. March 25, 2018.<https://www.lawfareblog.com/north-korea-and-problem-managing-emerging-nuclear-powers>]

Again, a comparison to pre-NPT cases is instructive. After the Soviet Union and China acquired nuclear weapons, the United States never made a serious effort to convince either state to unilaterally dismantle their nuclear arsenal. Instead, the United States focused on deterrence and was open to cooperating with its nuclear-armed adversaries on issues of strategic importance. Within twenty years of the Soviet Union acquiring nuclear weapons, for example, Washington and Moscow had worked together on creating the International Atomic Energy Agency, Limited Test Ban Treaty, the NPT, and had begun talks that led to the SALT I Treaty and a broader policy of detente. Meanwhile, within fifteen years of communist China's nuclear acquisition, the United States reached a historic rapprochement with Beijing and ended its formal alliance with Taiwan, giving the United States an advantage in its Cold War competition with the Soviets. Indeed, the Nixon administration even discouraged the Soviet Union from taking action against Chinese nuclear facilities during the 1969 border war between the two communist powers. Although North Korea today is by no means the same as the Soviet Union or China during the Cold War, it is worth noting that in the 1960s Mao was viewed as the ultimate "rogue" actor, and yet this did not prevent cooperation from emerging.

### NPT constrains effective diplomacy with illegitimate proliferators – spills over to other issues and causes prolif

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Yet there is an unintended downside to the NPT regime. By freezing the roster of legitimate nuclear powers at the five that existed in 1968, the NPT makes it difficult for the United States to adopt realistic policies toward countries that have subsequently acquired nuclear weapons. This includes countries that did so outside the treaty (Israel, South Africa, India, and Pakistan) as well as those who acquired weapons after withdrawing from the treaty (North Korea). In each of these cases, efforts to uphold the

nonproliferation regime by not legitimizing the state's nuclear arsenal have seriously complicated U.S. foreign policy—providing the proliferator with coercive leverage over the United States, limiting the possibility of cooperation on other issue areas, or incentivizing risky efforts at rollback rather than realistic arms control efforts. The current dynamics between the United States and North Korea may be the most extreme example of this phenomenon, but they are part of a broader pattern of the challenges Washington faces in dealing with emerging nuclear powers in the shadow of the NPT.

### NPT collapse doesn't cause prolif

**Kimura 5** [Akira, Professor – Kagoshima University, “What Can We Do to Resolve the Crisis in the NPT Regime?”, 5-6, <http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/anew/KimuraE.pdf>]

The NPT regime was not established with the sole aim of obligating the member nations to simply ensure nuclear nonproliferation, that is the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear nations. Rather, it must be emphasized that the regime clearly stipulates the duty of nuclear powers to act on nuclear disarmament, and includes the logical necessity or latent possibility of achieving the elimination of nuclear weapons as well as a vision of a nuclear free world. Although the ‘prohibition and prevention of nuclear proliferation’ and the ‘duty to implement nuclear disarmament’ are two sides of the same coin, there is no room for doubt that it is the latter that is the decisive factor for the survival of the NPT regime. The reason for this is the fact that non-nuclear nations have only accepted this unfair treaty based on the assumption that the nuclear nations would faithfully fulfill their duty of nuclear disarmament, and if that duty is not fulfilled there will be almost no meaning in continuing with the NPT regime. Yet, the collapse of the NPT regime would not necessarily bring about the chaos and confusion of immediate and uncontrolled nuclear proliferation, nor would this necessarily represent the worst case scenario. This is because non-nuclear nations that withdraw from the NPT regime would have the option of establishing a new ‘nuclear weapon prohibition treaty’ on their own to put pressure on nuclear nations to prohibit the preemptive use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear nations and fulfill their duty to eliminate nuclear weapons in a more effective manner. The important point here is that it is anticipated that the majority of non-nuclear nations that withdraw from the NPT regime would not choose to take the path of nuclear armament themselves, but rather on the contrary, they would implement initiatives and efforts to pursue not only promotion of nuclear non-proliferation but also the elimination of nuclear weapons ever more proactively. This is evident when one looks at the past activities and assertions of the member nations of the New Agenda Coalition or NPT nonmember nations.

**The NPT's resilient -- BUT, fears are about lack of disarm and nuke energy sharing -- the aff solves neither, especially because it's not just about the US**

**IAC Blanc 16.** [Emmanuelle Blanc, doctoral candidate in the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics. “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime at a Crossroads Part II Whither the International Nuclear Order?” Institute for National Security Studies. [https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Azriel\\_Berman/publication/322204191\\_The\\_Nuclear\\_Nonproliferation\\_Regime\\_at\\_a\\_Crossroads/links/5a4b6d610f7e9ba868b0b4de/The-Nuclear-Nonproliferation-Regime-at-a-Crossroads.pdf](https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Azriel_Berman/publication/322204191_The_Nuclear_Nonproliferation_Regime_at_a_Crossroads/links/5a4b6d610f7e9ba868b0b4de/The-Nuclear-Nonproliferation-Regime-at-a-Crossroads.pdf)]

Broadly speaking, one can say that today the international nuclear order is still considered legitimate by the majority of states. The near universality of the NPT is often referred to as testimony to the fact that its guiding principles have been embraced by almost all states, and that they are still valid today. Fueling this argument, one can highlight that the norms of nonproliferation have largely been integrated within states'

security debates. Yet a more nuanced picture emerges when one breaks down the different aspects of legitimacy mentioned above, and ponders the true degree of internalization that the nonproliferation regime enjoys today.

Considering “legitimacy” in broad terms, the close examination of Iran’s nuclear narrative actually provides strong evidence of the legitimacy that the nonproliferation regime has gained over time. Indeed, even Iran, which is a clear challenger of this nuclear order, understands this fact and strategically adopts the discourse of the NPT to better pursue its interest. As George Perkovich pointed out, whatever the aims of its nuclear program, Iran is determined to convince the international community that it is acting within the framework of existing laws and rules. Iranian leaders have undoubtedly broken many nuclear rules. But by denying any wrongdoing or claiming to have a different understanding of the rules, they show the importance they ascribe to being perceived as within the law. More precisely, from 2003 onward, following the discovery of Iranian nonproliferation rule violations, the challenge for the Iranian leadership was to persuade the rest of the world to forget its earlier violations and allow it to move forward under existing rules. After 2005, Ahmadinejad reflected this strategy in declaring that Iran will exercise without interruption of its “rights” to all nuclear technologies and activities under IAEA safeguards.<sup>39</sup> The government insisted on being righteous and just.<sup>40</sup> Since then, Iran has accelerated its uranium enrichment program and appears to be well on the way to developing an independent fuel cycle and missile technologies, all the while claiming that its nuclear program is solely for energy and other “peaceful purposes” consistent with Article IV of the NPT. The bottom line is that even while breaking the rules, Iran has felt the need to justify its actions as being within the limits of what is permitted. This clearly reflects the understanding that the NPT and its rules have become the norm – although in this specific case, Iran is blatantly undermining the regime.

Likewise, the nuclear narratives of the other NAMs, which are truly committed to nonproliferation, are replete with references to their “inalienable right” to nuclear energy<sup>41</sup> stipulated by the NPT, and most of all, to the “obligations” of the NWS that are not being upheld. This means that they have clearly internalized the rules of the nonproliferation regime, but have in parallel become increasingly frustrated, and now demand the complete fulfillment of the pledges that were previously made. Lakhdar Brahimi, a former Algerian diplomat and signatory of the Global Zero declaration, summarized the NAM position as follows: “For us in the Non-Aligned Movement, the NPT was a historic bargain whereby the nuclear club members would progressively get rid of their nuclear arsenals, while the rest of us committed to not acquiring nuclear weapons. For all these years, alarmingly, there was no nuclear disarmament and far too much proliferation. Powerful voices are at long last rising from all corners of the world to revive and work for such an objective.”<sup>42</sup> Brahimi refers here to the Global Zero movement that calls for the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons by 2030.

In order to reach this goal, the NAMs go a step further and attempt to reframe their demand for nuclear disarmament with references to the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, international law, and international humanitarian law.<sup>43</sup> By the same token, they attack core concepts of traditional arms control. For instance, they insist that nuclear deterrence is a dangerous misguided belief system. By doing so, they try to delegitimize the possession of nuclear weapons by any state. They put greater emphasis on accelerating nuclear disarmament because it is perceived as fundamental to the sustainability of nonproliferation.<sup>44</sup> Even the recent debate on “Global Zero” in the US, triggered by former influential US officials, makes the argument in favor of nuclear abolition a legitimate item on the Western security agenda.

In any case, the NNWS change of discourse does not intend to call into question the entire nonproliferation order, whose final goal of nonproliferation and complete disarmament remains highly desired. Rather, it reflects the NAM and NNWS discontent over the institutional arrangements that have not delivered their promises over time. Therefore it is the time factor that is crucial in the loss of legitimacy of this specific aspect of the nonproliferation regime. From the very beginning, as an organization dedicated to promoting the needs of the developing world, the NAM states have traditionally devoted their energy to ensuring that the inequalities of the international political order are addressed. Yet today, time has passed and the compromise on which the NPT is based is not satisfying anymore. The inequitable deal is rendered less and less acceptable to the rest of the international community. As a result, the claims of discrimination and double standards resonate more widely. The discrimination between the “haves” and the “have nots” in the nuclear realm has always been a major factor reducing the legitimacy of the treaty, and today, after a few decades, it is becoming more acute. This type of discrimination is all the more unbearable for the “have nots,” as it cannot be justified as promoting another important principle, as, for example, the exceptions from Most Favored Nation requirements for developing countries in the WTO. They are the result of power differentials rather than principle.<sup>45</sup> In other words, not enough progress has been made regarding the disarmament pillar that was supposed to dilute the discriminatory effects of the nonproliferation pillar and strengthen the legitimacy of the regime. The expectation that the special rights of the nuclear weapon states would end at some point in the future has not been fulfilled and it provoked a

crisis.<sup>46</sup> Lastly, the above-mentioned perception that the West refuses to give the South the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology (the third pillar of the NPT) might further weaken the legitimacy of the regime.

In sum, it can be argued that we are not witnessing the disappearance of the normative value of the treaty and the associated regime. The norms of nonproliferation and disarmament have been institutionalized and the international community realizes that the nuclear proliferation threat is an issue of international peace and security and not merely a parochial US interest.<sup>47</sup> But the experience with the current institutional arrangement has been disappointing and is viewed by many states as lacking ongoing credibility.

## NPT Turn – India Example

**India nuclear acquisition proves NPT dramatically constrains effective diplomacy to limit prolif**

**Miller 18** [Nicholas L. Miller is an assistant professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. His book, Stopping the Bomb: The Sources and Effectiveness of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy, is forthcoming with Cornell University Press in April. North Korea and the Problem of Managing Emerging Nuclear Powers. March 25, 2018.<https://www.lawfareblog.com/north-korea-and-problem-managing-emerging-nuclear-powers>]

In dealing with unaligned and adversary states that have gone nuclear since the NPT, U.S. policy has been similarly hamstrung. India's nuclear weapons program has been a consistent irritant in relations with Washington since the first Indian test in 1974. As late as 1999, a year after both India and Pakistan tested several nuclear devices, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott wrote in the pages of Foreign Affairs, "The United States must remain committed to the long-range goal of universal adherence to the NPT. It cannot concede, even by implication, that India and Pakistan have by their tests established themselves as nuclear-weapons states with all the rights and privileges enjoyed by parties to the NPT, such as full international help in developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. To relent would break faith with those states that have forsaken a capability they could have acquired."

It ultimately took more than thirty years after India's first test for the United States to agree to resume peaceful nuclear trade with New Delhi, and obstacles persist in the actual implementation of this agreement, including disagreement over liability for nuclear accidents and Indian resistance to U.S. policies for keeping track of any nuclear material it transfers. The nuclear issue has arguably stood in the way of U.S. efforts to develop a closer strategic relationship with India in the context of China's rising power.

## NPT Turn – North Korea

**And, prevents cooperation on North Korea – causes war – independently, prevents striking a deal to curb missile exports**

**Miller 18** [Nicholas L. Miller is an assistant professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. His book, Stopping the Bomb: The Sources and Effectiveness of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy, is forthcoming with Cornell University Press in April. North Korea and the Problem of Managing Emerging Nuclear Powers. March 25, 2018.<https://www.lawfareblog.com/north-korea-and-problem-managing-emerging-nuclear-powers>]

U.S. policy toward North Korea since its first nuclear test in 2006 has displayed similar pathologies. As noted above, recent Trump administration efforts to achieve denuclearization have raised the risk of catastrophic war on the Korean Peninsula. But prior U.S. administrations also maintained that complete disarmament was the ultimate goal, which likely made it harder to achieve more pragmatic limits on North Korea's capabilities or to reach deals in other issue areas—for example, in reining in North Korea's dangerous nuclear and missile exports. Efforts to achieve total disarmament can make the perfect the enemy of the good, allowing nuclear threats to grow in the absence of any pragmatic restraints.

**They export to the middle east – causes instability and war**

**Ruggiero et al 6/7/18** [On June 7, Anthony Ruggiero, Kongdan (Katy) Oh, and Jay Solomon addressed a Policy Forum at The Washington Institute. Ruggiero is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a veteran of Treasury and State Department programs tasked with countering North Korea. Oh is a resident staff member at the Institute for Defense Analyses and coauthor of North Korea Through the Looking Glass. Solomon is former chief foreign affairs correspondent for the Wall Street Journal. The following is a rapporteur's summary of their remarks. North Korea in the Middle East: A Dangerous Military Supply Line. June 12, 2018. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/north-korea-in-the-middle-east-a-dangerous-military-supply-line>]

ANTHONY RUGGIERO

Iran's missile relationship with North Korea is robust—so much so that the Obama administration took the diplomatic risk of sanctioning Tehran for receiving materials from Pyongyang just one day after the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was implemented. In announcing that designation, the Treasury Department noted that senior Iranian officials had worked with North Korea for several years. As Pyongyang develops more advanced weapons, the relationship will become even more attractive to Iran, particularly if the Kim regime manages to produce a functional ICBM.

A more controversial question is whether the two countries have a nuclear relationship. North Korea could give Iran blueprints, testing data, lessons learned, and centrifuges. No definitive information exists in the public realm regarding the status of Pyongyang's enrichment efforts, but wherever they stand, Iran has the resources to buy assets from the program.

As for relations with Syria, reports that Bashar al-Assad is set to visit Kim Jong-un soon are not surprising. Although Israel destroyed Syria's North Korean-built nuclear reactor in 2007, neither Damascus nor Pyongyang suffered any lasting consequences for their proliferation activity, so it has continued. They have cooperated on ballistic missile development, with

multiple groups of North Korean technicians traveling to Syria and transferring special missile technology, including help with developing Scuds. Kim has also provided Syria with technology and materials used for the development of chemical weapons, such as acid-resistant tiles and associated valves, pipes, and cables.

Elsewhere, Pyongyang has formed export relationships with Persian Gulf states, including the United Arab Emirates and other U.S. partners that Washington may be hesitant to sanction. North Korean solid propellant for short- and medium-range missiles would be especially attractive to regional states and nonstate actors.

As it negotiates with the Trump administration, North Korea needs to come clean on all of its proliferation efforts. Pyongyang likely does not realize just how much the United States knows about its activities. Armed with copious intelligence data, American officials will usually be able to tell when their counterparts across the table are being honest, and to what extent they are serious about an agreement. North Korea has pledged to stop proliferating military technology in the past but continues to do it, so the administration's demands will have to be more specific in order to obtain meaningful changes.

North Korea likely learned from the JCPOA that cheating on nuclear deals is permissible, that limited deals can be exploited, that it can push the envelope on nuclear issues to extract concessions, and that its military sites are off limits. Yet Washington has hopefully learned some lessons as well.

First, the administration needs to be prepared to walk away from the table if necessary. Second, it should understand that nuclear-focused deals do not solve broader strategic problems. Third, it should avoid phased denuclearization, insisting on the Libya model of denuclearization instead (while refuting accusations that it is invoking that country's specter of regime change). Fourth, Washington should not give North Korea any relief until it makes real progress toward denuclearization. Yet if Kim is truly willing to commit to such progress, the administration should be prepared to negotiate "big for big."

China and Russia, the world's top sanctions evaders, are not partners in these negotiations. They no doubt expect the Trump administration to believe Kim's promises, make concessions, and fall into the trap of phased denuclearization. In the end, though, Chinese and Russian companies could wind up bearing the brunt of U.S. sanctions. Although no sanctions regime is foolproof, American authorities can enforce them in new ways to increase their effectiveness. For example, Washington has already identified and sanctioned North Korean shipping networks, but it could go further and start intercepting the vessels directly.

#### KONGDAN OH

North Korea's nuclear and missile relationship with Syria began during the reign of Kim Il-sung, and symbols of its depth abound, from the monument to the late ruler erected in Damascus to the numerous congratulatory remarks Assad sent when Kim's son assumed power. As for relations with Iran, Pyongyang built them on a foundation of blackmail and anti-American geopolitics.

In 1997, a North Korean delegation met with the Israeli ambassador in Stockholm, explained that their country had successfully tested a satellite missile, and warned that Iran and other Middle Eastern states were interested in buying it. They asked Israel for one billion dollars in exchange for withholding the missile technology from its enemies. The Israelis declined to give cash, but they did offer humanitarian aid, agricultural technology, medicine, and other assistance worth even more than a billion dollars. Pyongyang refused the deal, explaining that it would rather violate the Geneva Conventions than be held to purportedly biased standards intended to serve the United States.

Today, North Korea is changing internally. Its citizens have around 3.7 million cell phones and can directly contact people in parts of South Korea, China, and Russia. Such contacts will inevitably raise questions at home about the regime's ideology and legitimacy. Kim knows that he has to focus on economic development if his regime is to survive, but the Democratic People's Republic remains a very cash-poor society with minuscule foreign reserves.

Therefore, Pyongyang will likely keep any nuclear promises it makes if the price is right. To be sure, the JCPOA withdrawal has likely convinced the regime that the United States is unreliable, so North Korean officials may be less willing to adhere to a deal signed with Washington. Yet given their dire economic situation, they may decide to put aside their distrust and uphold agreements for economic benefits.

Meanwhile, North Korea's relationship with China is at a historic low. A few years back, President Xi Jinping sent an envoy to Pyongyang asking it to halt nuclear testing. Testing resumed shortly thereafter, though, producing tensions that persist today. Xi has met with Kim at least twice in recent months, but Chinese government mouthpieces have been very sarcastic and skeptical about the prospect of talks with Washington.

#### JAY SOLOMON

Stories about Pyongyang's involvement in the Middle East have been floating around for years, from North Korean pilots fighting in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, to North Korean engineers visiting Iran during its war with Iraq, to Israel's attempt at paying Pyongyang off as a way of preventing missile exports to the region. All of these stories are true, and the Kim regime continues to get away with such proliferation today.

In Syria, North Korea uses foreign shell companies to procure equipment for Damascus indirectly. These fronts have been found in Malaysia, Egypt, and across China, among other locations. The notion that Beijing is blind to such activities strains credibility. In essence, then, the international community's ability to curb North Korean nuclear proliferation depends on political will in these front countries.

Today, almost every state in the Middle East has some link to North Korean military systems. In Yemen, the government acquired some of Pyongyang's missile technology before the current war. As a result, the missiles that rebel Houthi forces are launching into Saudi Arabia may have input from North Korean sources—or Iranian sources, or both.

## Goes nuclear – weapon acquisition is a unique threat

**Rafalovich 18** [journalist based in Brussel, who has 50 years of experience including international postings in Tel-Aviv, Brussels, Germany and Washington, DC (Israel, "The Middle East in Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons Capabilities," <https://www.offiziere.ch/?p=33413>)]

The Middle East is likely to face more instability in the near future and the incentives for maintaining or acquiring nuclear weapons are likely to increase. In this case, Middle East conflicts could easily escalate into nuclear standoffs in a region bereft of tempering international bodies or adequate mechanisms for conflict resolution. A factor that looms large behind Middle East aspirations for nuclear weapons is power and influence in regional and international politics.

## Global war

**Dervis 17** [Kemal, Senior Fellow in the Global Economy and Development program, and the Edward M. Bernstein Scholar. He was Vice President and Director of the program from April 2009 to November 2017. Formerly head of the United Nations Development Programme and

Minister of Economic Affairs of Turkey, he focuses on global economics, emerging markets, European issues, development and international institutions. "Is another debt crisis on the way?" 2017. <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/is-another-debt-crisis-on-the-way/>]

That said, geopolitical risks should not be discounted. While markets tend to shrug off localized political crises and even larger geopolitical challenges, some dramas may be set to spin out of control. In particular, the North Korean nuclear threat remains acute, with the possibility of a sudden escalation raising the risk of conflict between the U.S. and China.

The Middle East remains another source of serious instability, with tensions in the Gulf having intensified to the point that hostilities between Iran and Saudi Arabia and/or turmoil within Saudi Arabia are not unthinkable. In this case, it is Russia that might end up clashing with the U.S.

Even barring such a major geopolitical upheaval, which would severely damage the global economy's prospects in the short run, serious medium- and long-term risks loom. Rising income inequality, exacerbated by the mismatch between skills and jobs in the digital age, will impede growth, unless a wide array of difficult structural reforms are implemented, including reforms aimed at constraining climate change.

## NPT Turn – Opaque Prolif

**That's worse than typical prolif, and cause nuke terror**

**Wesley 5** [Michael Wesley, Ph.D. in International Relations and Director of the Asia Institute – Griffith University. Its Time to Scrap the NPT. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 59(3), p. 283-284]

My central argument is that the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons will probably continue at the rate of one or two additional nuclear weapons states per decade, whether or not the NPT is retained. Persisting with the NPT will make this proliferation much more dangerous than if the NPT is replaced with a more practical regime. I argue that the NPT is a major cause of opaque proliferation, which is both highly destabilising and makes use of transnational smuggling networks which are much more likely than states to pass nuclear components to terrorists. On the other hand, scrapping the NPT in favour of a more realistic regime governing the possession of nuclear weapons would help put transnational nuclear smuggling networks out of business and stabilise the inevitable spread of nuclear weapons.

## India-Pakistan Contention Answers

### **Pakistan doesn't trust anything because India uses ambiguity and psychological warfare despite having an NFU**

Kurita 17 [Masahiro KURITA Research Fellow, Asia and Africa Division, Regional Studies Department, National Institute for Defense Studies. Discussion on the Reconsideration of "No First Use" in India's Nuclear Doctrine. July 2017.  
[www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/briefing/pdf/2017/briefing\\_e201707.pdf](http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/briefing/pdf/2017/briefing_e201707.pdf)]

Nevertheless, taking into account the presence of such weapons development and Pakistan's long-held suspicions on the credibility of India's NFU, there is room for India to complicate Pakistan's calculations through showing signs of its shift toward the large-scale first strike option. Already, several commentators have presented the view that India is now attempting to apply "psychological warfare" through the use of such ambiguity. In addition, based on Menon's explanation, even if such an option were to be adopted, it is not certain if this would be apparent to external parties. According to Menon, a first strike in the face of an imminent nuclear attack by an adversary falls under a "gray area"

of India's current NFU, and the existing nuclear doctrine does not state whether such an attack would be allowed or not. In other words, this means that even if no changes were made to the NFU in terms of the wording used in the doctrine, we cannot eliminate the possibility that India is adopting the first strike option. This is considered to further complicate Pakistan's calculations.

The problem is that, regardless of the truth of whether or not India plans to change its policy, there is a strong possibility that Pakistan would act based on the premise that India is introducing such an option. For example, Rajagopalan points out that while India and Pakistan have maintained a relatively low level of nuclear readiness till now, and have stored nuclear warheads separately from their delivery vehicles in peacetime, if Pakistan were to perceive a serious threat of a large-scale counterforce first strike by India, it would raise its alert level. Ultimately, this would increase the risk of "inadvertent" nuclear use. In light of the presence of such a risk, even if India's nuclear doctrine does not move away from the NFU in the near future, the international community would still be called upon to pay close attention to such a debate and actual policy developments in both India and Pakistan.

## No impact --- weapons are dealerted and escalation checks stop conflict

**Ghoshal 16** [Research Associate at the Delhi Policy Group (Debalina, “India’s Recessed Deterrence Posture: Prospects and Implications,” The Washington Quarterly, 39:1, 159-170]

The theory behind India’s nuclear missile program is ‘induction without deployment.’<sup>15</sup> As Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, another nuclear expert, writes, **the Indian** military is clear that induction is meant for peacetime, while deployment is a wartime activity.<sup>16</sup> A **recessed deterrent posture**, hence, puts a lesser burden on its command and control and **enables New Delhi to clarify for the world** the difference between **its** induction **program** and a deployment program (should New Delhi wish to deploy the weapons). Nuclear deterrence usually comes just from the mere possession of such weapons. Therefore, the need to keep these nuclear weapons in a ready deterrent posture does not make sense, but instead adds to insecurity and instability. In fact, Lt. General B.M. Kapur has argued that “if range, target, yield, and mobility of nuclear weapons are made known to the enemy, that is the beginning of deterrence. Openness is itself deterrence.”<sup>17</sup> For instance, even though the Agni-V missile is neither deployed nor mated with nuclear warheads, the fact that New Delhi declares that the missile is capable of reaching targets in China—and that they are survivable against an enemy’s first-strike—could itself strengthen deterrence. Therefore, there is no need for India to keep nuclear weapons in ready deterrent posture to strengthen deterrence. **Recessed deterrence** thus **enables India to adopt** a strategy that is an amalgamation of **both openness and ambiguity**. India declared a state of possessing nuclear weapons, which is an openness that enabled New Delhi to strengthen its deterrent capability. However, the unassembled and semi-assembled states of its nuclear weapons and missile systems open the window of ambiguity regarding India’s nuclear weapons command and control issues (especially in the case of seabased deterrence) as well as its survivability and ability to launch a counterstrike, thereby further strengthening deterrence. Moreover, India has always projected itself as a firm supporter of nuclear disarmament. India has been the only state to call for a Nuclear Weapons Convention that would ban and eliminate nuclear weapons. While adopting a no-first-use policy is considered to be another vital step toward nuclear disarmament, nofirst-use is best ensured when states decide to not to keep their arsenal in a ready deterrent posture. How Can Recessed Deterrence Help? A posture of **recessed deterrence** offers a variety of benefits: **Allows for rational thinking**: When warheads are not mated with their delivery systems, **it gives a state more time to act rationally during times of crisis**. This has even more relevance when a state has a first-use policy. However, India, with a no-first-use policy, also gains from a recessed deterrence posture. In addition to the reasons given above, **the belief** that India’s warheads are not mated with their delivery systems **could give Pakistan reason not to clandestinely mate their own nuclear warheads with their delivery systems**. As former Defense Minister George Fernandes points out, if Pakistan strikes initially, the effects could be cataclysmic: “we [India] may [lose] a part of our population.” And after India’s retaliatory strikes on Pakistan, “Pakistan may [be] completely wiped out.”<sup>18</sup> This **irrationality and catastrophe** to an extent **has been prevented** not just because of New Delhi’s no-first-use policy, but also **because of its posture of keeping the nuclear weapons de-mated and de-alerted**. This provides a certain trust to Pakistan that New Delhi’s nuclear weapons are **not meant for warfighting**. Similarly, China has always been keen on avoiding nuclear “adventurism,” and a de-mated and de-alerted nuclear weapons posture coupled with no-first-use provides China the room to do so. **With both New Delhi and Beijing adopting a nofirst-use policy** (though the policy is conditional), **their de-mated and de-alerted nuclear weapons posture could leave less scope for an irrational launch by either state, thereby keeping the nuclear threshold high**. Prevent an all out nuclear war: **Choosing not to mate delivery systems with nuclear warheads could prevent** an all out **nuclear war**. This posture is conducive for both Pakistan and India since **both states could feasibly engage in limited conflict under a nuclear umbrella**. Tensions between India and Pakistan regarding border issues and cross-border infiltration have **always been at a heightened state**, and episodes like the Kargil Conflict in 1999 could escalate to nuclear brinkmanship or even confrontation. In this case, **the fact that the nuclear arsenals of both countries were not in a ready deterrent posture provided sufficient time for de-escalation**. As Air Commodore Jasjit Singh wrote, **a recessed deterrent posture provides “a fire-break in escalation of tensions beyond a certain level since the adversary will have to calculate the consequences of its actions in terms of Indian responses.**” Could reduce reliance on nuclear weaponry: Since nuclear warheads are not mated with

delivery systems for Pakistan and for India, there will always be a sliver of doubt about their nuclear weapon preparedness during crises. Hence, each country will also rely heavily on conventional capability. Both India and Pakistan are making an effort to improve their conventional capabilities. In fact, in 2011, former Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf stated that since both India and Pakistan have “conventional strength to meet the challenges of war,” they do not have to “go unconventional right away.”<sup>20</sup> In fact, both New Delhi and Islamabad should aim to ban short-range nuclear capable missile systems and convert them into conventional roles, thus reducing reliance on nuclear weapons. Enhances survivability: Not only must a nuclear arsenal be survivable against a first strike by the potential adversary, but the adversary must perceive it to be so.<sup>21</sup> With India’s posture of recessed deterrence, an adversary may need to choose whether to destroy nuclear warheads or their delivery systems—not only are delivery systems demated, the missile components and nuclear warheads may be situated far away from each other. This choice could prevent adversaries from fully destroying each others’ nuclear forces—destroying nuclear warheads could prevent nuclear catastrophe that could have been inflicted in the adversary’s territory. On the other hand, an adversary could still launch a cataclysmic strike with the delivery systems by arming them with precision guided munitions, electromagnetic pulse weapons, or even cluster guided munitions. For example, in 2011 Musharraf raised doubts on the U.S. ability to destroy Pakistan’s nuclear weapons since they were de-mated. De-mated and de-alerted nuclear weapons could ensure strong modes of survivability of the nuclear arsenals. Prevents accidental launch of nuclear weapons: De-mating the nuclear warheads from their nuclear delivery systems could reduce the chances of an accidental launch of nuclear weapons. It could also prevent nuclear weapons from accidentally falling into the hands of non-state actors. It also reduces the burden on command-and-control systems, like Permissive Action Links (PALs) or bomber switch control systems, during peacetime.

### No Indo-Pak war

**Ladwig 15** – Walter C. Ladwig III, Lecturer in International Relations at King's College London, Ph.D. in International Relations from Merton College, Oxford, 2015 ("Indian Military Modernization and Conventional Deterrence in South Asia," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, May 11<sup>th</sup>, Taylor & Francis Online)

Headline grabbing increases in the Indian defense budget and a high-profile military modernization program have alarmed observers who worry that these developments could undermine the conventional military balance credited with maintaining 'ugly stability' in South Asia. While on their face these concerns have validity, upon deeper examination, there is still good reason to continue to be optimistic about the prospects for conventional deterrence. India's defense procurement continues to under perform, producing far less in terms of military power than its spending would suggest. Conversely, Pakistan –assisted by China and others –has prevented the emergence of sharp asymmetries in the conventional military balance and even narrowed previously existing gaps. Modernizing or not, the Indian military is capable of bringing far less force to bear in a limited conflict with Pakistan than the pessimists realize. As a result, it is unlikely that Indian policymakers would conclude that they can either achieve strategic surprise against Pakistan or carry out highly-effective air strikes with little escalatory risk, each of which is a necessary condition for deterrence failure. Consequently, Pakistan's justification for its current efforts to develop tactical nuclear weapons and delivery systems on security grounds lacks a firm foundation. These systems only increase the likelihood of an inadvertent nuclear exchange, while adding little to the deterrence value of Pakistan's force posture. There may be a variety of reasons why Islamabad is expanding and diversifying its nuclear arsenal, but a rational response to the threat posed by India's ongoing military modernization is not one of them.<sup>140</sup>

## US Will Not Use Nukes

### **No risk US will use nukes first now**

Jim Geraghty, August 19, 2019, <https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/no-first-use-a-solution-in-search-of-a-problem/>, No First Use: A Solution in Search of a Problem

Warren's proposed policy is a solution in search of a problem. Our current policy amounts to "no first use, probably, unless you really mess with us, and we'll decide when we think you're really messing with us." For all of the current problems in our government, we're not even contemplating using nuclear weapons against anyone, and whatever else hostile regimes are doing, they haven't done anything to even put that option on the table. If President Trump was threatening to nuke other countries three times a week, formalizing this policy change, or requiring congressional approval of a nuclear strike would make sense. As of this moment, the only lawmaker who has recently discussed an American first-use nuclear strike against a target is Congressman Eric Swalwell, who speculated about nuking his own constituents during a gun-control debate. (I could meet Warren halfway and support a no-first-use policy regarding the use of the U.S. nuclear arsenal against American citizens.) If there was a good chance that President Trump was going to order a nuclear strike on some country for no good reason, this policy change would make sense. But this is the president who's eager to play footsie with Kim Jong-un, who nods along to Vladimir Putin's nonsensical claims at joint press conferences, who's publicly expressing confidence in Xi Jinping during the clashes in Hong Kong, and who made a big show of calling off a military strike against Iran at the last minute. Despite all the bellicose rhetoric, Trump clearly wants to avoid a military conflict.

## General Prolif Answers

### No nuke terror

**Seitz 16** [Sam, Director of Nuclear Security Studies @ the Global Intelligence Trust. "Why WMD Terrorism Isn't as Scary as it Seems"

[https://politicstheorypractice.wordpress.com/2016/08/26/why-wmd-terrorism-isnt-as-scary-as-it-seems/\]](https://politicstheorypractice.wordpress.com/2016/08/26/why-wmd-terrorism-isnt-as-scary-as-it-seems/)

Of all the potential WMD terror attacks, nuclear attacks seem to generate the most fear among the public. This is not surprising. After all, nuclear weapons represent the pinnacle of humans' destructive potential, and Hollywood frequently utilizes nuclear weapons to drive the plot in movies ranging from Dr. Strangelove to The Avengers. Fortunately, though, there is very little risk of terrorists acquiring or detonating nuclear weapons, particularly in large, Western metropolises. The reason for this is simple; it is exceedingly difficult for terrorists to acquire and transport nuclear weapons without being detected and stopped. First, terrorists would have to break into heavily guarded facilities, likely in Russia or the United States, and steal weapons weighing multiple tons. Then, after securing the weapons, these terrorists would need to escape while being pursued by elite security forces. Assuming the terrorists are able to escape, they would then need highly skilled technicians to assemble the nuclear device, as nuclear weapons held in storage are almost always broken down into their constituent parts so as to prevent unauthorized use. The terrorists would have to do this while being sought after by the most powerful and well-funded intelligence networks in the world, and would then need to transport the nuclear device into a major city without being detected. According to John Mueller, an expert on nuclear terrorism at Ohio State University, the risk of a successful nuclear terrorist attack occurring is, therefore, less than one in three billion (1).

Certain analysts contend that while the risk of terrorists stealing nuclear weapons is low, it is possible that terrorists might simply construct their own nuclear devices instead. This scenario is even less likely than nuclear theft, though, as the production of nuclear weapons is an exceedingly complicated task. Terrorists would need highly specific blueprints detailing how to construct a nuclear device, access to highly enriched uranium or plutonium, and a secure, well-equipped site to construct the weapon. As Mueller points out, the odds of all of these conditions being met are quite low. Moreover, the need for so many complex and uncommon materials – highly enriched uranium, heavy industrial equipment, etc. – would raise suspicion among intelligence analysts, increasing the chance of detection. Even if intelligence agencies missed these clues one of the many middle-men used to acquire these materials might inform on the terrorist network, either for profit or because of moral qualms (1).

### Prolif impact is totally wrong

**Walt 12** [Stephen Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, Foreign Policy, "The mother of all worst-case assumptions about Iran", [http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/11/30/the\\_mother\\_of\\_all\\_worst\\_case\\_assumptions\\_about\\_iran](http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/11/30/the_mother_of_all_worst_case_assumptions_about_iran)]

Yet this "mother of all assumptions" is simply asserted and rarely examined. The obvious question to ask is this: did prior acts of nuclear proliferation have the same fearsome consequences that Iran hawks now forecast? The answer is no. In fact, the spread of nuclear weapons has had remarkably little impact on the basic nature of world politics and the ranking of major powers. The main effect of the nuclear revolution has been to induce greater caution in the behavior of both those who

possessed the bomb and anyone who had to deal with a nuclear-armed adversary. Proliferation has not transformed weak states into influential global actors, has not given nuclear-armed states the ability to blackmail their neighbors or force them to kowtow, and it has not triggered far-reaching regional arms races. In short, fears that an Iranian bomb would transform regional or global politics have been greatly exaggerated; one might even say that they are just a lot of hooey. Consider the historical record. Did the world turn on its axis when the mighty Soviet Union tested its first bomb in 1949? Although alarmist documents like NSC-68 warned of a vast increase in Soviet influence and aggressiveness, Soviet nuclear development simply reinforced the caution that both superpowers were already displaying towards each other. The United States already saw the USSR as an enemy, and the basic principles of containment were already in place. NATO was being formed before the Soviet test and Soviet dominance of Eastern Europe was already a fait accompli. Having sole possession of the bomb hadn't enabled Truman to simply dictate to Stalin, and getting the bomb didn't enable Stalin or his successors to blackmail any of their neighbors or key U.S. allies. It certainly didn't lead any countries to "reorient their political alignment toward Moscow." Nikita Khrushchev's subsequent missile rattling merely strengthened the cohesion of NATO and other U.S.-led alliances, and we now know that much of his bluster was intended to conceal Soviet strategic inferiority. Having a large nuclear arsenal didn't stop the anti-communist uprisings in East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, or Poland, and didn't allow the Soviet Union to win in Afghanistan. Nor did it prevent the USSR from eventually collapsing entirely. Did British and French acquisition of nuclear weapons slow their decline as great powers? Not in the slightest. Having the force de frappe may have made De Gaulle feel better about French prestige and having their own deterrent made both states less dependent on America's security umbrella, but it didn't give either state a louder voice in world affairs or win them new influence anywhere. And you might recall that Britain couldn't get Argentina to give back the Falklands by issuing nuclear threats -- even though Argentina had no bomb of its own and no nuclear guarantee -- they had to go retake the islands with conventional forces. Did China's detonation of a bomb in 1964 suddenly make them a superpower? Hardly. China remained a minor actor on the world stage until it adopted market principles, and its rising global influence is due to three decades of economic growth, not a pile of nukes. And by the way, did getting a bomb enable Mao Zedong--a cruel megalomaniac who launched the disastrous Great Leap Forward in 1957 and the destructive Cultural Revolution in the 1960s -- to start threatening and blackmailing his neighbors? Nope. In fact, China's foreign policy behavior after 1964 was generally quite restrained. What about Israel? Does Israel's nuclear arsenal allow it to coerce its neighbors or impose its will on Hezbollah or the Palestinians? No. Israel uses its conventional military superiority to try to do these things, not its nuclear arsenal. Indeed, Israel's bomb didn't even prevent Egypt and Syria from attacking it in October 1973, although it did help convince them to limit their aims to regaining the territory they had lost in 1967. It is also worth noting that Israel's nuclear program did not trigger a rapid arms race either. Although states like Iraq and Libya did establish their own WMD programs after Israel got the bomb, none of their nuclear efforts moved very rapidly or made it across the finish line. But wait, there's more. The white government in South Africa eventually produced a handful of bombs, but nobody noticed and apartheid ended anyway. Then the new government gave up its nuclear arsenal to much acclaim. If anything, South Africa was more secure without an arsenal than it was before. What about India and Pakistan? India's "peaceful nuclear explosion" in 1974 didn't turn it into a global superpower, and its only real effect was to spur Pakistan -- which was already an avowed rival -- to get one too. And it's worth noting that there hasn't been a large-scale war between the two countries since, despite considerable grievances on both sides and occasional skirmishes and other provocations. Finally, North Korea is as annoying and weird as it has always been, but getting nuclear weapons didn't transform it from an economic basket case into a mighty regional power and didn't make it more inclined to misbehave. In fact, what is most remarkable about North Korea's nuclear program is how little impact it has had on its neighbors. States like Japan and South Korea could go nuclear very quickly if they wanted to, but neither has done so in the six years since North Korea's first nuclear test. In short, both theory and history teach us that getting a nuclear weapon has less impact on a country's power and influence than many believe, and the slow spread of nuclear weapons has only modest effects on global and regional politics. Nuclear weapons are good for deterring direct attacks

on one's homeland, and they induce greater caution in the minds of national leaders of all kinds. What they don't do is turn weak states into great powers, they are useless as tools of blackmail, and they cost a lot of money. They also lead other states to worry more about one's intentions and to band together for self-protection. For these reasons, most potential nuclear states have concluded that getting the bomb isn't worth it. But a few states—and usually those who are worried about being attacked—decide to go ahead. The good news is that when they do, it has remarkably little impact on world affairs.

## No widespread prolif

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[http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS\\_AtomicKingdom\\_Kahl.pdf](http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_AtomicKingdom_Kahl.pdf)

Concerns over "regional proliferation chains," "falling nuclear dominos" and "nuclear tipping points" are nothing new; indeed, reactive proliferation fears date back to the dawn of the nuclear age.<sup>14</sup> Warnings of an inevitable deluge of proliferation were commonplace from the 1950s to the 1970s, resurfaced during the discussion of "rogue states" in the 1990s and became even more ominous after 9/11.<sup>15</sup> In 2004, for example, Mitchell Reiss warned that "in ways both fast and slow, we may very soon be approaching a nuclear 'tipping point,' where many countries may decide to acquire nuclear arsenals on short notice, thereby triggering a proliferation epidemic." Given the presumed fragility of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and the ready supply of nuclear expertise, technology and material, Reiss argued, "a single new entrant into the nuclear club could catalyze similar responses by others in the region, with the Middle East and Northeast Asia the most likely candidates."<sup>16</sup> Nevertheless, predictions of inevitable proliferation cascades have historically proven false (see The Proliferation Cascade Myth text box). In the six decades since atomic weapons were first developed, nuclear restraint has proven far more common than nuclear proliferation, and cases of reactive proliferation have been exceedingly rare. Moreover, most countries that have started down the nuclear path have found the road more difficult than imagined, both technologically and bureaucratically, leading the majority of nuclear-weapons aspirants to reverse course. Thus, despite frequent warnings of an unstoppable "nuclear express,"<sup>17</sup> William Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova astutely note that the "train to date has been slow to pick up steam, has made fewer stops than anticipated, and usually has arrived much later than expected."<sup>18</sup> None of this means that additional proliferation in response to Iran's nuclear ambitions is inconceivable, but the empirical record does suggest that regional chain reactions are not inevitable. Instead, only certain countries are candidates for reactive proliferation. Determining the risk that any given country in the Middle East will proliferate in response to Iranian nuclearization requires an assessment of the incentives and disincentives for acquiring a nuclear deterrent, the technical and bureaucratic constraints and the available strategic alternatives. Incentives and Disincentives to Proliferate Security considerations, status and reputational concerns and the prospect of sanctions combine to shape the incentives and disincentives for states to pursue nuclear weapons. Analysts predicting proliferation cascades tend to emphasize the incentives for reactive proliferation while ignoring or downplaying the disincentives. Yet, as it turns out, instances of nuclear proliferation (including reactive proliferation) have been so rare because going down this road often risks insecurity, reputational damage and economic costs that outweigh the potential benefits.<sup>19</sup> Security and regime survival are especially important motivations driving state decisions to proliferate. All else being equal, if a state's leadership believes that a nuclear deterrent is required to address an acute security challenge, proliferation is more likely.<sup>20</sup> Countries in conflict-prone neighborhoods facing an "enduring rival"—especially countries with inferior conventional military capabilities vis-à-vis their opponents or those that face an adversary that possesses or is seeking nuclear weapons—may be particularly prone to seeking a nuclear deterrent to avert aggression.<sup>21</sup> A recent quantitative study by Philipp Bleek, for example, found that security threats, as measured by the frequency and intensity of conventional militarized disputes, were highly correlated with decisions to launch nuclear weapons programs and eventually acquire the bomb.<sup>22</sup> The Proliferation Cascade Myth Despite repeated warnings since the dawn of the nuclear age of an inevitable deluge of nuclear proliferation, such fears have thus far proven largely unfounded. Historically, nuclear restraint is the rule, not the exception – and the degree of restraint has actually increased over time. In the first two decades of the

nuclear age, five nuclear-weapons states emerged: the United States (1945), the Soviet Union (1949), the United Kingdom (1952), France (1960) and China (1964). However, in the nearly 50 years since China developed nuclear weapons, only four additional countries have entered (and remained in) the nuclear club: Israel (allegedly in 1967), India ("peaceful" nuclear test in 1974, acquisition in late-1980s, test in 1998), Pakistan (acquisition in late-1980s, test in 1998) and North Korea (test in 2006).<sup>23</sup> This significant slowdown in the pace of proliferation occurred despite the widespread dissemination of nuclear know-how and the fact that the number of states with the technical and industrial capability to pursue nuclear weapons programs has significantly increased over time.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, in the past 20 years, several states have either given up their nuclear weapons (South Africa and the Soviet successor states Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine) or ended their highly developed nuclear weapons programs (e.g., Argentina, Brazil and Libya).<sup>25</sup> Indeed, by one estimate, 37 countries have pursued nuclear programs with possible weaponsrelated dimensions since 1945, yet the overwhelming number chose to abandon these activities before they produced a bomb. Over time, **the number of nuclear reversals has grown while the number of states initiating programs** with possible military dimensions **has markedly declined.**<sup>26</sup> Furthermore – especially since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) went into force in 1970 – **reactive proliferation has been exceedingly rare. The NPT has near-universal membership** among the community of nations; only India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea currently stand outside the treaty. Yet the actual and suspected **acquisition of nuclear weapons by** these **outliers has not triggered widespread reactive proliferation** in their respective neighborhoods. Pakistan followed India into the nuclear club, and the two have engaged in a vigorous arms race, but **Pakistani nuclearization did not spark additional South Asian states to acquire nuclear weapons.** Similarly, **the North Korean bomb did not lead South Korea, Japan or other regional states to follow suit.**<sup>27</sup> **In the Middle East, no country has successfully built a nuclear weapon in the four decades since Israel allegedly built its first nuclear weapons.**

Egypt took initial steps toward nuclearization in the 1950s and then expanded these efforts in the late 1960s and 1970s in response to Israel's presumed capabilities. However, Cairo then ratified the NPT in 1981 and abandoned its program.<sup>28</sup> Libya, Iraq and Iran all pursued nuclear weapons capabilities, but only Iran's program persists and none of these states initiated their efforts primarily as a defensive response to Israel's presumed arsenal.<sup>29</sup> Sometime in the 2000s, Syria also appears to have initiated nuclear activities with possible military dimensions, including construction of a covert nuclear reactor near al-Kibar, likely enabled by North Korean assistance.<sup>30</sup> (An Israeli airstrike destroyed the facility in 2007.<sup>31</sup>) The motivations for Syria's activities remain murky, but the nearly 40-year lag between Israel's alleged development of the bomb and Syria's actions suggests that reactive proliferation was not the most likely cause. Finally, even countries that start on the nuclear path have found it very difficult, and exceedingly time consuming, to reach the end. Of the 10 countries that launched nuclear weapons projects after 1970, only three (Pakistan, North Korea and South Africa) succeeded; one (Iran) remains in progress, and the rest failed or were reversed.<sup>32</sup> The successful projects have also generally needed much more time than expected to finish. According to Jacques Hymans, **the average time required to complete a nuclear weapons program has increased from seven years prior to 1970 to about 17 years** after 1970, **even as the hardware, knowledge and industrial base required for proliferation has expanded** to more and more countries.<sup>33</sup> Yet throughout the nuclear age, many states with potential security incentives to develop nuclear weapons have nevertheless abstained from doing so.<sup>34</sup> Moreover, contrary to common expectations, recent statistical research shows that states with an enduring rival that possesses or is pursuing nuclear weapons are not more likely than other states to launch nuclear weapons programs or go all the way to acquiring the bomb, although they do seem more likely to explore nuclear weapons options.<sup>35</sup> This suggests that **a rival's acquisition of nuclear weapons does not inevitably drive proliferation decisions.** One reason that reactive proliferation is not an automatic response to a rival's acquisition of nuclear arms is the fact that security calculations can cut in both directions. Nuclear weapons might deter outside threats, but **leaders have to weigh** these **potential gains against the possibility that seeking nuclear weapons would make the country or regime less secure by triggering a regional arms race or a preventive attack by outside powers.** Countries also have to consider the possibility that **pursuing nuclear weapons will produce strains in strategic relationships with key allies** and security patrons. If a state's leaders conclude that their overall security would decrease by building a bomb, they are not likely to do so.<sup>36</sup> Moreover, although security considerations are often central, they are rarely sufficient to motivate states to develop nuclear weapons. Scholars have noted the importance of other factors, most notably the perceived effects of nuclear weapons on a country's relative status and influence.<sup>37</sup> Empirically, the most highly motivated states seem to be those with leaders that simultaneously believe a nuclear deterrent is essential to counter an existential threat and view nuclear weapons as crucial for maintaining or enhancing their international status and influence. Leaders that see their country as naturally at odds with, and naturally equal or superior to, a threatening external foe appear to be especially prone to pursuing nuclear weapons.<sup>38</sup> Thus, as Jacques Hymans argues, extreme levels of fear and pride often "combine to produce a very strong tendency to reach for the bomb."<sup>39</sup> Yet here too, leaders contemplating acquiring nuclear weapons have to balance the possible increase to their prestige and influence against the normative and reputational costs associated with violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). If a country's leaders fully embrace the principles and norms embodied in the NPT, highly value positive

diplomatic relations with Western countries and see membership in the “community of nations” as central to their national interests and identity, they are likely to worry that developing nuclear weapons would damage (rather than bolster) their reputation and influence, and thus they will be less likely to go for the bomb.<sup>40</sup> In contrast, countries with regimes or ruling coalitions that embrace an ideology that rejects the Western dominated international order and prioritizes national self-reliance and autonomy from outside interference seem more inclined toward proliferation regardless of whether they are signatories to the NPT.<sup>41</sup> Most countries appear to fall in the former category, whereas only a small number of “rogue” states fit the latter. According to one count, before the NPT went into effect, more than 40 percent of states with the economic resources to pursue nuclear programs with potential military applications did so, and very few renounced those programs. Since the inception of the nonproliferation norm in 1970, however, only 15 percent of economically capable states have started such programs, and nearly 70 percent of all states that had engaged in such activities gave them up.<sup>42</sup> The prospect of being targeted with economic sanctions by powerful states is also likely to factor into the decisions of would-be proliferators. Although sanctions alone proved insufficient to dissuade Iraq, North Korea and (thus far) Iran from violating their nonproliferation obligations under the NPT, this does not necessarily indicate that sanctions are irrelevant. A potential proliferator’s vulnerability to sanctions must be considered. All else being equal, the more vulnerable a state’s economy is to external pressure, the less likely it is to pursue nuclear weapons. A comparison of states in East Asia and the Middle East that have pursued nuclear weapons with those that have not done so suggests that countries with economies that are highly integrated into the international economic system – especially those dominated by ruling coalitions that seek further integration – have historically been less inclined to pursue nuclear weapons than those with inward-oriented economies and ruling coalitions.<sup>43</sup> A state’s vulnerability to sanctions matters, but so too does the leadership’s assessment regarding the probability that outside powers would actually be willing to impose sanctions. Some would-be proliferators can be easily sanctioned because their exclusion from international economic transactions creates few downsides for sanctioning states. In other instances, however, a state may be so vital to outside powers – economically or geopolitically – that it is unlikely to be sanctioned regardless of NPT violations. Technical and Bureaucratic Constraints In addition to motivation to pursue the bomb, a state must have the technical and bureaucratic wherewithal to do so. This capability is partly a function of wealth. Richer and more industrialized states can develop nuclear weapons more easily than poorer and less industrial ones can; although as Pakistan and North Korea demonstrate, cash-strapped states can sometimes succeed in developing nuclear weapons if they are willing to make enormous sacrifices.<sup>44</sup> A country’s technical know-how and the sophistication of its civilian nuclear program also help determine the ease and speed with which it can potentially pursue the bomb. The existence of uranium deposits and related mining activity, civilian nuclear power plants, nuclear research reactors and laboratories and a large cadre of scientists and engineers trained in relevant areas of chemistry and nuclear physics may give a country some “latent” capability to eventually produce nuclear weapons. Mastery of the fuel-cycle – the ability to enrich uranium or produce, separate and reprocess plutonium – is particularly important because this is the essential pathway whereby states can indigenously produce the fissile material required to make a nuclear explosive device.<sup>45</sup> States must also possess the bureaucratic capacity and managerial culture to successfully complete a nuclear weapons program. Hymans convincingly argues that many recent would-be proliferators have weak state institutions that permit, or even encourage, rulers to take a coercive, authoritarian management approach to their nuclear programs. This approach, in turn, politicizes and ultimately undermines nuclear projects by gutting the autonomy and professionalism of the very scientists, experts and organizations needed to successfully build the bomb.<sup>46</sup> Alternative Sources of Nuclear Deterrence Historically, the availability of credible security guarantees by outside nuclear powers has provided a potential alternative means for acquiring a nuclear deterrent without many of the risks and costs associated with developing an indigenous nuclear weapons capability. As Bruno Tertrais argues, nearly all the states that developed nuclear weapons since 1949 either lacked a strong guarantee from a superpower (India, Pakistan and South Africa) or did not consider the superpower’s protection to be credible (China, France, Israel and North Korea). Many other countries known to have pursued nuclear weapons programs also lacked security guarantees (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Libya, Switzerland and Yugoslavia) or thought they were unreliable at the time they embarked on their programs (e.g., Taiwan). In contrast, several potential proliferation candidates appear to have abstained from developing the bomb at least partly because of formal or informal extended deterrence guarantees from the United States (e.g., Australia, Germany, Japan, Norway, South Korea and Sweden).<sup>47</sup> All told, a recent quantitative assessment by Bleek finds that security assurances have empirically significantly reduced proliferation proclivity among recipient countries.<sup>48</sup> Therefore, if a country perceives that a security guarantee by the United States or another nuclear power is both available and credible, it is less likely to pursue nuclear weapons in reaction to a rival developing them. This option is likely to be particularly attractive to states that lack the indigenous capability to develop nuclear weapons, as well as states that are primarily motivated to acquire a nuclear deterrent by security factors (as opposed to status-related motivations) but are wary of the negative consequences of proliferation.

## The threat of first strike is key to allied assurance---the plan causes rapid prolif and breaks the alliance.

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US nuclear capabilities also provide unique support for the assurance of allies. US assurance efforts are meant to create or reinforce confidence among allies and partners with regard to the US ability and will to help ensure their security against external threats. There is a long, bipartisan history of US and allied recognition of the contributions of nuclear weapons to US assurance efforts.<sup>33</sup> It is equally important to note that most US allies fully reject the notion that US nonnuclear capabilities alone are adequate for US extended deterrence purposes and thus, their assurance. Indeed, the long-standing evidence is overwhelming that many allies see US nuclear capabilities as an essential component of deterrence and assurance,<sup>34</sup> and recent key NATO documents continue to highlight the consensus NATO position that nuclear weapons remain essential to NATO deterrence capabilities.<sup>35</sup> There is no indication that this perspective among allies is shifting in favor of substituting US conventional forces for this purpose. Indeed, Russia's war against Georgia in 2008, and annexation of part of the Ukraine in 2014, and China's ongoing expansionist actions in the East China Sea, appear to have reinforced the importance of US nuclear weapons for at least some key allies. As Hans Rühle, former head of the Policy Planning Staff in the German Ministry of Defense, recently observed regarding US allies and US extended nuclear deterrence: These states derive their security from a predictable international system—a system that is still upheld by the United States, including through the US nuclear umbrella. If the US were to reduce or even end its role as a nuclear protector, the security perceptions of its allies would change radically—and in some cases could even lead them to reconsider their attitudes vis-à-vis nuclear possession. The result could well be the largest wave of proliferation since the dawn of the nuclear age. ...US extended deterrence is a most effective non-proliferation tool and must be sustained for the deterrence of aggression, the assurance of allies and non-proliferation purposes.<sup>36</sup> While the primary audiences for US deterrence messaging are adversaries and potential adversaries, the primary audiences for US assurance efforts are allies and partner countries. US deterrence and assurance goals are closely related and “two sides of the same coin.” For example, the credibility of US extended deterrence commitments to allies (e.g., the US “nuclear umbrella”) is a key to their assurance, and a primary reason many have agreed to forego acquisition of their own independent nuclear deterrent capabilities. Indeed, following North Korea's nuclear tests, the United States reaffirmed its “unwavering and ironclad alliance commitments,” to the ROK and Japan, “and emphasize[d] that U.S. extended deterrence commitments are guaranteed by the full spectrum of U.S. military capabilities, including conventional, nuclear, and missile defense capabilities.”<sup>37</sup> However, deterrence and assurance are separate goals and may require different supporting strategies and capabilities. One difference is reflected in the “Healey Theorem.” To wit, Denis Healey, a British Defense Minister during the Cold War, famously observed that US deterrence strategy required five percent credibility to deter the Soviet Union, but 95 percent credibility to assure allies.<sup>38</sup> The United States has extended nuclear deterrence and assurance commitments to more than 30 countries around

the world—including North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, Japan, South Korea and Australia—to address their unique threat circumstances. Just as deterrence efforts are best tailored to specific adversaries, so too are US assurance efforts. US assurance efforts can include all forms of US power, military and political. For example, the most recent NATO communiqué issued in Warsaw in July 2016, states that: “To protect and defend our indivisible security and our common values, the Alliance must and will continue fulfilling effectively all three core tasks as set out in the Strategic Concept: collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security. These tasks remain fully relevant, are complementary, and contribute to safeguarding the freedom and security of all Allies.”<sup>39</sup> In October 2016, then-Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter “reaffirmed the continued U.S. commitment to provide extended deterrence for the ROK using the full range of military capabilities, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities.” In addition, he “also reiterated the long-standing U.S. policy that any attack on the United States or its allies will be defeated, and any use of nuclear weapons will be met with an effective and overwhelming response.”<sup>40</sup>

In the contemporary highly-charged threat environment, the assurance of US allies and partners has become both increasingly relevant and challenging. Speaking of the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, Gen. Petr Pavel, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, stated, “Their concern is justified. They are living close to Russia. They face on a daily basis the effects of a continuous information and propaganda campaign.”<sup>41</sup> As the Healey Theorem suggests, providing assurance to allies may be even more challenging than establishing a credible deterrent to aggression. As Russia, China, and North Korea pursue aggressive foreign policies, US allies such as Japan, South Korea, and some NATO members are expressing increased concern about the US capabilities and credibility that underpin US defense commitments, including the US nuclear umbrella. Allied perceptions of declining US credibility could ultimately lead some allies to feel compelled to pursue independent responses to common threats, including independent nuclear deterrence capabilities. This development would, of course, significantly undermine long-standing US nuclear nonproliferation goals. Public opinion polls in South Korea already show strong support for an independent South Korean nuclear deterrent,<sup>42</sup> and a recent report by an official South Korean presidential advisory group recommended asking the United States to redeploy US nuclear weapons to the Korean peninsula.<sup>43</sup> As Robert Einhorn, a senior State Department advisor in the Obama Administration recently observed, South Korean leaders want the US nuclear deterrent to be strengthened, including, “by permanently stationing U.S. ‘strategic assets’ (such as nuclear-capable aircraft and perhaps even U.S. nuclear weapons) in South Korea.”<sup>44</sup> Former South Korean President Park Geun-hye stated in 2014 that if North Korea continues testing its nuclear devices, “It would be difficult for us to prevent a nuclear domino from occurring in this area.”<sup>45</sup> Correspondingly, former Vice President Joseph Biden has stated that Japan could go nuclear “virtually overnight” if the threat from North Korea is not dealt with.<sup>46</sup> Officials in Poland apparently are considering various options, including moving toward an independent form of deterrence: “Without measures to address the new nuclear threat environment in Europe, Poland is left with three options. The first is to accept the risk of falling prey to the ‘escalate to de-escalate’ doctrine. The second is to offer political concessions to Moscow and drift towards a ‘Finlandized’ status, in order to decrease the likelihood of a military attack by Russia. The third is to create a nonnuclear deterrent for Poland (similar in logic to the French and British nuclear deterrents) that would create an alternative decision dynamic for adversaries contemplating escalation.”<sup>47</sup> These examples illustrate the possible causes and consequences of US assurance strategies perceived as incredible in a rapidly deteriorating threat environment. Democratic and Republican administrations have long recognized that the great benefits of assuring allies and partners include nonproliferation and stronger alliance cohesion. In short, credible assurance has been and must again be a priority goal for US nuclear policy, including in the determination of the US nuclear force posture. Specific US Capabilities for Assurance The United States pursued a “second-to-none” assurance standard for its nuclear forces during the Cold War and in the George W. Bush Administration’s 2001 NPR, in part to contribute to the credibility of extended deterrence. In 2008 and 2009, the bipartisan US

Strategic Posture Commission held closed-door hearings with allied representatives on the subject of US nuclear capabilities and found that, “U.S. allies and friends in Europe and Asia are not all of a single mind concerning the requirements for extended deterrence and assurance. These have also brought home the fact that the requirement to extend assurance and deterrence to others may well impose on the United States an obligation to retain numbers and types of nuclear weapons that it might not otherwise deem essential to its own defense.”<sup>48</sup> For example, in 2010 a Japanese government report listed some of the US nuclear force requirements that Japanese officials perceived as necessary for credible assurance: “... not only possess and deploy an invulnerable nuclear force, but must also put in place an escalation control capability that will force potential aggressors to take the threat of nuclear retaliation seriously. Such capabilities must be underpinned by a superior damage-limiting capability made possible by a strong counterforce capability against the potential aggressor (the ability to effectively destroy the enemy’s nuclear strike force) and an effective strategic defense force.”<sup>49</sup> The US nuclear posture remains an important metric for the assurance of many allies in the contemporary international threat environment. As the NATO Warsaw Summit Communiqué states, “The strategic forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States, are the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies...” NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture also relies, in part, on United States’ nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe and on capabilities and infrastructure provided by Allies concerned. These Allies will ensure that all components of NATO’s nuclear deterrent remain safe, secure, and effective. That requires sustained leadership focus and institutional excellence for the nuclear deterrence mission and planning guidance aligned with 21st century requirements.<sup>50</sup> The Joint Communiqué of the 48th US-South Korea Security Consultative Meeting in Washington in October 2016 stated that part of the US extended nuclear deterrence response to the 2016 North Korean missile and nuclear tests was the B-52 deployment to South Korea and the “Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile demonstrations earlier this year at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.”<sup>51</sup> The Communiqué also endorsed the “tailored deterrence” of North Korea. US measures of nuclear posture adequacy must take into consideration the assurance needs of allies and partners, including the effects of an increasingly threatening security environment, and an emerging concern among some allies about the credibility of US commitments. As the 2010 NPR states, “A failure of reassurance could lead to a decision by one or more non-nuclear states to seek nuclear deterrents of their own, an outcome which could contribute to an unraveling of the NPT regime and to a greater likelihood of nuclear weapon use.”<sup>52</sup> As noted above, these pressures already are at play in some allied capitals. Lawmakers in South Korea’s ruling party recently called for the return of US non-strategic nuclear weapons to Asia or for starting their own nuclear weapons program as a way to increase their deterrence efforts against North Korea.<sup>53</sup> South Korean polling shows nearly two-thirds of the public support these ideas.<sup>54</sup> In Japan, Prime Minister Abe’s cabinet reportedly recently ruled that, “war-renouncing Article 9 of the Constitution does not necessarily ban Japan from possessing and using nuclear weapons.”<sup>55</sup> In addition, a panel of the ruling political party in Japan recently made an “urgent proposal” to the Abe government to procure long-range cruise missiles for deterrent and retaliatory purposes.<sup>56</sup> These developments signal the renewed importance of, and need for, US assurance efforts. As former US Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Scher recently stated, “If allies and partners conclude that they cannot rely on the United States to respond effectively to restore deterrence, they might opt to pursue their own arsenals, thus undermining our nonproliferation goals. These are conditions that would be truly dangerous and destabilizing.”<sup>57</sup> Former CIA Director Michael Hayden has described the situation vis-à-vis North Korea starkly: “By the end of Donald Trump’s first term, we could be facing an isolated, pathological little gangster state able to obliterate Seattle.” He suggested that response options include making, “U.S. missile defenses facing the Pacific Basin a lot stronger,” and that “we could even revisit the decision to pull American nuclear weapons out of South Korea, or the rate at which American nuclear-capable ships visit Chinese/Korean waters....”<sup>58</sup> In November 2016, a US Trident submarine reportedly made a port call at Guam to reinforce extended nuclear deterrence in the Asia Pacific region.<sup>59</sup> Clearly, assurance is a priority goal and US assurance efforts have the potential to include moves that the United States would be unlikely to consider in the absence of this priority goal. Damage Limitation In the event that deterrence fails, limiting damage has been and continues to be a US policy goal.<sup>60</sup> This continuity is reflected explicitly in numerous past nuclear policy documents, and most recently, implicitly, in the 2013 Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States.<sup>61</sup> There is an inherent linkage between the goals of deterrence and damage limitation. As then Assistant Defense

Secretary Robert Scher explained recently, “First, effective deterrence requires credibility. We sometimes distinguish between the ability to deter and the ability to achieve our objectives if deterrence fails, but the two are in fact inextricably linked. Deterrence is most effective when underwritten by forces, posture, and strategy that can credibly succeed in the event deterrence fails. At the opposite extreme, a deterrent without credibility would be no deterrent at all. The current US nuclear weapons employment strategy supports credible deterrence by sustaining a flexible range of plans and capabilities to provide options to the President in the event deterrence fails.”<sup>62</sup> Extending deterrence into a conflict, “intra-war deterrence,” is a primary form of damage limitation. The priority goal is to reestablish deterrence to minimize further damage to US military, political, and societal assets. This has been referred to as a strategy of “escalation control” that is intended to limit the escalation of a conflict, and thus its destructiveness. Robert Scher summarized US policy on this point recently, saying, “Regional deterrence requires a balanced approach to escalation risk that deters escalation, but also prepares for the possibility that deterrence might fail. We accept and convey the reality that no one can count on controlling escalation in a crisis or conflict... [but] we do not simply assume that escalation cannot be limited once the nuclear threshold has been crossed.... Possessing a range of options for responding to limited use makes credible our message that escalating to deescalate is dangerous and will ultimately be unsuccessful.”<sup>63</sup> Escalation control, or intra-war deterrence, to support the goal of damage limitation may be most possible with US nuclear options, including limited options, that can provide a proportionate response to any level of attack.<sup>64</sup> A renowned contributor to US nuclear deterrence theory, the late Herman Kahn, referred to this form of deterrence as Lex Talionis and emphasized its potential value.<sup>65</sup> The United States therefore should retain a spectrum of nuclear deterrent threat options as necessary to help support the goal of damage limitation via intra-war deterrence in the event deterrence fails.

## NPT Strong

### NPT collapse claims are unfounded—the global non-prolif regime is resilient

**Egeland 18** (Kjølv - Fellow at the Norwegian Academy of International Law, “Kill the NPT Collapse Thesis,” 7/20/18, <https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/kill-the-npt-collapse-thesis/>)

A number of analysts have in recent months contended that the NPT process is at risk of “crumbling” or is damaged “beyond repair”. But the fear-mongering is unfounded. In fact, the impending doom of the NPT has been prophesized again and again since the 1960s. However, not only is the NPT “collapse thesis” wrong, it is detrimental to the goals of non-proliferation and disarmament. The narrative that the NPT is endlessly on the verge of disintegration fuels the thinking that nuclear restraint is a painful sacrifice and implicitly calls on the NPT community to protect the status quo rather than to push for the advancement of the Treaty’s goals. The triumph of non-proliferation in the 1960s, several governments viewed the NPT with intense hostility. The German Cabinet Minister Franz-Josef Strauß branded the NPT a “Versailles of cosmic dimensions”. As late as 1978, the Chinese government described the Treaty as “a conspiracy concocted by the USSR and the U.S. to maintain their nuclear monopoly.” But over time, as the superpowers twisted their allies’ arms and the non-proliferation norm took hold, opposition to the Treaty waned. NPT sceptics such as Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, France, Germany, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, and Thailand all eventually joined. As of today, only five UN member states are not party to the NPT. Only a single state, North Korea, has withdrawn. Four of the NPT’s non-nuclear-weapon states parties have renounced nuclear weapons (South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan) and many more have reversed nuclear-weapon programmes. The poverty of the NPT collapse thesis is striking, however, that the remarkable period of non-proliferation norm consolidation from the mid-1960s till today has produced a ceaseless flood of expert assertions that the NPT is about to collapse. Proponents of the collapse thesis commonly argue that a continued reluctance by the nuclear-weapon states to move more decisively towards disarmament will push non-nuclear weapon states to “go nuclear” or defect from the NPT. In other cases, collapse theorists argue that proliferation by one state (India, North Korea, Iran...) will lead to a chain reaction whereby numerous other states will defect from the NPT and construct their own nuclear armories. The collapse thesis is often invoked in support of abolition. If the alternative to disarmament is NPT collapse and ensuing global pandemonium, so goes the argument, the nuclear-armed states might prefer to reduce and eliminate their nuclear arsenals. But the use of the collapse thesis as an argument for disarmament is in fact deeply counterproductive, let alone inaccurate. Based on the assumption that a large group of non-nuclear states are perpetually looking for reasons to arm themselves with weapons of mass destruction – implicitly representing nuclear restraint as a surrender of something positive – the collapse thesis upholds the trope that denuclearization is a struggle against nature. It supports the argument that meaningful disarmament measures can only be pursued once “those without nuclear weapons [...] feel no need to acquire them”. One version of the collapse thesis states that the NPT will, or could be, seriously damaged by a failure by its parties to reach a negotiated final document at two review conferences in a row. But the NPT has not only survived such “failures”, it has thrived and increased its membership. In fact, the sixth NPT Review Conference, in 2000, was the first such conference to reach consensus on a fully negotiated final document. The CTBT, START, and New START were negotiated on the back of the “failed” conferences in 1990 and 2005. Nevertheless, scholars and policy makers have continued to argue that two “failures” in a row could lead to calamity. Accordingly, following the 2005 Conference’s inability to reach a settlement, the parties were desperate to reach agreement in 2010. The result was the adoption of what one commentator described as a “feeble” disarmament document that largely recycled the commitments agreed to ten years before. Critics have argued that this cycle of intermittent “success” and “failure” creates a false sense of progress that merely perpetuates existing risks and power structures. The 2020 Review Conference As all review conferences before it, the NPT Review Conference in 2020 will no doubt prove a discordant affair. The nuclear-weapon states will talk about the “deteriorating security environment” and attempt to buy as much non-proliferation for as little disarmament as possible. Certain non-nuclear-weapons states, for their part, will attempt to trade concessions on non-proliferation for meaningful gains on disarmament. This “transactional” dynamic has been the defining feature of NPT diplomacy since the mid-1960s. And after more than half a century, the verdict must be that the process has generated considerably more heat than light. Worse, non-nuclear-weapon states’ attempts to use progress on additional non-proliferation measures as negotiating leverage for concessions on disarmament has arguably had the opposite of its intended effect. Intransigence on the development of more robust “supply side” non-proliferation measures has both fostered discord and suspicion, allowing the nuclear-weapon states to make further excuses for their lack of progress on disarmament, and worked against attempts at creating a stronger norm against nuclear weapons. The NPT is one of the most widely supported agreements in international society. The challenge facing its supporters is not one of damage-limitation or “protecting what we’ve got”. The primary challenge facing supporters of the NPT is to extend the disarmament norm. This can be done in the following ways: At the 2020 Review Conference, proponents of disarmament should abandon the transactional bargaining strategy and instead aim to devalue, delegitimize, and stigmatize nuclear weapons. Rather than using progress on non-proliferation as a bargaining chip, advocates of disarmament should embrace all meaningful non-proliferation measures and seek to extend the norms against nuclear proliferation, testing, and use to also cover nuclear modernization and possession. The “humanitarian initiative” and adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) are important contributions to this initiative. Proponents of disarmament should focus their efforts on norms and humanitarian principles. As long as nuclear weapons are viewed as useful, legitimate, and status-enhancing, the nuclear-weapon states will remain disinclined to implement “concrete” disarmament roadmaps such as the “13 Practical Steps” (2000) and NPT “Action Plan” (2010). Reaching Critical Will estimates that only 5 of the 22 disarmament actions agreed in 2010 were implemented by 2015. Proponents of disarmament should focus their efforts on creating the normative conditions for a future denuclearization process. NPT parties should not agree to a final document in 2020 at any cost. The NPT will not collapse. If no genuine progress can be made – whether on non-proliferation or disarmament –

parties should resist the temptation of agreeing to a final document only for the sake of appearing agreeable. Proponents of change should not sanctify the status quo. In the next review cycle, parties should scrap the traditional NPT model of “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” altogether. Rather than negotiating a technocratic, Stalinesque five-year plan that won’t be implemented, the parties should adopt a final document listing all specific views and proposals put forward, together with lists of the states that supported them. The parties should also consider a “gift basket” model as practiced at the Nuclear Security Summits, that is, to allow individual states or groups of states to adopt specific measures beyond those enjoying consensus. **The norm of non-proliferation has never been as uncontested as it is today. The NPT will not collapse.** The 2020 Review Conference should endeavour to further the Treaty’s aims, not rescue the status quo.

## Prolif Slow

### **Prolif is slow—nuclear weapons are time-consuming and states fear backlash**

**Hymans 14** (Jacques EC - associate professor of international relations at the University of Southern California, “No cause for panic: Key lessons from the political science literature on nuclear proliferation,” *International Journal*, Vol. 69(I), 85-93, DOI: 10.1177/0020702014521565)

In 1963, President John F. Kennedy declared himself “haunted” by the expectation that the club of nuclear weapon states would grow to 15 or even 25 members by the mid-1970s, unless the world could come together on a global nuclear test ban treaty.<sup>1</sup> Despite Kennedy’s efforts, his hoped-for Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty finally materialized only in 1996, and as of 2013 the treaty had still not yet garnered enough state adherents to enter into force.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, there are fewer than 10 nuclear weapon states in the world today, 50 years after Kennedy’s dark prediction. Why are nuclear weapons arsenals still so uncommon? Political scientists have wrestled with this puzzle ever since the proliferation issue surged to prominence after the end of the Cold War. Despite its diversity of theoretical and empirical approaches, the political science literature has come to a rough consensus on the slow pace of proliferation. Simplistic “realist” arguments that “nuclear weapons are a wonderful deterrent, that’s why states love them”<sup>3</sup> have been falsified—as the realists themselves increasingly acknowledge. Instead, scholars of proliferation point out that most states are naturally reticent to take a step that could unleash highly uncertain and potentially revolutionary consequences. It is therefore actually quite easy to understand why most states are not seeking to obtain the bomb; what is harder to understand is why a handful of states still do seem to want it. The political science literature also emphasizes that, despite global technical and economic progress since 1945, building nuclear weapons systems remains complex, costly, dangerous, and potentially very time-consuming. Therefore, even among the small number of genuine nuclear weapons aspirants, failure to achieve their ultimate goal is at least as likely as success. Indeed, in recent decades the failure rate has sharply increased. The overall political science finding of the great proliferation slowdown needs to be recognized by policy analysts focusing on single countries of concern, such as Iran or North Korea. Proliferation is a serious problem, but there is no cause for panic.

## AT: Nuke Terror

### No risk of nuclear terrorism

**Mearsheimer 14**—John J. Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago [“America Unhinged,” January 2, [nationalinterest.org/article/america-unhinged-9639?page=show](http://nationalinterest.org/article/america-unhinged-9639?page=show)]

Am I overlooking the obvious threat that strikes fear into the hearts of so many Americans, which is terrorism? Not at all. Sure, the United States has a terrorism problem. But it is a minor threat. There is no question we fell victim to a spectacular attack on September 11, but it did not cripple the United States in any meaningful way and another attack of that magnitude is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. Indeed, there has not been a single instance over the past twelve years of a terrorist organization exploding a primitive bomb on American soil, much less striking a major blow. Terrorism—most of it arising from domestic groups—was a much bigger problem in the United States during the 1970s than it has been since the Twin Towers were toppled.

What about the possibility that a terrorist group might obtain a nuclear weapon? Such an occurrence would be a game changer, but the chances of that happening are virtually nil. No nuclear-armed state is going to supply terrorists with a nuclear weapon because it would have no control over how the recipients might use that weapon. Political turmoil in a nuclear-armed state could in theory allow terrorists to grab a loose nuclear weapon, but the United States already has detailed plans to deal with that highly unlikely contingency.

Terrorists might also try to acquire fissile material and build their own bomb. But that scenario is extremely unlikely as well: there are significant obstacles to getting enough material and even bigger obstacles to building a bomb and then delivering it. More generally, virtually every country has a profound interest in making sure no terrorist group acquires a nuclear weapon, because they cannot be sure they will not be the target of a nuclear attack, either by the terrorists or another country the terrorists strike. Nuclear terrorism, in short, is not a serious threat. And to the extent that we should worry about it, the main remedy is to encourage and help other states to place nuclear materials in highly secure custody.

### No impact to arms races — empirics

**Sundstrom 15** — Ian Sundstrom, Surface Warfare Officer in the United States Navy, M.A. in war studies from King’s College in London, 2015 (“An East Asian Arms Race: Does it Even Matter,” *The Diplomat*, January 16<sup>th</sup>, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/an-east-asian-arms-race-does-it-even-matter/>, Accessed On 07-28-2016)

Whatever the case may be, most observers treat the concept of an arms race in Asia as self-evidently negative. But is that truly the case? Must an arms race have negative consequences for regional security and stability? Historical evidence and logic say no. Arms races do not lead inevitably to conflict. There are two fundamental requirements before states enter into wars: capability and intent. The first comprises military forces, economic wherewithal, and demographic factors, among other components. It is the means of war, money and guns. The second is the desire to embark upon war. It consists of a grievance, opportunity, or other cause de guerre, and the belief that war is the only, or even just the best, option available to achieve the desired outcome. An arms race involves only the capability side of the equation. Looking at the historical record demonstrates that the relationship between arms races and eventual war is not cause and effect. The classic case is the Anglo-German naval buildup before the First World War. The two countries did indeed rapidly expand their navies, and in the end they did go to war, but there was no obvious intention for war between the two

countries. Circumstances outside their control, separate from the arms race – a rigid alliance structure, sudden assassination, and widely-held belief in the social virtues of armed conflict – led Europe to war. Another interesting example is the interwar naval arms treaties involving the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan. Those countries actively limited their naval construction programs in the belief that naval armaments had been a factor in the rush to war in 1914 and correspondingly that preventing any change in the naval balance would relieve pressure. In the end, the treaties were broken by the Japanese because they were intent on imperial expansion and the three powers went to war. The final classic example is the nuclear arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States. In this case, a rapid arms buildup from the 1950s onward, spurred by such mistaken beliefs as the “Missile Gap” on the US side, did not result in war between the two states. As early as the 1960s, both sides had the ability to quite literally eliminate the other from the face of the Earth with their nuclear arsenals, but that did not change the situation. Neither side had any intention of engaging in either a nuclear or massive conventional war with the other. From these three examples it is clear that a simple argument that arms races lead to war is incorrect. The more interesting question when pondering arms races involves a potential adversary’s intentions. In the context of an East

Asian arms race, what are Chinese intentions? If we look at the historical record it does not seem that China’s expanding military will necessarily be used for aggressive campaigns. China last went to war in 1979, fighting a brief conflict with Vietnam in response to that country’s invasion of Cambodia the year before. Before that, it fought a short border war with India in 1962 after repeated border clashes as it sought to consolidate its control over Tibet. Earlier, in 1950, China went to war against the United Nations on the side of North Korea after Douglas MacArthur led his troops all the way to the Yalu River. If you take Beijing’s point of view, its wars have been defensive, to protect its interests and allies against aggression. That is, of course, what every nation that has ever gone to war believes, but from the outside China’s historical record is not obviously aggressive.

## Conventional Prompt Global Strike is not deploying now—DOD is slowing testing new tech to avoid ballistic trajectories

Woolf 4/6/18 (Amy F. - Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy at Library of Congress, “Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues,” p. 12-13, *Congressional Research Service*, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41464.pdf>)

The Conventional Strike Missile As the AOA drew to a close in 2008, the Air Force began to pursue the development of a system known as the conventional strike missile (CSM). It initially expected this missile to serve as a mid-term follow-on to the conventional Trident modification (CTM) program,<sup>45</sup> but after Congress refused to fund development of the CTM, the CSM became the earlier option for the PGS mission. Reports indicate that General Kevin Chilton, then the commander of STRATCOM, assigned the Air Force the lead role in developing the long-range missile capability for PGS in mid-2008.<sup>46</sup> According to DOD, the CSM was, at that time, the CPGS warfighting capability gap.<sup>47</sup> According to DOD, the CSM would have been a land-based system that used boost-glide technologies to deliver conventional payloads at near-global ranges, and to provide effects on target within minutes to hours of launch.<sup>48</sup> The CSM would not follow the standard ballistic trajectory of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. Its booster would launch with a lower-profile, or depressed, trajectory. The payload delivery vehicle (PDV), after separating from the launch vehicle, could maneuver to its target. This would not only provide it with high accuracy, it would be able to maneuver to avoid overflight of third-party countries.<sup>49</sup> With these capabilities, the CSM may mitigate some of the concerns about nuclear ambiguity raised by Congress during its review of the CTM program. According to Air Force plans, the CSM would have combined the Minotaur IV launch vehicle described above with a hypersonic payload delivery vehicle (PDV).<sup>50</sup> The first PDV would have been a weaponized version of the DARPA/Air Force HTV-2 vehicle. As an alternative, it could have been based on the Army advanced hypersonic weapon (AHW) that is described below.<sup>51</sup> Press reports indicate that General Chilton initially hoped that the CSM would reach an initial operational capability, with one missile on alert and two spares, by 2012. He later indicated that the missile might be ready for deployment in 2015.<sup>52</sup> These dates slipped, however, and, according to DOD officials, the program did not have an official deployment date because DOD had not concluded the research, development, and testing programs for the possible reentry bodies. DOD was not prepared to decide which technology would be deployed until the reentry bodies have been tested in five demonstration flights. This has not yet happened, and may not happen until later in the decade.<sup>53</sup> Prolif Leads to Peace

## Prolif Leads to Peace

### **statistical, controlled study prove proliferation leads to peace**

**Suzuki 15** (Akisato Suzuki, June 2015. Akisato, Researcher at the Institute for International Conflict Resolution and Reconstruction, School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, MA in Violence, Terrorism and Security at Queen's University, "Is more better or worse? New empirics on nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict by Random Forests," Research and Politics, SagePub)

Given these conflict-reducing/provoking effects of nuclear proliferation, what overall effect would nuclear proliferation have on a systemic propensity for conflict? This is difficult to answer, not only due to the controversy over whether nuclear states are more or less prone to conflict, but also because the existing theories do not explain whether those conflict-reducing/provoking effects are large enough to influence a systemic propensity for interstate conflict, given the ratio of nuclear states to non-nuclear states in the system. This challenge motivates the empirical examination of the relationship between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for conflict. Empirical investigation by Random Forests The interstate–systemic year data are used here to investigate the relationship between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for interstate conflict. The dependent variable is the number of militarized interstate dispute onsets (Palmer et al., 2015; version 4.01 is used) per systemic-year, standardized as the ratio to the number of states in the interstate system (Correlates of War Project, 2011) – hereafter, the 'dispute–state ratio'. Observations one year ahead ( $t+1$ ) are used to make sure that causal effects precede a variation in the dispute–state ratio. Two regressors are used to examine the effect of nuclear proliferation: the number of nuclear states in the interstate system; and a count of the years since the number of nuclear states changes (hereafter 'nuclear year counter'), measuring the effect of new nuclear states (Horowitz, 2009). The data about nuclear states are from Gartzke and Kroenig (2009); additionally, the current paper codes North Korea as a nuclear state since 2009 (Table 1).<sup>3</sup> The model also includes the number of democratic states (Polity2 score  $\geq 6$  in Marshall, 2013) in the interstate system, the gross world product (Earth Policy Institute, 2012), and the binary variable of unipolarity (coded zero until 1989 and one from 1990; see Monteiro, 2011/2012); these three variables control for democratic peace (Russett and Oneal, 2001), capitalist peace (Gartzke, 2007), and polarity (Monteiro, 2011/2012) respectively. The number of nuclear states and these control variables suffer from multicollinearity (see Table A-9 in the online appendix), and this paper later explains how to resolve this problem. A lagged dependent variable is also included to address the temporal dependence of time-series data. The temporal scope is 1950–2009 (i.e. N=59) due to the data availability and the use of the dependent variable at  $t+1$ . The descriptive statistics of all variables are displayed in Table 2.4. As mentioned in the introduction, this paper uses the machine learning, non-parametric method Random Forests for the empirical investigation.<sup>5</sup> Although it is unfamiliar to most political science and international relations analysts, Random Forests has been widely used in numerous scientific studies (Strobl et al., 2009: 324; Strobl et al., 2008). The popularity of the method is also apparent from the fact that Breiman's (2001) original paper has been cited 12,721 times in the literature.<sup>6</sup> Random Forests generates two useful analytics: first, 'conditional variable importance' measures how 'important' each regressor is, conditional on the remaining regressors (Hothorn et al., 2006; Strobl et al., 2007, 2008). This is analogous to statistical significance in conventional regression models. The significance threshold proposed by Strobl et al. (2009: 343) is whether the importance score of a regressor is negative, zero, or lower than the absolute value of the lowest negative score. If none applies, the regressor is considered as important; and the second relevant analytic is a partial dependence plot (Friedman, 2001). This estimates the marginal effect of each regressor on the dependent variable while taking the remaining regressors into consideration. Random Forests has three attractive and distinctive characteristics for the purposes of this paper: first, the estimation of conditional variable importance and partial dependence plots enable conventional applied researchers to interpret non-parametric analysis in an intuitive way; second, Random Forests can examine non-linearity (Strobl et al., 2009: 339–341), which is desirable because, as already noted, some theories expect non-linearity between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for conflict, and finally, it can cope with potential interactions and multicollinearity between regressors (Strobl et al., 2009: 339–341; Strobl et al., 2008). As noted before, most of the regressors here are highly correlated, and also it is plausible to anticipate some interaction effect between them (e.g. the number of democratic states and the gross world product). The specific capabilities of Random Forests are therefore essential. The estimation of conditional variable importance shows that the nuclear year counter has a negative importance score.<sup>7</sup> Thus, the nuclear year counter is not important in explaining the dispute–state ratio. This suggests that the optimist theory is supported. The remaining regressors have an importance score higher than the absolute value of the importance score of the nuclear year counter, meaning that they are all important. Controlling for democratic peace, capitalist peace, and polarity, the number of nuclear states is still a significant predictor in explaining a systemic propensity for interstate conflict. Figure 1 presents the partial dependence plots of the model.<sup>8</sup> First, on average, a larger number of nuclear states is associated with a lower dispute–state ratio, although the changes from two nuclear states to three and from six to seven increase the ratio instead. Thus, the relationship is empirically non-linear, as Bueno de Mesquita and Riker (1982) and Intriligator and Brito (1981) expected in part. Overall, however, the optimist theory is supported, and the change from two nuclear states to nine nuclear states decreases the dispute–state ratio approximately from 0.228 to 0.18. This means that, if there are 194 states in the system (as there were in 2009), the number of militarized interstate dispute onsets per system-year decreases approximately from 44 to 35. This is a substantively significant decline. Second, the nuclear year counter shows a concave relationship with the dispute–state ratio, suggesting that new nuclear states are less prone to conflict than middle-aged nuclear states. Thus, the pessimist theory finds no support from either the variable importance estimation or the partial dependence plot. Finally, as for the control variables, the number of democratic states and the gross world product have a complex non-linear

relationship with the dispute-state ratio, but if the number of democratic states and the gross world product are sufficiently large, they tend to decrease the dispute-state ratio. Their substantive effects are also significant, though not as much as the number of nuclear states. When comparing the effect of their lowest and highest values (23 and 94 in the number of democratic states and 7 and 71.2 in the gross world product), the number of democratic states decreases the number of militarized interstate dispute onsets per system-year approximately from 40 to 37, and the gross world product from 44 to 37.

Unipolarity is also associated with a decline in the dispute-state ratio, suggesting that unipolarity is better than bipolarity in terms of a systemic propensity for interstate conflict; however, its effect is negligible, as it reduces the number of militarized interstate dispute onsets per system-year from 39 to 38. One caveat is, as explained in the online appendix, that the results of the number of democratic states and unipolarity are significantly sensitive to a parameter setting. Thus, these predictors are less robust, and the aforementioned points about them should be treated with caution. Discussion and concluding remarks The main findings reveal that the optimist expectation of the relationship between nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict is empirically supported.<sup>9</sup> first, a larger number of nuclear states on average decreases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict; and second, there is no clear evidence that the emergence of new nuclear states increases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict. Gartzke and Jo (2009) argue that nuclear weapons themselves have no exogenous effect on the probability of conflict, because when a state is engaged in or expects to engage in conflict, it may develop nuclear weapons to keep fighting, or to prepare for, that conflict. If this selection effect existed, the analysis should overestimate the conflict-provoking effect of nuclear proliferation in the above model. Still, the results indicate that a larger number of nuclear states are associated with fewer disputes in the system. This conclusion, however, raises questions about how to reconcile this study's findings with those of a recent quantitative dyadic-level study (Bell and Miller, 2015). The current paper finds that nuclear proliferation decreases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict, while Bell and Miller (2015) find that nuclear symmetry has no significant effect on dyadic conflict, but that nuclear asymmetry is associated with a higher probability of dyadic conflict. It is possible that nuclear proliferation decreases conflict through the conflict-mitigating effects of extended nuclear deterrence and/or fear of nuclear states' intervention, to the extent that these effects overwhelm the conflict-provoking effect of nuclear-asymmetrical dyads. Thus, dyadic-level empirics cannot solely be relied on to infer causal links between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for conflict. The systemic-level empirics deserve attention.

## Prolif is stable despite differences in leaders and cultures

**Tepperman 9** (Jonathon, former Deputy Managing Ed. Foreign Affairs and Assistant Managing Ed. Newsweek, Newsweek, "Why Obama should Learn to Love the Bomb", 44:154, 9-7, L/N)

A growing and compelling body of research suggests that nuclear weapons may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous, as Obama and most people assume. The bomb may actually make us safer. In this era of rogue states and transnational terrorists, that idea sounds so obviously wrongheaded that few politicians or policymakers are willing to entertain it. But that's a mistake. Knowing the truth about nukes would have a profound impact on government policy. Obama's idealistic campaign, so out of character for a pragmatic administration, may be unlikely to get far (past presidents have tried and failed). But it's not even clear he should make the effort. There are more important measures the U.S. government can and should take to make the real world safer, and these mustn't be ignored in the name of a dreamy ideal (a nuke-free planet) that's both unrealistic and possibly undesirable. The argument that nuclear weapons can be agents of peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple observations. First, nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Second, there's never been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war between two states that possess them. Just stop for a second and think about that: it's hard to overstate how remarkable it is, especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th century. As Kenneth Waltz, the leading "nuclear optimist" and a professor emeritus of political science at UC Berkeley puts it, "We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It's striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states." To understand why—and why the next 64 years are likely to play out the same way—you need to start by recognizing that all states are rational on some basic level. Their leaders may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but they tend to do things only when they're pretty sure they can get

away with them. Take war: a country will start a fight only when it's almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price. Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didn't think they could win. The problem historically has been that leaders often make the wrong gamble and underestimate the other side—and millions of innocents pay the price. **Nuclear weapons change all that by making the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable.** Suddenly, **when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of a button—and everybody knows it—the basic math shifts. Even the craziest tin-pot dictator is forced to accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable and thus not worth the effort.** As Waltz puts it, "Why fight if you can't win and might lose everything?" Why indeed? **The iron logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction is so compelling, it's led to** what's known as **the nuclear peace: the virtually unprecedented stretch since the end of World War II in which all the world's major powers have avoided coming to blows.** They did fight proxy wars, ranging from Korea to Vietnam to Angola to Latin America. But these never matched the furious destruction of full-on, great-power war (World War II alone was responsible for some 50 million to 70 million deaths). And since the end of the Cold War, such bloodshed has declined precipitously. Meanwhile, the **nuclear powers have scrupulously avoided direct combat, and there's very good reason to think they always will. There have been some near misses, but a close look at these cases is fundamentally reassuring—because in each instance, very different leaders all came to the same safe conclusion.** Take the mother of all nuclear standoffs: the Cuban missile crisis. For 13 days in October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union each threatened the other with destruction. But both countries soon stepped back from the brink when they recognized that a war would have meant curtains for everyone. As important as the fact that they did is the reason why: Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's aide Fyodor Burlatsky said later on, "It is impossible to win a nuclear war, and both sides realized that, maybe for the first time." The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: **nuclear-armed enemies slide toward war, then pull back, always for the same reasons.** The best recent example is India and Pakistan, which fought three bloody wars after independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998. **Getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction didn't do anything to lessen their animosity. But it did dramatically mellow their behavior. Since acquiring atomic weapons, the two sides have never fought another war, despite severe provocations** (like Pakistani-based terrorist attacks on India in 2001 and 2008). **They have skirmished once. But during that flare-up, in Kashmir in 1999, both countries were careful to keep the fighting limited** and to avoid threatening the other's vital interests. Sumit Ganguly, an Indiana University professor and coauthor of the forthcoming India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, has found that on both sides, officials' thinking was strikingly similar to that of the Russians and Americans in 1962. The prospect of war brought Delhi and Islamabad face to face with a nuclear holocaust, and leaders in each country did what they had to do to avoid it.

### **AT: First Strike – no incentive to first strike – risk of arsenal survival is too high**

**Seng 98** (Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci.—U. Chicago, Dissertation, "Strategy for Pandora's Children: Stable NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES," p. 156)

In sum, **though Third World proliferators are likely to lack some of the technologies that dissipated preemptive incentives between the superpowers, they will also enjoy circumstances that allow them to protect their nuclear weapons from first strikes without those technologies.** In some situations of Third World proliferation, **preemptors will have to rely on bombers to deliver the preemptive strike. Bombers are relatively slow, which decreases the chances that preemptive strikes will eliminate nuclear weapons on the ground before counterlaunch.** Bombers are also vulnerable to air defenses, which decreases the chances that a preemptive effort will be successful in eliminating all of its targets. Nuclear-capable missiles are becoming more and more plentiful in the Third World, and their addition to nuclear relationships is likely to increase the ease of weapons protection rather than increasing the viability of counterforce strategies. **Third World missiles will not be as accurate as the superpower weapons,** which makes them less appropriate for counterforce missions. In addition, the small size

of Third World nuclear arsenals, the small size of Third World missiles, and the poor reconnaissance capabilities of Third World adversaries will facilitate missile mobility and effective hiding strategies. Third World proliferators may lack the hardening technologies and early warning systems of the superpowers but, **on balance, there is no reason to expect preemptive incentives to be any stronger for Third World proliferators than they were for the U.S. and Soviets.**

### AT: Accidents/Miscalc – empirics prove very low risk of accidents

**Quinlan 9** (Michael Quinlan, Merton College, Oxford. "Thinking about Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects", p. 63-69)

**Critics have** nevertheless from time to time **argued that the possibility of accident involving nuclear weapons is so substantial that it must weigh** heavily **in** the entire evaluation of whether war-prevention structures entailing their existence should be tolerated at all. **Two sorts of scenario are usually in question. The first is that of a single grave event involving an unintended nuclear explosion**—a technical disaster at a storage site, for example, or the accidental or unauthorized launch of a delivery system with a live nuclear warhead. **The second is that of some event—perhaps such an explosion or launch**, or some other mishap such as malfunction or **misinterpretation of radar signals or computer systems**—**initiating a sequence of response and counter-response** that culminated in a nuclear exchange which no one had truly intended. **No event that is physically possible can be said to be of absolutely zero probability just as at an opposite extreme it is absurd to claim**, as has been heard from distinguished figures, **that nuclear-weapon use can be guaranteed to happen within some finite future span despite not having happened for over sixty years**. But human affairs cannot be managed to the standard of either zero or total probability. We have to assess levels between those theoretical limits and weigh their reality and implications against other factors, in security planning as in everyday life. There have certainly been, across the decades since 1945, many known accidents involving nuclear weapons, from transporters skidding off roads to bomber aircraft crashing with or accidentally dropping the weapons they carried (in past days when such carriage was a frequent feature of readiness arrangements—it no longer is). A few of these accidents may have released into the nearby environment highly toxic material. **None** however has **entailed a nuclear detonation. Some commentators suggest that this reflects bizarrely good fortune** amid such massive activity and deployment over so many years. **A more rational deduction from the facts of this long experience would however be that the probability of any accident triggering a nuclear explosion is extremely low**. It might be further noted that **the mechanisms needed to set off such an explosion are technically demanding**, and that in a large number of ways the past sixty years have seen extensive improvements in safety arrangements for both the design and the handling of weapons. It is undoubtedly possible to see respects in which, after the cold war, some of the factors bearing upon risk may be new or more adverse; but some are now plainly less so. **The years which the world has come through entirely without accidental or unauthorized detonation have included early decades in which knowledge was sketchier, precautions were less developed, and weapon designs were less ultra-safe than they later became**, as well as substantial periods in which weapon numbers were larger, deployments more widespread and diverse, movements more frequent, and several aspects of doctrine and readiness arrangements more tense. **Similar considerations apply to the hypothesis of nuclear war being mistakenly triggered by false alarm. Critics again point to the fact**, as it is understood, **of numerous occasions when initial steps in alert sequences for US nuclear forces were embarked upon**, or at least called for, by indicators mistaken or misconstrued. **In none of these instances**, it is accepted, **did matters get at all near to nuclear launch**—extraordinary **good fortune** again, **critics have suggested**. **But the rival and more logical inference from hundreds of events stretching over sixty years of experience presents itself once more: that the probability of initial misinterpretation leading far towards mistaken launch is remote**. Precisely because any nuclear-weapon possessor recognizes the vast gravity of any launch, release sequences have many steps, and human decision is repeatedly interposed as well as capping the sequences. To convey that because a first step was prompted the world somehow came close to accidental nuclear war is wild hyperbole, rather like asserting, when a tennis champion has lost his opening service game, that he was nearly beaten in straight sets. History anyway scarcely offers any ready example of major war started by accident even before the nuclear revolution imposed an order-of-magnitude increase in caution. It was occasionally conjectured that nuclear war might be triggered by the real but accidental or unauthorized launch of a strategic nuclear-weapon delivery system in the direction of a potential adversary. **No such launch is known to have occurred in over sixty years. The probability of** it is therefore very low. But even if it did happen, the further hypothesis of it initiating a general nuclear exchange is far-

fetched. It fails to consider the real situation of decision-makers as pages 63-4 have brought out. **The notion that** cosmic ~~holocaust~~ might be mistakenly precipitated in this way **belongs to science fiction.**

## Answers to: NFU/NATO Withdrawal Improves US/Russian Relations

**Alt causes to US Russia relations – Air strikes, treaties, BMD all mark russia's declining status.**

Kimberly Marten, Professor of Polisci @ Barnard, 4-16-20, "NATO enlargement: evaluating its consequences in Russia" *International Politics*, Vol 57, Iss 3. Springer.

Analysis of how NATO's post-Cold War enlargement per se affected Russia's relations with the West is further complicated because enlargement (which publicly began with a NATO study in late 1994, peaked from 1997 through 2004 as states bordering Russia were invited to join, and continues today) occurred alongside numerous other significant and largely negative security interactions between Russia and the West. The effects on Russian perceptions and planning of these various events are impossible to disentangle from those caused by enlargement. The most significant of these events include NATO airstrikes and NATO-led peace operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, where Russian diplomats and soldiers played complex and sometimes contradictory roles; US and British airstrikes against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein in 1998 and the eventual US-led coalition invasion of Iraq in 2003, both of which occurred without United Nations Security Council (UNSC) approval and in the face of what would have been Russian vetoes; US unilateral withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with Russia in 2001–2002, followed by US bilateral agreements with Poland and Romania (with NATO support) to build ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems on their territories against Russian wishes; and the UNSC approved NATO mission against Muammar Gaddafi's Libya in 2011, which morphed into a regime-change operation that Russia opposed. None of these events depended on NATO enlargement—arguably not even the agreement to build BMD sites in Romania and Poland, given that the USA also has bilateral BMD equipment arrangements with a wide variety of non-NATO members (including Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Japan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United Arab Emirates) (Reif 2019). Russia and the West also found themselves at odds during this fraught time because Russian military forces remained in Georgia and Moldova against the wishes of their UN-recognized sovereign governments, undermining the newly signed Adapted Conventional Forces in Europe (A/CFE) Treaty of 1999. NATO enlargement was not a discrete event in the panoply of Russia's security relationships with the West and cannot be treated as if it were.

There is no question that NATO's geographic enlargement was a major irritant to Russian leaders and contributed to the decline of the overall relationship between Russia and the West—but there is little evidence that enlargement actually threatened Russia. Instead, NATO enlargement was a marker for Russia's declining status and the growing influence of the USA in the world; it reflected, rather than caused, a shift in the relative global power balance. Given the long history of Soviet-NATO confrontation during the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and Russia's weakness and instability in the 1990s, any action that showcased the growth of relative US influence, especially in Europe, would likely have raised Russian hackles.

## Decreased relations don't reduce security cooperation.

Kimberly Marten, Professor of Polisci @ Barnard, 4-16-20, "NATO enlargement: evaluating its consequences in Russia" *International Politics*, Vol 57, Iss 3. Springer.

Even then, both of these Balkan cases had mixed, rather than completely negative, effects on Russia–NATO relations. NATO's geographic enlargement did not derail security cooperation in either case. Former Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin played an important role in 1999 in convincing Milošević to accept a peace settlement as quickly as he did in the Kosovo case, even though the primary cause of Serbian capitulation was the NATO bombing campaign (Hosmer 2001). Russia participated (somewhat uncooperatively, even in Bosnia) (Atkinson 1996), in the NATO-led peace enforcement operations that were established in both Bosnia and Kosovo after the worst hostilities had ended. The Kosovo operation came close to sparking open conflict between Russian and NATO troops when Russia secretly entered the country and seized the airport in Pristina before the joint operation was to start (Daalder and O'Hanlon 2001, 175; Clark 2002), and some analysts believe that Russia's intention at the time was to partition the country to create a Serbian-controlled northern region against NATO's wishes (Brudenell 2008). Yet Russia stayed in both peace operations until 2003 (after the invitation to the Baltic and Black Sea states to join NATO), working side by side with NATO troops on the ground, acting with generally high levels of professionalism, and achieving some real successes in maintaining stability (Cross 2002).

## Russia knows NATO enlargement doesn't threaten their security.

Kimberly Marten, Professor of Polisci @ Barnard, 4-16-20, "NATO enlargement: evaluating its consequences in Russia" *International Politics*, Vol 57, Iss 3. Springer.

Russian military planners knew that NATO enlargement did not create a threat to Russian security. Annual military data that Russia provided to members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe through the Vienna Document process show that the numbers of troops and weaponry (including battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery) deployed in Russia's Western and Southern Military Districts (those along NATO's new borders) fell steeply from 2000 to 2010—years that Putin was in office, and during which NATO enlargement both began and peaked. These numbers continued to decline until Russia's intervention in Ukraine caused a sharp rise in 2014 (Vershbow 2017).<sup>1</sup> This is exactly the opposite behavior from what would be expected if Russia saw NATO enlargement as militarily threatening. There is simply no evidence that Russian military planners were concerned about NATO's geographic expansion before Putin decided to invade Crimea—20 years after the NATO enlargement process began.

## Russia knows they'll never join – France and Germany will block accession.

Kimberly Marten, Professor of Polisci @ Barnard, 4-16-20, "NATO enlargement: evaluating its consequences in Russia" *International Politics*, Vol 57, Iss 3. Springer.

What about the claim (Mearsheimer 2014b) that Russia's August 2008 war with Georgia—and later seizure of Crimea and military intervention in eastern Ukraine—were caused by NATO's infamous April 2008 Bucharest summit statement that Ukraine and Georgia 'will

become members of NATO? Putin and other leading Russian commentators certainly made it clear that NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia would be considered a direct military threat to Russia—and US ambassador William J. Burns communicated that fact to the George W. Bush administration in a secret March 2008 cable (Burns 2008). But news reports at the time also made it clear that the Bucharest summit initiative lacked French and German support. The USA (especially Condoleezza Rice, Bush's national security advisor) had wanted to offer a MAP to the two countries at that time, but the rest of NATO balked (BBC News 2008). A Congressional Research Service report published the next month highlighted the divisions within NATO over this issue: Representatives of several allied governments criticized the Administration's handling of the MAP issue. They noted that several allies had clearly indicated before the summit their opposition to Georgia and Ukraine joining the MAP, and that President Bush's campaign in Georgia and Ukraine, and then at the summit, to persuade them to change their minds ignored their concerns. (Gallis 2008, 5)

The report notes: 'The allies did not provide a time frame for eventual membership' (6). Indeed, there was a snide joke circulating in the European diplomatic community at the time that rephrased the summit declaration as 'Ukraine and Georgia will become members of NATO...when hell freezes over.'

### **Frame alt causes by status – Russia wants to be seen as a great power. Slights to their power like ignoring their Veto in the UNSC, placing BMD without their approval and imposing unfair arms control all signal they are less than a great power.**

Kimberly Marten, Professor of Polisci @ Barnard, 4-16-20, "NATO enlargement: evaluating its consequences in Russia" *International Politics*, Vol 57, Iss 3. Springer.

In sum, most of the security issues that threatened Russia's relationship with the USA and its NATO partners had nothing at all to do with NATO's geographic enlargement. Distrust between Russia and the West instead grew out of two other fundamental problems that are in fact unresolvable conflicts of interest. First was US and NATO operational expansion, including both the use of airstrikes in out-of-area operations without UNSC authorization, and US unconcern for Russia as an armscontrol partner. These Western operational shifts could not have threatened Russia directly, given Russia's enormous nuclear arsenal; the USA would never dare launch air or missile strikes against Russian territory unless open warfare were already underway, and nothing that has happened so far has put Russia's nuclear deterrent at risk. Instead, they demonstrated that Russia had lost its former status and was now unable to influence US and Western security decision making even through its UN veto. Russia stopped being a global power, and the West stopped treating it as one, with no concern for Russian pride.

The second fundamental problem was Russia's unwillingness to play by the rules of the US-dominated European security architecture, which prescribed that all newly independent states had the right to sovereign decision making and that the West had the obligation to help them develop as liberal democracies. Moscow has instead consistently held that it must

be given a special role to play in what it once called the ‘near abroad,’ the states in its immediate neighborhood that had been part of the Soviet Union. Russia insists that it requires a sphere of influence, but the USA and Europe have refused to give it one. NATO enlargement is just one of many signs of this deeper conflict.<sup>2</sup>

## Arms control treaty abrogation.

Kimberly Marten, Professor of Polisci @ Barnard, **4-16-20**, “NATO enlargement: evaluating its consequences in Russia” *International Politics*, Vol 57, Iss 3. Springer.

There was also an entirely different set of security issues that plagued Russia’s relationship with the West over these years: arms control. While again there was forward progress in some areas, such as the START and New START set of strategic nuclear missile reduction treaties, the CFE Treaty (which, as noted above, was the stated institutional basis for Russia’s cooperation with NATO) faltered, and the ABM Treaty was unilaterally abrogated by the USA.

The 1990 CFE Treaty, which limited the numbers of troops and weapons in various places in the European theater and created a cooperative military exercise notification system, needed to be renegotiated after both the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union collapsed. While many issues bedeviled the negotiations, an ‘adapted’ (A/CFE) Treaty was finally signed in 1999—even as NATO began to enlarge. One unresolved issue in the new version is that the Baltic states and Slovenia, now NATO members, were never signatories, although that could presumably have been resolved if negotiations had gone forward (Chillaud and Tetart 2007). But the USA and its Western allies refused to ratify the 1999 treaty because Russian troops remained on the ground in breakaway regions of Moldova and Georgia, in defiance of treaty limits. Russia claimed that the forces were engaged in peacekeeping. In order to avoid conflict escalation, the USA and NATO did not forcibly demand their withdrawal, even though it was clear that Russia’s interest in these former Soviet states was not impartial, and that in both places Russia was supporting minority ethnic groups who wanted territorial secession (Lynch 2000).

Western nonratification made it easy for Putin to declare in 2007—the year before NATO made its infamous declaration that Ukraine and Georgia would become NATO members—that Russia would no longer observe CFE Treaty requirements or limits. Shortly thereafter Putin began the remilitarization of Kaliningrad (Sukhankin 2017, 2018b). Again, this conflict between Russia and the West, which also paved the way for Putin in later years to resume large-scale military exercises without advance notification, was not clearly tied in any logical way to NATO enlargement. Russian troops in 2020 still remain in the Transdniestrian region of supposedly sovereign Moldova, and even before the 2008 Russia-Georgia war led to the permanent establishment of Russian military bases in the contested Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia was frequently accused of illegally sending troops into Georgian territory to chase down Chechen insurgents in the mountains. In other words, Russia never acted to relieve the Western concerns that held up CFE ratification.

As the A/CFE Treaty stumbled, President George W. Bush meanwhile decided (with policy leadership from John Bolton, then the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control) to quickly and unceremoniously withdraw unilaterally from the 1972 ABM Treaty shortly after assuming office in 2001. That treaty had served as the cornerstone of US-Soviet arms control

in the Cold War era. Many experts believe that it served as a key guarantor of nuclear crisis stability by reassuring each side that the other could not launch a disabling first strike against its nuclear arsenal. Bush justified the US withdrawal from the treaty by pointing to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the US intervention in Afghanistan, even though he had already expressed his intentions to withdraw the previous May. Although Putin, Bush, and their advisers did engage in some negotiation about a new security framework to replace the ABM Treaty, the process was cut short by Washington, and Bush made clear that Russian interests were not a high priority in his decision to abandon the treaty (Rusten 2010; Giles and Monaghan 2014).

Russia did not react harshly at the time, perhaps because Putin wished to maintain cooperation with the USA as the war on terror began. He argued that the USA was within its rights to withdraw from the treaty and that doing so did not threaten Russia's nuclear security, but called the decision 'an erroneous one' (Neilan 2001). But what the Bush administration did not seem to recognize was that this treaty had crucial symbolic value beyond whatever role it played in nuclear stability. It was the original marker for the Soviet Union that it had attained nuclear parity with the USA and that Washington had to treat Moscow as an equal (Wallander 2002). By abandoning the treaty so precipitously, the USA sent essentially the same message that it had in Kosovo and would in Iraq: Russia was not important, because it had lost parity with the USA as a strategic partner.

US ABM Treaty abrogation was followed shortly thereafter by new BMD deployments in the new NATO member states. In 2006, Bush announced that the USA would deploy a land-based BMD system in Poland, with an associated radar system in the Czech Republic, for the purpose of stopping a future nuclear attack from Iran. That original plan was abandoned under the Obama administration, due to both strong popular protest against the decision in the two European countries and strident Russian arguments that the system was actually targeted against it and could be reconfigured to launch a nuclear attack (Giles and Monaghan 2014). Moscow threatened to respond by leaving the INF Treaty and placing short-range nuclear missiles on NATO's borders.

At that point, in 2009, the Obama administration tried a different tack. This time an existing sea-based BMD system, the Aegis, which could not be easily reconfigured the way the first system could have been, would be modified to become a land-based system in Poland and Romania. Russia nonetheless objected strenuously once more, and efforts were made to find some path forward for joint third-country missile tracking and defense by having Russia work together on BMD with the USA and its NATO partners. Those negotiations proved unfruitful, however, and at its 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO announced that these new US BMD systems would be integrated into its overall defenses (Giles and Monaghan 2014).

The USA and NATO insist to this day that the new BMD systems are designed to hit limited missile launches originating in the Middle East, and should not be threatening to Russia. Although a future stage of the program, if it is ever implemented, will allow the BMD systems to be used in a limited fashion against strategic (long-range) missiles, modeling demonstrates that even if all the systems were used against Russian attempts to hit the USA at an ideal success rate, they would have no effect on Russian targeting of the US West Coast and could hit US-bound missiles coming from only 5 of Russia's 14 land-based launch sites (Sankaran 2015).

Russia countered that the Polish and Romanian systems could be easily reprogrammed and reconfigured to launch intermediate-range Tomahawk cruise missiles, not just BMD missiles, onto Russian territory, and that the systems thus violated the INF Treaty (Kramer 2016). It must be noted, however, that these Russian accusations were relatively recent. They followed US reports beginning in January 2014 that Russia was testing and later deploying (possibly in Crimea and Kaliningrad) a new intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile, the 9M729 (known variously as a version of existing Russian Kalibr or Iskander missiles), which the USA claims definitively violated the treaty (Gordon 2014; Woolf 2019). It is therefore unclear whether Russia truly perceived the Obama-era BMD systems as threatening its security—or instead as a useful tool for its negotiating strategy.

## Airstrikes against Russia's veto outweigh NATO enlargement.

Kimberly Marten, Professor of Polisci @ Barnard, **4-16-20**, "NATO enlargement: evaluating its consequences in Russia" *International Politics*, Vol 57, Iss 3. Springer.

Washington's refusals to seek UNSC legitimization for its actions nonetheless expanded over time. In 1998, the USA and UK conducted several airstrike operations in Iraq without seeking UN approval, both to degrade Iraq's purported weapons of mass destruction capabilities and to provide safe areas for Shia and Kurdish populations that Saddam Hussein had targeted. The Russian General Staff was reportedly furious at this development, especially given that Iraq had once been a Soviet military ally (Brovkin 1999, 546). Then, in 2003, the biggest blow to UNSC authority occurred, when a US-led coalition invaded and occupied Iraq without UNSC authorization. If any one international event caused Russia to withdraw from the Bosnia and Kosovo peace operations in summer 2003, it was probably the Iraq invasion, not NATO enlargement—although some analysts argue that Russia's peace operations calculus was based more on domestic cost concerns (Forsberg 2005, 343–344), while others focus on Russia's belief that it had insufficient say in how the peace operations were being run (Adomeit 2007). Russia never did publicly explain its decision to leave Bosnia and Kosovo. Yet each US intervention hammered home the fact that Russia's veto in the UNSC—one of its last remaining sources of global power after the collapse of the Soviet Union—meant nothing to the USA, and contributed nothing to Russia's real influence in the world.

Then came the 2011 UNSC decision to support NATO airstrikes in Libya, with the stated goal of creating safe zones for civilians fleeing Muammar Qaddafi's violent state suppression of Arab Spring protesters. Russia chose to abstain from, rather than veto, the resolution, allowing the NATO operation to go ahead. Midway through, it became clear that NATO members France and the UK were actually giving significant military advisory help to Qaddafi's armed opponents and hence enabling civil war, with the active support of the USA and other NATO members (Kuperman 2013). With the death of Qaddafi, from Russia's perspective, this became one more Western-led effort at regime change, reflecting the same policies Moscow had attributed to the West during the color revolutions in post-Soviet Ukraine and Georgia in prior years. What may have been especially galling to Moscow is that the Barack Obama administration had assured it beforehand that the NATO mission was not about overthrowing Qaddafi's rule (Burns 2019, 318). By 2014, the Libya example had influenced how Russia's Defense Ministry presented Moscow's strategic planning to the outside world: Russia was now said to be focused on creating alliances with authoritarian

states globally, both as a means for restoring Russia's influence and isolating the West and to protect the Kremlin from Western attempts to undermine Putin (Gorenburg 2014). Many analysts believe that the outcome in Libya helps explain at least in part Russia's military support for Bashar Assad in Syria's civil war shortly thereafter (Trenin 2012; Menon 2013; Cohen 2019).

## **NAT Good Contention**

## Case

### **NATO cohesion high now.**

John Andreas **Olsen**, PhD @ Demontfort University, Colonel in the Royal Norwegian Air Force, **6-22-20**, "Understanding NATO," *RUSI Journal*, June 2020.

NATO again witnessed fundamental shifts in the global security setting in February and March 2014 when Russia used military force to illegally occupy and annex Crimea, and started leading, encouraging and supporting separatist activities in eastern Ukraine. Russia's military actions violated Ukraine's territorial sovereignty and constituted a clear breach of international law. Moscow's aggression united the members of the Alliance with a sense of urgency, as manifested during three successive NATO summits.

At the Wales Summit in September 2014, all NATO members condemned Russian actions, agreed to support the EU's economic sanctions against President Vladimir Putin's government, decided to enhance NATO's readiness and responsiveness significantly, and committed themselves to reverse the trend of declining defence budgets. Through the Defence Investment Pledge, all members of the Alliance (except Iceland) resolved to 'aim to move towards' spending at least 2% of their GDP on defence by 2024.<sup>9</sup> One of the Allies' decisions was to enhance the NATO Response Force (NRF), including the creation of a 'spearhead force' as part of it. The resulting Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) is now a land brigade equivalent that numbers some 6,000 troops, supported by air, sea and special forces. It is on permanent standby and initial elements are ready to move in a few days.<sup>10</sup>

At the 2016 Warsaw Summit, Allies agreed to increase NATO's military presence in the eastern part of the Alliance by deploying four combat-ready multinational battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland on a rotational basis.<sup>11</sup> These battlegroups, known as the Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP), are led by the UK, Canada, Germany and the US and supported by other Allies. The EFP demonstrates the strength of the transatlantic bond and makes clear that an attack on one Ally would from the outset be met by forces from across the Alliance. NATO also enhanced its presence in the Baltic Sea under its Tailored Forward Presence, built around the Romanian-led Multinational Brigade Southeast under Multinational Division Southeast, which together provide a framework for regular exercises of Allied forces in the region.

Then, at the Brussels Summit in 2018, NATO leaders initiated a major update of the Alliance's command structure, adding more than 1,200 personnel and two new commands.<sup>12</sup> The Joint Force Command (JFC) in Norfolk, Virginia, is tasked with ensuring that sea lines of communication between Europe and North America remain open and secure, and that military forces can move quickly across the Atlantic. The decision to reactivate the US Second Fleet just before the summit confirmed the continued US commitment to the North Atlantic and its European allies. The Joint Support and Enabling Command in Ulm, Germany, is tasked with improving the movement of troops and equipment across borders within Europe.

NATO also decided to establish the Cyberspace Operations Centre in Mons, Belgium, authorised to coordinate NATO operations in cyberspace.<sup>13</sup> It agreed to expand the Alliance's Article 5 commitment to include responding to 'significant' cyber attacks.<sup>14</sup> In addition, at the Brussels Summit NATO's political leaders issued the NATO Readiness Initiative 4-30 (NRI, often known as the 'Four Thirties'), under which the Alliance has committed itself to increasing, by 2020, the readiness of 30 mechanised battalions, 30 air squadrons and 30 combat vessels, enabling them to be employed in theatre within 30 days. The NRI will reinvigorate and enhance NATO's 'culture of readiness' and represents a significant addition to the NRF, VJTF and EFP. Taken together, these efforts will strengthen transatlantic and intraEuropean reinforcement capabilities and ensure that the NATO command structure is 'fit for purpose'.

When NATO heads of state and government met in London in December 2019 to mark the Alliance's 70 years of existence as well as the 30th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, all leaders confirmed solidarity and unity, and agreed to continue implementing the decisions from the three previous NATO summits. Reaching these decisions was not always easy, but despite different national positions, and at times heated debates, the Allies managed to find common ground. As a result, defence expenditure by countries other than the US has grown for six consecutive years. At the same time, the EU has stood firm in its use of economic sanctions, demonstrating to Russia the consequences of violating international law. Notably, NATO agreed to put China on its agenda, stating in the London Declaration that Beijing's growing political, economic, military and technological influence presents both opportunities and challenges that Alliance members need to address collectively.<sup>15</sup>

In sum, NATO is implementing the most significant reinforcement of collective defence since the end of the Cold War and has placed additional emphasis on defence and security sector reforms and capacity-building in support of selected partner countries in North Africa and the Middle East. At the recent summits, the member states agreed to continue the fight against terrorism by strengthening the Global Coalition Against Daesh (the Islamic State), setting up a training mission in Iraq, continuing its commitment to Afghanistan and reinforcing NATO efforts to project security and stability to the Alliance's southern environs.

## US article five commitments key to deterrence *credibility*.

John Andreas Olsen, PhD @ Demontfort University, Colonel in the Royal Norwegian Air Force, 6-22-20, "Understanding NATO," RUSI Journal, June 2020.

Alliance cohesion derives from NATO's *raison d'être*, captured in the 'Three Musketeers' principle' of 'all for one, one for all'. Thus, the primary task to ensure the Alliance's future relevance is to maintain political unity based on the common values that underpin the commitment to Article 5. Ultimately, this is NATO's core strength, but these values are under constant pressure from autocratic, populist and nationalist movements in several member states. Consequently, NATO must seek to ensure that its own members do not fall short of the treaty's democratic standards. If a member drifts away from liberal democratic norms, as some have done, the rest must encourage a return to the central values while exhibiting strategic patience and offering constructive advice rather than undertake rash

and possibly irreversible action. Maintaining Alliance cohesion, 'for better or worse ... in sickness and in health', is NATO's collective vow.<sup>21</sup>

Revitalise US Leadership and Transatlantic Unity

Strong US leadership remains crucial in almost all aspects of NATO decision-making. US commitment to the Alliance, including its military presence in Europe, is critical for credible collective deterrence and defence. NATO was and is designed for US leadership.

In the words of Ambassadors Douglas Lute and Nicholas Burns, 'with American leadership anything is possible within the Alliance; absent American leadership, progress will be slow at best'.<sup>22</sup> Although Alliance-wide consultation and consensus are all-important principles, the US must remain primus inter pares politically as well as militarily. Simply put, without the US there is no NATO.

### **Undermining cohesion ruins deterrence**

**Veebel 18** [Viljar Veebel, Department of Political and Strategic Studies, Baltic Defence College, Tartu, Estonia, "NATO options and dilemmas for deterring Russia in the Baltic States", Defence Studies, 2018 VOL. 18, NO. 2, 229–251, Taylor and Francis]

So, capabilities, information, communication, cooperation and integrity are relevant in terms of deterrence. This view basically overlaps with the statement of Paulauskas (2016, 1) in respect of NATO: "Alliance credibility can be pictured as a three-legged stool, comprising cohesion, capability and communication". Capability refers to military capabilities, cohesion to the unity and solidarity of the Alliance, and communication to the existence of a clear and unambiguous communication strategy. To create successful deterrence, all three components need to be present – as argued by Paulauskas, "take away one leg, and the stool topples over" (Paulauskas 2016, 1).

### **Unconditional support for the defense pact specifically is the bedrock of NATO deterrence – any reduction in commitment unravels the whole arrangement**

**Uri Friedman 16**, Global Editor @ The Atlantic, Deputy Managing Editor @ Foreign Policy Magazine, Senior Analyst @ Atlantic Media Company, "What If Russia Invaded the Baltics—and Donald Trump Was President?",  
<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/07/russia-nato-trump-shirreff/492938/>

But are NATO members really obligated to help each other unconditionally? I pointed out that Article 5 of the NATO treaty stipulates that if an "armed attack" occurs against a NATO nation, each member will assist the assaulted party by taking "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." The Times asked Trump whether he would immediately offer military aid, and he declined to specify exactly what he would do if the country in question hadn't paid its bills. Doesn't the NATO treaty grant him some latitude on how to respond? Shirreff urged me to focus on the clause about restoring North Atlantic security, not the line about taking whatever action is needed. If Russia were to occupy the territory of a NATO member, "then, clearly, armed intervention [by NATO] may become necessary," he said. He added

that unconditional support is the bedrock of NATO. It's "the blank check that says, 'If you get attacked, whatever happens, we're going to come to your aid.' ... As soon as you get into a sort of transactional approach, that completely undermines the strength of collective defense."

Donald Trump, however, thinks transactionally—more so than any U.S. presidential aspirant in recent memory. And when you think that way, it's hard to justify many features of the international system that the U.S. helped design after World War II. Those features are easier to justify when you consider America's long-term economic and security interests. "We want allies to keep the peace, fight alongside us in times of war and defend our common values," Michael McFaul, the former U.S. ambassador to Russia, recently explained in The Washington Post. "Fueling uncertainty about our security commitment to NATO in order to get the Latvians or Slovenians to increase their military budgets by a percentage point is not strategic." I asked Shirreff if he had ever doubted the U.S. president's commitment to NATO during his years with the alliance. "No," he answered. I asked if he thought Trump's approach could increase the likelihood of Russian aggression in the Baltics given Trump's skepticism about the alliance and apparent fondness for President Vladimir Putin and Putin's worldview. Potentially, he said. "In terms of the risk equation for whoever's sitting in the Kremlin, if he or she decides to have a go at the Baltic states, he may just decide, 'Yeah I think the chances are I'll get away with it'," Shirreff told me. "And that, of course, makes the world more dangerous."

## **Putin will pocket concessions to test redlines and expand in Europe – each causes nuke war and turns every adv**

**Gray 17** [Dr. Colin S. Gray, Senior Reviewer, Professor Emeritus, Centre for Strategic Studies, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Reading; European Director, National Institute for Public Policy. "Russian strategy Expansion, crisis and conflict." Comparative Strategy. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01495933.2017.1277121>]

There is little, if any, mystery about the broad political purpose fueling Vladimir Putin's conduct of international relations. Subtlety is not a characteristic of Russian statecraft; cunning and intended trickery, though, are another matter. Stated directly, Putin is striving to recover and restore that of which he is able from the late USSR. There is no ideological theme in his governance. Instead, there is an historically unremarkable striving after more power and influence. The challenge for the Western World, as demonstrated in this National Institute study in meticulous and troubling detail, is to decide where and when this latest episode in Russian expansionism will be stopped. What we do know, for certain, is that it must and will be halted. It is more likely than not that Putin himself does not have entirely fixed political-strategic objectives. His behavior of recent years has given a credible impression of opportunistic adaptability. In other words, he will take what he is able, where he can, and when he can. However, there is ample evidence to support this study's proposition that Russian state policy today is driven by a clear vision of Russia as a recovering and somewhat restored superpower, very much on the high road back to a renewed hegemony over Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Putin's international political objectives appear largely open today: he will have Russia take whatever turns out to be available to take, preferably if the taking allows for some humiliation of the principal enemy, the United States. A practical political and strategic problem for Putin is to guess just how far he dares to push NATO in general and the United States in particular, before he finds himself, almost certainly unexpectedly, in a situation analogous to 1939. Just how dangerous would it be for Russia to press forcefully the Baltic members of NATO? Vladimir Putin would not be the first statesman to trust his luck once too often, based upon unrealistic confidence in his own political genius and power. There is danger not only that Putin could miscalculate the military worth of Russia's hand, but that he also will misunderstand the

practical political and strategic strength of NATO ‘red lines.’ In particular, Putin may well discover, despite some current appearances, that not all of NATO’s political leaders are expediently impressionable and very readily determable. Putin’s military instrument is heavily dependent, indeed probably over-dependent, upon the bolstering value of a whole inventory of nuclear weapons. It is unlikely to have evaded Putin’s strategic grasp to recognize that these are not simply weapons like any others. A single political or strategic guess in error could well place us, Russians included, in a world horrifically new to all.

### The plan makes Europe pay for their own defense. That forces a tradeoff with social welfare spending – the impact is a surge in populism and disintegration of Europe

Matthew Fay 17, foreign policy analyst @ Niskanen Center, holds two master’s degrees, one in international relations from American Military University and one in diplomatic history from Temple University, “The Problem with Europe Paying its Defense Bills”, <https://www.niskanencenter.org/problem-europe-paying-defense-bills/>

The two reasons Gilli notes for the inability of European states to increase defense spending also raise another question: should the United States want European states to do so? Writing at the end of the Cold War, political scientist John Mearsheimer warned that a Europe free from superpower domination would return to its recurrent patterns of interstate warfare. Europe’s major states would be forced to pay for their own defense absent American and Soviet security guarantees. To convince domestic populations to support investment in military capabilities—likely at the expense of welfare spending—state leaders would likely lean on nationalist rhetoric and policies. According to Mearsheimer, the reason they have not had to do so was because the American “pacifier” has remained in place even after the superpower standoff in Europe ended.

An American withdrawal as an effort to induce greater defense spending in Europe might lead to the empowerment of the very nationalist populist parties that would like to see the European Union dismantled. The disintegration of Europe—coupled with increased spending on military capabilities by its largest states—could lead to the return of security competition and the dilemmas inherent in it. Meanwhile, smaller states—Estonia just being one example—unable to invest sufficiently in their own defense will be subject to manipulation and domination by the continent’s major powers.

So the question of whether the Trump administration should consider withholding defense of America’s European allies to encourage them to “pay their bills” hinges on two things: whether they can, and if so, whether doing so is worth potentially undermining the peaceful integration of Europe.

### **European populism causes nuke war**

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<https://time.com/4815170/wwii-nationalism-donald-trump-america-first/>

This collective tendency to forget is not a new phenomenon. After the horrors of the Napoleonic Wars, Europe was given a new order of nation states under the Treaty of Vienna, signed in 1815. The new order lasted relatively well, surviving the revolutions of 1848 and the subsequent Crimean and Franco-Prussian wars. By the time World War I began in 1914, institutional and personal memories of the post-Napoleonic order had been weakened or forgotten.

Similarly, seventy years after World War II, millions of people in the U.S. and Europe have forgotten the lessons learned from that war and from the peace that followed. Nascent nationalist and popular movements converged in Britain to produce a vote to leave the European Union. Similar coalitions heavily influence the American political scene today, as they do in Poland, Hungary and even the Netherlands. White House communications that appear to realign foreign policy put in place over the last half-century are beginning to concern America's allies.

I understand why the "America First" movement propagated by Donald Trump sounds patriotic to many voters, as do other movements that favor isolationism. It is natural to blame others for our failure to adjust to new technologies, to immigration and to competition from countries whose growth rates are higher than our own. But the truth is that the "America First" movement runs the risk that it could trigger a global decline in productivity. Free trade has benefitted the U.S., Europe and much of the rest of the world. Many new businesses, particularly in information technology, can now start with a global footprint on Day One instead of being confined to a local market. NATO has preserved the freedom of the Western World from Communism. It has recently become more relevant again in view of the Russia's efforts to disrupt it.

Perhaps most worrisome is the apparent cooling of relations between European NATO allies and the United States, which has compelled German Chancellor Angela Merkel to say, "The times when we could fully rely on others are to some extent over... We Europeans must really take our fate into our own hands."

Problems arise when we start classifying our own and other countries as "winners" or "losers." Free trade, immigration and the treatment of refugees will never be perfect – far from it. But the alternatives of walling off people, as well as trade, are worse. Appealing to ultra-nationalist and xenophobic feelings is playing with fire. With easy access to weapons of mass destruction, the danger is greater than ever.

Growing up in Germany, I saw the dangers of fascism and nationalism. I saw leaders who only made matters worse by appealing to the majority of voters who feared minorities and foreigners.

Anyone who appreciates history would know better than to make even casual references to the possibility of nuclear war.

### **The plan causes Turkey to proliferate**

**Stratfor 20** – Stratfor Worldview, the world's leading geopolitical intelligence platform, "In Turkey, the Road to Proliferation Goes Through a Military Base",

<https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/turkey-road-proliferation-goes-through-military-base-trump-erdogan-incirlik>

A potential fissure between Turkey, a powerful member of NATO, and the United States could pave the way for a complete transformation of the geopolitical map in the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean — particularly in the event of one of the most radical potential outcomes: Turkey's pursuit of a nuclear weapon. See Turkey's Resurgence A Base With a Long History Incirlik has been synonymous with the U.S. military presence in Turkey since the start of the Cold War. The United States initially used the air base, which the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers built near the Mediterranean coast in the early 1950s, to conduct strategic reconnaissance missions and other intelligence operations against the Soviet Union and its allies before turning the facility into a key air transportation and training site. More recently, Incirlik provided a base for aerial refueling during the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and a stopover for U.S. troops rotating home from the Iraq war. Today, Incirlik is the main U.S. base for air missions against the Islamic State. Kurecik, meanwhile, was established in 2012 in eastern Anatolia, deploying the AN/TPY-2 radar as part of NATO's early-warning system against potential Iranian ballistic missile attacks on Europe. Given the importance of Incirlik and Kurecik, the United States would be loath to lose the bases — especially as the country is struggling to continue its fight against the Islamic State at a time when it is facing potential expulsion from Iraq, which would complicate any efforts to maintain its presence in Syria. What's more, tensions with Iran are hardly subsiding, raising the importance of the wider ballistic missile defense network protecting Europe. Even so, Incirlik and Kurecik are not irreplaceable. The United States has numerous allies in the Middle East that would be happy to offer up air bases as alternatives, including Jordan, from which U.S. aircraft would be only marginally farther from the areas in Syria that are within the immediate proximity of Incirlik. Washington also has alternatives in Europe, such as Greece, which is already negotiating with the United States to expand the U.S. Air Force presence there. As for Kurecik, the United States could mitigate its loss by conducting additional patrols with destroyers armed with ballistic missile defenses in the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea until another replacement site is built in Eastern Europe. Nuclear Fallout The fallout of the loss of the bases, instead, would be more political. If Turkey kicks the United States out, for instance, the countries' fissure would almost certainly widen. More pertinent, however, is the nuclear question. Throughout the Cold War and since, Washington has managed to kill two birds with one stone. It has both extended nuclear deterrence to NATO allies like Turkey by protecting it with the B61 U.S. nuclear bombs stationed at Incirlik and, in the process, countered nuclear proliferation by dissuading partners like Turkey from pursuing their own nuclear weapons programs. While there is some doubt as to how up to date Turkey's fighter pilots are with their training and ability to deploy these weapons (the United States could allow Turkish fighter jets to arm themselves with some of the approximately 50 nuclear bombs currently at Incirlik if an outside power ever seriously threatened the country with atomic weapons), there is little doubt that the presence of the weapons in Turkey gives Ankara strong reassurance about its wider security. By taking away the nuclear umbrella, however, Washington could spur Ankara to pursue its own atomic weapons, especially at a time when Turkey is at loggerheads with Israel (a nuclear power), Iran could restart its own nuclear program and Saudi Arabia has floated the idea of developing its own bomb too. As it is, Erdogan has long criticized the notion that nuclear-armed states would deign to forbid Turkey from

obtaining its own nuclear weapons. Without question, Turkey would come under significant economic and political pressure if it were to push ahead with any plans to develop its own nuclear deterrent, but Ankara might well calculate that, in the event of a de facto divorce from the United States and the potential emergence of more nuclear powers in the neighborhood, the pros of an atomic weapons program outweigh the cons. Naturally, such a decision would have other severe ramifications; for one, NATO could expel Turkey from the alliance, while it could also galvanize other countries, such as Greece, to pursue their own programs, thereby further destabilizing the region's fragile balance.

## Deterrence key to prevent the expansion of Russian strategic buffer zones. Russia is a revisionist power, new expansion creates new frontiers for conflict.

John Andreas Olsen, PhD @ Demontfort University, Colonel in the Royal Norwegian Air Force, 6-22-20, "Understanding NATO," *RUSI Journal*, June 2020.

### Contain Revisionist Russia

Russia once again represents NATO's most significant external challenge. Politically, Russia tries to undermine NATO's cohesion and values. Russian cyber attacks, political subversion and aggressive social media campaigns – including extensive disinformation – pose a danger to all NATO democracies and their electoral processes. At the same time, Russia seeks to create confusion, uncertainty and fear within Western governments and societies through 'Heavy Metal Diplomacy' – the use of military means to impress and intimidate the West.<sup>34</sup> Moscow's interests are incompatible with the Euro-Atlantic values, which hold that small states should be sovereign and independent.

The greatest potential threat to NATO stems from Russia's ability to use hard power to achieve its political objectives. At present, Russian forces are occupying Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and parts of Moldova's territory (Transnistria). Russia has more than 30,000 soldiers in the illegally annexed Crimean Peninsula and the Russian armed forces are leading and aiding the so-called 'separatists' in Luhansk and Donetsk in eastern Ukraine.<sup>35</sup> Its military actions to reshape these borders constitute part of a broader strategy of coercion aimed at NATO members and partners.

These actions underpin Putin's most important foreign policy goals: to restore Russia as a respected great power and to establish security buffer zones along its borders. North Central Europe and the Black Sea region are the most vulnerable flashpoints between Russia and NATO because of Russia's geographical proximity, the readiness of its armed forces – in particular in the Western Military District – and its ability to quickly mass firepower at its borders, along with its demonstrated behaviour and objectives in the region.<sup>36</sup>

The Kremlin is strengthening its anti-access and area denial (A2AD) capabilities from the Arctic to the Mediterranean through deployment of integrated air defence systems and long-range precision strike missiles. The 'bastion' concept sets out to protect Russia's strategic nuclear submarines in the north, and includes sea control of northern waters, sea denial down into the Greenland–Iceland–UK gap and force projection into the North Atlantic

to disrupt trade flows and military manoeuvre. Russian submarine activity in the North Atlantic has risen to levels not seen in 25 years, including suspicious activities around vital undersea cables that provide commercial and military communications and internet links.<sup>37</sup> Russian submarine operations also pose new risks for the operations of US, UK and French strategic deterrent forces.

The 'Fourth Battle of the Atlantic' – a phrase coined by Admiral James G Foggo III, commander of NATO's JFC in Naples – is the new strategic reality for transatlantic security. In broader terms, the contested maritime domain is the new normal. The defence of Europe depends on timely US reinforcement; thus, it cannot be over-emphasised how vital it is for the Alliance to keep the sea lines of communication between North America and Europe open for transport and supply of military forces, equipment and weapon systems. Russia's commitment to revitalising and updating the bastion concept will remain the defining factor in NATO defence planning for the northern region in the foreseeable future because it threatens the ocean that links North America to Europe.<sup>38</sup>

### **Strategic buffer zone expansion makes nuclear war likely.**

Daniel C. Willis, Major, USAF, '16, "Countering Putin's Nuclear-backed Aggression with a Continuous Nuclear-Capable Bomber Presence."

<https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1021505.pdf>

Putin's Strategy – Nuclear Weapons Prevent Western Interference Laying at the foundation of Putin's strategy are his nuclear weapons. He still sees Russia as a super power mostly because of his large stockpile of nuclear weapons.<sup>26</sup> Unlike the U.S. and China, Russia's public policy does not preclude them from using nuclear weapons even if a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) has not been used against them. Their policy states that they can use nuclear weapons if conventional warfare threatens their nation.<sup>27</sup> Putin relies on this policy in case his conventional weapons do not produce a decisive victory. Russia's pledge to modernize its nuclear arsenal also signaled that they will be relying on these weapons for the foreseeable future to keep nations from interfering with their plans to secure their buffer zone.

Nuclear weapons deter conflict by promising that the costs of action against a nucleararmed country will be significantly higher than the rewards. A credible deterrent is achieved when the enemy believes one has both the will and the capability (or credibility) to use the nuclear weapons.<sup>28</sup> While the U.S. would like to see the world free of nuclear weapons, Russia has signaled that they will no longer discuss nuclear arms control.<sup>29</sup> The mismatch between American and Russian views on nuclear weapons could be problematic. Russia may see the U.S. as not having the will to employ their nuclear arsenal, which could erode U.S. deterrence and embolden Russia to leverage their arsenal. Russia's nuclear weapons will likely stay central to their strategy, and their recent rhetoric has been an indication of their will.

When the international community condemned Russian aggression, Putin quickly reminded them that Russia is one of the world's most powerful nuclear nations.<sup>30</sup> Further, Russian leaders announced that they had been updating their nuclear arsenal with the goal of being able to match NATO.<sup>31</sup> Russian foreign Prime Minister Sergei Lavrov even stated that Russia could move nuclear weapons to Crimea without violating international law since it

was now a part of Russia.<sup>32</sup> The Kremlin threatened to deploy nuclear weapons to both Kaliningrad and Crimea, which demonstrated that they were considering using nuclear means to shore up their hybrid warfare gains.<sup>33</sup> The “nuclear saber-rattling” that Russia conducts is meant to deter retaliation for their movements by showing that they have the will to use their weapons.

Russia has also made moves to prove that their nuclear operations are credible. Since 2014, Russia has exercised its nuclear-capable force at higher than usual levels.<sup>34</sup> In 2014 and the first part of 2015, NATO aircraft intercepted nearly four times as many Russian Tu-95s (a nuclear-capable bomber) than they did in previous years.<sup>35</sup> Exercises involving nuclear-capable bombers, naval ships, submarines, and missiles have been combined with large ground forces.<sup>36</sup>

These exercises focus on command and control as well as the force’s capability to perform nuclear strikes. Ground force integration into these exercises gives Russia the ability to practice escalation from conventional war to nuclear war. Exercises like these demonstrate that Russia has the capability and tactical coordination to launch nuclear warheads if they deem it necessary.

Russia has also signaled that they are willing to disregard international treaties regarding nuclear weapons. Kremlin officials have openly questioned whether Russia should be participating in the New START treaty, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.<sup>37</sup> Recently, questions have arisen as to whether or not Russia is in compliance with the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF).<sup>38</sup> Russia's words and actions disregarding international nuclear norms can lead to a greater risk of miscalculation between nuclear powers. Russia is signaling that they are willing to risk nuclear war for their buffer zone.

Putin's strategy is clear. He wants a buffer zone around Russia to exert his influence. He will use conventional or hybrid warfare to undermine nations in order to install a pro-Russian government or at least freeze their coordination with the West. He wishes to undermine NATO in order to maintain or even grow his buffer zone. Finally, he uses his nuclear arsenal as a credible and visible element of military power to prevent western interference.

## **That causes extinction**

**Kluth 19** [Andreas Kluth is a member of Bloomberg's editorial board. He was previously editor in chief of Handelsblatt Global and a writer for the Economist. "What Can NATO Really Do About Turkey?" 12/4/19 <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-12-05/what-can-nato-really-do-about-turkey>]

First, Erdogan could actually make good on his threat to send migrants into Europe in numbers that exceed the populations of some EU countries. Turkey accommodates 3.7 million Syrian refugees. It could nudge them to cross to the Greek islands, as about 200,000 people did every month at the height of Europe's migrant crisis in 2015.

One reason those crossings all but stopped the next year was that the two sides reached a deal: Turkey agreed to take back refugees that made it to Greece in return for lots of money and other help from the EU. Quitting that deal would hurt Turkey. But faced with the humiliation of being cast out of NATO, Erdogan might decide that it's worth it. The EU, meanwhile, has failed to reform its migrant system since 2015; it would enter another crisis.

An even greater peril is that Erdogan would respond to expulsion by building his own nuclear weapons. He definitely wants them. The West says that Turkey "can't have them," he ranted in October. "This I cannot accept." Nuclear proliferation is one of the world's most dire problems as it is. One arms-control treaty between the U.S. and Russia (on "Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces") recently fell apart; the remaining one (called "New START") seems destined to lapse in 2021. And as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty turns 50 next March, it looks increasingly toothless. From North Korea to Iran, the wrong people have, or are capable of getting, the wrong weapons. A Turkish bomb in the Middle East would therefore be a disaster. It would almost certainly lead to an arms race, as not only Iran but Saudi Arabia joined Israel in going nuclear. Superimposed on a map of conflicts that makes Europe in 1914 look simple, this is a recipe for Armageddon.

**NATO collapse causes conflicts and trade wars in Europe, Russian miscalc, and collapses Asian alliances, which encourages Chinese aggression in the SCS and Taiwan**

**Binnendijk 19** [Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council. He previously served as senior director for defense policy on the Clinton administration's National Security Council, "5 consequences of a life without NATO", 3/19/19, <https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/03/19/5-consequences-of-a-life-without-nato/>]

To see if they are correct, let's consider what international life might be like without NATO. There would be at least five set of consequences, all negative.

The most catastrophic impact of NATO's retirement would be the risk of Russian aggression and miscalculation. Without a clear commitment to defend allied territory backed up by an American nuclear deterrent, President Vladimir Putin will certainly see opportunities to seize land he believes is Russian. He has already done this in Georgia and Ukraine. Had they not joined NATO, the Baltic states would probably already be occupied by Russian troops. Certainly Putin would also see an opportunity to seize more of Ukraine without the "shadow" of NATO to protect it.

History teaches us that major wars start when aggressive leaders miscalculate. German leader Adolf Hitler attacked Poland in 1939, believing that after then-British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's Munich Agreement, England would be unlikely to respond. North Korea attacked South Korea in 1950 after the United States appeared to remove Seoul from its defensive perimeter. Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, believing the United States had signaled that it would not respond.

In each case, miscalculation led to larger conflict.

Secondly, NATO's retirement would also decrease American military reach, its political influence and its economic advantage. American bases throughout Europe not only provide for the defense of Europe — they bring the U.S. a continent closer to trouble spots that threaten vital American interests. Fighting the Islamic State group, clearly an American interest, would have been markedly more difficult without permanent U.S. bases in Europe and without the American-built coalition that included every NATO nation. Without NATO, the mutual security interests that underpin both U.S. **bases and coalition operations** would be undermined.

This extends to the economic realm. U.S. annual trade in goods and services with Europe exceeds \$1 trillion, and U.S. total direct investment in Europe nears \$3 trillion. These economic ties enhance U.S. prosperity and provide American jobs, but they require the degree of security now provided by NATO to endure.

NATO's retirement would thirdly exacerbate divisions within Europe. NATO's glue not only holds European militaries together — it provides the principal forum to discuss and coordinate security issues. The European Union is unlikely to substitute for NATO in this respect because it has no military structure, few capabilities and no superpower leadership to bring divergent views together.

Germany and France already seek a plan B should NATO collapse, but without the United Kingdom in the European Union, an all-European approach is likely to fail. The added insecurity of NATO's collapse would also amplify current populist movements in Europe. The consequence could be renationalization of European militaries, a system that brought conflict to the 19th and early 20th centuries.

The fourth consequences of life without NATO would be global. American bilateral alliances in Asia would each be shaken to their core should NATO fail. America's defense commitments there would become worthless. With China determined to claim a dominant position in Asia, the collapse of NATO would cause America's Asian partners to seek accommodation with China, much as the Philippines is in the process of doing.

Trump's decision to abandon the economic Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement has already given China new advantages in the region. Without credible American security commitments, there would be little to stop China from controlling the South China Sea and probably occupying Taiwan as well. Add to this equation the new footholds that China is building in central Asia, Africa and Europe: Abandoning NATO would help assure China's competitive success.

The final impact of NATO's retirement would be the near collapse of what has been called the "liberal international order." This order consists of treaties, alliances, agreements, institutions and modes of behavior mostly created by the United States in an effort to safeguard democracies.

This order has kept relative peace in the trans-Atlantic space for seven decades. The Trump administration has begun to unravel elements of this order in the naive notion that they undercut American sovereignty. The entire European project is built on the edifice of this order.

NATO is its principal keystone. Collapsing this edifice would undercut the multiple structures that have brought seven decades of peace and prosperity.

So the answer is clear. Life without NATO would be more dangerous and less prosperous. Russia and China would be the big winners at America's expense. NATO simply can't retire.

## NoKo first strike causes extinction

**Dempsey 18** [Michael P. Dempsey is the national intelligence fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, a fellowship sponsored by the U.S. government. He is the former acting director of national intelligence. 2/21. "What If Kim Jong Un Decides to Bloody America's Nose First?" <https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/kim-decides-bloody-americas-nose-first/>]

For the past several decades, North Korea has weathered periodic spikes in U.S. diplomatic and economic pressure while continuing to make steady progress with its weapons programs. North Korean leaders correctly calculated for years that U.S. policymakers would find the cost of an actual conflict on the Peninsula too high for serious consideration, and that China would be a safety valve if economic sanctions became too painful.

From Kim's vantage point, however, there are reasons to question whether those assumptions are still valid. Over the past year, the public rhetoric from U.S. leaders threatening his regime has reached an unprecedented level, with some statements indicating that the United States is "locked and loaded" for a conflict, and others even hinting at the idea of a nuclear strike against North Korea. At the same time, the United States has quietly increased its military footprint in the region, including more regular B-1 bomber flights over the Korean Peninsula and — for the first time in a decade — the deployment late last year of three U.S. aircraft carriers off the Peninsula. This stepped-up military activity has undoubtedly not been lost on Kim or his generals and has likely sparked internal discussion about potential U.S. offensive military operations.

On the economic front, meanwhile, China has become intensely frustrated by both Kim's behavior and constant U.S. demands to get tougher on the North, and has gradually imposed increasingly punishing sanctions, agreeing to limit oil supplies and stop importing steel and various food products. This is particularly worrisome to Kim because China accounts for about 90 percent of North Korea's foreign trade. Taken in combination these actions might convince Kim that the established playbook has fundamentally changed, and that he is now in real danger.

So, how might this realization alter North Korea's actions? It's plausible that, contrary to the logic that maximum pressure will force concessions, the North's new constraints could persuade Kim that he needs to demonstrate his own resolve and preemptively remind the United States and its allies just how costly an attempt at forced denuclearization or regime change would be. Indeed, Pyongyang's track record suggests a willingness to raise the stakes during periods of tension and to take lethal action — from the seizure of the USS Pueblo in 1968 to the artillery bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 — when it believes it necessary.

If Kim reaches this conclusion, there are a few options that his regime could consider which U.S. policymakers should prepare now to counter. First, there is the strong possibility of additional missile testing, potentially involving more sophisticated delivery systems and warheads — a standard tactic Kim has employed in recent months to demonstrate his resolve and showcase the North's newfound technical prowess. I believe the regime is also likely to engage in proportional actions: Recall that when North Korea objected to the release of a Sony film in 2014 that portrayed an assassination attempt on Kim, it responded with a cyberattack on that specific studio. Today, Pyongyang could calculate that it needs to similarly target business interests in South Korea and the U.S. to force an easing of economic sanctions. This would likely be done through a series of cyberattacks against vulnerable commercial targets in both the United States and South Korea, especially banks and key economic infrastructure, but could also involve physical sabotage operations.

Second, if Kim believes that **military pressure** against the North is reaching an unacceptable level, he could try to **intimidate Seoul** and undermine its cooperation with Washington. This option could involve using North Korean special forces to trigger a series of isolated **explosions in major cities in the South** (North Korean special forces have operated in the South in the past) or even another incident similar to the sinking of a **South Korean corvette in 2010** (the Cheonan), which the North has repeatedly denied despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Along these lines, Kim could also enlist a "sympathizer group" rather than his own special forces to attack a U.S. or South Korean military installation, calculating this would send the intended message while maintaining some degree of deniability.

And third, if confronted with the threat of a major **U.S. military buildup on the Peninsula later this year**, Kim may well decide in desperation that his best option is to **preemptively target** (including with mines) the **ports and airfields** that the U.S. military would rely on to **transport troops** into South Korea. If he pursues this option, Kim would almost certainly expect a **strong U.S. retaliation**, but might calculate that **delaying America's ability to deploy significant ground forces** onto the Peninsula is **his only remaining option to buy time** and is therefore his best military play. Kim has undoubtedly learned the lesson of Desert Storm, and is unlikely to allow the U.S. military to mass hundreds of thousands of troops in the South for an offensive at the time and place of its choosing.

Understanding North Korea's internal decision-making process and the various influences on Kim's calculations is perhaps the hardest intelligence challenge on the planet. As is well documented, North Korea is among the most isolated countries in the world, with a young leader with almost no international expertise and only a few years of actual leadership experience. Therefore, it's quite plausible that Kim himself has yet to decide on a course of action for the current standoff with Washington, and that his decisions will be shaped almost entirely by his superficial perception of U.S. intentions and the perceived threat. Sadly, my experience working on this issue while in government also causes me to believe that **Kim is surrounded by advisers who**, based on the last quarter-century of U.S.-North Korea relations, **may be overconfident that the United States will shy away from conflict in the face of aggressive actions by North Korea**. These advisers are unlikely to tell Kim anything he **doesn't want to hear** for fear of their own **personal safety**. In other words, **it's a situation ripe for miscalculation by both sides**.

Given the stakes — a potential **conflict involving nuclear weapons** — a **miscalculation leading to a broader conflict simply cannot be allowed to occur**. So in the coming months U.S. policymakers will want to exercise prudence in and carefully weigh their public statements, think deeply about how Kim and other critical actors might misperceive and overreact to U.S. actions and rhetoric, work in the closest possible consultation with key regional allies (especially South Korea), and prepare U.S. military, intelligence, and diplomatic responses to the full range of potential North Korean preemptive actions and counter-actions. It would be nice if the current showdown with North Korea could be resolved through diplomacy and follow a logical, predictable script of American design, but the two countries' painful shared history suggests that we shouldn't bank on that occurring.

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John Andreas **Olsen**, PhD @ Demontfort University, Colonel in the Royal Norwegian Air Force, **6-22-20**, "Understanding NATO," *RUSI Journal*, June 2020.

### **Contain Revisionist Russia**

Russia once again represents **NATO's most significant external challenge**. Politically, **Russia tries to undermine NATO's cohesion** and values. **Russian cyber attacks, political subversion** and aggressive **social media campaigns** – including extensive disinformation – **pose a danger to all NATO democracies** and their electoral processes. At the same time, **Russia**

seeks to create confusion, uncertainty and fear within Western governments and societies through 'Heavy Metal Diplomacy' – the use of military means to impress and intimidate the West.<sup>34</sup> Moscow's interests are incompatible with the Euro-Atlantic values, which hold that small states should be sovereign and independent.

The greatest potential threat to NATO stems from Russia's ability to use hard power to achieve its political objectives. At present, Russian forces are occupying Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and parts of Moldova's territory (Transnistria). Russia has more than 30,000 soldiers in the illegally annexed Crimean Peninsula and the Russian armed forces are leading and aiding the so-called 'separatists' in Luhansk and Donetsk in eastern Ukraine.<sup>35</sup> Its military actions to reshape these borders constitute part of a broader strategy of coercion aimed at NATO members and partners.

These actions underpin Putin's most important foreign policy goals: to restore Russia as a respected great power and to establish security buffer zones along its borders. North Central Europe and the Black Sea region are the most vulnerable flashpoints between Russia and NATO because of Russia's geographical proximity, the readiness of its armed forces – in particular in the Western Military District – and its ability to quickly mass firepower at its borders, along with its demonstrated behaviour and objectives in the region.<sup>36</sup>

The Kremlin is strengthening its anti-access and area denial (A2AD) capabilities from the Arctic to the Mediterranean through deployment of integrated air defence systems and long-range precision strike missiles. The 'bastion' concept sets out to protect Russia's strategic nuclear submarines in the north, and includes sea control of northern waters, sea denial down into the Greenland–Iceland–UK gap and force projection into the North Atlantic to disrupt trade flows and military manoeuvre. Russian submarine activity in the North Atlantic has risen to levels not seen in 25 years, including suspicious activities around vital undersea cables that provide commercial and military communications and internet links.<sup>37</sup> Russian submarine operations also pose new risks for the operations of US, UK and French strategic deterrent forces.

The 'Fourth Battle of the Atlantic' – a phrase coined by Admiral James G Foggo III, commander of NATO's JFC in Naples – is the new strategic reality for transatlantic security. In broader terms, the contested maritime domain is the new normal. The defence of Europe depends on timely US reinforcement; thus, it cannot be over-emphasised how vital it is for the Alliance to keep the sea lines of communication between North America and Europe open for transport and supply of military forces, equipment and weapon systems. Russia's commitment to revitalising and updating the bastion concept will remain the defining factor in NATO defence planning for the northern region in the foreseeable future because it threatens the ocean that links North America to Europe.<sup>38</sup>

### **Strategic buffer zone expansion makes nuclear war likely.**

Daniel C. Willis, Major, USAF, '16, "Countering Putin's Nuclear-backed Aggression with a Continuous Nuclear-Capable Bomber Presence."

<https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1021505.pdf>

Putin's Strategy – Nuclear Weapons Prevent Western Interference Laying at the foundation of Putin's strategy are his nuclear weapons. He still sees Russia as a super power mostly because of his large stockpile of nuclear weapons.<sup>26</sup> Unlike the U.S. and China, Russia's public policy does not preclude them from using nuclear weapons even if a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) has not been used against them. Their policy states that they can use nuclear weapons if conventional warfare threatens their nation.<sup>27</sup> Putin relies on this policy in case his conventional weapons do not produce a decisive victory. Russia's pledge to modernize its nuclear arsenal also signaled that they will be relying on these weapons for the foreseeable future to keep nations from interfering with their plans to secure their buffer zone.

Nuclear weapons deter conflict by promising that the costs of action against a nucleararmed country will be significantly higher than the rewards. A credible deterrent is achieved when the enemy believes one has both the will and the capability (or credibility) to use the nuclear weapons.<sup>28</sup> While the U.S. would like to see the world free of nuclear weapons, Russia has signaled that they will no longer discuss nuclear arms control.<sup>29</sup> The mismatch between American and Russian views on nuclear weapons could be problematic. Russia may see the U.S. as not having the will to employ their nuclear arsenal, which could erode U.S. deterrence and embolden Russia to leverage their arsenal. Russia's nuclear weapons will likely stay central to their strategy, and their recent rhetoric has been an indication of their will.

When the international community condemned Russian aggression, Putin quickly reminded them that Russia is one of the world's most powerful nuclear nations.<sup>30</sup> Further, Russian leaders announced that they had been updating their nuclear arsenal with the goal of being able to match NATO.<sup>31</sup> Russian foreign Prime Minister Sergei Lavrov even stated that Russia could move nuclear weapons to Crimea without violating international law since it was now a part of Russia.<sup>32</sup> The Kremlin threatened to deploy nuclear weapons to both Kaliningrad and Crimea, which demonstrated that they were considering using nuclear means to shore up their hybrid warfare gains.<sup>33</sup> The "nuclear saber-rattling" that Russia conducts is meant to deter retaliation for their movements by showing that they have the will to use their weapons.

Russia has also made moves to prove that their nuclear operations are credible. Since 2014, Russia has exercised its nuclear-capable force at higher than usual levels.<sup>34</sup> In 2014 and the first part of 2015, NATO aircraft intercepted nearly four times as many Russian Tu-95s (a nuclear-capable bomber) than they did in previous years.<sup>35</sup> Exercises involving nuclear-capable bombers, naval ships, submarines, and missiles have been combined with large ground forces.<sup>36</sup>

These exercises focus on command and control as well as the force's capability to perform nuclear strikes. Ground force integration into these exercises gives Russia the ability to practice escalation from conventional war to nuclear war. Exercises like these demonstrate that Russia has the capability and tactical coordination to launch nuclear warheads if they deem it necessary.

Russia has also signaled that they are willing to disregard international treaties regarding nuclear weapons. Kremlin officials have openly questioned whether Russia should be

participating in the New START treaty, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.<sup>37</sup> Recently, questions have arisen as to whether or not Russia is in compliance with the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF).<sup>38</sup> Russia's words and actions disregarding international nuclear norms can lead to a greater risk of miscalculation between nuclear powers. Russia is signaling that they are willing to risk nuclear war for their buffer zone.

Putin's strategy is clear. He wants a buffer zone around Russia to exert his influence. He will use conventional or hybrid warfare to undermine nations in order to install a pro-Russian government or at least freeze their coordination with the West. He wishes to undermine NATO in order to maintain or even grow his buffer zone. Finally, he uses his nuclear arsenal as a credible and visible element of military power to prevent western interference.

## NATO Good Impacts

**NATO solves global war, but allies are increasingly worried – they look to other places where the US gives military aid and fear they could be next**

**McDonald-Gibson 18** [Charlotte McDonald Gibson, TIME Magazine. Trump Is Trying to Dismantle the World Order. Is NATO Next on His List? June 22, 2018. time.com/5319626/trump-nato-summit-military-spending-germany/]

The 29 countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are not referred to in its statutes as members or signatories but as allies. As the military grouping nervously prepares for a July 11/12 summit, 28 of those nations' leaders may be forgiven for wondering whether that word still describes the country led by the 29th.

In the space of two weeks in June, U.S. President Donald Trump first baited his supposed friends into a trade war by slapping tariffs on steel and aluminum from the European Union, Canada and other nations. He argued that Russian President Vladimir Putin – still under E.U. and U.S. sanctions for the annexation of Crimea – should be invited back into the G7, before rejecting the summit's communique and personally insulting Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. All that before he met North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un and called him a "very talented" leader.

This dismantling of long-established norms of global diplomacy has many wondering whether NATO, the alliance that has preserved global stability since the darkest days of the Cold War, is the next foundation block of the current world order that the President plans to uproot.

"All of that left the friends and allies of the United States wondering, who is the leader of the democratic world?" Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the previous secretary general of NATO, tells TIME. "And if that is repeated in Brussels in July it would be no less than a disaster, not only for the Western democratic world but for the democratic world globally."

There are many targets of Donald Trump's ire, but NATO has long played a key role in his narrative of the U.S. footing the bill for the rest of the world at the expense of its own citizens. He has repeatedly railed against the U.S. putting up a disproportionate amount of funding for NATO.

The U.S. accounts for 22% of the NATO alliance's common funding, which is spent on projects like military readiness, joint exercises, and initiatives to counter cyber-warfare, and is responsible for 70% of total defense spending among alliance members. Under pressure from Washington – and reacting to Russian aggression – NATO members agreed in 2014 to each increase defense spending to 2% of GDP by 2024. But progress has been slow; so far only eight NATO countries meet that target.

While many Europeans, including Rasmussen, agree with Trump's general point about defense spending, his method of expressing it is exasperating allies. On June 10, a day after the G7 summit, Trump launched a Twitter tirade clearly aimed at Europe, lamenting that the U.S. spends money "protecting many of these same countries that rip us off on trade", and warning that "change is coming".

On trade and the G7, European leaders are feeling empowered to punch back at the U.S. French President Emmanuel Macron said recently that the G7 could do without Trump, while on trade the E.U. this week retaliated with their own tariffs on US goods. "The initial idea of playing nice with Donald Trump, which several European leaders have tried, has been demonstrably proven to yield no benefits," says Anthony Gardner, who acted as U.S. Ambassador to the E.U. from 2014 to 2017.

But there is far more at stake when it comes to NATO, especially on the front line of the new antagonistic relationship with Russia. Since Putin annexed Crimea in 2014, nations along NATO's eastern flank have been increasingly concerned by Russian aggression along their own borders, and still see the U.S. as the most important backer of their security.

"Without the United States, European security would be in great danger," Latvian Foreign Minister Edgars Rinkevics tells TIME. "We can't simply build something that would exclude the United States – this is simply impossible: look at the resources, look at

capabilities." While he predicts "long, very difficult, very heated meetings" at the July summit, Rinkevics believes a consensus is still within reach.

Trump's abrupt cancelling of joint military exercises on the Korean peninsula after his meeting with Kim has also raised questions about whether war games in Europe could suffer a similar fate. Just this month, the U.S. led joint exercises in the Baltics and in Poland with 18 other nations. Rinkevics, whose country helped host these exercises, is confident the war games will continue. "I don't believe that there is going to be such kind of development," he says, even if Trump does make good on suggestions of a U.S.-Russia summit.

Yet the tensions between the U.S. and Germany may again come to the fore. Not only does Germany spend comparatively less on defense than other major powers, but Trump has recently taken Chancellor Angela Merkel to task over her refugee policy that is currently the subject of a bitter domestic political feud.

"He is picking on Germany more than anyone else for a simple reason: he wants Merkel to fail and he wants the migration issue to demonstrate the failure of her policies," says Gardner. "It is a remarkable situation of the President of the United States attacking one of our closest and dearest allies, basically for domestic purposes."

The embattled Merkel will be keen to avoid a further spat with Trump, says Christian Mölling, deputy director of the German Council on Foreign Relations. With that in mind, German defense officials travelled to Washington for meetings ahead of the summit to try and sell to their U.S. counterparts a plan to increase defense spending to 1.5% by 2024. "She will definitely want to prevent a public fight with Trump, if that is possible, because he holds the cards given the fact that he can always choose to come up with the 2% discussion and Merkel would be on the defensive side," says Mölling.

Rasmussen urged NATO members to keep discussions about defense spending behind closed doors, cautioning that a public disagreement may raise public doubt over America's commitment to Article 5, the clause which says that all NATO members will respond if one of their number is threatened. "Putin might take it as a signal that when push comes to shove, the Americans will not be ready to really defend its allies, so it sends a very dangerous signal to autocrats," he says.

### **Consensus confirms NATO solves war**

**Beauchamp 16** [Zach Beauchamp, senior reporter at Vox, where he covers global politics and ideology, citing multiple political science professors. Donald Trump needs to clarify his position on NATO before something scary happens. Vox. 2016.

<https://www.vox.com/2016/7/21/12247074/donald-trump-nato-war>]

Trump's comments about NATO are like an arrow pointed straight at the heart of the alliance - and, if implemented, would directly threaten the foundations of global peace itself. Any president could simply choose not to abide by Article 5. But abrogating NATO agreements was always deemed unthinkable by both parties, which has played an important part in maintaining credible deterrence vis-à-vis Russia. Trump has put the idea of the US not defending NATO on the table, in a very real way. This threatens the very integrity of NATO itself. If NATO allies start to think that the United States can't be trusted to defend them, that NATO is just on paper, then they'll start to wonder why they bother to adhere to this alliance in the first place. If Trump wins the election, this could cause them to exit the security agreement altogether. According to the best available research, this would make war on the European continent far more likely. One study, from professors Jesse C. Johnson and Brett Ashley Leeds, surveyed about 200 years of data on conflicts and concluded that "defensive alliances lower the probability of international conflict and are thus a good policy option for states seeking to maintain peace in

the world." Another study looked specifically at the period from 1950 to 2000 and found that formal alliances with nuclear states appear to carry significant deterrence benefits." The US's formal agreements, then, deter aggression against its non-nuclear partners (like Germany and the Baltics). In their new book on American grand strategy, Dartmouth scholars Steven Brooks and William Wohlforth also surveyed research from regional experts and found a similar consensus. In Europe, they write, "most assessments nonetheless sum up to the conclusion that NATO is a net security plus." Trump, then, could end up weakening one of America's most important security agreements — and may already have done so.

**Allied abandonment causes nuclear war – err strongly neg because it causes unpredictable miscalculation – the perception of American security commitment is key to stopping prolif**

Fay 17 [Mathew, Director of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies The Niskanen Center. "America Unrestrained?: Engagement, Retrenchment, and Libertarian Foreign Policy." 11/16. <https://niskanencenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/America-Unrestrained.pdf>. Page 21-22]

If the risk of territorial aggression increases, the possession of nuclear weapons would become an attractive option for some states whose security was previously guaranteed by the United States. Nuclear weapons are most useful for deterring major territorial aggression, meaning their potential utility increases as the potential for war does.<sup>93</sup> A number of U.S. allies have either previously pursued nuclear weapons or have the capability to do so. They might choose to obtain a nuclear arsenal once responsible for their own security.

There are at least two reasons why increasing the number of nuclear weapons states may not have the pacifying effect some realists suggest they do. First, states do not always adopt the second-strike — that is, retaliatory — postures realists assume they will. Recent research shows that even in the paradigmatic case of mutual assured destruction—the Cold War superpower standoff—neither the United States nor the Soviet Union abandoned the search for a first-strike capability.<sup>94</sup> Moreover, political scientist Vipin Narang's research on India-Pakistan nuclear relations has demonstrated that states sometimes adopt risky postures in pursuit of goals other than deterrence.<sup>95</sup>

Second, an increased number of nuclear weapon states will increase the chances nuclear weapons will be used even if states do adopt second-strike postures. On the one hand, simple organizational pathologies or political instability in a new nuclear state could lead to an accidental or unauthorized nuclear launch.<sup>96</sup> On the other hand, even for retaliatory postures, effective deterrence requires that states credibly signal that they are willing to use nuclear weapons in retaliation for an attack. To do so requires that nuclear states in competition with one another must maintain a willingness to risk nuclear war. The greater the number of these "competition[s] in risk taking," as Thomas Schelling called them, the more likely it is that nuclear weapons will be used at some point.<sup>97</sup>

The situation in Northeast Asia helps illustrate how increasing the number of nuclear weapons states increases the probability that nuclear weapons will be used. Absent U.S. security guarantees, there is a real possibility that Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea would build nuclear arsenals of their own given their concerns about China and North Korea.<sup>98</sup> There are currently two nuclear dyads in the region: the United States and China, and the United States and North Korea. If Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea all acquired nuclear weapons, there would be at least five additional dyads: China and Taiwan, China and Japan, China and South Korea, North Korea and South Korea, and North Korea and Japan. Given lingering tensions from its pre-1945 occupation of the Korean Peninsula, a South Korea-Japanese nuclear dyad is entirely plausible as well.<sup>99</sup> Each new dyad adds a contest in risk-taking, which increases the chances that nuclear weapons will be used in the region.<sup>100</sup>

## NATO prevents global nuclear war

Brzezinski, John Hopkins American foreign policy professor, 2009

(Zbigniew, "An Agenda for NATO", Foreign Affairs, September/October, ebsco)

And yet, it is fair to ask: Is NATO living up to its extraordinary potential? NATO today is without a doubt the most powerful military and political alliance in the world. Its 28 members come from the globe's two most productive, technologically advanced, socially modern, economically prosperous, and politically democratic regions. Its member states' 900 million people account for only 13 percent of the world's population but 45 percent of global GDP. NATO's potential is not primarily military. Although NATO is a collective-security alliance, its actual military power comes predominantly from the United States, and that reality is not likely to change anytime soon. NATO's real power derives from the fact that it combines the United States' military capabilities and economic power with Europe's collective political and economic weight (and occasionally some limited European military forces). Together, that combination makes NATO globally significant. It must therefore remain sensitive to the importance of safeguarding the geopolitical bond between the United States and Europe as it addresses new tasks. The basic challenge that NATO now confronts is that there are historically unprecedented risks to global security. Today's world is threatened neither by the militant fanaticism of a territorially rapacious nationalist state nor by the coercive aspiration of a globally pretentious ideology embraced by an expansive imperial power. The paradox of our time is that the world, increasingly connected and economically interdependent for the first time in its entire history, is experiencing intensifying popular unrest made all the more menacing by the growing accessibility of weapons of mass destruction - not just to states but also, potentially, to extremist religious and political movements. Yet there is no effective global security mechanism for coping with the growing threat of violent political chaos stemming from humanity's recent political awakening. The three great political contests of the twentieth century (the two world wars and the Cold War) accelerated the political awakening of mankind, which was initially unleashed in Europe by the French Revolution. Within a century of that revolution, spontaneous populist political activism had spread from Europe to East Asia. On their return home after World Wars I and II, the South Asians and the North Africans who had been conscripted by the British and French imperial armies propagated a new awareness of anticolonial nationalist and religious political identity among hitherto passive and pliant populations. The spread of literacy during the twentieth century and the wide-ranging impact of radio, television, and the Internet accelerated and intensified this mass global political awakening. In its early stages, such new political awareness tends to be expressed as a fanatical embrace of the most extreme ethnic or fundamentalist religious passions, with beliefs and resentments universalized in Manichaean categories. Unfortunately, in significant parts of the developing world, bitter memories of European colonialism and of more recent U.S. intrusion have given such newly aroused passions a distinctively anti-Western cast. Today, the most acute example of this phenomenon is found in an area that stretches from Egypt to India. This area, inhabited by more than 500 million politically and religiously aroused peoples, is where NATO is becoming more deeply embroiled. Additionally complicating is the fact that the dramatic rise of China and India and the quick recovery of Japan within the last 50 years have signaled that the global center of political and economic gravity is shifting away from the North Atlantic toward Asia and the Pacific. And of the currently leading global powers - the United States, the EU, China, Japan, Russia, and India - at least two, or perhaps even three, are revisionist in their orientation. Whether they are "rising peacefully" (a self-confident China), truculently (an imperially nostalgic Russia) or boastfully (an assertive India, despite its internal multiethnic and religious vulnerabilities), they all desire a change in the

global pecking order. The future conduct of and relationship among these three still relatively cautious revisionist powers will further intensify the strategic uncertainty. Visible on the horizon but not as powerful are the emerging regional rebels, with some of them defiantly reaching for nuclear weapons. North Korea has openly flouted the international community by producing (apparently successfully) its own nuclear weapons - and also by profiting from their dissemination. At some point, its unpredictability could precipitate the first use of nuclear weapons in anger since 1945. Iran, in contrast, has proclaimed that its nuclear program is entirely for peaceful purposes but so far has been unwilling to consider consensual arrangements with the international community that would provide credible assurances regarding these intentions. In nuclear-armed Pakistan, an extremist anti-Western religious movement is threatening the country's political stability.



## Russia Contention

### NFU crushes deterrence against Russian aggression in Europe

Gordon G. Chang, July 27, 2016, <https://thebulletin.org/2016/07/declaring-a-no-first-use-nuclear-policy-would-be-exceedingly-risky/>, Declaring a no-first-use nuclear policy would be exceedingly risky

Various defense and disarmament experts have suggested that in the coming months, US President Barack Obama will declare a no-first-use stance on nuclear weapons, which would mark a fundamental policy shift. In June, Bruce Blair, co-founder of the pro-disarmament organization Global Zero, wrote in Politico, “I believe Obama will soon announce that henceforth the United States will never use nuclear weapons first in a conflict.” Washington Post columnist Josh Rogin asserted as much on July 10, citing officials who said the president was considering a no-first-use declaration. A few days later, Japan’s Kyodo News reported that President Obama would decide by the end of this month whether to announce the policy shift. Would declaring no-first-use actually be a good idea, though? The answer is no, at least not now. Unilateral changes of this sort should be made only in times of strategic stability. At this time, America and its treaty partners are already having difficulty deterring big-state aggressors in Europe and Asia, and may need their most destructive weaponry to maintain peace and stability in troubled regions. As its name implies, a no-first-use policy is a promise to use nuclear weapons only in retaliation for a nuclear attack. There are, of course, reasons to favor such a policy, and none is more important than avoiding history’s last war. As Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, wrote in War on the Rocks, “A clear U.S. no-first-use policy would reduce the risk of nuclear miscalculation by nuclear-armed adversaries by alleviating concerns about a devastating U.S. nuclear first-strike, especially during a crisis.” Blair put forth a more practical perspective: “The strategy today,” he wrote of America’s first-use posture, “has grown less and less connected to the contemporary world and its emerging security threats: terrorism, proliferation, cyber warfare, economic disruption, mass refugee migrations, and climate change.” Proponents of first use, Blair suggested, are “mired in a Cold-War mind-set.” Today, unfortunately, resembles that multi-decade, global struggle in crucial respects. During the Cold War, big-power authoritarians threatened the international system, seizing territory and using armies to hold on to their new possessions. Now, China is grabbing specks in the South China Sea. It effectively seized Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines in 2012, and is threatening to take others, notably Second Thomas Shoal, also claimed by the Philippines, and the Japan-administered Senkakus in the East China Sea. Beijing is, at the same time, sending troops deep into Indian-controlled territory in the Himalayas. Its prosecution of territorial claims is creating instability in an arc from India to South Korea. Moscow is also on the march. Russian President Vladimir Putin dismembered Georgia last decade and Ukraine this one, annexing Crimea in 2014. At the moment, his forces are occupying a large portion of the Ukrainian region of Donbass, which he ominously calls part of “New Russia.” As former Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk recently told the

Washington Post, there are, despite a cease-fire, both civilian and military casualties there every single day. No time to experiment. The West largely stood by and watched Putin's mischief in Georgia and Ukraine, but now he has his eye on the Baltic states. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are NATO members, and pursuant to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, an attack on any of them would be considered an attack on all. The alliance, however, is not at the moment capable of defending the Baltics with just conventional weapons. A RAND study released this year, reporting on the results of a series of war games, produced sobering assessments of a Russian move on the three states. "The games' findings are unambiguous: As currently postured, NATO cannot successfully defend the territory of its most exposed members," the authors write. "Across multiple games using a wide range of expert participants playing both sides, the longest it has taken Russian forces to reach the outskirts of Tallinn and Riga is 60 hours." A NATO war game in March also showed Russia winning. The West, in short, is outgunned, tank for tank, plane for plane, and soldier for soldier. To slow down Russian advances, Obama and leaders of the 27 other members of the Atlantic alliance met in Warsaw early this month for perhaps the most important NATO meeting since the fall of the Soviet Union. There, they agreed to deploy four battalions, consisting of around 4,000 troops in total, in Poland and the three Baltic states. The new force, according to the Wall Street Journal, will be "the first regular deployment aimed at deterring Moscow since the reunification of Germany more than a quarter-century ago." Presumably, NATO will increase the size of this small contingent. As president of the Center for Security Policy Frank Gaffney argues, though, today the West needs more than just conventional forces. He said to me in an interview that it needs to convince aggressors they can be destroyed by a first nuclear strike.

Whether maintaining a first-use policy does in fact deter aggression is much debated. Kimball argues that the risk of "an uncontrollable and potentially suicidal escalation" is so high that the threat of using nuclear weapons "lacks credibility." Meanwhile Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, told me "we don't really know what precisely deters and what does not." There is evidence, though, suggesting that nuclear threats can prevent conventional attacks. After all, during the Cold War, Soviet tanks could have rolled across Western Europe but never did. Back then, NATO threatened to incinerate the Soviet Union in the event of such an invasion. Odds are, the NATO threat helped stop the Soviets in their tracks. Moreover, we know that nuclear weapons affected Soviet defense thinking and planning. Moscow worked hard to prevent NATO from upgrading its nuclear arsenal, especially in the early 1980s when the Kremlin tried to forestall the deployment of America's Pershing II missiles in Europe. We cannot say for sure how the alliance's most destructive weapons have affected Putin's thinking—as Sokolski said, nuclear deterrence is "endlessly debatable"—but at least so far, a strong Russia, which had no compunction in going after non-alliance members Georgia and Ukraine, has not attacked weak, nearby NATO states. In any event, Putin is bulking up forces on his side of the border, planning to deploy three new divisions near Poland and the Baltics. Therefore, common sense, if nothing else, suggests now may not be the best moment to adopt no-first-use and thereby create a real-life experiment on what deters aggression. Conventional deterrence needed. The United States has maintained a first-use policy for as long as it has possessed nuclear weapons. For all their drawbacks, these weapons shortened World

**War II and look instrumental in having avoided global war since then.** “The current policy has served us well over many years and if there’s some movement to change that, it would require some scrutiny,” said Adm. Cecil Haney, commander of US Strategic Command, at a hearing of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces this month. “We need to be very careful given the directions and the developments we see around the world, that we do everything in our power to maintain strategic stability.” Timing, as Haney suggests, has become an issue. The moment when large states are redrawing their borders by force is not the time to try something different with America’s weapons of last resort. That is what Washington’s Japanese allies think. Threatened by China and its ally North Korea, Tokyo does not want to see a declaration of no-first-use. As “a senior government official close to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe” told Kyodo News about such a possibility, “it is unacceptable.” South Korea, Jonathan Pollack and Richard Bush of the Brookings Institution report, is also opposed to America adopting no-first-use. **The world, of course, would be far safer if all nine of the world’s nuclear-armed states—the five recognized by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the four that are not—had no-first-use policies in place. Blair, the co-founder of Global Zero, believes that if the United States took a first nuclear strike off the table, it would “exert pressure on other nations whose doctrines allow for nuclear first use—Russia and Pakistan in particular—to revise those doctrines accordingly.” In the case of Russia, though, a revision of its first-use posture is unlikely while Putin remains in the Kremlin. He has talked about using nuclear weapons to hold onto Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, and his generals, meeting with American officials in March of last year, threatened to use them to prevent NATO from reinforcing the Baltic states.** General Sir Richard Shirreff, NATO’s deputy supreme allied commander from 2011 to 2014, thinks a war with Russia over the Baltics would not stay conventional. “The chilling fact,” he told BBC Radio 4, “is that because Russia hardwires nuclear thinking and capability to every aspect of their defense capability, this would be nuclear war.” We don’t have to take Shirreff’s word for it. Putin, while in Crimea in August 2014, talked about his country’s “new developments in offensive nuclear weapons.” And Gaffney of the Center for Security Policy said that the Russians not only have a doctrine of first-use, but are also “building first-strike capabilities, including some in violation of their arms-control obligations.” So Kimball’s argument that declaring no-first-use will reduce the possibility of nuclear conflict looks, at best, debatable. “During the past half century, no president has dared to change the nation’s nuclear strategy in any fundamental way,” Blair wrote. He’s right to ask us to rethink risky nuclear policy, but what he does not say is that any adoption of no-first-use would require a substantial rebuilding of conventional war-fighting capabilities. It takes years—and sometimes decades—to do that, **so no-first-use is** not an idea whose time has come. As Sokoloski said of nuclear weapons, “We should not want to use them first, we should be reluctant to use them first, we should do everything not to use them first, but we should not exclude the possibility of doing so.”

## Russian foreign policies prove they are revisionist

**Natsios 18** — Andrew Natsios, executive professor at the Bush School, director of the Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs, Distinguished Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, 2018. (“Putin’s New Russia: Fragile State or Revisionist Power?”, *Johns Hopkins University Press*, May 15<sup>th</sup>, 2018, Available Online at: <https://www.press.jhu.edu/news/blog/putin%E2%80%99s-new-russia-fragile-state-or-revisionist-power> Accessed 11-13-2018)

John Mearsheimer, the international relations scholar, argues Russia’s aggressiveness towards its neighbors stems from western efforts to extend NATO membership to former members of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. According to this view, traditional national interest drives Russia’s behavior, and NATO extension has been seen by Putin as a threat to Russia’s vital national security interests. From this perspective, the western democracies helped create Vladimir Putin’s Russia by impinging on its “sphere of influence” along its borders; thus, Russia is not what international relations scholars call a “revisionist power”—one which seeks to overthrow the existing international order—but a traditional state protecting what it sees as its equities and vital national interests. Other analysts, such as Anne Applebaum, argue Putin’s policies are not part of a grand strategy, but are evidence of an improvised foreign policy. Thus, Russia’s aggression in Georgia, Ukraine, Syria, and its threats to the Baltic States, may be seen not as a carefully designed and executed strategy of conquest, but as symptomatic of Putin’s ad hoc, opportunistic foreign policy. He probes for Western weakness, irresolution, and indecision, and then, if there is no resistance, he intervenes to extend Russia’s reach by absorbing more territory.

Putin has sought to return Russia to great power status by weakening other competing powers or annexing neighboring states rather than risking reforms that could be destabilizing in the short term, but would strengthen Russia as a nation state over the long term. The immediate objectives of Russian foreign policy are not mysterious if one examines Putin’s government’s public rhetoric, its published documents, and its actions. One of Putin’s greatest strengths has been the aggressive and systematic pursuit of these strategic objectives which include:

- efforts to regain military parity with the United States (they are nowhere near achieving this)
- the neutralization of the NATO alliance
- the end of the European Union as one of the most powerful economic blocs in the world
- the creation of an alternative anti-liberal, authoritarian, reactionary governance model of statehood for which Russia is trying to gain adherents among far right and far left parties wing in Europe

the reconstruction of the historic Russian sphere of influence through annexation of parts of neighboring states and the projection of Russian power to other regions of the world such as the Middle

## Russia Impact

Russia war is the only nuclear extinction risk

**Farquhar et al 17** (Sebastian Farquhar, DPhil from the University of Oxford in Cybersecurity and AI. Stefan Schubert, PhD in philosophy and postdoc at London School of Economics, where he combined his research with outreach work in the field of political rationality. Owen Cotton-Barratt, DPhil in pure mathematics, Research Fellow at the University of Southampton, former Director of Research at the Centre for Effective Altruism. Haydn Belfield, Policy Associate to the University of Oxford's Global Priorities Project, former Senior Parliamentary Researcher to a British Shadow Cabinet Minister. John Halstead, Global Priorities Project, a collaboration between the Centre for Effective Altruism and the Future of Humanity Institute, part of the University of Oxford. Andrew Snyder-Beattie, fellow in the Emerging Leaders in Biosecurity Initiative from the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security. "Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance". Global Priorities Risk 2017. <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf>) swap

The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the unprecedented destructive power of nuclear weapons. However, even in an all-out nuclear war between the United States and Russia, despite horrific casualties, neither country's population is likely to be completely destroyed by the direct effects of the blast, fire, and radiation.<sup>8</sup> The aftermath could be much worse: the burning of flammable materials could send massive amounts of smoke into the atmosphere, which would absorb sunlight and cause sustained global cooling, severe ozone loss, and agricultural disruption – a nuclear winter. According to one model<sup>9</sup>, an all-out exchange of 4,000 weapons<sup>10</sup> could lead to a drop in global temperatures of around 8°C, making it impossible to grow food for 4 to 5 years. This could leave some survivors in parts of Australia and New Zealand, but they would be in a very precarious situation and the threat of extinction from other sources would be great. An exchange on this scale is only possible between the US and Russia who have more than 90% of the world's nuclear weapons, with stockpiles of around 4,500 warheads each, although many are not operationally deployed.<sup>11</sup> Some models suggest that even a small regional nuclear war involving 100 nuclear weapons would produce a nuclear winter serious enough to put two billion people at risk of starvation,<sup>12</sup> though this estimate might be pessimistic.<sup>13</sup> Wars on this scale are unlikely to lead to outright human extinction, but this does suggest that conflicts which are around an order of magnitude larger may be likely to threaten civilisation. It should be emphasised that there is very large uncertainty about the effects of a large nuclear war on global climate. This remains an area where increased academic research work, including more detailed climate modelling and a better understanding of how survivors might be able to cope and adapt, would have high returns.

- East and Afghanistan

## Russia a Threat

### Russia is threat

Patrick Porter is a professor of International Security and Strategy at the University of Birmingham, Spring 2019, Washington Quarterly

<https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2121/f/downloads/Porter.pdf>, Advice for a Dark Age: Managing Great Power Competition

In March 2018, Russia used a chemical weapon on the soil of the most senior American ally, the United Kingdom, attempting to kill a former defector and his wife using a nerve agent.<sup>16</sup> This act of aggression narrowed the debate within the British and U.S. government and security services about Russia's hostile intentions. Far from being accepted as a great power with legitimate security interests to be negotiated with, Russia in western eyes increasingly resembles a predator. Its attack in Britain followed a series of Russian actions over the past decade perceived by the West as the actions of an offensively-minded greedy state, from its invasion of Georgia in 2008 to the seizure of the Crimea in 2014 to its ongoing campaign supporting secessionists in Ukraine, its military probes of air and sea space proximate to NATO's borders, its cyber-mischief, its use of "dark money" to sabotage western democratic politics, and its support for Syria's tyrant Bashar al Assad. While its aggregate wealth and power is considerably less than NATO's, it retains advantages such as localized military superiority, a ruthless intelligence network, its pioneering expansion of asymmetric tactics and information warfare, and a large nuclear arsenal. Russia also has a reputation—justified or not—of being willing to resort suddenly to nuclear use against military targets to settle conflicts on its terms, given its rehearsal of such scenarios in doctrine and deed.<sup>17</sup> This record makes it difficult to press alternative arguments about the need for mutual accommodation, as Russia's record at least since Putin's return has reinforced the designation of the country itself, and not interactions between Russia and the West, as a principle source of threat.<sup>18</sup> What will this evolving world of protracted security competition look like? Historical multipolar periods suggest underlying dynamics: antagonistic powers will seek to maximize their security at others' expense; competition will feature constant measures to seize advantage in areas short of head-on combat. This includes expansion into and around disputed territories; espionage and theft; competition for allies; competition for legitimacy through propaganda; trade wars; competition for military advantage, both nuclear and conventional; arms races and the abandonment (or loosening) of mutual restraints such as arms control treaties. In the field of cyberwar, actors will fear all-out strikes on critical infrastructure, and prepare such capabilities for themselves. Nuclear weapons will probably have a restraining effect at the highest level of competition, and reduce the chances of miscalculation, but if growing instability heightens reciprocal fear of surprise attack, it also makes miscalculation potentially deadlier. New technologies from communication to weapons systems will lend the competition greater velocity. As fears rise, states may lose sight of geographical limitation, viewing threats not as discrete, but monolithic and worldwide. They will fear the fall of dominoes, leading to the loss of international credibility and the defection of allies. Defensively-motivated actions will resemble and appear as offense, creating an "action-reaction" spiral.<sup>19</sup> Self-protective forward

deployments will look like encirclement. Efforts at negotiation will attract suspicions of cheating. Support for human rights will look like fomenting revolution. All sides will adopt images of the enemy that become self-fulfilling. Great powers will see adversaries as one-dimensional, predatory, greedy states, without legitimate security interests, that can only be countered by creating situations of strength that give firm signals of resolve. An “us” versus “them” mentality is likely to emerge, where “we” have benign motives and must look strong to repel the aggression of malign states and evil empires, and “they” are a killer breed that looks to probe our weaknesses and test our commitment. In a nuclear world, states will not ordinarily seek major war, just seek the fruits of that war by other means. To prevent decline and unfavorable power shifts, they will conduct proxy wars, initiate crises and dangerous games of “chicken” to coerce concessions.<sup>20</sup>

### **Need to deter Putin – He wants war**

Leon Aron is a resident scholar and director of Russian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, April 25, 2019, <http://www.aei.org/publication/theres-a-bigger-russian-threat-than-meddling-vladimir-putin-is-acting-like-he-wants-war/>, There’s a bigger Russian threat than meddling. Vladimir Putin is acting like he wants war

Russia’s meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election was an attack on our sovereignty and can’t be ignored. But we shouldn’t allow it to distract us from the larger threat Russian President Vladimir Putin poses to both the United States and the world. To understand that threat, we have to examine Putin’s motivations. His policies are dictated by deeply held convictions and ambitions rooted less in Russian patriotism than in Soviet patriotism. In his mind, the end of the Soviet Union was a profound historical injustice, visited upon his country by plotters from without and traitors from within. His self-imposed mission is to avenge this “tragic,” man-made disaster by recovering for Russia some of the economic, political and geopolitical assets it lost when the Soviet Union collapsed. For Putin, as his policies have made clear again and again, the most important of these is to reoccupy the Soviet Union’s place as an existential alternative — military and moral — to the United States. In the most popular trope of state propaganda, he is “raising Russia off its knees” to make America pay dearly for the humiliation it dealt the Soviet Union. Whether because of his rough childhood in the slums of postwar Leningrad or his training in judo, Putin regards direct confrontation as the ultimate measure of manliness. He views victories in such bouts as proof of superior virtue — for men as well as nations. For Putin, Russia’s greatest geopolitical success in recent years was the occupation and annexation of Crimea. And the operation’s success, he emphasized, was largely because of his hands-on approach. “Do you know what our advantage was?” he said during an interview. “The fact that I personally dealt with [the operation]!” Putin’s aggression in Crimea paid off handsomely politically: His support among Russians skyrocketed from a record low of 61% at the end of 2013 to a record high of 86% in October 2014. Russia is in “total confrontation” mode with the U.S., Putin’s chief of general staff, Valery Gerasimov, declared last year. Putin’s policies match this assessment. Russia’s president is never happier or more animated than when he describes Russia’s nuclear hardware, aimed at the United States — and invulnerable to U.S. missile defense, as he emphasizes again and again. No Soviet leader ever bragged of his country’s nuclear might the way Putin does. In his two most recent annual state-of-Russia annual

addresses to the Federal Assembly, he concluded with triumphant tributes to Russia's nuclear arsenal, modernized under his loving care and home to the world's heaviest, fastest and longest-range missiles. He has also touted a new cache of futuristic weapons: underwater nuclear drones, a hypersonic "meteorite;" a mighty ognennyi shar, or "ball of fire," which Russian wits have called the "flying Chernobyl." Putin has authorized two multiyear "state armament programs," costing around a trillion dollars. (Russia's GDP last year was \$1.6 trillion.) The biggest threat posed by Putin's militarism, however, is to his nearest neighbors. He has resurrected the Western Military District, established in the Soviet era and abolished by Boris Yeltsin, making it the largest and best armed of Russia's military districts. NATO members Latvia and Estonia today face between 350,000 and 400,000 troops just across the border in Russia, a tank army, more than 100 fighter jets, four squadrons of long-range bombers, and Russia's most modern surface-to-air missiles. And they are worried about a Crimea-style annexation of parts of their territories. Praising the Soviet Union for the way it nurtured patriotism in the young, Putin has created programs that mimic those of the former Soviet Main Political Directorate of the Armed Forces, which had responsibility for propaganda and ideological control. As of last year, 380,000 children under the draft age of 18 were reportedly enrolled in the Yunarmiya (Young Army), created in 2016 to "instill patriotism" and "positive motivation toward military service." Yunarmiya members enjoy preferential treatment in college admissions and their numbers are expected to swell to 1 million in time for the 75th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War (better known as World War II) next spring. The timing of Putin's war preparations could hardly be worse. Economic growth is projected to be anemic for years to come, personal incomes are down for a fifth consecutive year, and 68% of Russians believe that their country is in an economic crisis. According to a recent survey by the Russian State Statistical Agency, 80% of Russian families have a monthly income that leaves them unable to buy a "minimal assortment" of goods. Thirty-five percent cannot afford to buy two pairs of shoes for each family member. Putin's approval ratings have fallen to 64%, only a few percentage points higher than they were before he embarked on his Crimean conquest. While that may sound high to those living in a democracy, it is a troubling number for a politician who operates unchallenged within his country. The Russian constitution bars Putin from running again in 2024. But if Putin, who clearly would like to rule Russia for life, wants support from Russians in doing so, he will need to boost his popularity before then. How? Putin has recast himself as a wartime president defending the motherland, and he is determined to restore his country to a victorious superpower status. What better way to accomplish all his goals than to fight and win another military conflict.

## Russia's military engagement increasing globally

Harlan Ullman is UPI's Arnaud de Borchgrave Distinguished Columnist. His latest book is "Anatomy of Failure: Why America Has Lost Every War It Starts", 4-22, 19, [https://www.upi.com/Top\\_News/Voices/2019/04/22/US-Russia-must-work-to-thaw-relations/362155535610/](https://www.upi.com/Top_News/Voices/2019/04/22/US-Russia-must-work-to-thaw-relations/362155535610/), U.S., Russia must work to thaw relations

Putin continues to play a weak hand with skill. Following the Crimea grab, Putin's intervention into Middle East politics -- meeting with regional leaders on both sides of the Arab-Israeli conflict; the sale of S-400 surface-to-air missiles to Turkey; engagement in Syria; and efforts to

**sow disruption in NATO -- are advancing Moscow's influence and prestige. Nor was placing a handful of troops in Venezuela missed by many observers.** A seeming detente with China, including a large oil deal, and Russian arms sales suggests that **the Moscow-Beijing axis is strengthening.** Putin has also cut defense spending in order to boost public sector accounts and mitigate the negative effects of increasing retirement age. This may keep Putin's opinion polls well into the high 60 percent range. Although well below his once astronomical ratings, they are still more than 20 points higher than Donald Trump's scores in America.

## **Russia is militarily aggressive**

Gurganus & Rumber, February 20, 2019, Russia's Global Ambitions in Perspective, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/02/20/russia-s-global-ambitions-in-perspective-pub-78067> Julia Gurganus NONRESIDENT SCHOLAR RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM Julia Gurganus is a nonresident scholar with the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Her research focus is on trends in Russian foreign policy and Russia-U.S. relations. Eugene Rumer DIRECTOR AND SENIOR FELLOW RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM Rumer, a former national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the U.S. National Intelligence Council, is a senior fellow and the director of Carnegie's Russia and Eurasia Program.

While usually associated with Putin, Russia's contemporary activist foreign policy was, in fact, launched before he even became president. It was first launched by Yevgeny Primakov, who was appointed Russian foreign minister in 1996. He formulated what became known as the Primakov Doctrine. According to Primakov, Russia would no longer follow the lead of Western powers, especially the United States, but would instead position itself as an independent center of power on the world stage, contributing to the development of a multipolar world as an alternative to the U.S.-led unipolar order. Primakov's successor as foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, summed up his predecessor's influence in October 2014, saying:

## **Nuclear doomsday torpedos**

Peck, April 23, 2019, Michael Peck is a contributing writer for the National Interest, Russia's Doomsday Submarines Are Here (Armed with Nuclear Robot Torpedoes), <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russias-doomsday-submarines-are-here-armed-nuclear-robot-torpedoes-53947>

**Russian has launched the first of several submarines designed to carry thermonuclear-armed robot torpedoes. The Belgorod, recently launched from the Sevmash shipyard in northern Russia, is designed to carry the Status-6 Poseidon, an** 80-foot-long robot sub with intercontinental range and armed with a 100-megaton warhead that to create a tsunami that will bury enemy coastal cities. **"The new submarine would be able to carry six strategic underwater drones,"** reported Russian news agency TASS. Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly watched the launch over a special TV link.

## **Russia is a threat to the international order**

Friedman & Hooper, Spring 2018, Rebecca Friedman Lissner is a Research Fellow at Perry World House, the University of Pennsylvania's global policy research center, and can be reached via email at lissner@upenn.edu or on Twitter @RebeccaLissner. Mira Rapp-Hooper is a Senior Research Scholar in the Paul Tsai China Center at Yale Law School, and can be reached via email at mrapp-hooper@yale.edu or on Twitter @MiraRappHooper, Washington Quarterly, The Day after Trump: American Strategy for a New International Order, [https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2121/f/downloads/TWQ\\_Spring2018\\_LissnerRappHooper\\_0.pdf](https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2121/f/downloads/TWQ_Spring2018_LissnerRappHooper_0.pdf)

As American hegemony has eroded, so too has the willingness of the United States' near-peer competitors to tolerate a liberal international order which reflects a distribution of benefits that decreasingly resembles the global distribution of economic and military power. Russia and China have begun to chip away at the elements of it that do not suit them, asserting their dominance over limited areas without challenging the liberal international order wholesale. Russia is decidedly a power in decline, yet has come to define its national interests in opposition to the post-Cold War European security order.<sup>14</sup> Long opposed to the expansion of NATO, Russia challenged foundational sovereignty norms through the 2014 annexation of Crimea and invasion of Eastern Ukraine and brazenly deployed active measures to subvert 2016-17 democratic elections in the United States, Germany, and France, all while diminishing its exposure to economic reprisal through an autarkic policy of "economic sovereignty."

## Con Tactical Nuclear Weans Good Contentions

### NFU ends all forward-deployed nuclear weapons

**Belfer Center 16** [Belfer Center at the Harvard Kennedy School, “The Utility of Nuclear Weapons and the Strategy of No-First-Use,” November 15-17, 2016,  
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170430210252/https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/utility-nuclear-weapons-and-strategy-no-first-use>]

Force Composition and Disposition. A strategy of **NFU would require** or permit dramatic **alterations in force posture**. A purely deterrent force could be much smaller and simpler than the present arsenals of the larger nuclear powers. **There would be no need for** emphasis on speed or **offensive readiness**.

(Readiness for survivability would, of course, remain desirable.) The force postures most compatible with NFU, and most convincing to other powers, would possess little or no capability for first-use. This proposition - that states should seek to minimize the first-use capacities of their nuclear arsenals - has potentially profound implications for nuclear posture. It could lead far down a road toward latent, residual, undeployed nuclear capabilities. In effect, this would entail the aggressive pursuit of deep dealerting.<sup>27</sup> In the context of a strategy of NFU, nuclear forces need only survive an attack and be capable of retaliation. No other demands are placed upon them. This means that all readiness measures associated with first use options are superfluous, unnecessary, and even undesirable. **Some categories of nuclear weapons** - nonstrategic nuclear forces, for example - would become expendable. **Forward deployed weapons**, such as the **American nuclear capabilities deployed in Europe, would be neither necessary nor appropriate**. With offensive readiness no longer important, **there would be no reason to leave warheads** routinely **mated to delivery systems**. **There might be little reason**, indeed, **to possess actively deployed nuclear weapons**. There might be no compelling reason to leave nuclear weapons **in the custody of military organizations**. So long as survivability could be assured, there might be an argument for keeping few, if any, fully assembled nuclear weapons in the arsenal. Following this logic still further, in this sort of nuclear environment, states might grow comfortable not only with NFU, but with the notion of no-early-second-use - retaliation does not need to be prompt in order to deter. The end point of this logic might be something like the capacities of present day Japan, which might be regarded as a massively dealerted nuclear power. It possesses nuclear expertise, delivery systems, and fissile material. In some weeks or months it could build nuclear weapons for retaliation if it needed to. But no one fears its first use options. Thus, the premise of NFU, if taken seriously, produces a logic that can lead in stunning directions.

### U.S. TNWs in Europe are key to deter Russian aggression

**Thayer 14** (Bradley A. - associate professor of political science at the University of Minnesota-Duluth & Petr Suchy - Head of Department of International Relations and European Studies at the Faculty of Social Studies at Masaryk University, “Weapons as political symbolism: the role of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe,” 7/3/14, *European Security*, Volume 23, Issue 4, Taylor & Francis Online)

**The value of US TNWs remains significant today**, but with a different emphasis. In this section, **We will consider the contemporary roles of TNWs in Europe and argue that the political aspect of the weapons is more important than their military role**. The first role is less significant today due to high accuracy of conventional weapons. But even the first role cannot and should not be taken off the table totally.<sup>7</sup> The reason is that **the future is uncertain, and NATO confronts the possibility of a resurgent Russia**, a threat not equal to the Soviet Union to be sure, but **Russia's actions in 2014 reveal that it poses irredentist or revisionist political objectives in Europe**. Put directly, before the seizure of Crimea, Russia under Putin generated cause for concern (RIA Novosti, May 3, 2012). **The change of tack toward greater bellicosity in Putin's Russia underscores our point, countries can change**. Accordingly, **strategic thinking about the threats NATO may face, and the role TNWs may play, should govern NATO's decision-making with respect to TNWs**. Moreover,

new threats may arise on NATO's flanks, particularly its southeastern along the Turkish border with Iran, for which TNWs might be necessary or useful (The Baltic Times 2009, Johnson 2010, Kibaroglu 2011). In sum, deterrence is a complicated concept and its application even more so. It is strategically imprudent to withdraw US TNWs from Europe, given that they may have an important future role for deterrence by denial, although we recognize that such a role might be more likely in other theaters. While superiority of US conventional weapon systems is a major advantage for NATO and greatly strengthens its deterrence by denial capabilities, our concern is that in the longer term, US conventional superiority is undermined through the proliferation of capabilities on which the United States currently has a monopoly or near monopoly. Although it may be difficult to perceive fully at present, the rapidity with which the Chinese are closing the gap in some conventional capabilities was alarming to US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (The Guardian 2011). In addition, cyber complicates this issue due to the ability of the Chinese to steal military and commercial technology from the United States, Japan and NATO allies. Due to cyberespionage, as well as old-fashioned espionage and commercial exchange, the Chinese are able to acquire the technology and use it to improve their own military and economy and disseminate the technology to other states, allowing states to better understand US military capabilities and reduce the gap in some categories of conventional weapons with the United States sooner than they would be able to do independently. With respect to the second role of TNWs, deterrence of TNWs use by the adversary is even more relevant. Unlike the United States, the elimination of TNWs is not entertained by other present possessors of TNWs, most importantly, Russia, in the European context (Interfax 2012). Some attempts at gradual threat reduction, especially at the beginning of the post-cold war era – including unilateral reductions and withdrawals of various types of TNWs, such as the 8-inch howitzer round, and the termination or cancellation of modernization, such as the follow on to the Lance short range missile – were definitely critical decisions that helped to strengthen trust between former adversaries. Unfortunately, uncertainty prevails about whether these initiatives, such as the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of early 1990s, have been really implemented by Russia (Larsen 2006, p. 34, Perry et al. 2009, Payne et al. 2013). Nonetheless, political conditions have changed dramatically since 1989 for NATO and for Russia and given that they appear to be worsening, unilateral measures by NATO are no longer necessary or positive for stability. Russia and the United States have reduced their strategic arsenals significantly. The USA has done so unilaterally, as well as through treaties such as the New START Treaty.<sup>8</sup> Both states are now at comparable levels of launchers, missiles and warheads for strategic systems. However, the situation with tactical weapons is different. The USA and Russia steeply reduced their TNW stockpiles, but due to the fact that their numbers heavily favored Russia, TNW arsenals still are in Moscow's favor.<sup>9</sup> As a consequence, NATO does not have the ability to depend on equal numbers of TNWs to deter their use by Russia. While the US Air Force deploys currently between 160 and 200 tactical nuclear bombs at European air bases, Russia has at its disposal 2000 operational TNWs (Kristensen 2012, pp. 16, 46). We recognize, and as is discussed in detail below, that the Russians have a greater need for TNWs due to their difficult strategic situation. Moscow faces technologically more advanced NATO forces in the West, and in the East they face Chinese numerical superiority. We also acknowledge that some scholars doubt their deterrent role even for the Russians (Pomper et al. 2009, pp. 14–15, Yost 2011b, p. 1408). There are scholars who attribute the hawkish Russian position on TNWs to the Russian military and thus a matter of domestic politics (Pomper et al. 2009, pp. 16–17). Other analysts, David Yost most significantly, see their role as strengthening Russian national confidence (Yost 2012, p. 21) or as aiding the demonization of NATO (Sutyagin 2012, p. 56). Unfortunately, there is more to Russian tactical nuclear capabilities than domestics or a dire strategic situation. A major story by preeminent security journalist Bill Sweetman revealed that the Russian doctrine calls for TNWs use to compel deescalation by the opponent (Sweetman 2013). According to Sweetman's reporting, the use of TNWs for purposes of deescalation appeared after the 1999 war between NATO and Yugoslavia over Kosovo (Sweetman 2013).<sup>10</sup> Russia's conception that a tactical nuclear strike against a high-value target would compel NATO to deescalate is worrisome. No doubt, NATO's tactical nuclear capabilities have a direct role to play to deter such strikes.

## Extinction

**Fisher 15** (Max, Foreign affairs columnist at VOX, "How World War III became possible," 6/29, <http://www.vox.com/2015/6/29/8845913/russia-war>)

That is why, analysts will tell you, today's tensions bear far more similarity to the period before World War I: an unstable power balance, belligerence over peripheral conflicts, entangling military commitments, disputes over the future of the European order, and dangerous uncertainty about what actions will and will not force the other party into conflict. Today's Russia, once more the strongest nation in Europe and yet

weaker than its collective enemies, calls to mind the turn-of-the-century German Empire, which Henry Kissinger described as "too big for Europe, but too small for the world." Now, as then, a rising power, propelled by nationalism, is seeking to revise the European order. Now, as then, it believes that through superior cunning, and perhaps even by proving its might, it can force a larger role for itself. Now, as then, the drift toward war is gradual and easy to miss — which is exactly what makes it so dangerous. But there is one way in which today's dangers are less like those before World War I, and more similar to those of the Cold War: the apocalyptic logic of nuclear weapons. Mutual suspicion, fear of an existential threat, armies parked across borders from one another, and hair-trigger nuclear weapons all make any small skirmish a potential armageddon. In some ways, that logic has grown even more dangerous. Russia, hoping to compensate for its conventional military forces' relative weakness, has dramatically relaxed its rules for using nuclear weapons. Whereas Soviet leaders saw their nuclear weapons as pure deterrents, something that existed precisely so they would never be used, Putin's view appears to be radically different. Russia's official nuclear doctrine calls on the country to launch a battlefield nuclear strike in case of a conventional war that could pose an existential threat. These are more than just words: Moscow has repeatedly signaled its willingness and preparations to use nuclear weapons even in a more limited war. This is a terrifyingly low bar for nuclear weapons use, particularly given that any war would likely occur along Russia's borders and thus not far from Moscow. And it suggests Putin has adopted an idea that Cold War leaders considered unthinkable: that a "limited" nuclear war, of small warheads dropped on the battlefield, could be not only survivable but winnable. "It's not just a difference in rhetoric. It's a whole different world," Bruce G. Blair, a nuclear weapons scholar at Princeton, told the Wall Street Journal. He called Putin's decisions more dangerous than those of any Soviet leader since 1962. "There's a low nuclear threshold now that didn't exist during the Cold War." Nuclear theory is complex and disputable; maybe Putin is right. But many theorists would say he is wrong, that the logic of nuclear warfare means a "limited" nuclear strike is in fact likely to trigger a larger nuclear war — a doomsday scenario in which major American, Russian, and European cities would be targets for attacks many times more powerful than the bombs that leveled Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Even if a nuclear war did somehow remain limited and contained, recent studies suggest that environmental and atmospheric damage would cause a "decade of winter" and mass crop die-outs that could kill up to 1 billion people in a global famine.

## **Also—middle east war—causes Turkey prolif, goes wildfire across the Middle East—nuke war in five years max—no alt causes or impact defense**

**Garfinkle 18** (Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, editor of The American Interest, former speechwriter for Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice, taught at many universities and has been a staff member at high levels of the government, really quite an impressive Wikipedia page, Adam, "The U.S.-Turkish Unraveling and the Arabs," <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/09/03/the-u-s-turkish-unraveling-and-the-arabs/>)

The reasons for wanting to suppress such regional security competitions have been several. First, competitions between and among allies—Turkey and Greece, for example, over Cyprus—were thought to provide opportunities for adversaries to divide alliances and complicate alliance management.<sup>1</sup> Second, competitions could breed local arms races, and thus invite ambient insecurity and raise the costs of any crises gotten out of hand. Third, some arms races could lead to weapons-of-mass-destruction proliferation, threatening the global security commons in general and generating a more dangerous world overall for the United States, as webmaster of the system, to manage. From the U.S. point of view, minimizing the number and size of wars and minimizing WMD proliferation constituted an act of doing good and doing well simultaneously: It was valuable for most others even as it was also valuable for the United States at the pinnacle of the postwar pecking order. The Cold War is over, but the imperative to limit WMD proliferation remains—and so back to the Turkish situation we must go. Consider that Turkey sits in a regional environment

in which states armed with nuclear weapons, or prospectively armed with nuclear weapons, are abundant. If a statesman or military planner sits in a swivel chair in Ankara and rotates 360° around, he can barely catch his breath between identifying actors capable of targeting Turkey with nuclear weapons: **Russia, Pakistan, India, Israel, France, the United Kingdom, the United States** both from its homeland and from other points in Europe, and of course prospectively **Iran**.<sup>2</sup> Now, the logic of the security dilemma is such that **in the absence of the credible U.S. provision of extended deterrence**, Turkey would **feel pressure to develop its own nuclear weapons**. That it has not exerted itself in that direction, despite its formidable engineering and scientific capacities, illustrates the **stability of Turkish trust in U.S. protection**—until recently—and the ability of both sides to **bracket the core security relationship away from various disagreements**. As with other nuclear-armed states, should Turkey go its own way it would do so with no active intention of actually using such weapons, but rather as a kind of insurance policy against diplomatic extortion at the hands of other nuclear-armed powers. But of course **if Turkey, no longer tethered to U.S. security protection** in one way or another, developed nuclear weapons for such a purpose, **other regional states would probably feel obliged to develop or otherwise acquire their own weapons**, if they could, as an insurance policy against nuclear extortion by Turkey.<sup>3</sup> They have already practiced that way of thinking in reaction to the possibility of an Iranian nuclear breakout, of course. Indeed, that kind of hedging behavior is exactly what analysts have discussed for many years now as the so-called N+ danger inherent in the development of Iranian nuclear weapons. **It is not just the danger posed by Iranian nuclear weapons**, bad enough as that would be, **but the mousetrap effect of proliferation that would likely drive other states to want such an insurance policy: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Algeria, and so on**. Now, some observers have argued that nuclear weapons are really not very important after all. If the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as China, France, and the United Kingdom, survived the Cold War without any nuclear use, it must be because deterrence is easy and hence stable, since all rational people know that the weapons are unusable save for the since-become-impossible exception of a state holding a monopoly over them. One well-known scholar, Kenneth Waltz, argued persistently that the more nuclear the weapons the better—because they would sober everyone up and lead to more stability and fewer wars. Happily, those with actual government responsibility did not agree. **It is unspeakably lazy thinking to glibly superimpose** the U.S.-Soviet Cold War **deterrence experience onto** places like **the Middle East**. **It is**, after all, **one thing to maintain stable deterrence when there are only two, or a small number of, nuclear powers, and quite another to maintain stable deterrence when the number of nuclear actors gets larger** and becomes somewhat **open-ended** as more states lean that way. Under such conditions **it becomes much more difficult to calculate what a sufficient deterrent is**, and so efforts to make sure of having “enough” can touch off a **multilateral arms competition** in which sufficiency becomes an **ever-moving target**, almost impossible to hit. At the same time **it becomes much more difficult to imagine crisis stability if one or more states resort to launch-on-warning deployment postures**, which **are more likely** when young arsenals **are small and unprotectable** against preemptive attack. Other important potential differences between U.S.-Soviet Cold War deterrence and potential multiparty deterrence in the Middle East exist, too. Let us note just three. First, U.S. and Soviet arsenals displayed clear lines of civil-military authority in highly institutionalized state systems, but many **Middle Eastern countries lack both such clear lines of authority and highly institutionalized arrangements**, being instead **looser and more personalized** by nature. Second, **it was taken for granted that both U.S. and Soviet leaderships cared about the safety of their populations**, a necessary assumption for effective deterrence. **But in some heterogeneous and authoritarian Middle Eastern countries this premise may not so surely apply**—think both **Iraq and Syria** under minoritarian (and coincidentally Ba'athi) **leadership**, both of which committed mass murder against its own citizens. And third, U.S.-Soviet deterrence operations became **inextricably bound up** in the minds of observers with **intercontinental ballistic missile delivery systems**. The result is that **some people today think that if missiles can be limited** in one way or another, **then the dangers of nuclear weapons**, even if they come to exist, **would be much mitigated**. This is delusional because

it is **technologically obtuse**. You need intercontinental ballistic missiles if you're trying to shoot a warhead across an ocean. But **if your enemy target is not across an ocean**, but, as in the Middle East, quite nearby, **airplanes are immensely less expensive and more reliable as delivery systems**. The basic point is that in both theory and practice, there is little difference between the proliferation stimulating effects of a Turkish nuclear weapons breakout and an Iranian one. So **if the U.S.-Turkish strategic partnership unravels, logic does indeed suggest a Turkish effort to develop its own nuclear capabilities**. (Of course, the same kinds of pressures pertain to other key countries were they to lose, one way or another, their U.S. nuclear umbrellas, including Germany, Japan, South Korea, and others.) **If that happens, the Turkish government could probably develop deliverable nuclear warheads at least on its side of the ocean within two to three years.** If the **Iranian government had thought for its own good reasons to avoid overt testing and breakout postures** once the nuclear deal expires by calendar or "is expired" by volition, **a Turkish bomb would make that posture far more difficult to justify**. One could therefore imagine a situation of **twinned or near-simultaneous breakouts** of Turkish and Iranian nuclear weapons even a mere **three, four, or five years from now**. The shock to the region would be **profound**, and possibly **very dangerous**. It almost goes without saying that these larger strategic implications of the current U.S.-Turkish disagreement bear significantly on the security of U.S. allies, friends, and associates in the Arab world. First of all, **any significant weakening of the structure of the U.S. alliance system diminishes the reputation and effective power of the U.S. government, and hence its ability to protect its friends and associates even outside the core of that alliance system**. The United States does not have explicit defense treaty obligations, as ratified by the U.S. Senate according to the U.S. Constitution, with any Arab state on a par with its obligations within NATO, ANZUS, and its bilateral obligations to Japan and South Korea in Asia. Nevertheless, **its longstanding ties to Jordan and Saudi Arabia**, its special arrangements with **Egypt** since 1973, its more recent ties with **Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar**, and its looser but still friendly arrangements with **Morocco and Tunisia, are all affected by both America's reputation as a reliable and sympathetic partner and its willingness to affirm consistently its interests in those relationships**. In a sense, America's associated Arab governments (whatever one thinks of them) have been indirect but still real beneficiaries of a strong NATO, not much less so than European "neutral" countries such as Sweden, Finland, and Austria, or Israel for that matter. This is why the fact that some Arab leaders rejoiced at the coming of the Trump Administration now looks so maladroit. They rejoiced because the new President clearly took a far less benign view of the potential for a major amelioration of U.S. relations with Iran. Some of these leaders had previously urged the Obama Administration to "cut off the head of the snake," not to cozy up in bed with the snake, so to them, Trump seemed a huge improvement. This, however, was a narrow and shortsighted judgment. It has since become clear that the Trump Administration is busy with an historically unprecedented act of great power self-abnegation. The President does not believe in any but zero-sum relationships. He thinks of inherited alliance ties on an entirely transactional basis, and the thinking—such as it is—proceeds almost exclusively in the literal "coin" of trade dollar numbers. Trump is not just a protectionist in trade; he is a mercantilist in terms of overall statecraft—an approach that had heretofore been obsolete for nearly two centuries, and for good reason. Trump's reticence to think of the United States as a provider of global common security goods has expressed itself in his manifest desire to have nothing to do with Syria; his instinct to leave, and let the Russians have their way with it, has been restrained only by dint of great and subtle effort by key advisers. This instinct shows even more clearly in the President's dour attitude toward the Article 5 pledge that is the very foundation of NATO, and toward the European Union which, however troubled at present, has been a major postwar project of every U.S. administration—again, for good reason. In short, this Administration's admittedly tougher attitude toward Iran does not presume any willingness to take significant risks on behalf of Arab associates who may find themselves in some sort of trouble. In this context, Turkey has been and remains special as a link between NATO-Europe and the Near East. During the Cold War the U.S. government explicitly guaranteed Turkey's borders with the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, as a Warsaw Pact Soviet ally. It managed Turkey's border with Greece as an intra-NATO affair, again in the interest of suppressing regional security competitions among allies. Successive U.S. administrations did not formally guarantee Turkey's borders with Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Informally, however, those countries aligned with the Soviet Union and possessing a Soviet-supplied order of battle (Iraq and Syria) were considered threats and were addressed accordingly. For example, the Soviet government used its position in Syria, largely via Syria's Kurdish community, to build up and support the PKK inside Turkey. Arguably, that was a factor in stimulating a 1980 Turkish military coup—a development that clearly concerned the U.S. government and complicated the bilateral relationship. So Turkey had a dual status as a U.S. ally—formal with respect to its NATO-facing flanks, informal but still real with respect to its Near Eastern flanks. Of course, things have changed: There is no more Soviet Union and Iraq is no longer a Russian client; but Russia's role in Syria, with Iran and for a time ISIS playing roles in the context of the revenant Kurdish question, is if anything more important to Turkey than ever. The Russian position in Syria gives it considerable leverage over Turkey, so much so that in the current declined state of U.S.-Turkish relations, the U.S. government is at a loss to offset it at reasonable cost or risk. The United States and Turkey have had, at best, sometimes overlapping and sometimes incongruent interests in all of these shifting sands of events, which in the absence of a dominant Soviet threat has vastly complicated the bilateral relationship. Suffice it to say that **if Turkey were indeed to fall away from its core strategic relationship with the United States it would have different effects on the strategic environment in Europe and in the Near East**. For one thing, as to the Near East, **one needs to think of the U.S. military and intelligence footprint in the region as an integrated whole**: Assets at Incirlik cover the Gulf as well as the Levant, just as al-

Odeid in Qatar, as a command-and-control facility for air power, covers Afghanistan as well as the Gulf. The same can be said, more or perhaps less, about the basing of the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain and the concentration of U.S. intelligence assets in Jordan: These **assets radiate generally, their reputational clout transcending the specific countries in which they are located**. When it comes to the Near East, **the end of the U.S.-Turkish strategic relationship would basically come down to this: Instead of Turkey being part of a coherent, stabilizing, and protective U.S.-led power in the region, it would play a more independent and divisive role**.<sup>4</sup> One case in point is already manifest: **When the Saudi/UAE-Qatari spat broke out** in June of this past year, **the Turkish leadership sent troops to Qatar as a symbol of its support**; and just recently, in the face of punitive U.S. tariffs slapped on Turkey, Qatar pledged \$15 billion in investment to ease the impact. **Were the U.S.-Turkish strategic partnership to fully end, the political and geostrategic landscape of the Levant and the Gulf would be transformed on account of a truly independent, unfettered Turkish policy**—in ways we can study, but cannot possibly know for sure. Some of the scenarios one can imagine are fairly stunning. For example, there was an extended time, before the United States even existed, when Turks and Persians tried to kill one another in large numbers. **The Ottoman-Safavid wars raged for much of the 16th century**, their enmity reshaping the sectarian bounds within dar al-Islam. But as much tragedy as those wars caused back then, it **pales in comparison to the destruction that an Iranian-Turkish nuclear war** would cause in the 21st century for all the peoples of the region. Of course **there is nothing inevitable** about Turkish-Iranian enmity in the years ahead; but **given the sectarian, cultural, and strategic cleavages between the two, only a fool would rule it out completely**. It therefore behooves everyone, each according to their own capacities, to **do everything possible to prevent the development** of additional independent nuclear weapons capabilities in or near the Middle East. For the moment, **everything possible certainly includes not threatening to remove U.S. nuclear weapons from Turkey**, let alone actually doing it, for **that would be the single most powerful motivating force** behind a Turkish decision to build its own nuclear weapons arsenal. The U.S. government must not allow its pique at President Erdogan to displace its good and common sense—whatever remains of it—despite what some experts may now be saying. For note well: **It would be much harder, and perhaps impossible, to reknit the strategic relationship** in the post-Erdogan era **if the core military-strategic understanding upon which it has been based were no longer in existence**. A decision of this kind, whether sparked by a judgment on the U.S. or the Turkish side, **is not a toggle switch** that one can throw this way or that with equal ease. It would produce something more like a **Humpty Dumpty scenario**.

## No-first-use causes TNW withdrawal from Europe

**Chamberlain 16** (Dianne Pfundstein - associate research fellow with the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University, “The Case for Retaining the First-Use Doctrine for Nuclear Weapons,” 9/28/16, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-case-retaining-the-first-use-doctrine-nuclear-weapons-17865?page=0%2C1>)

**Adopting a no-first-use doctrine would allow the United States to remove the tactical nuclear weapons that are currently deployed in Europe.** This seems to provide an opportunity for cost-saving, but in fact reliance on first use was motivated in part by the desire to minimize U.S. costs for defending Western Europe. President Eisenhower did not want to station huge numbers of American troops in Europe on a permanent basis, so relying on the U.S. nuclear arsenal seemed to be a cheaper way to defend NATO. If the United States has decided that defending the Baltics from a Russian attack and South Korea from its northern neighbor are core strategic interests, then taking nuclear weapons off the table would probably prompt these allies to demand a much larger commitment of U.S. conventional forces for their defense. The cost savings of abandoning first use are not as straightforward as they might seem. Even if removing tactical weapons from Europe resulted in a net savings for the United States, **it is not clear that making U.S. commitments cheaper would produce the desired policy outcome**, i.e. the deterrence of U.S. adversaries. To the extent that

the use of a nuclear weapon against a nuclear-armed opponent could be extremely costly for the United States, the nuclear threat may be more effective in deterring the adversary than a low-risk commitment of conventional forces. Removing tactical nuclear weapons and placing the U.S. nuclear force on a lower state of alert could also prove extremely dangerous if the United States subsequently reversed these decisions for any reason. An opponent may interpret such reversals as signs of an imminent attack and choose to strike the United States before it has a chance to act.

### **U.S. TNWs in Europe are key to deter Russian aggression—it's an actual internal to their impact**

**Thayer 14** (Bradley A. - associate professor of political science at the University of Minnesota-Duluth & Petr Suchy - Head of Department of International Relations and European Studies at the Faculty of Social Studies at Masaryk University, "Weapons as political symbolism: the role of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe," 7/3/14, *European Security*, Volume 23, Issue 4, Taylor & Francis Online)

The value of US TNWs remains significant today, but with a different emphasis. In this section, We will consider the contemporary roles of TNWs in Europe and argue that the political aspect of the weapons is more important than their military role. The first role is less significant today due to high accuracy of conventional weapons. But even the first role cannot and should not be taken off the table totally.<sup>7</sup> The reason is that the future is uncertain, and NATO confronts the possibility of a resurgent Russia, a threat not equal to the Soviet Union to be sure, but Russia's actions in 2014 reveal that it poses irredentist or revisionist political objectives in Europe. Put directly, before the seizure of Crimea, Russia under Putin generated cause for concern (RIA Novosti, May 3, 2012). The change of tack toward greater bellicosity in Putin's Russia underscores our point, countries can change. Accordingly, strategic thinking about the threats NATO may face, and the role TNWs may play, should govern NATO's decision-making with respect to TNWs. Moreover, new threats may arise on NATO's flanks, particularly its southeastern along the Turkish border with Iran, for which TNWs might be necessary or useful (The Baltic Times 2009, Johnson 2010, Kibaroglu 2011). In sum, deterrence is a complicated concept and its application even more so. It is strategically imprudent to withdraw US TNWs from Europe, given that they may have an important future role for deterrence by denial, although we recognize that such a role might be more likely in other theaters. While superiority of US conventional weapon systems is a major advantage for NATO and greatly strengthens its deterrence by denial capabilities, our concern is that in the longer term, US conventional superiority is undermined through the proliferation of capabilities on which the United States currently has a monopoly or near monopoly. Although it may be difficult to perceive fully at present, the rapidity with which the Chinese are closing the gap in some conventional capabilities was alarming to US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (The Guardian 2011). In addition, cyber complicates this issue due to the ability of the Chinese to steal military and commercial technology from the United States, Japan and NATO allies. Due to cyberespionage, as well as old-fashioned espionage and commercial exchange, the Chinese are able to acquire the technology and use it to improve their own military and economy and disseminate the technology to other states, allowing states to better understand US military capabilities and reduce the gap in some categories of conventional weapons with the United States sooner than they would be able to do independently. With respect to the second role of TNWs, deterrence of TNWs use by the adversary is even more relevant. Unlike the United States, the elimination of TNWs is not entertained by other present possessors of TNWs, most importantly, Russia, in the European context (Interfax 2012). Some attempts at gradual threat reduction, especially at the beginning of the post-cold war era – including unilateral reductions and withdrawals of various types of TNWs, such as the 8-inch howitzer round, and the termination or cancellation of modernization, such as the follow on to the Lance short range missile – were definitely critical decisions that helped to strengthen trust between former adversaries. Unfortunately, uncertainty prevails about whether

these initiatives, such as the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of early 1990s, have been really implemented by Russia (Larsen 2006, p. 34, Perry et al. 2009, Payne et al. 2013). Nonetheless, political conditions have changed dramatically since 1989 for NATO and for Russia and given that they appear to be worsening, unilateral measures by NATO are no longer necessary or positive for stability. Russia and the United States have reduced their strategic arsenals significantly. The USA has done so unilaterally, as well as through treaties such as the New START Treaty.<sup>8</sup> Both states are now at comparable levels of launchers, missiles and warheads for strategic systems. However, the situation with tactical weapons is different. The USA and Russia steeply reduced their TNW stockpiles, but due to the fact that their numbers heavily favored Russia, TNW arsenals still are in Moscow's favor.<sup>9</sup> As a consequence, NATO does not have the ability to depend on equal numbers of TNWs to deter their use by Russia. While the US Air Force deploys currently between 160 and 200 tactical nuclear bombs at European air bases, Russia has at its disposal 2000 operational TNWs (Kristensen 2012, pp. 16, 46). We recognize, and as is discussed in detail below, that the Russians have a greater need for TNWs due to their difficult strategic situation. Moscow faces technologically more advanced NATO forces in the West, and in the East they face Chinese numerical superiority. We also acknowledge that some scholars doubt their deterrent role even for the Russians (Pomper et al. 2009, pp. 14–15, Yost 2011b, p. 1408). There are scholars who attribute the hawkish Russian position on TNWs to the Russian military and thus a matter of domestic politics (Pomper et al. 2009, pp. 16–17). Other analysts, David Yost most significantly, see their role as strengthening Russian national confidence (Yost 2012, p. 21) or as aiding the demonization of NATO (Sutyagin 2012, p. 56). Unfortunately, there is more to Russian tactical nuclear capabilities than domestics or a dire strategic situation. A major story by preeminent security journalist Bill Sweetman revealed that the Russian doctrine calls for TNWs use to compel deescalation by the opponent (Sweetman 2013). According to Sweetman's reporting, the use of TNWs for purposes of deescalation appeared after the 1999 war between NATO and Yugoslavia over Kosovo (Sweetman 2013).<sup>10</sup> Russia's conception that a tactical nuclear strike against a high-value target would compel NATO to deescalate is worrisome. No doubt, NATO's tactical nuclear capabilities have a direct role to play to deter such strikes.



## **5G Bad Contention**

## Brink

**The 5g race is at an inflection point – whether the world will see greater American or Chinese tech dominance depends on whether Europe complies with or resists American tech sanctions.**

Laurens Cerulus, 8-25-2020, "Europe's 5G plans in limbo after latest salvo against Huawei," POLITICO, <https://www.politico.com/news/2020/08/25/5g-technology-europe-china-401404>

The U.S.'s latest salvo against Huawei is creating headaches for European telecom operators locked into contracts with the Chinese telecom giant.

Last week, Washington announced it is blocking the use of any American technology in microchips powering Huawei's smartphones and networking equipment, dealing what some analysts called a "lethal blow" to the company.

The rule, which entered into force on Thursday, could jeopardize Europe's own telecom networks, potentially ramping up costs and creating delays to the deployment of the bloc's 5G networks.

Analysts at Gavekal estimate that — if the U.S. rules remain unchanged — Huawei would run out of stocked components "early next year."

Huawei said "it's still too early to determine what, if any, impact this will have on our supply chain," but warned that "ultimately it is Europe's and the world's consumers who will suffer" due to U.S. attempts to thwart the company.

While the U.S. has been openly hostile to the manufacturer — and Chinese enterprise in general — Europe's taken a more ambivalent approach. The European Union agreed in January to reduce its dependency on Chinese equipment for future 5G networks, but national capitals have differed in their reading of how urgently they will do so.

Some, like the Czech Republic and Poland, are echoing the U.S.'s line to cut Huawei's market access. Others, like France, say they will phase out the company later in the decade, while Germany and Spain haven't taken a clear position yet.

For now, European operators still rely heavily on Huawei for its existing 4G networks. A recent market analysis by Strand Consulting estimated that Huawei has ongoing contracts to provide telecom gear in all but one EU country, Slovakia.

## Tech Dominance Impact

### China will control 5G tech deployed in global markets---the PLA will weaponize information networks, which causes Taiwan war

Elsa B. Kania 19, an Adjunct Senior Fellow with the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, research focuses on Chinese military innovation in emerging technologies, PhD student in Harvard University's Department of Government, Nov 7 2019, "Securing Our 5G Future: The Competitive Challenge and Considerations for U.S. Policy", CNAS, <https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/securing-our-5g-future>

Chinese advances in 5G also contribute to military innovation. The PLA aims to leverage emerging technologies to achieve an advantage in future military competition. In his capacity as as commander-in-chief, Xi Jinping has called upon the PLA to become a “world-class” military (世界一流军队) by midcentury.<sup>82</sup> 5G will be vital to the process of military “intelligentization” (智能化), which involves the realization of AI in support of a range of applications and capabilities.<sup>83</sup> 5G could be critical to information support,<sup>84</sup> creating improvements in data sharing, new mechanisms for command and control, and enhanced system construction to fulfill future operational requirements,<sup>85</sup> such as the military internet of things.<sup>86</sup> 5G is anticipated to enable machine-to-machine communication among sensors, drones,<sup>87</sup> or even swarms on the battlefield, as well as improvements in human-machine interaction.<sup>88</sup> The potential for rapid integration of information and improved communications could provide key advantages for situational awareness. As China looks to construct a more integrated information and communications architecture across space-and ground-based systems, 5G could be incorporated.<sup>89</sup> For instance, there are plans to integrate 5G with BeiDou, China’s dual-purpose competitor to GPS, to improve position, navigation, and timing capabilities.<sup>90</sup> Beyond the battlefield, deployment of 5G could facilitate China’s model of national defense mobilization, providing for more “intelligent” approaches to coordinate resources and logistical support to fulfill the demands of wartime contingencies.<sup>91</sup> For instance, when Jilin Province carried out a drill for national defense mobilization, 5G was used to support emergency communications.<sup>92</sup> Already, some units in Chinese military and paramilitary forces have started to employ 5G for pilot programs, such as border security.<sup>93</sup>

China’s development of 5G will be shaped by the implementation of a national strategy of military-civil fusion (军民融合).<sup>94</sup> There are certain synergies between military and commercial technologies, including advanced electronics in which elements of the Chinese defense industry, such as the China Electronics Technology Group Corp. (CETC), have particular proficiency.<sup>95</sup> Even some military academic institutions, such as the PLA Strategic Support Force’s Information Engineering University, have noteworthy proficiency in relevant technological components, especially chips and advanced antennas.<sup>96</sup> The Information Engineering University, which contributes to the Chinese military’s education and capabilities for information operations, is engaged in research on 5G network security, seemingly in collaboration with Huawei.<sup>97</sup> Increasingly, a growing number of companies, including Shenzhen Kingsignal (金信诺),<sup>98</sup> are pursuing opportunities for expansion into the military 5G market, including working on military projects.<sup>99</sup> In November 2018, a number of industry players established the 5G Technology Military-Civil Fusion Applications Industry Alliance (5G 技术军民融合应用产业联盟), including ZTE, China Unicom, and the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corp. (CASIC), a major defense conglomerate.<sup>100</sup> This new partnership aims to foster collaboration and integration in military and civilian development of 5G.<sup>101</sup> Some Chinese telecom companies are already supporting 5G pilot projects that appear to be intended for dual-use or military employment.<sup>102</sup>

#### 5G Risks and Security Concerns

The U.S. government has actively sounded the alarm over the risks that Huawei may present, urging allies and partners to impose a ban against it in order to mitigate the threats of disruption or espionage through 5G networks.<sup>103</sup> Huawei has faced pushback and scrutiny, and a growing number of countries have considered — or undertaken in the case of Japan, Australia, and the United States, among others — a ban or de facto exclusion

of Huawei on the basis of varying rationales and mechanisms, which have predated U.S. action in some cases.<sup>104</sup> There are also valid concerns that the outright exclusion of Huawei may slow and increase the costs of 5G deployment.<sup>105</sup> What has often been characterized as an American “campaign” targeting Huawei risks backfiring if continued on its current trajectory, in which U.S. rationales have been perceived as shifting and inconsistent.<sup>106</sup> However, a growing number of concerning incidents involving Huawei, including indicators of the insecurity of its equipment, accusations regarding its theft of intellectual property, and its involvement in providing surveillance capabilities to governments, continue to be exposed.<sup>107</sup>

China’s quest for 5G dominance has played out within a complex technological and geopolitical landscape.<sup>108</sup> Indeed, different countries have their own security concerns and considerations, but not all share American assessments of the severity of these risks. Insofar as American policymakers see China as a great power rival and strategic competitor, allowing Chinese companies to play a key role in American critical infrastructure, or that of U.S. allies and partners, presents grave threats that are untenable and unacceptable for the United States, not only espionage but also outright subversion of this critical infrastructure.<sup>109</sup> Yet Huawei has continued to expand its global presence, and the U.S. government has yet to present a viable and attractive alternative to working with Huawei. Many countries may have sunk costs and be “locked in” already to this choice based on earlier decisions, which raises concerns about not only security but also fair competition.<sup>110</sup> However, it is encouraging to see emerging consensus among like-minded countries about potential principles and shared approaches to 5G security, particularly through the progress of a recent conference on 5G security in Prague.<sup>111</sup>

The age of 5G will present new risks and novel threats of disruption or exploitation. 5G involves far more than just new and faster wireless networks; it will be a vital component of future critical infrastructure. Consequently, the cybersecurity of 5G networks could prove uniquely challenging, considering the high levels of complexity and much greater potential for damage in the case of an attack. Not only the confidentiality of data on 5G networks but also questions of integrity and assurance will become urgent challenges. Whereas most cyberattacks to date have involved only data theft, an attack against future 5G networks could cause massive damage that might threaten public safety and critical industries in future smart cities.<sup>112</sup> The often subpar security of IoT devices, of which there are an estimated 20 billion globally and growing, also presents serious reasons for concern. A high proportion of devices on the U.S. market have been made in China by companies with very poor track records on security.<sup>113</sup> While vulnerabilities have been and remain a major concern in the telecom industry for 3G and 4G, the stakes will be even higher for securing 5G networks at all stages of their life cycles.<sup>114</sup> In some cases, supply chains could be weaponized deliberately by adversaries that may prefer to “win without fighting.”<sup>115</sup> The exclusion of high-risk vendors is an important measure to mitigate risk but does not constitute a complete solution.

5G must be designed and implemented with a holistic approach to security in mind from the start. The development of secure networks must entail more than simply excluding high-risk vendors, requiring rigorous, ongoing testing and screening. Indeed, careful scrutiny should be extended to all aspects of the production, construction, and management of these networks, involving screening of the security of all vendors and carriers. If an end-to-end approach to security is effectively implemented, 5G could prove more secure than our existing networks and critical infrastructure, but the consequences of insecurity would be far graver. In public debates on 5G security, the call and search for a “smoking gun” has been problematic. This framing of the issue has often distracted policymakers from thinking about the greater challenge of mitigating vulnerabilities that tend to be pervasive. Bugs can be just as problematic as backdoors. It is inherently challenging to differentiate an accidental vulnerability from one that is deliberately introduced. The primary difference is intent, which cannot be discerned from code alone. It is encouraging that the 3GPP’s SA3 working group is focusing on security, seeking to ensure that such security concerns will shape the development of standards.<sup>116</sup> However, industry and government are just starting to grapple with the full range of issues in play.

Given the gravity of these security challenges, the apparent centrality of Chinese companies in the global development of 5G has raised intense concerns. There is a very real risk that vulnerabilities in networks, whether the result of poor security practices or deliberate introduction of backdoors, could be weaponized for leverage or coercive purposes, particularly in a crisis or conflict scenario. Considering China's history of IP theft and cyberespionage, there is also a real risk such networks could be exploited for purposes of espionage.<sup>117</sup> As a Chinese company, Huawei also would be subject to a number of legal demands, regulatory requirements, and mechanisms of coercion that are often ambiguous and expansive.<sup>118</sup> Regardless of whether Huawei's leadership may wish to disregard an order from the Chinese government, China lacks an independent judiciary system for company leaders to plead their case against the government, as Apple did in the United States when it fought an FBI order to unlock an iPhone. Huawei's claims that it would "say no" to the Chinese government are not credible without indications of the company's actual ability to do so.

Even if Huawei is given the full benefit of the doubt, despite its history and apparent involvement with the Chinese military and intelligence organizations, Huawei's products and services have been assessed to be highly insecure, with a much greater prevalence of vulnerabilities relative to their primary competitors.<sup>119</sup> Moreover, there are reasons to question whether knowledge of any bugs in its equipment could be shared more readily with China's Ministry of State Security (MSS). This risk may be heightened given the influence of MSS in China's vulnerabilities database, not to mention Huawei's historical and continued linkages to the Chinese People's Liberation Army, including military intelligence.<sup>120</sup> For the United States, these risks and security concerns are inextricable from today's geopolitical exigencies, insofar as the U.S.-China rivalry encompasses scenarios for which there is a nonzero probability of conflict, including over Taiwan. Consistently, Chinese military writings have highlighted the potential for cyberattacks on critical infrastructure as a prelude to outright warfare.<sup>121</sup> The presence of equipment from high-risk vendors, such as Huawei, even in rural telecoms is concerning, considering that some of these networks are near military bases, which raises risks of espionage or exploitation.

5G security presents a global challenge that will demand creative and cooperative solutions. Huawei will likely remain a major player in 5G in a number of countries, including some U.S. allies and partners, that believe the benefits of partnering with it outweigh the risks. Although a criteria-based calculation of risk provides compelling arguments for exclusion of such highly risky players, many nations could still continue current collaborations with Huawei in ways that exacerbate global risks to this emergent ecosystem. Even if the United States were to succeed in fully securing its own 5G networks, U.S. data and entities may remain reliant, including for military and commercial activities, upon overseas digital infrastructure that could prove highly vulnerable. The presence of Huawei's equipment in the critical infrastructure of U.S. allies and partners, whose support or location as a staging ground the U.S. military might require to fulfill its treaty obligations in the event of a crisis or conflict, also creates new risks, to an extent that could undermine U.S. capabilities for command and control and power projection. As Dan Coats, had warned during his time as director of national intelligence (DNI), "U.S. data will increasingly flow across foreign-produced equipment and foreign-controlled networks, raising the risk of foreign access and denial of service."<sup>122</sup>

Consequently, it is in the U.S. interest to develop and promote collaborative approaches to 5G security with allied and partner nations. Certainly, robust testing and rigorous oversight, such as the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Center that was established in the United Kingdom and comparable mechanisms created in Berlin and Brussels, constitute one alternative for risk mitigation. However, no such screening can provide a complete or perfect solution, particularly considering the inherent complexity of 5G.<sup>123</sup> Moreover, no amount of

testing can enable full confidence, particularly when Huawei's involvement in the operation and maintenance of 5G networks would provide routine access that could be exploited. Huawei's apparent failure so far to meet these security standards and reports of the extent and severity of vulnerabilities in its equipment have not engendered confidence. There are reasons for skepticism that these paradigms will merit emulation.<sup>124</sup> Given the stakes, security cannot—and must not—be an afterthought in the process, nor a consideration to be sacrificed for the sake of cost or speed. Those countries that choose less secure options or prioritize ease and rapidity of deployment may encounter higher risks and greater costs in the future.

## Taiwan war goes nuclear

Caitlin **Talmadge 18**, Associate Professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Nov/Dec 2018, "Beijing's Nuclear Option", Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option>

As China's power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the **risk of war** with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington's fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil.

A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a military confrontation—resulting, for example, from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan—no longer seems as implausible as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think.

Members of China's strategic community tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as "somewhere between nil and zero."

This assurance is misguided. If deployed against China, the Pentagon's preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States' signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent's key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power.

China, by contrast, not only has nuclear weapons; it has also intermingled them with its conventional military forces, making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other. This means that a major U.S. military campaign targeting China's conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to.

As U.S. and Chinese leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual suspicion, they must come to grips with the fact that a conventional war could skid into a nuclear confrontation. Although this risk is not high in absolute terms, its consequences for the region and the world would be devastating. As long as the United States

and China continue to pursue their current grand strategies, the risk is likely to endure. This means that leaders on both sides should dispense with the illusion that they can easily fight a limited war. They should focus instead on **managing** or resolving the political, economic, and military **tensions** that might lead to a conflict in the first place.

## **Deterrence Contention**

## Deterrence Constructive Case

### NFU undermines nuclear deterrence that is needed to stop war

ELBRIDGE COLBY, AUGUST 4, 2016, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/04/nuclear-weapons-arent-just-worst-case-scenario-first-use-china-obama-trump/> Nuclear Weapons Aren't Just For the Worst Case Scenario, Elbridge Colby is a former deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and force development, during which time he served as the lead official in the development of the 2018 National Defense Strategy and as the principal Pentagon representative in the development of the 2017 National Security Strategy.

Nuclear weapons are horrible instruments of destruction, but they are also associated with the longest period of major-power peace in human history. And they only work because potentially ambitious states believe their use is plausible enough that starting a war or escalating one against a nuclear-armed state or its allies would just be too risky to countenance. The point of reserving the right to use nuclear weapons first (which, it must be emphasized, is different from a policy of preemption or heavy reliance on them) is not to convey a madman's itchy trigger finger on the button. Rather, its purpose is to communicate clearly to any potential aggressor that attacking one's vital interests too harshly or successfully — even without resorting to nuclear weapons — risks prompting a devastating nuclear response, something that, at scale, is far more costly than any realistic gains. A no-first-use pledge would undermine this pacifying logic. If the policy were believed, then it would make the world safe for conventional war. Since potential aggressors would write the risk of nuclear use down to zero, they would feel they could safely start and wage fierce conventional wars. Conventional wars can be small, quick, and decisive, which is why they can also be appealing — just ask Napoleon, James Polk, Otto von Bismarck, or Moshe Dayan. But they can also escalate dramatically and unpredictably, especially when major powers are involved. Thus, the most likely route to nuclear use is via a nasty conventional war, as happened in World War II. In such circumstances, high-minded pledges made in peacetime may well seem foolish or too burdensome. A believable no-first-use pledge would likely raise, rather than diminish, the likelihood of nuclear weapons being used by lightening the shadow of nuclear weapons over the decision-making of potential combatants. Better for everyone to think as carefully and clearly as possible about nuclear weapons before a war is underway. Alternatively, if the no-first-use pledge were not believed, what would the point of such a promise be other than diplomatic window dressing? It is for these reasons that the United States has never adopted a no-first-use policy. During the Cold War, the United States relied on its nuclear deterrent to compensate for perceived Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional advantages in Europe. But even in the post-Cold War period of American military supremacy, when Washington sought to diminish its strategic reliance on nuclear weapons, it judged the future was too uncertain to dispense with the reserved right to go first. While other countries such as China and India have declared no-first-use policies (though there is a great deal of skepticism about how reliable Beijing's pledge is), Washington and the allies that depend on its nuclear umbrella have always recognized that a no-first-use pledge by the United States would be unwise because of the breadth of defense commitments it has assumed. If the U.S. nuclear arsenal were solely

designed to deter attacks on the continental United States, a no-first-use pledge might have more merit, as launching such an assault would be incredibly difficult. But Washington also seeks to deter attacks on its allies in areas like Eastern Europe and East Asia, where U.S. conventional superiority is far less assured. The main reason why a no-first-use pledge does not make sense for Washington, then, is the reality that the United States cannot always expect to maintain the military upper hand everywhere, and a no-first-use pledge is not the kind of commitment a nation can turn on and off without damage to its credibility and reputation. But can anyone plausibly challenge the United States in a conventional war in the near to medium term? The answer is yes; China might well be able to. Russia and North Korea are also very dangerous to the United States and its allies in their own ways, and Moscow could plausibly hope to take on the United States conventionally if it could localize a conflict in its “near abroad” and keep it short, but neither can reasonably expect to challenge the United States in a serious, prolonged conventional war and hope to prevail. But China at some point in the not-too-distant future might. A range of authoritative sources are showing that the conventional military balance of power between the United States and China with respect to points of contention in East Asia such as Taiwan and the South and East China Seas is, at the very least, becoming increasingly competitive. Beijing is fielding more and more highly capable forces in the Western Pacific that present a growing challenge to America’s ability to effectively project military power in the region. The days are therefore passing when the United States could easily swipe away any effort by the People’s Liberation Army at power projection in the Western Pacific. Instead, any future fight in the region between the United States and its allies on the one hand and China on the other would be hard and nasty. And the trend lines are not moving in a good direction. Indeed, within a decade, China might be in a position where it could reasonably expect to confront a U.S. ally or partner in the Western Pacific and hope to prevail if the conflict remained relatively limited. If the United States adds to this a credible guarantee that it would not use nuclear weapons first, it would strengthen China’s confidence that it could wage a short, sharp conventional war and gain from it, just as such confidence is rising and becoming more plausible to decision-makers in Beijing already contemplating the use of force in the region. According to a recent Reuters report, for instance, influential voices in the Chinese military establishment are already pushing for firmer security policies and even military action in the South China Sea — and this at a time when the United States still enjoys the conventional upper hand. These voices are likely to seem more credible and appealing in the councils of power in Beijing as Chinese military advantages grow, and they would only be emboldened by a U.S. statement that it will not use nuclear weapons first. A no-first-use pledge would therefore increase the chances of war in Asia. Indeed, rather than excluding the possibility of American nuclear first use, Washington should be emphasizing it. This does not mean the United States should ever use its nuclear weapons lightly. Rather, Beijing should simply understand that, even if it is able to gain conventional military advantages in the Western Pacific, Washington is prepared to seriously consider using nuclear weapons first to vindicate its own vital interests and those of its allies — for instance with respect to their territorial integrity. Washington is prepared to seriously consider using nuclear weapons first to vindicate its own vital interests and those of its allies — for instance with respect to their territorial integrity. More than that, Beijing should understand clearly that if it pushes forward with its military buildup, it will spur the United States to rely even more on its nuclear forces to

compensate — and, if that is not enough, the real possibility that U.S. allies will be impelled to pursue nuclear arsenals of their own. Communicating all this to Beijing does not require any Strangelovian contortions. But it does require the United States to firmly and consistently say (or otherwise communicate) that it is prepared to use nuclear weapons first if truly pressed; to build the forces, such as a next-generation standoff cruise missile and intercontinental ballistic missile, useful in making such a declaration credible; and to exercise and deploy its forces in ways that show Beijing its earnestness about such a declaration. Such a policy is more likely to contribute to peace and stability than a no-first-use pledge. China is very unlikely to turn away from its effort to achieve military dominance in East Asia and the Western Pacific based on appeals to goodwill or competitions in moral preening. What might actually work is persuading Beijing that succeeding in this effort is likely to backfire by resulting in little to no gain and a more menacing and dangerous set of opposing militaries. Does China want a U.S. defense posture for Asia that relies more on nuclear weapons? A proliferated Asia-Pacific? Washington must make Beijing understand that if it continues its military buildup, those are very real probabilities. A no-first-use pledge would suggest to Beijing just the opposite — that continuing to build up, and perhaps even using, its military power may not be sufficiently dangerous or costly after all. That would be far worse for Asia and America than a perhaps unfashionable reminder that there will be a grim nuclear risk if Beijing ever seeks to capitalize on its growing conventional military strength.

### NFU undermines deterrence

Michaela Dodge and Adam Lowther, <https://www.e-ir.info/2016/10/04/a-no-first-use-policy-would-make-the-united-states-less-secure/>, NFU Undermines A No-First-Use Policy Would Make the United States Less Secure

**A no-first-use nuclear weapons policy means that a country vows not to use nuclear weapons unless it is first attacked with nuclear weapons. Such a declaration would be a departure from the current U.S. policy of “calculated ambiguity.” Since the dawn of the atomic age, the United States has refused to specify exactly which scenarios would lead to the use of its nuclear weapons. The ambiguity created by having an undefined “red line” contributed greatly to deterrence during the Cold War—including deterrence of large-scale attacks conducted with non-nuclear weapons—and continues to do so today. The effect of changing this policy would be to make the United States and its allies less secure while failing to provide tangible nonproliferation benefits.** The very term “no-first-use” is misleading. While a nuclear weapon has not been used in anger for over 70 years, nuclear weapons are used every single day to deter large-scale conventional and nuclear attacks. Former Air Force Chief of Staff General Larry Welch points out that “we have used the nuclear forces every second of every day for 50 years.” Moreover, during those 50 years, humankind has experienced the most peaceful period in its history as measured by the number of conflict-related casualties as a proportion of the world’s population. This is due in large part to the devastating risks that nuclear weapons pose to any society that is attacked with them. For the United States and the Soviet Union, a large-scale nuclear exchange meant the end of society as Americans and Russians had known it. That risk led American and Soviet leaders to exercise a level of caution and restraint that was not exercised by German, Japanese, and other world leaders in the years leading up to World War II. **If the United States were to adopt a no-first-use policy, the perceived threat of nuclear conflict**

admittedly would decline. While a decline in the perceived threat of nuclear weapons use may seem like a good thing, however, it is actually dangerous because it is that very perceived threat that gives leaders who may be contemplating the use of force the chance for second thoughts that can prevent great-power war. This is an important point. Opening the door to great-power conflict, even if ever so slightly, is obviously a step in the wrong direction. Nor are great-power conflicts the only dangerous challenge that nuclear weapons deter. Biological, chemical, and even well-organized and targeted cyber-attacks can be as devastating as nuclear attacks. Some proponents may claim that the combination of a no-first-use policy and American conventional superiority plays to America's strength, but recent history suggests that simply using our conventional forces rarely achieves our political objectives. It is also worth noting that the U.S. military is overstretched and on the verge of a readiness crisis. In the European theater, for example, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces are judged by many to be insufficient to counter a Russian military advance into the Baltics. Most important, the point of deterrence is to prevent a war from happening, which is frequently preferable to becoming engaged in a war even if one wins at the end of the day. In the context of the no-first-use policy, we must keep in mind that President Harry Truman made the decision to use nuclear weapons against Japan to prevent an estimated 500,000 or more American casualties in a planned invasion of Japan. We cannot know that future Presidents will not find the nation in a similar situation in which using nuclear weapons could end a war and save thousands or even millions of American lives. Such a decision ought never to be taken lightly, but considering how many times we have been wrong about the future, changing a policy that has served the United States and its allies so well since the end of the Cold War would be at best naïve and at worst dangerous, particularly since security trends for the United States point in a negative direction. Finally, a no-first-use nuclear weapons policy could result in more, not less, proliferation. America's allies depend on U.S. nuclear guarantees. They do not develop their own nuclear weapons because they rely on the United States to defend them, a necessity that is all too real for countries like South Korea, Japan, Poland, and the Baltic States. We must remember that North Korea has threatened "a sea of fire" upon South Korea. Russia has threatened to use nuclear weapons against NATO allies in order to force the United States to deescalate a conflict. In the context of today's threats and to strengthen deterrence, the United States does not specify the exact location of its red lines that would trigger an American nuclear response. South Korea and Japan are technologically advanced and could rapidly join the club of nuclear weapons states should they lose confidence in the credibility of American deterrence. Increasing these nations' uncertainty about U.S. security commitments undermines American nonproliferation policy. A no-first-use policy only adds to the already existing view that an American President is not likely to trade San Francisco or New York for Seoul or Riga. The benefits of a no-first-use policy are unlikely to materialize as advocates suggest. Rather, the United States is much more likely to see a number of negative consequences. The old adage "peace through strength" is certainly applicable to nuclear weapons policy. No-first-use is antithetical to such a view and only works to undermine the credibility of American deterrence.

## Key allies oppose NFU

Josh Rogin August 14, 2016 [https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/allies-unite-to-block-an-obama-legacy/2016/08/14/cdb8d8e4-60b9-11e6-8e45-477372e89d78\\_story.html?utm\\_campaign=Defense%20EBB%2008-15-16&utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_source=Sailthru&utm\\_term=.98a2100e9a00](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/allies-unite-to-block-an-obama-legacy/2016/08/14/cdb8d8e4-60b9-11e6-8e45-477372e89d78_story.html?utm_campaign=Defense%20EBB%2008-15-16&utm_medium=email&utm_source=Sailthru&utm_term=.98a2100e9a00)

U.S. allies unite to block Obama's nuclear 'legacy'

President Obama waves to people in Prague's Hradcany Square in April 2009 after his speech on the U.S. commitment to nuclear disarmament. (Pablo Martinez Monsivais/Associated Press)

President Obama's last-minute drive for a foreign-policy legacy is making U.S. allies nervous about their own security. Several allied governments have lobbied the administration not to change U.S. nuclear-weapons policy by promising never to be the first to use them in a conflict. The governments of Japan, South Korea, France and Britain have all privately communicated their concerns about a potential declaration by President Obama of a "no first use" nuclear-weapons policy for the United States. U.S. allies have various reasons for objecting to what would be a landmark change in America's nuclear posture, but they are all against it, according to U.S. officials, foreign diplomats and nuclear experts. Japan, in particular, believes that if Obama declares a "no first use" policy, deterrence against countries such as North Korea will suffer and the risks of conflict will rise. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe personally conveyed that message recently to Adm. Harry Harris Jr., the head of U.S. Pacific Command, according to two government officials. (Update: After this column was published, a spokesman for Pacific Command said that Abe and Harris did not discuss U.S. nuclear policy in their July meeting.) President Obama addressed a crowd in Prague's Hradcany Square on April 5, 2009, touching on issues from green energy to nuclear treaties. (The White House)

U.S. allies in Europe have a separate, additional concern. They don't want any daylight between their nuclear policies and those of the United States, especially since Britain, France and the United States all are permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. In the case of an emergency, those differences could cause real coordination problems. It's my understanding that the defense ministries of many of our allied nations have lobbied the White House against changing this doctrine, and there's been particularly strong opposition from the U.K., France, Japan and South Korea," said Joe Cirincione, president of the Ploughshares Fund , an anti-proliferation advocacy group that supports the policy change. "We have an interest in creating an international norm that no one should use nuclear weapons first. The allies lobbying against it are nervous nellies." The White House is considering declaring a "no first use" nuclear-weapons policy as one of several ways Obama can advance his non-proliferation agenda in his final months in office. Several options are under debate, and no final decisions have been made on "no first use." The president wants to roll out announcements on nuclear policy in September to coincide with his final appearance at the U.N. General Assembly, officials said. One administration official told me that, in part because of allied concerns, the internal push on "no first use" was not gaining traction. National Security Council spokesman Ned Price told me that the administration is "always looking for additional ways to achieve progress" on Obama's Prague agenda — named for the disarmament aspirations the president set out in his April 2009 speech in the Czech capital — "while maintaining a credible deterrent for the United States, our allies and partners."

Foreign officials from multiple allied countries said that their governments were upset about a lack of consultation on the possible declaration of a “no first use” policy, which would affect all allies who live under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Many said that allied governments first learned about the policy debates in The Post. “While the goal of a ‘no first use’ policy is correct — to never be the first country to launch a cataclysmic nuclear strike — doing so unilaterally could run the risk of weakening our allies’ confidence in our security guarantees. This would not be in our interest,” said Joel Rubin, a former Obama administration State Department official.

Diplomats from allied countries argued that if the United States takes a nuclear first strike off the table, the risk of a conventional conflict with countries such as North Korea, China and Russia could increase. Regimes that might refrain from a conventional attack in fear of nuclear retaliation would calculate the risks of such an attack differently.

### NFU undermines conventional deterrence

Brent Peabody, 2019, m

<https://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-make-us-military-weak-again-81891>, How to Make the U.S. Military Weak Again, Brent Peabody is a researcher at the Center for New American Security. A recent graduate from Georgetown University, he will continue his studies next year as Fulbright Scholar in Brazil, where he will be researching Brazil’s own push to nuclearize during its military dictatorship.

No-first-use, or the idea that the United States should not use nuclear weapons unless first attacked with them, has gained traction everywhere from the House Armed Services Committee to the Democratic presidential debates. Proponents of a no-first-use policy present it as a common-sense solution that would reduce the likelihood of nuclear war and signal U.S. leadership on nuclear proliferation. The reality, however, is that a no-first-use policy would upend decades of bipartisan consensus at precisely the moment when continuity in nuclear policy is needed most. America’s adoption of a no-first-use policy would be bad for the United States, worse for our allies, and terrible for the cause of nuclear nonproliferation in an era of strategic competition with China. First, a no-first-use policy would weaken our military posture in the face of a wide array of chemical, biological, and cyberattacks. Under the rules of engagement outlined by the no-first-use policy, the United States could suffer a biological attack killing thousands of troops stationed abroad, a chemical attack killing hundreds of thousands of civilians in San Francisco, and a crippling cyberattack on America’s nuclear infrastructure and still be unable to respond with nuclear force. A no-first-use policy would place a needless restriction on the country even when nuclear force would be the best option to deter further aggression. And far from reducing the probability of nonconventional warfare, America’s adoption of a no-first-use policy would make nonconventional warfare likelier. Adversaries, emboldened by the knowledge that even the most brazen attacks on the United States no longer carry the risk of an American nuclear strike, would feel more confident in testing the upper boundaries of what they could get away with. In short, a no-first-use policy would leave the United States less able to respond to exactly the kind of biological, chemical, and cyber brinksmanship it would invite. If a no-first-use policy weakens our hand in the face of such attacks, then it outright hobbles us in the event of actual nuclear

warfare. In any scenario with an American no-first-use policy in place, adversaries would understand the first strike is theirs and thus use it as an opportunity to erode our second-strike capabilities, something that could give them a decisive advantage in the conflict ahead.  
This threat is underscored by Russia's tactical nuclear advantage over the United States, which they could leverage to destroy nuclear bunkers, siloes, and submarines before we ever have the chance to use them. A no-first-use policy would thus weaken our nuclear posture even in the only situation where nuclear weapons are permitted—after we've already been attacked.

A no-first-use policy is likewise bad for our allies, who have long relied on our extended deterrence for their own protection. During the Cold War, for example, the threat of a first-use nuclear strike did much to deter the Soviet Union from rolling into Western Europe, even when they had the superior conventional forces to do so. The Cold War is over, but the dynamic is much the same. Allies from South Korea to Saudi Arabia depend on America's right to use nuclear weapons first as a credible deterrent to keep regional rivals like North Korea, China, and Iran in check. This was made explicit in the run-up to the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, when President Barack Obama flirted with the idea of a no-first-use policy but backed off after hearing firsthand from allies how the policy would leave them more exposed to attack from emboldened regional adversaries. Indeed, it is conceivable that many of our allies would develop nuclear weapons of their own if they no longer felt covered by America's nuclear-security umbrella. South Korea, for example, is the world's fourth largest generator of nuclear energy, and the transition from producing the low-enrichment uranium needed for nuclear energy to the weapon-grade uranium needed for a warhead is not insurmountable. Japan and Taiwan, with latent nuclear capabilities of their own, could also nuclearize if they no longer deem America's nuclear deterrent strong enough. And this is the paradox of a no-first-use policy. Its purported goal is a world with fewer nuclear weapons, but its implementation would in fact result in more of them. Some may welcome a nuclear South Korea or Taiwan in an era of strategic competition with China, but the reality is a world more populated with nuclear countries would necessarily increase the chance of nuclear miscalculation—exactly what a no-first-use policy set out to avoid in the first place. From the Iran Nuclear Deal to the Paris Climate Agreement, the Trump administration has made a point to undo much of what was accomplished during the Obama years. This makes Trump's 2018 Nuclear Posture Review all the more notable. Not only did the review retain the previous administration's language on a no-first-use policy, it did so word-for-word. Obama and Trump's mutual rejection of a no-first-use policy perhaps best underscores the extent to which the policy would weaken the United States, endanger our allies, and lead to nuclear proliferation. We might continue to hear more about this policy in the coming presidential cycle, but we should hesitate before upending a policy that has underscored decades of national and global security—and could continue to do so for decades to come.

## Nuclear Better – General

**Nuclear is better—empirics, yields, easier to target and more credible.**

**Tertrais 15** (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique in France,  
“How Relevant is Nuclear Deterrence Today?”

[https://www.idn.gov.pt/publicacoes/nacaodefesa/textointegral/NeD140.pdf#page=9\)](https://www.idn.gov.pt/publicacoes/nacaodefesa/textointegral/NeD140.pdf#page=9)

Alternatives to Nuclear Deterrence Are Not Credible Furthermore, costs and risks associated with nuclear deterrence have to be measured in comparison with possible alternatives. But alleged possible substitutes lack credibility. As is well-known, **conventional deterrence has a long record of failure – in fact, as long as civilization itself**. As former UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher once reportedly said, there is a monument to its failures in every French village.<sup>6</sup> The threat of conventional bombing is not enough to make an adversary desist when the stakes are extreme or vital: even when they are more limited, the crises of the past 20 years – Iraq in 1991, Serbia in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, Iraq again in 2003 – have shown that it does not always lead adversaries to change their strategic calculus. The reasons are well-known. Besides the intrinsically frightening character of nuclear weapons, due to radioactivity, these weapons have important specific characteristics. **There is still today a large difference – at least an order of magnitude – between conventional and nuclear yields.** According to open literature, the smallest known nuclear weapons yields are measured in hundreds of tons of equivalent-TNT (300 tons for the lowest yield of the US B-61 bomb), whereas the most powerful conventional bombs, which were tested during the past decade, are measured at the maximum in tens of tons of equivalent-TNT (a little over 10 tons for the US Massive Ordnance Air Blast, perhaps twice for the equivalent Russian device). For this reason, conventional weapons cost much more for an equivalent effect. Going back to conventional deterrence, even assuming that such deterrence was credible for the defense of vital interests, would be a return to the logic of big battalions. **It is far from certain that Western countries – with the possible exception of the United States – would have the means or the political will for the arms races that would probably follow.** This difference in yields is particularly relevant when one attempts to maintain a second-strike capability: other things being equal, an SSBN fleet endowed with conventional missiles would be extraordinarily costly. Even more than its nuclear counterpart, conventional strategy relies on the threat of targeted strikes on key assets and centers of gravity. **Such a logic places extraordinary demands on intelligence and C3.** The amount of energy expended by nuclear weapons makes them “forgiving” (less demanding in these respects). **Conventional means today still cannot credibly threaten two particular categories of targets. The most important one consists of hardened targets.** Just to give an example: in 1999, NATO failed to disable Pristina’s military airport (Ripley, 1999). As the former director of a US nuclear lab reminds us, “some targets are simply too hard to be destroyed by anything less than a nuclear explosion” (Younger, 2009: 122). Another category is deeply buried targets. **In order to neutralize a buried installation (by coupling effect), a conventional weapon would need to penetrate much more deeply than a nuclear one, and in many cases much beyond what is feasible today.**<sup>7</sup> Of course, using nuclear weapons to destroy such installations would pose a well-known problem: fallout could be massive in case of shallow penetration, which could make a political leader hesitate. But let us recall once again that this is about deterrence, not use (the challenge being to persuade the opposing leader that we would not be self-deterring by such a prospect). **The other essential characteristics of nuclear weapons are political. A massive and sustained bombing campaign could, in many scenarios, have a physical effect equivalent to several nuclear weapons. However, as stated above, it is far from obvious that Western public opinion would bear the conduct of such a prolonged campaign,** the unfolding of which would be visible 24/7 on television and the Internet. As was seen on several occasions recently – Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Southern Lebanon, Gaza, Libya... – the media and publics get impatient very quickly, demand fast results and are shocked by collateral damage and targeting errors. (In a major war, domestic sensitivity to collateral damage inflicted to the adversary’s population would certainly be limited. **But this would play out at the global level, potentially affecting the political context of the war.**) And that is without

taking into account possible asymmetrical reprisals (terrorism, cyberattacks...) which could be conducted by an adversary. A conflict can be winnable in theory, but not in practice, and even in situations of obvious conventional superiority, the outcome is never guaranteed. As stated by Kenneth Waltz, "so complex is the fighting of wars with conventional weapons that their outcomes have been extremely difficult to predict" (Waltz, 1990: 734). Once again, other things being equal, nuclear weapons give the political authorities the quasi-certainty of massive but targeted destruction. Could the threat of a massive regime change operation be enough to make an adverse leader think twice about major aggression or the use of WMDs? This is unlikely. The difficulties of the US-led coalition in Iraq have probably devalued the threat of regime change for at least a generation. These two specific features of nuclear weapons have clear deterrence benefits. It is unlikely that technological evolutions on the horizon will make this argumentation obsolete. Peacetime Western superiority is global, not necessarily local. Conventional forces remain time-consuming to mobilize and deploy, and their use often leads to protracted and bloody wars. From a technical standpoint, Elbridge Colby compares the substitution of nuclear weapons by conventional ones to an asymptote curve: to threaten the kinds of targets mentioned above, the difficulties become exponential (Colby, 2010). Future long-range precision strike weapons will not alter this. In 2004, a Defense Science Board task force concluded that the United States would not have, by 2030, an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance architecture commensurate with the ambitions of the Prompt Global Strike program (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2004). It is for these reasons that, from the point of view of a former commander of USSTRATCOM, such means cannot replace nuclear weapons even by "ten-for-one" (Chilton, 2010: 25).

## Nuclear Better – Asia

**Conventional deterrence is terminally ineffective in the Asia Pacific environment --- only a strategy prioritizing nuclear deterrence reassures allies and deters conflict**

**Leah 15** (Postdoctoral Associate in Grand Strategy at Yale University. Previously a Stanton Postdoctoral Fellow in Nuclear Security at MIT. "Should U.S. Allies in Asia Get Their Own Nukes?" The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/should-u-s-allies-in-asia-get-their-own-nukes/>)

The prospects for the U.S. being able to project its power and defend its allies in Asia are not good. The U.S. security guarantee – known as “extended deterrence” – was never really tested in Asia the way it was on a daily basis in Europe during the Cold War. Understandable, since Asia was not the global center of strategic gravity. But it is now. Military modernization and expansion by all the players is causing greater friction between the tectonic plates of Japan, China, South Korea, and the United States, testing the limits of U.S. extended deterrence, which currently minimizes the role of nuclear weapons. However, the very foundations of this concept were designed to deal with a land, European theater, not the Asian maritime environment. Historically, the foundation of power projection has been sea-control. Since the end of World War Two, U.S. power in Asia has been uncontested. What contributed to making the U.S. such a decisive power there for over sixty years was a robust sea-control capacity with low risk, with therefore little cost. Since the late 90s, however, China has been gradually building up its sea-denial capabilities, which have progressively increased the costs for the U.S. to maintain sea-control. And as Hugh White and others have pointed out, whilst Washington has commitments all over the world, Beijing only has to focus all its military power in one area and focus on a denial strategy. And sea-denial is a lot easier than sea-control. What strategic effect does the U.S. want to achieve with the deployment of its forces? Is there a theory of victory? The vast logistical challenges of relying mainly on conventional forces for sea-control means that if Washington wants to keep playing the extended deterrence game, then nuclear weapons are going to have to feature much more prominently in American strategy. Nuclear weapons are special. They “connect” allies (especially those in far-flung lands such as Australia) in a way that was not possible in the past without the protector state forward deploying substantial conventional forces to the ally’s territory – a costly exercise. In the conventional world, commitments need to be much more explicit and physically visible to appear credible. And that becomes more difficult and costly for the protector state depending on geography. Relatively less effort is needed when nuclear weapons are involved. Compared to Western Europe, the Asia-Pacific is a vast maritime environment, with many more actors, and allies that all have diverging interests. Big geography (the Pacific, Russia), and big military and industrial bases require big weapons (nuclear weapons) to reassure allies that the U.S. is capable of defending their vital interests in a major conflict. Currently, the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. policy is marginalized. It is not even clear what U.S. strategy in Asia actually is, let alone how nuclear weapons fit in the picture. But they should. Whilst nuclear disarmament will not happen any time soon, lowering the stockpiles of the United States and Russia to a few hundred weapons each brings big issues of “conventional” strategy back to the surface. And these may be much harder to manage in a world where much more precise conventional systems (including ballistic and cruise missiles) take center stage. Furthermore, the proliferation of precision-strike weapons poses additional challenges for conventional deterrence. China, for instance poses a formidable arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles. The nuclear aspect of U.S. extended deterrence has always been important for Seoul, Tokyo, and even Canberra. Conventional forces alone simply do not provide the same level of reassurance. Compared to Western Europe (which was never happy with a purely conventional deterrent anyway), there are immense logistical difficulties extending conventional deterrence in a maritime environment as vast as the Asia-Pacific. Tasks

include the need to ensure the prompt replenishment of destroyed combat ships, establishing defensive perimeters for fleet support, and ensuring the safety of fleet replenishment oilers and dry cargo/ammunition supply ships, to name but a few. Meanwhile, the budget constraints of sequestration in 2013, coupled with longer-term financial uncertainty raise questions about the future of the U.S. Navy's Military Sealift Command and its Combat Logistics Force. As David Gompert and Terrence Kelley have argued: "**Air-Sea battle does not solve** the underlying problem of U.S. forces' growing **vulnerability** in the Western Pacific. That is the result of military-technological trends, geographic realities, and the limitations and costs of defending overseas deployments." Europe was, and remains, one single geostrategic entity connected by land. In the Asia-Pacific, Japan, South Korea, Australia and Taiwan are more dispersed and far apart from each other, with neutral and non-aligned states dotted here and there in between. U.S. forces need to be able to move around a lot of vessels, aircraft, troops, and munitions. A significant problem here is that U.S. and allied air and naval **bases** in the western Pacific are **vulnerable to Chinese conventional ballistic and cruise missile strikes.** The closer the base is to Chinese territory, the more **vulnerable it is.** Guam is also within range of cruise missile strikes launched from aircraft and submarines.

## CBW Contention

### NFU triggers CBW attacks

REBECCA HEINRICHES , SENIOR FELLOW, HUDSON INSTITUTE, August 24, 2020,  
<https://www.newsweek.com/reject-no-first-use-nuclear-policy-opinion-1527037>, Reject 'No First Use' Nuclear Policy | Opinion

First, adopting an NFU policy invites a strategic non-nuclear attack against the American people, our allies and our interests. An NFU declaration broadcasts to America's enemies that they can proceed with a chemical weapons attack on U.S. forces and their families, can proceed with a biological attack on an American city and can proceed with an overwhelming conventional attack against critical U.S. assets, all without fear of nuclear retaliation. Any would-be enemy could carry out an infinite number of attacks short of a nuclear attack, while the NFU-endorsing U.S. president assures their safety from our nuclear weapon arsenal.

### First-use nuclear authority is key to deter aggression—restrictions cause CBW attacks and hotspot escalation

**Payne 16** (Keith B. - President of National Institute for Public Policy and head of the Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, "Once Again: Why a "No-First-Use" Policy is a Bad, Very Bad Idea," 7/5/16,  
[https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/07/06/once\\_again\\_why\\_a\\_no-first-use\\_policy\\_is\\_a\\_bad\\_very\\_bad\\_idea\\_109520.html](https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/07/06/once_again_why_a_no-first-use_policy_is_a_bad_very_bad_idea_109520.html))

[1] A prospective NFU policy would be a US commitment never to be the first to use nuclear weapons—as opposed to existing policy that retains some ambiguity regarding when and if the US would use nuclear weapons. An NFU policy would eliminate that ambiguity for US adversaries. It sounds warm and progressive, and has long been a policy proposal of disarmament activists. NFU has, however, been rejected by all previous Democratic and Republican administrations for very sound reasons, most recently by the Obama Administration in 2010. The most important of these reasons is that retaining a degree of US nuclear ambiguity helps to deter war while adopting an NFU policy would undercut the deterrence of war. How so? Under the existing policy of ambiguity, potential aggressors such as Russia, China, North Korea or Iran must contemplate the reality that if they attack us or our allies, they risk possible US nuclear retaliation. There is no doubt whatsoever that this risk of possible US nuclear retaliation has deterred war and the escalation of conflicts. In fact, the percentage of the world population lost to war has fallen dramatically since US nuclear deterrence was established after World War II. [2] That is an historic accomplishment. The fatal flaw of the warm and progressive-sounding NFU proposal is that it tells would-be aggressors that they do not have to fear US nuclear retaliation even if they attack us or our allies with advanced conventional, chemical, and/or biological weapons. They would risk US nuclear retaliation only if they attack with nuclear weapons. As long as they use non-nuclear forces, a US NFU policy would provide aggressors with a free pass to avoid the risk now posed by the US nuclear deterrent. Promising potential aggressors that they can use modern conventional, chemical or biological weapons against us or our allies without fear of possible US nuclear retaliation will encourage some to perceive greater license to do precisely that. Numerous historical case studies demonstrate without a doubt that some aggressors look for such openings to undertake their military moves to overturn a status quo they deem intolerable. They do not need to see a risk-free path to pursue aggression, only a path that

allows them some vision of success, however improbable that vision may seem to others. The great advantage of current US nuclear policy is that the US nuclear deterrent helps to shut down the possibility that would-be aggressors contemplate such paths. A US NFU policy would be particularly dangerous at a time when both Russia and China may be armed with chemical and biological weapons and are pursuing expansionist policies in Europe and Asia, respectively, to overturn the status quo.<sup>[3]</sup> Russia is by far the strongest military power in Europe. It has moved repeatedly against neighboring states since 2008, forcibly changing established borders in Europe for the first time since World War II and issuing explicit nuclear first-use threats in the process. Only several months ago, Russia reportedly rehearsed the invasion of Norway, Finland, Sweden and Denmark in a military exercise involving 33,000 troops.<sup>[3]</sup> In Asia, China is the strongest military power and is expanding its reach against US allies, including by building and militarizing islands in the South China Sea. At a time when key US allies face unprecedented threats from powerful neighbors, the US should not reduce the calculation of risks Russia and China must confront in their respective expansionist drives by adopting a US NFU policy. Indeed, saying so should be considered a breathtaking understatement in a world in which aggressors still exist, as do advanced conventional, chemical and biological weapons, and another world war using "only" such modern non-nuclear weapons could cause death levels far beyond the 80-100 million souls lost in World Wars I and II.

## Bioweapon attacks cause extinction—uniquely different than natural diseases

**Myhrvold 13** (Nathan, PhD in theoretical and mathematical physics from Princeton + founded Intellectual Ventures after retiring as chief strategist and chief technology officer of Microsoft Corporation, July 2013, "Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action," The Lawfare Research Paper Series No.2, <http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Strategic-Terrorism-Myhrvold-7-3-2013.pdf>)

A virus genetically engineered to infect its host quickly, to generate symptoms slowly—say, only after weeks or months—and to spread easily through the air or by casual contact would be vastly more devastating than HIV. It could silently penetrate the population to unleash its deadly effects suddenly. This type of epidemic would be almost impossible to combat because most of the infections would occur before the epidemic became obvious. A technologically sophisticated terrorist group could develop such a virus and kill a large part of humanity with it. Indeed, terrorists may not have to develop it themselves: some scientist may do so first and publish the details. Given the rate at which biologists are making discoveries about viruses and the immune system, at some point in the near future, someone may create artificial pathogens that could drive the human race to extinction. Indeed, a detailed species-elimination plan of this nature was openly proposed in a scientific journal. The ostensible purpose of that particular research was to suggest a way to extirpate the malaria mosquito, but similar techniques could be directed toward humans.<sup>16</sup> When I've talked to molecular biologists about this method, they are quick to point out that it is slow and easily detectable and could be fought with biotech remedies. If you challenge them to come up with improvements to the suggested attack plan, however, they have plenty of ideas. Modern biotechnology will soon be capable, if it is not already, of bringing about the demise of the human race—or at least of killing a sufficient number of people to end high-tech civilization and set humanity back 1,000 years or more. That terrorist groups could achieve this level of technological sophistication may seem far-fetched, but keep in mind that it takes only a handful of individuals to accomplish these tasks. Never has lethal power of this potency been accessible to so few, so easily. Even more dramatically than nuclear proliferation, modern biological science has frighteningly undermined the correlation between the lethality of a weapon and its cost, a fundamentally stabilizing mechanism throughout history. Access to extremely lethal agents—lethal enough to exterminate Homo sapiens—will be available to anybody with a solid background in biology, terrorists included. The 9/11 attacks involved at least four pilots, each of whom had sufficient education to enroll in flight schools and complete several years of training. Bin Laden had a degree in civil engineering. Mohammed Atta attended a German university, where he earned a master's degree in urban planning—not a field he likely chose for its relevance to terrorism. A future set of terrorists could just as easily be students of molecular biology who enter their studies innocently enough but later put their skills to homicidal use. Hundreds of universities in Europe and Asia have curricula sufficient to train people in the skills necessary to make a sophisticated biological weapon, and hundreds more in the United States accept students from all over the world. Thus it seems likely that sometime in the near future a small band of terrorists, or even a single misanthropic individual, will overcome our best defenses and do something truly terrible, such as fashion a bioweapon that could kill millions or even billions of people. Indeed, the creation of such weapons within the next 20 years seems to be a virtual certainty.

## NFU increases CBM aggression

Keith Payne, July 6, 2016, National Review, Once Again: Why a ‘No First Use’ Nuclear Policy Is a Very Bad Idea, <https://www.nationalreview.com/2016/07/no-first-use-nuclear/>, — Keith B. Payne is the president of the National Institute for Public Policy, the head of the Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University (Washington-area campus), and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense.

**It would reduce the potential cost of using conventional, chemical, and biological attacks for would-be aggressors.** The Obama administration reportedly is seriously considering adopting a “no first use” (NFU) nuclear-weapons policy. A prospective NFU policy would be a U.S. commitment never to be the first to use nuclear weapons — as opposed to existing policy, which retains some ambiguity regarding when and if the U.S. would use nuclear weapons. An NFU policy would eliminate that ambiguity for U.S. adversaries. It sounds warm and progressive and has long been a policy proposal of disarmament activists. NFU has, however, been rejected by all previous Democratic and Republican administrations for very sound reasons, most recently by the Obama administration in 2010. The most important of these reasons is that **retaining a degree of U.S. nuclear ambiguity helps to deter war, while adopting an NFU policy would undercut that deterrence.** How so? Under the existing policy of ambiguity, potential aggressors such as Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran must contemplate the reality that if they attack us or our allies, they risk possible U.S. nuclear retaliation. There is no doubt whatsoever that this risk of possible U.S. nuclear retaliation has deterred war and the escalation of conflicts. In fact, **the percentage of the world population lost to war has fallen dramatically since U.S. nuclear deterrence was established after World War II. That is a historic accomplishment. The fatal flaw of the warm and progressive-sounding NFU proposal is that it tells would-be aggressors that they do not have to fear U.S. nuclear retaliation as long as they attack us or our allies with advanced conventional, chemical, and/or biological weapons. They would risk U.S. nuclear retaliation only if they attack with nuclear weapons.** RELATED: Underestimating Nuclear Missile Threats from North Korea and Iran **Numerous historical case studies demonstrate without a doubt that some aggressors look for such openings to undertake military moves they deem critical. They do not need to see a risk-free path to pursue aggression, only a path that allows them some vision of success, however improbable that vision may seem to others. The U.S. nuclear deterrent helps to shut down the possibility that would-be aggressors will contemplate such paths. U.S. adoption of a no-first-use policy would mean that the United States could no longer reassure allies with its nuclear umbrella. A U.S. NFU policy would be particularly dangerous at a time when Russia and China may be armed with chemical and biological weapons and are pursuing expansionist policies in Europe and Asia, respectively. Russia is by far the strongest military power in Europe. It has moved repeatedly against neighboring states since 2008, forcibly changing established borders in Europe for the first time since World War II and issuing explicit nuclear first-use threats in the process. Only several months ago, Russia reportedly rehearsed the invasion of Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark in a military exercise involving 33,000 troops. In Asia, China is the strongest military power and is expanding its reach against U.S. allies, with tactics that include building and militarizing islands in the South China Sea. At a time when key U.S. allies**

**face unprecedented threats from powerful neighbors, the U.S. should not reduce the calculation of risks that Russia and China must confront in their respective expansionist drives by adopting an NFU policy. Indeed, this is a breathtaking understatement in a world in which aggressors still exist, as do advanced conventional, chemical, and possibly biological weapons, and in which another world war using “only” such modern non-nuclear weapons could cause death levels far beyond the 80 to 100 million lost in World Wars I and II.**

## China Deterrence Contention

**NFU legitimates Chinese war hawks — that makes Chinese revisionism and escalation in Asia more likely**

**Colby 16** — Elbridge Colby, Robert M. Gates Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute of Strategic Studies, former Policy Advisor to the Secretary of Defense's Representative for the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, J.D. from Yale Law School, 2016. ("Nuclear Weapons Aren't Just For the Worst Case Scenario", *Foreign Policy*, August 4<sup>th</sup>, 2016, Available Online at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/04/nuclear-weapons-arent-just-worst-case-scenario-first-use-china-obama-trump/> Accessed 8-26-2018)

But China at some point in the not-too-distant future might. A range of authoritative sources are showing that the conventional military balance of power between the United States and China with respect to points of contention in East Asia such as Taiwan and the South and East China Seas is, at the very least, becoming increasingly competitive. Beijing is fielding more and more highly capable forces in the Western Pacific that present a growing challenge to America's ability to effectively project military power in the region.

The days are therefore passing when the United States could easily swipe away any effort by the People's Liberation Army at power projection in the Western Pacific. Instead, any future fight in the region between the United States and its allies on the one hand and China on the other would be hard and nasty. And the trend lines are not moving in a good direction. Indeed, within a decade, China might be in a position where it could reasonably expect to confront a U.S. ally or partner in the Western Pacific and hope to prevail if the conflict remained relatively limited.

If the United States adds to this a credible guarantee that it would not use nuclear weapons first, it would strengthen China's confidence that it could wage a short, sharp conventional war and gain from it, just as such confidence is rising and becoming more plausible to decision-makers in Beijing already contemplating the use of force in the region. According to a recent Reuters report, for instance, influential voices in the Chinese military establishment are already pushing for firmer security policies and even military action in the South China Sea — and this at a time when the United States still enjoys the conventional upper hand. These voices are likely to seem more credible and appealing in the councils of power in Beijing as Chinese military advantages grow, and they would only be emboldened by a U.S. statement that it will not use nuclear weapons first. A no-first-use pledge would therefore increase the chances of war in Asia.

## Conventional Weapons Shift Contention

### **NFU causes conventional war with China and North Korea – both go nuclear**

**Colby 16** [Eldridge Colby, fellow at the Center for a New American Security, JD from Yale Law, “Nuclear Weapons Aren’t Just For the Worst Case Scenario,” *Foreign Policy*, August 4<sup>th</sup>, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/04/nuclear-weapons-arent-just-worst-case-scenario-first-use-china-obama-trump/>]

This controversy is not merely another spark of the campaign season, for, according to news reports, President Barack Obama himself is considering implementing a “no-first-use” pledge regarding nuclear weapons — that is, a promise never to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Such a pledge would be exceedingly unwise

Nuclear weapons are horrible instruments of destruction, but they are also associated with the longest period of major-power peace in human history. And they only work because potentially ambitious states believe their use is plausible enough that starting a war or escalating one against a nuclear-armed state or its allies would just be too risky to countenance. The point of reserving the right to use nuclear weapons first (which, it must be emphasized, is different from a policy of preemption or heavy reliance on them) is not to convey a madman’s itchy trigger finger on the button. Rather, its purpose is to communicate clearly to any potential aggressor that attacking one’s vital interests too harshly or successfully — even without resorting to nuclear weapons — risks prompting a devastating nuclear response, something that, at scale, is far more costly than any realistic gains.

A no-first-use pledge would undermine this pacifying logic. If the policy were believed, then it would make the world safe for conventional war. Since potential aggressors would write the risk of nuclear use down to zero, they would feel they could safely start and wage fierce conventional wars.

Conventional wars can be small, quick, and decisive, which is why they can also be appealing — just ask Napoleon, James Polk, Otto von Bismarck, or Moshe Dayan. But they can also escalate dramatically and unpredictably, especially when major powers are involved. Thus, the most likely route to nuclear use is via a nasty conventional war, as happened in World War II. In such circumstances, high-minded pledges made in peacetime may well seem foolish or too burdensome.

A believable no-first-use pledge would likely raise, rather than diminish, the likelihood of nuclear weapons being used by lightening the shadow of nuclear weapons over the decision-making of potential combatants. Better for everyone to think as carefully and clearly as possible about nuclear weapons before a war is underway.

Alternatively, if the no-first-use pledge were not believed, what would the point of such a promise be other than diplomatic window dressing?

It is for these reasons that the United States has never adopted a no-first-use policy. During the Cold War, the United States relied on its nuclear deterrent to compensate for perceived Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional advantages in Europe. But even in the post-Cold War period of American military supremacy, when Washington sought to diminish its strategic reliance on nuclear weapons, it judged the future was too uncertain to dispense with the reserved right to go first. While other countries such as China and India have declared no-first-use policies (though there is a great deal of skepticism about how reliable Beijing’s pledge is), Washington and the allies that depend on its nuclear umbrella have always recognized that a no-first-use pledge by the United States would be unwise because of the breadth of defense commitments it has assumed. If the U.S. nuclear arsenal were solely designed to deter attacks on the

continental United States, a no-first-use pledge might have more merit, as launching such an assault would be incredibly difficult. But Washington also seeks to deter attacks on its allies in areas like Eastern Europe and East Asia, where U.S. conventional superiority is far less assured.

The main reason why a no-first-use pledge does not make sense for Washington, then, is the reality that the United States cannot always expect to maintain the military upper hand everywhere, and a no-first-use pledge is not the kind of commitment a nation can turn on and off without damage to its credibility and reputation.

But can anyone plausibly challenge the United States in a conventional war in the near to medium term? The answer is yes; China might well be able to. Russia and North Korea are also very dangerous to the United States and its allies in their own ways, and Moscow could plausibly hope to take on the United States conventionally if it could localize a conflict in its “near abroad” and keep it short, but neither can reasonably expect to challenge the United States in a serious, prolonged conventional war and hope to prevail.

But China at some point in the not-too-distant future might. A range of authoritative sources are showing that the conventional military balance of power between the United States and China with respect to points of contention in East Asia such as Taiwan and the South and East China Seas is, at the very least, becoming increasingly competitive. Beijing is fielding more and more highly capable forces in the Western Pacific that present a growing challenge to America’s ability to effectively project military power in the region.

The days are therefore passing when the United States could easily swipe away any effort by the People’s Liberation Army at power projection in the Western Pacific. Instead, any future fight in the region between the United States and its allies on the one hand and China on the other would be hard and nasty. And the trend lines are not moving in a good direction.

Indeed, within a decade, China might be in a position where it could reasonably expect to confront a U.S. ally or partner in the Western Pacific and hope to prevail if the conflict remained relatively limited.

If the United States adds to this a credible guarantee that it would not use nuclear weapons first, it would strengthen China’s confidence that it could wage a short, sharp conventional war and gain from it, just as such confidence is rising and becoming more plausible to decision-makers in Beijing already contemplating the use of force in the region. According to a recent Reuters report, for instance, influential voices in the Chinese military establishment are already pushing for firmer security policies and even military action in the South China Sea — and this at a time when the United States still enjoys the conventional upper hand. These voices are likely to seem more credible and appealing in the councils of power in Beijing as Chinese military advantages grow, and they would only be emboldened by a U.S. statement that it will not use nuclear weapons first. A no-first-use pledge would therefore increase the chances of war in Asia.

Indeed, rather than excluding the possibility of American nuclear first use, Washington should be emphasizing it. This does not mean the United States should ever use its nuclear weapons lightly. Rather, Beijing should simply understand that, even if it is able to gain conventional military advantages in the Western Pacific, Washington is prepared to seriously consider using nuclear weapons first to vindicate its own vital interests and those of its allies — for instance with respect to their territorial integrity. Washington is prepared to seriously consider using nuclear weapons first to vindicate its own vital interests and those of its allies — for instance with respect to their territorial integrity. More than that, Beijing should understand clearly that if it pushes forward with its military buildup, it will spur the United States to rely even more on its nuclear forces to compensate — and, if that is not enough, the real possibility that U.S. allies will be impelled to pursue nuclear arsenals of their own.

Communicating all this to Beijing does not require any Strangelovian contortions. But it does require the United States to firmly and consistently say (or otherwise communicate) that it is prepared to use nuclear weapons first if truly pressed; to build the forces, such as a next-generation standoff cruise missile and

intercontinental ballistic missile, useful in making such a declaration credible; and to exercise and deploy its forces in ways that show Beijing its earnestness about such a declaration.

Such a policy is more likely to contribute to peace and stability than a no-first-use pledge. China is very unlikely to turn away from its effort to achieve military dominance in East Asia and the Western Pacific based on appeals to goodwill or competitions in moral preening. What might actually work is persuading Beijing that succeeding in this effort is likely to backfire by resulting in little to no gain and a more menacing and dangerous set of opposing militaries. Does China want a U.S. defense posture for Asia that relies more on nuclear weapons? A proliferated Asia-Pacific? Washington must make Beijing understand that if it continues its military buildup, those are very real probabilities.

A no-first-use pledge would suggest to Beijing just the opposite – that continuing to build up, and perhaps even using, its military power may not be sufficiently dangerous or costly after all. That would be far worse for Asia and America than a perhaps unfashionable reminder that there will be a grim nuclear risk if Beijing ever seeks to capitalize on its growing conventional military strength.

### **Russia and China are increasingly instigating conventional attacks creating an arc of instability – only threats of first use deescalate them**

**Chang 16** [Gordon G. Chang is the author of Nuclear Showdown: North Korea Takes On the World and a columnist for the Daily Beast. 7/27. "Declaring a no-first-use nuclear policy would be exceedingly risky." <https://thebulletin.org/2016/07/declaring-a-no-first-use-nuclear-policy-would-be-exceedingly-risky/>]

Would declaring no-first-use actually be a good idea, though? The answer is no, at least not now. Unilateral changes of this sort should be made only in times of strategic stability. At this time, America and its treaty partners are already having difficulty deterring big-state aggressors in Europe and Asia, and may need their most destructive weaponry to maintain peace and stability in troubled regions.

As its name implies, a no-first-use policy is a promise to use nuclear weapons only in retaliation for a nuclear attack. There are, of course, reasons to favor such a policy, and none is more important than avoiding history's last war. As Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, wrote in War on the Rocks, "A clear U.S. no-first-use policy would reduce the risk of nuclear miscalculation by nuclear-armed adversaries by alleviating concerns about a devastating U.S. nuclear first-strike, especially during a crisis." Blair put forth a more practical perspective: "The strategy today," he wrote of America's first-use posture, "has grown less and less connected to the contemporary world and its emerging security threats: terrorism, proliferation, cyber warfare, economic disruption, mass refugee migrations, and climate change." Proponents of first use, Blair suggested, are "mired in a Cold-War mindset."

Today, unfortunately, resembles that multi-decade, global struggle in crucial respects. During the Cold War, big-power authoritarians threatened the international system, seizing territory and using armies to hold on to their new possessions. Now, China is grabbing specks in the South China Sea. It effectively seized Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines in 2012, and is threatening to take others, notably Second Thomas Shoal, also claimed by the Philippines, and the Japan-administered Senkakus in the East China Sea. Beijing is, at the same time, sending troops deep into Indian-controlled territory in the Himalayas. Its prosecution of territorial claims is creating instability in an arc from India to South Korea.

**Moscow is also on the march**. Russian President Vladimir Putin dismembered Georgia last decade and Ukraine this one, annexing Crimea in 2014. At the moment, his forces are occupying a large portion of the Ukrainian region of Donbass, which he ominously calls part of "New Russia." As former Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk recently told the Washington Post, there are, despite a cease-fire, both civilian and military casualties there every single day.

No time to experiment. The West largely stood by and watched Putin's mischief in Georgia and Ukraine, but now he has his eye on the Baltic states. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are NATO members, and pursuant to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, an attack on any of them would be considered an attack on all.

The alliance, however, is not at the moment capable of defending the Baltics with just conventional weapons. A RAND study released this year, reporting on the results of a series of war games, produced sobering assessments of a Russian move on the three states. "The games' findings are unambiguous: As currently postured, NATO cannot successfully defend the territory of its most exposed members," the authors write. "Across multiple games using a wide range of expert participants playing both sides, the longest it has taken Russian forces to reach the outskirts of Tallinn and Riga is 60 hours." A NATO war game in March also showed Russia winning.

The West, in short, is outgunned, tank for tank, plane for plane, and soldier for soldier. To slow down Russian advances, Obama and leaders of the 27 other members of the Atlantic alliance met in Warsaw early this month for perhaps the most important NATO meeting since the fall of the Soviet Union. There, they agreed to deploy four battalions, consisting of around 4,000 troops in total, in Poland and the three Baltic states. The new force, according to the Wall Street Journal, will be "the first regular deployment aimed at deterring Moscow since the reunification of Germany more than a quarter-century ago."

Presumably, NATO will increase the size of this small contingent. As president of the Center for Security Policy Frank Gaffney argues, though, today the West needs more than just conventional forces. He said to me in an interview that it needs to convince aggressors they can be destroyed by a first nuclear strike.

Whether maintaining a first-use policy does in fact deter aggression is much debated. Kimball argues that the risk of "an uncontrollable and potentially suicidal escalation" is so high that the threat of using nuclear weapons "lacks credibility." Meanwhile Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, told me "we don't really know what precisely deters and what does not." There is evidence, though, suggesting that nuclear threats can prevent conventional attacks. After all, during the Cold War, Soviet tanks could have rolled across Western Europe but never did. Back then, NATO threatened to incinerate the Soviet Union in the event of such an invasion. Odds are, the NATO threat helped stop the Soviets in their tracks. Moreover, we know that nuclear weapons affected Soviet defense thinking and planning. Moscow worked hard to prevent NATO from upgrading its nuclear arsenal, especially in the early 1980s when the Kremlin tried to forestall the deployment of America's Pershing II missiles in Europe.

We cannot say for sure how the alliance's most destructive weapons have affected Putin's thinking—as Sokolski said, nuclear deterrence is "endlessly debatable"—but at least so far, a strong Russia, which had no compunction in going after non-alliance members Georgia and Ukraine, has not attacked weak, nearby NATO states.

In any event, Putin is bulking up forces on his side of the border, planning to deploy three new divisions near Poland and the Baltics. Therefore, common sense, if nothing else, suggests now may not be the best moment to adopt no-first-use and thereby create a real-life experiment on what deters aggression.

Conventional deterrence needed. The United States has maintained a first-use policy for as long as it has possessed nuclear weapons. For all their drawbacks, these weapons shortened World War II and look instrumental in having avoided global war since then.

## Extension -- Usability

**Reliance on conventional weapons increase the risk of nuke miscalc---**  
**adversaries respond by increasing the size of their arsenals.**

S. Paul Kapur 19. Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the US Naval Postgraduate School. "Managing the Challenges of the Second Nuclear Age" in Rakesh Sood ed. *Nuclear Order in the Twenty-First Century*. Observer Research Foundation.  
<https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Nuclear-Order.pdf>

Advances in **conventional weapons systems** seem unlikely to slow or reverse these trends. In theory, the **development of sophisticated conventional strike capabilities could enable states to substitute them for nuclear forces**, thereby **reducing nuclear weapons' roles in states' strategic postures**. The US' prompt global strike is an example of this type of capability. xx Its **third offset strategy, which seeks to create new technologies, incorporating such components as artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles, lasers, and advanced aeronautics to counter growing technological prowess on the part of** adversaries such as Russia and China, could lead to the development of more such advanced **non-nuclear weapons systems**. xxi It seems unlikely, however, that many states will be able to develop and deploy these types of weapons. The technological sophistication and financial resources required to do so will be prohibitive. **China's** example suggests that states **lacking such advanced conventional weapons will simply rely more heavily on nuclear forces** to counteract them, **increasing arsenal size, improving delivery systems and lowering response times**. Thus, **conventional systems, which in theory could reduce dangers in the second nuclear age, can actually increase them**. xxii

## Assurances Contention

### No one would trust our NFU, but it still breaks the nuclear umbrella – causes Japan and SoKo prolif – extinction

**Roehrig 17** [Terence Roehrig, Ph.D., Professor of National Security Affairs and the Director of the Asia-Pacific Studies Group. He has been a Research Fellow at the Kennedy School at Harvard University in the International Security Program and the Project on Managing the Atom and a past President of the Association of Korean Political Studies. He has published numerous books, articles and book chapters on Korean and East Asian security issues, North Korea's nuclear weapons program, the U.S.-South Korea alliance, human rights, and transitional justice. Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence After the Cold War. 2017. Chapter 7. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/roeh15798>]

Scholars and analysts have long recognized the credibility problems in extended deterrence, not only for the nuclear umbrella but as a broader commitment to defend an ally. Despite military preparations, security treaties, and regular statements of resolve, there is always a chance that in a crisis, the defender will choose to back away from its commitment. Even when the overall alliance is highly credible, as is the case with Japan and South Korea, the nuclear umbrella has lingering questions of resolve that were present during the Cold War and are likely to continue in the future. Would the United States ever use nuclear weapons to defend an ally? The answer is likely to remain "no."

In the face of these credibility problems, does the nuclear umbrella have any value, or should it be withdrawn? Indeed, does the nuclear umbrella even exist? The United States does possess the necessary capability, and the military trains to carry out an order for a nuclear strike. Thus, regarding capability, there is no doubt the United States possesses a credible nuclear umbrella. The questions arise with the other part of credibility, namely resolve and the likelihood the United States would ever be willing to carry out a nuclear strike in defense of an ally.

Though significant credibility questions persist, the nuclear umbrella will remain in place because of the political and symbolic benefits it provides. The affirmation of the nuclear umbrella plays a central role in reassuring allies. Japan and South Korea have not always been involved in nuclear planning or been certain how it might work, but the nuclear umbrella furnishes a strong pronouncement of the U.S. commitment to defend those allies. To withdraw the nuclear umbrella would be to change the regional security architecture in a way that would be difficult for Tokyo or Seoul to understand and accept, and would likely lead to a reassessment regarding acquisition of their own nuclear weapons. Thus, Patrick Morgan argues, "American extended nuclear deterrence is woven into East Asian international politics and US relations with East Asia [italics in the original]. In the eyes of various governments, it is one of the salient characteristics of a satisfactory status quo."<sup>9</sup> The 2010 NPR notes that "enhancing regional security architectures is a key part of U.S. strategy for strengthening regional deterrence." Moreover, "these regional security architectures include effective missile defense, counter-WMD capabilities, conventional power-projection, and integrated command and control—all underwritten by strong political commitments."<sup>10</sup> Thus, the nuclear umbrella sends an important political signal of support that reinforces the overall credibility of the alliance.

Despite questions of credibility, given the overwhelming power of nuclear weapons, an uncertain umbrella retains value as a deterrent. As Robert Jervis notes, "the argument that the American threat to use nuclear weapons is not very credible glosses over the point that only a

**little credibility may be required.**<sup>11</sup> As former British secretary of state for defence Denis Healey remarked, regarding deterrence in Europe, "it takes only 5 percent credibility of American retaliation to deter the Russians, but 95 percent credibility to reassure the Europeans."<sup>12</sup> Given the devastation and risks involved with nuclear weapons, even small amounts of credibility may be useful to deter adversaries. In addition, **no one knows how a crisis that escalates to nuclear use would play out, raising a host of unnerving possibilities** that are **likely to evoke caution, even with leaders who are** judged to be **minimally rational.**

**Washington and Pyongyang have so little trust** in each other **that the nuclear umbrella, even with its credibility questions, likely has an impact on the North Koreans because they can never be certain the United States might not use nuclear weapons.** No doubt, one of the chief motivations behind the DPRK's nuclear program is to counter any perceived vulnerabilities Pyongyang believes it has in the face of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Thus, while allies may see a lack of credibility and reassurance, enemies will see it differently. Adversaries conducting threat analyses tend to view security challenges from a worst case perspective, and the possibility that the defender might use nuclear weapons makes credibility stronger in their eyes.

Do nonnuclear states recognize the existence of the norms that constrain nuclear-armed states and discount the chance of nuclear use in a crisis? Phrased another way, have leaders like Kim Jong-un read Tan-nenwald and Paul and come to believe the United States will never use nuclear weapons? In a study on the impact of nuclear weapons on decision makers in nonnuclear states, Paul Avey found that when involved in confrontations with nuclear-armed adversaries, "non-nuclear state leaders took their opponents' nuclear arsenals very seriously and sought to reduce the risks of nuclear war."<sup>13</sup> Thus, despite low levels of credibility, there is evidence that nuclear deterrence may still be effective.

These credibility questions are also tied to the Obama administration's reluctance to provide a "no first use" guarantee and its willingness to go only so far as a negative security assurance. There is merit in providing a "**no first use**" guarantee, particularly in regard to China. While these guarantees are suspect, they can contribute to overall strategic stability, particularly in a crisis.

However, in the case of North Korea, **Pyongyang is unlikely to believe it regardless. Even if the United States rescinded the nuclear umbrella in a formal declaration, North Korea and other adversaries could never be certain whether Washington would use nuclear weapons.** As long as the United States **possesses a nuclear arsenal, the DPRK will likely have little trust in a U.S. commitment not to use nuclear weapons first** or a declaration that removes the nuclear umbrella from Japan and South Korea.<sup>14</sup> U.S. skeptics place **little faith in the "no first use" statements of North Korea and China, and the reverse would also likely be the case.**

Given widespread doubts about the credibility of the nuclear umbrella, why do U.S. allies continue to call for this commitment? Surely, officials and analysts in Japan and South Korea have read the same literature that raises these credibility questions?

**Despite the long-standing credibility questions, Japan and South Korea continue to place a high value on the U.S. nuclear umbrella as a sign of the U.S. security commitment to defend them and an important statement of reassurance. The credibility of the nuclear umbrella is tied to the overall credibility of the individual alliance.** Again, Healey maintained, "Europe's concern with the credibility of American deterrence is a function of its general confidence in the wisdom and consistency of American leadership rather than changes in the relative military power of the United States and the Soviet Union."<sup>15</sup> A strong alliance buttresses the nuclear umbrella, and vice versa. Thus, **the political aspects of the nuclear umbrella are as important as the security dimensions.** Moreover, though Japan and South Korea have separate bilateral alliances with the United States, their security has always been linked; both Tokyo and Seoul watch closely their counterpart's alliance with the United States and the impact it may have on their own security. **The U.S. nuclear umbrella helps Japanese and South Korean leaders demonstrate that they are doing something to respond to rising threat levels and helps them avoid contentious domestic debates over acquiring their own nuclear weapons.** Though the credibility questions linger and resurface periodically, **the symbolic and political value of the nuclear umbrella, accompanied by an assessment that the credibility of the U.S. commitment is sufficient, motivates leaders in Japan and South Korea to continue their calls for reasserting the nuclear umbrella and to rely on the commitment for their security.**

NONPROLIFERATION GOALS

The U.S. nuclear umbrella plays an important security role for Japan, South Korea, and other U.S. allies, but it has an equally important function for U.S. efforts to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Whenever nuclear threats have arisen in Asia, the United States has been quick to reassert that its allies are under the nuclear umbrella while continuing to provide regular pronouncements of this commitment in a variety of venues, both formal and informal. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review states squarely that strong security ties with U.S. allies “can also serve our non-proliferation goals … by reassuring non-nuclear allies and partners that their security interests can be protected without their own nuclear capabilities.”<sup>16</sup>

Calls have been particularly strong in South Korea for the acquisition of nuclear weapons, with surveys indicating as much as 60 percent support after North Korea’s 2013 nuclear test. The ROK government has been steadfast in maintaining its nonnuclear status, but the issue will resurface, particularly when North Korea succeeds in disrupting the security environment again, as it certainly will. Though Japanese leaders have long considered the nuclear option privately, public sentiment continues to be far more restrained than in South Korea. Japanese politicians are a bit freer to raise the subject now than in the past, but while Japan will continue to keep the option open by maintaining a civilian nuclear energy program, it will refrain for the time being from developing nuclear weapons. Thus, in the wake of the March 2011 tsunami and the disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, former Japanese defense minister Ishiba Shigeru remarked, “I don’t think Japan needs to possess nuclear weapons, but it’s important to maintain our commercial reactors because it would allow us to produce a nuclear warhead in a short amount of time. It’s a tacit nuclear deterrent.”<sup>17</sup>

To the surprise of many, the nonproliferation issue surfaced in the 2016 U.S. presidential primary season. Republican nominee Donald Trump stated in a New York Times interview,<sup>18</sup> and later in a CNN-sponsored town hall meeting,<sup>19</sup> that he believed nuclear proliferation was inevitable and suggested it would not be such a bad idea if Japan and South Korea, among others, acquired their own nuclear weapons. These views were accompanied by assertions that Japan and South Korea were not contributing sufficiently to support the alliance and U.S. troops in their respective countries. Should they balk at increasing their contributions, Trump suggested, the United States could withdraw its forces, and possessing their own nuclear weapons could fill the gap left by the departure of the U.S. military. Ben Rhodes, deputy national security adviser, responded emphatically:

The entire premise of American foreign policy as it relates to nuclear weapons for the last 70 years is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional states. That’s the position … of everybody who has occupied the Oval Office. It would be catastrophic were the United States to shift its position and indicate that we support somehow the proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional countries.<sup>20</sup>

Despite the headlines generated by Trump’s campaign comments, U.S. nonproliferation policy and the role of the nuclear umbrella in that policy are likely to remain the same.

So long as Tokyo and Seoul view the nuclear umbrella as sufficiently reliable, they are unlikely to acquire their own nuclear weapons. Yet herein lies the conundrum of the nuclear umbrella. Extended nuclear deterrence is a central part of alliance relations that helps reassure allies of the U.S. defense commitment. The nuclear umbrella bolsters allied confidence, and as a result, they do not seek their own nuclear weapons. Yet despite these dynamics, serious questions remain regarding the credibility of the nuclear commitment. The U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea are strong, and there is little doubt the United States would defend these two allies if attacked, but it is unlikely to do so with nuclear weapons, regardless of the circumstances. In the final analysis, there will always be credibility questions regarding extended deterrence and the nuclear umbrella. But despite these concerns, the nuclear umbrella will be “good enough” when it is part of a strong, credible alliance. Moreover, from an adversary’s perspective, even if U.S. credibility is low, it will never be zero, providing a tangible degree of deterrence that will make challengers hesitate. So long as both allies retain confidence in the overall U.S. defense commitment and the costs of going nuclear are sufficiently high, Japan and South Korea will continue their nonnuclear status.

## **Causes nuke war**

**Terry 16** [Sue Mi Terry, a managing director for Bower Group Asia, is a former senior North Korea analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency. An American Nuclear Umbrella Means a Lot to Northeast Asia. 2016. <https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/10/26/a-nuclear-arsenal-upgrade/an-american-nuclear-umbrella-means-a-lot-to-northeast-asia>]

North Korea is racing ahead with its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Publicly available estimates suggest that by 2020 it will have the ability to hit the continental United States with a nuclear missile; by that point it may have as many as 100 nuclear warheads. Even before then North Korea poses a growing danger to its neighbors, South Korea and Japan, which both have the technology to field their own nuclear weapons in relatively short order.

Why haven't South Korea and Japan gone ahead and nuclearized already? A big part of the explanation is the faith they have placed in the American nuclear umbrella. But that faith is starting to erode.

There are growing calls from South Korean lawmakers in the conservative, ruling Saenuri Party to develop nuclear weapons — an option that was endorsed by 54 percent of those surveyed by Gallup Korea in January 2016. What would happen if South Korea were to go nuclear? Japan would follow suit. And then we would be in the midst of a dangerous and destabilizing nuclear-arms race involving Japan, South Korea, North Korea and China, similar to the nuclear competition that already exists between India and Pakistan. The chances of a catastrophic conflict would greatly increase. That would not be in the interests of Northeast Asia or in the interests of America.

## Weighing

### **Impact outweighs:**

**It's faster – prolif takes 6 months.**

**Keck '14** [Zachary; Managing Editor of The Diplomat; 3/18/14; "Japan and China's Dispute Goes Nuclear"; <https://thediplomat.com/2014/03/japan-and-chinas-dispute-goes-nuclear/>; The Diplomat; accessed 8/27/20; TV]

Many experts believe that Japan could produce nuclear weapons within 6 months of deciding to do so, and some believe that Tokyo is pursuing a "nuclear hedging" strategy. Japan has done little to mollify these concerns. In fact, it has often encouraged them, with a Japanese official recently saying off the record that "Japan already has the technical capability [to build a nuclear bomb], and has had it since the 1980s."

**The attempt alone guarantees conflict.**

**Beauchamp, 16** (Zach, Trump's comments on Japanese nukes are worrisome — even by Trump standards, <http://www.vox.com/2016/3/31/11339040/trump-nukes-japan-south-korea>)

For example, if either country does decide to build nuclear weapons, it will take that country some time to develop its program, and to build enough of an arsenal to serve as a reliable deterrent. During this time, adversaries such as China or even North Korea would have an incentive to try to disrupt that development to maintain their nuclear superiority. "You have a Trump presidency ... and he decides to pull out troops from Japan and South Korea, you have Japan and South Korea potentially racing to develop nuclear weapons without the benefit of US troops being there," Miller says. "That provides a lot of incentive for countries in the region like China or North Korea to try to stop that process." As Bell puts it, ominously, "We're talking about the remote possibility of an actual nuclear war between Japan and China." That possibility, it is worth stressing, is indeed extremely remote. The risk is not that, for example, China would simply launch a nuclear war against Japan, which would be far too dangerous and costly to be worth it. Rather, the risk is that, for example, China might try to bully or threaten Japan out of developing nuclear weapons, and that in a period of tension, this bullying could potentially spiral out of control into a full-blown conflict neither side actually wanted. And there are other risks. According to scholars, successful nuclear deterrence results in something called the stability/instability paradox: The fact that major wars are unlikely makes countries feel safer in engaging in small provocations against one another, knowing that nuclear deterents make those small provocations unlikely to escalate to full-blown war. Consider, for instance, the South and East China Seas — areas where Japan, South Korea, and China have territorial disputes. If the former two powers are nuclear-armed, and unrestrained by the United States, the chances of low-level conflict could go up. "Certainly, we would be worried about these sort of lower-level, stability-instability paradox type things," Bell says. That's not an exhaustive list of things that could happen if Trump were elected and followed through on these policies. Since no one can really know what will happen, there's no sense in listing every single hypothetical possibility. These examples, rather, illustrate just how serious the ideas we're discussing are. It is very easy to detach ourselves from the potential consequences of a Trump presidency: to see his

candidacy as clownish, and simply assume that his outlandish policy ideas would never be implemented. But Trump is the leading Republican candidate; it is time to take his ideas seriously. And nothing is more serious than nuclear weapons.

## US -Japan alliance solves Asian escalation

**Meijer 19** (October 15, 2019, Hugo is a CNRS Research Fellow at Sciences Po, Center for International Studies, "Shaping China's rise: the reordering of US alliances and defence partnerships in East Asia, International Politics, Vol 57 Is 2)

Through the so-called Rebalance to Asia, the Obama administration aimed to readjust the thrust of US foreign policy, after a decade of conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, in light of the shifting centre of strategic and economic gravity of world politics towards Asia (Bader 2012; Campbell 2016; Meijer 2015). This policy consisted of four central components: bolstering of existing bilateral alliances; developing new partnerships with emerging regional players; fostering multilateral cooperative initiatives (such as trilaterals and quadrilaterals); and strengthening multilateral institutions in East Asia (Russel 2014a). Gradually, the interweaving of these different arrangements with US allies and partners—coupled with China's inclusion through a variety of cooperation pathways (detailed below)—led to the emergence of a networked security architecture.

First, the US sought to bolster the credibility of its five formal bilateral alliances in East Asia in order to reassure its regional allies of American resolve and to deter China from engaging in assertive behaviour and from probing the solidity of individual alliances (Russel 2015; Shear 2015). By doing so, ultimately, Washington also intended to uphold the rules-based order underpinned by these alliances. As explained by former Under Secretary of Defence for Policy, James Miller, strengthening US bilateral alliances provides “stronger warfighting capability [and] a stronger deterrent”, but “the primary, the higher level objective is one of strengthening political unity and reinforcing the idea that any adversary will not be able to stick a lever between the United States and its allies or between partners or among those allies and partners. [...] The highest order objective is the promotion and preservation of an international rules-based order” (interview, 5 April 2017).

As one of the flagship initiatives of US alliance management efforts, Washington signed with Tokyo the 2015 new guidelines for Japan-US defence cooperation that concurrently increased the US commitment to Japanese defence and assigned a greater regional security role to Japan (Japanese Ministry of Defence 2015; Satake 2016; see also Dian in this Special Issue). The US government also stepped up bilateral cooperation on ballistic missile defence with Japan, reaffirmed that the mutual defence alliance covered all territories under Japan’s administration, including Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, and expressed support for the 2014 reinterpretation of Article 9 of Japan's constitution which allowed Tokyo, under certain circumstances, to engage in “collective self-defence”—thereby expanding its potential contribution to the alliance in case of conflict (Liff 2015; Rinehart et al. 2015; The White House 2015a).<sup>7</sup> Similarly, the US sought to reinforce its alliance with the Republic of Korea (ROK) through both diplomatic and military means. Washington and Seoul issued the 2009 Joint Vision for the Alliance, followed in 2013 by

the Joint Declaration in commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the US–ROK alliance, pledging for the thickening of US–ROK defence ties (The White House 2009, 2013). Washington also reinforced the US military footprint on the Korean peninsula with the deployment of the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defence) missile defence system (Bong 2016). With Australia, it signed the Force Posture Initiative, providing for the deployment of a rotational force of 2500 marines at Darwin and increased air cooperation (Bisley in this Special Issue; Australian Department of Defence, 2018; Taylor 2016). In Southeast Asia, the administration sought to revive its alliances with the Philippines and Thailand (Quayle in this Special Issue). In 2014, it signed the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with Manilla, a ten-year agreement that provided US troops with greater access to military bases, bolstered the rotational presence of US personnel, ship, aircraft and equipment and expanded existing military facilities (Albert 2016; Lum and Dolven 2014; Misalucha and Amador 2016). In Thailand, domestic instability and the 2014 coup d'état constrained defence cooperation between Bangkok and Washington. The two countries signed the 2012 Joint Vision Statement for the Thai–US Defence Alliance, highlighting the importance of bilateral defence cooperation, albeit with little concrete progress (Chanlett-Avery et al. 2015; Pongsudhirak 2016).

## **US-Japan relations are key to avert a host of existential threats--climate change, ecological destruction, North Korea instability, space debris, open Internet, and South Asia coop.**

**Richard Armitage 16.** \*\*United States Deputy Secretary of State. \*\*John Hamre, president and CEO of CSIS. \*\*Ryozo Kato, Japanese lawyer and career diplomat who served as the Japanese Ambassador to the United States from 2001 to 2008. "The U.S.-Japan Alliance to 2030 Power and Principle." Report of the Commission on the Future of the Alliance. 2/29/2016.  
<https://www.spf.org/topics/finalreportfinal.pdf>

For the first time in nearly a quarter century, the world is witnessing multiple momentous challenges to the international order. China's emergence, Russia's resurgence, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's (ISIL's) barbarity are forcing the United States and Japan to address simultaneous, diverse threats to the international order within Asia, increasing prosperity and economic interdependence coincide with intensifying friction among the major powers. Changes in relative power, rapid expansion in the military budgets of some states, territorial disputes, historical animosities, irregular threats, and nuclear proliferation all present serious risks to regional security. Managing these challenges will require an understanding of how long-term trends, such as demographics, technology, and climate change, are likely to affect the strategic environment. Asia is the world's most dynamic region, so understanding current trends and potential future discontinuities is essential if the United States and Japan are to adopt an overall strategy that is capable of adapting effectively to rapid shifts in the security environment.

While regional trends in the Asia-Pacific region favor China's continued rise, the United States and Japan could themselves play a role in mitigating some of the challenges. The shrinking young-age population in Japan, South Korea, China, Taiwan, Singapore, and the over-reliance of economies such as Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, and Australia on exports to drive their own growth. Economic growth in these countries has been driven by a regional trade as well as global investment flows, underwritten by the World Bank and other regional institutions established at Bretton Woods and sustained since then with the active support of Japan and the United States. However, as the international economy has diversified, the original managers of global financial governance, such as the G-7, have lost ground to more inclusive but less effective groupings, such as the G-20. Moreover, progress on global trade liberalization at the World Trade Organization (WTO) has stalled. China is challenging the existing international financial institutions with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and its new "One Belt, One Road" initiatives. At the same time, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), led by the United States and Japan, has the potential to rebrand international trade liberalization and governance. Passage of TPP by Japan, the United States, and the ten other participating countries would boost economic growth in Asia by reducing barriers, establishing standard for ensuring protection of intellectual property in new areas such as e-commerce, empowering China's economic reformers as Beijing is drawn by preferential tariffs to join TPP, animating negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), and perhaps eventually helping to revitalize the pursuit of global free trade agreements through the WTO. Governance of global trade and finance is in flux, but the forces of liberalization and integration are still

present. Beyond these economic concerns the dangers of climate change and ecological degradation threaten the region. The ability of the major Asia-Pacific economies to cooperate in the face of all these transnational challenges will have important implications for the future strategic environment. While China and the United States are the world's leading emitters of greenhouse gases (in that order), Japan is the world's superpower in clean technology and energy efficiency.

There are encouraging signs of U.S. and Chinese initiatives to curb greenhouse gas emissions as well as the recent agreement at the 2015 Paris Climate Conference, but these promises remain aspirational and unenforceable, requiring further efforts at bilateral, regional, and global Cooperation to reduce carbon emissions.

China believes that China's prosperity is at the core concern in reshaping the environment of the Asia-Pacific region up to 2050. Given the variety and complexity of the factors involved, it is impossible to predict a single outcome for China. To the contrary, the range of possible alternative futures for that country is exceptionally broad. That said, the main overarching drivers of China's development will likely be internal—reforming the economy, the polity, the state, and society, and the succession, reforms, and unanticipated effects of government policies. Regardless of China's economic trajectory, its investments in military capabilities will expand, and its assertiveness and expansive claims to territory are unlikely to abate and could intensify. The Central Bank's baseline projection over the next 15 years is that China will continue to grow more powerful and influential more rapidly than the United States, and that the gap between the two countries' economic output will widen. This projection is based on the assumption that China's economic growth will continue at a rate of 6 percent per year, and that its domestic consumption and enhanced production will encourage significant industrialization. Growth will continue, albeit less steadily and at a significantly lower rate in the medium decades. China is unlikely to overtake the United States as the largest economy in the world by 2050. While China could increase its share of GDP allocated to defense, Beijing may also choose to follow the example of other major powers and reduce its defense budget. This would mean reductions from the annual double-digit increases in defense spending of the past two decades. As reforms announced in November 2015 indicate, China's leadership is seeking to continue the transformation of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) into a technologically advanced, professionally advanced, and fighting military.

China will continue to press its

bring to bear in East Asia through 2050. However, the PLA's growing anti-access and area denial capabilities will pose an increasing threat to U.S. and Japanese bases and to their forces operating inside the First and Second Island Chains. China's military advantages or other neighboring countries, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, will also continue to grow.

claims to Taiwan, in the East and South China Seas, and over disputed territory with India, and it will use both paramilitary and coercive military tactics to do so. There will also be further attempts by Beijing to weaken U.S. alliances and construct an Asia-Pacific economic and security order that marginalizes

United States, as suggested by Jing in 2014, China will continue to extend its influence to mobilize domestic political capital for coercive purposes, but it is unlikely to take deliberate actions intended to trigger an armed conflict with its neighbors. At the same time, China will increase its military and diplomatic activities in the region to reinforce its influence over the United States, particularly in dealing with other global problems, and it will continue to develop Chinese-led alternatives to Western models of economic, diplomatic, and military organizations, particularly within Asia. As Xi Jinping's signature "One Belt, One Road" initiative will result in increased investments in infrastructure, agriculture, and natural resources throughout Central, South, and Southeast Asia, these activities could lead to expanded political influence, but they also may result in friction between China and some of its neighbors, including India and Russia, and could increasingly reshape the behavior of the Pacific island states. As other natural resources become more scarce, China will continue to compete for them, particularly in Southeast Asia, where its influence is increasing, ranging from higher growth trajectories based on economic restructuring, to political instability, militarization, or even economic or political collapse. However, it provides the most useful scenarios to plan against as it highlights both the downside risks of China's increasing influence in Asia and the upside possibilities for expanded cooperation.

with China on global challenges and to some extent within Asia. With the uncertainties in China's future, the United States and Japan must develop a sufficiently resilient strategy.

to handle a wide range of potential developments on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea will continue to be a critical security concern as the situation on the Korean Peninsula remains unstable and uncertain.

**Korea represents a dangerous threat to both Japan and the United States, particularly now that it appears to have developed nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. Further improvements in warhead and missile design** (including the development of miniaturized thermonuclear devices capable of delivery by intercontinental

ballistic missiles) will enhance Pyongyang's ability to threaten an increasingly wide range of countries, including the United States. It is highly probable that North Korea will continue a pattern of intermittent provocative military actions to justify its grip on power.

internally, and it is extremely unlikely that the regime will give up its nuclear weapons as it regards them as a guarantee against attack by the United States and South Korea. Despite disapproval of North Korea's adventurism and its growing nuclear arsenal, China is unlikely to alter its current policy of providing Pyongyang economic assistance and a measure of diplomatic support. Beijing still prefers the status quo on the peninsula, and only more extreme North Korean provocations might change that calculation. As in the past, the North Korean regime may experiment with some limited market elements in its economy, but there

is no doubt that the regime will retain tight political control over the population through brutal and effective security measures. Changes to this dismal projection could come from unexpected events. A

**faction** within the power elite in North Korea upset with Kim's leadership and the impoverishment of the country **could stage a coup**. China might use its leverage more actively to

push North Korea towards a larger private sector, potentially providing incentives for more moderate behavior by the regime. Finally, although he is in his mid-30s, Kim Jong-un could die or be setting off a succession struggle with unpredictable consequences. Sudden regime instability

killed, setting off a succession struggle with unpredictable consequences. Sudden regime instability or collapse could lead to dangerously chaotic situations inside North Korea that would require close U.S.-

**Japan-Republic of Korea (ROK) cooperation**, as well as dialogue with China and Russia to avoid potentially dangerous reinforcements. In the meantime, Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul should agree and define the mutual dependency of L.ROK and US-Japan alliance. Japan relies on Korea to protect its western flank while the ROK depends on Japan for indispensable rear area support on the Korean peninsula.

Russia, once the **raison d'être** for the U.S.-Japan Alliance, has assumed a second-tier role in the strategic outcome of this process, based both geopolitical interests and democratic values in Asia and Russia.

**is more capable and active in Asia than it has been at any time since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.** Moscow is

since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. While Russia appears to be working with China to counter the U.S.-led alliance system, MOSCOW IS also quietly bolstering its regional military forces, as well as putting more investment into its Far Eastern

**federal regions** In hopes of enhancing its geopolitical position and preserving its autonomy with respect to China. Russia's activities in Ukraine have resulted in an international sanctions regime and damage to Russian relations with all democracies — particularly the United States, but also Japan. In the immediate future Japanese and U.S. interests regarding Russia will not perfectly coincide. Japan's need for energy diversity will lead it to consider increasing imports of Russian natural gas, and many in Japan will continue to seek a resolution of the Northern Territories issue with Russia. That said, beyond the current crisis with Putin over Ukraine and through the longer term, the United States and Japan share a geopolitical interest in cooperating with Russia in ways that inhibit the possible emergence of a Sino-Russian bloc. Although President Putin's military buildup and aggressive actions currently enjoy wide popularity within Russia, it is unlikely that he and his successors will be able to sustain them through 2030. Russia faces

dealing with environmental and demographic problems, and its aggressive actions in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific have awakened dominant fears of its international intentions. Putin seems unique among recent Russian leaders in his willingness to take unpredictable risks in foreign policy. His primary external focus is competition with the United States over influence in Eurasia, and he has been successful in this regard. The Arctic is a key element in this strategy. Russia's increasing influence in the Arctic is a cause for concern, particularly given the region's strategic importance as a major shipping route and its potential commercial opportunities. The melting sea ice and partially navigable northern passages could create new shipping routes between Europe, North America, and Asia. Such navigational changes could raise concerns regarding security in several littoral states and lead to disputes regarding who owns areas constituting international waters and what rights to passage associated with such waters according to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Moreover, the combination of melting ice and rapid development in transportation and energy infrastructure in the Arctic could lead to increased competition for resources and influence in the region. This is particularly true in the case of the part of the Arctic that includes Alaska, the Yukon, and the Northwest Territories of Canada, and the northern territories of the United States, including the regions of the tropic and Hudson Bay. With Japan joining four other Asian states, including China, as observers to the Arctic Council, there is an increasing focus among Asian states on engaging the existing core Arctic states on a range of regional

Issues Australia, India, and Europe Japan and the United States work closely with a number of important allies and partners outside Northeast Asia. **Tokyo and Washington have together been transforming the Alliance into a hub for regional and global cooperation by networking these**

**transforming the Alliance into a hub for regional and global cooperation by networking these relationships**

alliances to manage alone. Foremost among these relationships are ties to other major democratic countries that share support for international rules, norms, and values. Efforts to increase security cooperation with Australia,

**India**, and key European states have been central to Alliance strategy in recent years. Australia is already an

extremely closely of the United States and is now expanding security cooperation with Japan in a variety of areas, **including** possible **submarine development**, based on the historic Japan-Australia Security Agreement concluded in 2007. While its security interests and core values are fundamentally aligned with the United States and Japan, Australia has relatively higher dependence on the Chinese market for exports of natural resources. That could change, however, as exports of Australian liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Japan outpace commodity exports to a slowing Chinese economy. Overall, the relationship between Australia and Japan is likely to remain strong, but will depend on the outcome of the U.S.-China competition.

trend will be towards closer U.S.-Japan-Australia strategic alignment and security cooperation over the next 15 years. India's economic growth is impressive, and could substantially improve with better governance and economic reform. India shares a democratic political system with the United States and Japan, but its international ambitions and diplomatic capacities are likely to remain limited for the foreseeable future. Both Japan and the United States are increasing security and economic cooperation with India.

complemented by enhanced trilateral strategic dialogue and joint military exercises, such as the annual Malabar exercise hosted by India. India's non-aligned tradition will likely prevent mutual security commitments, but opportunities for security cooperation have expanded and are likely to continue to do so over the coming years. **Europe has an important role to play**

in Asia's security landscape and should ideally be coordinating more with the United States and Japan in **forging a common approach to "grey zone" challenges**, whether they are in Eastern Europe or the East China Sea. However, many European capitals view Asia through the lens of economic cooperation with China and show little inclination to

whether they are in East Europe or the East China Sea. However, many European capitals view Asia through the lens of economic cooperation with China and show little inclination to oppose Beijing's territorial ambitions, aggressive mercantile behavior, or repression of dissent. China, meanwhile, finds it increasingly easy to divide Europe and put pressure on individual member states. The United Kingdom's surprise announcement that it would join the AIIB in 2015 provides an example of how important it is for the United States and Japan to convince European allies that they too have a stake in the security order in Asia. At the same time, Japan's new security cooperation agreements with the United Kingdom and France point to the potential for greater alignment between the Atlantic and Pacific allies

challenges facing the Asia-Pacific region. **Terrorism** The threat from violent extremist Islamic organizations shows no sign of diminishing over the next 15 years. Operations in the Middle East, some of these organizations have spread through North Africa, South Asia, and into Southeast

**Asia** These organizations draw sympathizers, often inspired by global social media, from among minority populations in developed countries in Europe, North America, and Asia. These organizations change

**they plan and inspire terrorist attacks in countries with both Islamic and secular governments around the world.**

Although the actual number of victims of terrorist attacks is relatively small, the random nature of these attacks and the intense media coverage substantially impact policies in developed countries. Most governments in the world oppose these groups, but have varying degrees of capacity to confront them, and cooperation is hampered by suspicion and policy differences in other areas. Reducing this threat will depend on a combination of military and law enforcement measures against the radical elements, improvement of governance and economic progress in countries in which social conditions give rise to support for these radical organizations, and developments within Islamic communities that further discredit terrorism as a legitimate action. Cyber the cyber domain will become increasingly important through 2030 as the Internet continues to grow and take on more important functions. The "Internet of things" and Internet Protocol Version 6 will dramatically increase the size of the Internet. Nationally sponsored cyber attacks on public and private companies in other countries have occurred, and it will be a major challenge to agree on limiting these attacks short of war. Cyber espionage is also growing rapidly, and there are differences among major countries in their choice of targets and techniques. It is a short step from cyber espionage to cyber attacks, and the lack of international understanding and agreement is potentially dangerous. The North Korean and Russian regimes both appear to have used the Internet to strike at targets in foreign countries, including the United States. The United States, Japan, and other advanced industrial countries have lost hundreds of billions of dollars in intellectual property to commercial cyber espionage, in many cases aided and abetted by authoritarian regimes. Cybercrime is another widespread and complex issue that should bring the major nations together in a common cause, at least for activities that they all consider to be criminal. A final unresolved international

cyber issue is the degree of control over the Internet. China, Russia, and other authoritarian countries insist that their sovereignty extends beyond network facilities on their territory, while **the United States and Japan favor an open Internet driven by private sector cooperative efforts.** Despite the growing dependence of all countries on a functioning Internet, the major powers have not agreed formally or informally on principles to outlaw, prevent, or deter major cyber war—large-scale government-sponsored attacks on the power grids, transportation systems, or other critical infrastructure of another country. The link between cyber space and outer space also merits further attention. Additionally, major states have failed to establish and uphold rules and norms for economic espionage in cyber space. In both the United States and Japan, government organizations and responsibilities for protecting government networks are relatively recent and in the developmental stage. A legal and effective relationship between government and the private sector—inventor and operator of most of the important networks—has not yet been firmly established in either country. Moreover, both countries face a significant shortage of skilled cybersecurity professionals. The Commission calls special attention to the vulnerabilities that might be introduced into Japan's electric grid and power generation system as it plans for fundamental restructuring of the ownership and operating structures of this critical network. Electric power generation and distribution networks are truly fundamental critical infrastructure. Every other infrastructure system (for example, rail transportation, fuel pumps for gasoline refueling stations, signal systems for road and rail networks, etc.) ultimately depends on reliable electric power supplies. The critical nodes of a nation's electrical system (transformers, switching stations,

generation plants, etc.) are controlled by computers. Cyber disruption of those computers could damage or destroy essential components of a national power network. Space **The space domain will also be increasingly important to Japan and the United States** through 2030, **for both economic prosperity and national security.** In 2014, China and Russia between them conducted almost twice as many space launches as the United States and Japan combined. **As space has become more crowded, it has also become more contested.** China's **anti-satellite test** in 2007 made clear the risks that kinetic weapons pose to civilian and military satellites. That **test produced more than 2,600 pieces of large debris** (greater than 10 centimeters) and at least 150,000 pieces of small debris (greater than 1 centimeter), the vast majority of which are in orbits **projected to last a decade or longer.** Other threats to satellites, such as jamming, high-powered microwaves, and laser blinding, can threaten satellites in a wider range of orbits. **The threat to satellites in orbit is growing.** The 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits nuclear weapons in space and contains a general exhortation against other hostile space activities, but has had little effect on the development of anti-satellite weapons. By 2030, **China will become as dependent on satellites for both military and commercial purposes as the United States, Japan, and other advanced countries.** Therefore, **it may be possible to reach understandings, if not treaties, concerning the regulation of hostile activities in space.**

## Japan O/V

### **Low threshold – even just *moving towards a nuke* risks arms race and war**

Emma Chanlett-Avery 9, CRS Asian affairs specialist, "Japan's Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests," Congressional Research Service, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf>

**Any reconsideration of Japan's policy of nuclear weapons abstention would have significant implications for U.S. policy in East Asia. Globally, Japan's withdrawal from the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) could damage the most durable international non-proliferation regime. Regionally, Japan "going nuclear" could set off a nuclear arms race with China, South Korea, and Taiwan and, in turn, India, and Pakistan may feel compelled to further strengthen their own nuclear weapons capability.**

Bilaterally, assuming that Japan made the decision without U.S. support, **the move could indicate Tokyo's lack of trust in the American commitment to defend Japan. An erosion in the U.S.-Japan alliance could upset the geopolitical balance in East Asia, a shift that could indicate a further strengthening of China's position** as an emerging hegemonic power. **These ramifications would likely be deeply destabilizing** for the security of the Asia Pacific region and beyond

## Japan Link

### **NFU decks the Japanese alliance — causes proliferation**

**Payne 16** — Keith Payne, Professor of Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, B.A. in political science from the University of California at Berkeley, Ph.D. in international relations from the University of Southern California, 2016. (“Once Again: Why a “No-First-Use” Policy is a Bad, Very Bad Idea”, *RealClearDefense*, July 5<sup>th</sup>, 2016, Available Online at: [https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/07/06/once\\_again\\_why\\_a\\_no-first-use\\_policy\\_is\\_a\\_bad\\_very\\_bad\\_idea\\_109520.html](https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/07/06/once_again_why_a_no-first-use_policy_is_a_bad_very_bad_idea_109520.html) Accessed 8-8-2018)

In addition, the Obama Administration declares nuclear nonproliferation to be its highest nuclear policy goal.[5] Yet, US adoption of an NFU policy would mean that the United States could no longer assure allies with its nuclear umbrella. No longer would their foes confront the deterring risk of US nuclear retaliation should those foes consider a devastating conventional, chemical or biological attack on US allies and partners. Pulling down the US nuclear umbrella so precipitously would compel some allies and partners who have foregone nuclear weapons in the past, on the basis of the promised US nuclear deterrence umbrella, to consider acquiring their own nuclear weapons. This could include South Korea and Japan. As such, additional nuclear proliferation is virtually an inevitable consequence of a US NFU policy.

### **NFU causes shreds the alliance and causes Japanese proliferation**

**White 16** — Hugh White, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University, former Intelligence Analyst with Australia’s Office of National Assessments and Senior Official with Australia’s Department of Defence, 2016. (A second strike on nuclear ‘no first use’”, East Asia Forum, September 6<sup>th</sup>, 2016, Available Online at: <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/09/06/a-second-strike-on-nuclear-no-first-use/> Accessed 8-26-2018)

A ‘first use’ option by the United States may be illusory, but it is still taken very seriously by US allies like Poland and Japan that confront large and threatening neighbours like Russia and China. They believe that the United States’ threat to cross the nuclear threshold to defeat an overwhelming conventional attack on its allies is vital to their security, just as it was during the Cold War.

They cling to the illusion that the United States is still willing to accept the huge risks and costs involved in starting a nuclear war, because its commitment to its allies is as strong as ever. No one in Washington has so far been prepared to disabuse them of this, but a NFU declaration would smash this illusion and leave them feeling much more exposed. That would have unsettling consequences as they looked for other ways to ensure their security.

Supporters of a NFU declaration like Gareth Evans, Ramesh Thakur and others dismiss this concern. They say that a NFU declaration will have no effect on the credibility of US alliance commitments, because the United States’ conventional forces are now so preponderant that they can deter or defeat any adversary without resorting to nuclear weapons. But all the evidence points the other way.

Certainly, the United States spends more on its conventional forces than any other country and it has an unmatched capacity to deploy those forces globally. But that doesn't mean it can outmatch rival powers on their home turf. On the contrary, as key recent studies have shown, the United States would quickly be overpowered by Russian conventional forces in the Baltic States and would face a costly and escalating stalemate against China in a maritime war in Asia.

Optimists in the United States hope new technological breakthroughs, packaged as the 'third offset strategy', will swiftly restore US conventional military preponderance, but that is so far just a three-word slogan and a pious hope. It is much more likely that the conventional military balance in their respective theatres will keep shifting Russia's and China's way.

US allies like Japan understand this reality all too well. If a NFU declaration smashes the illusion that the United States would be willing to use nuclear forces to defend them from conventional attack, their confidence in the alliance will plummet — then they will start looking for alternatives. For Japan, at least, that could mean building nuclear weapons of its own. Or it could push Japan in the other direction, towards passive acceptance of China's regional primacy. Either would be very unsettling.

## Impact – East Asian Prolif

### **Fast nuclear war and global arms races – outweighs other conflicts**

Tanter 17 [Richard Tanter, Senior Research Associate, Nautilus Institute, Honorary Professor in the School of Political and Social Sciences at the University of Melbourne. “Donald Trump’s Japanese and South Korean Nuclear Threat to China: A tipping point in East Asia?” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 15, Issue 7, No. 2, 4/1, <https://apjjf.org/-Richard-Tanter/5025/article.pdf>]

But in the longer run, apart from the direct risks of such an event for the U.S. itself, its East Asian alliance network, now in its seventh decade, founded on Japanese and Korean acceptance of U.S. nuclear primacy and a U.S. nuclear umbrella, would change dramatically, bringing with it, for better or worse, the end of U.S. hegemony in East and Southeast Asia (<http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/playing-the-japan-nuclear-card-did-the-us-secretary-of-state-reverse-five-decades-of-us-non-proliferation-policy/>). Whether occurring on a Gaullist or British model, the foundations of Korean and Japanese relations with the United States would be irrevocably altered. Even leaving aside the obvious questions about the DPRK, in the event of a nuclearized Japan and South Korea, clearly the mathematical risks of nuclear war initiated in East Asia would be very much greater than even the current risks of India-Pakistan nuclear conflict. Regional nuclear security planning would be woven with multiple valences of possible perceived nuclear threats. The calculus of China-U.S. nuclear relations immediately becomes much more complex, with China facing two new potential threats, nominally at least coordinating with the U.S., in addition to the older concerns about India and Russia. For the United States, a nuclear-armed, fully ‘normalized’ Japan would never be the undoubtedly loyal lapdog of by then likely postUnited Kingdom Little England. And the calculations of a nuclear-armed South Korea and Japan about each other would start and finish in historically-conditioned suspicion.

At a global level, the U.S. opening the door to Japanese and Korean nuclear weapons could not fail to encourage a cascade of regional races to nuclear weapons, not only in the Western Pacific but in the Middle East, in Latin America, and quite possibly in Africa. The risks of regional nuclear war, with all its now thoroughly documented (<http://www.psr.org/assets/pdfs/two-billion-at-risk.pdf>) catastrophic environmental and climate consequences (<http://www.readcube.com/articles/10.1002/2013EF000205>), would be both manifold and far higher than at present.

### **Causes preemptive attacks and nuke terror – extinction**

Kleiner 16 [Sam Kleiner, Postdoctoral fellow at Yale Law School, “With His Finger on the Trigger,” <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/06/donald-trump-nuclear-weapons/485504/>]

A new nuclear-arms race, moreover, could be even riskier than the one Reagan and others worked so hard to end. In retrospect, the Cold War standoff between two massive, nuclear-armed superpowers offered some stability; among other things, the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union could destroy each other, or any other challenger, in a nuclear confrontation ended up preventing either side from using nuclear weapons. Global alliances were structured in a bipolar system, with smaller powers picking one side or the other, which

meant fewer possible avenues for conflict. But that world came to an end when the Cold War finished. We now live in a multipolar world that is, in many ways, a more dangerous one. Former Secretaries of State Kissinger and George Shultz, former Secretary of Defense William Perry, and Senator Sam Nunn warned in 2011 that “the growing number of nations with nuclear arms and differing motives, aims and ambitions poses very high and unpredictable risks and increased instability.” One particularly risky and region right now is East Asia, where competing territorial claims and an unpredictable North Korea threaten to flare into conflict. If Japan, which is revising its pacifist post-World War II foreign policy toward a more assertive one, or South Korea, where there is broad popular support for weaponization, go nuclear, the chances grow for a regional arms race—and for nuclear war. One possibility, as Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies noted: “North Korea might be tempted to launch a preemptive attack at a time when the U.S. defense commitment [to South Korea] might no longer apply.” But even “short of this worst-case scenario, rather than negotiate disarmament, North Korea more likely would claim the South’s actions as a justification for stepping up its own nuclear program.” These are by no means the only risks. There is, for example, the risk of an accidental firing or a rogue officer deciding that he or she wants to launch a nuclear weapon. There is the risk of “loose nukes” falling into the wrong hands, and the risk that individual scientists will be willing to transfer nuclear technology to the highest bidder, as Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan did in selling nuclear technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. When the nuclear bomb was first being developed, Secretary of War Henry Stimson offered a poignant warning about how devastating the weapon would be. He told President Henry Truman that “such a weapon may be constructed in secret and used suddenly and effectively with devastating power by a willful nation or group against an unsuspecting nation or group of much greater size and material power.” Today, America’s “greater size and material power” can’t necessarily stop a nuclear strike, particularly if the materials fall into the hands of terrorists.

## AT: US-Japan Ties Bad Now

**US-Japanese ties remain strong.**

**Hammond '8/19** [Andrew; Associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics, former special advisor for the U.K. government; 8/19/20; "75 years on, Japan embeds into Western alliances"; [https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/opinion/2020/08/197\\_294550.html](https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/opinion/2020/08/197_294550.html); Korea Times; accessed 9/5/20; TV]

Saturday marked the 75th anniversary of Victory over Japan (V-J Day) that brought closure to World War II. While Japan was a major U.S. foe then, **today Tokyo's role in the Western alliance is of significant, and growing, strategic importance.**

**Not only is Japan a longstanding member of** Western clubs such as **the G7**, there is also growing policy speculation that **the country could be invited to join the** so-called "**5 Eyes**" **intelligence alliance** which currently comprises Canada, the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand.

**A key part of** the rationale for **Japan's growing geopolitical importance** is that, just like the start of the Cold War, **it is perceived in the West as a key bulwark against the advance of China and potentially Russia into Asia-Pacific**. yet, while much emphasis is put on the security pillar of the Japanese-Western alliance, **economics is important too.**

Since the end of World War II, the gradual transformation of Japan's world role stemmed, in part, from its phenomenal post-war business success which led to growing calls for it to match its economic power with commitment to international political relations too. Today, **it remains one of the world's largest three economies, and it will be critical to helping rejuvenate global economic growth after** the shock of **the coronavirus** crisis.

Many other **Western countries**, including in Europe, particularly **welcome Japan's invigorated commitment to international trade**. **Not only did Tokyo sign last year a bilateral agreement with Washington, it has committed recently to an EU-Japan trade agreement covering around a third of global GDP** and almost 650 million people. Moreover, **Tokyo was at the vanguard of the so-called Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership** last year with 11 nations from Asia-Pacific and the Americas which account for around 13 percent of global trade and a combined population of around 500 million.

**One of the reasons Europe particularly appreciates Japan's defense of international trade**, and indeed a wider "rules-based world order," **is the Trump administration's equivocation** on these issues. The G20 summit **in Tokyo last year saw trade being given key focus**, despite the fact that this issue caused much contention between Trump and other world leaders at previous G20 meetings, including in Germany in 2018 which saw a clash between Chancellor Angela Merkel and the president with the latter pushing for protectionist language to be inserted into the end-of-summit communique.

Beyond these structural factors driving Japan's international policy, Shinzo **Abe** — now the longest serving prime minister in the nation's history — **has proven personally very adept at consolidating relationships with Western leaders**. This **includes Trump** who during the 2016 election campaign was critical of Tokyo.

**Abe** spotted this danger and **became the first foreign leader to meet Trump after his shock victory four years ago**. Since then, **Abe appears to have forged a significant personal bond with him to fortify U.S.-Japan ties** in the face of significant international uncertainty.

Abe has been one of the few foreign leaders, for instance, to agree on a trade deal with Trump. This has helped neutralize the president's previous criticism of what he characterized as Japan's unfair trade practices involving car imports and exports; and his accusations that Tokyo was using monetary policy to devalue its currency to boost exports.

Moreover, Trump has repeatedly highlighted the strong U.S. commitment to the security of Japan and said that the relationship is the "cornerstone of peace" in Asia-Pacific. This comes despite his "America First" philosophy, and his 2016 assertions that the bilateral relationship had become too one-sided and Japan needed to undertake more financial burden-sharing in international security.

This deepening of U.S.-Japanese ties reflects bilateral concerns about a range of issues, including North Korea. Yet, the major driver in increasing close U.S.-Japan ties is China.

In this fluid geopolitical landscape, Abe has sought to align his long-standing foreign policy plans around that of Trump's agenda and he has significantly increased defense spending. Building from last year's U.S.-Japan trade deal, in a context whereby the president appears to want a more internationally assertive Tokyo, the prime minister would now like to overturn much of the remaining legal and political underpinning of the country's post-1945 pacifist security identity so that it can become more externally engaged.

Specifically, they just re-affirmed alliance commitments over the China Seas.

Mitra '8/30 [Sounak; reporter, citing official statements from the Department of Defense; 8/30/20; "US, Japan Reiterate South China Sea Commitments Amid Growing Chinese Presence"; <https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/us-news/us-japan-reiterate-south-china-sea-commitments-amid-growing-chinese-p.html>; Republic World; accessed 9/5/20; TV]

US Defence Secretary Mark Esper and Japanese Defence Minister Taro Kono reiterated their commitment to maintaining a 'rules-based order' in the East and South China Seas on Saturday, August 29.

An official statement from the US Department of Defence stated that Esper hosted Kono in Guam where both the leaders acknowledged the strength of the US-Japan alliance and held high-level talks to boost and expand bilateral defence cooperation.

'Rules-based order'

As per ANI, the statement said, "Secretary Esper and Minister Kono exchanged views on their shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific region. The Secretary expressed serious concern regarding Beijing's decision to impose a national security law in Hong Kong, as well as coercive and destabilising actions vis-a-vis Taiwan".

It further added, "Both ministers restated their commitment to maintain a rules-based order in the East and South China Seas, and more broadly in the region and world. The Secretary welcomed Japan's efforts to strengthen cooperation with other like-minded partners, including members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), India, Australia and trilaterally with the United States and the Republic of Korea".

The move comes as China increases its military presence in the South China Sea region. Moreover, China also has launched two sets of military drills off the country's east coast in a bid to display its power while countering the rising US military presence in the region. According to the South China Morning Post, the first exercise started in the Yellow Sea on Saturday, August 29, and will continue until Thursday while another drill began on Friday in the Bohai Sea and will last a week.

### Troops are merely symbolic of the defense pact.

**Lanoszka '18** [Alexander; Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Waterloo, PhD from Princeton University; 2018; "Conclusion"; *Atomic Assurance: The Alliance Politics of Nuclear Proliferation*; pp. 156-57; TV]

Yet there are upsides. One is that the United States can deter nuclear weapons interest among its allies. Given how vital strong security guarantees are toward this end, American decision makers thankfully have a say. More specifically, they can recalibrate doctrines and deployments so as to shape perceptions of credibility. Ally leaders appear to refer to these metrics in their own nuclear decision-making. We should thus remember that it is of the utmost importance that American defense planners take the time to think about the effects of their moves from more than just a budgetary or rational perspective. Having Marines in Okinawa might make little tactical or operational sense, but shifting them thousands of miles away could still be destabilizing. Symbols matter, and they may matter more from the perspective of allies than from the perspective of Washington.<sup>30</sup> Nevertheless, the symbolic nature of such deployments should not be overstated. Allies value them because they believe such forces can put up a fight against an adversary should deterrence fail. In a world of anti-access and area denial (A2/ AD) military technology, a United States that practices offshore balancing might experience overwhelming difficulties in entering a theater of operations so as to aid an ally under siege. An onshore presence makes the United States look more capable and resolved to allies and adversaries alike.<sup>31</sup> That said, withdrawing forces unilaterally might be counterproductive when it comes to having an ally bear a greater share of the collective defense burden. If the ally feels threatened by a nuclear-armed aggressor, then it might arm itself in ways that are to the detriment of the guarantor's own interests.

## AT: Public Won't Support Prolif

**Security shifts drastically change public support for nukes.**

**Newman '19** [Sean A; Lieutenant in the United State Navy, MA in Security Studies from the Naval Postgraduate School; September 2019; "Japan and the Bomb: Perspectives from South Asia"; [https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/63489/19Sep\\_Newman\\_Sean.pdf](https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/63489/19Sep_Newman_Sean.pdf); NPS Theses and Dissertations; accessed 8/25/20; TV]

Despite Japan's model support for the international non-proliferation regime, the historical evidence suggests Japan is not singularly guided by the trauma of being an atomic victim. First, the Japanese public and policymakers are sensitive to security concerns. Support for nuclear weapons actually increases during periods of insecurity. Second, Japan adopted non-nuclear agreements only after national security concerns were addressed and within the context of political maneuvering. Rather than enthusiastically joining the nonproliferation regime, Japan cautiously weighed its options and ensured its security requirements were met. Only then did Japan enthusiastically adopt its role as a model nonproliferator.

The Japanese public has historically maintained a low level of public support for nuclear weapons.<sup>88</sup> However, the polling data suggests they nonetheless remain sensitive to security concerns. Nearly a decade following Hiroshima but prior to China's first nuclear test in 1964, public support for nuclear weapons was weak with only a quarter of Japanese supporting nuclear acquisition.<sup>89</sup> However, as security concerns increased following China's nuclear test, the Japanese public and its policymakers in particular had begun to envision the possibility of Japan becoming a nuclear armed state. By the end of the 1960s, "77 percent (of Japanese) predicted that Japan would have nuclear weapons by 2000."<sup>90</sup> A 1972 poll found that "only 45 percent of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) members thought Japan should absolutely not arm itself."<sup>91</sup> While numbers against nuclear weapons were significantly higher among other political parties including the Socialist and Communists, polls suggest opposition to nuclear weapons was neither universal nor absolute. In fact, one scholar has suggested that in the aftermath of China's nuclear test Japan felt a tangible sense of "growing 'nationalist pragmatism'" that had overcome 'moral disgust' and increased the numbers of nuclear weapons advocates."<sup>92</sup> Another scholar, writing in the 1970s "estimated that a popular majority might have supported an LDP initiative for nuclear armament in the 1960s in the aftermath of China's nuclear test."<sup>93</sup> As SinoJapanese relations improved through the '70s and '80s, the U.S.-Japanese relationship matured, and non-nuclear institutions further shaped Japanese identity, consequently, support for nuclear weapons fell again. By 2014, fully 80 percent of the Japanese public were reportedly opposed to Japan becoming a nuclear weapons state.<sup>94</sup> Today, Japan is firmly opposed to nuclear weapons; however, the evidence suggests these views are not fixed and sensitive to security conditions.

## AT: Conventional Solves

### **Allies don't think conventional solves – that's all that matters**

Miller and Payne 16 [principal of The Scowcroft Group AND president and co-founder of the National Institute for Public Policy, professor and department head at the Graduate School of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, and chair of the US Strategic Command Senior Advisory Group, Strategy and Policy Panel (Franklin and Keith, "The dangers of no-first-use," <http://thebulletin.org/dangers-no-first-use9790>)]

US adoption of no-first-use would also severely shake allied confidence in our security guarantees to them. In fact, US allies Japan, South Korea, Great Britain, and France reportedly have recently informed the Obama administration that a no-first-use policy would be detrimental to their security. The vast majority of our treaty allies depend, at least in part, on a credible US nuclear deterrence "umbrella" for their security. US adoption of a no-first-use policy would compel some to take steps to mitigate the degradation of the US nuclear deterrent which has heretofore protected them. One such avenue would be the possible acquisition or creation of their own independent nuclear weapons. There already appears to be considerable popular support today for the development of nuclear weapons in South Korea; US adoption of no-first-use would only increase that motivation. A policy of no-first-use now would likely increase the prospect for new nuclear powers in Asia and Europe, which would severely undercut the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and be extremely destabilizing, given the likely severe Chinese and Russian responses.

In short, based on evidence from the past seven decades, the US nuclear deterrent helps deter war and preserve global stability by compelling potential aggressors to consider the possibility of a US nuclear response in any of their prospective plans to attack us or our allies. It also provides enormous support for nuclear non-proliferation by helping to assure over 30 US allies of their security. US adoption of a no-first-use policy would threaten to degrade this critical deterrence of enemies and assurance of allies.

### **Even if conventional assurance solves, nukes are key to political signaling of commitment**

Roehrig 17 [Terence Roehrig, Ph.D., Professor of National Security Affairs and the Director of the Asia-Pacific Studies Group. He has been a Research Fellow at the Kennedy School at Harvard University in the International Security Program and the Project on Managing the Atom and a past President of the Association of Korean Political Studies. He has published numerous books, articles and book chapters on Korean and East Asian security issues, North Korea's nuclear weapons program, the U.S.-South Korea alliance, human rights, and transitional justice. Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence After the Cold War. 2017. Chapter 6. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/roeh15798>]

### **CONCLUSION**

Though some people have questioned its existence, the nuclear umbrella is real. The United States has a sizable nuclear force with sufficient options and firepower to defend Japan and South Korea with nuclear weapons. Consequently, the capability portion of the nuclear umbrella

is very credible. Resolve remains the part of credibility that is problematic, as it was throughout the Cold War and will likely be in the future. The U.S. commitment to defend Japan and South Korea is highly credible; there is little doubt that the United States would be there to defend these two valued allies. However, the U.S. response would almost certainly be with conventional weapons. Given the power and precision of U.S. conventional weapons, their use can have strategic effects similar to nuclear weapons, and threats to use them are far more credible. As argued in this chapter, U.S. use of nuclear weapons, even in response to a nuclear attack, is not in anyone's interest. Using nuclear weapons in defense of Japan and South Korea is unlikely and unwise for a number of strategic, operational, and moral reasons. Yet the nuclear umbrella continues to have an important political impact in reassuring allies and supporting U.S. nonproliferation goals and is likely to remain in place.

## AT: Rearm Now

**The only way they'd rearm would be a reduction in US commitments – prefer statements of leaders instead of the general public**

Roehrig 17 [Terence Roehrig, Ph.D., Professor of National Security Affairs and the Director of the Asia-Pacific Studies Group. He has been a Research Fellow at the Kennedy School at Harvard University in the International Security Program and the Project on Managing the Atom and a past President of the Association of Korean Political Studies. He has published numerous books, articles and book chapters on Korean and East Asian security issues, North Korea's nuclear weapons program, the U.S.-South Korea alliance, human rights, and transitional justice. Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence After the Cold War. 2017. Chapter 4. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/roeh15798>]

During the Cold War, Japan conducted several assessments regarding the feasibility of developing its own nuclear weapons. Each time, these studies concluded that although Japan had the technology and materials to produce nuclear weapons, the economic, political, and security costs were prohibitive and it would remain a nonnuclear state. However, these studies often contained an important caveat: Japan would not develop nuclear weapons "at present," leaving the door open for this path should there be drastic changes to the security environment or deterioration of the U.S. extended deterrence commitment. Thus, while much of the Japanese public had a "nuclear allergy," many of Japan's conservative leaders did not and actively considered a nuclear option. Japanese leaders also made it clear that the U.S. alliance and the nuclear umbrella were vital to Japan's security.

**They periodically consider it, but the nuclear umbrella reigns them in each time – it's strong now**

Roehrig 17 [Terence Roehrig, Ph.D., Professor of National Security Affairs and the Director of the Asia-Pacific Studies Group. He has been a Research Fellow at the Kennedy School at Harvard University in the International Security Program and the Project on Managing the Atom and a past President of the Association of Korean Political Studies. He has published numerous books, articles and book chapters on Korean and East Asian security issues, North Korea's nuclear weapons program, the U.S.-South Korea alliance, human rights, and transitional justice. Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence After the Cold War. 2017. Chapter 4. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/roeh15798>]

Japan's position with regard to nuclear weapons is unusual. While the "nuclear allergy" remains a potent force in Japanese society and Japan has been a staunch advocate of the elimination of nuclear weapons,<sup>109</sup> it has relied on the U.S. nuclear umbrella and has been concerned about the credibility of the U.S. commitment to use nuclear weapons to defend Japan. In addition, despite a strong aversion to nuclear weapons among the public, Japanese leaders have been far less "allergic" and have periodically examined the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons, with some advocating strongly for moving in this direction. In the end, these studies concluded it was not in Japan's interests to go nuclear at this time and that Japan should continue to rely on the U.S. umbrella while retaining the ability to go nuclear should circumstances warrant.

Despite Japanese reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, periodically the commitment has been questioned amid fears that U.S. resolve to use nuclear weapons was slipping. Yet Washington has worked hard to reassure Japan of its commitment, not only the nuclear umbrella but the overall security commitment under the alliance. The Japan-U.S. alliance remains on solid ground, and U.S. bases in Japan along with the broader defense commitment are central to Washington's ability to maintain a forward presence and "rebalance" to the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. nuclear umbrella remains only one part of a much larger relationship that helps to reassure Japan of the U.S. commitment. Even with a relatively small chance the United States would ever use nuclear weapons (a reality that some Japanese analysts acknowledge), when combined with a robust alliance, the nuclear umbrella provides a significant degree of reassurance while also furnishing enough strategic ambiguity to contribute to deterrence. The political dimensions of the alliance are strong, in part because of the nuclear umbrella, and in turn Japan sees the nuclear umbrella as reasonably credible because it is part of a healthy alliance relationship. At the same time, the nuclear umbrella helps to reassure Japan so that it does not feel the need to acquire its own nuclear weapons.

attractive options to Beijing."

## **AT: Non Unique: ‘Trum Destrys Credibility’**

**Allies perceive current commitments as credible.**

**Heritage 18.** “U.S. Nuclear Weapons Capability.” The Heritage Foundation. 10/4/2018.

[https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-09/2019\\_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength\\_ASSESSMENT\\_POWER\\_NUCLEAR.pdf](https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-09/2019_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength_ASSESSMENT_POWER_NUCLEAR.pdf)

**Allied Assurance Score: Strong** The number of weapons held by U.S. allies is an important element when speaking about the credibility of America’s extended deterrence. Allies that already have nuclear weapons can coordinate action with other powers or act independently. During the Cold War, the U.S. and the U.K. cooperated to the point where joint targeting was included.<sup>39</sup> France maintains its own independent nuclear arsenal, partly as a hedge against the uncertainty of American credibility. The U.S. also deploys nuclear gravity bombs in Europe as a visible manifestation of its commitment to its NATO allies. The U.S., however, must also concern itself with its Asian allies. The United States provides nuclear assurances to Japan and South Korea, both of which are technologically advanced industrial economies facing nuclear-armed adversaries and potential adversaries. If they do not perceive U.S. assurances and guarantees as credible, they have the capability and know-how to build their own nuclear weapons and to do so quickly. That would be a major setback for U.S. nonproliferation policies. The 2018 NPR takes a step in a good direction when it places “[a]ssurance of allies and partners” second on its list of four “critical roles” (immediately following “[d]eterrence of nuclear and non-nuclear attack”) that nuclear forces play in America’s national security strategy. The 2018 NPR proposes two supplements to existing capabilities—a low-yield SLBM warhead and a new nuclear sea-launched cruise missile—as important initiatives that act to strengthen assurance along with the Obama and Trump Administrations’ initiatives to bolster conventional forces in NATO.<sup>40</sup> Grade: **At this time**, most U.S. allies are not seriously considering developing their own nuclear weapons. European members of NATO continue to express their commitment to and appreciation of NATO as a nuclear alliance. Doubts about the modernization of dual-capable aircraft and even about the weapons themselves, as well as NATO’s lack of attention to the nuclear mission and its intellectual underpinning, preclude assigning a score of “very strong.” An unequivocal articulation of U.S. commitment to extended deterrence leads to an improvement in this year’s score, raising it to “strong.”

**And, media bias makes all their cards suspect – Trump has sufficiently committed to allies**

Bilahari Kausikan **18**, retired Singaporean senior diplomat, formerly Ambassador-at-Large and Policy Advisor at Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “America’s retreat from the world is greatly exaggerated”, Nikkei Asian Review, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Bilahari-Kausikan-America-s-retreat-from-the-world-is-greatly-exaggerated>

U.S. President Donald Trump is often portrayed as retreating from global leadership and paving the way for China’s unstoppable rise under President Xi Jinping. The reality is more complex. By emphasizing Trump’s alleged withdrawal, much of the mainstream liberal U.S. media are unwittingly undermining confidence in America as much as does China’s Communist Party propaganda. The shared sentiment is that the U.S. has become more unreliable under Trump, and that America is the past and China is the

future. **This is a superficially persuasive argument. But it does not stand up to close examination.** The U.S. president remains the only world leader who can still say -- as he did in his State of the Union speech -- that "unmatched power is the surest means of our defense." He is right. Nobody else, including Xi, can make such a claim. It cannot be denied that the Chinese political system is better able to consistently pursue long-term goals than the U.S. political system, which is subject to disruptions every election cycle. But it is not as if the Chinese system has been immune to major disruptions since 1949, such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Xi's concentration of power and shift away from collective leadership potentially creates a single point of failure. We should not forget it was the so-called unreliable American system that put in place and maintained international order over many decades. **We should not let anti-Trump prejudices in the U.S. or Trump's outsize personality exaggerate the extent of discontinuity his administration represents.** The Trump administration's National Security Strategy (NSS 2017) released in December **is a largely mainstream document** that makes clear the **Trump administration has not eschewed leadership or disavowed the current order**, but has a narrower concept of leadership that puts "America first" and stresses a more robust approach to competitors. Some might not like this concept of leadership. But **it cannot be called a retreat.** NSS 2017 makes clear that the current administration will return to the long-standing U.S. posture of "peace through strength." **If we examine the Trump administration's record in East Asia, it represents in many respects a reversion to the norm of U.S. policy.** Like his predecessors, Trump has placed priority on relations with China, but unlike Barack Obama, who naively downplayed competition in the hope it would make the Chinese more cooperative, Trump has emphasized both aspects of the relationship. **Trump has also reaffirmed U.S. alliances with Japan, South Korea and Australia.** There is no sign his administration will let China's claims in the East and South China seas go unchallenged.

### **Trump just creates a brink – countries are still sticking with the US alliance now – but they're becoming increasingly wary**

Stewart Patrick **18**, James H. Binger senior fellow in global governance at the Council on Foreign Relations, "How U.S. Allies Are Adapting to "America First""  
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-01-23/how-us-allies-are-adapting-america-first>

At the dawn of the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump, I predicted in Foreign Affairs that Trump's "America first" agenda would set in motion tectonic forces beyond his control. As the ground shifted beneath their feet, longtime U.S. allies would lose confidence in U.S. leadership and credibility. They would adapt by hedging their bets, moving away from alignment with a United States no longer willing to promote and defend the liberal world order that it had sustained since 1945. The evidence for this hedging would be in adjustments by U.S. allies to their approaches toward geopolitics, economics, and climate change. **One year after Trump's inauguration, the liberal order has not collapsed. But it is in distress** as the president turns his back on the world the United States made **to embrace a nationalist and isolationist foreign policy.** Although **they still hope that Trump's abdication of global leadership is a temporary aberration rather than a lasting inflection point**, U.S. allies and partners are making contingency plans. **SAFE EUROPEAN HOME** The tendency toward hedging is most marked in transatlantic relations, the bedrock of the post-1945 liberal order. At NATO's Brussels summit in May, **Trump rattled Europeans by suggesting that his country's commitment to the alliance was contingent on their reimbursing American taxpayers for U.S. military expenditures** while declining to endorse Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which covers collective defense. Although **he belatedly affirmed the United States' commitments two months later**, Europeans got the message. "The times in which we can fully count on others are somewhat over, as I have experienced in the past few days," German Chancellor Angela Merkel said after the Brussels summit. **Europeans have hardly abandoned the Western alliance, but Trump's unpredictability is spurring them to take greater responsibility for their own defense.** In June, EU member states launched a new European Defense Fund, promising to increase their own defense spending by 4.3 percent. Beyond bolstering the continent's capacity to stand up to Russia, these new capabilities are designed to increase the EU's "strategic autonomy" vis-à-vis the United States. In addition, 25 of the EU's 28 member states have agreed to endorse an EU defense pact, known as Permanent Structured Cooperation, that "could cover projects ranging from new battle tanks to the deployment of multinational forces."

### **The link is linear**

Robert Einhorn **17**. Fellow with the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative and the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, both housed within the Foreign Policy program at Brookings, "Non-Proliferation Challenges Facing the Trump Administration," Foreign Policy at Brookings, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Series Paper 15,

[https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/acnpi\\_201703\\_nonproliferation\\_challenges\\_v2.pdf](https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/acnpi_201703_nonproliferation_challenges_v2.pdf)

The Japanese, like the South Koreans, can never be reassured enough, especially given current worrisome developments in the regional security environment. We can expect that, in future bilateral security meetings, the Japanese will press for many of the things the South Koreans are seeking, including a more prominent role in the planning and operation of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent. While the likelihood of Japan eventually opting for its own nuclear deterrent is lower than that of South Korea, it still behooves the Trump administration to give priority in its bilateral relations with Tokyo to addressing Japanese anxieties and ensuring that its ally remains confident in U.S. security guarantees.

## AT: “Confidence Building”

### **The plan triggers worst-case-scenario fears from allies---guarantees prolif**

Richard C. **Bush 16.** Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies @ Brookings, Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, John L. Thornton China Center, "Before moving to "no first use," think about Northeast Asia", Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/07/20/before-moving-to-no-first-use-think-about-northeast-asia/>

According to recent press reports, the policy options under consideration include U.S. enunciation of a nuclear “no first use” doctrine. Such a step would represent a profound shift in U.S. policy. Non-nuclear states living in the shadow of nuclear-armed adversaries have long relied on U.S. security guarantees, specifically the declared commitment to employ nuclear weapons should our allies be subject to aggression with conventional forces. They have based their own national security strategies on that pledge, including their willingness to forego indigenous development of nuclear weapons. These issues bear directly on the credibility of U.S. guarantees to allies in Europe and Asia, with particular relevance in Northeast Asia. Since the end of the Cold War, the content of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence pledge has already narrowed. Washington has long deemed any use of nuclear weapons a matter of absolute last resort. Since the early 1990s, Washington has also enunciated an unambiguous distinction between employment of conventional and nuclear weapons, including the unilateral withdrawal of all tactical nuclear weapons deployed on the Korean peninsula. The Obama administration itself has also moved closer to limiting nuclear weapons use exclusively to deter another state’s first use of such a weapon against the United States, its allies, and partners—in fact, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review declared that this was a “fundamental role” of the American nuclear arsenal. At that time, it also pledged to “work to establish conditions” under which it was safe to adopt universally a policy where the “sole purpose” of U.S. nuclear weapons was to deter a nuclear attack by an adversary. The implication of such a “sole purpose” policy would be that North Korea need not fear American nuclear retaliation if it mounted only a conventional attack against South Korea. Whether it is “no first use” or “sole purpose use,” Northeast Asia presents a clear contradiction between President Obama’s non-nuclear aspirations and existing circumstances. The Republic of Korea and Japan (the only state ever subject to nuclear attack) confront the reality of a nuclear-armed North Korea. Pyongyang continues to enhance its weapons inventory and the means to deliver them. It also regularly threatens Seoul and Tokyo with missile attack, potentially armed with nuclear weapons. Both U.S. allies are therefore strongly opposed to a U.S. “no first use” pledge, and would likely have deep concerns about a sole purpose commitment. Though the United States possesses a wide array of non-nuclear strike options in the event of a North Korean attack directed against South Korea or Japan, any indications that the United States might be wavering from its nuclear guarantees would trigger worst-case fears that the United States, above all, would not want to stimulate. At the same time, choosing not to issue a “no first use” pledge should not in any way suggest that the United States favors nuclear use, which would play directly into North Korean propaganda strategy. Rather, the United States should not preemptively remove the nuclear option, especially when North Korea is in overt defiance of its non-proliferation obligations and is single-mindedly intent on a building a nuclear weapons capability.

**Japan thinks NFU would increase insecurity. Even if it's not true, the perception is there.**

**Fetter & Wolfsthal 18** – professor in the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland & director of the Nuclear Crisis Group, a Global Zero initiative, nonresident fellow at the Belfer Center at Harvard [Steve Fetter & Jon Wolfsthal, Deterrence and No First Use of Nuclear Weapons, Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, Volume 1 18 - Issue 1]

According to the Times and Post reports, the main reason President Obama did not adopt a policy of no first use was concern about the reaction of allies – particularly Japan. In fact, the Washington Post reported that Prime Minister Abe personally conveyed his opposition to NFU, because he believed it could increase the likelihood of conventional conflict with North Korea or China (Rogin 16b). Reports indicated, however, that the Japanese concern stemmed from a belief that adopting no first use would weaken the perceived American commitment to Japan's defense. While untrue and not even directly related, this perception made rapid adoption of a no-first-use statement impossible. President Obama left office without adopting a policy of NFU or making any additional major changes to US nuclear policy.

**Allies think first strike is credible. Prefer ev about how allies make decisions over abstract political science debates.**

Hugh White 16. Professor of Strategic Studies at The Australian National University. "A second strike on nuclear 'no first use.'" East Asia Forum. 9/6/2016.

<http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/09/06/a-second-strike-on-nuclear-no-first-use/>.

But a NFU declaration would have some unintended and unwelcome consequences which should not be ignored. This is the thought I was developing in the earlier post which Gareth Evans was responding to. The most important of these unwelcome consequences is the effect on the confidence of US allies in Washington's commitment to their security. A 'first use' option by the United States may be illusory, but it is still taken very seriously by US allies like Poland and Japan that confront large and threatening neighbours like Russia and China. They believe that the United States' threat to cross the nuclear threshold to defeat an overwhelming conventional attack on its allies is vital to their security, just as it was during the Cold War. They cling to the illusion that the United States is still willing to accept the huge risks and costs involved in starting a nuclear war, because its commitment to its allies is as strong as ever. No one in Washington has so far been prepared to disabuse them of this, but a NFU declaration would smash this illusion and leave them feeling much more exposed. That would have unsettling consequences as they looked for other ways to ensure their security. Supporters of a NFU declaration like Gareth Evans, Ramesh Thakur and others dismiss this concern. They say that a NFU declaration will have no effect on the credibility of US alliance commitments, because the United States' conventional forces are now so preponderant that they can deter or defeat any adversary without resorting to nuclear weapons. But all the evidence points the other way. Certainly, the United States spends more on its conventional forces than any other country and it has an unmatched capacity to deploy those forces globally. But that doesn't mean it can outmatch rival powers on their home turf. On the contrary, as key recent studies have shown, the United States would quickly be overpowered by Russian conventional forces in the Baltic States and would face a costly and escalating stalemate against China in a maritime war in

Asia. Optimists in the United States hope new technological breakthroughs, packaged as the ‘third offset strategy’, will swiftly restore US conventional military preponderance, but that is so far just a three-word slogan and a pious hope. It is much more likely that the conventional military balance in their respective theatres will keep shifting Russia's and China's way. US allies like Japan understand this reality all too well. If a NFU declaration smashes the illusion that the United States would be willing to use nuclear forces to defend them from conventional attack, their confidence in the alliance will plummet — then they will start looking for alternatives. For Japan, at least, that could mean building nuclear weapons of its own. Or it could push Japan in the other direction, towards passive acceptance of China’s regional primacy. Either would be very unsettling. Advocates of a NFU stance need to weigh these potential consequences. In Asia, a US declaration could spur nuclear proliferation, or promote a new China-led regional order. These possibilities might not be enough to swing the argument against a NFU declaration, if only because they may well happen anyway as it becomes clearer that the United States’ ‘first use’ option is an illusion. But a NFU declaration could well bring them about faster, and foreclose other, less scary outcomes. This needs at least to be acknowledged.

### **Especially true given the importance of declaratory policy for Japanese assurance – the possibility of nuclear first use is vital**

Ariana Rowberry 14, Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow @ Brookings, “Advanced Conventional Weapons, Deterrence and the U.S.-Japan Alliance”, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/advanced-conventional-weapons-deterrence-us-japan-rowberry.pdf>

Washington sends strong signals to Japan and potential adversaries through its declaratory policy, which outlines how and when the United States might use military force. As discussed above, the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan is the linchpin of the alliance. Article 5 states, “Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the Administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.”<sup>29</sup> Despite the “mutual” defense commitments of both the United States and Japan, historically the United States has borne the majority of the burden for providing protection to the alliance. Declaratory policy under the mutual defense treaty has become particularly important in light of escalating tensions with neighbors. Some Japanese scholars have expressed concern that the United States could be reluctant to come to Japan’s aid in the event of a low-level conflict, such as a dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.<sup>30</sup> In providing assurance to Japan, it is necessary to make clear that U.S. declaratory policy applies to these types of contingencies. Another example of declaratory policy is the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, which serves as a guiding document for the Obama Administration’s nuclear policy. More than previous NPRs, the 2010 document stresses the importance of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policy. However, the document also identifies strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners as a key objective.<sup>31</sup> As part of the effort to assure Japan that changes in U.S. policy would not be to Japan’s detriment, U.S. and Japanese officials conducted extensive consultations during the formulation of the 2010 NPR. Many Japanese officials felt that those close talks resolved their anxieties regarding future U.S. policy on nuclear weapons.<sup>32</sup> Crucially, these consultations gave Japan an opportunity to provide input in the formulation of U.S. declaratory policy, and provided a channel for Japan to express its thinking about the U.S. extended deterrent.

## **Backlash to the plan's immediate – they closely monitor US nuclear policy to ensure continued support for extended deterrence**

Ariana Rowberry 14, Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow @ Brookings, "Advanced Conventional Weapons, Deterrence and the U.S.-Japan Alliance", <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/advanced-conventional-weapons-deterrence-us-japan-rowberry.pdf>

**Since Japan closely monitors U.S. nuclear policy, the United States must consider the implications of such policy changes**

for the assurance of Japan. While it is unlikely that further modest reductions in U.S. strategic forces would spur Japan to take extreme measures, such as developing its own nuclear capability, the U.S. government should consult Japan on further reductions. These consultations will become particularly important if the United States ever approaches quantitative nuclear parity with China, although parity will likely not be reached for the foreseeable future. To date, the United States maintains a strong numerical advantage over all nuclear weapon states with the exception of Russia. It appears that Japan may be less concerned with the absolute level of the U.S. nuclear stockpile, but rather with the level relative to other nuclear weapon states, especially China.

RESPONDING TO THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: RECENT POLICY CHANGES IN JAPAN'S DEFENSIVE DOCTRINE Today, Japan is at a critical juncture in its national security policy.

As the only state to be the victim of nuclear weapons use, Japan has long had a "nuclear allergy," a strong aversion to the development or acquisition of an indigenous nuclear capability. Japan's experience with nuclear weapons has also informed its broader defense strategy, which has historically taken a negative view of

developing or using military capabilities for any reason other than self-defense. For the first time, in December 2013, Japan published a National Security Strategy. The development of such a strategy reflects Tokyo's concern about the changing regional security environment.

The strategy states that Japan's new security policy will be one of "proactive pacifism based on the principle of international cooperation."<sup>56</sup> Despite Japan's long-term policy of maintaining forces for defensive purposes only, this new strategy indicates that Japan may be willing to be a more active participant in peacekeeping missions, in coming to the defense of allies such as the United States, or in responding to

military provocations. The strategy reflects the reality that Japan is "surrounded by an increasingly severe security environment and confronted by complex and grave national security challenges."<sup>57</sup>

One of the strategy's core objectives is to strengthen deterrence to maintain peace and security.<sup>58</sup> Other important Japanese security documents similarly reveal Japan's growing anxiety about its uncertain security environment.

In 2013, the Japanese government released its latest National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), a document detailing Japan's security challenges and providing recommendations for the future of Japan's SDF. Increasingly, the guidelines emphasize Japan's uncertain security environment and the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The 2013 guidance states that Japan "will continue to maintain and improve the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence with nuclear deterrent as a vital element," through close cooperation with the U.S. This is the first time that the NDPG has explicitly used the words "extended deterrence."<sup>59</sup>

## AT: Wolfstahl

**The only way they'd rearm would be a reduction in US commitments – prefer statements of leaders instead of the general public**

**Roehrig 17** [Terence Roehrig, Ph.D., Professor of National Security Affairs and the Director of the Asia-Pacific Studies Group. He has been a Research Fellow at the Kennedy School at Harvard University in the International Security Program and the Project on Managing the Atom and a past President of the Association of Korean Political Studies. He has published numerous books, articles and book chapters on Korean and East Asian security issues, North Korea's nuclear weapons program, the U.S.-South Korea alliance, human rights, and transitional justice. Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence After the Cold War. 2017. Chapter 4. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/roeh15798>]

During the Cold War, Japan conducted several assessments regarding the feasibility of developing its own nuclear weapons. Each time, these studies concluded that although Japan had the technology and materials to produce nuclear weapons, the economic, political, and security costs were prohibitive and it would remain a nonnuclear state. However, these studies often contained an important caveat: Japan would not develop nuclear weapons "at present," leaving the door open for this path should there be drastic changes to the security environment or deterioration of the U.S. extended deterrence commitment. Thus, while much of the Japanese public had a "nuclear allergy," many of Japan's conservative leaders did not and actively considered a nuclear option. Japanese leaders also made it clear that the U.S. alliance and the nuclear umbrella were vital to Japan's security.

**They periodically consider it, but the nuclear umbrella reigns them in each time – it's strong now**

**Roehrig 17** [Terence Roehrig, Ph.D., Professor of National Security Affairs and the Director of the Asia-Pacific Studies Group. He has been a Research Fellow at the Kennedy School at Harvard University in the International Security Program and the Project on Managing the Atom and a past President of the Association of Korean Political Studies. He has published numerous books, articles and book chapters on Korean and East Asian security issues, North Korea's nuclear weapons program, the U.S.-South Korea alliance, human rights, and transitional justice. Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence After the Cold War. 2017. Chapter 4. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/roeh15798>]

Japan's position with regard to nuclear weapons is unusual. While the "nuclear allergy" remains a potent force in Japanese society and Japan has been a staunch advocate of the elimination of nuclear weapons,<sup>109</sup> it has relied on the U.S. nuclear umbrella and has been concerned about the credibility of the U.S. commitment to use nuclear weapons to defend Japan. In addition, despite a strong aversion to nuclear weapons among the public, Japanese leaders have been far less "allergic" and have periodically examined the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons, with some advocating strongly for moving in this direction. In the end, these studies concluded it was not in Japan's interests to go nuclear at this time and that Japan should continue to rely on the U.S. umbrella while retaining the ability to go nuclear should circumstances warrant.

Despite Japanese reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, periodically the commitment has been questioned amid fears that U.S. resolve to use nuclear weapons was slipping. Yet Washington has worked hard to reassure Japan of its commitment, not only the nuclear umbrella but the overall security commitment under the alliance. The Japan-U.S. alliance remains on solid ground, and U.S. bases in Japan along with the broader defense commitment are central to Washington's ability to maintain a forward presence and "rebalance" to the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. nuclear umbrella remains only one part of a much larger relationship that helps to reassure Japan of the U.S. commitment. Even with a relatively small chance the United States would ever use nuclear weapons (a reality that some Japanese analysts acknowledge), when combined with a robust alliance, the nuclear umbrella provides a significant degree of reassurance while also furnishing enough strategic ambiguity to contribute to deterrence. The political dimensions of the alliance are strong, in part because of the nuclear umbrella, and in turn Japan sees the nuclear umbrella as reasonably credible because it is part of a healthy alliance relationship. At the same time, the nuclear umbrella helps to reassure Japan so that it does not feel the need to acquire its own nuclear weapons.

## AT: Mount

### **Allied perceptions matter more than the actual distribution of capabilities.**

Hugh **White 16**. Professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in Canberra. "No first use' nuclear pledge bad for US standing in Asia." The Straits Times. 8/23/2016.  
<https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/no-first-use-nuclear-pledge-bad-for-us-standing-in-asia>

Back in 2009, Mr Obama seemed to agree with this argument, and he was widely expected to make an NFU declaration which would take that threat off the table. But many of his advisers disagreed, and they talked him round, and when his major Nuclear Posture Review came out in 2010, it stopped far short of an NFU declaration. That left his historic Prague initiative dead in the water. Mr Obama could not credibly argue to abolish nuclear weapons while his own government, alone among the major nuclear powers, still threatened to start a nuclear war by using them first to defeat a conventional attack. The key reason that Mr Obama's advisers, like most of Washington's foreign policy "establishment", thought the US should hang on to this threat was the attitude of US allies, including South Korea and Japan. They said an NFU declaration would seriously undermine allies' confidence in US security guarantees because leaders in Tokyo and Seoul did not buy the argument that US conventional forces were now so strong that nuclear forces would never be needed. On the contrary, US allies understand all too well how much the conventional forces of US rivals like China have improved in recent years. They agree with many analysts and policymakers in the US itself, where China's growing air and naval capabilities have prompted a major rethink of US strategy because it is a much tougher adversary now than it was even 10 years ago. In fact, there is no real doubt that defeating China in a major war without using nuclear forces is becoming harder, not easier. That seems to many people a decisive argument for the US to keep the threat of nuclear escalation firmly on the table.

### **Conventional capabilities are eroding. The threat of first use stops the war from starting in the first place.**

Franklin C. **Miller & Keith B. Payne 16**. \*\*Principal of The Scowcroft Group; served 22 years in senior positions in the Department of Defense and four additional years on the National Security Council staff as a special assistant to the President; member of the Defense Policy Board and the US Strategic Command Senior Advisory Group. \*\*Professor and department head at the Graduate School of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University; president and co-founder of the National Institute for Public Policy. "The dangers of no-first-use." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 8/22/2016. <https://thebulletin.org/2016/08/the-dangers-of-no-first-use/>.

US adoption of no-first-use would also severely shake allied confidence in our security guarantees to them. In fact, US allies Japan, South Korea, Great Britain, and France reportedly have recently informed the Obama administration that a no-first-use policy would be detrimental to their security. The vast majority of our treaty allies depend, at least in part, on a credible US nuclear deterrence "umbrella" for their security. US adoption of a no-first-use policy would compel some to take steps to mitigate the degradation of the US nuclear deterrent which has heretofore protected them. One such avenue would be the possible acquisition or creation of their own independent nuclear weapons. There already appears to be considerable popular

support today for the development of nuclear weapons in South Korea; US adoption of no-first-use would only increase that motivation. A policy of no-first-use now would likely increase the prospect for new nuclear powers in Asia and Europe, which would severely undercut the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and be extremely destabilizing, given the likely severe Chinese and Russian responses.

In short, based on evidence from the past seven decades, the US nuclear deterrent helps deter war and preserve global stability by compelling potential aggressors to consider the possibility of a US nuclear response in any of their prospective plans to attack us or our allies. It also provides enormous support for nuclear non-proliferation by helping to assure over 30 US allies of their security. US adoption of a no-first-use policy would threaten to degrade this critical deterrence of enemies and assurance of allies.

Proponents of no-first-use often assert that US high-tech conventional forces could ultimately defeat an opponent's massive use of military force, including advanced conventional weapons, and chemical and biological weapons, without the US needing to resort to nuclear weapons—and thereby claim that the US nuclear deterrent threat is unnecessary for this purpose.

This presumption of US military dominance is questionable in some key geographic areas. But more importantly, this claim fundamentally confuses the distinction between deterrence and war-fighting. We and our allies want to deter an opponent's massive use of force from ever taking place; we do not want to be compelled to wage war, even winning a non-nuclear war, in order to recover lost allies. Fighting such a war would cause unprecedented levels of death and destruction wherever it is fought. That is why US policy for over seven decades has sought to deter war via the US nuclear deterrent, and why every Democratic and Republican administration for over seven decades has rejected a no-first-use policy. Retaining ambiguity regarding the US nuclear deterrent threat appears to be central to the success of that deterrence policy; we do not want a no-first-use policy that essentially assures opponents that they may safely ignore a US nuclear response if they themselves launch anything short of a nuclear attack. That is why key US allies also strongly oppose a no-first-use policy.

## AT: Not Credible – General

### **The alliance is politically credible – that's enough to stop prolif**

Roehrig 17 [Terence Roehrig, Ph.D., Professor of National Security Affairs and the Director of the Asia-Pacific Studies Group. He has been a Research Fellow at the Kennedy School at Harvard University in the International Security Program and the Project on Managing the Atom and a past President of the Association of Korean Political Studies. He has published numerous books, articles and book chapters on Korean and East Asian security issues, North Korea's nuclear weapons program, the U.S.-South Korea alliance, human rights, and transitional justice. Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence After the Cold War. 2017. Introduction. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/roeh15798>]

The U.S. alliances with Tokyo and Seoul are solid and credible. There is little doubt Washington would defend these two allies if attacked, but that response is highly unlikely to include nuclear weapons. Though the credibility of the nuclear umbrella is low, the nuclear umbrella remains an important political signal that is an integral part of the regional security architecture and helps demonstrate the U.S. commitment to its allies in Asia. To withdraw the nuclear umbrella would be a serious alteration of the status quo that would disrupt security relations throughout the region. In addition, even if the resolve portion of the umbrella's credibility is very low, the mere existence of the nuclear umbrella along with a small chance it might ever be used may still make an adversary hesitate, given the destructive power of nuclear weapons. Thus, even with the nuclear umbrella's low credibility, it is sufficient to generate a discernible deterrent effect.

Finally, the nuclear umbrella is an important tool for another U.S. goal, limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. The U.S. nuclear umbrella, along with the overall alliance commitment, helps to convince allies to forgo this option and avoid further complications to regional security with the addition of other nuclear weapons states in East Asia. The nonproliferation of nuclear weapons has long been a central element of U.S. foreign policy and is likely to remain so.

## Japan Link

### **You should prefer Roehrig – he uses excellent analysis of under-explored phenomena in the umbrella – adopting NFU would cause allied prolif and nuclear war – extended deterrence is credible now**

Nilsson-Wright 17 [John Nilsson-Wright is Senior Lecturer, University of Cambridge, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia, Chatham House, and a regional editor for Global Asia. Why War Won't Be Breaking Out Soon. December 21, 2017.

[https://www.globalasia.org/v12no4/book/why-war-wont-be-breaking-out-soon\\_john-nilsson-wright\]](https://www.globalasia.org/v12no4/book/why-war-wont-be-breaking-out-soon_john-nilsson-wright)

Are we on the brink of nuclear conflict on the Korean Peninsula? In the wake of North Korea's sixth nuclear test, a proliferation of medium- and long-range missile tests — most dramatically, the recent launch of Pyongyang's Hwasong-15 ICBM capable of reaching the continental United States — and President Donald Trump's warning of "fire and fury," the drumbeat of imminent war appears louder and more insistent.

It's easy to see why public opinion in the region and headline writers around the world are concerned. A war on the peninsula would have catastrophic consequences for everyone. Even though the US would almost certainly prevail, the human costs — as US Secretary of Defense James Mattis has pointed out — would be huge: for Korean civilians and troops on both sides of the demilitarized zone, for the large numbers of foreign citizens who live in South Korea, and also for then tens if not hundreds of thousands of Japanese citizens who would be targeted by North Korea in a conflict that would almost certainly expand to include Japan and potentially the wider East Asian region.

So, if war is so unpalatable and clearly a last resort, why are anxiety levels increasing? Part of the concern is that an overconfident Kim Jong Un, emboldened by his recent technical successes and temperamentally eager to thumb his nose at Trump, might cross a critical "red line" that would force the US to respond militarily. An atmospheric nuclear test by North Korea — something Pyongyang has threatened — a missile launch in the direction of Guam, or conventional provocations by North Korea near the Northern Limit Line marking the maritime boundary between the two Koreas could provoke military action that might escalate rapidly to the nuclear level.

These fears are exacerbated by worries that Trump is incapable of exercising restraint. A thin-skinned, insecure and impulsive leader, devoid of empathy for either allies or adversaries, might press the nuclear button to demonstrate his resolve or simply to secure a "win" in what appears to many to have become a childish, name-calling battle of wills between two equally petulant national leaders.

Terence Roehrig, in his timely and thoughtful analysis of US nuclear deterrence in Northeast Asia, explains why such fears may be exaggerated. While the risk of conventional conflict on the Korean Peninsula should not be underestimated, we are not on the brink of nuclear Armageddon. The reasons for this are complex and multifaceted.

First and foremost, the US remains committed to providing extended deterrence to its key allies in the region, Japan and South Korea. In a detailed analysis of both the historical development and current assumptions underpinning US nuclear doctrine, Roehrig shows how successive US administrations have sought to reinforce the key ingredients of credibility and resolve that are at the heart of an effective deterrence strategy.

This is partly a matter of declaratory policy, expressed most recently in President Barack Obama's 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. By intentionally not committing to a no-first-use nuclear policy and deliberately remaining ambiguous about the precise circumstances in which it might use nuclear weapons, the US can deter an adversary such as North Korea from attacking US allies — whether with conventional or unconventional weapons (nuclear, biological or chemical). Bolstering this rhetoric with concrete demonstrations of US military capabilities, such as sending nuclear-capable US B-52 and B-1 stealth bombers to fly close to or through North Korean airspace as the Trump administration has done recently, sends a clear signal of intent to North Korea.

The credibility of such signals is strengthened also by the diversity of strategic options available to the US. Extended deterrence relies on multiple military means, both conventional and nuclear — all of which have the potential to destroy North Korea. The overwhelming and destructive capacity of US conventional forces to eliminate North Korea's political and military leadership is sufficient, in Roehrig's judgement, to deter a rational Kim Jong Un from attacking South Korea.

What happens, however, once North Korea acquires the ability to target the US with nuclear weapons, as seems increasingly likely within the next year or so? If there were a credible risk that Pyongyang could destroy Washington, San Francisco or New York, would an American president be prepared to go to war with North Korea in order to protect its regional allies? For policy-makers in Seoul or Tokyo, this uncertainty about US intentions has strengthened calls at home for South Korea and Japan to acquire their own nuclear capability to deter an attack from North Korea. If this were to happen, the long-term goal of the US to avoid nuclear proliferation would be undercut and the risk of nuclear conflict would increase substantially.

In response to allied fears of US abandonment and this "decoupling" scenario, recent US administrations have worked to reinforce their commitment to Japan and South Korea, not just via formal declarations on the reliability of extended deterrence, but by establishing since 2010 new bilateral deterrence dialogue mechanisms with military and political partners in Seoul and Tokyo, and by working closely to enhance interoperability and the military capacities of America's allies — developments that Roehrig describes in detail.

This is important, given both the past and present willingness of Japanese and South Korean political elites to consider developing their own nuclear capabilities. Roehrig documents the fascinating and rarely explored history of such thinking, revealing in the process the gap between public views — frequently ambivalent or opposed to acquiring nuclear weapons, particularly in Japan — and those of government officials and politicians, often more receptive to going nuclear, either for strategic reasons or to boost national status.

### **Wavering commitments to Japan cause nuclear rearmament – that escalates.**

**Debs & Monteiro '18** [Alexandre & Nuno P; Associate Professor of Political Science at Yale University, research fellow at the Whitney and Betty MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies; Associate Professor of Political Science at Yale University; March 2018; "Cascading Chaos in Nuclear Northeast Asia"; <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2018.1445902>; The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 41; accessed 8/27/20; TV]

Contrary to South Korea, Japan has never attempted to develop nuclear weapons since the end of World War II. Having enjoyed reliable U.S. security guarantees, Tokyo has always eschewed an investment in an autonomous nuclear arsenal. Japan's nuclear forbearance has deep historical roots. The Japanese constitution of 1947 renounces war; Japanese strategy since then relies on U.S. security guarantees and U.S. forces deployed on its soil to mitigate any security threats—a logic known as the "Yoshida Doctrine." To this day, Japan continues to impose considerable limitations on its own conventional military capabilities. As a result, it depends on U.S. protection against both North Korea and, perhaps more importantly, a rising China—at least as much as its South Korean neighbor. Perhaps even more than in the case of South Korea, Japan's nuclear policy is shaped by the reliability of U.S. security guarantees.

While renouncing nuclear weapons, Japan possesses a capacious nuclear energy program and a mature space program. Were it to decide for nuclearization, therefore, Tokyo would quickly be able to place nuclear warheads on long-range missiles. Estimates of the nuclear breakout period that Tokyo would face range from less than 6 months to a more conservative 3-5 years.<sup>37</sup> In any case, Japanese nuclearization would entail serious potential for regional instability, creating conditions propitious for a nuclear arms race if not a preventive counterproliferation war. At the root of the Yoshida Doctrine was an attempt to reassure the region and the world of Japan's peaceful intentions. Serious concerns would arise, especially in Beijing, if Japan were to pursue an independent nuclear arsenal.

Japanese reliance on U.S. security guarantees has been tested over the decades, with Washington consistently reiterating its determination to protect Japan whenever threatened. When in 1964, China tested its first nuclear weapon, Japanese Prime Minister Sato Eisaku hinted at the possibility that Japan might also go nuclear, telling U.S. ambassador Edwin Reischauer that "if other fellow had nuclears [sic] it was only common sense to have them oneself."<sup>38</sup> In response, President Lyndon Johnson told Sato that "since Japan possesses no nuclear weapons, and we have them, if Japan needs our nuclear deterrent for its defense, the United States would stand by its commitment and provide that defense. ... Japan need not give even a second thought to the dependability of its American ally." Sato responded positively, telling Johnson that "although he could see why it might be argued that if China has nuclear weapons, Japan should also, this was not Japan's policy."<sup>39</sup> In the end, Sato was satisfied with an unequivocal restatement of U.S. security assurances.

Three years later, Japan deepened its commitment to remaining a nonnuclear state by adopting the so-called "three nonnuclear principles": Japan would not produce, possess, or introduce nuclear weapons on its territory. Sato met again with President Johnson, stating that "Japan's whole security was based on its security arrangement with the U.S. The Japanese were well protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella and Japan had no intention to make nuclear weapons."<sup>40</sup> A reliable U.S. nuclear umbrella has always been the necessary condition for Japan's nuclear forbearance.

Soon, shifts in U.S. policy would again test Japanese confidence in U.S. security guarantees. In early 1968, President Johnson announced the de-escalation of U.S. intervention in Vietnam. The following year, President Nixon announced his "Guam doctrine," asking the United States' Asian allies to shoulder more of the costs

of their own security—based on a logic not unlike that underpinning the Trump administration's recent pronouncements. Consequently, Sato's government entertained the possibility of altering Japanese defense policy and commissioned a cost-benefit analysis of Japanese nuclearization from the Cabinet Information Research Office—what became known as the 1968/70 Internal Report. This study concluded that even though Tokyo had the economic and technological wherewithal to build a nuclear arsenal, Japan's nuclearization would be counterproductive for its security situation. A Japanese bomb would cause serious concerns among its adversaries; plus, the particularly high population density of the country made it especially vulnerable to nuclear attack. Japan's security would be ensured as long as its adversaries believed that they would face U.S. nuclear retaliation. The report thus recommended continued reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella.<sup>41</sup> In February 1970, Japan agreed to sign the NPT.

Since the end of the Cold War, Japan's security concerns focus on a rising and revisionist China and on North Korea provocations. When Pyongyang first tested a nuclear weapon in 2006, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe reaffirmed Japan's adherence to the three nonnuclear principles, while President George W. Bush reassured the U.S. commitment to Japanese security.<sup>42</sup> President Barack Obama offered similar assurances after each subsequent North Korean nuclear test.<sup>43</sup>

Japan's nuclear forbearance is certainly made easier by Japanese public opinion, which is frequently described as allergic to nuclear weapons as a result of the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a feeling that was only reinforced with the disaster at Fukushima.<sup>44</sup> Nevertheless, reliable U.S. security assurances, supported by the presence of a large number of U.S. troops in Japan, have played a key role in maintaining Japan's unique forbearance against nuclear weapons. After all, Japan is the world's third largest economy and possesses full control of the nuclear fuel cycle, yet remains a nonnuclear state.

Faced with a rising and increasingly assertive China and with a rapidly growing North Korean nuclear ability to target the Japanese islands, Tokyo more than ever relies on U.S. security guarantees to be able to deter aggression without its own autonomous nuclear arsenal. Should the Trump administration question U.S. commitments to its East Asian allies, Tokyo may be pushed to change its policy of nuclear forbearance.

As with South Korea, Washington might still attempt to deter Japanese nuclearization by imposing economic sanctions on Japan while denying it credible security guarantees. In our view, despite the deep level of international integration of the Japanese economy and the strong preference of Japanese leaders to remain embedded in the U.S.-led economic order, the dire security situation in which Japan would be left in this scenario would likely lead Tokyo to push toward nuclear acquisition despite any sanctions.

The key source of instability in this scenario, however, would stem from Beijing's likely reaction to a Japanese proliferation effort. Given the short breakout period Tokyo enjoys, Beijing's leadership would have to decide fast on China's policy. A preventive counterproliferation strike against Japan would be exceedingly costly and, for now, likely to be beyond the technical capability of the Chinese military, but a forceful Chinese reaction, including threats of military action, is not beyond the realm of the possible.

This risk of Japanese nuclear acquisition would, of course, be compounded by eventual South Korean nuclearization. Were Seoul to build an autonomous nuclear arsenal, Tokyo would be greatly tempted to do so as well. In what concerns U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy, then, U.S. security commitments to each of its two main East Asian allies are deeply interconnected. The removal of U.S. security guarantees to either South Korea or Japan would trigger a process that would vastly augment instability in East Asia.

### **Abandonment fears accelerate military autonomy – extinction.**

**Fatton '19** [Lionel P; Assistant Professor of International Relations at Webster University Geneva, Research Collaborator at the Research Institute for the History of Global Arms Transfer, Meiji University, PhD in Political Science, specialization International Relations, from Sciences Po Paris, Fellow at The Charhar Institute, Beijing; May 2019; "A new spear in Asia: why is Japan moving toward autonomous defense?"; <https://academic.oup.com/irap/article-abstract/19/2/297/4959342>; International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 19, Issue 2; accessed 8/25/20; TV]

The alliance could be jolted by the United States' growing entrapment anxiety. Washington has been relatively insulated from the 'deter versus restrain dilemma', or the fact that US security guarantees that strengthen the alliance's deterrent power may embolden Japan to aggressive actions against neighbors by reassuring Tokyo about US backing (Snyder, 1997, 196). Heavy reliance on the United States for security and offensive operations has prevented Japan from taking such actions. The country's move toward a more independent and offensive defense posture will exacerbate the 'deter versus restrain dilemma' for Washington. In line with the classic strategy of alliance management, the United States could be tempted to distance itself from Japan to mitigate the risk of entrapment. This in turn would heighten Tokyo's fear of abandonment in regard to China and reinforce the 'entrapment-abandonment dilemma' vis-a-vis the Korean Peninsula, thus accelerating the Japanese shift to autonomy. A vicious circle would ensue, pulling the two allies apart and triggering an existential crisis for the alliance.<sup>7</sup>

The evolutions of Japan's defense posture could have destabilizing consequences for the Asia-Pacific region as well. The high level of distrust, if not hostility, between China and Japan since the end of the Second World War has portended spiraling tensions caused by action-reaction dynamics between competitive defensive measures (Samuels, 2007). The US-Japan alliance has mitigated this security dilemma by guaranteeing Japan's survival and acting as a 'bottle cap' on the resurgence of Japanese militarism (Christensen, 2011, 236). A militarily more autonomous and powerful Japan would alarm China. The 'egg shell' perception, which has gained momentum in Beijing since the mid-1990s and posits that the alliance is an incubator of Japanese rearmament, would strengthen (Christensen, 2011, 236). Not only would Sino-Japanese relations deteriorate due to the prospect of Japan's revival as a great power, US-China relations would also be undermined by Beijing's recognition of the alliance as a destabilizing factor.

The United States and China, the world's two largest economic and military powers, are widely regarded as holding the faith of the Asia-Pacific region. Japan is often dropped out of the equation despite its disruptive potential. A more autonomous Japan does not only raise the prospect of a military clash with China in the East China Sea, it also increases the likelihood of a Sino-American war. The US-Japan alliance could become the thread between an emotionally-charged territorial dispute and what would be a cataclysmic great power conflict (Miller, 2015). Deng Xiaoping said in the late 1970s that half of heaven would fall if Japan and China were to fight each other. Today, the whole heaven would collapse if the United States were embroiled.

## Japan alliance is on the brink—perception of US abandonment guarantees prolif and East Asian war

**Monteiro 18** (2018, Nuno P. Monteiro is the Director of International Security Studies and Associate Professor of Political Science at Yale University, “Cascading Chaos in Nuclear Northeast Asia” The Washington Quarterly, 41:1, 97-113)

Since the end of the Cold War, Japan's security concerns focus on a rising and revisionist China and on North Korea provocations. When Pyongyang first tested a nuclear weapon in 2006, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe reaffirmed Japan's adherence to the three nonnuclear principles, while President George W. Bush reassured the U.S. commitment to Japanese security.<sup>42</sup> President Barack Obama offered similar assurances after each subsequent North Korean nuclear test.<sup>43</sup> Japan's nuclear forbearance is certainly made easier by Japanese public opinion, which is frequently described as allergic to nuclear weapons as a result of the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a feeling that was only reinforced with the disaster at Fukushima.<sup>44</sup> Nevertheless, reliable U.S. security assurances, supported by the presence of a large number of U.S. troops in Japan, have played a key role in maintaining Japan's unique forbearance against nuclear weapons. After all, Japan is the world's third largest economy and possesses full control of the nuclear fuel cycle, yet remains a nonnuclear state. Faced with a rising and increasingly assertive China and with a rapidly growing North Korean nuclear ability to target the Japanese islands, Tokyo more than ever relies on U.S. security guarantees to be able to deter aggression without its own autonomous nuclear arsenal. Should the Trump administration question U.S. commitments to its East Asian allies, Tokyo may be pushed to change its policy of nuclear forbearance. As with South Korea, Washington might still attempt to deter Japanese nuclearization by imposing economic sanctions on Japan while denying it credible security guarantees. In our view, despite the deep level of international integration of the Japanese economy and the strong preference of Japanese leaders to remain embedded in the U.S.-led economic order, the dire security situation in which Japan would be left in this scenario would likely lead Tokyo to push toward nuclear acquisition despite any sanctions. The key source of instability in this scenario, however, would stem from Beijing's likely reaction to a Japanese proliferation effort. Given the short breakout period Tokyo enjoys, Beijing's leadership would have to decide fast on China's policy. A preventive counterproliferation strike against Japan would be exceedingly costly and, for now, likely to be beyond the technical capability of the Chinese military, but a forceful Chinese reaction, including threats of military action, is not beyond the realm of the possible. This risk of Japanese nuclear acquisition would, of course, be compounded by eventual South Korean nuclearization. Were Seoul to build an autonomous nuclear arsenal, Tokyo would be greatly tempted to do so as well. In what concerns U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy, then, U.S. security commitments to each of its two main East Asian allies are deeply interconnected. The removal of U.S. security guarantees to either South Korea or Japan would trigger a process that would vastly augment instability in East Asia.

### Specifically, for NFU

**Quilop 16** (2016, Raymund Jose G. Quilop is the assistant secretary for assessments and international affairs in the Philippines' Department of National Defense, “No-first-use: Best to maintain ambiguity”, <https://thebulletin.org/roundtable/us-no-first-use-the-view-from-asia/>)

Declaring a no-first-use policy could also undermine the credibility of the nuclear umbrella that the United States extends to its partners and this could lead allies to produce nuclear weapons of their own. Japan, if it decides to produce nuclear weapons, has both the technology and the fissile material to do so easily. South Korea, with its strong technology base and its large civilian nuclear energy sector, is also eminently capable of developing nuclear weapons. If such scenarios play

out—if allies began to doubt US security assurances—no-first-use would contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and undermine efforts to eliminate them.

### That goes nuclear

**Tan 15** (2015, Andrew Tan is an Associate Professor at the University of New South Wales. “Security and Conflict in East Asia”, p. 31)

East Asia’s arms race leads to the classic problem of the security dilemma, in which a state that is perceived as becoming too powerful leads to counter-acquisitions by other states. This results in misperceptions, conflict spirals, heightened tensions and ultimately open conflict, thereby destroying the very security that arms are supposed to guarantee (Jervis 1976). East Asia’s sustained economic rise since the end of the Korean War in 1953 and the lack of any major conflict since has lulled many into believing that growing economic interdependence will make war unlikely in that region (Khoo 2013: 47-48). However, this is a false premise as significant historical antagonisms have remained. Japan’s imperialism prior to 1945 and its failure adequately to account for its past continues to stir up strong nationalist emotions in China and South Korea. In addition, the divisions between North Korea and South Korea are as strong as intractable as ever, leading to an arms race on the Korean peninsula. The situation is compounded by the weakness or absence of regional institutions, regimes and laws that could regulate interstate relations, build trust and confidence- and security-building measures which were in place in Europe during the Cold War and helped to calm tensions as well as contain the arms race exist in Asia. Within East Asia itself, the Six-Party Talks have focused only on the Korean issue and have not managed to stem North Korea’s open brinkmanship that in early 2013 almost brought the Korean peninsula to war again. The arms race in East Asia is dangerous owing to the increased risk of miscalculation as a result of misperception. Chinese policymakers appear to be convinced that Japan is dominated by right-wing conservatives bent on reviving militarism (Glosserman 2012). At the same time, there is also a perception within China that given its growing strength, it should now aggressively assert what it perceives to be its legitimate claims in the East and South China Seas. Thus, China’s nationalist discourse perceives that the problems about disputed territory emanate from other powers, not China (Sutter 2012). The consequences of conflict between China and Japan, on the Korean peninsula or over Taiwan, however, will not stay regional. As a key player in East Asia, the USA, which has security commitments to Japan and South Korea, residual commitments to Taiwan, and troops on the ground in East Asia and in the Western Pacific, will be drawn in. The problem is that any conflict in East Asia is not likely to remain conventional for long. In fact, it is likely that it would rapidly escalate into a nuclear war because three of the key players, namely China, North Korea and the USA, possess nuclear weapons.

### Allied prolif wrecks global non-prolif regime---triggers nuclear war in every hotspot

**Zarate 14** (May 7th, 2014, Robert Zarte is Policy Director of the Foreign Policy Initiative (FPI), “America’s Allies and Nuclear Arms: Assessing the Geopolitics of Nonproliferation in Asia,” [http://www.project2049.net/documents/Zarate\\_America\\_Allies\\_and\\_Nuclear\\_Arms\\_Geopolitics\\_Nonproliferation](http://www.project2049.net/documents/Zarate_America_Allies_and_Nuclear_Arms_Geopolitics_Nonproliferation))

U.S. allies and security partners in Asia and the Middle East would use America’s diminished military power and geopolitical influence as justification to pursue their own nuclear options. If Washington were

perceived as acquiescing in any way to nuclear breakout by Tokyo or Seoul, then we should expect signatories of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968 (NPT),<sup>25</sup> including some U.S. friends, to cite discriminatory doublestandards and even quit the NPT. Likely candidates in the Middle East would include Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf security partners who are already threatened by Iran's drive to rapid nuclear weaponsmaking capability in violation of the NPT and numerous U.N. Security Council Resolutions. In Asia, candidates would include the region's many technologically-advanced and technologically-rising nations. Taiwan might be tempted to restart its reversed nuclear bomb-making efforts from the 1970s and 1980s. Australia, birthplace of the SILEX method of laser enrichment that General Electric hopes someday to commercialize,<sup>26</sup> may see prudence in developing, at the very least, a latent nuclear weapons-making capability. So might partners like Singapore, Indonesia and Vietnam, China, Russia, North Korea and perhaps others would likely use Japanese and South Korean nuclear breakout—and any accompanying breakdown in the international nuclear order—as an excuse to proliferate, rather overtly, nuclear weapons-making technologies or nuclear weapons themselves to problematic states. Moreover, the United States could expect Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang, if not also India and Pakistan, potentially to ramp up the size and capabilities of their respective nuclear arsenals. In terms of strategic nuclear forces, the regional and global distribution of military power would shift further against America's advantage. Nuclear war would likely go from being in the background of interstate conflicts in Asia, the Middle East, and other regions, to the immediate foreground. In turn, the worsening nuclear dimensions of the international security environment would gravely strain the formal security guarantees of America's treaty-based bilateral alliances and informal guarantees of its bilateral security partnerships.

## Saudi Prolif

### **The plan undermines US assurances to Saudi Arabia — causes proliferation**

**Kahan 16** — Jerome H. Kahan, Director of Regional Studies at the Center for Naval Analyses, member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute of Strategic Studies, former Adjunct Professor in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, former Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, 2016. (“Security Assurances for the Gulf States: A Bearable Burden?”, Middle East Policy, Volume 23, Number 3, Fall 2016, Available Online at: <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/mepo.12214> Accessed 8-27-2018)

The uncertain and dangerous environment in the Middle East demands that the GCC states remain convinced that the United States will indeed stand behind our security assurances, including our extended-deterrence and nuclear-umbrella guarantees. We should recognize that “in today’s international environment ‘deterrence’ should mean convincing the adversary not to attack because he will calculate that any such attempt would likely fail to achieve its political or military objectives and therefore not be worth the investment or the risk.”<sup>35</sup> At the same time, we must accept that it is very demanding to reassure our Gulf allies we will honor our extended deterrence commitment — by being both willing and able to come to their aid if they are threatened — whereas even a small chance of U.S. intervention would tend to have the effect of deterring adversarial actions.<sup>36</sup> This proposition is especially apt if we have to reassure these states that our “nuclear umbrella” will safeguard their security by deterring potential nuclear-armed adversaries, thus obviating their need to acquire such weapons.<sup>37</sup> Special attention should be paid to ensuring the Saudis trust this assurance and do not move to acquire their own nuclear weapons, even if Iran becomes nuclear-armed. To make our assurance more credible, we should reaffirm our nuclear guarantee to Gulf-state leaders in future high-level summits, hold institutionalized exchanges on deterrence and refrain from major reductions in our nuclear forces that might be seen as making our commitment less viable.<sup>38</sup> Additionally, the United States should assure the Gulf allies that we will not allow our nuclear forces to be lowered to levels that cannot support our nuclear assurances, nor adopt a nuclear no-first-use policy.

### **Saudi proliferation causes extinction**

**Edelman et al. 11** — Eric Edelman, Roger Hertog Distinguished Practitioner in Residence at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies, Johns Hopkins University SAIS, Counselor at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, B.A. in History and Government from Cornell University, Ph.D. in U.S. Diplomatic History from Yale University; Andrew Krepinevich, president and chief operating officer of Solarium LLC, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, M.P.A. from Harvard University, Ph.D. from Harvard University; Evan Braden, Senior Fellow and the Director of Research and Studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2011. (“The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran”, Foreign Affairs, January 2011, Available Online at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/persian-gulf/2011-01-01/dangers-nuclear-iran> Accessed 8-28-2018)

There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This “Islamabad option” could develop in one of several different ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the NPT since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on

Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan's weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India's reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT. n-player competition Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multi-polar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents' forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine-based nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to "launch on warning" of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war.

## AT: No Impact

### **Every instance of prolif exponentially increases the risk of nuclear war**

**Quek 16** (Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Hong Kong (Kai, “Nuclear Proliferation and the Use of Nuclear Options,” Political Research Quarterly June 2016 vol. 69 no. 2 195-206, dml) [“N” in “N = 2” refers to the number of states with a nuclear option in a crisis)

Does nuclear proliferation affect the risk that nuclear weapons will be used in a crisis? The question implicates human survival but is difficult to study, as observations of nuclear war do not actually exist. Our empirical knowledge is thus limited. I use experimental games with nuclear options to circumvent the observational constraint and construct empirical tests. I find that decisions are mostly peaceful at N = 2 despite the existence of nuclear options with a relative first-strike advantage. This finding is especially relevant as most nuclear-state confrontations in history had been bilateral crises. More generally, I find that one is less likely to choose the nuclear option when it is known that the number of nuclear actors in the crisis is small, and more likely to choose the nuclear option when it is known that the number of nuclear actors is large. In particular, a jump in the number of nuclear actors in crisis beyond N = 2 significantly increases the chance of choosing the nuclear option. Preliminary probes also suggest that players in inter-alliance crises are more peaceful when they have second-strike countervalue capabilities, and that nuclear framing has no significant effect on the use of the nuclear option. To my knowledge, this is the first randomized experiment in political science that focuses on the relationship between proliferation and the use of nuclear options.<sup>23</sup> In a fortunate world where nuclear war remains unobserved, there are justifications for an experimental approach on theoretical, practical, and ethical grounds. Methodologically, the use of a controlled experiment also allows for a clean identification of the causal relationship. This experiment focuses exclusively on the strategic dimension. It also assumes that the crisis has already escalated to the point where players are considering the use of the nuclear option, and thus it does not address the ex ante question of whether nuclear weapons would make states more cautious about avoiding conflict escalation in the first place (Waltz 2003). Nonetheless, while the focus of the experiment is narrow, it is a useful first step toward understanding the strategic effects of proliferation on the risk of nuclear conflict. Several implications arise for future research. First, with the basic mechanism established, we now have a baseline for future experiments that explore various realistic complications to the nuclear-option game. For instance, do interactions between nuclear actors change when we introduce different types of psychological stress, or different stake sizes, or different asymmetries in the expected cost of nuclear conflict? In particular, an interesting extension of this experiment would be to study how behavior differs—or does not—across interactions with different combinations of nuclear and non-nuclear actors. The results suggest that distrust over the rationality of other players increases with an increase in the N parameter, and weakens the tendency toward the payoff-dominant outcome of peaceful restraint. Thus, proliferation may be dangerous even in a world of states trying to behave rationally, contrary to the arguments made by Waltz (2003) and others in which the common knowledge of rationality is assumed. The results also offer an interesting contrast with Asal and Breadley's (2007) finding that the risk of (non-nuclear) war is higher when the number of nuclear actors in crisis is lower. This contrast raises the hypothesis that States in bilateral crises may choose to drag out a crisis as the risk of nuclear war is lower under N = 2, as suggested by our results.<sup>24</sup> This hypothesis has practical importance and should be investigated in future research.

## Yes Prolif

**Saudis already have the tech to proliferation but assurances is key to deter them**

**Guzansky 15** — Yoel Guzansky, Senior Researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies, visiting Fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, 2015. ("The Saudi Nuclear Genie is Out", *The Washington Quarterly*, Volume 38, Issue 1, May 20<sup>th</sup>, 2015, Available Online at: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0163660X.2015.1038176> Accessed 8-28-2018)

A nuclear deal with Iran—Saudi Arabia's regional rival—was always going to be unwelcome news in Riyadh, as it means that Tehran receives international recognition as a nuclear threshold state. Saudi Arabia views a deal as an increase in Iran's power at Saudi expense. Even before any broad outlines for an agreement were in place, though, the negotiations themselves placed Iran on par with the world's leading superpowers. Which is exactly why Saudi Arabia made contingency plans to keep pace with Iran. In recent years, Riyadh has accelerated its own civilian nuclear development in response—a move that might undermine U.S. nonproliferation endeavors—but will make sure the Kingdom can match any nuclear capabilities Iran is allowed to maintain as part of any final nuclear deal with world powers. While a deal with Iran is unlikely to lead Saudi Arabia to immediately launch a full nuclear military program, it may cause the Kingdom to accelerate its nuclear hedging strategy—building up nuclear infrastructure to keep future options open.<sup>1</sup> Saudi Arabia declared the foundation of its (civilian) nuclear intentions as early as the conclusion of the December 2006 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) annual summit, and since then has been investigating the use of nuclear technology for a variety of purposes. In 2011, Saudi Arabia announced its ambitious plan to build no fewer than sixteen nuclear power plants at an estimated cost of over \$100 billion.<sup>2</sup> One of the concerns associated with such civilian programs is that they could serve as a basis to develop military programs should political circumstances, threat perceptions, and allies' commitments change.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, well before any agreement's conclusion, some of the most senior Saudi princes stated in recent years that if Tehran were granted the "right" to enrich uranium, that would obligate the Kingdom to examine its own nuclear path.<sup>4</sup> In other words, Saudi Arabia wants whatever Iran gets: "I think we should insist on having equal rights for everybody, this is part of the [Non-Proliferation Treaty] arrangement," said Saudi Prince Turki al Faisal, the Kingdom's powerful former intelligence chief.<sup>5</sup> Thus, a major probable consequence of any international deal with Iran was that Saudi Arabia would likely demand equal terms. Although reaching an agreement with Iran on the nuclear issue has probably become the Obama administration's most important priority in the Middle East, reaching the deal, paradoxically, may actually increase, not lower, the probability of a Middle Eastern nuclear arms race. Whatever the case is, a Saudi civilian nuclear program might be hard to reverse, and a deal might not change its course. At this stage, Saudi Arabia is far enough down the road that it is at least committed to a civilian nuclear program. In other words, the cat is out of the bag, or the genie is out of the bottle...choose your cliché for a nascent slow-motion Middle Eastern nuclear arms race.

## South Korea Rearm

**The nuclear umbrella is key to South Korean assurance – they'll prolif without it because they need to deter North Korea, stop escalation dominance, placate domestic calls for a nuclear arsenal, and resist diplomatic leverage from nukes – prefer statements from Korean analysts**

Roehrig 17 [Terence Roehrig, Ph.D., Professor of National Security Affairs and the Director of the Asia-Pacific Studies Group. He has been a Research Fellow at the Kennedy School at Harvard University in the International Security Program and the Project on Managing the Atom and a past President of the Association of Korean Political Studies. He has published numerous books, articles and book chapters on Korean and East Asian security issues, North Korea's nuclear weapons program, the U.S.-South Korea alliance, human rights, and transitional justice. Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence After the Cold War. 2017. Chapter 5. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/roeh15798>]

Second, North Korea must know that it cannot escalate a conflict to nuclear weapons and get away with it without a nuclear response. Phrased another way, North Korea must not be allowed to have escalation dominance in a conflict with the South. In addition, the nuclear umbrella allows South Korea to respond, even escalate, with conventional weapons without fear that North Korea will escalate to nuclear weapons, given the likelihood of nuclear retaliation under the umbrella.<sup>19</sup>

Third, some ROI<sup>20</sup> analysts add that the nuclear umbrella is less about military operations and more about countering any perceived political leverage Pyongyang thinks it may gain with nuclear weapons. North Korea is likely to use its nuclear capability to intimidate the South to obtain political concessions or perhaps to achieve domestic political goals.<sup>20</sup> The nuclear umbrella is necessary to offset any political power that possession of nuclear weapons generates for North Korea.<sup>21</sup> In addition, the nuclear umbrella against North Korea gets China's attention, reminding Beijing of the dangers of nuclear escalation should Pyongyang act in a provocative manner.<sup>22</sup> As a result, Beijing may work harder to restrain the DPRK than it would if there were no nuclear umbrella.

Fourth, the U.S. nuclear umbrella has important implications for ROK domestic politics. When North Korea conducts tests of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, the ROK government comes under great pressure to "do something" to address the threat. The umbrella provides reassurance to the ROK public and provides its leaders with the cover to show they are addressing the threat while avoiding what could be a contentious decision to consider acquiring its own nuclear weapons.<sup>23</sup> Each time North Korea has tested a nuclear weapon, calls for building the South's own nuclear weapons resurfaces. After the January 2016 test, one ROK lawmaker argued, "We cannot borrow an umbrella from a neighbor every time it rains. We need to have a raincoat and wear it ourselves."<sup>24</sup> The U.S. nuclear umbrella provides the needed reassurance in the face of these pressures.

## The nuclear umbrella is the bottle cap that prevents South Korean prolif – current nonnuclear posture is the direct result of the US commitment which is credible now – South Korean statements prove

Roehrig 17 [Terence Roehrig, Ph.D., Professor of National Security Affairs and the Director of the Asia-Pacific Studies Group. He has been a Research Fellow at the Kennedy School at Harvard University in the International Security Program and the Project on Managing the Atom and a past President of the Association of Korean Political Studies. He has published numerous books, articles and book chapters on Korean and East Asian security issues, North Korea's nuclear weapons program, the U.S.-South Korea alliance, human rights, and transitional justice. Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence After the Cold War. 2017. Chapter 5. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/roeh15798>]

In the wake of North Korea's nuclear tests, calls for South Korea to acquire its own nuclear weapons increased, particularly after the last two tests. Again, one of its most vocal advocates was conservative politician Chung Mong-joon, who argued, "We, the Korean people, have been duped by North Korea for the last 20 to 30 years and it is now time for South Koreans to face the reality and do something that we need to do. The nuclear deterrence can be the only answer. We have to have nuclear capability."<sup>96</sup> Other conservative politicians followed suit in calling for a South Korean bomb, and ROI< public opinion provided further support for going nuclear. For example, a poll conducted by the Asan Institute in February 2013, prior to North Korea's third nuclear weapons test, found that 66 percent of South Korean respondents supported a ROK nuclear weapons capability with only 31 percent opposed. These numbers included 58 percent support from Progressives, South Korea's left, and showed a significant increase in those who "strongly support" a nuclear South Korea.<sup>97</sup> Other surveys reported similar results.

After the January 2016 nuclear test, several politicians again spoke out for South Korean nuclear weapons. Conservative party floor leader Won Yoo-chul remarked, "It's time for us to peacefully arm ourselves with nuclear weapons from the perspective of self-defense to fight against North Korea's terror and destruction."<sup>98</sup> Surveys that followed the test also continued to show majority support for acquiring nuclear weapons. However, a study by the Carnegie Endowment compared political elite sentiment, media attention, and polling data from 2013 and 2016 and found that while elite support was relatively consistent and media attention had increased, public support for acquiring nuclear weapons had decreased by as much as 10 percentage points. Although the study points to the difficulty of interpreting the data and the complexity of these views, it concludes that "public opinion is malleable, but support for nuclear options has declined."<sup>99</sup>

Despite these pressures, the ROK government has remained committed to a nuclear-free South Korea. At the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit held at The Hague, President Park reaffirmed her support for a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, asserting that "the journey toward a world without nuclear weapons should start from the Korean Peninsula."<sup>100</sup> According to a former U.S. official, the nuclear umbrella makes an important contribution here in helping to support South Korea's nonnuclear position and relieving pressure on ROK leaders to consider acquiring their own nuclear weapons.<sup>101</sup> Choi and Park maintain, "A strong U.S. security commitment and the

provision of its nuclear umbrella play the role of a ‘bottle cap’ that keeps South Korea from thinking it needs to develop nuclear weapons. Thus the current nonnuclear posture of South Korea is a direct result of the strength and credibility of the U.S. commitment.”<sup>102</sup>

## German Prolif Bad Contention

### **Assurance high now.**

John Andreas **Olsen**, PhD @ Demontfort University, Colonel in the Royal Norwegian Air Force, **6-22-20**, "Understanding NATO," *RUSI Journal*, June 2020.

Europeans have been concerned about President Donald **Trump's** ambivalent commitment to NATO, **but facts are more encouraging than rhetoric**: the **Trump** administration is **spending more** money on defence in Europe **than its predecessor** did.<sup>25</sup> In the immediate run-up to the Brussels Summit, **the Senate voted 97 to 2 to reaffirm the US commitment** to collective defence and in January 2019 the **House** of Representatives **passed the NATO Support Act** by 357 to 22,<sup>26</sup> **rejecting 'any efforts to withdraw the United States from NATO'**.<sup>27</sup> The future of NATO depends on continued American commitment and leadership, but the US also needs European allies in order to remain a global superpower. Europe in turn must take on far greater international responsibility, acting as a unified and capable partner of North America within the scope of a renewed 'transatlantic bargain'.<sup>28</sup>

### **Alliance cred key to stop german prolif.**

**Kühn**, Ulrich; **and Volpe**, Tristan, Fellows in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, '17, "Keine Atombombe, Bitte: Why Germany Should Not Go Nuclear" Foreign Affairs; July/August.

Those **fears have given new life to an old idea: a European nuclear deterrent**. Just **days after Trump's election**, Roderich Kiesewetter, a **senior member of Chancellor Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic Union**, **said that if the United States no longer wanted to provide a nuclear shield, France and the United Kingdom should combine** their nuclear **arsenals into an eu deterrent**, financed through a joint eu military budget. Then, in February, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, **the leader of Poland's ruling Law and Justice party**, **spoke out in favor of the idea of the eu as a "nuclear superpower," as long as** any **eu deterrent matched Russian capabilities**.

Some German commentators even suggested that those proposing a British-French deterrent under the auspices of the eu didn't go far enough. Berthold **Kohler**, one of the publishers of the influential conservative newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, **argued** that the British and French arsenals were too weak to take on Russia. He suggested that **Germany consider "an indigenous nuclear deterrent which could ward off doubts about America's guarantees."** Other German **analysts**, such as Thorsten Benner, **head of the Global Public Policy Institute, in Berlin, and** Maximilian Terhalle, a scholar of international relations, **have come to the same conclusion**. "Germany needs nuclear weapons," Terhalle wrote in Foreign Policy in April.

For now, those calling for a German bomb are a fringe minority. For decades, Germany has stood as one of the world's staunchest supporters of nuclear nonproliferation and global disarmament. In February, a spokesperson for Merkel told the press, "There are no plans for nuclear armament in Europe involving the federal government." She and others evidently

recognize that such plans are a bad idea: a German arsenal would destabilize Eu-Russian relations and heighten the risk that other countries would attempt to go nuclear.

But even though Germany's current nuclear flirtation may reflect nothing more than a passing reaction to Trump's presidency, it reveals a deeper problem: insecurity in Berlin, caused by years of meandering U.S. policy toward Russia and Europe. To solve this problem, Germany and the United States must work together. Merkel's government should encourage the EU to coordinate more effectively on defense. The Trump administration, meanwhile, should double down on the U.S. commitment to the success of the EU and NATO while also pushing for broader negotiations with Russia over the future of European security.

### THE SHADOW OF THE PAST

Over the last decade, Europe has experienced a series of intensifying crises, culminating in Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014. Each time, Germany, as the EU's largest country, has led the response. In 2015, for example, Germany led the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine that resulted in a shaky cease-fire. But every time Germany takes the lead, its neighbors recall history and grow nervous about German hegemony over Europe.

Such fears go back at least as far as the creation of the modern German state in 1871. From then until the country's partition after World War II, European leaders confronted "the German question," a simple but unsolvable dilemma. Germany's size meant that no single European country could ever balance its economic or military power. Yet Germany was never powerful enough to rule over Europe alone. Part of the problem stemmed from the country's so-called Mittellage, its location at the center of Europe, surrounded by potentially hostile coalitions. Germany responded to external threats by pursuing what historians have called its Sonderweg, or "special path," a term used to describe the country's affinity for authoritarian rule and attempts to impose that rule throughout Europe. Whenever it did that, the resulting wars devastated the continent.

Germany's partition-after Hitler led the country's last and most disastrous attempt to rule over Europe-temporarily solved these problems. West Germany could not dominate Europe during the Cold War since the struggle between the East and the West subsumed European rivalries. And after reunification, in 1990, the institutional bonds of the EU and NATO prevented the question from recurring. Surrounded only by friends, Germany did not have to worry about its Mittellage. At the same time, the U.S. military retained a limited presence in Europe (including Germany), and the former western Allies successfully transformed Germany into a peaceful and democratic nation, making the pursuit of Sonderweg unthinkable. The U.S. security guarantee also allowed Germans to maintain their largely antimilitaristic stance, reap the economic benefits of peace, and, at times, claim the moral high ground over Washington for its overreliance on military power.

This halcyon era for Germany ended abruptly in 2009. The Great Recession and the subsequent EU debt crisis led many EU countries to demand German leadership. But when Germany imposed its solutions on the rest of the continent-for example, by insisting that southern European countries follow austere economic policies-it triggered accusations of rising German hegemony. In 2015, for example, the ruling Greek Syriza party claimed that

Germany had threatened "immediate financial strangulation" and "annihilation" of Greece if the Greek government rejected the harsh terms of the proposed eu bailout.

The first major shock to European security came in 2014, when Russia invaded Ukraine. Merkel's once pragmatic relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin deteriorated rapidly. Sidelining the United States, Germany joined France in brokering a shaky truce in eastern Ukraine, led eu efforts to impose sanctions on Russia, and sent German forces to reassure nervous Baltic nato allies. Years of mercurial U.S. policy toward Moscow that veered back and forth between efforts to repel Russian influence in eastern Europe and attempts to "reset" the strained relationship left Germany with little choice but to take the lead.

Against this backdrop, Trump's election heightened the tensions among competing factors: the need for German leadership, the limits of German power, and Europe's intolerance of German dominance. During the campaign, Trump displayed indifference to the possible breakup of the eu and praised nationalist political movements such as the Brexit campaign, a stance that threatened Germany's core political identity as the heart of the eu and put pressure on Berlin to defend the union. Worse still, by declaring nato "obsolete," Trump undermined the system that has kept Europe safe and Germany restrained for over half a century.

But worst of all, by appearing to cozy up to Putin, Trump put Germany in a new Mittellage-this time between the White House and the Kremlin. The effect was not confined to Germany; the prospect of a rapprochement between Putin and Trump has left the entire eu in an uncomfortable position. In January, when Donald Tusk, the president of the European Council, ranked the threats facing the eu, he highlighted not just the traditional menaces of jihadism and Russian aggression but also "worrying declarations by the new American administration." Across the continent, leaders feared that Trump would support populist forces seeking to break up the eu or trade away the U.S. nuclear guarantee of European security in a grand bargain with Russia.

#### A DANGEROUS IDEA

Should Europe find itself caught between a hostile Russia and an indifferent United States, Berlin would feel pressure to defend Europe militarily rather than just politically. But then it would face the problem of how to guarantee European security without reviving fears of German hegemony. And if Germany boosted its military power without integrating it into the European project, that might well lead to German isolation and the breakup of the eu.

Nuclear weapons seem to offer Germany a way out of this impasse. In the eyes of their proponents, they would deter existential threats and reduce European dependence on the United States without raising fears of German dominance. "Nuclear power projection on the part of Berlin would be accepted as legitimate," Terhalle wrote, because "World War II has no real political weight in today's relations." Instead, it is the "perception of threat from Russia" that determines policy in central and eastern European countries. This claim rests on a shaky foundation. Russia's actions in eastern Ukraine may be driving European nations together, but the fear of a German resurgence has not gone away entirely. If Germany built nuclear weapons, the Eu's current unity would quickly fracture.

### **German prolif cascades, causes Russia and Europe war.**

**Ischinger 18** (Wolfgang Ischinger, former German ambassador to the United States, is chairman of the Munich Security Conference and professor for security policy and diplomatic practice at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, August 10, 2018.  
“Acquiring nuclear weapons could blow up in Germany’s face.”  
<https://www.irishexaminer.com/breakingnews/views/analysis/acquiring-nuclear-weapons-could-blow-up-in-germanys-face-861223.html>)

Supporters of a nuclear-armed Germany contend that Nato’s nuclear umbrella has lost all credibility, because of statements made by US president, Donald Trump. **There are at least three good reasons why a nuclear option would be foolhardy for Germany.** For starters, Germany has repeatedly renounced it, first in 1969 by signing (and later ratifying) the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and then in 1990, by signing the so-called Two Plus Four Treaty, which paved the way for German reunification. Casting doubt on these commitments **would severely damage Germany’s reputation and reliability** worldwide. **Germany would call into question the credibility of Nato’s nuclear deterrence, and** thus the alliance itself, along with **the entire nuclear non-proliferation regime.** Since its creation, in 1949, Nato has been one of the world’s most successful instruments of proliferation-prevention. Not a single Nato member state — apart from the United States, the United Kingdom, and France — has found it necessary to acquire nuclear weapons of its own. If Germany were now to break out of its non-nuclear power status, **what would keep Turkey or Poland**, for instance, from **following suit?** Germany as a gravedigger of the international non-proliferation regime — who could want that? **Second, a German nuclear bomb would damage the strategic environment in Europe, to Germany’s disadvantage.** **Russia would interpret German** steps toward a **nuclear arsenal as a direct threat** to its own national security **and would likely adopt military countermeasures.** That, in turn, **would make it even harder to pursue** the vision of a pan-European order of **peace and security**, a core foreign-policy goal of all German governments since that of Konrad Adenauer. Moreover, **a German nuclear ambition might jeopardise the delicate balance of power in Europe — including between Germany and France, for example — with incalculable consequences for the long-term cohesion of the European Union.** Finally, the pursuit of nuclear weapons would draw significant public opposition, especially given that such a move would be a complete about-face for German chancellor, Angela Merkel’s government, which, just a few years ago, moved to phase out nuclear energy altogether. It is difficult to imagine a greater fiasco for German foreign and security policy than proposing a nuclear strategy and then failing to obtain parliamentary approval. There are smarter, long-term ways to bolster Europe’s nuclear defence than introducing a German bomb. For example, France might be willing to consider playing an extended nuclear-deterrence role, along with the US and the UK within Nato. While this would require a fundamental reorientation and Europeanisation of France’s nuclear strategy, Germany and other European partners could offer financial contributions to such an initiative, in the context of a future European defence union with a nuclear component. But these are, at best, long-term options. In short, no matter what Trump says, Germany will remain dependent on the US nuclear umbrella for the foreseeable future. **The best way to maintain Nato’s credibility**, and be taken seriously by the US, is to work assiduously toward the alliance’s 2% of GDP target for defence spending and to invest more heavily in conventional military capabilities — not to satisfy US demands, but to protect our own security and defence interests. But this is not simply about spending more; it is about spending more intelligently, particularly by pooling and sharing capabilities, and by systematic joint procurement with France and other European partners, including through the recently established EU Defence Fund. None of this will work if Germany will not start defining military strategy, security, and defence as top political priorities. Only then will the Bundestag be able to give the Bundeswehr — often referred to as a ‘parliamentary army’ — what it needs to do its job. The alternative — considering the development of **nuclear weapons — would be a game-losing move.**

## **Assurances feed halcyon to the German Sonderweg. US-Russia rapprochement awakens latent nuclear desires.**

**Kühn, Ulrich; and Volpe**, Tristan, Fellows in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, '17, "Keine Atombombe, Bitte: Why Germany Should Not Go Nuclear" Foreign Affairs; July/August.

Those fears have given new life to an old idea: a European nuclear deterrent. Just days after Trump's election, Roderich Kiesewetter, a senior member of Chancellor Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic Union, said that if the United States no longer wanted to provide a nuclear shield, France and the United Kingdom should combine their nuclear arsenals into an eu deterrent, financed through a joint eu military budget. Then, in February, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the leader of Poland's ruling Law and Justice party, spoke out in favor of the idea of the eu as a "nuclear superpower," as long as any eu deterrent matched Russian capabilities.

Some German commentators even suggested that those proposing a British-French deterrent under the auspices of the eu didn't go far enough. Berthold Kohler, one of the publishers of the influential conservative newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, argued that the British and French arsenals were too weak to take on Russia. He suggested that Germany consider "an indigenous nuclear deterrent which could ward off doubts about America's guarantees." Other German analysts, such as Thorsten Benner, head of the Global Public Policy Institute, in Berlin, and Maximilian Terhalle, a scholar of international relations, have come to the same conclusion. "Germany needs nuclear weapons," Terhalle wrote in Foreign Policy in April.

For now, those calling for a German bomb are a fringe minority. For decades, Germany has stood as one of the world's staunchest supporters of nuclear nonproliferation and global disarmament. In February, a spokesperson for Merkel told the press, "There are no plans for nuclear armament in Europe involving the federal government." She and others evidently recognize that such plans are a bad idea: a German arsenal would destabilize Eu-Russian relations and heighten the risk that other countries would attempt to go nuclear.

But even though Germany's current nuclear flirtation may reflect nothing more than a passing reaction to Trump's presidency, it reveals a deeper problem: insecurity in Berlin, caused by years of meandering U.S. policy toward Russia and Europe. To solve this problem, Germany and the United States must work together. Merkel's government should encourage the eu to coordinate more effectively on defense. The Trump administration, meanwhile, should double down on the U.S. commitment to the success of the eu and nato while also pushing for broader negotiations with Russia over the future of European security.

### **THE SHADOW OF THE PAST**

Over the last decade, Europe has experienced a series of intensifying crises, culminating in Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014. Each time, Germany, as the Eu's largest country, has led the response. In 2015, for example, Germany led the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine that resulted in a shaky cease-fire. But every time Germany takes the lead, its neighbors recall history and grow nervous about German hegemony over Europe.

Such fears go back at least as far as the creation of the modern German state in 1871. From then until the country's partition after World War II, European leaders confronted "the German question," a simple but unsolvable dilemma. Germany's size meant that no single European country could ever balance its economic or military power. Yet Germany was never powerful enough to rule over Europe alone. Part of the problem stemmed from the country's so-called Mittellage, its location at the center of Europe, surrounded by potentially hostile coalitions. Germany responded to external threats by pursuing what historians have called its Sonderweg, or "special path," a term used to describe the country's affinity for authoritarian rule and attempts to impose that rule throughout Europe. Whenever it did that, the resulting wars devastated the continent.

Germany's partition-after Hitler led the country's last and most disastrous attempt to rule over Europe-temporarily solved these problems. West Germany could not dominate Europe during the Cold War since the struggle between the East and the West subsumed European rivalries. And after reunification, in 1990, the institutional bonds of the eu and nato prevented the question from recurring. Surrounded only by friends, Germany did not have to worry about its Mittellage. At the same time, the U.S. military retained a limited presence in Europe (including Germany), and the former western Allies successfully transformed Germany into a peaceful and democratic nation, making the pursuit of Sonderweg unthinkable. **The U.S. security guarantee also allowed Germans to maintain their largely antimilitaristic stance**, reap the economic benefits of peace, and, at times, claim the moral high ground over Washington for its overreliance on military power.

This halcyon era for Germany ended abruptly in 2009. The Great Recession and the subsequent eu debt crisis led many eu countries to demand German leadership. But when Germany imposed its solutions on the rest of the continent-for example, by insisting that southern European countries follow austere economic policies-it triggered accusations of rising German hegemony. In 2015, for example, the ruling Greek Syriza party claimed that Germany had threatened "immediate financial strangulation" and "annihilation" of Greece if the Greek government rejected the harsh terms of the proposed eu bailout.

The first major shock to European security came in 2014, when Russia invaded Ukraine. Merkel's once pragmatic relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin deteriorated rapidly. Sidelining the United States, Germany joined France in brokering a shaky truce in eastern Ukraine, led eu efforts to impose sanctions on Russia, and sent German forces to reassure nervous Baltic nato allies. Years of mercurial U.S. policy toward Moscow that veered back and forth between efforts to repel Russian influence in eastern Europe and attempts to "reset" the strained relationship left Germany with little choice but to take the lead.

Against this backdrop, Trump's election heightened the tensions among competing factors: the need for German leadership, the limits of German power, and Europe's intolerance of German dominance. During the campaign, Trump displayed indifference to the possible breakup of the eu and praised nationalist political movements such as the Brexit campaign, a stance that threatened Germany's core political identity as the heart of the eu and put pressure on Berlin to defend the union. Worse still, by declaring nato "obsolete," Trump undermined the system that has kept Europe safe and Germany restrained for over half a century.

But worst of all, by appearing to cozy up to Putin, Trump put Germany in a new Mittellage-  
this time between the White House and the Kremlin. The effect was not confined to  
Germany; the prospect of a rapprochement between Putin and Trump has left the entire eu  
in an uncomfortable position. In January, when Donald Tusk, the president of the European  
Council, ranked the threats facing the eu, he highlighted not just the traditional menaces of  
jihadism and Russian aggression but also "worrying declarations by the new American  
administration." Across the continent, leaders feared that Trump would support populist  
forces seeking to break up the eu or trade away the U.S. nuclear guarantee of European  
security in a grand bargain with Russia.

#### A DANGEROUS IDEA

Should Europe find itself caught between a hostile Russia and an indifferent United States,  
Berlin would feel pressure to defend Europe militarily rather than just politically. But then it  
would face the problem of how to guarantee European security without reviving fears of  
German hegemony. And if Germany boosted its military power without integrating it into  
the European project, that might well lead to German isolation and the breakup of the eu.

Nuclear weapons seem to offer Germany a way out of this impasse. In the eyes of their  
proponents, they would deter existential threats and reduce European dependence on the  
United States without raising fears of German dominance. "Nuclear power projection on the  
part of Berlin would be accepted as legitimate," Terhalle wrote, because "World War II has  
no real political weight in today's relations." Instead, it is the "perception of threat from  
Russia" that determines policy in central and eastern European countries. This claim rests  
on a shaky foundation. Russia's actions in eastern Ukraine may be driving European nations  
together, but the fear of a German resurgence has not gone away entirely. If Germany built  
nuclear weapons, the Eu's current unity would quickly fracture.

#### German prolif cascades, causes Russia war and ends 70 years of European peace.

**Ischinger 18** (Wolfgang Ischinger, former German ambassador to the United States, is  
chairman of the Munich Security Conference and professor for security policy and  
diplomatic practice at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, August 10, 2018.  
"Acquiring nuclear weapons could blow up in Germany's face."

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### **US alliance commitments keep NATO from turning to Chinese 5g. The plan reinforces NATOs suspicions and inspires a shift to Chinese tech.**

Janka Oertel, PhD @ University of Jena, Chatham House Fellow, '19, "V. NATO's China Challenge," Whitehall Papers, 95:1, 67-80, DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2019.1731211

US Vice President Mike Pence prominently raised the issue at the 2019 Munich Security Conference, pushing NATO to place 5G on its agenda. Pence underlined US expectations vis-à-vis its partners: 'The United States has also been very clear with our security partners on the threat posed by Huawei and other Chinese telecom companies ... America is calling on all our security partners to be vigilant and to reject any enterprise that would compromise the integrity of our communications technology or our national security systems'.

37 On a visit to Budapest in 2019, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo reiterated that the choices made with regard to 5G networks would directly affect US military cooperation with the Alliance and could have an effect on the future of interoperability within NATO.<sup>38</sup>

The forcefulness with which Washington pursued its campaign among its European allies is unprecedented in recent years: over the course of 2019, countless official delegations visited European capitals, exchanged notes with the EU and tried to shape public discourse, with mixed success.

Among Allies on NATO's eastern flank, the security and interoperability argument – or the fear that the US might renege on its Article 5 commitments – proved reasonably effective. Estonia, Poland and Romania committed in one way or another to exclude Chinese vendors from

building their 5G infrastructure. Norway's Nortel and Denmark's TDC – the largest mobile operators in the countries – followed suit. In Germany, the Netherlands and Italy fierce domestic discussions are taking place – in Germany with serious anti-US undertones.<sup>39</sup> The emotional debate over the issue underlines existing rifts in the transatlantic relationship, which are reinforced by changes in the geopolitical realities of the 21st century that are manifested by the growing importance of the economic relationship with China for most Allies.

The latest leaders' meeting in London serves as an indication that 5G represents just the beginning of a new conversation about China within NATO. Discussions underscored the need to address, as the Declaration stated, the 'breadth and scale of new technologies to maintain our technological edge, while preserving our values and norms. ... NATO and Allies, within their respective authority, are committed to ensuring the security of our communications, including 5G, recognising the need to rely on secure and resilient systems'. <sup>40</sup> 5G is the first test case for NATO unity when it comes to resisting China's economic influence.

### Chinese influence in eastern Europe key to global tech norm setting.

Frances G. Burwell et al, distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a senior director at McLarty Associates, Jörn Fleck, associate director at the Atlantic Council's Future Europe Initiative, Eileen Kannengeiser, project assistant at the Atlantic Council's Future Europe Initiative. **8-13-2020**, "Beyond 5G, Central Europe will be key to countering Chinese technological influence," Atlantic Council, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/beyond-5g-central-europe-will-be-key-to-countering-chinese-technological-influence/>

Still, Pompeo's overly narrow focus on 5G and containing Huawei in CEE—as valid as the security concerns may be—risks missing a much bigger challenge. The CEE region and technology frontiers beyond 5G are two of the major arenas in which great-power competition will play out. To effectively counter China's influence in these areas, the United States should consider ways to broaden its narrative and embrace the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as strategic partners.

In Central and Eastern Europe, Chinese influence extends beyond 5G infrastructure—a reality overlooked by the US fixation on Huawei. To truly develop a defensive strategy and even transition to offense, the United States should push to educate its CEE partners on the risks of Chinese investment. As European public opinion on China worsens, the United States should seize the opportunity to build a strategic partnership with the CEE region to drive innovation. A number of CEE countries are already among the leaders in key areas such as cybersecurity and artificial intelligence (AI). And as Europe's frontier with Russia, the CEE region has painful memories of, and a heightened sensitivity toward, great-power meddling. If stronger regional entrepreneurship materializes, China will no longer be able to buy influence in Central and Eastern Europe and will, instead, be forced to compete with CEE companies.

To drive innovation and mitigate Chinese influence over global norms, the United States should prioritize its strategic partnership with Europe to develop global rules on key digital technologies and their application. Current transatlantic disagreements distract from China's attempts to corner critical domains in the global economy and shape future technology standards. As the

**United States and Europe clash over regulation**—from data-sharing to content removal, taxation, and the development of AI and cloud technology—**China is advancing alternative rules, standards, and behaviors that align with authoritarian objectives.**

CEE countries are **natural allies** in helping the United States stake out a common transatlantic position on digital rules and regulation. Actors in the region are more skeptical of the instinct of other EU member states to regulate the domain, viewing excessive rules as an impediment to innovation and entrepreneurship. Such an engagement strategy could encourage more dynamic digital innovation while mobilizing indigenous opposition to undue foreign influence. Moreover, expanding the conversation to highlight the region's role as a policy influencer and digital innovator will also help to engage CEE countries that are marginalized by the overly narrow focus on 5G, including Hungary and Slovakia—two countries that were excluded from Pompeo's trip.

### **Chinese tech leadership destroys the liberal order.**

Michael **Abramowitz**, president of freedom house, **And** Michael **Chertoff**, chairman of freedom house and former homeland security secretary and chief executive of the Chertoff Group, **'18**, "Opinion," Washington Post, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-global-threat-of-chinas-digital-authoritarianism/2018/11/01/46d6d99c-dd40-11e8-b3f0-62607289efee\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-global-threat-of-chinas-digital-authoritarianism/2018/11/01/46d6d99c-dd40-11e8-b3f0-62607289efee_story.html)

Officials in Beijing are providing governments around the world with technology and training that enable them to control their own citizens. As Chinese companies compete with their international counterparts in crucial fields such as artificial intelligence and 5G mobile service, the **democratic norms that long governed the global Internet are falling by the wayside**. When it comes to Internet freedom, many governments are eager to buy the restrictive model that China is selling.

The Chinese Communist Party leadership is quite open about its intention to replace the liberal international order **with its own authoritarian vision**, a project that clearly extends to the digital sphere.

The “Belt and Road Initiative,” an ambitious bid to project Chinese influence around the world through bilateral loans and infrastructure projects, includes a major emphasis on information technology. Of the 65 countries examined by “Freedom on the Net,” Freedom House’s global assessment of Internet freedom published Thursday, 38 were found to have installed large-scale telecommunications equipment from leading Chinese companies such as Huawei, ZTE or the state-owned China Telecom. Huawei is building Latin America’s largest public WiFi network in Mexico, Bangladesh’s 5G mobile network and Cambodia’s 4.5G service, and it is advising the Kenyan government on its “master plan” for information and communication technologies.

As these firms build a “digital Silk Road” linking host nations through fiber-optic cables, experts have warned that the equipment may facilitate surveillance by Chinese intelligence services. In January, it was reported that the Chinese-built IT network of the African Union headquarters in Ethiopia had been transmitting confidential data to Shanghai daily for five years.

Some Chinese companies are focused explicitly on exporting surveillance technology. In 18 of the 65 countries assessed by Freedom House — including Zimbabwe, Singapore and several Eurasian countries — enterprises such as Yitu, CloudWalk and the partly state-owned Hikvision are combining advances in artificial intelligence and facial recognition to create “Smart Cities” and sophisticated surveillance systems. This allows authoritarian-leaning governments to identify and track citizens’ everyday movements.

Chinese authorities’ relentless persecution of Muslims in the country’s Xinjiang region provides a disturbing preview of these tools’ potential. Residents are tracked through surveillance drones, ubiquitous street cameras and obligatory spyware apps on their phones. Suspicions of “untrustworthiness” may land individuals in one of Xinjiang’s secretive “reeducation” camps.

Beijing is not only transferring its repressive technology to like-minded governments abroad, but is also inviting those governments’ officials and media elites to China for training on how to control dissent and manipulate online opinion. Chinese officials have held training sessions on new media or information management with representatives from 36 out of the 65 countries that Freedom House surveyed. During a two-week seminar last year, visiting officials toured the headquarters of a company involved in “big data public-opinion management systems.”

Democracies need to take immediate action to slow China’s techno-dystopian expansionism. Governments should impose sanctions on companies that knowingly provide technology designed for repressive crackdowns in places such as Xinjiang. Legislators in the United States should reintroduce and pass the Global Online Freedom Act, which would direct the secretary of state to designate Internet-freedom-restricting countries and prohibit the export to those countries of any items that could be used to carry out censorship or repressive surveillance. The law would also require tech companies operating in repressive environments to release annual reports on what they are doing to protect human rights and freedom of information.

But the best way for democracies to stem the rise of digital authoritarianism is to prove that there is a better model for managing the Internet. We will have to tackle social media manipulation and misuse of data in a manner that respects human rights, while also preserving an Internet that is global, free and secure.

Policymakers should undertake serious efforts to protect critical infrastructure and citizens’ personal data from misuse by governments, companies and criminals. Tech companies should dramatically scale up their work with civil-society experts to maximize their own transparency and ensure that their platforms are not being misused to spread disinformation. As the 2016 elections in the United States showed, more-responsible management of social media and stronger privacy rights are needed to prevent malicious actors from exploiting open societies to undermine democracy.

Beijing is working hard to propagate its system around the world. If democracies fail to advance their own principles and interests with equal determination, digital authoritarianism threatens to become the new reality for all of us.

## LIO solves extinction – only liberal democratic frameworks can adapt to apocalyptic technology.

Deudney and Ikenberry, PhDs, 18

(Daniel, PoliSci@JohnsHopkins, G. John , InternationalAffairs@Princeton, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-06-14/liberal-world, 6-14)

In many respects, today's liberal democratic malaise is a byproduct of the liberal world order's success. After the Cold War, that order became a global system, expanding beyond its birthplace in the West. But as free markets spread, problems began to crop up: economic inequality grew, old political bargains between capital and labor broke down, and social supports eroded. The benefits of globalization and economic expansion were distributed disproportionately to elites. Oligarchic power bloomed. A modulated form of capitalism morphed into winnertake- all casino capitalism. Many new democracies turned out to lack the traditions and habits necessary to sustain democratic institutions. And large flows of immigrants triggered a xenophobic backlash. Together, these developments have called into question the legitimacy of liberal democratic life and created openings for opportunistic demagogues. Just as the causes of this malaise are clear, so is its solution: a return to the fundamentals of liberal democracy. Rather than deeply challenging the first principles of liberal democracy, the current problems call for reforms to better realize them. To reduce inequality, political leaders will need to return to the social democratic policies embodied in the New Deal, pass more progressive taxation, and invest in education and infrastructure. To foster a sense of liberal democratic identity, they will need to emphasize education as a catalyst for assimilation and promote national and public service. In other words, the remedy for the problems of liberal democracy is more liberal democracy; liberalism contains the seeds of its own salvation. Indeed, liberal democracies have repeatedly recovered from crises resulting from their own excesses. In the 1930s, overproduction and the integration of financial markets brought about an economic depression, which triggered the rise of fascism. But it also triggered the New Deal and social democracy, leading to a more stable form of capitalism. In the 1950s, the success of the Manhattan Project, combined with the emerging U.S.-Soviet rivalry, created the novel threat of a worldwide nuclear holocaust. That threat gave rise to arms control pacts and agreements concerning the governance of global spaces, deals forged by the United States in collaboration with the Soviet Union. In the 1970s, rising middle-class consumption led to oil shortages, economic stagnation, and environmental decay. In response, the advanced industrial democracies established oil coordination agreements, invested in clean energy, and struck numerous international environmental accords aimed at reducing pollutants. The problems that liberal democracies face today, while great, are certainly not more challenging than those that they have faced and overcome in these historically recent decades. Of course, there is no guarantee that liberal democracies will successfully rise to the occasion, but to count them out would fly in the face of repeated historical experiences. Today's dire predictions ignore these past successes. They suffer from a blinding presentism. Taking what is new and threatening as the master pattern is an understandable reflex in the face of change, but it is almost never a very good guide to the future. Large-scale human arrangements such as liberal democracy rarely change as rapidly or as radically as they seem to in the moment. If history is any guide, today's illiberal populists and authoritarians will evoke resistance and countermovements. THE RESILIENT ORDER After World War II, liberal democracies joined together to create an international order that reflected their shared interests.

And as is the case with liberal democracy itself, the order that emerged to accompany it cannot be easily undone. For one thing, it is deeply embedded. Hundreds of millions, if not billions, of people have geared their activities and expectations to the order's institutions and incentives, from farmers to microchip makers. However unappealing aspects of it may be, replacing the liberal order with something significantly different would be extremely difficult. Despite the high expectations they generate, revolutionary moments often fail to make enduring changes. It is unrealistic today to think that a few years of nationalist demagogery will dramatically undo liberalism. Growing interdependence makes the order especially difficult to overturn. Ever since its inception in the eighteenth century, liberalism has been deeply committed to the progressive improvement of the human condition through scientific discovery and technological advancements. This Enlightenment project began to bear practical fruits on a large scale in the nineteenth century, transforming virtually every aspect of human life. New techniques for production, communication, transportation, and destruction poured forth. The liberal system has been at the forefront not just of stoking those fires of innovation but also of addressing the negative consequences. Adam Smith's case for free trade, for example, was strengthened when it became easier to establish supply chains across global distances. And the age-old case for peace was vastly strengthened when weapons evolved from being simple and limited in their destruction to the city-busting missiles of the nuclear era. Liberal democratic capitalist societies have thrived and expanded because they have been particularly adept at stimulating and exploiting innovation and at coping with their spillover effects and negative externalities. In short, liberal modernity excels at both harvesting the fruits of modern advance and guarding against its dangers. This dynamic of constant change and ever-increasing interdependence is only accelerating. Human progress has caused grave harm to the planet and its atmosphere, yet climate change will also require unprecedented levels of international cooperation. With the rise of bioweapons and cyberwarfare, the capabilities to wreak mass destruction are getting cheaper and ever more accessible, making the international regulation of these technologies a vital national security imperative for all countries. At the same time, global capitalism has drawn more people and countries into cross-border webs of exchange, thus making virtually everyone dependent on the competent management of international finance and trade. In the age of global interdependence, even a realist must be an internationalist. The international order is also likely to persist because its survival does not depend on all of its members being liberal democracies. The return of isolationism, the rise of illiberal regimes such as China and Russia, and the general recession of liberal democracy in many parts of the world appear to bode ill for the liberal international order. But contrary to the conventional wisdom, many of its institutions are not uniquely liberal in character. Rather, they are Westphalian, in that they are designed merely to solve problems of sovereign states, whether they be democratic or authoritarian. And many of the key participants in these institutions are anything but liberal or democratic. Consider the Soviet Union's cooperative efforts during the Cold War. Back then, the liberal world order was primarily an arrangement among liberal democracies in Europe, North America, and East Asia. Even so, the Soviet Union often worked with the democracies to help build international institutions. Moscow's committed antiliberal stance did not stop it from partnering with Washington to create a raft of arms control agreements. Nor did it stop it from cooperating with Washington through the World Health Organization to spearhead a global campaign to eradicate smallpox, which succeeded in completely eliminating the disease by 1979. More recently, countries of all stripes have crafted global rules to guard against environmental destruction. The signatories to the Paris climate agreement, for example, include such autocracies as China, Iran, and Russia. Westphalian approaches have also thrived when it comes to governing the commons, such

as the ocean, the atmosphere, outer space, and Antarctica. To name just one example, the 1987 Montreal Protocol, which has thwarted the destruction of the ozone layer, has been actively supported by democracies and dictatorships alike. Such agreements are not challenges to the sovereignty of the states that create them but collective measures to solve problems they cannot address on their own. Most institutions in the liberal order do not demand that their backers be liberal democracies; they only require that they be status quo powers and capable of fulfilling their commitments. They do not challenge the Westphalian system; they codify it. The UN, for example, enshrines the principle of state sovereignty and, through the permanent members of the Security Council, the notion of great-power decision-making. All of this makes the order more durable. Because much of international cooperation has nothing at all to do with liberalism or democracy, when politicians who are hostile to all things liberal are in power, they can still retain their international agendas and keep the order alive. The persistence of Westphalian institutions provides a lasting foundation on which distinctively liberal and democratic institutions can be erected in the future. Another reason to believe that the liberal order will endure involves the return of ideological rivalry. The last two and a half decades have been profoundly anomalous in that liberalism has had no credible competitor. During the rest of its existence, it faced competition that made it stronger. Throughout the nineteenth century, liberal democracies sought to outperform monarchical, hereditary, and aristocratic regimes. During the first half of the twentieth century, autocratic and fascist competitors created strong incentives for the liberal democracies to get their own houses in order and band together. And after World War II, they built the liberal order in part to contain the threat of the Soviet Union and international communism. The Chinese Communist Party appears increasingly likely to seek to offer an alternative to the components of the existing order that have to do with economic liberalism and human rights. If it ends up competing with the liberal democracies, they will again face pressure to champion their values. As during the Cold War, they will have incentives to undertake domestic reforms and strengthen their international alliances. The collapse of the Soviet Union, although a great milestone in the annals of the advance of liberal democracy, had the ironic effect of eliminating one of its main drivers of solidarity. The bad news of renewed ideological rivalry could be good news for the liberal international order.



## **Precision Guided Munitions Shift Bad Contention**

## PGMS Case Contention

### **Restrictions on nuclear first-use force short-term conventional modernization**

**Gerson 10** (Michael S. - research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, "No First Use The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy," p. 40, *International Security*, Vol. 35, No. 2, [https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC\\_a\\_00018](https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00018))

Third, NFU places primary emphasis on U.S. conventional forces. By relegating nuclear weapons to the sole mission of retaliation for nuclear attacks, the United States would make conventional forces the sole instrument of warfighting absent an opponent's nuclear escalation. Given U.S. advantages in conventional power, this is precisely the level where it should want to fight. NFU would place a necessary and important burden on the [DOD] Defense Department to maintain superior conventional forces and power-projection capabilities against any conceivable threat. This responsibility would ensure that political and military leaders would not again be tempted, as they were in the early period of the Cold War, to rely on the threat of nuclear escalation as a cost-efficient alternative to expending the effort and resources to maintain conventional superiority

### **That leads to CPGS deployment—seen as an alternative to nukes**

**Grossman 8** (Elaine M. - contributing correspondent, "Strategic Arms Funds Tilt Conventional in 2009," 11/7/8, <http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/strategic-arms-funds-tilt-conventional-in-2009/>)

WASHINGTON — With the u.s. Congress having eliminated funds for a Bush administration proposal to develop a new nuclear warhead for the second year in a row, the focus of the strategic arms budget for fiscal 2009 has largely turned to conventional weaponry (see GSN, Sept. 15). The trend might just sit well with President-elect Barack Obama, who said last year that, if voted into the White House, he would "take the lead to work for a world in which the roles and risks of nuclear weapons can be reduced and ultimately eliminated." The impending rise of long-range conventional arms comes principally in the form of two futuristic efforts: an Air Force "Conventional Strike Missile" and an Army "Advanced Hypersonic Weapon." These are the leading candidates to become "prompt global strike" weapons, which defense leaders envision as a partial alternative to nuclear arms under limited circumstances (see GSN, Oct. 29). For the new fiscal year, Congress has appropriated nearly \$82 million to develop prompt strike weapons, while zeroing a requested \$33 million in Defense and Energy department funds for design work on a Reliable Replacement Warhead to upgrade the nuclear stockpile. "A nuclear weapon is still a viable part of our inventory, but ... one size does not fit all," Gen. James Cartwright — at the time the top U.S. strategic commander — told a Senate Armed Services panel in March 2006. "What we'd like to do is ... field a [conventional] weapon that will give us a broader and potentially more appropriate choice for the nation." For the emerging conventional mission, the Defense Department seeks the capacity to attack targets anywhere around the world within 60 minutes of a launch order. Commanders have said such a capability could be crucial if the nation were confronted by a serious but fleeting threat, such as a terrorist leader pinpointed at a safe house or a weapon of mass destruction being readied for firing by a rogue nation. Currently, the only U.S. weapons with sufficient range and speed to undertake the mission are nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. As a U.S. president would be unlikely to launch a nuclear weapon against such targets, conventional ballistic missiles should be developed that might be used more readily, defense leaders have argued (see GSN, May 28). In light of the appropriately extreme reluctance to use nuclear weapons, conventional prompt global strike could be of particular value in some important scenarios in that it would eliminate the dilemma of having to choose between responding to a sudden threat either by using nuclear weapons or by not responding at all," stated an August report by a National Academy of Sciences panel (see GSN, Aug. 15).

### **Short-term CPGS is deployed on existing ballistic technology**

**Woolf 18** (Amy F. - Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy at Library of Congress, "Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues," p. 32-33, *Congressional Research Service*, 4/6/18, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41464.pdf>)

The Air Force considered two types of warheads for the CPGS mission.<sup>41</sup> One of these would contain kinetic energy projectiles, like the flechettes described above, that would be fused to disperse over a wide area after release from the payload delivery vehicle. The delivery body could also carry an explosive warhead to enhance its capability to penetrate and destroy hardened and buried targets.

These munitions could be delivered by a hypersonic glide vehicle should such a system become operational. However, if the United States determined that it needed a conventional PGS capability in the near term, before the boost-glide technology was ready for deployment, these munitions might be deployed in existing reentry vehicles that follow a ballistic trajectory to their targets, like those currently deployed on U.S. nuclear-armed missiles.

### That makes nuclear war inevitable—Russia miscalc

**Woolf 18** (Amy F. - Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy at Library of Congress, “Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues,” p. 32-33, *Congressional Research Service*, 4/6/18, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41464.pdf>)

Many analysts have also argued that the deployment of CPGS might upset strategic stability and increase the likelihood of nuclear war. Although the U.S. President might choose to initiate a conflict or respond to a threat with a conventional attack, it is not clear that the adversary would know that the incoming weapons carried conventional warheads. Moreover, the United States would not be able to control the adversary's reaction or the escalation of the conflict, particularly if the adversary possessed nuclear weapons. Hence, by making the start of the war “easier” the deployment of conventional warheads on ballistic missiles might, in this view, actually make the eventual use of nuclear weapons more likely. Russian officials have expressed a number of concerns about U.S. conventional prompt global strike capabilities and their implications for strategic stability.<sup>98</sup> They have argued that these weapons, even if armed with conventional warheads, could threaten critical targets in Russia and even threaten Russia's strategic nuclear forces if the United States deployed large numbers of missiles armed with highly accurate reentry vehicles. This might provide the United States with the capability to undermine Russia's nuclear deterrent, without resorting to the first use of nuclear weapons, and might actually increase the likelihood of a U.S. attack against Russia. Moreover, even if Russia were not the target of an attack with these missiles, it might not know whether the missile carried a nuclear warhead or a conventional warhead, or whether it was headed towards a target in Russia. Finally, some Russians have argued that the United States might replace the conventional warheads with nuclear warheads to exceed the limits in a treaty.<sup>99</sup>



## Impact

Filling the nuclear gap with strategic conventional strike outweighs:

- A.) The U.S. thinks reducing nuclear reliance reduces fears even though the opposite is true. Nuclear threats have been contained for decades, but this dangerous divide creates unique pressures for miscalc and deterrence failure. Empirics disprove benefits – Obama's NPR proves nuclear de-emphasis isn't effective.

**Bradley 16**, [joined the National Institute for Public Policy as an analyst in 2007. She currently provides on-site support at United States Strategic Command in the Plans and Policy Directorate as part of the Deterrence Analysis Plans Support group, Increasing Uncertainty, [www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1001632.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1001632.pdf)]

Implications for Nuclear Deterrence

A gulf exists between how the United States and Russia/China view the value of nuclear weapons. These adversarial perceptions are well documented, predating the development and release of the NPR, but were not taken into account during drafting of the new policy. The US decision to rely less on nuclear weapons to meet its national security needs, instead bridging the gap with advanced conventional capabilities, did not have the desired effect on our adversaries. Instead of inspiring confidence, it reinforced some of their worst fears.

The NPR overstated the improvement in US-Russia relations, and the US declaration that Russia was not an enemy did not consider how Russia viewed the relationship. Failure to take into account that country's deep-seated suspicion of the United States invalidated the NPR's assumption that improved ties would allow the United States to rely less on nuclear weapons. Further, US policy and Russian policy do not agree on the usability of nuclear weapons. The US desire to decrease the role of nuclear weapons and compensate with conventional weapons suggests that US policy makers do not feel that nuclear weapons are usable. However, this perception contrasts with Russia's nuclear doctrine and statements, which have been consistent for well over a decade, that these weapons are quite usable. These differences are further emphasized as the United States debates unilateral reduction in nuclear capabilities while Russia violates a landmark arms-control treaty to increase the types and capabilities of its nuclear arsenal to gain a strategic advantage.<sup>46</sup> This situation creates a dangerous divide that has the potential for miscalculation and deterrence failure.

Both Russia and China are concerned with US use of advanced conventional capabilities in a strategic manner to negate their nuclear deterrent. According to the NPR, the United States has the strongest conventional capabilities in the world and an alliance system that further augments those capabilities. America has also demonstrated its willingness to use conventional power repeatedly over the last 25 years. The very usability of conventional precision-strike weapons capable of creating effects once reserved only for nuclear forces undermines deterrence by creating or reinforcing perceptions in our adversaries that their nuclear forces are vulnerable and that the United States may have an incentive to strike them. Both China and Russia are reevaluating their nuclear doctrines and relying more on nuclear weapons to counter this perceived threat.

**B.) Nuclear reliance forces cooperation by creating clear, destructive costs for conflict – this checks their impact but don't contain the DA because conventional reliance removes this incentive for diplomacy.**

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Relations with other nuclear powers have been fairly cooperative and benign since the end of the Cold War. Crises that arose were managed, and peaceful solutions have been negotiated, contributing to the mistaken belief that nuclear weapons are no longer relevant. However, could it be that those weapons encourage leaders to be benign and cooperative?<sup>48</sup> In 1946 J. Robert Oppenheimer reflected that "it did not take atomic weapons to make man want peace. But the atomic bomb was the turn of the screw. It has made the prospect of war unendurable."<sup>49</sup> That is, far from being unusable, nuclear weapons are used every day to encourage compromise in international relations because failure to compromise may lead to the unthinkable.

In drafting the NPR, the US government failed to consider the perceptions of our adversaries or to tailor strategy to the unique threat that each poses. As we have pointed out, deterrence is a psychological function in the mind of the adversary. Failure to acknowledge and account for how our enemies view their security environment, their relationship with the United States, their unique history and culture, or the value they place on nuclear weapons to meet their security needs has made our deterrence relationships potentially less stable. Increasing our emphasis on conventional weapons that adversaries view as more usable and a threat to their nuclear arsenals has caused them to feel insecure. To counter this trend, they have modernized and increased the size of their arsenals and rely more on nuclear weapons to meet their security needs.

Nuclear deterrence has always been a risky proposition, and the fact that it has not failed in the past 70 years may have as much to do with our deterrence strategy as plain luck. But as risky as relying on nuclear deterrence is, it is still the "least bad" option and has not lost its relevance. Therefore, it is important that we strive to understand our adversaries as we develop and implement our nuclear-deterrent strategies so that we do not undermine its effectiveness. Nuclear deterrence may be much more fragile than any of us realize. It is imperative that we do not take the "nuclear taboo" for granted by assuming that our adversaries place the same value on the relevance of nuclear weapons that we do.

**C.) Prevents Solvency – if other countries fear conventional weapons more than nukes, they would obviously not cooperate or limit their own nukes after the plan! This means there is only a risk of our offense.**

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Conclusion

From nuclear weapons' pinnacle of importance at the end of the Cold War to today, the United States has steadily decreased the attention paid to its nuclear arsenal and strategy, but nuclear deterrence has not decreased in its overall importance. It is clear that our adversaries place much more value in their nuclear arsenals than does the United States, precisely

to deter America's unmatched conventional power. The US decision to rely more on conventional weapons to achieve nuclear deterrence has created dangerous potential for miscalculation in its deterrent relationships with Russia and China.

The United States has fallen into a "mirror imaging" trap by assuming that other nations place the same low value on nuclear weapons that it does and that they have the same priority of reaching "Global Zero." The Obama administration has even gone so far as to recommend unilateral nuclear reductions, which were made outside arms-control negotiations with Russia.<sup>47</sup> Part of this policy is that other nuclear-armed nations will follow the US example and choose to reduce the size of their nuclear arsenal. This assumption does not take into account how our opponents interpret their security environment and the role that nuclear weapons play in safeguarding their interests.

## CPGS

### **CPGS fails due to technical difficulties**

**Action 15** (James, CO-DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR POLICY PROGRAM, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Prompt Global Strike: American and Foreign Developments," 12/8, House testimony, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/12/08/prompt-global-strike-american-and-foreign-developments/imuy>)

Without the right enabling capabilities—command and control; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and battle damage assessment—**CPGS weapons could prove unusable**. So far **these support systems appear to have received insufficient attention**. Current deficiencies are clearly illustrated by the difficulty of destroying mobile targets, such as road-mobile missiles. **All of the potential missions for CPGS weapons could present this challenge**. Locating and tracking mobile targets is very difficult, as the United States learned during the 1991 Gulf War, when it failed to achieve a single confirmed kill of an Iraqi Scud launcher in almost 1,500 sorties. Today, the most plausible means of detecting and tracking mobile targets would be through manned and unmanned surveillance aircraft operating from within or close to the theater of operations. Using these assets to provide targeting data for CPGS weapons would, however, make little sense. If the battlespace permitted the use of aircraft for surveillance, then it would be more effective and cheaper to outfit those same aircraft with strike weapons and use them for offensive operations than to develop a CPGS capability. **Acquiring CPGS weapons to attack mobile targets would make military sense only if the United States also developed a reliable means of remotely locating and tracking these targets**. Plans for such a capability—notably, a globe-spanning network of satellite-based radars—**have repeatedly been canceled, and** to my knowledge, **no program is currently in the works**. Given that this capability would probably cost an order of magnitude more than the CPGS weapons themselves, deficiencies in current enabling capabilities merit immediate attention. Probably **more worrying than specific gaps in enabling capabilities are apparent organizational deficiencies** within the Department of Defense **that may cause this issue to receive insufficient attention**. A 2008 report by the Government Accountability Office expressed concern that major Department of Defense studies did not analyze what enabling capabilities would be required but instead simply “assumed that certain needed improvements...would be available when any future [weapon] system is fielded.” Remarkably, the GAO reported that, in one of these studies—the Prompt Global Strike Analysis of Alternatives—enabling capabilities were not considered because, among other reasons, “the study staff lacks the special access clearances required to obtain information on all [Department of Defense] efforts for improving enabling capabilities.” If **such deficiencies** still persist—as I believe they do—they **severely threaten the viability of any future CPGS weapon system**.

### **CPGS causes Russia miscalc**

**Woolf 18** (Amy F. - Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy at Library of Congress, "Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues," p. 32-33, *Congressional Research Service*, 4/6/18, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41464.pdf>)

Many analysts have also argued that the **deployment of CPGS might upset strategic stability and increase the likelihood of nuclear war**. Although the U.S. President might choose to initiate a conflict or respond to a threat with a conventional attack, **it is not clear that the adversary would know that the incoming weapons carried conventional warheads**. Moreover, **the United States would not be able to control the adversary's reaction or the escalation of the conflict**, particularly if the adversary possessed nuclear weapons. Hence, **by making the start of the war "easier" the deployment of conventional warheads on ballistic missiles might**, in this view, actually **make the eventual use of nuclear weapons more likely**. Russian officials have expressed a number of concerns about U.S. conventional prompt global strike capabilities and their implications for strategic stability.<sup>98</sup> They have argued that **these weapons, even if armed with conventional warheads**, could threaten critical targets in Russia and **even threaten Russia's strategic nuclear forces** if the United States deployed large numbers of

missiles armed with highly accurate reentry vehicles. This might provide the United States with the capability to undermine Russia's nuclear deterrent, without resorting to the first use of nuclear weapons, and might actually increase the likelihood of a U.S. attack against Russia. Moreover, even if Russia were not the target of an attack with these missiles, it might not know whether the missile carried a nuclear warhead or a conventional warhead, or whether it was headed towards a target in Russia. Finally, some Russians have argued that the United States might replace the conventional warheads with nuclear warheads to exceed the limits in a treaty.<sup>99</sup>

## Russia Turn – PGS

### **CPGS causes Russia miscalc**

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## PGS Fails

### **CPGS fails due to technical difficulties**

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## Conventional Forces Won't Deter Russia

### Russia has conventional superiority and geographical advantages

- the EFP is insufficient and allies can't agree on a response

**Kühn 18** [Ulrich Kühn is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and a senior research associate at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP)/James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Preventing Escalation in the Baltics: A Nato Playbook",

[https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Kuhn\\_Baltics\\_INT\\_final\\_WEB.pdf](https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Kuhn_Baltics_INT_final_WEB.pdf)]

The regional imbalance between NATO's and Russia's conventional forces, NATO's own deterrence loopholes, and the geography of the Baltics all make both deliberate and inadvertent escalation possible. Although NATO as a whole has much greater conventional military capabilities than Russia, Moscow enjoys a significant margin of conventional superiority in the wider Baltic region (see map). Russia has been heavily funding and modernizing its aging armed forces over the last decade, making them a credible force again. In addition, Moscow continues to expand its arsenal of long-range cruise missiles and other precision-guided munitions.

To be fair, Russian modernization efforts continue to experience serious setbacks, as a result of widespread corruption and mismanagement, for instance. The Kremlin's goal of equipping 70 percent of its forces with the latest military equipment by 2020 is generally considered largely aspirational.<sup>79</sup> Nevertheless, Western analysts assume that in case of an open military attack on one or more of the Baltic states, Russian forces would most likely overrun Baltic defenses within only a few days, presenting NATO with a military fait accompli.<sup>80</sup>

Recognizing these weaknesses, the NATO allies agreed at the 2016 Warsaw Summit to deploy four multinational battalions—a so-called Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP)—to the three Baltic states and Poland. NATO also agreed to increase the intensity and scope of its exercises in the region to deter Russian aggression and assure its eastern members. Separately, the United States has sent additional forces and military equipment under a U.S. national program known as the European Deterrence Initiative. (See Box 1 for a description of the forces deployed under the EFP and the European Deterrence Initiative.)

NATO force deployments to Eastern Europe—the EFP in particular—are intended to increase pressure on NATO members to respond more forcefully in the event of combat. The logic behind this strategy is that involving NATO forces from a variety of nations in a conflict against Russia—and hence giving them a direct stake in the outcome—would help minimize pressure within the alliance to simply cede to Russia any territory it may take, thus strengthening deterrence and preventing deliberate Russian escalation.

However, the benefits of this multinational approach might be significantly overstated. As some Western analysts have pointed out, a limited, targeted Russian attack could implicate only a small subset of the nations that contribute to the EFP.<sup>82</sup> If Russia were to solely attack, say, Latvia (which has about 5,300 active national personnel), its forces would face about 1,100 additional soldiers from Albania, Canada, Italy, Poland, Slovenia, and Spain—but Russia would not face British, French, German, or U.S. forces.<sup>83</sup> In fact, given that the EFP base in Latvia is located in Ādaži, more than 200 kilometers from the Latvian-Russian border, even the Latvian EFP battlegroup would not necessarily be involved in the initial stages of combat if Russia were to attack and rapidly seize only a small part of eastern Latvia. Moreover, Russia has repeatedly shown that it can muster a force of up to 100,000 personnel in its Western Military District on relatively short notice.<sup>84</sup> The small EFP force that would line up against them would essentially constitute a trip wire that could neither halt nor

**push back a serious Russian intervention.** The main purpose of the EFP personnel would be to ensure that as many NATO allies as possible would be involved in combat, or to put it more bluntly, would die.<sup>85</sup>

### **Reinforcements take months to arrive and can't overcome geographical barriers or A2/AD**

**Kühn 18** [Ulrich Kühn is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and a senior research associate at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP)/James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Preventing Escalation in the Baltics: A Nato Playbook”,

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The grim logic of this arrangement is that once the trip wire is pulled, NATO would be forced to retake the Baltic states if it were to not accept (temporary) defeat at Russia's hands. In the event of a crisis or combat, the EFP could, according to current plans, receive two waves of reinforcements. The first to arrive would be NATO's Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF)—also known as the Spearhead Force—which consists of, at most, 13,000 personnel. The Spearhead is the most rapidly deployable part of the Enhanced NATO Response Force (eNRF) the rest of which would follow later. At most, the complete eNRF consists of 40,000 personnel (including the Spearhead).<sup>86</sup>

Assembling, moving, and deploying those forces would take time. NATO estimates that it would take less than seven days to deploy the Spearhead.<sup>87</sup> Little is known publicly about the readiness of the rest of the eNRF.<sup>88</sup> Some experts believe that “between 30 and 45 days” would be needed “from notice to movement”—a timeline that does not include actual deployment.<sup>89</sup> How long it would take European allies to muster additional credible forces for a potential third wave, given the atrophied state of some European allies' forces, is even less clear.<sup>90</sup> One study concluded that even British, French, or German forces would have a hard time providing a combat-ready heavy brigade at short notice.<sup>91</sup>

Of course, in the event of a crisis, it would be possible for individual NATO states, most notably the United States, to bypass NATO's political command structure and intervene independently ahead of a NATO decision.<sup>92</sup> However, doing so would come at the political price of rendering NATO's collective decisionmaking in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) obsolete. Moreover, given the current U.S. administration's ambiguous commitment to Article V, Washington's willingness to intervene independently is questionable. In any case, all military crisis planning ultimately depends on NATO allies politically agreeing to use force to counter a potential Russian attack. While the decision to enter war with Russia would certainly not be an easy one, it would require a unanimous vote by the twenty-nine members of the NAC.<sup>93</sup>

NATO's long reaction times create another problem—the risk of inadvertent escalation. In the event that Russia threatened a conventional attack, NATO decisionmakers would be under potentially enormous pressure to ready the Spearhead and perhaps also the eNRF as early as possible to prevent deliberate escalation. But Moscow could misinterpret these actions as an imminent threat, leading Russia to rapidly escalate in response.<sup>94</sup> NATO could try to communicate the purposes behind its actions to Russia, but doing so persuasively could be difficult.

To make matters worse, the geography of the Baltics would not be conducive to NATO operations. Russia enjoys considerable strategic depth in its vast Western Military District and has a well-

integrated railroad system to reinforce troops quickly in the event of a conflict. By contrast, NATO allies would have to fly or ship in reinforcements of personnel and military equipment—a much slower process.<sup>95</sup> NATO has decided against pre-positioning equipment in the Baltic states; much U.S. equipment is, for example, based 1,500 kilometers away in Germany. Reinforcing by land would entail multiple challenges, ranging from NATO's atrophied logistics or missing railway links in Eastern Europe to Russia's abilities to hold NATO's transportation nodes at risk.

Particularly the latter represents a serious problem for NATO. The flow of NATO's reinforcements—by air, sea, and land routes—could be disrupted by Russia's substantial modern anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, which are centered in the Kaliningrad enclave and around Saint Petersburg. These capabilities include conventional and dualcapable guided missiles, anti-ship weapons, air defense systems, and several layers of modern radar.<sup>96</sup> If accusations that Russia has violated the INF Treaty are correct, then Moscow might well also possess dual-capable intermediate-range missiles that could be used to target key transport nodes and pre-positioned equipment deep in Western Europe.

### **Russia has conventional superiority and geographical advantages**

- the EFP is insufficient and allies can't agree on a response

**Kühn 18** [Ulrich Kühn is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and a senior research associate at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP)/James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Preventing Escalation in the Baltics: A Nato Playbook”,  
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The regional imbalance between NATO's and Russia's conventional forces, NATO's own deterrence loopholes, and the geography of the Baltics all make both deliberate and inadvertent escalation possible. Although NATO as a whole has much greater conventional military capabilities than Russia, Moscow enjoys a significant margin of conventional superiority in the wider Baltic region (see map). Russia has been heavily funding and modernizing its aging armed forces over the last decade, making them a credible force again. In addition, Moscow continues to expand its arsenal of long-range cruise missiles and other precision-guided munitions.

To be fair, Russian modernization efforts continue to experience serious setbacks, as a result of widespread corruption and mismanagement, for instance. The Kremlin's goal of equipping 70 percent of its forces with the latest military equipment by 2020 is generally considered largely aspirational.<sup>79</sup> Nevertheless, Western analysts assume that in case of an open military attack on one or more of the Baltic states, Russian forces would most likely overrun Baltic defenses within only a few days, presenting NATO with a military fait accompli.

Recognizing these weaknesses, the NATO allies agreed at the 2016 Warsaw Summit to deploy four multinational battalions—a so-called Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP)—to the three Baltic states and Poland. NATO also agreed to increase the intensity and scope of its exercises in the region to deter Russian aggression and assure its eastern members. Separately, the United States has sent additional forces and military equipment under a U.S. national program known as the European Deterrence Initiative. (See Box 1 for a description of the forces deployed under the EFP and the European Deterrence Initiative.)

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To make matters worse, the **geography of the Baltics** would not be conducive to NATO operations. **Russia enjoys considerable strategic depth** in its vast Western Military District and has a **well-integrated railroad system** to reinforce troops quickly in the event of a conflict. By contrast, **NATO allies would have to fly or ship** in reinforcements of personnel and military equipment—a **much slower process.**<sup>95</sup> **NATO has decided against pre-positioning equipment** in the Baltic states; much U.S. equipment is, for example, **based 1,500 kilometers away in Germany.** **Reinforcing by land would entail multiple challenges**, ranging from **NATO's atrophied logistics** or **missing railway links** in Eastern Europe to **Russia's abilities to hold NATO's transportation nodes at risk.**

Particularly the latter represents a serious problem for NATO. **The flow of NATO's reinforcements—by air, sea, and land routes—could be disrupted by Russia's substantial modern anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities**, which are centered in the Kaliningrad enclave and around Saint Petersburg. These capabilities include conventional and dualcapable guided missiles, anti-ship weapons, air defense systems, and several layers of modern radar.<sup>96</sup> If accusations that Russia has violated the INF Treaty are correct, then **Moscow might well also possess dual-capable intermediate-range missiles** that could be used to target key transport nodes and pre-positioned equipment deep in Western Europe.

### **Russian aggression is a result of status denial and will remain limited to regional spoiler behavior – the empirical record doesn't line up with any other theory**

**Larson and Shevchenko 14** [Deborah Welch Larson, Political Science Department, University of California, Los Angeles, Alexei Shevchenko, Political Science Department, California State University, Fullerton, USA, “Russia says no: Power, status, and emotions in foreign policy”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies Volume 47, Issues 3–4, September–December 2014, Pages 269–279, <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0967067X14000610>]

Since 2003, **Russian foreign behavior has become much more assertive and volatile** toward the West, often rejecting U.S. diplomatic initiatives and overreacting to perceived slights. Russia's war with Georgia in 2008 and its rapid takeover of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014 have generated heightened Western concerns and a backlash against Russia's strategy in international affairs. **Does Russia's increased assertiveness mark the beginning of a policy of “balancing” against U.S. power? Is Russia's tougher diplomacy a necessary corollary to the growing centralization of its domestic politics or a consequence of Russia's improved economic position?** Is it an integral part of an “energy superpower” strategy supposedly promoted by the country's economic and political elites?

While Russian power is a patchwork of formidable strengths and glaring weaknesses, **there is little doubt, as exemplified by the 2014 Ukrainian crisis, that Moscow is “more than capable of playing the role of spoiler” in international politics** (Govella and Aggarwal, 2012, p. 136). **Russia as a veto-wielding**

member of the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council can block intervention or economic sanctions against problem states. Russia is an important variable, a “wild card” in American attempts to integrate **China** into the Western order. It is also a crucial player in the emerging competition over hydrocarbon reserves in the Arctic region. Finally, Russia is an essential player in efforts to deal with global **warming, energy security, and instability in the vast Eurasian land mass** that adjoins Europe and East Asia (Legvold, 2012).

Some realpolitik-inclined analysts (Shleifer and Treisman, 2011) view Russian tensions with the West as reflecting the **absence of shared interests**. Russia's policy has been “purposeful, cautious and—even when misguided—reasonably consistent” (ibid., p.131). Russia's cooperation with the United States, however, has varied significantly, ranging from Vladimir Putin's strategic assistance to the United States in the War in Afghanistan and the New START to Russia's exercise of its veto on Syria and refusal to initiate a new round of arms reductions. At times Russia's overreacting to perceived slights has undermined Russian interests in attracting foreign investment to facilitate modernization.

In this essay we outline a theoretical framework for explaining ostensible shifts and vacillation in Russia's foreign policy. **Realism** would expect Russia to assert its predominance in neighboring areas where it would come into conflict with the United States and China. **Liberals** would attribute Putin's anti-American stance to his return to authoritarianism and domestic repression and the corresponding **need for an external enemy**. A review of Russia's actions since the end of the Cold War, however, does not lend support to either power or domestic politics as the main source of variation in Russian foreign policy. Instead, Russia's stance toward the United States has been strongly influenced by the degree of external validation of its self-image as a great power. Russia is striving for enhanced global recognition while at the same time retaining its national identity. Russia reacts strongly, at times emotionally, to perceived humiliation and disrespect. We argue that a better understanding of Russia's status concerns is **essential** not only to understand Moscow's volatile behavior but to encourage its cooperation in global governance.

### 1. Explaining Russia's assertiveness

What explains Russia's **abrupt shifts and prickly sensitivity** to alleged slights and insults?

Available theoretical explanations account neither for the pattern of changes in Russian policy, nor for the tone of grievance frequently adopted by Russian elites.

Russia's increased assertiveness might be viewed as the inception of long-awaited “**balancing**” against U.S. predominant power. Russia's opposition to U.S. initiatives in the United Nations (U.N.) could be described as “soft balancing,” that is, coalition-building and diplomatic bargaining within international institutions to constrain the dominant power (Layne, 2006). On the other hand, a genuine balancing strategy for Russia would entail competition with the United States for predominant influence in Eurasia while forming an anti-U.S. coalition with China and other non-Western states, as advocated by Russian Eurasianists, but Russia has avoided commitments to these states (Tsygankov, 2008, Tsygankov, 2014). An even more pessimistic interpretation argues that Moscow is trying to overturn the post-Cold War order, restore its position as a global superpower, and reassert control over its lost empire in a modern guise (Bugajski, 2009, Lucas, 2014). While Russia's takeover of Crimea and its behavior during the 2014 Ukrainian crisis seem on the surface to validate this “offensive realist” reading of Russian foreign policy, Russia's determination to prevent further enlargement of NATO and its demand for a droit de regard (historically, an intrinsic aspect of great power status in international politics),

**should not be confused with imperial expansionism.** Russia's **aspiring for greater regional influence may lead to spoiler behavior, but not full-scale revisionism.**

Others charge that Russia's assertiveness reflects the "energy superpower" strategy, an effort to use Russia's energy exports as an instrument of power and prestige (Baev, 2008, Goldman, 2008). **It is difficult to see how Russian elites could reasonably expect to carry out such a policy, given Russia's greater dependence on the European energy market** (for two-thirds of its foreign exchange revenue) **than Europe's on Russian gas** (about 25 percent of their imports) (Trenin, 2007, p. 107). **Relative changes in the market price of oil and gas are imperfectly correlated with Russia's overall stance toward the West.** Russia's recent chilly relations with the United States coincide with the emergence of U.S. shale gas, which has lowered the market price of gas (Herszenhorn and Kramer, 2013).

Another explanation rooted in the liberal tradition and popular among prominent Russia watchers views anti-Westernism in Moscow's foreign policy as an attempt to **distract public attention from the growing centralization of Russia's domestic politics and shift towards authoritarianism**, camouflaged as "sovereign democracy" or discourse about national specificity (Shevtsova, 2007, Shevtsova, 2010). **Despite his anti-American rhetoric, though, Putin has continued the policy of allowing U.S. military and supplies to transit through Russian territory to and from Afghanistan and has cooperated**

**on important geopolitical problems** such as **removing chemical weapons** from Syria and negotiating the future of **Iran's nuclear program**.

A **number of scholars** have attributed the deterioration of Russian relations with the United States and Europe to Russia's **desire to recover its status as a great power and reaction to perceived humiliations by the United States**, going back to the 1990s when Russia's wishes on international security issues were ignored (Stent, 2014, Sakwa, 2011, Simes, 2007, Trenin, 2006, Tsygankov, 2008). Building on that insight, we attempt to place Russia's status aspirations within a well-developed theoretical framework from social psychology that relates social groups' desire for status to their strategies for achieving a positively distinctive identity – Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Larson and Shevchenko, 2003, Larson and Shevchenko, 2010; Clunan, 2009).

## **China Contention**



## China Aggression Bad Case

### NFU undermines deterrence against China

REBECCA HEINRICHES , SENIOR FELLOW, HUDSON INSTITUTE, August 24, 2020,  
<https://www.newsweek.com/reject-no-first-use-nuclear-policy-opinion-1527037>, Reject 'No First Use' Nuclear Policy | Opinion

An NFU policy is especially unwise now, while the United States contends with not one, but two major power threats. Both Russia and China are expanding their military capabilities and have acted in ways that demonstrate their willingness to attack sovereign nations and redraw borders. Of the two, China poses the single greatest threat to America's national security and way of life. General Secretary Xi Jinping and his Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are now in the midst of a rapid modernization of their military. China has the most diverse missile force on the planet, and has launched more ballistic missiles for testing and training than the rest of the world combined. Nor has Beijing neglected its nuclear capabilities—although their efforts are furtive, we know the CCP is investing in a large force, with delivery systems capable of launching nuclear weapons. Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency Lt. General Robert P. Ashley, Jr. said in 2019 that the intelligence community believes China is likely to "at least double the size of its nuclear stockpile in the course of implementing the most rapid expansion and diversification of its nuclear arsenal in China's history." The number commonly cited for China's stockpile is around 300. But it is plausible that there are actually many more than 300, as one highly credible former government official confided to me. What's more, China likely has an advanced chemical warfare program. Like its nuclear program, China does not reveal to the United States what, exactly, it does have. But the more we learn about the CCP's gross abuse of religious minorities, including of the Uyghurs imprisoned in Xinjiang concentration camps, the more our hackles should be raised. Western democracies view any use of chemical weapons as unconscionable, but the evidence shows our enemies do not share this view. Although the scope of Russia's economy and the ambitiousness of its national objectives pale in comparison to China's, Russia still seeks to undermine the United States and our allies wherever it can. Like China, it is investing heavily in its nuclear forces and has repeatedly violated U.S. arms control agreements. To take one particularly abhorrent and brazen example, on August 6, 2018, the Russian government used chemical weapons on British soil in an attempt to assassinate a former Russian spy, eliciting sanctions by the United States. That brings us to the second reason NFU is a terrible idea. The United States should be working to create more complex calculations for China and Russia—not making their calculations simpler. Every policy decision related to arms control, the make-up and quality of America's own weapons and our public declarations should be made with one goal in mind: to deter acts of aggression against the United States. The United States must keep our options open, maintain some ambiguity about what we may do and force our enemies to make complex calculations and always doubt whether an act of aggression against the United States would be worth the punitive cost. Start

with Russia. Russian officials have implied their comfort with the use of nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict, have at times threatened nuclear use against purely defensive systems and, in at least one instance, an official stated that the conditions for a Russian nuclear use could be as small as a regional, or even a local, conflict. In June 2015, the Obama administration's deputy secretary of defense, Robert Work, and then-Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral James Winnefeld informed Congress that "Russian military doctrine includes what some have called an 'escalate to de-escalate' strategy—a strategy that purportedly seeks to de-escalate a conventional conflict through coercive threats, including limited nuclear use." Then-Trump administration Secretary of Defense James Mattis testified to the same concern in 2018. As for China, the Chinese have purported to embrace NFU. Way back on October 16, 1964, China declared that it "will never, at any time or under any circumstances, be the first to use nuclear weapons." For decades, that was blindly accepted by those who wished to believe it—including NFU proponents in the U.S. But current Commander of U.S. Strategic Command Admiral Richard, when speaking about the Chinese NFU policy, told senators in February 2020, "I could drive a truck through that no first use policy." He went on to explain that the Chinese nuclear program lacks transparency and fosters distrust. Worse, the CCP's dubious claims to disputed Chinese territory raises concerns about how, and where, Beijing may employ nuclear weapons. Moreover, the CCP is engaged in a robust disinformation campaign across all areas of its government and society: America should not presume anything but deceit from our number one geopolitical threat. Finally, adopting an NFU policy would cause allied nations, who have rightly forsaken nuclear weapons and who rely on the American nuclear umbrella, to doubt our assurances. And if allies and partners can no longer rely on our nuclear umbrella, they will develop their own. The result of the nuclear idealists' efforts, zealous as their mission is to take the world down to zero nuclear weapons, could ironically result in precipitous nuclear proliferation.

President Obama, recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize for, in part, his denuclearization aspirations, eschewed an NFU declaration. Though he was ideologically motivated to pursue the idealist nuclear disarmament agenda, reality and the weight of responsibility to protect the American people won the day. It is inexplicable that his vice president, who has decades of experience grappling with the global threats and has had a front-row seat to these executive decisions, would still hold to the notion that NFU is good policy. We must see the world as it is. We might wish that other nations will follow our lead and do as we do, but other nations do not hold to our same moral judgments. We should not assume that our adversaries will make the same strategic and operational decisions that we make. The historical evidence shows that they are not inspired by our efforts to de-emphasize nuclear weapons, either by unilaterally moving toward lower numbers or by placing restrictions on testing. Every American president should keep our options open, maintain strategic ambiguity and reject NFU.

### **Turns taiwan - this is our impact - only china views benevolence as weakness and invites aggression**

Yves-Heng Lim, PhD, Senior Lecturer, Department of Security Studies and Criminology Dr Tim Benbow, Professor Greg Kennedy, and Dr Jon Robb-Webb "China's Naval Power : An Offensive Realist Approach" 2014-01-15 Taylor & Francis Group

Aside from specific problems stemming from US “Cold War mentality” and “hegemonism,” some authors suggest that more mechanical causes might also be at the root of the rising US–China antagonism. To put it simply, at least some Chinese observers consider that East Asia has become today too small to accommodate both of China and the United States. In an article published in Contemporary International Relations, Wang Honggang (2011: 9) argues for instance that “wherever it goes in the Asia-Pacific, the United States finds itself face to face with China, and, reciprocally, China finds itself face to face with the United States.” In other words, even in the optimist hypothesis that Beijing and Washington do not harbor hostile sentiments toward each other, China and the United States are bound to collide because their respective weight in the East Asian system implies that any initiative taken by one of the powers has consequences—and is likely to cause concerns—for the other. In this sense, while we might express some reserves regarding Niu Jun and Lan Jianxue’s (2007: 245) caveat “that from a subjective standpoint, China has no intention of challenging the US global position, including its position in East Asia,” there is some self-evident logic in their conclusion that “East Asia is, after all, China’s space of existence and the main stage of its activities, [and] as China develops, its influence in the region is bound to expand and is very likely to have some impact on the US position.”

To be sure, Beijing has been careful to reassert ad nauseam that its rise does not constitute a threat to any country, and that its policy is not aimed at pushing the United States out of the East Asian region. There is, nonetheless, some obvious zero-sum logic in the Sino-American relations in East Asia, and Chinese views regarding American initiatives in the region show that “Cold War thinking” and “power politics” prisms remain as useful to examine Beijing’s posture as they are supposed to be in monitoring Washington’s initiatives. To put it simply, while China continues to assert that she “welcomes the United States as an Asia-Pacific nation that contributes to peace, stability and prosperity in the region” (The White House 2011), it is, in fact, difficult to see what role China would like the United States to play in the East Asian system—the opposite being equally true. Considering the last two decades, most initiatives taken by Washington in the region—with the exception of those conforming explicitly with Beijing’s preferences—seem to qualify as hegemonic or China-containment actions. Beijing has, of course, consistently opposed US interferences on the Taiwan issue—and more particularly to the continuation of arms sales to the island. The Taiwan issue constitutes, however, only the tip of the iceberg. China observed US counterterrorism activities in Southeast Asia with a great deal of suspicion (Roy 2006, Cai 2009), and has expressed strong dissatisfaction with American attempts to “internationalize” South China Sea issues (Liu 2011a, Zhong 2012). Additionally, China has proven uncomfortable with the preservation of the US alliance network in East Asia since the end of the Cold War (Malik 2007, Song and Li 2011)—though China has been very circumspect in its management of this issue. Chinese observers tend to consider these alliances as one of the main channels allowing the illegitimate perpetuation of the “security model of the ‘Cold War’” and have reacted to the consolidation of these ties with palpable hostility (Liu 2011a: 18, Sa and Yu 2012).

Moreover, as explained in more details below, Beijing was blessed with a window of opportunity that opened thanks to the turmoil created by the 1997–98 Asian Financial Crisis and was prolonged by the September 11 attacks. China took advantage of this period to push for the construction of a form of regionalism that left the United States out of the loop. Archetypically, when faced with the debate regarding the membership of the East Asia Summit, Beijing lobbied strongly against granting the United States a seat at the table (Sutter 2005, Hung 2006, Malik 2006). The change of US administration in 2008 further demonstrated that Beijing’s problem with the presence of the United States in East Asia could not be solved by the adoption of more friendly postures by Washington. The Obama administration came to office with a distinctive pro-China agenda—the infamous “strategic reassurance” (Steinberg, 2009) policy—which failed to bring about any positive change in China’s posture toward the United States. In fact, in the midst and immediate aftermath of the financial crisis, Beijing seems to have considered Washington’s shift toward a softer stance as a sign of weakness that should be exploited rather than as a sign of benevolence that should be reciprocated (Zhao 2011b, Sutter 2012). Considered as a whole, Chinese visions of US initiatives in the last decade suggest that China had, in many ways, become unfriendly not to particular American postures but to the enduring presence of the United States as a major power in the East Asian system.

## 2. China territorial acquisition collapses international order

Michael E. O'Hanlon, senior fellow, and director of research, in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution "The Senkaku Paradox: Risking Great Power War Over Limited Stakes, Brookings Institution Press, April 30<sup>th</sup> 2019, P40-41

Two of the scenarios involve an attack on a U.S. ally that would formally commit the United States to consider employing all means of national power, including military force, in response. In other words, these are Article 5 scenarios—one involving NATO, the other the U.S.-Japan alliance. The third involves a very close security partner, Taiwan. The first scenario envisions a limited Russian foray into a Baltic state—say, Estonia or Latvia—that results in an occupation of at least a sliver of that NATO member's territory. The other two involve possible aggressions ordered by Beijing: a Chinese seizure of one or more of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and a People's Republic of China (PRC) attack on Taiwan featuring a naval blockade.

These scenarios, or others like them, may not be likely in the years ahead. But they are far from implausible. They do not involve bolt-from-the-blue nuclear volleys, surreptitious biological weapons attacks, or other extreme and nihilistic actions.<sup>1</sup> None would involve seizure or annexation of major populated areas of a U.S. ally or other close friend. None need involve much loss of life. None necessarily implies any further aggressive action by Moscow or Beijing. All these realities may make them seem less risky to a possible aggressor. Moreover, they could succeed. They could be carried out so fast, in areas where defenses were so modest, that a "military entrepreneur" or ambitious political leader might elect to roll the dice.<sup>2</sup> The aggressions may also seem quickly reversible, further limiting the stakes.

Yet such scenarios, though limited in one sense, could have enormous consequences. If there were no response, and the aggressions were allowed to stand, the international order that has made interstate war extremely rare since World War II could be seriously imperiled. Historically, it is often through a series of individually modest actions or events that a global order weakens and ultimately collapses.<sup>3</sup> For that reason, Washington and other capitals would feel strong pressure to respond militarily. Once that happened, escalation could occur even if neither side had initially sought it. Once this process got going, it would be hard to know where it would end. Thus America and its allies need responses that are resolute and punishing, but also as nonmilitary and nonescalatory as possible, consistent with the specifics of the scenario at hand. An additional if secondary advantage of my proposed approach of asymmetric defense is that it would provide a more viable recourse than going to war against both China and Russia at once, in the unlikely but not inconceivable event that they somehow decided to coordinate their attacks.

## Strong Commitment Now

**The US has bolstered the alliance with Tokyo to extend credibility and assurance.**

**Meijer 19** (October 15, 2019, Hugo is a CNRS Research Fellow at Sciences Po, Center for International Studies, "Shaping China's rise: the reordering of US alliances and defence partnerships in East Asia, International Politics, Vol 57 Is 2)

Through the so-called Rebalance to Asia, the Obama administration aimed to readjust the thrust of US foreign policy, after a decade of conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, in light of the shifting centre of strategic and economic gravity of world politics towards Asia (Bader 2012; Campbell 2016; Meijer 2015). This policy consisted of four central components: bolstering of existing bilateral alliances; developing new partnerships with emerging regional players; fostering minilateral cooperative initiatives (such as trilaterals and quadrilaterals); and strengthening multilateral institutions in East Asia (Russel 2014a). Gradually, the interweaving of these different arrangements with US allies and partners—coupled with China's inclusion through a variety of cooperation pathways (detailed below)—led to the emergence of a networked security architecture.

First, the US sought to bolster the credibility of its five formal bilateral alliances in East Asia in order to reassure its regional allies of American resolve and to deter China from engaging in assertive behaviour and from probing the solidity of individual alliances (Russel 2015; Shear 2015). By doing so, ultimately, Washington also intended to uphold the rules-based order underpinned by these alliances. As explained by former Under Secretary of Defence for Policy, James Miller, strengthening US bilateral alliances provides “stronger warfighting capability [and] a stronger deterrent”, but “the primary, the higher level objective is one of strengthening political unity and reinforcing the idea that any adversary will not be able to stick a lever between the United States and its allies or between partners or among those allies and partners. [...] The highest order objective is the promotion and preservation of an international rules-based order” (interview, 5 April 2017).

As one of the flagship initiatives of US alliance management efforts, Washington signed with Tokyo the 2015 new guidelines for Japan–US defence cooperation that concurrently increased the US commitment to Japanese defence and assigned a greater regional security role to Japan (Japanese Ministry of Defence 2015; Satake 2016; see also Dian in this Special Issue). The US government also stepped up bilateral cooperation on ballistic missile defence with Japan, reaffirmed that the mutual defence alliance covered all territories under Japan's administration, including Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, and expressed support for the 2014 reinterpretation of Article 9 of Japan's constitution which allowed Tokyo, under certain circumstances, to engage in “collective self-defence”—thereby expanding its potential contribution to the alliance in case of conflict (Liff 2015; Rinehart et al. 2015; The White House 2015a).<sup>7</sup> Similarly, the US sought to reinforce its alliance with the Republic of Korea (ROK) through both diplomatic and military means. Washington and Seoul issued the 2009 Joint Vision for the Alliance, followed in 2013 by the Joint Declaration in commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the US–ROK alliance, pledging for the thickening of US–ROK defence ties (The White House 2009, 2013). Washington

also reinforced the US military footprint on the Korean peninsula with the deployment of the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defence) missile defence system (Bong 2016). With Australia, it signed the Force Posture Initiative, providing for the deployment of a rotational force of 2500 marines at Darwin and increased air cooperation (Bisley in this Special Issue; Australian Department of Defence, 2018; Taylor 2016). In Southeast Asia, the administration sought to revive its alliances with the Philippines and Thailand (Quayle in this Special Issue). In 2014, it signed the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with Manilla, a ten-year agreement that provided US troops with greater access to military bases, bolstered the rotational presence of US personnel, ship, aircraft and equipment and expanded existing military facilities (Albert 2016; Lum and Dolven 2014; Misalucha and Amador 2016). In Thailand, domestic instability and the 2014 coup d'état constrained defence cooperation between Bangkok and Washington. The two countries signed the 2012 Joint Vision Statement for the Thai-US Defence Alliance, highlighting the importance of bilateral defence cooperation, albeit with little concrete progress (Chanlett-Avery et al. 2015; Pongsudhirak 2016).

## UQ – Gray Zones

**Gray-zone challenges substitute armed attacks now because china knows they will lose -- this calculation will change if the us-japan alliance isn't reinforced**

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So far, China has kept its challenges below the level of an armed attack. China appears not to be confident enough in its ability to manage the consequences of a conflict were it to escalate to the level of an armed clash with the United States and Japan. Such a conflict could lead to China's political and military defeat, and for this reason, it has chosen to adopt gray zoned challenges as the means of undermining the status quo.

However, if China's comprehensive national power continues to grow as time passes, this situation will likely change. The relative growth of China's economic and military power, especially if coupled with a declining commitment of U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region, may lead China to have greater confidence in its ability to challenge the status quo through force without suffering unacceptable consequences. China could eventually gain enough confidence that it might feel free to alter the status quo by executing an armed attack, something it has already done in the past in the cases of the Paracel Islands in 1974 and the Spratly Islands in 1988.

Many factors might shape China's thinking about such matters. First, China might become confident that the PLA has acquired the capability to deny U.S. forces access to the region through the employment of a robust suite of A2/AD capabilities, including ballistic and cruise missiles, sea mines, submarines and advanced surface ships, fighters and bombers, cyberwarfare, electronic warfare, and ASAT assets. Second, China might reach the conclusion—correctly or not—that the United States will not intervene in any conflict with China because of problems associated with U.S. domestic politics and a growing reluctance on the part of the American people to continue paying the costs to support U.S. military commitments in the Asia-Pacific region.

## Link -- Distancing

### **Distancing prompts Chinese emboldenment - only alliance stability balances deterrence and re-assurance**

**French**, Erik David, B.A., Colgate University, 2012 M.A., Syracuse University, 2010 Dissertation Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science "The US-Japan Alliance and China's Rise: Alliance Strategy and Reassurance, Deterrence, and Compellence" (August 2018). Dissertations - ALL. 917.  
<https://surface.syr.edu/etd/917>

#### 4.7 Findings: Alliance Strategy and Alternative Explanations

Alliance Strategy Strategic coordination appears to have had a positive effect on the US' ability to reassure and deter China in the ECS. Across the cases, increases in US coordination (in 1996 and 2013) are associated with subsequent increases in Japanese policy support and more successful deterrence and reassurance toward China. Similarly, in 1991-1996, limited coordination was associated with Japanese fears of abandonment, less support for US policy toward China, and less successful deterrence and reassurance toward China. This provides some support for H1, H2a, and H2b. 85

It is important to note, however, that there are limits to the fit between the cases and these hypotheses. Most importantly, the sudden uptick in escalation from 2009-2013 occurred despite no corresponding shift in US strategy. Indeed, the first-movers in the dispute were China and Japan, with the US reacting to the escalation by subsequently changing its strategy in 2013 and 2014. There are a number of reasons for why this shift may have occurred. China, believing the 2008 financial crisis to be a harbinger of US decline, may have been emboldened to pursue its claims more forcefully. Similarly, the perceived distance between the US and Japan during the Hatoyama administration may also have convinced China that the alliance was drifting apart. Finally, the chaos and internal division of the DPJ administrations in Japan may have contributed to more erratic Japanese conduct toward the dispute, contributing unnecessarily to increased tensions with China.

The US experience in managing the Senkakus provides disconfirming evidence for the strategic arguments in favor of distancing. While some strategists contend that a coordination strategy toward Japan will only encourage it to escalate disputes with China, the opposite has largely proved true in practice. Indeed, the dispute has escalated the farthest and risked US entrapment the most when Japan believes that it cannot depend on a firm US commitment to its defense. As such, H3 and H4a are not supported by these cases. Furthermore, Japanese hedging behavior has not been associated with improved deterrence and reassurance outcomes for the US, contrary to the predictions of H4b. Finally, increases in US coordination with Japan do not seem to have imposed significant constraints on the US ability to deter or reassure China, contrary to the predictions of H5.

## China

### **Unchecked greyzone aggression poses an extreme threat to the LIO and economy**

Adam p. Liff PhD , 2020. nonresident senior fellow with the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings. He is also an associate professor of East Asian international relations at Indiana University's Hamilton Lugar School of Global and International Studies , Proactive Stabilizer JAPAN'S ROLE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY ORDER The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism: Japan and the World Order. Brookings Institution Press,

For Japan, most provocative are the regular operations of the increasingly robust (and militarized) China Coast Guard (**CCG**) near **the Senkaku Islands** (Diaoyu in Chinese; below, the Senkakus).<sup>27</sup> Since September 2012, larger and more capable CCG vessels frequently enter the Senkakus' contiguous zone and conduct regular "presence" missions in the islands' territorial sea to coercively challenge Japan's decades-old effective administrative control.<sup>28</sup> Beyond the gray zone, **China's "maritime advance" and increasing scope of its naval and air force operations place further pressure on Japan**. For example, Japan's annual scrambles of Japan Air SDF fighters against approaching Chinese planes nearly tripled between 2012 and 2017, when the frequency reached a record high of 851.<sup>29</sup> Accordingly, nearly three dozen pages of Japan's 2017 defense white paper discuss concerns about **Beijing's capabilities and operations**, such as its "**attempts to change the status quo by coercion.**"<sup>30</sup>

**Beijing's East China Sea maritime gray zone operations appear intended to probe**, or take advantage of, **a perceived "seam" in Article V** of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, which refers only to an "armed attack" situation. In addition to asserting its sovereignty claim, China's actions also seem aimed at undermining Washington's obligations by trying to establish a perception of "shared administrative control." They also may be intending to exploit political and legal constraints on Japan's Coast Guard (JCG) and Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), as well as a general and longstanding reluctance on Japan's part to use kinetic force in situations outside of an armed attack against Japan.<sup>31</sup>

As these operations have been ongoing since late 2012, China appears to have concluded it can assert its claim coercively through these subthreshold operations with relative impunity.<sup>32</sup> **Beijing's decision to limit its conspicuous coercion vis-à-vis the Senkakus to gray zone operations reveals how its activities are corrosive to the security order**: not directly challenging it, but simultaneously **undermining it in a manner that is also difficult to deter**—by staying below the level of armed attack prohibited by the UN Charter. It further highlights the severity of the challenge that these activities take place while the **PLA** operates over the horizon, occasionally engages in provocative maneuvers and actions in international waters and Japan's contiguous zone, and is set to **grow increasingly capable and active in the years ahead.**

Further afield, **the gray zone operations of** the CCG and **China's maritime militia** in the South China Sea **are additionally corrosive to rules in the maritime domain**.<sup>33</sup> CCG vessels **harass other countries' fishing boats** operating in their exclusive economic zones.<sup>34</sup> The destabilizing activities of China's maritime militia have also gained increasing attention in Tokyo and Washington.<sup>35</sup> And, especially since 2013, **Beijing's large-scale land reclamation and construction of civilian and military outposts are also widely judged as provocative and destabilizing.**<sup>36</sup>

The contrast between Japan's self-restraint and China's—as well as, in all fairness, some other claimants’—activities in the South China Sea is stark. Although it does not officially acknowledge a dispute, since the 1970s Tokyo's policy toward the Senkakus has focused on heion katsu anteiteki na iji oyobi kanri (peaceful, stable management) characterized by three prohibitions: "No people, no development, no militarization."<sup>37</sup>

## China is a Threat

**The Xi doctrine announced this June declares revisionism.**

**Thayer and Han 6-12-2019** - Bradley A. Thayer is Professor of Political Science at the University of Texas San Antonio. Lianchao Han is vice president of Citizen Power Initiatives for China and a visiting fellow at the Hudson Institute. ("The 'Xi Doctrine': Proclaiming and Rationalizing China's Aggression," *National Interest*, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/%E2%80%98xi-doctrine%E2%80%99-proclaiming-and-rationalizing-china%E2%80%99s-aggression-62402>)

Using the occasion of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore this month, Chinese Minister of National Defense and State Councilor Gen. Wei Fenghe, delivered a sharp message to the United States, which may be termed the "Xi Doctrine" on China's use of force, after Chinese premier Xi Jinping. Wei declaring both China's resolve to aggress to advance its interests and a rationalization for the use of force. Wei's de facto threat of war should not be lost in his nuances, deliberate ambiguity, or in translation. His remarks were so bellicose that the world has noticed, as was certainly intended by the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Empirical evidence of China's aggression is increasingly common, from its attempt to dominate the South China Sea, the neo-imperialist effort to gain control of states through the Belt and Road Initiative, to its technological imperialism to control 5G and artificial intelligence technologies. What is rather less frequent are statements from high-level Chinese officials proclaiming the country's intent to be aggressive and offering an attempted legitimizing principle justifying that aggression.

While much of the content of Wei's remarks were in keeping with the gossamer pronouncements on China's peaceful intentions, as well as a paean to Xi Jinping's leadership, they still conveyed that China is ready and willing to resort to war if the United States stands in its way of global expansion; and they made clear that China must go to war, or even a nuclear war, to occupy Taiwan.

Specifically, there are four elements that comprise the Xi Doctrine and are indications of China's signaling its willingness to use force. The first component is a new and alarming proclamation of the undisguised threats to use force or wage an unlimited war. China is becoming bolder as its military power grows. This is evidenced in Wei's muscular remarks on the People's Republic of China's approach against Taiwan, his explicit statement that China does not renounce the use of force against Taiwan, and his effort to deter the United States and its allies from intervention should an attack occur. Wei forcefully stated: "If anyone dares to separate Taiwan from China, the Chinese military has no choice but must go to war, and must fight for the reunification of the motherland at all costs." "At all cost" means that China will not hesitate to use nuclear weapons or launching another Pearl Harbor to take over Taiwan. This is a clear warning of an invasion.

Second, the Xi Doctrine legitimizes territorial expansion. Through his remarks, Wei sought to convince the rest of the world that China's seizure of most of the South China Sea is an accomplished fact that cannot be overturned. He made bogus accusations, which included blaming the United States for "raking in profits by stirring up troubles" in the region. He insisted that only ASEAN and China must resolve the issue. He claimed that China's militarization on South China Sea islands and reefs were an act of self-defense. Should this be allowed to stand, then the Xi Doctrine will set a perilous precedent of successful territorial expansion,

which will further entice China and jeopardize the peace of the region.

Third, the doctrine targets the United States as a cause of the world's major problems and envisions a powerful China evicting the United States from the region. Wei obliquely identified the United States as the cause wars, conflicts, and unrest, and sought to convey that the United States will abandon the states of the South China Sea (SCS) when it is confronted by Chinese power, a typical divide and conquer strategy used by the CCP regime.

The Xi Doctrine's fourth element is the mendacity regarding China's historical use of force and current actions. While the distortions of history were numerous, there were three major lies that should be alarming for the states of the region and the global community. First, Wei said that China had never invaded another country, which is a claim so transparently false it can only be a measure of the contempt he held for the audience. China has a long history of aggression, including against the Tibetans and Vietnamese, and perhaps soon against the Taiwanese.

Second, Wei argued that hegemony does not conform to China's values when, in fact, China proudly was Asia's hegemon for most of the last two thousand years. Lastly, he claimed that the situation in the SCS is moving toward stability—from China's perspective this stability is caused by its successful seizure of territory. In fact, the SCS is far less stable as a result of China's actions. Efforts to counter this grab are denounced by Wei as destabilizing, which is a bit like a thief accusing you of a crime for wanting your property returned.

Wei's belligerent rhetoric is an indication that the CCP regime faces deep external and internal crises. Externally, the Trump administration has shocked the CCP with the three major steps it has taken. First, it has shifted the focus of the U.S. national-security strategy and now identifies China explicitly as its primary rival—abandoning the far more muted policies of previous administrations. Second, Trump has acted on this peer competitive threat by advancing tangible measures, such as arms sales to allies and the ban of Huawei. Third, the administration has made credible commitments to assure partners and allies to counter China's aggression and bullying. These have unbalanced the CCP regime, and its natural reaction is to bully its way out. Additionally, the CCP regime has perceived that the world today has begun to consider the negative implications of China's rise, and the United States is determined to prevent what heretofore had been considered China's unstoppable rise. From the perspective of CCP, conflict is increasingly seen as inevitable and perhaps even imminent. Wei's bellicosity should be seen in this light, and the PLA is tasked with fighting and winning the war.

Internally, Xi's anti-corruption campaign that selectively targets his political rivalries, and his abandoning the established rules such as term limited of presidency, have introduced deep

cleavages into the unity of the regime unity. China's economic slowdown, made worse by the U.S. trade war, is a fundamental challenge to the regime's legitimacy. Xi's repression and suppression of the Chinese people, particularly human-rights defenders, Christians, Kazakhs, Uighurs, and other minorities, have miscarried.

Drawing from the pages of unfortunate history, in a classic social-imperialist move, the regime wants to direct these internal tensions outward. At the same time, the nationalistic fervor advanced by the CCP's propaganda and by the rapid military modernization have made many young militant officers in the PLA overconfident. This is infrequently noticed in the West. They can hardly wait to fight an ultimate war to defeat the arch-enemy. This plainly dangerous mentality echoes the Japanese military's beliefs before Pearl Harbor.

The bellicosity evinced in Wei's speech is serious and is not bluster intended to deter. The United States cannot meet China's threat with half-measures, which are likely to further encourage China's aggressive behavior. The United States must respond to China's belligerence with greater strength, adamantine determination, and more vigorous diplomatic and military measures. With the Xi Doctrine, China has proclaimed and rationalized its aggression. A Trump Doctrine forged in response has to reveal to all global audiences, most importantly the CCP leadership, the recklessness of the Xi Doctrine and the supreme folly of aggression.

## China aggression escalates

**Lowther and Littlefield 15** (Adam and Alex, Director, School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies - Air Force Global Strike Command + professor at Feng Chia University, "Taiwan and the Prospects for War Between China and America," 8/11, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwan-and-the-prospects-for-war-between-china-and-america/>)

For the United States and its allies and partners in Asia, China's aggressive efforts to assert questionable claims in the South and East China Sea, enforce a disputed Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), build the rocket/missile and naval capabilities needed to invade Taiwan, and build a substantial ballistic missile capability all work to create a situation where conflict between the U.S. and the PRC could occur and rapidly escalate. Given that American political and military leaders have a poor understanding of Chinese ambitions and particularly their opaque nuclear thinking, there is ample reason to be concerned that a future conflict could escalate to a limited nuclear conflict. Thus, it is worth taking a look at the PRC with an eye toward offering insight into Chinese motivation and thinking when it comes to how a possible crisis over Taiwan could escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. Chinese Capabilities In their latest estimate, Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris assess that the Second Artillery Corps possesses forty long-range nuclear missiles that can strike the United States if fired from China's eastern seaboard and an additional twenty that could hit Hawaii and Alaska. The challenge for China, is reaching the East Coast – home to the nation's capital and largest economic centers. To overcome this challenge China is also developing its JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) which is a sea-based variant of the DF-31 land-mobile long-range missile that will go to sea on Jin-class submarines. China may also be developing a new mobile missile, the DF-41, which will carry multiple warheads, giving the Chinese a way to potentially defeat an American ballistic missile defense system. It is worth noting that the quantity, though not the quality, of China's nuclear arsenal is only limited by its dwindling stock of weapons grade plutonium. This raises the question; to what end is China developing and deploying its nuclear arsenal? Chinese Motivation The textbook answer is straightforward. China seeks a secure second (retaliatory) strike capability that will serve to deter an American first strike. As China argues, it has a "no-nuclear-first policy" which makes its arsenal purely defensive – while its other capabilities such as cyber are offensive. Potential nuclear adversaries including Russia, India, and the United States are fully aware that China's investment in advanced warheads and ballistic missile delivery systems

bring Delhi, Moscow, and, soon, Washington within reach of the “East Wind.” While not a nuclear peer competitor to either Russia or the U.S., China is rapidly catching up as it builds an estimated 30-50 new nuclear warheads each year. While American leaders may find such a sentiment unfounded, the PRC has a strong fear that the United States will use its nuclear arsenal as a tool to blackmail (coerce) China into taking or not taking a number of actions that are against its interests. China’s fears are not unfounded. Unlike China, the United States maintains an ambiguous use-policy in order to provide maximum flexibility. As declassified government documents from the 1970s clearly show, the United States certainly planned to use overwhelming nuclear force early in a European conflict with the Soviet Union. Given American nuclear superiority and its positioning of ballistic missile defenses in Asia, ostensibly to defend against a North Korean attack, China sees its position and ability to deter the United States as vulnerable. Possible Scenario While there are several scenarios where conflict between the United States and China is possible, some analysts believe that a conflict over Taiwan remains the most likely place where the PRC and the U.S. would come to blows. Beijing is aware that any coercive action on its part to force Taiwan to accept its political domination could incur the wrath of the United States. To prevent the U.S. from intervening in the region, China will certainly turn to its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy, beginning with non-lethal means and non-lethal threats to discourage the American public from supporting the use of force in support of Taiwan. If thwarted in its initial efforts to stop Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the United States may be tempted to resort to stronger measures and attack mainland China. A kinetic response to a cyber-attack, for example, although an option, would very likely lead to escalation on the part of the Chinese. Given the regime’s relative weakness and the probability that American attacks (cyber and conventional) on China will include strikes against PLA command and control (C2) nodes, which mingle conventional and nuclear C2, the Chinese may escalate to the use of a nuclear weapon (against a U.S. carrier in China’s self-declared waters for example) as a means of forcing de-escalation. In the view of China, such a strike would not be a violation of its no-first-use policy because the strike would occur in sovereign Chinese waters, thus making the use of nuclear weapons a defensive act. Since Taiwan is a domestic matter, any U.S. intervention would be viewed as an act of aggression. This, in the minds of the Chinese, makes the United States an outside aggressor, not China. It is also important to remember that nuclear weapons are an asymmetric response to American conventional superiority. Given that China is incapable of executing and sustaining a conventional military campaign against the continental United States, China would clearly have an asymmetry of interest and capability with the United States – far more is at stake for China than it is for the United States. In essence, the only effective option in retaliation for a successful U.S. conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear one. Without making too crude a point, the nuclear option provides more bang for the buck, or yuan. Given that mutually assured destruction (MAD) is not part of China’s strategic thinking – in fact it is explicitly rejected – the PRC will see the situation very differently than the United States. China likely has no desire to become a nuclear peer of the United States. It does not need to be in order to achieve its geopolitical objectives. However, China does have specific goals that are a part of its stated core security interests, including reunification with Taiwan. Reunification is necessary for China to reach its unstated goal of becoming a regional hegemon. As long as Taiwan maintains its de facto independence of China it acts as a literal and symbolic barrier to China’s power projection beyond the East China Sea. Without Taiwan, China cannot gain military hegemony in its own neighborhood. China’s maritime land reclamation strategy for Southeast Asia pales in scope and significance with the historical and political value of Taiwan. With Taiwan returned to its rightful place, the relevance to China of the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea is greatly diminished. China’s relationship with the Philippines, which lies just to the south of Taiwan, would also change dramatically. Although China criticizes the United States for playing the role of global hegemon, it is actively seeking to supplant the United States in Asia so that it can play a similar role in the region. While Beijing may take a longer view toward geopolitical issues than Washington does, Chinese political leaders must still be responsive to a domestic audience that demands ever higher levels of prosperity. Central to China’s ability to guarantee that prosperity is the return of Taiwan, and control of the sea lines of commerce and communication upon which it relies. Unfortunately, too many Americans underestimate the importance of these core interests to China and the lengths to which China will ultimately go in order to guarantee them – even the use of nuclear weapons. Should China succeed in pushing the United States back, the PRC can deal with regional territorial disputes bilaterally and without U.S. involvement. After all, Washington invariably takes the non-Chinese side. China sees the U.S. as a direct competitor and obstacle to its geopolitical ambitions. As such it is preparing for the next step in a crisis that it will likely instigate, control, and conclude in the Taiwan Straits. China will likely use the election or statement of a pro-independence high-ranking official as the impetus for action. This is the same method it used when it fired missiles in the Straits in response to remarks by then-President Lee Teng-hui, ushering in the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis. The U.S. brought an end to the mainland’s antics when the U.S.S Nimitz and six additional ships sailed into the Straits. Despite the pro-China presidency of Ma Ying-jeou, China continues to expand its missile force targeting Taiwan and undertakes annual war games that simulate an attack on Taiwan. China has not forgotten the humiliation it faced in 1996 and will be certain no U.S. carrier groups have access to the Strait during the next crisis. The Second Artillery Corps’ nuclear capabilities exist to help secure the results China seeks when the U.S. is caught off-guard, overwhelmed, and forced to either escalate a crisis or capitulate. While the scenario described is certainly not inevitable, the fact that many American readers will see it as implausible if not impossible is an example of

the mirror-imaging that often occurs when attempting to understand an adversary. China is not the United States nor do Chinese leaders think like their counterparts in the United States. Unless we give serious thought to possible scenarios where **nuclear conflict could** occur, **the United States may be unprepared for a situation that escalates beyond its ability to prevent a catastrophe.**

### internal Chinese documents prove territorial ambitions

**Peck 18** (Michael Peck, National Interest. "Leaked Chinese Military Document Suggests America Is a Declining Power". July 10, 2018. <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/leaked-chinese-military-document-suggests-america-declining-power-25416>) swap

China has a plan: to expand Chinese power globally -- and to overtake the United States. These are the tenets of a leaked Chinese military document, obtained by Japan's Kyodo News. The internal document, circulated within the Chinese military by the Central Military Commission in February, was intended to convey President Xi Jinping's desire to strengthen the armed forces. The document paints a dark worldview, with China confronting "antagonistic blocs of the Western world" that are encouraging separatists in Tibet, Xinjiang and Hong Kong, as well as terrorists and Falun Gong practitioners. The document calls for the People's Liberation Army, or PLA, to shift its focus from defense of China's coast to land, sea and air operations beyond China's borders. "As we open up and expand our national interests beyond borders, we desperately need a comprehensive protection of our own security around the globe," it said. It also calls for consolidating the military's command and control system from four tiers to three. By adjusting military strategy, the "balance, dimension and expansion of our strategic goal will be strengthened." The result will be to "more effectively create a situation, manage a crisis, contain a conflict, win a war, defend the expansion of our country's strategic interests in an all-round fashion and realize the goals set by the party and Chairman Xi." But most interesting is why China is telling its military it needs to reform. The reason, says the Central Military Commission, is that the U.S., Russia, Japan and other nations became strong nations because they had a strong military. "The lessons of history teach us that strong military might is important for a country to grow from being big to being strong," according to the document. "A strong military is the way to avoid the 'Thucydides Trap' and escape the obsession that war is unavoidable between an emerging power and a ruling hegemony."

### Chinese strategic missile modernization causes US-China war and destabilizes Asian nuclear dyads.

Stephen J. Cimbala, Political Science @ Penn State, '20, *The United States, Russia and Nuclear Peace*, Springer, ISBN 978-3-030-38088-5

China's military related aspirations have to do with enhancing its IndoPacific regional and wider strategic profile and economic influence. Accordingly, Chinese nuclear modernization will support deterrence of nuclear attack or blackmail against China proper, but also provide for coercive military backing of China's growing regional assertiveness in Asia. With regard to the United States, for example, this implies that China will want to deter any conventional military intervention in the region against China's vital interests, through a combination of improving conventional and nuclear missile and air forces. According to the 2018 US Department of Defense annual report to Congress on Chinese military and security developments, The Chinese armed forces (People's Liberation Army or PLA) are undergoing transformation to support complex war fighting capabilities:

The PLA is undergoing the most comprehensive restructure in its history to become a force capable of conducting complex joint operations. The PLA strives to be capable of

fighting and winning “informatized local wars” – regional conflicts defined by real-time, data-networked command and control, and precision strike.<sup>7</sup>

China’s nuclear forces also serve as a measure of escalation control on favorable terms should conventional war in its early stages not go according to Beijing’s expectations. With respect to strategic nuclear forces, modernization should provide a canopy, atop a range of Chinese military capabilities, that will have integrity from the lowest to the highest rungs of the escalation ladder. For example: China’s nuclear modernization includes unprecedented modernization of its ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers, but also the development of next generation nuclear warheads with smaller yields and high accuracy.<sup>8</sup>

Along with this, China’s fleet of nuclear attack submarines supports an ambitious anti-access, area denial (A2/AD) strategy to deter US military intervention to support allied interests in Asia against Chinese wishes.<sup>9</sup> In addition, experts warn that, as China’s military capabilities for power projection expand, so may its strategic aspirations:

Since anti-access strategies are adopted by nations who perceive their potential opponents as strategically inferior, China is likely to shift defense resources away from A2/AD systems and toward power projection and expansion capabilities once this perception of inferiority dissipates. Indeed, China is preparing to make this shift.<sup>10</sup>

Under President Xi Jinping, China has also been more assertive on other military-strategic issues, including the construction of Chinese military airfields on disputed islands in the South China Sea; claiming extended “air defense identification zones” whose transit would require permission from China; and developing a larger inventory of cyberweapons to support its diplomatic and military strategy.<sup>11</sup>

China’s diplomacy also creates additional space for maneuver on arms control and other issues. As nuclear arms control expert Alexei Arbatov has noted, Beijing’s “cautious and multivectored” policies “have allowed it to assume the role to which Russia has traditionally aspired – that of a balancer between East and West. In fact, it is Russia, with its new policy of “Eurasianism,” that has become the East”.<sup>12</sup> On the other hand, China’s political and military objectives in Asia and worldwide differ from those of the United States and Russia, reflecting China’s perception of its own interests and of its anticipated role in the emerging world order.<sup>13</sup> China’s military modernization is intended to support its rising global profile and expanded portfolio of international interests: focused on “investments and infrastructure to support a range of missions beyond China’s periphery” including “power projection, sea lane security, counterpiracy, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR), and noncombatant evacuation operations”.<sup>14</sup>

Entering China into the US-Russian nuclear deterrence equation creates considerable analytical challenges, for a number of reasons. First, China’s military modernization is going to change the distribution of power in Asia, including the distribution of nuclear and missile forces. China’s military modernization draws not only on its indigenous military culture but also on careful analysis of Western and other experiences. As David Lai has noted:

The Chinese way of war places a strong emphasis on the use of strategy, strategems and deception. However, the Chinese understand that their approach will not be effective without the backing of hard military power. China's grand strategy is to take the next 30 years to complete China's modernization mission, which is expected to turn China into a true great power by that time.<sup>15</sup>

China's ballistic missile force—the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF)—is among the beneficiaries of its military modernization. The PLARF, established in 2016, is responsible for maintaining conventional and nuclear weapons and for the “ability to deter and strike across the entire defense area”. It is also tasked to “enhance nuclear deterrence and counter-strike capacity” with the ability for long and medium-range precision strike.<sup>16</sup>

Chinese military publications have identified a number of missions that might be undertaken by nuclear or conventional missile-rocket forces in peacetime or under conditions of crisis or war, including war prevention, escalation control, using nuclear deterrence to “backstop” conventional operations, and strategic compellence of enemies by means of deterrent actions.<sup>17</sup> Chinese military modernization and defense guidance for the use of nuclear and other missile forces hold some important implications for US policy. First, Chinese thinking is apparently quite nuanced about the deterrent and defense uses for nuclear weapons. Despite the accomplishments of modernization thus far, Chinese leaders are aware that they are far from nuclear-strategic parity with the United States or Russia. On the other hand, China may not aspire to this model of nuclear-strategic parity, as between major nuclear powers, as the key to war avoidance by deterrence or other means. China may prefer to see nuclear weapons as one option among a spectrum of choices available in deterring or fighting wars under exigent conditions, as well as means of supporting assertive diplomacy and conventional operations when necessary. Nuclear-strategic parity as measured by quantitative indicators of relative strength may be less important to China than the qualitative use of nuclear and other means as part of broader diplomatic-military strategies.<sup>18</sup> As the United States Defense Intelligence Agency has noted:

In 2015, Beijing directed the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to be able to win “informatized local wars” with an emphasis on “maritime military struggle.” Chinese military strategy documents also emphasize the growing importance of offensive air, long-distance mobility, and space and cyberspace operations. The PLA views space superiority, the ability to control the information sphere, and denying adversaries the same as key components of conducting modern “informatized” wars.

Second, China is expanding its portfolio of military preparedness not only in platforms and weapons, but also in the realm of C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) and information technology, including for cyber war and space deterrence.<sup>20</sup> Having observed the US success in Operation Desert Storm against Iraq in 1991, Chinese military strategists concluded that the informatization of warfare under all conditions would be a predicate to future deterrence and defense operations.<sup>21</sup> China's growing portfolio of smart capabilities and modernized platforms includes, in addition to items previously noted, stealth aircraft, antisatellite warfare, quiet submarines, “brilliant” torpedo mines, improved cruise missiles, and the potential for disrupting financial markets. As Paul

Bracken has noted, the composite effect of China's developments is to make its military more agile:

By agility I mean the ability to identify and seize opportunities and to move more quickly than rivals. This nimbleness is reflected in China's mobile missiles, a reactive air and sea response against the U.S. Navy, and information warfare. What all of these have in common is quick action.<sup>22</sup>

The emphasis on agility instead of brute force reinforces the traditional emphasis in Chinese military thinking since Sun Tzu on the acme of skill as winning without fighting, but, if war is unavoidable, getting in the first and decisive blows. It also follows that one should attack the enemy's strategy and his alliances making maximum use of deception, based on superior intelligence and estimation. The combination of improved platforms, command-control and information warfare should provide options for the selective use of precision fire strikes and cyberattacks against priority targets, avoiding mass killing and fruitless attacks on enemy strongholds.<sup>23</sup> As former defense official Robert O. Work has explained, an important component of China's military strategy is the concept of "system destructive warfare" that focuses on "disabling the sensor, command and control, and effects grids common to all battle networks".<sup>24</sup> More broadly, China is determined to dominate future AI and cyberspace research and development and its application for military purposes. According to US Naval War College cyber expert Chris C. Demchak:

With the real revolution in AI found in the emerging applications of so-called deep neural learning that require massive computational resources, Chinese command of AI and eventually quantum computing will massively increase the speed at which its actors can compute likely outcomes across societal-scale problems and threats. They'll then be able to coordinate rapid actions to enhance, dampen, disrupt, or destroy the essential elements of targeted processes in any opposing nation.<sup>25</sup>

A third aspect of the Chinese military modernization that is important for nuclear deterrence and arms control in Asia is the problem of escalation control. Two examples or aspects of this problem might be cited here. First, improving Chinese capabilities for nuclear deterrence, and for conventional warfighting, increase Chinese leaders' confidence in their ability to carry out an A2/AD strategy against the United States, or against another power seeking to block Chinese expansion in Asia. This confidence might be misplaced in the case of the United States. The United States is engaged in a "pivot" in its military-strategic planning and deployment to Asia, and toward that end, is developing its doctrine and supporting force structure for "AirSea Battle" countermeasures against Chinese anti-access strategy.<sup>26</sup>

A second aspect of the problem of escalation control is the question of nuclear crisis management as between a more muscular China and its Asian neighbors or others. Asia in the Cold War was a comparative nuclear weapons backwater, since the attention of US and allied NATO policy makers and military strategists was focused on the US-Soviet arms race. The world of the twenty-first century is very different. Europe, notwithstanding recent contretemps in Ukraine, is a relatively pacified security zone compared to the Middle East or to South and East Asia, and postCold War Asia is marked by five nuclear weapons states: Russia, China, India, Pakistan and North Korea. The possibility of nuclear first use, growing out of a conventional war

between, say, India and Pakistan, or China and India, is nontrivial, and North Korea poses a continuing uncertainty of two sorts. It might start a conventional war on the Korean peninsula, or the Kim III regime might implode, leaving uncertain the command and control over its armed forces, including nuclear weapons and infrastructure.<sup>27</sup> Further to this issue, the uncertain implications for China of United States' withdrawal from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty have yet to be worked out, including the possible US deployment of conventional land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with INF-range capabilities in the West Pacific.<sup>28</sup>

The problem of keeping nuclear armed states below the threshold of first use, or containing escalation afterward, was difficult enough to explain within the more simplified Cold War context. Uncertainties are even more abundant with respect to escalation control in the aftermath of a regional Asian war. Then, too, there is the possibility of a US-Chinese nuclear incident at sea or a clash over Taiwan escalating into conventional conflict, accompanied by political misunderstanding and the readying of nuclear forces as a measure of deterrence. The point is that US and Chinese forces would not actually have to fire nuclear weapons to use them. Nuclear weapons would be involved in the conflict from the outset, as offstage reminders that the two states could stumble into a process of escalation that neither had intended.

### **China is revisionist power. Military modernization allows them to accomplish their geopolitical objectives.**

Jagannath P. Panda, Research Fellow and Coordinator of the East Asia Centre at MP-IDSA, New Delhi, 5-19-20, “China as a Revisionist Power in Indo-Pacific and India’s Perception: A Power-Partner Contention” JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA2020, AHEAD-OF-PRINT, 1-17  
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epub/10.1080/10670564.2020.1766906?needAccess=true>

The evolving international order has mostly been divided into two categories of powers: status quo and revisionist. The latter, as the term signifies, are powers who aim to revise the existing global systems or order by altering it gradually or overthrowing it completely through new measures or initiatives. A gradual change would indicate the rise of an evolutionary revisionist power, while a sudden or rapid change indicates a revolutionary revisionist power. Essentially, a revisionist power aims to enhance its power, status and authority in global decision-making process, seeking to remodel the international system, and eventually the order, in its favor. A revolutionary revisionist power views such an endeavor through the lenses of realism.<sup>13</sup> Alternatively, an evolutionary revisionist power follows the idealist school of thought, or a gradualist path: it would not necessarily confront the established great powers in seeking to change the existing international systems and order.<sup>14</sup>

Scholars, such as John Mearsheimer and Suisheng Zhao, argue that rising powers such as China and India, with the potential to emerge as major (or great) powers, would continue to pose challenges for the existing international system and order.<sup>15</sup> The intensity to compete, perhaps to challenge the existing system or order, is more noticeable in China than in other powers, highlighting that China is more ‘revisionist’ than a normal ‘status quo’ power.<sup>16</sup> The reasons behind China’s perception as a revisionist power in Indo-Pacific are appositely clear. These include authoritarian and unilateral initiatives to bring out fast-track infrastructure development along with connectivity through the flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and

assertive claims in the **maritime domains**, such as the South China Sea and East China Sea disputes. Further, mounting **claims over land territories** and **attempts to create a distinct order through the creation of international institutions** or forums that are evidently linked to China's national interests are also important factors.<sup>17</sup> On account of this, **the tag of revisionism on Beijing appears today to be justified.**<sup>18</sup>

Defining a status quo power is fairly simple: they are powers that are primarily content with the fundamental characteristics of the prevailing global order and power distribution.<sup>19</sup> Accepting globalization and international organizations by willingly participating or being a part of them is a key trait of a status quo power. Despite the reservations that it holds on a range of subjects pertaining to the established institutions or organizations, Beijing has been an active member, participant and beneficiary of the international liberal order or the Bretton Woods institutions and other existing international or regional multilateral organizations. Long has China reaped the benefits of the Bretton Woods institutions, even though it has always expressed its displeasure, stating that these institutions are not developing society friendly mannerisms and are primarily dominated by the Western influence. Equally, China established the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO); has been an active partner of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); is a founding member of the United Nations (UN); and holds a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), to enhance its international interest.<sup>20</sup>

In contrast, a revisionist power is one that is dissatisfied with the global order and wants to change the existing norms that have been created by the status quo powers. As explained by political scientist Randall Schweller, a revisionist state wants to 'undermine' the existing order so as to increase its own power in the system.<sup>21</sup> In the case of China, **an article by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs** on the creation of 'two China's' in the United Nations highlights the country's dissatisfaction with the established order, and mainly the US.<sup>22</sup> Such dissatisfaction is no more a secret phenomenon in the Chinese public discourse. Most domestic debates in China are centered around the dialogue on how Beijing's rise must bring revisions to the existing international systems or create new systems. Nevertheless, the emerging 'great' power does not seem to fall clearly under either category. It has recently started advocating for a far more active role in the UN; and since assuming a permanent seat in the UNSC in 1971, used its veto power only 14 times, the lowest of the permanent five.<sup>23</sup> At the same time, it has become an increasingly assertive regional power that has, since the launch of its BRI in 2013, factored greatly on the US watch as a 'threat that is greater than terrorism'.<sup>24</sup>

Revisionism also draws greatly from the power transition theory of international relations.<sup>25</sup> It was A.F.K. Organski who in his book World Politics first propagated the power transition theory while simultaneously predicting the possible rise of China and the effect it would have on international power politics.<sup>26</sup> Power transition theory has two major premises: (1) internal growth or development is the source of power for a country and (2) the existing international order during the time of another power's 'rise' is shaped by a hegemon.<sup>27</sup> China's economic growth in the past decade has been nothing short of a miracle; from a primarily agrarian economy, China has developed into an industrial dynamo, more importantly emerging as a donor country.<sup>28</sup> It is this very remarkable growth that has marked China, in the eyes of the US,

as a revisionist power—in 2014, China overtook, although briefly, the US as the largest economy of the world, in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP). 29

It is important to note that efforts by the reigning dominant power to allay the concerns of the challenging powers can lower the possibility of a power transition conflict. However, that did not happen in the case of the US vis-à-vis China. The election of Donald Trump as president in 2016 marked a major turning point in the US approach towards China. 30 Unlike the previous US administration, Trump's hostility to Chinese advances, from bilateral to regional dealings, has been vocal, direct and critical. 31 Fortunately, until the time China's military strength is able to match that of the US, major war between the two competing powers in not really foreseen. As Schweller argues, a key characteristic of a revisionist power is that it will 'employ military force' in order to disrupt the status quo; this has not been the case with China in respect to the US. 32 While Chinese military assertiveness in the South China Sea and within its own borders has been open, it has not engaged in a military conflict with the US, the dominant power. The trade war between the US and China, however, represented a geo-economic conflict between both the powers. The trade war intensified in 2019, although the finalizing of a 'phase one' deal at the beginning of 2020 marks an optimistic sign. 33 The inking of the deal allayed fears that the US-China relations were deteriorating faster than they could be mended.

### **NATO commitments unsustainable because of the rise of china.**

William **Ruger**, Professor of IR @ CUNY, **and** Rajan **Menon** War and Peace Studies @ Columbia, **5-11-20**, "NATO enlargement and US grand strategy: a net assessment," *International Politics*, Vol 57, Iss 3. Springer.

Some aver that alliance relations will revert to normal should President Trump depart the White House in 2021. But they forget that US concerns about the relative contribution of the Europeans are long-standing, harking back to the 1960s. Moreover, these concerns are likely to intensify as the USA faces economic constraints (the colossal national debt and soaring budget deficits—especially in the post-COVID-19 world) and long-neglected domestic problems increase disaffection among Americans. Since the early decades of NATO, European countries have become economic competitors of the USA and neomercantilists and populists in the USA have become more vocal—in Democratic as well as Republican ranks. US leaders will ratchet up pressure on NATO allies to assume more of the burden of collective defense—and NATO may not survive if Europe does nothing more than tinker in response. Moreover, the rise of China will inevitably divert US military resources from Europe. In short, Trump's departure in 2021 or 2025 won't restore the status quo ante for NATO, at least not for long (Becker 2017; Menon 2007; NATO 1995; Putin 2007; Ruger 2017, 2019; Shlapak and Johnson 2016; US Department of Defense 2011).

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Along with this, China's fleet of nuclear attack submarines supports an ambitious anti-access, area denial (A2/AD) strategy to deter US military intervention to support allied interests in Asia against Chinese wishes.<sup>9</sup> In addition, experts warn that, as China's military capabilities for power projection expand, so may its strategic aspirations:

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Scholars, such as John Mearsheimer and Suisheng Zhao, argue that rising powers such as China and India, with the potential to emerge as major (or great) powers, would continue to pose challenges for the existing international system and order. 15 The intensity to compete, perhaps to challenge the existing system or order, is more noticeable in China than in other powers, highlighting that China is more 'revisionist' than a normal 'status quo' power. 16 The reasons behind China's perception as a revisionist power in Indo-Pacific are appositely clear. These include authoritarian and unilateral initiatives to bring out fast-track infrastructure development along with connectivity through the flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and assertive claims in the maritime domains, such as the South China Sea and East China Sea disputes. Further, mounting claims over land territories and attempts to create a distinct order through the creation of international institutions or forums that are evidently linked to China's national interests are also important factors. 17 On account of this, the tag of revisionism on Beijing appears today to be justified. 18

Defining a status quo power is fairly simple: they are powers that are primarily content with the fundamental characteristics of the prevailing global order and power distribution. 19 Accepting globalization and international organizations by willingly participating or being a part of them is a key trait of a status quo power. Despite the reservations that it holds on a range of subjects pertaining to the established institutions or organizations, Beijing has been an active member, participant and beneficiary of the international liberal order or the Bretton Woods institutions and other existing international or regional multilateral organizations. Long has China reaped the benefits of the Bretton Woods institutions, even though it has always expressed its displeasure, stating that these institutions are not developing society friendly mannerisms and are primarily dominated by the Western influence. Equally, China established the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO); has been an active partner of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); is a founding member of the United Nations (UN); and holds a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), to enhance its international interest. 20

In contrast, a revisionist power is one that is dissatisfied with the global order and wants to change the existing norms that have been created by the status quo powers. As explained by political scientist Randall Schweller, a revisionist state wants to 'undermine' the existing order so as to increase its own power in the system. 21 In the case of China, an article by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the creation of 'two China's' in the United Nations highlights the country's dissatisfaction with the established order, and mainly the US. 22 Such dissatisfaction is no more a secret phenomenon in the Chinese public discourse. Most domestic debates in China are centered around the dialogue on how Beijing's rise must bring revisions to the existing international systems or create new systems. Nevertheless, the emerging 'great' power does not seem to fall clearly under either category. It has recently started advocating for a far more active role in the UN; and since assuming a permanent seat in the UNSC in 1971, used its veto power only 14 times, the lowest of the permanent five. 23 At the same time, it has become an

increasingly assertive regional power that has, since the launch of its BRI in 2013, factored greatly on the US watch as a 'threat that is greater than terrorism'. 24

Revisionism also draws greatly from the power transition theory of international relations. 25 It was A.F.K. Organski who in his book World Politics first propagated the power transition theory while simultaneously predicting the possible rise of China and the effect it would have on international power politics. 26 Power transition theory has two major premises: (1) internal growth or development is the source of power for a country and (2) the existing international order during the time of another power's 'rise' is shaped by a hegemon. 27 China's economic growth in the past decade has been nothing short of a miracle; from a primarily agrarian economy, China has developed into an industrial dynamo, more importantly emerging as a donor country. 28 It is this very remarkable growth that has marked China, in the eyes of the US, as a revisionist power—in 2014, China overtook, although briefly, the US as the largest economy of the world, in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP). 29

It is important to note that efforts by the reigning dominant power to allay the concerns of the challenging powers can lower the possibility of a power transition conflict. However, that did not happen in the case of the US vis-à-vis China. The election of Donald Trump as president in 2016 marked a major turning point in the US approach towards China. 30 Unlike the previous US administration, Trump's hostility to Chinese advances, from bilateral to regional dealings, has been vocal, direct and critical. 31 Fortunately, until the time China's military strength is able to match that of the US, major war between the two competing powers is not really foreseen. As Schweller argues, a key characteristic of a revisionist power is that it will 'employ military force' in order to disrupt the status quo; this has not been the case with China in respect to the US. 32 While Chinese military assertiveness in the South China Sea and within its own borders has been open, it has not engaged in a military conflict with the US, the dominant power. The trade war between the US and China, however, represented a geo-economic conflict between both the powers. The trade war intensified in 2019, although the finalizing of a 'phase one' deal at the beginning of 2020 marks an optimistic sign. 33 The inking of the deal allayed fears that the US-China relations were deteriorating faster than they could be mended.