

MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

ITSC 201 Winter 2021



THE COLD WAR

A Brief Overview

Rival Alliances

Early U.S. Advantages

The Apex of Soviet
Power



THE COLD WAR

Unsustainable demands


Fatal reforms

A long game

Three periods to
examine



PRELUDE TO THE WAR



FDR's misplaced confidence

Lacking leverage with Moscow

Truman's inadvertent shift

GEORGE KENNAN



Buried in Moscow

Washington's
opportune request

The long shadow of the
Long Telegram

KENNAN & CONTAINMENT



One of the foundational figures

Kennan's key goals

Paging H. Mackinder

Four out of five



“We are great and strong, but we are not great enough or strong enough to conquer or change or hold in subjugation by ourselves all ... hostile or irresponsible forces. To attempt to do so would mean to call upon our own people for sacrifices which would in themselves completely alter our way of life and our political institutions, and would lose the real objectives of our policy in trying to defend them.”

George Kennan

KENNAN & CONTAINMENT

The grandest
strategy

Three key
components

Much adjusted, never
abandoned



DÉTENTE



The crisis of
containment

The perils of parity

Nixon and Kissinger's
masterclass

DÉTENTE

Détente the Solution

Making Partners of the
Soviets

From SALT to Berlin



DÉTENTE

The Sino-Soviet
Conflict

Triangulation

The Great Opening



THE DECLINE OF DÉTENTE

Relations with the
Soviets difficult

The troublesome Third
World

Washington's eroding
leverage



THE LATE COLD WAR: CONFRONTATION



The unlikely
strategist

Reagan's key insight

Rejecting détente

THE LATE COLD WAR: CONFRONTATION



Echoing Kennan

The instrumentality
of human rights

The key advantage

The new tensions

THE LATE COLD WAR: CONFRONTATION



Seeking stability
through
confrontation

Unexpected
flexibility

The whole toolbox

REFERENCES

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