

关系表达与attention机制、模型攻击与对抗 (C21)



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内容提要

- 回顾一下word embedding模型
- 基于上下文的结构关系表达与multi-head attention
- 层级化的结构编码解码模型Transformer
- 深度神经网络模型编码空间与模型攻击
- 攻击防御技术

Word2vec

- 从大量的文本语料中学习到词向量表示的一种方法
- ➡ 除了Word2Vec之外，还有很多词向量表示方法：fastText, GloVe, BERT, GPT.....

Efficient Estimation of Word Representations in Vector Space

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概率语言模型

Language Model: 给定一个词语序列, 预测序列的概率 $P(w_1, \dots, w_m)$

一元语言模型: $P(t_1 t_2 t_3) = P(t_1)P(t_2 | t_1)P(t_3 | t_1 t_2)$ $P_{\text{uni}}(t_1 t_2 t_3) = P(t_1)P(t_2)P(t_3).$

n-gram语言模型:
$$P(w_1, \dots, w_m) = \prod_{i=1}^m P(w_i | w_1, \dots, w_{i-1}) \approx \prod_{i=1}^m P(w_i | w_{i-(n-1)}, \dots, w_{i-1})$$

A Neural Probabilistic Language Model


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Abstract

A goal of statistical language modeling is to learn the joint probability function of sequences of words in a language. This is intrinsically difficult because of the **curse of dimensionality**: a word sequence on which the model will be tested is likely to be different from all the word sequences seen during training. Traditional but very successful approaches based on n-grams obtain generalization by concatenating very short overlapping sequences seen in the training set. We propose to **fight the curse of dimensionality by learning a distributed representation for words** which allows each training sentence to inform the model about an exponential number of semantically neighboring sentences. **The model learns simultaneously (1) a distributed representation for each word along with (2) the probability function for word sequences, expressed in terms of these representations.** Generalization is obtained because a sequence of words that has never been seen before gets high probability if it is made of words that are similar (in the sense of having a nearby representation) to words forming an already seen sentence. Training such large models (with millions of parameters) within a reasonable time is itself a significant challenge. We report on experiments using neural networks for the probability function, showing on two text corpora that the proposed approach significantly improves on state-of-the-art n-gram models, and that the proposed approach allows to take advantage of longer contexts.

Keywords: Statistical language modeling, artificial neural networks, distributed representation, curse of dimensionality



神经网络语言模型与词向量：

- Linear projection layer：从词到词向量

$$x = (C(w_{t-1}), C(w_{t-2}), \dots, C(w_{t-n+1})).$$

- Non-linear hidden layer：得到隐藏表示

$$y = b + Wx + U \tanh(d + Hx)$$

- softmax：计算词表上的概率分布
- 使用随机梯度下降和误差反向传播算法进行训练


词向量矩阵作为训练任务的中间产物
(为了得到词向量表示而设置了另一个目标)

计算量主要集中在非线性变换层

CBOW (Continuous Bag-of-words)

用周围的词预测当前词：根据上下文出现的单词预测当前词的生成概率

滑动窗口：不光使用历史出现的词，也会使用后面的词




CBOW 模型结构

对Feedforward NNLM进行了简化：去除了非线性隐藏层

- 输入：单词的one-hot编码
- 线性映射层：对每个词的向量求和或者取平均
忽略词语之间的相对位置关系
- 输出：目标单词的one-hot编码



训练得到矩阵 W (look-up table)

任何一个单词的one-hot编码乘以这个矩阵都得到自己的词向量表示。



Skip-gram 模型结构

- 核心思想：用当前词预测周围的词
- 中心词向量矩阵 \mathbf{W} ：存储了词向量
- 上下文词向量矩阵 \mathbf{W}' ：上下文词的抽象表示（与中心词的关联信息）



训练数据：

Thou shalt not make a machine in the likeness of a human mind

thou	shalt	not	make	a	machine	in	the	...
------	-------	-----	------	---	---------	----	-----	-----

thou	shalt	not	make	a	machine	in	the	...
------	-------	-----	------	---	---------	----	-----	-----

input word	target word
not	thou
not	shalt
not	make
not	a
make	shalt
make	not
make	a
make	machine

模型训练：

Actual
Target

0
0
0
...
0
1
...
0

not



Update
Model
Parameters

Model
Prediction

0	aardvark
0	aarhus
0.001	aaron
...	...
0.4	taco
0.001	thou
...	...
0.0001	zyzzyva

Error

0
0
-0.001
...
-0.4
0.999
...
-0.0001



Word embedding的本质

- ➡ 词汇在实数空间的向量表达 + 概率语言模型

概率语言模型的本质

- ➡ 上下文关联关系的概率转移矩阵

Exploiting Similarities among Languages for Machine Translation


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Abstract

Dictionaries and phrase tables are the basis of modern statistical machine translation systems. This paper develops a method that can automate the process of generating and extending dictionaries and phrase tables. Our method can translate missing word and phrase entries by learning language structures based on large monolingual data and mapping between languages from small bilingual data. It uses distributed representation of words and learns a linear mapping between vector spaces of languages. Despite its simplicity, our method is surprisingly effective: we can achieve almost 90% precision@5 for translation of words between English and Spanish. This method makes little assumption about the languages, so it can be used to extend and refine dictionaries and translation tables for any language pairs.



传统的RNN跨语言生成模型


- 通过RNN在源语言空间中实现序列编码 (LSTM)
- 将编码向量作为解码端的输入，在目标语言中利用RNN模型进行解码

$$h_t = \text{EncoderRNN}(e(x_t), h_{t-1})$$

$$s_t = \text{DecoderRNN}(d(y_t), s_{t-1})$$


$$\hat{y}_t = f(s_t)$$

训练过程一般采用teacher forcing
解码过程采用beam search



Beam search

- 保留前k最优，向后展开
- 求得最高权重路径




跨语言的生成模型实现方案 (attention based)


- 由于：基于词向量的语言模型可以实现（源）语言的生成
- 又：双语之间的词向量表达是可以通过线性变换实现对齐
- attention based seq2seq model
 - 一种语言中的生成模型可以借助：
 - step1、选择合理的相关上下文
 - Step2、预测生成另一种语言的词汇序列

seq2seq中常规的Attention方案：

- 增加了一个注意力范围，强调接下来输出内容应该关注哪一部分。本质上属于一种词典学习。更多的参数、更多的信息输入。



层级结构语言模型（2型文法）：



■ 上下文无关文法 (context-free grammar, CFG)

- 引入PCFG (规则带概率的CFG)
- 对每棵推导树计算概率，选取概率最大的

上下文无关文法 G 是 4-元组：

$G = (V, \Sigma, R, S)$ 这里的

1. V 是“非终结”符号或变量的有限集合。它们表示在句子中不同类型的短语或子句。
2. Σ 是“终结符”的有限集合，无交集于 V ，它们构成了句子的实际内容。
3. S 是开始变量，用来表示整个句子（或程序）。它必须是 V 的元素。
4. R 是从 V 到 $(V \cup \Sigma)^*$ 的关系，使得 $\exists w \in (V \cup \Sigma)^* : (S, w) \in R$ 。

此外， R 是有限集合。 R 的成员叫做文法的“规则”或“产生式”。星号表示 Kleene 星号运算。

Attention Is All You Need

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
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Abstract

The dominant sequence transduction models are based on complex recurrent or convolutional neural networks that include an encoder and a decoder. The best performing models also connect the encoder and decoder through an attention mechanism. We propose a new simple network architecture, the Transformer, based solely on attention mechanisms, dispensing with recurrence and convolutions entirely. Experiments on two machine translation tasks show these models to

Self-Attention详解



根据输入得到Query和Key向量，经Softmax计算出当前词的权重，利用权重对所有Value向量加权求和，激活得到当前位置下一层的表示（embedding）


$$\text{Attention}(Q, K, V) = \text{softmax}\left(\frac{QK^T}{\sqrt{d_k}}\right)V$$

Self-Attention——矩阵运算


$$\mathbf{X} \times \mathbf{W}^Q = \mathbf{Q}$$


$$\mathbf{X} \times \mathbf{W}^K = \mathbf{K}$$


$$\mathbf{X} \times \mathbf{W}^V = \mathbf{V}$$


$$\text{softmax}\left(\frac{\mathbf{Q} \times \mathbf{K}^T}{\sqrt{d_k}}\right) \mathbf{V}$$


Self-Attention——可视化展示




左侧代表第k层，右侧代表第k+1层

第k+1层的每个单元都可以看作是前一层的
一个翻译结果（自编码空间）

获取不同类型的语法编码规则

—— multi-head attention

Scaled Dot-Product Attention



Multi-Head Attention




Figure 2: (left) Scaled Dot-Product Attention. (right) Multi-Head Attention consists of several attention layers running in parallel.

编码-解码模型:





Figure 1: The Transformer - model architecture.

Transformer-based大规模语言模型

➤ Encoder-only模型: BERT家族

➤ 论文: <https://arxiv.org/abs/1810.04805>



(a) Sentence Pair Classification Tasks:
MNLI, QQP, QNLI, STS-B, MRPC,
RTE, SWAG

深度神经网络模型的优势与缺陷

- 通过有监督并发学习获得特征表达，形成高质量的解析能力
- 多层网络得到的连续特征表达的可解释性（独立性）并不好
- 可以通过对特征空间表达的回归算法得到一些‘坏样本’来攻击网络模型
- 坏样本可以是鲁棒且模型不敏感的

Intriguing properties of neural networks

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Wojciech Zaremba

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Joan Bruna

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Dumitru Erhan

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Rob Fergus

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Abstract

深度神经网络模型的优势与缺陷


Deep neural networks are highly expressive models that have recently achieved state of the art performance on speech and visual recognition tasks. While their expressiveness is the reason they succeed, it also causes them to learn uninterpretable solutions that could have counter-intuitive properties. In this paper we report two such properties.

First, we find that **there is no distinction between individual high level units and random linear combinations of high level units**, according to various methods of unit analysis. It suggests that it is the space, rather than the individual units, that contains the semantic information in the high layers of neural networks.

Second, we find that deep neural networks learn input-output mappings that are fairly discontinuous to a significant extent. We can **cause the network to misclassify an image by applying a certain hardly perceptible perturbation, which is found by maximizing the network's prediction error**. In addition, the specific nature of these perturbations is not a random artifact of learning: **the same perturbation can cause a different network, that was trained on a different subset of the dataset, to misclassify the same input.**

classifier by $f : \mathbb{R}^m \longrightarrow \{1...k\}$

- Minimize $\|r\|_2$ subject to:
 1. $f(x + r) = l$
 2. $x + r \in [0, 1]^m$



(a)

通过加噪声的编码-解码方案实现对抗模型

- 在训练集样本上加入随机噪声
- 训练一个消除噪声的编码解码网络
- 对所有样本进行一次预处理实现对抗

TOWARDS DEEP NEURAL NETWORK ARCHITECTURES ROBUST TO ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES

Shixiang Gu


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additional noise and pre-processing with denoising autoencoders (DAEs).

	N-100-100-10	N200-200-10	AE-400-10	ConvNet
N-100-100-10	2.3%	2.4%	2.3%	5.2%
N-200-200-10	2.3%	2.2%	2.2%	5.4%
AE400-10	3.6%	3.5%	2.7%	9.2%
ConvNet	7.7%	7.6%	8.3%	2.6%
Test error (clean)	2.1%	1.9%	2.1%	1.1%
Avg adv distortion	0.049	0.051	0.043	0.038



模型压缩与对抗期末大作业



李世成 郭明非

2022.04.

对抗攻击与防御

- 神经网络在图片分类任务上取得了很高的准确率，但研究表明它们的鲁棒性往往很差。
- 通过对输入图片进行一个微小的扰动，可以在不影响图片视觉效果的前提下，让神经网络的分类准确率大幅下降。



x
“panda”
57.7% confidence

+ .007 ×



$\text{sign}(\nabla_x J(\theta, x, y))$
“nematode”
8.2% confidence

=



$x + \epsilon \text{sign}(\nabla_x J(\theta, x, y))$
“gibbon”
99.3 % confidence

网络模型攻击本质

- 图片信息有冗余，空间特征表达存在大量沉默信息。对应的扰动可以被利用作为攻击信号产生反直觉的效果
- 存在关键分类面与临界支撑点，可以进行有针对性的扰动达到攻击

模型对抗攻击与防御 by 郭明非、李世成

- 根据模型是否可见，对抗攻击可以分为
 - 白盒攻击 (white-box attack)：攻击者知道模型的内部结构与参数，可以对输入数据求梯度来寻找对抗样本。
 - 黑盒攻击 (black-box attack)：攻击者不知道模型的内部结构与参数，仅可以调用模型获取对于给定输入的输出结果。
- 根据是否指定攻击后的分类类别，对抗攻击又可以分为
 - 指向性攻击 (targeted attack)：使模型将扰动后的输入分类为指定的错误类别。
 - 非指向性攻击 (untargeted attack)：使模型将扰动后的输入分类为任一错误类别。

对抗攻击与防御

大多数白盒非指向性攻击算法求解这样一个优化问题：在给定扰动量的限制下，最大化扰动后的损失函数。

- Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)

$$x' = x + \epsilon \cdot \text{sign}(\nabla_x l(x, y; \theta))$$

- Projected Gradient Descent (PGD)

$$x'_{t+1} = \text{Clip}_{x, \epsilon} \{x'_t + \alpha \cdot \text{sign}(\nabla_x l(x'_t, y; \theta))\}$$

对抗训练

- 对抗训练：在训练过程中，将对抗样本作为数据增广的方式加入训练集，与原始样本一起进行训练
- 对抗训练是一种简单而有效的增强模型鲁棒性的方式。

模型压缩

- 模型压缩通常分为以下几个类别：
 - 剪枝，去掉模型中作用比较小的连接。
 - 量化，降低大模型的精度来减小模型。
 - 低秩稀疏近似，通过组合较少的参数来近似一个层的大量冗余参数。
 - 蒸馏，用大模型的学到的知识训练小模型，从而让小模型具有大模型的能力。
- 当对抗样本中包含的扰动非常小时，量化模型的低精度有助于去掉样本中的扰动，获得更好的鲁棒性。

模型压缩

- 不同量化的阈值是通过权重矩阵绝对值中的最大值决定的，并且是均匀分布的。
- 这种均匀分布的阈值不适合权重矩阵里有离群值的情况。
- 因此可以使用动态量化方法，将不同的量化阈值设定成可学习的参数。
- 由于输入到下一层的值是直接由激活函数得到的，因此量化激活函数的阈值更加重要。
- 一个2bit动态阈值激活函数的例子如下

$$f(x) = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } x < t_1 \\ t_1, & \text{if } t_1 < x < t_2 \\ t_2, & \text{if } t_2 < x < t_3 \\ t_3, & \text{if } x > t_3 \end{cases}$$

正则化

- 网络的李普希茨常数 l 满足，对于任意 x_1, x_2 都有

$$\|f(x_1) - f(x_2)\| \leq l \|x_1 - x_2\|$$

- 当神经网络的李普希茨常数较小时，意味着给输入一个微小的扰动不会带来输出的大幅变化。
- 可以通过限制李普希茨常数，提高模型的鲁棒性。

正则化

先考虑一个线性层

$$f(x) = Wx + b$$

则有

$$\|f(x_1) - f(x_2)\|_2 = \|(Wx_1 + b) - (Wx_2 + b)\|_2 = \|W(x_1 - x_2)\|_2 \leq \|W\|_2 \|x_1 - x_2\|_2$$

因此 $l = \|W\|_2$ 为矩阵 W 的谱范数，对应于矩阵 W 的最大奇异值。

多个线性层的正则化

对于多个线性层的ReLU网络 $f = f^L \circ f^{L-1} \circ \dots \circ f^1$, 其中

$$f^i(x) = \text{ReLU}(W^i x + b^i)$$

有

$$\max_{x_1, x_2} \|f(x_1) - f(x_2)\|_2 \leq \prod_i \sigma(W^i) \cdot \|x_1 - x_2\|_2$$

正则化方式1：正交正则化

- 由于正交矩阵的奇异值都为1，可以加入如下正则化项鼓励权重矩阵 W 为（列）正交矩阵

$$\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}_{\text{CE}} + \frac{\lambda}{2} \sum_i \|(W^i)^T W^i - I\|^2$$

正则化方式2：谱范数正则化

- 通过奇异值分解，可以直接将谱范数加入正则化项

$$\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}_{\text{CE}} + \frac{\lambda}{2} \sum_i \|\sigma_1(W^i)\|^2$$

正则化

- 对矩阵 $W \in R^{n \times m}$ 进行奇异值分解 $W = U\Sigma V^T$, 其中
 - $U \in R^{n \times k}$, $UU^T = I_n$
 - $V \in R^{m \times k}$, $VV^T = I_m$
 - $\Sigma \in R^{k \times k}$, $\Sigma = \text{diag}(\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \dots, \sigma_k)$, $\sigma_1 \geq \sigma_2 \geq \dots \geq \sigma_k > 0$
- 则 σ_1 即为矩阵 W 的谱范数 $\sigma(W)$, 同时我们有
 - $\sigma(W) = u_1^T W v_1$
 - $\nabla_W \sigma(W) = u_1 v_1^T$

正则化

- 幂迭代法求解最大奇异值及对应的奇异向量
 - 随机初始化向量 \tilde{u} 和 \tilde{v}
 - 重复以下过程直至收敛

$$\tilde{v} \leftarrow W^T \tilde{u} / \|W^T \tilde{u}\|_2, \quad \tilde{u} \leftarrow W \tilde{v} / \|W \tilde{v}\|_2$$

证明该结论

先讨论当 $f(\mathbf{x})$ 是线性的时候, $f(\mathbf{x}) = Wx$ 。

把矩阵看作线性算子, 那么可以由向量范数诱导出矩阵范数, 它自动满足对向量范数的相容性, 即:

$$\|Ax_1 - Ax_2\|_2 = \|A * (x_1 - x_2)\|_2 \leq \|A\|_2 * \|x_1 - x_2\|_2$$

因此可得:

$$l = \|A\|_2$$

并且:

$$\|A\|_2 = \sigma_{\max}(A)$$

l 就是矩阵奇异值的最大值。

正交矩阵的奇异值就是特征值。正交矩阵的特征值的范数为1, 满足 l 条件, 因此可证明增加的正则项要求

正则化

- 卷积运算也是线性变换，在输入大小固定时，可以将卷积层等价转化为一个线性层，这个线性层的输入大小为 $\text{in_channels} * \text{in_height} * \text{in_width}$ ，输出大小为 $\text{out_channels} * \text{out_height} * \text{out_width}$ 。
- 同样可以使用上述正则化方法。

参考文献


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语言模型的后门攻击

NLP后门攻击——概念

顾名思义，后门攻击希望在模型的训练过程中通过某种方式在模型中埋藏后门(backdoor)，埋藏好的后门通过攻击者预先设定的触发器(trigger)激发。在后门未被激发时，被攻击的模型具有和正常模型类似的表现；而当模型中埋藏的后门被攻击者激活时，模型的输出变为攻击者预先指定的标签（target label）以达到恶意的目的。后门攻击可以发生在训练过程非完全受控的很多场景中，例如使用第三方数据集、使用第三方平台进行训练、直接调用第三方模型，因此对模型的安全性造成了巨大威胁。




NLP后门攻击


- 1. 在**clean**的测试集上，效果要和正常模型效果持平
 - 因此需要能够访问到用户的test set，或至少是一个类似的task
- 2. 在**添加了trigger词之后**，要能够预测出预先指定的label
- 常见做法：使用一个不常见的字符串作为trigger，将相同或者类似的数据集处理成脏数据，fine-tune得到有毒模型并提供给用户


总体流程图

With data knowledge



Without data knowledge





对抗防御方法：

- 对抗训练
- 对抗检测

FGSM: Fast Gradient Sign Method

- 是属于白盒攻击（模型对攻击者可见）
- 在经过输入数据进行forward操作后，利用loss进行反向梯度回传操作
- 利用回传的梯度值对输入图像进行合理修改，达到：
 - 看上去跟原图片差别不大：控制学习率
 - 实际分类效果会有较大差别（分类错误）：正向误差积累

η is smaller than the precision of the features. Formally, for problems with well-separated classes, we expect the classifier to assign the same class to x and \tilde{x} so long as $\|\eta\|_\infty < \epsilon$, where ϵ is small enough to be discarded by the sensor or data storage apparatus associated with our problem.

Consider the dot product between a weight vector w and an adversarial example \tilde{x} :

$$w^\top \tilde{x} = w^\top x + w^\top \eta.$$

The adversarial perturbation causes the activation to grow by $w^\top \eta$. We can maximize this increase subject to the max norm constraint on η by assigning $\eta = \text{sign}(w)$. If w has n dimensions and the average magnitude of an element of the weight vector is m , then the activation will grow by ϵmn . Since $\|\eta\|_\infty$ does not grow with the dimensionality of the problem but the change in activation caused by perturbation by η can grow linearly with n , then for high dimensional problems, we can make many infinitesimal changes to the input that add up to one large change to the output. We can think of this as a sort of “accidental steganography,” where a linear model is forced to attend exclusively to the signal that aligns most closely with its weights, even if multiple signals are present and other signals have much greater amplitude.

生成攻击数据、通过数据增广实现对抗训练

Let θ be the parameters of a model, x the input to the model, y the targets associated with x (for machine learning tasks that have targets) and $J(\theta, x, y)$ be the cost used to train the neural network. We can linearize the cost function around the current value of θ , obtaining an optimal max-norm constrained perturbation of

$$\eta = \epsilon \text{sign}(\nabla_x J(\theta, x, y)).$$

We refer to this as the “fast gradient sign method” of generating adversarial examples. Note that the required gradient can be computed efficiently using backpropagation.

We found that training with an adversarial objective function based on the fast gradient sign method was an effective regularizer:

$$\tilde{J}(\theta, x, y) = \alpha J(\theta, x, y) + (1 - \alpha) J(\theta, x + \epsilon \text{sign}(\nabla_x J(\theta, x, y))).$$

projected gradient descent (PGD)

<https://arxiv.org/pdf/1706.06083.pdf>

Our perspective on the saddle point problem (2.1) gives answers to both these questions. On the attack side, prior work has proposed methods such as the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [11] and multiple variations of it [18]. FGSM is an attack for an ℓ_∞ -bounded adversary and computes an adversarial example as

$$x + \varepsilon \operatorname{sgn}(\nabla_x L(\theta, x, y)).$$

One can interpret this attack as a simple one-step scheme for maximizing the inner part of the saddle point formulation. A more powerful adversary is the multi-step variant, which is essentially projected gradient descent (PGD) on the negative loss function

$$x^{t+1} = \Pi_{x+\mathcal{S}} (x^t + \alpha \operatorname{sgn}(\nabla_x L(\theta, x, y))).$$