Security in Internet Applications (Specific protocols)

2024/25 Q2

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DAC - UPC



Security in Internet Applications

- Security in application layer protocols
- XML and security
- Specific security protocols for the Web

Security in Internet Applications

- Security in application layer protocols
- XML and security
- Specific security protocols for the Web

Specific security web protocols

Specific security protocols:

SAML

OAuth

OpenID Connect

JSON Web Tokens (JWT)

SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language)

- v2.0 March 2005. OASIS (Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards) https://www.oasis-open.org/standards#samlv2.0
- Interchange of authentication and Protocolo para cultorisary autenticar authorization data
- Based in XML
- Security tokens: "Assertions" (user info)
- Interchange between an "identity provider" and a "service provider"
- Useful for authentication and authorization in web environments

SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language)

- v2.0 March 2005. OASIS


 (Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards)

 https://www.oasis-open.org/standards#samlv2.0
- Interchange of authentication and authorization data
- Based in XML
- Security tokens: "Assertions" (user info)
- Interchange between an "identity provider" and a "service provider", and a "service provider", and a "service provider".
- Useful for authentication and authorization in web environments



How these entities interrelate

- Most of the SAML and ID-FF*use cases are eyeballoriented
- But some backchannel (SOAP and other) communication takes place in service of this



* ID-FF (origin of SAML): Liberty Identity Federation Framework

SAML basic concepts

Profiles

Combinations of assertions, protocols, and bindings to support a defined use case

Bindings

Mappings of SAML protocols onto standard messaging and communication protocols

Protocols

Requests and responses for obtaining assertions and doing identity management

Assertions

Authentication, attribute, and entitlement information

Se prede implementare STAME sobre la Ge querames, pero nanalmente & cycs=bre +177P.

Authentication Context


Detailed data on types and strengths of authentication

Metadata

Configuration data for identity and service providers

SAML-concepts

SAML components




EAST-component-resting

SAML assertion structure

```
1: <saml:Assertion xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
    Version="2.0"
 3:
     IssueInstant="2005-01-31T12:00:00Z">
     <saml:Issuer Format=urn:oasis:names:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:entity>
        http://idp.example.org
 6: </saml:Issuer>
     <saml:Subject>
        ≺saml:NameID
 9:
          Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress">
10:
            j.doe@example.com
11:
        </saml:NameID>
12:
     </saml:Subject>
13:
     <saml:Conditions</pre>
14:
        NotBefore="2005-01-31T12:00:00Z"
15:
        NotOnOrAfter="2005-01-31T12:10:002">
16:
      </saml: Conditions>
17:
      <saml:AuthnStatement</pre>
18:
        AuthnInstant="2005-01-31T12:00:00Z" SessionIndex="67775277772">
19:
      <saml:AuthnContext>
20:
          <saml: AuthnContextClassRef>
21:
            urn: oasis:names:tc: SAML: 2.0:ac: classes: PasswordProtectedTransport
22:
          </saml:AuthnContextClassRef>
23:
        </saml:AuthnContext>
24:
      </saml: AuthnStatement>
25: </saml:Assertion>
```

Figure 6: Assertion with Subject, Conditions, and Authentication Statement

SAML: Assertion structure



SAML attribute statement structure

```
1: <saml:AttributeStatement>
      <saml:Attribute</pre>
 3:
         xmlns:x500="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:profiles:attribute:X500"
 4:
         NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:uri"
 5:
         Name="urn:oid:2.5.4.42"
         FriendlyName="givenName">
         ≺saml:AttributeValue xsi:type="xs:string"
           x500: Rncoding="LDAP">John</saml: AttributeValue>
 9-
      </saml:Attribute>
10:
      <saml:Attribute</pre>
11:
        NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic"
12:
        Name="LastName">
13:
        ≺saml:AttributeValue
14-
          xsi:type="xs:string">Doe</saml:AttributeValue>
15:
      </saml:Attribute>
16:
      Ksaml:Attribute
17:
        NameFormat="http://smithco.com/attr-formats"
        Name="CreditLimit">
18-
        xmlns: smithco="http://www.smithco.com/smithco-schema.xsd"
19:
20:
        <saml:AttributeValue xsi:type="smithco:type">
21:
          <smithco:amount currency="USD">500.00</smithco:amount>
22:
        </saml:AttributeValue>
23:
      </saml:Attribute>
24: </saml:AttributeStatement>
```

Figure 7: Attribute Statement


SAML: SOAP binding example

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
     <env: Envelope
З.
       xmlns: env="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap/envelope/">
4.
5.
         <samlp:AttributeQuery
6.
           xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
7.
           xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
           ID="aaf23196-1773-2113-474a-fe114412ab72"
           Version="2.0"
10.
           IssueInstant="2006-07-17T20:31:40Z">
11.
           <saml:Issuer>http://example.sp.com</saml:Issuer>
12.
           <saml:Subject>
13.
               ≺saml:NameID
14.
               Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:X509SubjectName">
15.
               C=US, O=NCSA-TEST, OU=User, CN=trscavo@uiuc.edu
16.
               </saml:NameID>
17.
           </saml:Subject>
18.
           <saml:Attribute</pre>
19.
               NameFormat="urn: oasis:names:tc: SAML: 2.0: attrname-format:uri"
20.
               Name="urn:oid:2.5.4.42"
21.
               FriendlyName="givenName">
22.
           </saml:Attribute>
23.
          </samlp:AttributeQuery>
24.
       </env:Body>
25. </env:Envelope>
```

Figure 9: Attribute Query in SOAP Envelope

```
1: <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
 2: <env: Envelope xmlns:env="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
 3:
      <env: Bodv≻
        <samlp:Response
 4:
 5:
          xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
          xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
 7:
          Version="2.0"
          ID="i92f8b5230dc04d73e93095719d191915fdc67d5e"
 9:
          IssueInstant="2006-07-17T20:31:412"
10:
          InResponseTo="aaf23196-1773-2113-474a-fe114412ab72">
11:
          <saml:Issuer>http://idp.example.org</saml:Issuer>
12:
          <samlp:Status>
13:
            <samlp: StatusCode Value="urn: oasis:names: tc: SAML: 2. 0: status: Success"/>
14:
          </samlp:Status>
15:
                        ...SAML assertion...
16:
        </samlp: Response>
17:
      </env:Bodv>
18: </env:Envelope>
```

Figure 10: Response in SOAP Envelope



OTTH-SADS-EDGES

SAML: Examples of uses

Sitema de intificación que wavez

Sitema de intificación que wavez

te has identificado y no tevelue a

pedirlo porque te permite el


- Standard browsers acceso a un minero de recensor.

Enhanced HTTP clients


Identity federation

- Using a well-known name or attribute
- For anonymous users by means of attributes
- Using a privacy-preserving pseudonym


Single Sign-On (SSO) use case




Identity Federation use case




Initiation of web browser SSO




Example of IdP-Initiated SSO: POST Bindings



Example of SP-Initiated SSO:Redirect/POST Bindings



SP-Initiated web browser SSO example



Specific security web protocols

Specific security protocols:

SAML

OAuth

OpenID Connect

JSON Web Tokens (JWT)

OAuth 2.0 (Open Authorization)

- Developed by IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force)
- RFC 6749 (+ 6750 & 6819) first published in 2012, updates in RFC 8252 ('17) [+ many related standards]
 - Not backwards compatible with OAuth 1.0 !!

- OAuth 1.0 published in RFC 5849 in 2010
 - Implements different authorization flows
 - No longer used in many services (e.g. Google APIs)


OAuth 2.0: Features

- Authorization protocol
- Allows users to approve an application to act on their behalf
- No password share with the application

Over HTTP(S)


Frame: Log in with Google pushers

OAuth 2.0: Protocol example



OAuth 2.0: Roles

OAuth 2.0 defines the following roles of users and applications



OAuth 2.0 roles as defined in the specification.

OAuth 2.0: Roles and users

- Resource Owner: Grants access to protected resource (typically the end-user)
- Resource Server: Hosts protected resources (API to be accessed)
- Client (application): Requests access to protected resource on behalf of the Resource Owner
- Authorization Server: Authenticates the Resource
 Owner and issues Access Tokens after authorization
- User Agent: Used by the Resource Owner to interact with the Client (for example a browser or a native application)

OAuth 2.0 Framework

```
|--(A) - Authorization Request ->| Resource
                                                Owner
        |<-(B)-- Authorization Grant ---|</pre>
       |--(C)-- Authorization Grant -->| Authorization
Client
                                                Server
        |<-(D) ---- Access Token -----</pre>
        |--(E)---- Access Token ---->| Resource
                                                Server
        |<-(F)--- Protected Resource ---|</pre>
```

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749

Abstract Protocol Flow

OAuth 2.0 Framework

```
|--(A) - Authorization Request ->| Resource
                                               Owner
       |<-(B) <- Authorization Grant -->
       Credential to obtain an access token
       |--(C)-- Authorization Grant -->| Authorization
Client
                                               Server
       |<-(D)---- Access Token -----
        --(E)---- Access Token ---->| Resource
                                               Server
       |<-(F)--- Protected Resource ---|</pre>
```

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749

Authorization Grant types

- Authorization code:
 - For server-side applications (most commonly used)
- Implicit:
 - Applications running on user's device
- Resource Owner password credentials:
 - Trusted applications (owned by the service, ...)
- Client credentials:
 - Applications API access

Authorization Grant types

- Authorization code:
 - For server-side applications (most commonly used)
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- Resource Owner password credentials:
 - Trusted applications (owned by the service, ...)
- Client credentials:
 - Applications API access

```
Authorization Code Flow
 Resource
  Owner
                         tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749
  (B)
-+---(A)-- & Redirection URI ---->|
User-
                               | Authorization |
Agent -+---(B) -- User authenticates --->| Server
      -+---(C) -- Authorization Code ---<
(A) (C)
       |>---(D)-- Authorization Code -----'
 Client | & Redirection URI
       | <--- (E) ---- Access Token ----- '
 -----+ (w/ Optional Refresh Token)
```


Lines illustrating steps (A), (B), and (C) are broken into two parts as they pass through the user-agent

Protocol Endpoints (RFC6749)

Authorization server endpoints (HTTP resources):

- Used by the authorization process
- Two types:
 - Authorization endpoint used by the client to obtain authorization from the resource owner via user-agent redirection
 - -Token endpoint used by the client to exchange an authorization grant for an access token, typically with client authentication


OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps (RFC8252)



Authorization Flow for Native Apps Using the Browser

OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps

Authorization Flow for Native Apps Using the Browser



Native App Authorization via an External User-Agent

OAuth 2.0: Authorization request

response_type

Required. Depends on grant type

client id

Required. Id of the application that asks for authorization (issued by authorization server)

redirect_uri

Optional. The redirect URI registered by the client

scope

Optional. List of operations that the application requires. Examples in https://oauth.net/2/scope/

state

Recommended. To maintain state. Returned to the application in the redirect_uri. To prevent CSRF (Cross-site request forgery) attack

OAuth 2.0: Authorization response

code

state

Required. Depends on grant type. The authorization code, for example. Must expire (10' f.e.). Used once by the client

Required, if present in request. The same value as sent by the client in the state parameter

OAuth 2.0: Access token request

client_id

client_secret

grant_type

code

redirect uri

Required. Application's id

Required. The client application's client secret

Required. For example authorization_code

Required. The authorization code received, if it is the case

Required, if request URI included in authorization request. Must be identical

OAuth 2.0: Access token response


```
{ "access_token" : "...",
    "token_type" : "...",
    "expires_in" : "..."
    option
```

Properties:

- access_token as assigned by the authorization server
- token type assigned by the authorization server
- expires_in number of seconds after which the access token expires. *Expiration of access* tokens is optional
- ...

OAuth 2.0: Example

Google APIs: Web server & installed applications



Google APIs example (Mobile & Desktop Apps)

Obtain the authorization code

[Authorization Request] (URL)

```
https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/v2/auth?
scope=email%20profile&
response_type=code&
state=security_token%3D138r5719ru3e1%26url%
3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Foauth2.example.com%2Ftoken&
redirect_uri=com.example.app%3A/oauth2redirect&
client_id=client_id
```

Google APIs example (Mobile & Desktop Apps)

Authorization code → access token

[Access token Request] (HTTP)

```
POST /token HTTP/1.1
```

Host: oauth2.googleapis.com

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

```
code=4/P7q7W91a-oMsCeLvIaQm6bTrgtp7&
client_id=your_client_id&
client_secret=your_client_secret&
redirect_uri=https://oauth.example.com/code&
grant_type=authorization_code
```

Google APIs example (Mobile & Desktop Apps)

Authorization code → access token

[Access token Response] (JSON)

```
"access token": "1/fFAGRNJru1FTz70BzhT3Zq",
   "expires in":3920,
   "token type": "Bearer"
   "scope": "https://www.googleapis.com/auth/
drive.metadata.readonly",
   "refresh token": "1/xEoDL4iW3cx1I7yDbSRFYNG01
kVKM2C-259HOF2aQbI" sulle ser menor que el la SAMC,

Duración del folch sulle ser menor que el la SAMC,

así que se recesita el parametro de regresh toben.
```

Google APIs example (Mobile & Desktop Apps)

[Refresh token Request] (HTTP)

```
POST /token HTTP/1.1
```

Host: oauth2.googleapis.com

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

```
client_id=your_client_id&
client_secret=your_client_secret&
refresh_token=refresh_token&
grant_type=refresh_token
```

Google APIs example (Mobile & Desktop Apps)

[Refresh token Response] (JSON)

```
"access_token":"1/fFAGRNJru1FTz70BzhT3Zg",
   "expires_in": 3920,
   "scope": "https://www.googleapis.com/auth/
drive.metadata.readonly",
   "token_type": "Bearer"
}
```

Google APIs example (Mobile & Desktop Apps)

[Refresh token Response] (JSON)

Specific security web protocols

Specific security protocols:

SAML

OAuth

OpenID Connect

JSON Web Tokens (JWT)

OpenID Connect

- Simple identity layer on top of OAuth 2.0
- Enables Clients (web-based, mobile, JavaScript, ...)
 to:
 - verify identity of end-user based on authentication performed by Authorization Server
 - obtain basic profile information (end-user) in RESTlike manner

— ...

 Specification developed by OpenID Foundation (1.0, 2014) (errata set 2 in Dec. 2023)

OpenID Connect

For developers:


- Provides a secure and verifiable answer to the question:
 - "What is the identity of the person currently using the browser or mobile app that is connected?"
- Removes responsibility of setting, storing, and managing passwords
 - → avoid credential-based data breaches

Añade paron sobre oput.

OpenID Connect protocol

```
-----(1) AuthN Request---->|
             End- |\langle --(2)\rangle AuthN & AuthZ-->|
             User
  RP
                                                  OP
(Relying)
                                                OpenID
                       (ID Token and usually Access Token) | Provider |
Party) |
Client | <---- (3) AuthN Response-----
         -----(4) UserInfo Request---->|
        <----(5) UserInfo Response----
```


OpenID Connect protocol



OpenID Connect protocol

```
End- |\langle --(2)\rangle AuthN & AuthZ-->|
          User
  RP
                                         OP
(Relying)
                                       OpenID
                  (ID Token and usually Access Token) | Provider |
Party) |
Client | <---- (3) AuthN Response-----
       <----(5) UserInfo Response----
                     ("Claims" about End-User)
```

OpenID Connect



OpenID Connect: Example

Google APIs (OpenID Connect authentication URI):

```
https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/v2/auth?
response type=code&
client id=424911365001.apps.googleusercontent.com&
scope=openid%20email&
redirect uri=https%3A//oauth2.example.com/code&
state=security token%3D138r5719ru3e1%26url%3Dhttps%
  3A%2F%2Foauth2-login-demo.example.com%2FmyHome&
login hint=jsmith@example.com&
nonce=0394852-3190485-2490358&
hd=example.com
```

Specific security web protocols

Specific security protocols:

SAML

OAuth

OpenID Connect

JSON Web Tokens (JWT)

- JSON Web Tokens (JWT)
 Se tiche se war can obe posicio Eistinsono tiene ser

 Tries to "simplify" SAML pupio como Oscullo.
- "JWT ("jot") is a standard for safely passing claims in space constrained environments" (*)
- · "Container" format : estrutiva de Later
- <u>Use</u>: user authentication, secure info. exchange
- "JSON Web Token" RFC7519 (2015) [updates later]
- Also:
 - -JSON Web Signature (JWS) RFC7515 (2015)
 - -JSON Web Encryption (JWE) RFC 7516 (2015)

- 3 parts (separated by "."):
 - Header
 - Payload
 - Signature (optional)
- Base64Url encoded
 - As base64 but changing 2 characters:
 - 62: From + to (minus)
 - 63: From / to _ (underline)

no estan en la table de mapeo

Header

- Signing/decrypting algorithm
- Token type (equal to "JWT" when present)
- content type (for, rarely, nested JWTs)

— ...

Payload

- Registered claims:
 - issuer, expiration time, subject (principal),
 - audience (recipients), not before,
 - issued at (time), jWt iD,
- Public claims:
 - IANA JSON Web Token Registry or URI
- Private claims:
 - Custom

JWT structure – Public claims

- https://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt/ jwt.xhtml
- Example: OpenID Connect Core 1.0
 - Claims defined in IANA JSON Web Token Registry:

OpenID Connect defined claims (1/2)

acr Authentication Context Class Reference

amr Authentication Methods References

at_hash Access Token hash value

auth_time Time when the authentication occurred

azp Authorized party - the party to which the ID Token was issued

nonce Value used to associate a Client session with an ID Token

c_hash
 Code hash value

address
 Preferred postal address

birthdate Birthday

email
 Preferred e-mail address

email_verified True if the e-mail address has been verified; otherwise false

family_name Surname(s) or last name(s)

gender Gender

given_name Given name(s) or first name(s)

locale

OpenID Connect defined claims (2/2)


- middle_name Middle name(s)
- name
 Full name
- nickname Casual name
- phone_number
 Preferred telephone number
- phone_number_verified
 True if the phone number has been verified
- picture Profile picture URL
- preferred_username
 Shorthand name to refer to End-User
- profile
 Profile page URL
- updated_at Time the information was last updated
- website Web page or blog URL
- zoneinfo Time zone

- sub_jwk Public key used to check the signature of an ID Token

- Signature (JWS)
- Example (with the HMACSHA256 algorithm)

```
HMACSHA256(
   base64UrlEncode(header) + "." +
   base64UrlEncode(payload),
   secret)
```

- Other recommended algorithms:
 - RSASSA PKCS1 v1.5 using SHA-256
 - ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256
- Other algorithms supported



Encrypted JWT (JWE)

Structure

- Protected header
- Encrypted key (symmetric)
- Initialization vector (optional)
- Encrypted data (ciphertext)
- Authentication tag (optional)

Encrypted JWT (JWE)

- Recommended encryption algorithms (key encryption)
 - RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 (to be removed)
 - RSAES-OAEP with defaults (to be required)
 - AES-128 Key Wrap
 - AES-256 Key Wrap
 - Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Static (ECDH-ES) using Concat KDF (to be required)
 - ECDH-ES + AES-128 Key Wrap
 - ECDH-ES + AES-256 Key Wrap

Encrypted JWT (JWE)

- Recommended encryption algorithms (content encryption)
 - RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 (to be removed)
 - AES CBC + HMAC SHA: AES 128 to 256-bits with Cipher Block Chaining and HMAC + SHA-256 to 512 for validation.
 - AES GCM: AES 128 to 256 using Galois Counter Mode.
 - REQUIRED:
 - AES-128 CBC + HMAC SHA-256
 - AES-256 CBC + HMAC SHA-512

Security in Internet Applications

- Security in application layer protocols
- XML and security
- Specific security protocols for the Web