PENTEST REPORT

Mobile Penetration Testing

Bina Nusantara University

APPS WE TRIED

SATUSEHAT

IPUSNAS

JKN Mobile

• NIKE

• SHEIN

Janji Jawa

Kopi Kenangan

WeChat

• Identitas Kependudukan Digital

-> Succeeded in finding something

-> Failed to find anything relevant

STATIC ANALYSIS FINDINGS

```
*SATUSEHAT - jadx-gui
 # AndroidManifest.xml x
                          # res/values/strings.xml
       <string name="common open on phone">Open on phone</string>
       <string name="common_signin_button_text">Sign in</string>
 86
       <string name="common_signin_button_text_long">Sign in with Google</string>
 87
       <string name="confirm device credential password">Use password</string>
 88
       <string name="copy_toast_msg">Link copied to clipboard</string>
 89
       <string name="default_error_msg">Unknown error</string>
       <string name="default web client id">1073063711068-lgh91rqh8nhahitt24v51p2aheru87n7.apps.googl
91
       <string name="fallback_menu_item_copy_link">Copy link</string>
92
       <string name="fallback menu item open in browser">Open in browser</string>
93
       <string name="fallback_menu_item_share_link">Share link</string>
94
       <string name="fcm_fallback_notification_channel_label">Miscellaneous</string>
       <string name="fingerprint_dialog_touch_sensor">Touch the fingerprint sensor</string>
       <string name="fingerprint_error_hw_not_available">Fingerprint hardware not available.</string>
97
       <string name="fingerprint_error_hw_not_present">This device does not have a fingerprint sensor
       <string name="fingerprint_error_lockout">Too many attempts. Please try again later.
       <string name="fingerprint error no fingerprints">No fingerprints enrolled.</string>
100
       <string name="fingerprint_error_user_canceled">Fingerprint operation canceled by user.
101
       <string name="fingerprint_not_recognized">Not recognized</string>
102
       <string name="gcm defaultSenderId">1073063711068</string>
103
       <string name="generic_error_no_device_credential">No PIN, pattern, or password set.</string>
104
       <string name="generic_error_no_keyguard">This device does not support PIN, pattern, or passwor
105
       <string name="generic_error_user_canceled">Authentication canceled by user.</string>
       <string name="google_api_key">AIzaSyDtbl-G-9Xwp81FYRVDAla5Tc4pfr05Rr4</string>
107
        <string name="google_app_id">1:1073063711068:android:60a7e7b7f90292f4787199</string>
        <string name="google_crash_reporting_api_key">AIzaSyDtbl-G-9Xwp81FYRVDAla5Tc4pfr05Rr4</string>
```


Hardcoded API keys can be extracted and abused by attackers. This can lead to unauthorized access to Google services, potentially resulting in data breaches, quota exhaustion, or financial costs due to misuse.

MSTG-CRYPTO-1: API KEY & APP ID (Low-High)



No Root Check

ROADBLOCK





Setting Burpsuit Proxy detects the device as Illegal


POSSIBLE WAYS

```
> 🖿 ac
                                                   # AndroidManifest.xml
                                                                            @ MainActivity x @ MethodCall x
                                                                                                                  c C6924k
> 🖿 ad
                                                      import java.io.File;
                                                      import p038ce.FlutterFragmentActivity;
> 🖿 ae
                                                      import p255ge.MethodCall;
> 🖿 af
                                                      import p255qe.MethodChannel;
> 🖿 ag
                                                      import p316uf.C6924k;
> mandroid.support.p013v4
                                                      /* compiled from: MainActivity.kt */
> mandroidx
                                                      /* Loaded from: classes.dex */
> 🖿 ba
                                                      public final class MainActivity extends FlutterFragmentActivity {
> 🖿 bb
> 🖿 bd
                                                         /* renamed from: q */
                                                         public final String f5654q = "com.satusehat.go.id/methodchannel";
> 🖿 be
> 🖿 bf
                                                         /* renamed from: T */
> 🖿 bg
                                                         public static final void m19175T(MainActivity mainActivity, MethodCall method(
                                                             C6924k.m3010e(mainActivity, "this$0");
> 🖿 ca
                                                             C6924k.m3010e(methodCall, "call");
> 🖿 cd
                                                             C6924k.m3010e(interfaceC6274d, "result");
> cf
                                                             if (C6924k.m3014a(methodCall.f20447a, "illegalDevice")) {
> 🖿 cg
                                                                 interfaceC6274d.success(Boolean.valueOf(mainActivity.m19176S()));
                                                             } else if (C6924k.m3014a(methodCall.f20447a, "getDeviceId")) {
> 🖿 com
                                                                 interfaceC6274d.success(Settings.Secure.getString(mainActivity.getCont
> 🖿 de
> mdev.fluttercommunity.plus.share
                                                                 interfaceC6274d.notImplemented();
```

Deleting/Modifying the "Illegal Device" Function but this results to the App not functioning completely



WEIRD STUFF THAT HAPPENED



Random unknown calls after signing up



STATIC ANALYSIS FINDINGS

A hardcoded secret key can be extracted from the application binary, allowing attackers to gain unauthorized access to APIs or services. This could lead to significant data breaches or unauthorized actions within the system.

MSTG-CRYPTO-1: HardCoded Secret Key (Low-High)



STATIC ANALYSIS FINDINGS



MSTG-NETWORK-1: Clear Text Traffic HTTP (Low-Medium)

Using clear text traffic means data can be intercepted in transit, leading to potential data leakage or man-in-the-middle attacks. However, the severity depends on the type of data transmitted.




What We Have Done

```
Command Prompt
                          Windows PowerShell
                                                   Windows PowerShell
PS C:\Users\Koroza> adb shell ls /data/local/tmp/cert-der.crt
/data/local/tmp/cert-der.crt
PS C:\Users\Koroza> frida -U -f mam.reader.ipusnas --codeshare pcipolloni/universal-android-ssl-pinning-bypass-w
ith-frida
             Frida 16.2.5 - A world-class dynamic instrumentation toolkit
             Commands:
                           -> Displays the help system
                 help
                 object? -> Display information about 'object'
                 exit/quit -> Exit
             More info at https://frida.re/docs/home/
             Connected to Android Emulator 5554 (id=emulator-5554)
Spawned 'mam.reader.ipusnas'. Resuming main thread!
[Android Emulator 5554::mam.reader.ipusnas ]->
[.] Cert Pinning Bypass/Re-Pinning
[+] Loading our CA...
[o] Our CA Info: CN=PortSwigger CA, OU=PortSwigger CA, O=PortSwigger, L=PortSwigger, ST=PortSwigger, C=PortSwigg
[+] Creating a KeyStore for our CA...
[+] Creating a TrustManager that trusts the CA in our KeyStore...
[+] Our TrustManager is ready...
[+] Hijacking SSLContext methods now...
[-] Waiting for the app to invoke SSLContext.init()...
[Android Emulator 5554::mam.reader.ipusnas ]-> [o] App invoked javax.net.ssl.SSLContext.init...
[+] SSLContext initialized with our custom TrustManager!
[Android Emulator 5554::mam.reader.ipusnas ]->
[Android Emulator 5554::mam.reader.ipusnas ]-> Connection terminated
```





What We Have Done



Trying out SSL pinning bypass using Frida

BYPASS ROOT WITH FRIDA

