

Proofs, and what they're good for

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MELBOURNE

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To explain the nature of *proof*,
from the perspective of a *normative
pragmatic account of meaning*, using
the formal tools of *proof theory*.

Outline

Motivation

Background

What Proofs Are

How Proofs Work

MOTIVATION

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
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Example Proof 1 (the formal structure)


$$\begin{array}{c}
 \frac{\frac{Ba \succ Ba \quad La \succ La}{Ba \vee La \succ Ba, La} \vee L \quad Da \succ Da}{Da \supset (Ba \vee La), Da \succ Ba, La} \supset L \\
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Example Proof 2 (The Bridges of Königsberg)





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

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

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

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But what I say here can be extended to proof relying on other concepts.

Puzzles about proof

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- ▶ How can we be ignorant of a conclusion which logically follows from what we already know?
- ▶ What *grounds* the necessity in the connection between the premises and the conclusion?
- ▶ (Notice that these are important questions for proofs in first order predicate logic, as much as for proof more generally.)

BACKGROUND

Assertions and Denials

$[X : Y]$

... in a communicative practice

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They are connected to other speech acts, too, like imperatives, interrogatives, recognitives, observatives, *etc.*

Assertions and denials take a *stand*
(*pro* or *con*) on something.

DENIAL clashes with assertion.
ASSERTION clashes with denial.

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- ▶ A position that is OUT OF BOUNDS doesn't succeed in taking a stand.

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Logical concepts are similarly sharply delimited,
but they cannot all be given explicit definitions.

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$$\frac{X, A, B \vdash Y}{X, A \wedge B \vdash Y} \wedge Df$$

What about when to *deny* a conjunction?

$$\frac{\frac{\frac{}{A \wedge B \vdash A \wedge B} Id}{X \vdash B, Y \quad A, B \vdash A \wedge B} \wedge Df}{\frac{X \vdash A, Y \quad X, A \vdash A \wedge B, Y}{X \vdash A \wedge B, Y} Cut} Cut$$

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So, we have

$$\frac{X \vdash A, Y \quad X \vdash B, Y}{X \vdash A \wedge B, Y} \wedge R$$

Definitions for other logical concepts

$$\frac{X \vdash A, Y}{X, \neg A \vdash Y} \neg Df$$

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$$\frac{X \vdash Fa, Y}{X \vdash (\forall x)Fx, Y} \forall Df$$

$$\frac{X, Fa \vdash Y}{X, (\exists x)Fx \vdash Y} \forall Df$$

$$\frac{X, Gb \vdash Gc, Y}{X \vdash b = c, Y} \forall Df$$

(Where a and G are not present in X and Y .)

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- ▶ Are *subject matter neutral*. (They work wherever you assert and deny—and have singular terms and predicates.)
- ▶ In Brandom's terms, they *make explicit* some of what was implicit in the practice of assertion and denial.

WHAT PROOFS ARE

A Tiny Proof

If it's Wednesday, I'm in Sydney.

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Therefore, I'm in Sydney.

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[It's Wednesday \supset I'm in Sydney, It's Wednesday : I'm in Sydney]

(This is out of bounds.)

The Undeniable

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and I've asserted *it's Wednesday*,
then *I'm in Sydney* is undeniable.

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The *stance* (*pro* or *con*)
on *I'm in Sydney* was already made.

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In this sense, proofs are *analytic*.

They apply, given the definitions, independently of the positions taken by those giving the proof.

What Proofs Prove

A proof of $A, B \vdash C, D$ can be seen
as a *proof* of C from $[A, B : D]$,
and a *refutation* of A from $[B : C, D]$,
and *more*.

HOW PROOFS WORK

Observation o: Proofs are *analytic*

These proofs are grounded in the *rules*
defining the concepts used in them.

Observation 1: *Specification* outstrips *Recognition*

Our ability to *specify* concepts and consequence
far outstrips our ability to *recognise* that consequence.

Peano Arithmetic and Goldbach's Conjecture

SUCCESSOR AXIOMS:

PA1: $\forall x \forall y (x' = y' \supset x = y)$;

PA2: $\forall x (0 \neq x')$.

ADDITION AXIOMS:

PA3: $\forall x (x + 0 = x)$;

PA4: $\forall x (x + y' = (x + y)')$.

MULTIPLICATION AXIOMS:

PA5: $\forall x (x \times 0 = 0)$;

PA6: $\forall x \forall y (x \times y' = (x \times y) + x)$.

INDUCTION SCHEME:

PA7: $(\phi(0) \wedge \forall x (\phi(x) \supset \phi(x')))) \supset \forall x \phi(x)$.

GOLDBACH'S CONJECTURE:

GC: $\forall x \exists y \exists z (\text{Prime } y \wedge \text{Prime } z \wedge 0'' \times x = y + z)$

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Verifying a putative proof is straightforward.
Checking that something *has* a proof is not so easy.

Are we logically omniscient?

Suppose that $PA \vdash GC$
(but we don't possess that proof)
and that we *know* PA .

Do we know GC ?

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In a weak sense of 'know', *yes*, we do know GC

- ▶ It's a logical consequence of what we know.
- ▶ It is implicitly present in what we already know.
- ▶ There is no epistemic possibility (no circumstance consistent with our knowledge) that leaves GC out.

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- ▶ Do we *believe* GC?

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In a not-so-weak sense, we don't know GC

- ▶ Do we *believe* GC?
- ▶ If we believed it, do we believe it *in the right way*?
- ▶ There is evidence for GC (its proof from PA, for example), but if that evidence plays no role in our belief...

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- ▶ This *follows from* the concepts of consequence and truth.

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- ▶ Here, p transforms warrants for the premises into warrant for the conclusion.
- ▶ This works only for *categorical, conclusive* warrants (*grounds*), not for *defeasible* warrants.

A Caveat on Defeasible Warrants

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Consider the “Lottery Paradox.”

$$\begin{aligned} & [(\exists x)(Tx \wedge Wx), \\ & (\forall x)(Tx \equiv (x = t_1 \vee x = t_2 \vee \dots \vee x = t_{1\,000\,000})) \\ & \quad : Wt_1, Wt_2, \dots, Wt_{1\,000\,000}] \end{aligned}$$

A Caveat on Defeasible Warrants

Consider the “Lottery Paradox.”

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We have a very high degree of confidence in each part.

Each component is highly probable.

But the whole position is out of bounds.

Observation 4: Achilles and the Tortoise

“Well, now, let’s take a little bit of the argument in that First Proposition—just *two* steps, and the conclusion drawn from them. Kindly enter them in your note-book. And in order to refer to them conveniently, let’s call them *A*, *B*, and *Z* :—

(*A*) Things that are equal to the same are equal to each other.

(*B*) The two sides of this Triangle are things that are equal to the same.

(*Z*) The two sides of this Triangle are equal to each other.

Readers of Euclid will grant, I suppose, that *Z* follows logically from *A* and *B*, so that any one who accepts *A* and *B* as true, *must* accept *Z* as true?”

“Undoubtedly! The youngest child in a High School—as soon as High Schools are invented, which will not be till some two thousand years later—will grant *that*.”

“And if some reader had *not* yet accepted *A* and *B* as true, he might still accept the *sequence* as a *valid* one, I suppose?”

Observation 4: Achilles and the Tortoise

“No doubt such a reader might exist. He might say ‘I accept as true the Hypothetical Proposition that, *if* A and B be true, Z must be true; but, I *don't* accept A and B as true.’ Such a reader would do wisely in abandoning Euclid, and taking to football.”

“And might there not *also* be some reader who would say ‘I accept A and B as true, but I *don't* accept the Hypothetical’?”

“Certainly there might. *He*, also, had better take to football.”

“And *neither* of these readers,” the Tortoise continued, “is *as yet* under any logical necessity to accept Z as true?”

“Quite so,” Achilles assented.

“Well, now, I want you to consider *me* as a reader of the *second* kind, and to force me, logically, to accept Z as true.”

“A tortoise playing football would be—” Achilles was beginning

“—an anomaly, of course,” the Tortoise hastily interrupted. “Don’t wander from the point. Let’s have Z first, and football afterwards!”

“I’m to force you to accept Z , am I?” Achilles said musingly. “And your present position is that you accept A and B , but you *don't* accept the Hypothetical—”

“Let’s call it C ,” said the Tortoise.

“—but you *don't* accept

(C) If A and B are true, Z must be true.”

“That is my present position,” said the Tortoise.

“Then I must ask you to accept C .”

Our Analysis

$$A, B \vdash Z$$

Our Analysis

$A, B \vdash Z$

or

$A, A \supset Z \vdash Z$

Our Analysis

$$A, B \vdash Z$$

or

$$A, A \supset Z \vdash Z$$

This *doesn't* mean when I accept A
and I accept $A \supset Z$,
I ought to also accept Z .

Our Analysis

$$A, B \vdash Z$$

or

$$A, A \supset Z \vdash Z$$

This *doesn't* mean when I accept A
and I accept $A \supset Z$,
I ought to also accept Z .

However, if I assert A and $A \supset Z$ then Z is *undeniable*.

If I assert A and *if A then Z* and *deny Z* ,
then I am using ‘*if...then*’ in a way that
deviates from the defining rule for \supset ,
or I am explicitly contradicting myself.

If I assert A and *if* A *then* Z and *deny* Z ,
then I am using ‘*if...then*’ in a way that
deviates from the defining rule for \supset ,
or I am explicitly contradicting myself.

$$\frac{A \supset B \vdash A \supset B}{A \supset B, A \vdash B} \supset Df$$

An account of the logical concepts given in terms
of defining rules governing assertions and denials

An account of the logical concepts given in terms of defining rules governing assertions and denials helps explain how (*first order predicate logic*) proof works,

An account of the logical concepts given in terms of defining rules governing assertions and denials helps explain how (*first order predicate logic*) proof works, how possessing a proof can expand our knowledge, while proofs make explicit what is implicit in what we know.

THANK YOU!

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