CS7642 Project 2 – Solving LunarLander problem with Double Deep Q-Learning

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Abstract-git hash:

I. SOCCER GAME

II. LEARNER IMPLEMENTATION

We follow a general off-policy learning template (Alg. 1) for all training process, each learner (Q, Friend-Q, Foe-Q, CE-Q) has to implement it's own way of action selection (for ϵ -greedy to call if greedy action is needed), and the function to update Q values. The general form of updating Q values of agent i is:

$$Q_i(s, \mathbf{a}) = (1 - \alpha)Q_i(s, \mathbf{a}) + \alpha((1 - \gamma)R_i + \gamma V_i(s')) \quad (1)$$

where α is learning rate, γ is discount factor. $\mathbf{a} = (a_1, a_2 \dots a_N)$ is a combination of all agent actions (although we will see in Q-Learning each agent only need to track the Q-table of its own action, while for other learners each agent also keep track of other agent's actions). Each learner defines state value function $V_i(s)$ differently.

Our implementation of Foe-Q is restricted to only two agents, while Q-Learning, Friend-Q, and CE-Q are generalized to handle multi-agents, with each agent potentially having different action choices. The joint action space of all agent is $\mathbf{A} = \{A_1, A_2 \dots A_N\}$.

In Greenward's 2003 paper, it is unclear how learning rate is decayed, and whether Friend/Foe-Q, CE-Q used ϵ -greedy for action exploration. In Greenward's 2005 extented paper, the authors decay learning rate according to the number of times each state-action pair is visited, i.e. $\alpha(s,\mathbf{a})=1/n(s,\mathbf{a})$. The 2005 paper also employs $\epsilon=1$ (random action selection) for Friend/Foe-Q, CE-Q. We implemented this procedure described in Greenward's 2005 paper, as well as other possibilities such as decaying ϵ and α exponentially.

A. Q-Learning

In Q-Learning implementation, each agent i maintains its own Q-table of size $nS \times nA_i$. The greedy action is each agent taking it's own greedy action, i.e:

$$\mathbf{a}^* = (a_1^*, a_2^* \dots a_N^*)$$

$$a_i^* = argmax_{a_i}Q_i(s, a_i), a_i \in A_i$$

The value function used in Eq.1 is:

$$V(s) = \max_{a_i} Q_i(s, a_i) = Q_i(s, a_i^*)$$
 (2)

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Algorithm 1 off_policy_learning template

function OFF_POLICY_LEARNING(learner, env)

for each episode do

reset environment, get current state s

for t in episode do

\mathbf{a} = \epsilon-greedy(learner, env, \mathbf{s}, \epsilon)

take action \mathbf{a}, observe s', \mathbf{R}, done
learner.update(\mathbf{s}, s', \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{R} done, \alpha(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{a}), \gamma)

decay \alpha, e.g. \alpha(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{a}) = 1/n(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{a})

optional: decay \epsilon, e.g. \epsilon *= \epsilon_decay

s = s'

end for

end for
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B. Friend-Q

end function

In Friend-Q, each agent maintain a copy of Q-table of size $nS \times nA_1 \times \dots nA_N$. Each agent assumes other agents will corporate to maximize the Q values, and the greedy action is defined as:

$$\mathbf{a}^* = (a_1^*, a_2^* \dots a_N^*)$$

$$a_i^* = argmax_{\mathbf{a}}Q_i(s, \mathbf{a})[i], \mathbf{a} \in \mathbf{A}$$

The value function is defined as:

$$V(s) = \max_{\mathbf{a}} Q_i(s, \mathbf{a}) = Q_i(s, \mathbf{a}^*) \tag{3}$$

C. Foe-Q

In Foe-Q learning, each agent maintain a of Q-table of size $nS \times nA_{opponent} \times nA_{self}$. The agents can follow a mixed policy: each agent i takes action a_i with probability $\sigma_i(a_i)$. The greedy policy is obtained from solving the minimax problem of σ :

$$\sigma_i^*(a) = \max_{\sigma_i} \min_{a_o \in A_{opponent}} \sum_{a_i \in A_{self}} Q_i(a_o, a_i) \sigma_i(a_i)$$
(4)

and the greedy action can be sampled from the minimax probability: $a_i^* \sim \sigma_i^*(a)$.

Let the value function $V_i = min_{a_o} \sum_{a_i} Q_i(a_o, a_i) \sigma_i(a_i)$, the minimax equation can be formulated in the following linear

programing problem:

maximize
$$V_i$$
 (5)

1. nA_o inequality constraint:

$$V_i - \sum_{a_i \in A_i} Q_i(a_o, a_i) \sigma_i(a_i) \le 0, \forall a_o \in A_{opponent}$$

2. nA_i inequality constraint : $\sigma_i(a_i) \geq 0, \forall a_i \in A_i$

3. 1 equality constraint:
$$\sum_{a_i \in A_i} \sigma_i(a_i) = 1 \tag{6}$$

(7)

The second inequality constraint and equality constraint are simply probability restrictions. Foe-Q follows Alg.2 to solve the minimax problem and update Q values. Note we first update Q(s) with V(s') then solve for V(s) with the updated Q(s), alternatively we can solve V(s') from Q(s') first, then update Q(s). I believe the order shouldn't matter – more like a chicken or egg problem. But with the first way we can initialize V=0 and no need to treat terminal state specially, the second way we don't need to save V in memory.

Algorithm 2 foe-Q update

function FOE-Q.UPDATE(s, s', a, R)
$$Q_1(s,a_2,a_1) = (1-\alpha)Q_1(s,a_2,a_1) + \alpha \big((1-\gamma)R_1 + \gamma V_1(s')\big)$$

$$Q_2(s,a_1,a_2) = (1-\alpha)Q_2(s,a_1,a_2) + \alpha \big((1-\gamma)R_2 + \gamma V_2(s')\big)$$

$$V_1(s),\sigma_1(s) = minimax(Q_1(s))$$

$$V_2(s),\sigma_2(s) = minimax(Q_2(s))$$
 end function

D. Correlated-Q.

In CE-Q, each agent maintain a copy of Q-table of size $nS \times nA_1 \times \dots nA_N$. All agents follows a mixed policy based on join probability $\sigma(\mathbf{a}) = \sigma(a_1, a_2 \dots a_N)$. The joint probability has to satisfy rational constraint as well as regular probability constraint. For utilitarian CE-Q, the objective function is to maximize the sum of the agents' rewards, and the uCE-Q can be formulated in the following linear programing problem:

$$\text{maximize} \sum_{i}^{n_{agent}} \sum_{\mathbf{a} \in \mathbf{A}} Q_i(\mathbf{a}) \sigma(\mathbf{a})$$

1. Each agent contribute $nA_i(nA_i-1)$ rational constraint:

$$\sum_{\mathbf{a_o}} (Q_i(\mathbf{a_o}, a_i') - Q_i(\mathbf{a_o}, a_i)) \sigma(\mathbf{a_o}, a_i) \le 0$$

$$\forall a_i \ne a_i' \in A_i$$

$$\mathbf{a_o} \in \{A_1, A_2 \dots A_{i-1}, A_{i+1} \dots A_N\}$$

2. $\Pi_i n A_i$ inequality constraint : $\sigma(\mathbf{a}) \leq 0, \forall \mathbf{a} \in \mathbf{A}$

3. 1 equality constraint:
$$\sum_{\mathbf{a} \in \mathbf{A}} \sigma(\mathbf{a}) = 1$$
 (8)

After solving the above LP and obtain the joint probability, the state value function can be calculated as: $V_i(s) =$

 $\sum_{\mathbf{a}} Q_i(s,\mathbf{a}) \sigma(s,\mathbf{a})$. The uCE-Q updating procedure is summarized in Alg.3.

Algorithm 3 Correlated-Q update

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\begin{array}{l} \textbf{function} \ \text{CE-Q.UPDATE}(s,\,s',\,\mathbf{a},\,\mathbf{R}) \\ \textbf{for} \ i = 1,2,\dots \ n_{agent} \ \textbf{do} \\ Q_i(s,\mathbf{a}) = (1-\alpha)Q_i(s,\mathbf{a}) + \alpha \big((1-\gamma)R_i + \gamma V_i(s')\big) \\ \textbf{end for} \\ \sigma(s,\mathbf{a}) = uCE(\{Q_1(s),Q_2(s)\dots Q_N(s)\}) \\ \textbf{for} \ i = 1,2,\dots \ n_{agent} \ \textbf{do} \\ V_i(s) = \sum_{\mathbf{a}} Q_i(s,\mathbf{a})\sigma(s,\mathbf{a}) \\ \textbf{end for} \\ \textbf{end for} \end{array}
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III. COMPARISON BETWEEN FOE-Q AND CORRELATED-Q