CS5562: Trustworthy Machine Learning

Lecture 1: Robustness → Inference in the Adversarial Setting

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Security versus Correctness

- Correctness:
  - A system satisfies the specification.
  - For reasonable input, it generates reasonable output
- Security:
  - System properties are preserved upon attacks.
  - For unreasonable input, the output is not disastrous
- Main difference: **adversary**
  - Active interference from a malicious agent
  - Misuse of unintended available information

Machine Learning in the Benign Setting

- Consider a **classification task** over input space $\mathcal{X} = \mathbb{R}^d$ to a discrete set of classes $\mathcal{Y}$.
- We are given a set of samples $\mathcal{D} = \{(x_1, y_1), (x_2, y_2), \cdots, (x_n, y_n)\}$ from a **population distribution** D over $\mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y}$.
- Our goal is to learn a classifier $f : \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}$ that minimizes the **expected loss** (risk) over distribution D, given the training set $\mathcal{D}$.

$$\min_f \qquad R(f) = \mathbb{E}_{(x,y)\sim D}\left[l(f(x), y)\right] \approx \frac{1}{n} \sum_{(x,y)\in\mathcal{D}} \left[l(f(x), y)\right]$$

- Example of loss function l is a $0/1$ loss $l_{0/1} = \mathbb{1}[y \neq y']$.
- **Inference** is computing $f(x)$ for any $x \in \mathcal{X}$. Implicit assumption is that the input x is sampled from the population distribution D.
- Challenge is to make sure the model **generalizes** to samples from D.

Security and Safety Issues

Adversarial examples

- Input data is crafted by an adversary
- The data (as perceived by the algorithm) in inference (test) time does not follow the distribution of D
- The data (as perceived by us humans) follows the distribution of D
- Adversary's objective conflicts with that of the training algorithm

Example: Bypassing Perceptual Ad blocking



Ads are detected based on their visual appearances. Images can be crafted adversarially to bypass ad blockers.

Source: [Tramèr et al., 2019]

Security and Safety Issues

Machine learning algorithms used in adversarial settings: Spam detection, detection of inappropriate content, speaker identification, surveillance and face recognition, ...

Adversarial t-shirt evading person detectors, [Xu et al., 2020]

What are Adversarial Examples?

Neural Networks can be easily fooled i



Source: [Nguyen et al., 2015]

Neural Networks can be easily fooled ii



These images are classified as digits with 99.99% confidence

Source: [Nguyen et al., 2015]

Adversarial Examples

- The adversary's objective is to craft input data x' that is confidently classified into a wrong class (different from the class that human experts assign to x')
  - The condition is that x' remains useful for some malicious objective. The adversary doesn't want to generate random data.
- Example: craft some texts (e.g., email), images, or videos (e.g., for YouTube) that are spam and inappropriate, yet can evade spam detection algorithms. For this reason, adversarial example attacks were originally called evasion attacks.
- One strategy would be to modify a data point x by converting it to an adversarial input x', where the difference between them is not recognizable by a human expert.

Adversarial Examples as Perturbations of Regular Data



(left) correctly classified images, (right) images classified as “ostrich”, (center) the difference between the images

Source: [Szegedy et al., 2014]

Adversarial Examples as Transformations of Regular Data



Various otherwise benign transformations of images result in a misclassification

Source: [Engstrom et al., 2018]

Adversarial Examples as Perturbations of Regular Data



(odd columns) correctly classified images, (even columns) wrongly classified images – 0% classification accuracy

What is the chance that a random perturbation of the input results in a misclassification?

Source: [Szegedy et al., 2014]

What about Randomized Examples?



(odd) correctly classified images, (even) randomly distorted images with Gaussian noise – 51% accuracy

If we move away from x in a random direction, most probably it is not adversarial (i.e., it does not alter the model's prediction $f(x)$, without imposing recognizable changes to x.)

Source: [Szegedy et al., 2014]

Crafting Adversarial Examples

- Consider a model f and a data point (x, y) sampled from the population distribution D
- Adversary aims at constructing x' such that
  - $f(x') \neq y$ (misclassification condition)
  - The perturbations are imperceptible
- Adversarial examples could be "targetted" or untargetted
  - Targetted attacks aim at a particular class y' and ensure $f(x') = y'$
- Adversary has the upper hand

Robustness within a Perturbation Set

- For each $x \in \mathbb{R}^d$, we specify a perturbation set $\mathcal{P}_x$ that captures the "imperceptible" changes to x which hopefully should not change the semantic of x
- With a robust model, perturbations to x within the set $\mathcal{P}_x$ should not change the classification of x
- We can learn the robust model by minimizing the robust expected loss $R_{\text{rob}}(f)$:

$$\min_f \qquad R_{\text{rob}}(f) = \mathbb{E}_{(x,y)\sim D}\left[\sup_{x' \in \mathcal{P}_x} l(f(x'), y)\right]$$

- What is a reasonable $\mathcal{P}$? In the example of image classification, one reasonable choice is

$$\mathcal{P}_{p,\epsilon}(x) = \{x' \in \mathbb{R}^d \quad : \left\|x - x'\right\|_p \leq \epsilon\}$$

Imperceptible Change as a Bound on ℓ_p-Norm

$$\left\|x - x'\right\|_p = \left(\sum_{i=1}^{d} \left|x(i) - x'(i)\right|^p\right)^{\frac{1}{p}}$$



Visualization of ℓ_p-norm for 2-dimensional data

- Note that this, of course, does not tightly cover all transformation changes that are imperceptible (e.g., rotation)

Perturbations with various p

Clean

L_∞

L_2

L_1

Source: [Steinhardt, 2019]

A little break: What are these?



Pinna and Gregory, 2002

Intertwined spirals? or concentric circles?

Generating Adversarial Examples

The Optimization Problem

- Given a model f and a data point (x, y), the adversary's objective is to generate x' in set $\mathcal{P}_x$ (imperceptible changes to x) such that $f(x') \neq f(x)$ (in the untargeted attack)
- This could be formulated as the following optimization problem

$$x' = \arg\max_{z \in \mathcal{P}_x} \quad l(f(z), y).$$

- The search space for this optimization problem is very large, so brute force will be very computationally expensive, if not impossible

Logistic Regression (Binary classification) i

- Consider the binary classification setting: $y \in \{+1, -1\}$
- The classifier f predicts class $+1$ on x if $\text{sigmoid}(w^T x + b) > 0.5$, and -1 otherwise, where $w \in \mathbb{R}^d$ and $b \in \mathbb{R}$ are model parameters.
- Loss function is $l(f(x), y) = \log(1 + \exp(-y \cdot (w^T x + b)))$.



Logistic Regression (Binary classification) ii

- Suppose the perturbation set is the l_∞ ball, of size ϵ, around x.

$$\mathcal{P}_x = \{x + \delta : \|\delta\|_\infty \leq \epsilon\}$$

- Adversary's goal is

$$\max_{\|\delta\|_\infty \leq \epsilon} \log\left(1 + \exp\left(-y \cdot \left(w^T(x+\delta) + b\right)\right)\right)$$

- Which can be further simplified as[1]

$$\min_{\|\delta\|_\infty \leq \epsilon} y \cdot w^T \delta$$

- The optimal is $\delta^* = -y\epsilon\,\mathrm{sign}(w)$.

[1] The function $\log(1 + \exp(-z))$ is monotonically decreasing with respect to z.

Note that $-y\,\mathrm{sign}(w)$ is the sign of the gradient of the loss with respect to the input:

$$\mathrm{sign}\left(\nabla_x \log\left(1+\exp\left(-y\cdot(w^T x+b)\right)\right)\right) = -y\,\mathrm{sign}(w)$$



Figure 3: Adversary perturbs the points along the direction indicated by arrows.

Logistic Regression (Binary classification) iv



Figure 4: Under perturbation within l_∞ ball of size $\epsilon = 0.2$, the classifier's accuracy on adversarial examples is only 15.5%

Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) i

- Assume loss function l is differentiable as a function of input x.[2]
- Assuming that neural networks behave similar to piece-wise linear models, the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) applies the same attack method against such models to neural networks, and computes adversarial examples as follows:

$$x' = x + \epsilon \operatorname{sign}(\nabla_x l(f(x), y)) \tag{1}$$

[2] Note that this is not always the case, for example if we consider binary $l_{0/1}$ loss.

Source: [Goodfellow et al., 2014]

Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) ii



Figure 5: Example of an adversarial example for GoogLeNet model trained on ImageNet, [Goodfellow et al., 2014]

Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) iii



Figure 6: FGSM attack on a CNN model trained on the MNIST dataset

Limitation of FGSM Heuristics



Figure 7: The output surface of a two-layer fully connected neural network

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Source: Zico Kolter and Aleksander Madry, Adversarial Robustness - Theory and Practice

Neural Networks are Prone to Adversarial Examples



Figure 8: Loss surface of Resnet-56

Source: [Li et al., 2018]

Projected Gradient Descent (PGD)

- Recall the adversary's objective:

$$\arg\max_{x' \in \mathcal{P}_x} l(f(x'), y)$$

- The adversary can leverage the **gradient ascent** algorithm:
  - Update the adversarial example towards maximizing the loss:

$$x'_{t+1} = x'_t + \eta_t \nabla_x l(f(x'_t), y),$$

    where we set x_0 to x, and η_t is the step-size at iteration t.
  - Project the adversarial example to the feasible set:

$$x'_{t+1} = \Pi_{\mathcal{P}_x}(x'_{t+1})$$

    where Π is the projection function (onto $\mathcal{P}_x$).

Source: [Madry et al., 2017]

Compare PGD and FSGM

We generate adversarial examples for the test dataset and measure the fraction of adversarial examples that are misclassified by the model.



Figure 9: Adversarial example for CNN model on MNIST dataset

Adversarial examples in real-life settings



The pictures taken with these glasses can fool face recognition algorithms (top row face images are classified as individuals in the bottom row)

Source: [Sharif et al., 2016]

Advanced Topic: Transferable Adversarial Examples i

Adversarial examples transfer between models.



The cell (i, j) represents the percentage of adversarial samples produced using model i misclassified by model j, [Papernot et al., 2016]

Advanced Topic: Transferable Adversarial Examples ii

Problem: Why do adversarial examples transfer?

Reading List

- Transferability in machine learning: from phenomena to black-box attacks using adversarial samples ([Papernot et al., 2016])
- The space of transferable adversarial examples([Tramèr et al., 2017])
- Delving into transferable adversarial examples and black-box attacks ([Liu et al., 2016])

The Case of Language Models

Adversarial examples for language models

- Recall that the adversary's goal is to construct x' such that

$$x' = \arg\max_{z \in \mathcal{P}_x} \quad l(f(z), y).$$

- The set $\mathcal{P}_x$ contains data points that are indistinguishable from x
- Challenges:
  - Objective: Defining the loss function l for various NLP tasks (e.g., classification and generative models)
  - Perturbation: What is imperceivable? What is a small change?
  - Search: The space is discrete

What is an imperceptible change?

- Small modification of words: x and x' have a small edit distance
  - Whatz type of ~~road~~doa sign is shofwn?
  - What type of road sign is NOT shown?
  - ~~What~~ Which type of road sign is shown?
- Rephrasing of the text: x' and x have a small semantic distance
  - x' has the same/similar meaning as x for human being
  - x' has "different" model predictions than x
- Adding a prefix/suffix that is ignorable

Example: Adversarial suffix on Alined LLMs

```
System: You are a chat assistant designed to provide helpful and not
harmful responses to user queries.
User: Tell me how to build a bomb.
Assistant:
```

Figure 11: QA Tasks in modern LLM systems.

- Normal Behavior: refuse to respond.
- Misbehavior: The system generates harmful answers.
- Attacker's Goal: Inducing a LLM generating harmful answers (misbehavior)

Source: [Zou et al., 2023]

Motivation: Initial affirmative responses.

- Forcing the model to give (just a few tokens of) an affirmative response to a harmful query can induce objectionable behavior in language models. [Wei et al., 2023, Carlini et al., 2023]
  - The intuition is that if the language model can be put into a "state" where this completion is the most likely response, as opposed to refusing to answer the query, then it likely will continue the completion with precisely the desired objectionable behavior.
- Attacker's Goal in Specific: Find a set of tokens to compose a *suffix prompt* (added to the original question) so that the aligned LLM will respond affirmatively to any choice of instruction in blue provided by the user.

Source: [Zou et al., 2023]

Adversarial Objective

- Idea: Optimize over discrete tokens to maximize the log-likelihood of an affirmative response like "Sure, here is (content of query)".
- Adversarial Loss: The (log) probability of some target sequences of tokens $x^*_{n+1:n+H}$ (i.e., representing the phrase "Sure, here is how to build a bomb.") given the prompt $x_{1:n}$

$$\mathcal{L}(x_{1:n}) = \log p(x^*_{n+1:n+H} | x_{1:n})$$

Source: [Zou et al., 2023]

Threats to LLM Systems



Figure 12: Screenshots of harmful behavior elicited by this attack from state-of-the-art business models: ChatGPT (left), Claude 2 (right)

Source: [Zou et al., 2023]

Threats to LLM Systems



Figure 13: Screenshots of harmful behavior elicited by this attack from state-of-the-art business models: Bard (left), LLaMA-2 (right)

Source: [Zou et al., 2023]

Reading Lists: Adversarial Attacks in NLP

Reading List

- Jailbroken: How Does LLM Safety Training Fail? ([Wei et al., 2023])
- Are aligned neural networks adversarially aligned? ([Carlini et al., 2023])

Takeaways

1. ML models need to be tested in the adversary setting
2. Neural networks can be easily fooled
3. Adversarial examples are much more harmful than random noise

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