How Can Cooperation Be Fostered? The Cultural Effects of Individualism-Collectivism

Article *in* The Academy of Management Review · April 1998

DOI: 10.2307/259375

3 authors, including:

Chao C. Chen
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey
93 PUBLICATIONS **8,841** CITATIONS

SEE PROFILE

Xiao-Ping Chen
University of Washington Seattle
94 PUBLICATIONS **6,833** CITATIONS

SEE PROFILE

© Academy of Management Review
1998, Vol. 23, No. 2, 285–304.

HOW CAN COOPERATION BE FOSTERED? THE CULTURAL EFFECTS OF INDIVIDUALISM–COLLECTIVISM

CHAO C. CHEN
Rutgers University

XIAO-PING CHEN
Hong Kong University of Science & Technology

JAMES R. MEINDL
State University of New York at Buffalo

Studies of cooperation are abundant in the social sciences, but organizational researchers are calling for integrating the numerous conceptions of cooperation and meeting the new challenges of cultural differences. In this article we develop a culturally contingent model of cooperation. We differentiate various mechanisms from cooperative behaviors and theorize about how culture affects behavioral cooperation through mechanism selection or modification. Delineating cultural effects, we derive patterned differences in the instrumental and expressive motives of individualists and collectivists and propose six culturally contrasting cooperation mechanisms. Finally, we discuss directions for future research and consider implications for practice.

Scholars long have recognized that cooperation is crucial to the success of organizations (Barnard, 1938). Recent restructuring of work and organization toward cross-disciplinary and cross-functional teams, as well as the increase in interorganizational and international collaborations and alliances, has made cooperation even more important (Adler, 1991; Byrne, 1993; Jackson, 1991; Lawler, 1990; Manz & Sims, 1987). In a special issue of the *Academy of Management Journal* that highlights recent research in intra- and interorganizational cooperation, Smith, Carroll, and Ashford (1995) point out new challenges presented by cultural differences in cooperation. Indeed, Adler (1991) considers international and intercultural cooperation the key to the success of multinational and global companies.

We thank Michael Bond, Chris Earley, Harry Hui, and John Wagner for their comments on earlier versions of this article. Part of the article was presented at the Joint Symposium "New Directions for Research on Individualism-Collectivism and Organizational Behavior" of the International Management Division and the Organizational Behavior Division, at the 1996 annual meeting of the Academy of Management, Cincinnati, Ohio.

Our understanding of the connection between culture and cooperation—and its implications for organizational behavior—is just beginning to develop. One can deduce some broad cultural differences regarding cooperation. For example, since collectivism means group members working together toward the achievement of collective goals, one can expect that there is more cooperation among collectivists than among individualists. In fact, such a generalization has some validity, for scholars have shown that collectivists, compared with individualists, enjoy working together more, are generally more cooperative, and are less inclined to "free ride" (e.g., Cox, Lobel, & McLeod, 1991; Earley, 1989, 1993). However, our cultural understanding of cooperation needs to go deeper. To the extent that an optimal level of cooperation is necessary for all societies, regardless of their cultural orientations, we need to explore how cooperation is achieved differently in different cultures. Exploring and contrasting culturally linked cooperation mechanisms will generate knowledge helpful in gaining an understanding of both intra- and intercultural cooperation.

We propose a culturally contingent model of cooperation. This model is based on new theo-

rizing that attends to several recent empirical studies of individualism-collectivism (I-C) within organizational contexts. For example, Earley (1989, 1993) recently found that individual accountability enhances cooperation for individualists, but not for collectivists. Other scholars also have found that individuals holding collectivist values reciprocate cooperation with more cooperation, but those holding individualist values do not (Chatman & Barsade, 1995; Cox et al., 1991). Findings such as these suggest that culture does not merely cause individuals to be more or less cooperative but may affect the selection and the effectiveness of intervention mechanisms aimed at increasing cooperation. In this article we theorize about how cooperation can be fostered, given the different cultural orientations of I-C. In doing this we draw, integrate, and extend two major categories of literature: (1) the literature on I-C and its impact on psychological motives and (2) the literature on cooperation, particularly various mechanisms through which cooperation is fostered.

In the article we first review and define cooperation. We then differentiate the instrumental and expressive motives associated with individualism and collectivism. Next, we propose a model about the effects of I-C on the fostering of cooperation, from which we derive a series of propositions. Finally, we conclude the article with a discussion of implications for research and practice.

CONCEPTIONS OF COOPERATION

Although "cooperation" as a topic is widely researched, there has been little conceptual integration as to the term's various meanings. Smith et al. point out, "One difficulty in interpreting the theory and research on cooperation stems from the numerous definitions of cooperation scholars have offered without making much attempt to reference other usage of the term" (1995: 10). We seek, first, to conceptually differentiate various conceptions of cooperation and then integrate them into our theoretical model of culture and cooperation.

In our review of the relevant literature, we identified three somewhat distinctive approaches to the conception and definition of cooperation. One approach emphasizes the psychological motives of the participants, in the tradition of Mead. Although Mead defines cooperation as "the act of working together to one end" (1976: 8), she emphasizes the actor's cooperative motives of working toward a common goal rather than the overt behavioral modes of engaging in a collective activity. Mead uses the concepts of cooperation and competition to represent different patterns of psychological motives of different societies. Her conception of cooperation bears many similarities to the conception of I-C (Hui & Triandis, 1986) as it has been applied to the analysis of cross-cultural variation.

Those holding a second conception of cooperation define it in terms of social relations and situations. This approach was pioneered by Deutsch (1949a,b, 1973, 1985) and developed further by Tjosvold (1984, 1986) in organizational contexts. In his work Deutsch (1949a) elaborates and transforms Mead's cultural conception of cooperation by focusing on the nature of relationships that exist between the goals of social actors in any given social situation. Deutsch differentiates social situations into cooperative and competitive ones, depending on how participants' goals are related to each other. A situation is cooperative if the goals of participants are positively related to each other but is competitive if the goals are negatively related to each other.

In this tradition goal relationships are conceived as objective social realities, although it is through their corresponding psychological implications, which Deutsch calls "locomotions," that the goal structures affect the processes and outcomes of the group. Deutsch assumes that participants, in general, are "veridical to" (1949a) the objective goal structure of their environment. Tjosvold (1986) makes explicit distinctions between the objective goal interdependence, as embedded in the task and reward structures of the organization, and the subjective goal interdependence, as perceived by organizational members. According to Tjosvold (1988a,b), it is perceived goal interdependence that leads group members to engage in positive interactive behaviors. Notice, here, that Deutsch and Tjosvold define cooperation in terms of actual or perceived goal relationships, rather than behaviors, which represent the third approach to cooperation.

The behavioral approach to cooperation focuses on cooperative activities. Barnard defines cooperation "as a functional system of activities

of two or more persons" (1938: 17). His theory of organizing and managerial processes elaborates how individual actions and efforts are joined and synthesized into cooperative actions and how the inducement, facilitation, and maintenance of cooperation constitute the essence of organizing and managing. For the purpose of a general theory of organization and management, Barnard's conception of cooperation is necessarily broad, covering almost all functional activities of an organization. Furthermore, although cooperation, per se, is defined in terms of actions, the theory of cooperation (i.e., organization) includes individual motives and collective purposes, both of which are essential factors for the continuance of cooperation.

In contrast to this broad conception of cooperative behavior, others, in prisoner's dilemma research (e.g., Axelrod, 1984) and in social dilemma research (for a review, see Komorita & Parks, 1995, and Messick & Brewer, 1983), define cooperation as an act that maximizes the interest of the other (as an individual or as a collective) and define defection as an act that maximizes self-interest. Cooperation versus defection has been operationalized in many different ways, but all with a well-specified and clear choice—for example, whether or not to confess a crime, to donate a contribution, or to invest in a public account. Although the dilemma approach to cooperation has the advantage of behavioral specificity, it reduces the scope and complexity of cooperative behaviors in real life (Argyle, 1991).

Between the general and the specific definitions of cooperative behavior lies the dimensional approach. Those researching cooperation within work groups have identified various dimensions of positive interactions. Argyle summarizes the pattern of behaviors for successful cooperative work groups: more coordination, more helping, more communication, and more division of labor (1991: 127). Tjosvold (1988a) identifies four interaction dimensions associated with a cooperative goal relationship: (1) exchanging and combining information, ideas, and other resources; (2) giving assistance; (3) discussing problems and conflicts constructively; and (4) supporting and encouraging each other.

Scholars of organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) have adopted another dimensional approach to cooperative behavior. According to Organ, OCB "represents individual behavior that is discretionary, not directly or explicitly recognized by the formal reward systems, and that in the aggregate promotes the effective functioning of the organization" (1988: 4). Graham (1989) proposes a four-dimension model of OCB: (1) interpersonal helping, (2) individual initiative in communications to others in the workplace, (3) personal industry in performing specific tasks beyond the call of duty, and (4) loyal boosterism—that is, the promotion of organizational image to outsiders.

As can be seen from the above description, the OCB dimensions overlap with the interaction dimensions. Conceptually, they both emphasize willful behavior (Wagner, 1995), in that they are voluntarily displayed and with more or less discretion as to the level and frequency of such behavior. Both also are generally considered to be functional to the effectiveness of collective action. However, OCB emphasizes extra-role activities not directly recognized and rewarded by the organization, but within this limitation it includes both interactive activities and those that are organization directed but do not involve interaction (e.g., personal industry or conscientiousness). In comparison, the interaction dimensions are limited to interactive and relational activities, but not to extra-role or formally rewarded ones.

In this article we adopt the behavioral conception of cooperation in terms of interactions (Agyle, 1991; Tjosvold, 1986, 1988a), which subsumes extra-role, nonrewarded aspects of OCB, but only with respect to interactive behaviors. Such a qualified inclusion is necessary, because not doing so would result in a conception of cooperation so broad that it covers virtually all functional organizational behaviors: interactive and noninteractive behaviors, in- and extra-role behaviors, and formally rewarded or unrewarded behaviors.

TOWARD A CULTURAL MODEL OF COOPERATION

As variants of the same construct, the above differences in the conceptions of cooperation are quite striking. As we show in Figure 1, cooperative behavior is the most specific and tangible, basic cultural values are the most general and abstract, and goal relationship is in the middle. According to the "layers" model of culture

FIGURE 1
A Structure of the Conceptions of Cooperation



(Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohayv, & Sanders, 1990; Rousseau, 1990; Schein, 1992), assumptions, beliefs, and values constitute the deep core elements of culture, whereas tangible artifacts and patterns of activities and behaviors are culture's outwardly visible manifestations; much of individual behavior is influenced by cultural values and norms. Following this view, one can interpret Figure 1 as a (cultural) theory of cooperation, which posits that cultural values affect cooperative behavior either directly or by means of goal relationships.

To formally construct a cultural theory of cooperation, we undertake the following conceptual tasks. First, we take as our dependent variable of interest cooperative behavior, which can be OCB or non OCB, as long as it is interactive and relational. Our major question is as follows: how can cooperative behavior be fostered and sustained for collective actions?

One way of fostering cooperation is through establishing positive goal relationships among potential or actual participants. This entails making a distinction between cooperative behavior and mechanisms for bringing about such behavior, which constitutes our second task. Over several decades accumulated research has identified a great number of cooperation mechanisms. Many of the most effective ones are summarized in literature reviews by Messick and Brewer (1983) and Komorita and Parks (1995). These major cooperation mechanisms include the following:

1. superordinate goals (e.g., Mead, 1976; Sheriff, 1966);
2. group identity (e.g., Chen, 1996; Chen & Triandis, 1996; Dawes, 1980);
3. trust (e.g., Komorita, Sheposh, & Braver, 1968; Kramer & Tyler, 1996; Smith et al., 1995);
4. accountability (e.g., Earley, 1989; Wagner, 1995) or perceived criticality (e.g., Chen, Au, & Komorita, 1996; Kerr, 1992);
5. communication (e.g., Chen & Komorita, 1994; Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee, 1977; Farrell & Gibbons, 1989; van de Kragt, Orbell, & Dawes, 1983); and
6. reward structure and incentives (e.g., Deutsch, 1985; Komorita, Chan, & Parks, 1993).

Although the identification of these mechanisms is an important contribution to the understanding and management of cooperation, the research on which they are based has been conducted mainly by and on Westerners with fundamentally individualistic assumptions.

How effective are the various mechanisms in bringing about (behavioral) cooperation in different cultures? Toward addressing this question, we turn to our third task, which is to delineate how culture differences can shape the primary motives of cultural members, which, in turn, affect the effectiveness of various cooperation mechanisms. Following that, we specify a cultural contingency perspective and make propositions accordingly.

INDIVIDUALISM–COLLECTIVISM AND ITS ASSOCIATED PSYCHOLOGICAL MOTIVES

We examine the effects of culture by focusing on one well-established cultural construct—namely, I-C (Hofstede, 1980; Hui & Triandis, 1986; Triandis, 1995; Wagner & Moch, 1986). Although this construct often has been operationalized by organizational researchers as a specific cultural aspect (e.g., Cox et al., 1991; Earley, 1989, 1993; Wagner & Moch, 1986), we follow the broad conception of I-C as a cultural syndrome that is multifaceted and represents a pattern of shared attitudes, values, and beliefs around a particular theme (Hui, 1988; Triandis, 1996). From this broad conception we derive primary instrumental and expressive motives, through which culture affects the fostering of cooperation.

Key Attributes of Individualism-Collectivism

In an extensive review of the literature, Triandis (1995) summarizes four defining attributes of I-C[1]:

1. Conceptions of the self: Individualists define the self as an autonomous entity independent of groups, whereas collectivists define the self in terms of its connectedness to others in various in-groups (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).
2. Goal relationships: Personal goals have priority over group goals in individualism, but they are subordinated to the collective goals in collectivism (Triandis, 1989; Yamaguchi, 1994). When there are conflicts between individuals' self-interest and the collective interest, individualists find it permissible to give priority to self-interest, whereas collectivists feel obliged to give priority to collective interests (Parsons, 1951).
3. Relative importance of attitudes and norms: Social behaviors of collectivists are more likely to be driven by social norms, duties, and obligations, whereas those of individualists are more likely to be driven by their own beliefs, values, and attitudes (Bontempo & Rivero, 1992; Davidson, Jaccard, Triandis, Morales, & Diaz-Guerrero, 1976).
4. Emphasis on relationships: Individualists are more oriented toward task achievement, sometimes at the expense of relationships, whereas collectivists put more emphasis on harmonious relationships, sometimes at the expense of task accomplishment (e.g., Kim, Triandis, Kagitcibasi, Choi, & Yoon, 1994; Redding, 1993).

Closely related to the above attributes of I-C are two concepts important to our cultural understanding of cooperation. The first is the structure of self-identity. Social identity theorists (Tajfel, 1982; Turner, 1987) posit that self-identity is composed of two broad types: (1) personal identities based on individuals' traits, preferences, and attitudes and (2) social identities based on group memberships. Social identity is part of an individual's self-concept, which derives from the knowledge of one's membership of a social group together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership (Tajfel, 1978). Although both social and personal identities are important for the psychological functioning of all individuals, their relative significance may differ across cultures, owing to differences in self-conceptions. Markus and Kitayama argue that in the individualist self-construals, personal identities in terms of internal attributes are the "primary unit of consciousness" and "are most significant in regulating behavior and are assumed both by the actor and by the observer alike, to be diagnostic of the actor," whereas in the collectivist self-construals, social identities in terms of social relationships are the primary units of consciousness because "the significant self-representations are those in relationship to specific others" (1991: 226–227).

The second related concept is the psychological boundaries between self and others. Again, for reasons rooted in different self-construals, individualists typically distinguish the autonomous self from others, either as individuals or as groups, whereas collectivists typically draw the distinction between those they are personally related to (in-groups) and those they are not (out-groups). Triandis (1995) observes that individualists form and move with greater ease in and out of multiple, loosely affiliated groups and associations based on individualists' particular needs and objectives; collectivists, however, are more likely to form and stay in few, stable, and closely knit groups that satisfy mem-

[1] Some scholars have made further distinctions between vertical and horizontal aspects of individualism and collectivism (Chen, Meindl, & Hunt, 1997; Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995; Triandis, 1995). Since our discussion of cultural differences focuses on the broad distinctions between individualism and collectivism, we will not get into the more refined distinctions.

bers' multiple needs and objectives. As a result, the collectivists' orientations, such as subordinating self-interest, sense of duty, and relationship orientation, outlined above are confined to only in-groups. In summary, collectivists have less problem with applying different sets of values and norms, depending on whether they are dealing with in-group or out-group relationships (Earley, 1989; Leung & Bond, 1984), whereas individualists find it more desirable to treat all individuals with a universal consistency (Waterman, 1988).

It is worth noting that I-C is a continuum rather than a dichotomy; the distinctions, therefore, are relative to each other. For example, both individualists and collectivists may have individual and collective goals, but they differ in the relative priority placed on goal types. An additional point to bear in mind is that the above characteristics of I-C pertain to cultural differences. For individual value differences, Triandis, Leung, Villareal, and Clark (1985) propose the term "ideocentrism-allocentrism." Following this distinction, we use I-C as a cultural rather than individual construct, yet in our discussion we consider the applicability of the contingency notion on individual value differences.

Instrumental and Expressive Motives

It is widely accepted that much of human behavior is purposive or teleological (Locke & Henne, 1986; Tolman, 1932). According to Lewin's seminal theory of motivation (1935), the tension within an individual motivates behaviors toward the accomplishment of desired goals. Human behavior is characterized by instrumental rationality—that is, people strive to engage in activities and courses of action that enable them to reach their goals in the most efficient manner feasible. However, other researchers have pointed out that human beings are also self-expressive—that is, they do things to express and affirm their self-concepts, including their fundamental beliefs and values (Snyder & Ickes, 1985). Whereas instrumental motives aim at enhancing material and pragmatic well-being, expressive motives aim at providing meaning to human existence by enhancing emotional and spiritual well-being. Note that the expressive motives we refer to here are more fundamental than desires to establish social relationships with others or to overtly demonstrate one's feelings. Although these latter desires can be subsumed into our expressive motives, our use of the term emphasizes people's motive to maintain the integrity of their identities, values, and principles (Etzioni, 1988).

Researchers have found that behaviors and attitudes sometimes serve both instrumental and expressive functions for the individual (e.g., Kinder & Sears, 1985; Prentice, 1987). For instance, people obtain and hold physical objects not only to make life convenient and comfortable but also to express their valued personal traits, religious beliefs, and aesthetic values. Likewise, people vote for a particular candidate not only in accordance with their self-interest but also to express their social identification and personal values.

The nature of the instrumental and expressive motives can be very different for different individuals, and the determinants of the differences are multiple and complex. Culture appears to be one of the determinants. Relating the defining characteristics of I-C to the two primary psychological motives, we identify two major differences between individualists and collectivists.

First, as indicated in their goal priority, individualists and collectivists follow different rationalities: the individual and the collective. Individual rationality dictates doing what is in one's own best interests. Competence refers to the extent to which actors are capable of engaging in activities that cause them to realize their self-interest goals. The willingness to work for the interests and preferences of others is determined by the extent to which such actions are in some way instrumental in obtaining personal goals. Collective rationality, in contrast, regards the pursuit of group goals and values. Here, competence is the ability to pursue strategies that contribute to the realization of the collective goals; individual goals are aligned with, channeled into, or restrained for the achievement of collective objectives. Individual actions are evaluated in terms of their instrumentality to the fulfillment of the needs and preferences of the collectivity.

Second, consistent with the cultural differences in self-conception, the expressive motives of individualists center around actualizing the true or potential self, which has been referred to as "individuality," "autonomy," "agency," "independence," "self-direction," "self-reliance," "self-fulfillment," "self-actualization," and so on

(Bakan, 1966; Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985; Erez & Earley, 1993; Geertz, 1973; Hsu, 1985; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Norton, 1988; Schwartz, 1994; Waterman, 1988). The collectivist's expressive motives center around dedication of self to the collective, which has been referred to as "self-discipline," "self-restraint," "self-sacrifice," "loyalty," "solidarity," and "sociality" (Bond & Hwang, 1996; Erez & Earley, 1993; Gudykunst & Ting-Toomey, 1988; Hsu, 1985; Hui, 1988; Hui & Villareal, 1989; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Tu, 1985; Yang, 1986).

INDIVIDUALISM–COLLECTIVISM AND FOSTERING COOPERATION

Cultural values and motives can affect cooperation in three ways. First, they can directly affect the level of cooperation. A general consensus in research, as well as in conventional wisdom, is that collectivists tend to be more cooperative, whereas individualists are more competitive (Mead, 1976; Triandis, 1990). Here, no cooperation mechanisms have been specified to account for the cultural effects.

Second, culture can affect cooperation through the mediation of certain cooperation mechanisms. The insertion of mechanisms between culture and cooperation helps explain why collectivists cooperate more than individualists do. In going through the six cooperation mechanisms, for example, one can say that collectivists tend to share common goals and have stronger group identity, more group accountability, more communication, and a more egalitarian reward system. Whether directly or through the mediation of mechanisms, culture is posited to have a straightforward and rather deterministic effect on cooperation. It fixates on the theme that collectivists are more cooperative than individualists, which, we think, is simplistic and captures only part of the reality. Observing that cooperation takes place in all societies, a more sophisticated view of cultural differences should focus on the means and processes by which cooperation is initiated and maintained. This leads us to consider a third type of effect—one that focuses on interactions between culture and cooperation mechanisms.

By interaction, we mean that cultural variables moderate the effects of various cooperation mechanisms: a given mechanism can be more or less effective in one culture than in another. This cultural contingency perspective is consistent with Child's (1981) argument that cultural variables can moderate the effects of macrolevel situational factors, such as organizational structure. Although scholars have given the moderating effects of culture considerable attention in the debate regarding organizational structure (Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 1994), the main effects of culture have been focused on by authors of the cooperation literature. Therefore, we need to advance a cultural contingency perspective to stimulate theory and research.

Beneath the contingency approach lies two basic assumptions. First, human beings have the capacity to cooperate and not to cooperate, which means that cooperation occurs in all societies and that all societies have to work at fostering and sustaining cooperation. Second, as societies experiment with ways of fostering cooperation, those means that are culturally appropriate will be used more often and with more success.

Later, we will reason in more detail and make propositions about the moderating effects of culturally shaped values and motives on each type of cooperation mechanism. For now, we argue that differences in the motive patterns of individualists and collectivists provide bases for predicting the effectiveness of various mechanisms. In a culture in which the normative values are individualistic, cooperation mechanisms that appeal to and satisfy individual rationality and individuality will be more effective; in a culture in which the normative values are collectivistic, cooperation mechanisms that appeal to and satisfy collective rationality and sociality will be more effective. Table 1 presents

TABLE 1
Cooperation Mechanisms by Culturally Shaped Motives

Mechanisms	Individualist	Collectivist
Superordinate goal	Goal interdependence	Goal sharing
Group identity	Self enhancement	Group complementarity
Trust	Cognition based	Affect based
Accountability	Individual based	Group based
Communication	Partial channel	Full channel
Reward distribution	Equity based	Equality based

the six cooperation mechanisms; from each we derive contrasting subtypes, according to individualist versus collectivist motives. In the following sections we formally propose how the effectiveness of each type of mechanism depends on its cultural appropriateness.

The Superordinate Goal and the Group Identity

Researchers consistently have shown that the introduction of a superordinate goal is the key to inducing cooperation among individuals or groups that have conflicting interests (e.g., Deutsch, 1973; Sheriff, 1966). Similarly, many researchers have demonstrated that group identity induces cooperation among group members in social dilemma situations (e.g., Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Dawes, van de Kragt, & Orbell, 1990; Kramer, 1993). The effect of superordinate goals and of group identity on cooperation may be more or less correlated. Dawes et al. (1990), for instance, suggests that the effect of group identity occurs primarily through the increased importance of the collective welfare. However, it is possible that goal consideration carries more instrumental elements, whereas identities are largely expressive or noninstrumental (Kramer & Tyler, 1996).

Goal interdependence versus goal sharing. The concept of the superordinate goal presumes acceptance of a shared goal of a collectivity consisting of individuals or subunits. However, conception of a shared goal as reviewed and adopted by Deutsch (1949a) is in terms of goal interdependence, which refers to a relationship in which the goals of each individual or subunit can be achieved only if those of the others also can be achieved. Deutsch calls such a relationship "promotively interdependent" (1949a: 132), and Tjosvold (1984) describes it as consisting of positively related goals. Notice that goal interdependence presupposes the existence of independently defined individual goals and requires the knowledge of individual goals of one's own and others, as well as an evaluation of the relationships between these goals.

The interdependence conception of the superordinate goal is quite consistent with individual rationality: others in the collectivity serve as instruments for achieving individual self-interest. To be sure, others can be used as instruments in such a manipulative way as defection; the interdependent view, therefore, is one of enlightened self-interest. Nevertheless, the rationality it follows is still individualist.

A collectivist view of the superordinate goal emphasizes the common fate or destiny of the individuals in a collectivity. This view may stem from what Lodge and Vogel call the "organic" view of a community—namely, it is "more than the sum of the individuals in it," and it has "special and urgent needs that go beyond the needs of its individual members" (1987: 15). The superordinate goal, therefore, is the common goal shared by all members of a given collectivity. An extreme version of the collectivist view may require individuals to have no individual goals except the superordinate ones, which was the case in China during the Cultural Revolution, when citizens were asked to serve the big community without the slightest concern for self (*da gong wu si*). Although collectivism does not usually require individuals to abandon all individual goals, it does encourage individuals to conceive goals that are connected to or congruent with collective goals (e.g., contributing to the well-being of a work group as a personal goal). Where individual goals are independent of or incongruent with collective ones, the collective rationality requires the subordination of the individual goals to those of the collective.

Individual rationality dictates that instrumentality be the major criterion by which individualists decide to enter, remain in, or exit a cooperative relationship. In cases where one's cooperative behavior cannot be justified by self-interested instrumentality, individualists may come to see themselves as "suckers" (Axelrod, 1984), may suspect that others have ulterior motives, or may see the relationship as unjust (Miller & Ratner, 1996). In any case, there seems to be a preoccupation with the avoidance of acting irrationally and of being exploited by others or the group.

In contrast, collective rationality is the more compelling rationale for soliciting cooperation in collectivist cultures. Collectivists are more likely to emphasize the common goal shared by all parties in a collectivity, discouraging articulation of individual goals or the instrumentality of the collective to the individual. There seems to be a preoccupation with the avoidance of being selfish. Indeed, individual rationality could very well be viewed as harmful or unethical by some ardent collectivists. Altruistic or

self-sacrificial behaviors toward relevant others are legitimized, if not expected. Cooperation that involves the inconvenience or sacrifice of oneself for the promotion of the collectivity and the in-group others is highly honored.

We summarize the above discussion by proposing the following:

> *Proposition 1: Goal interdependence, which appeals to the instrumentality of cooperation for self-interest, will be more effective for gaining cooperation in an individualist culture, whereas goal sharing, which appeals to self-sacrificial contribution for the collective good, will be more effective for gaining cooperation in a collectivist culture.*

Group identity. Group identity formation has been referred to as an effective mechanism for inducing cooperation (Aram, 1993; Dawes, Orbell, & van de Kragt, 1988). Dawes et al. state, "Our experiments have led us to conclude that cooperation rates can be radically affected by one factor in particular. . . . That factor is group identity" (1990: 99). However, the few scholars who attempted to test this hypothesis directly found that group identity alone was not sufficient for inducing cooperation; group identity must be accompanied by other factors, such as commitment (Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994), perception of consensus (Bouas & Komorita, 1996), or feeling of criticalness (Chen, 1996).

It is possible that group identity did not have consistent effects on cooperation, as expected by Dawes et al. (1990), because the studies were conducted mostly in an individualistic culture (Chen & Triandis, 1996). Group membership carries stronger psychological attachment for collectivists than for individualists. In Japan or China, for instance, such memberships as schools, geographical origins, or family names are more likely to trigger sufficient mutual identification to serve as a solid basis for emerging cooperation. These memberships are also meaningful to individualists, but they may not, by themselves, be sufficient to have an impact on cooperative behavior.

In addition to affecting the strength of group identity, culture may influence the dynamics of group identity development. The formation and the effect of a new group identity may depend on how it relates to the existing self-identities. Recall that for collectivists social identities are relatively more salient than personal identities, whereas for individualists the reverse is true. For it to have a positive effect on cooperation, the new group identity should enhance and complement the currently salient self-identities and serve the dominant rationality. This means that for individualists the new group identity should enhance personal identities and the instrumentality to rational self-interest, but for collectivists it should enhance other social identities and their collective interests.

In a recent study Chen, Brockner, and Katz (1997) examined attitudes toward newly formed in-groups under favorable and unfavorable conditions. When individuals and the group they belonged to both performed well, those individuals had a more positive attitude toward their own group than toward other groups. However, when individuals performed well but the rest of the group did not, there was an interaction effect between the group performance and the cultural values of I-C: Americans showed a more positive attitude toward other groups than toward their own group, whereas the Chinese showed a positive in-group attitude despite the group's poor performance. The authors interpreted the findings as an indication that individualists develop strong group identity only when groups are instrumental to the goal of self-enhancement. We would add that, in cases where an emergent group identity is in conflict with the current significant group identities, collectivists also may experience difficulty with the new group identity. On the basis of these considerations, we offer the following:

> *Proposition 2: Cooperation in an individualist culture increases to the extent that the new group identity enhances personal identities, whereas cooperation in a collectivist culture increases to the extent that the new group identity complements existing group identities.*

Trust: Cognition Based versus Affect Based

Scholars widely recognize the critical importance of trust as an immediate antecedent to cooperation (e.g., Kramer & Tyler, 1996; Smith et al., 1995). Trust is an individual's confidence in the goodwill of others in a relationship and the expectation that others will reciprocate if one

cooperates (Pruitt, 1983; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). McAllister (1995) further differentiates two broad foundations upon which trust is built in organizational settings: cognition and affect. Cognition-based trust is built on the knowledge of role performance, whereas affect-based trust is built on the emotional bonds between partners (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995; McAllister, 1995; Shapiro, Sheppard, & Cheraskin, 1992).

Cognitive bases of trust include cues of performance behaviors and accomplishments. Among the most significant are those that convey competence (Brockner & Siegel, 1996; Tyler & Degoey, 1996) and reliability, such as professional credentials and performance track record. Notice that cognition-based trust pertains to the fulfillment of one's prescribed responsibilities and that the goodwill of such fulfillment is expected to be out of enlightened self-interest. Therefore, cognition-based trust suggests professionalism and provides partners with confidence that they will abide by their contract and treat each other equitably.

The development of affect-based trust indicates that partners have formed a social-emotional bond that goes beyond a regular business or professional relationship; goodwill has expanded to extra-role tasks and other nontask relational activities. Furthermore, this extra-role and relational goodwill is displayed for the personal care of and concern for others, rather than for one's own self-interest.

We should highlight a few points from the above discussion of trust. First, cognitive trust is motivated by enlightened self-interest, whereas affective trust is motivated by a commitment to the relationship. Second, cognitive trust is built by adhering to relatively universal rules and standards of transaction, whereas affective trust is built by showing particularistic concerns for the other party. Third, affective trust is a further development of cognitive trust, although, once formed, it can be decoupled from or even influence cognitive trust (Holmes & Rempel, 1989; Johnson-George & Swap, 1982; Zajonc, 1980). According to a developmental perspective on trust (Graham & Organ, 1993; Holmes & Rempel, 1989; Lewicki & Bunker, 1995; McAllister, 1995), parties initiate cooperation for instrumental reasons. Cognition-based trust emerges as exchange parties faithfully adhere to their respective role responsibilities and share outcomes equitably. Over time, the relationship may expand from calculus- and knowledge-based to identity-based trust (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995) or from an instrumental to a personal relationship; hence, cognition-based trust develops into affect-based trust.

How does I-C affect trust bases in relation to cooperation? It appears that the scenario of developing trust outlined above is more appropriate for individualist cooperation. Indeed, Farh, Earley, and Lin (1997) use the same scenario to characterize trust development in individualistic societies. The authors further argue that equity-based justice influences citizenship behaviors in Western societies more than in Eastern societies. Here, we propose that trust bases have a different impact on cooperation, depending on individualist or collectivist values and motives.

According to individual rationality, pursuing self-interest through associating and collaborating with others is not only legitimate but even laudable, provided that the exchange is equitable. Goodwill does not obligate partners to be selfless or altruistic but to fulfill their respective part of the agreed-upon contract. It is possible that an honest expression and affirmation of self-interest may lead to the appreciation of interdependence and may contribute to positive affect between partners. To the extent that cognition-based trust leads to expected outcomes, the collaborative relationship is enhanced.

Cognition-based trust is also valued in collectivist cultures, but what differentiates in-group from out-group relationships is affect-based trust. The in-group relationship is characterized by communal sharing and emotional closeness. Cognition-based trust alone may not be sufficient for collectivist cooperation for a number of reasons.

First, in a collectivist culture, role expectations are not confined to task performance, nor are they all formally prescribed. For instance, Markus and Kitayama cite research evidence that Asian employees prefer a manager "who demands a lot more than officially required in the work, yet extends his care for the person's personal matters even outside of work over the Western-type, task-oriented manager (who separates personal matters from work and demands as much as, yet not more than, officially required)" (1991: 241). Second, expressing and asserting self-interest will be viewed by others in the group as a challenge to and poisoning of collective rationality, which prescribes the sub-

ordination of self-interest to collective interest. Finally, although in individualist cultures emotional trust rarely can precede cognitive trust, it is possible in collectivist cultures. Collectivists can be highly motivated for task achievement by their personal loyalty and attachment to significant others, which, in turn, leads to cognitive trust.

In summary, the contrasting role of cognition- versus affect-based trust in the two cultures leads us to the following pair of propositions:

Proposition 3a: Cognition-based trust will be more positively related to cooperation in an individualist culture than in a collectivist culture.

Proposition 3b: Affect-based trust will be more positively related to cooperation in a collectivist culture than in an individualist culture.

Accountability: Individual versus Group Based

Accountability is typically conceptualized by researchers in individual terms—that is, the extent to which an individual's contribution to the group is identifiable. Numerous studies have been conducted to examine the effects of accountability in decision making, small-group task performance, and social dilemmas (e.g., Latane, Williams, & Harkins, 1979; Tetlock, 1983; Vancouver & Ilgen, 1989). The general finding is that accountability has positive effects in inducing cooperation or reducing social loafing (free-riding). However, there is some evidence indicating that social loafing is less likely to appear among collectivists who are working with in-group members and that individual identifiability has a significant impact only on people from individualist cultures or people holding individualist values (Earley, 1989; Wagner, 1995).

We do not view cultural differences in the effect of accountability as evidence that accountability is unimportant for collectivists. Rather, individualists and collectivists respond differently to individual- versus group-based accountability. Individual-based accountability is the extent to which each individual is responsible for his or her own behavior and its consequences; group-based accountability is the extent to which an individual is responsible for the group outcome.

Individual accountability may enhance the individualist's self-image of having an internal locus of control and may reinforce the instrumental motive of working for one's self-interest. It also reassures individualists that others are not free-riding on their system. Group accountability, in contrast, may trigger collectivists' sense of groupness and their sense of responsibility not only for their own but for others' behaviors. For these reasons, we propose the following:

Proposition 4a: Individual-based accountability is more effective for fostering cooperation in an individualist culture, whereas group-based accountability is more effective for fostering cooperation in a collectivist culture.

Drawing a parallel with organizational control, we can describe accountability as a control mechanism for monitoring and regulating cooperative behaviors. Control mechanisms may vary from process to outcome, on the one hand (Minzberg, 1983), and from contract to social control, on the other (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996; Ouchi, 1979). Accountability that induces conformity to standards of cooperative behaviors is process accountability; accountability that induces conformity to the achievement of cooperation outcome (e.g., meeting the deadline) is outcome accountability. Attempts to enforce cooperation can be either through formal and explicit rules—that is, contractual control—or more informally, through socialization of values or peer pressure—that is, social control.

Previous authors have drawn a parallel between control mechanisms and I-C. Collectivist cultures are considered tight, in that they require more behavior conformity than individualist cultures (Bond & Smith, 1996; Triandis, 1996); collectivist cultures are also called clan cultures, which rely more on social controls than contractual controls (Ouchi, 1979). Similarly, we expect that individualist control is outcome oriented, and, to the extent that there is process control, that control is primarily through contracts (formal rules) that are applied consistently to all parties involved.

In collectivistic cooperative relationships, however, performance outcomes often are assessed at the group level, and there may not be identifiable outcome information for individu-

als. Rules targeted at individual behavior and outcome are less relevant and, in any case, are hard to enforce consistently because of particularistic considerations of special relationships and circumstances. To enhance accountability, collectivists, therefore, rely more heavily on social control (e.g., group norms) to influence individual behavior and to ensure group outcome. Social control is also strongly sanctioned through the internalization of collective goals and peer pressure. These kinds of self- and peer monitoring enable group members to tune in and adjust to the needs of others in the group and to emulate others' cooperative behaviors. Based on these arguments, we propose the following:

> *Proposition 4b: Explicit cooperative rules will be more effective in fostering cooperation in an individualist culture, whereas social pressures will be more effective in fostering cooperation in a collectivist culture.*

Communication: Partial versus Full Channel

Researchers have shown that communication among partners greatly enhances cooperation (Axelrod, 1984; Braver & Wilson, 1986; Chen & Komorita, 1994; Dawes et al., 1977; Lindskold, 1978). However, based on theories and research on cultural differences in interpersonal communication, individualists and collectivists may communicate different things and do things in different ways (Gudykunst, 1994; Gudykunst & Ting-Toomey, 1988). Examining these effects in detail is beyond the scope of this article. Therefore, we focus on one major cultural difference: the extent to which individualists and collectivists prefer face-to-face communication as opposed to partial communication. Partial communication (Chen & Komorita, 1994; Voissem & Sistrunk, 1971; Wichman, 1970) refers to information exchanged through constrained modalities—for example, audio only, visual only, or written message only.

Hall (1976, 1983) classifies cultures according to the extent to which communication is contextualized. A high-context communication is one in which "most of the information is either in the physical context or internalized in the person, while very little is in the coded, explicit, transmitted part of the message;" a low-context communication is one in which "the mass of the information is vested in the explicit code" (Hall, 1976: 79). According to Gudykunst and Ting-Toomey, "[T]he dimensions of low-high-context communication and individualism-collectivism are isomorphic" (1988: 44): inviduals prefer low-context communication, but collectivists prefer high-context communication. Furthermore, individualists and collectivists are concerned with, and respond to, different communication needs. Gudykunst and Ting-Toomey propose that the former are more concerned with satisfying dissociation (autonomy) needs and, therefore, tend to engage in instrumental styles of verbal communication, whereas the latter are more concerned with satisfying association needs and, therefore, tend to engage in affective styles of verbal communication (1988: 112).

These cultural differences in communication styles correspond with our discussion regarding the individual versus collective rationality and the task versus relationship emphasis of individualists and collectivists. They serve as the bases for predicting preferences for partial- versus full-channel communication. Partial communication, whether by paper, telephone, or electronics, decontextualizes the situation, leaving out many additional sources of social meanings, feelings, and intentions implicit in face-to-face interactions (McGrath & Hollingshead, 1994; Siegel, Dubrovsky, Kiesler, & McGuire, 1986).

The social cues and their feedback in face-to-face communication are more essential for collectivists than for individualists for a number of reasons. First, collectivists need more social and emotional cues to build or signify particularistic relationships, whereas individualists are more concerned with efficiency of communication (saving time and avoiding hassles) to get the job done. In Japanese organizational communication, for example, there is an emphasis on personal, face-to-face meetings and talks, even between top-level managers and the rank-and-file employees (Erez & Earley, 1993). Second, context is more important for collectivists, both to convey their own meanings and to infer others' meanings. Since individualists are, in general, more verbal, direct, and sender centered in their communication (Ting-Toomey, 1988), they can directly express and solicit information about the desires, concerns, and preferences through mediated channels. In contrast, because collectiv-

ists are less verbal, more indirect, and more receiver centered, they rely more on nonverbal cues in face-to-face interactions to convey, as well as to discern, desires, concerns, and preferences.

Collectivists' preference for face-to-face communication may also arise from the different nature of "facework": self-presentation in public. According to Ting-Toomey (1988) and her colleagues (Ting-Toomey et al., 1991), collectivists care more about mutual face and other face in communication than do individualists, who care more about maintaining their own face. Because of their highly personal nature, face-to-face meetings have a more binding effect on collectivists than on individualists. If a promise was made face to face, not keeping it means a greater loss of face to both oneself and to others than if the promise was made otherwise; rejecting a person one has met personally means a greater loss of face to the person than if there was no personal meeting. Furthermore, if an informal, nonbinding promise made face to face is kept, such as in a cheap talk before formal negotiations (Farrell & Gibbons, 1989), it has even greater potential for both self- and other-face gain, because an officially nonbinding promise is kept for personal considerations. In any case, the "face value" of communication is much greater for collectivists than for individualists.

Proposition 5a: Face-to-face communication will evoke higher levels of cooperation in a collectivist culture than in an individualist culture.

Proposition 5b: Mediated partial communication will evoke higher levels of cooperation in an individualist culture than in a collectivist culture.

Reward Distribution

Judgments of justice and fairness permeate organizational life. Comparisons of pay raises, the distribution of scarce budgets, and promotions are just a few of the many situations in which the sense of fairness affects people's cooperative behaviors. Those conducting earlier cross-cultural research in reward distribution found that, in general, individualists prefer the equity principle, in which rewards are proportional to individual contribution, whereas collectivists prefer the equality principle, in which rewards are distributed equally among group members (Bond, Leung, & Wan, 1982; Hui, Triandis, & Yee, 1991; Leung & Bond, 1984).

The individual rationality, with few exceptions, entails the belief that performance and productivity will increase when participants of a joint endeavor can benefit in proportion to what each contributes (Mowday, 1987). Apart from the pragmatic concerns, equity also is believed to be the fairest principle for distributing rewards. The equity belief is so prevalent and normative in the United States that, sometimes, self-sacrificial behaviors are justified in terms of self-interest, and manipulative behaviors are explained in terms of differential contribution (Lerner, Miller, & Holmes, 1976; Miller & Ratner, 1996).

The "fairness as equity" concept may be such a core belief that it constitutes an important part of an individualist's self-image. Being fair means being equitable. When a person gets more or less than an equitable share from an exchange, a just and fair self-conception may be violated. In any case, because the equity principle is believed to be consistent with both individual rationality and the self-image of being fair, it can simultaneously satisfy the instrumental and the expressive motives of the individualists.

The collective rationality, in general, prescribes nondifferential principles, such as equal or need-based reward distribution, among members of a closely knit in-group. Collectivists fear that increasing differentials in rewards will motivate individuals to work for self-interest, at the expense of the collective interest. Furthermore, they feel that differential rewards reinforce and enlarge status differentials among group members (Reis, 1984), potentially threatening group harmony (Leung, 1988).

The allocation preferences of individualists and collectivists can be modified by at least two factors. One is that allocation preferences of either individualists or collectivists can be adjusted in response to the predominant goals of the organization (Chen, 1995; Chen, Meindl, & Hui, in press; Meindl, 1989). The other is the in-group/out-group membership. In a cross-cultural study of rewards allocation, Leung and Bond (1984) found that individualists used the equity principle more consistently across different kinds of social relations, whereas collectiv-

ists used the equality principle in close in-groups, such as among friends and relatives, but the equity principle when dealing with out-groups, such as strangers. Chatman and Barsade (1995) found that individuals with collectivist values cooperated significantly more under a cooperative rather than uncooperative organizational culture, whereas those with individualist values showed a lower level of cooperation, regardless of the organizational culture.

This second modification implies that reward allocation preferences of the collectivists may depend on the nature of the cooperative relationships. When interacting with strangers with whom they expect no long-term relationship, the collectivists' most important consideration is to get an equity-based fair share. However, when interacting with people with whom they expect to have future long-term interactions, collectivists are more willing to compromise equity in favor of the other party so as to induce a harmonious relationship and to initiate a cycle of reciprocity. The long-term relationship may be conceived as a quasi in-group, because the long-term fate of both parties is intertwined. These considerations lead to the following propositions:

Proposition 6a: In an individualist culture, equity-based reward allocation systems will be positively related to cooperation in both short- and long-term work relations.

Proposition 6b: In a collectivist culture, equity-based reward allocation systems will be positively related to cooperation in short-term relations, but equality-based systems will be positively related to cooperation in long-term work relations.

IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH AND PRACTICE

We have derived a series of propositions by combining insights from research on I-C and from research on cooperation. Despite abundant research in both areas, little work exists that directly addresses the issues we raise in this article. Neither the psychological motives nor the cooperation mechanisms we cover in this article are meant to be exhaustive. We seek to integrate various approaches first within the respective areas and then between them. Within the cooperation literature, in response to Smith et al.'s (1995) call for conceptual integration, we have differentiated and structured the various conceptions of cooperation. From the cultural syndrome of I-C, we have derived patterned differences in the motives of individualists and collectivists. We then have integrated the two sets of literature by theorizing how the culturally linked motives affect the selection and the effectiveness of cooperation mechanisms.

We propose that individualist cooperation typically will be driven by motives of individual rationality and individuality, but collectivist cooperation will be driven by collective rationality and sociality. More specifically, we propose six sets of contrasting cooperation mechanisms for individualists and collectivists: (1) goal interdependence versus goal sharing, (2) personal identity versus group identity enhancement, (3) cognition- versus affect-based trust, (4) individual accountability and formal control versus group accountability and social pressure control, (5) partial- versus full-channel communication, and (6) equity-based versus equality-based reward distribution.

The optimal research context is in situations where task accomplishment involves member interactions. Specific hypotheses can be derived from the broad propositions. Levels of cooperation can be assessed for the group as a whole, for the leader-member dyad, or at the individual level, and cooperation mechanisms can be planned and implemented as part of a conscious organizational change effort—or as influence strategies to be learned by team leaders or members to gain cooperation. Researchers can design longitudinal studies for assessing the effects of various mechanisms on cooperative behaviors. These various mechanisms may be explored separately, for their main effect, or together, to see if they have joint effects on creating more or less cooperation among members of different cultures.

Although it is highly desirable for scholars to conduct field investigations, doing so in real-life organizations is likely to present complexities, in which cooperation mechanisms are deeply embedded in cultural or other contextual factors, thus making it difficult to assess independent and interaction effects of culture and specific mechanisms. Researchers, therefore, may start with lab experiments, which give them

more control over the various factors. When exploring the mechanisms separately, investigators can use a relatively simple experimental design that involves replicating the same single-factor experiment within at least two different cultures that vary in terms of I-C. For example, testing moderating effects of culture on partial- versus full-channel communication (see Propositions 5a and 5b) would require a minimum 2 × 2 factorial experimental design, with I-C having the status of an independent variable that would be crossed with a second independent variable (e.g., face-to-face versus e-mail communication modality). Groups of randomly selected subjects from each culture would be formed and then randomly assigned to each of the communication conditions for the completion of a group project. Researchers would then compare peer cooperation for each communication condition across the two cultures, using ANOVA procedures. Such experiments could be made more complex by adding covariates known to have an impact on communication, by using ANCOVA procedures, and/or by considering multiple operational measures of cooperation simultaneously, with standard MANOVA frameworks.

It is worth reiterating that our model focuses on the moderating effects of culture. This means that what we compare across cultures are relationships between variables, rather than the variables themselves. For example, when doing a U.S.-Japan comparison on the effect of superordinate goals (see Proposition 1), we do not simply ask whether the individualist Americans prefer the goal-interdependence mechanism, whereas the collectivist Japanese prefer the goal-sharing mechanism. Rather, we examine the extent to which the two mechanisms relate to cooperation differently across the two cultures.[2] Although the I-C moderator in our model is conceived of as a cultural variable, the relationships it modifies may be either at the individual level, as in perceived goal interdependence and individual cooperative behavior, or at the group level, as in a group's reward system and its level of peer cooperation.

[2] The cultures selected do not have to be national cultures; they can be subcultures of a national culture (such as Israeli *kibbutzim* and urban cultures in Erez & Somech, 1996) or organizational and occupational cultures and subcultures (Trice & Beyer, 1993), as long as they vary on I-C.

Can the moderating effects of I-C be extended to individual differences? Our answer is a qualified yes. Since, in addition to I-C differences across members of different cultures, there are I-C differences across members within a culture, it appears logical that what applies at the cultural level may also apply at the individual level—namely, the effect of a given mechanism on a person's cooperative behavior may depend on his or her individual I-C values. Yet, this requires that the relationship to be moderated by the individual I-C is also at the individual level. Furthermore, for cooperation to be sustained as a reciprocal activity in a social relationship, all parties involved must willingly cooperate. Viewed this way, cultural values, which are shared across societal members, may be more predictive of the effectiveness of a given mechanism than are independent individual values.

Limited space does not allow us to get into measurement issues surrounding I-C (see Singelis et al., 1995; Triandis, 1996; Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 1990, for more detailed discussions). Suffice it to say that the paper-and-pencil measurement prevalent in organizational research is not the only way. Culture, for example, can be approached in various other ways, such as by analyzing cultural products (e.g., folk tales) or ethnographic archives or by doing ethnographic fieldwork (Berry et al., 1994: Chapter 7). However, of the currently available paper-and-pencil scales, we need convergence and standardization for research to be replicated. Further, because I-C is a multifaceted construct, it is essential to select an I-C attribute in accordance with the targeted cooperation mechanisms. In sum, organizational researchers, while exploring alternative ways of measuring culture, should work together to develop conceptually based, organizationally relevant, and internally consistent I-C scales to meet the growing needs of empirical research.

What are the implications of our theory for intercultural cooperation or for teams composed of a mixture of individualists and collectivists? First, comparative knowledge yielded from new research will provide a more valid base for initiating intercultural cooperation. Discovering culturally contingent cooperation mechanisms can reduce bias and misunderstanding and can stimulate efforts to learn and adapt to different cultures.

Second, although unilateral adaptation often falls on those whose values differ from the prevailing culture or on those who are in minority positions, various degrees of mutual adaptation and synergy may occur, especially in multicultural groups (Adler, 1991; Cox, 1993). It is possible that new types of cooperation mechanisms may emerge to coincide with the emergence of a "third culture" (Graen & Wakabayashi, 1990; Useem, Useem, & Donghue, 1963). For example, a multinational team of individualists and collectivists may develop a third culture of communitarianism (Etzioni, 1988, 1993), in which there is a dual emphasis and balance on both the individual and the collective rationality and on both individuality and sociality. In such a culture, a set of mechanisms may emerge out of compromise, balance, or synergy between what is originally individualist and collectivist. Comparative research, therefore, can yield insights for building a third culture, whereas research on intercultural dynamics of multinational teams (Adler & Graham, 1989) can provide the impetus for discovering new paradigms of cooperation for either individualist or collectivist cultures.

REFERENCES

Adler, N. J. 1991. ***International dimensions of organizational behavior.*** Boston: Kent Publishing.

Adler, N. J., & Graham, J. L. 1989. Cross-cultural interaction: The international comparison fallacy. ***Journal of International Business Studies,*** 20: 515–537.

Aram, J. D. 1993. ***Presumed superior: Individualism and American business.*** Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Argyle, M. 1991. ***Cooperation: The basis of sociability.*** New York: Routledge.

Axelrod, R. 1984. ***The evolution of cooperation.*** New York: Basic Books.

Bakan, D. 1966. ***The duality of human existence.*** Chicago: Rand McNally.

Barnard, C. 1938. ***The functions of the executive.*** Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Bellah, R. N., Madsen, R., Sullivan, W. M., Swidler, A., & Tipton, S. M. 1985. ***Habits of the heart: Individualism and commitment in American life.*** Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Berry, J. W., Poortinga, Y. H., Segall, M. H., & Dasen, P. R. 1994. Organizations and work. In. J. W. Berry, Y. H. Poortinga, M. H. Segall, & P. R. Dasen (Eds.), ***Cross-cultural psychology:*** 315–338. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bond, M. H., & Hwang, K. K. 1986. The social psychology of Chinese people. In M. Bond (Ed.), ***The psychology of the Chinese people:*** 213–266. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.

Bond, M. H., Leung, K., & Wan, K. C. 1982. How does cultural collectivism operate? The impact of task and maintenance contributions on reward distribution. ***Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology,*** 13: 186–200.

Bond, M. H., & Smith, P. 1996. Cross-cultural social and organizational psychology. ***Annual Review of Psychology,*** 47: 205–235.

Bontempo, R., & Rivero, J. C. 1992. ***Cultural variation in cognition: The role of self-concept in the attitude-behavior link.*** Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Academy of Management, Las Vegas, NV.

Bouas, K. S., & Komorita, S. S. 1996. Group discussion and cooperation in social dilemmas. ***Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,*** 22: 1144–1150.

Braver, S. L., & Wilson, L. 1986. Choices in social dilemmas: Effects of communication within subgroups. ***Journal of Conflict Resolution,*** 30: 51–62.

Brewer, M. B., Kramer, R. M. 1986. Choice behavior in social dilemmas: Effect of social identity, group size, and decision framing. ***Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,*** 50: 543–549.

Brockner, J., & Siegel, P. 1996. Understanding the interaction between procedural and distributive justice: The role of trust. In R. M. Kramer & T. R. Tyler (Eds.), ***Trust in organizations:*** 390–413. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Byrne, J. 1993. The horizontal corporation. ***Business Week,*** December 20: 76–81.

Chatman, J. A., & Barsade, S. G. 1995. Personality, organizational culture, and cooperation: Evidence from a business simulation. ***Administrative Science Quarterly,*** 40: 423–443.

Chen, C. C. 1995. New trends in rewards allocation preferences: A Sino-U.S. comparison. ***Academy of Management Journal,*** 38: 408–428.

Chen, C. C., Meindl, J. R., & Hui, H. In press. Deciding on equity or parity: A test of situational, cultural, and individual factors. ***Journal of Organizational Behavior.***

Chen, C. C., Meindl, J. R., & Hunt, R. G. 1997. Testing the effects of vertical and horizontal collectivism: A study of reward allocation preferences in China. ***Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology,*** 28: 44–70.

Chen, X.-P. 1996. Group-based binding pledge as a solution to public goods problems. ***Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,*** 66: 192–202.

Chen, X.-P., Au, W.-T., & Komorita, S. S. 1996. Sequential choice in a step-level public goods dilemma: The effects of criticality and uncertainty. ***Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,*** 65: 37–47.

Chen, X.-P., & Komorita, S. S. 1994. The effects of communication and commitment in a public goods social dilemma. ***Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,*** 60: 367–386.

Chen, X.-P., & Triandis, H. 1996. ***Toward a behavioral theory of group identity in solving free-rider problems of organizations: A cross-cultural study.*** Paper presented at

the January Global Organization Conference at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong.

Chen, Y., Brockner, J., & Katz, T. 1997. ***Individual-primacy and collective-primacy as bases for ingroup bias: Evidence from the United States and the People's Republic of China.*** Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Academy of Management, Boston.

Child, J. 1981. Culture, contingency and capitalism in the cross-national study of organizations. In L. L. Cummings & B. M. Staw (Eds.), ***Research in organizational behavior,*** vol. 3: 303–356. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

Cox, T. H. 1993. ***Cultural diversity in organizations.*** San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler.

Cox, T. H., Lobel, S. A., & McLeod, P. L. 1991. Effects of ethnic group cultural differences on cooperative and competitive behavior on a group task. ***Academy of Management Journal,*** 34: 827–847.

Davidson, A. R., Jaccard, J. J., Triandis, H. C., Morales, M. L., & Diaz-Guerrero, R. 1976. Cross-cultural model testing: Toward a solution of the etic-emic dilemma. ***International Journal of Psychology,*** 11: 1–13.

Dawes, R. M. 1980. Social dilemmas. ***Annual Review of Psychology,*** 31: 169–193.

Dawes, R. M., McTavish, J., & Shaklee, H. 1977. Behavior, communication, and assumptions about other people's behavior in a common dilemma situation. ***Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,*** 35: 1–11.

Dawes, R. M., Orbell, J. M., & van de Kragt, A. J. 1988. Not me or thee but we: The importance of group identity in eliciting cooperation in dilemma situations. ***Acta Psychogica,*** 68: 83–97.

Dawes, R. M., van de Kragt, A. J., & Orbell, J. M. 1990. Cooperation for the benefit of us or me, or my conscience. In J. Mansbridge (Ed.), ***Beyond self interest:*** 97–110. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Deutsch, M. 1949a. A theory of cooperation and competition. ***Human Relations,*** 2: 129–152.

Deutsch, M. 1949b. An experimental study of the effects of cooperation and competition upon group process. ***Human Relations,*** 2: 199–232.

Deutsch, M. 1973. ***The resolution of conflict.*** New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Deutsch, M. 1985. ***Distributive justice.*** New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Earley, P. C. 1989. Social loafing and collectivism: A comparison of the United States and the People's Republic of China. ***Administrative Science Quarterly,*** 34: 565–581.

Earley, P. C. 1993. East meets West meets Mideast: Further explorations of collectivistic and individualist work groups. ***Academy of Management Journal,*** 36: 319–348.

Erez, M., & Earley, P. C. 1993. ***Culture, self-identity, and work.*** New York: Oxford University Press.

Erez, M., & Somech, A. 1996. Is group productivity loss the rule or the exception? Effects of culture and group-based motivation. ***Academy of Management Journal,*** 39: 1513–1537.

Etzioni, A. 1988. ***The moral dimension: Toward a new economics.*** New York: Free Press.

Etzioni, A. 1993. ***The spirit of community.*** New York: Crown Publishers.

Farh, J.-L., Earley, P. C., & Lin, S.-C. 1997. Impetus for action: A cultural analysis of justice and organizational citizenship behavior in Chinese society. ***Administrative Science Quarterly,*** 42: 421–444.

Farrell, J., & Gibbons, R. 1989. Cheap talk can matter in bargaining. ***Journal of Economics Theory,*** 48: 221–237.

Geertz, C. 1973. ***The interpretation of culture.*** New York: Basic Books.

Ghoshal, S., & Moran, P. 1996. Bad for practice: A critique of the transaction cost theory. ***Academy of Management Review,*** 21: 13–47.

Graen, G. B., & Wakabayashi, M. 1990. Cross-cultural leadership making: Bridging American and Japanese diversity for team advantage. In H. C. Triandis (Ed.), ***Handbook of industrial and organizational psychology,*** vol. 4: 415–445. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.

Graham, J. W. 1989. ***Organizational citizenship behavior: Construct redefinition, operationalization, and validation.*** Unpublished working paper, Loyola University of Chicago.

Graham, J. W., & Organ, D. W. 1993. Commitment and the covenantal organization. ***Journal of Managerial Issues,*** 5: 483–502.

Gudykunst, W. B. 1994. ***Bridging differences.*** Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Gudykunst, W. B., & Ting-Toomey, S. 1988. ***Culture and interpersonal communication.*** Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Hall, E. T. 1976. ***Beyond culture.*** New York: Doubleday.

Hall, E. T. 1983. ***The dance of life.*** New York: Doubleday.

Hofstede, G. 1980. ***Culture's consequences.*** Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Hofstede, G., Neuijen, B., Ohayv, D. D., & Sanders, G. 1990. Measuring organizational cultures: A qualitative and quantitative study across twenty cases. ***Administrative Science Quarterly,*** 35: 286–316.

Holmes, J. G., & Rempel, J. K. 1989. Trust in close relationships. In C. Hendrick (Ed.), ***Close relationships:*** 187–220. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Hsu, F. 1985. The self in cross-cultural perspective. In A. Marsella, G. DeVos, & F. Hsu (Eds.), ***Culture and self: Asian and Western perspectives:*** 24–55. New York: Tavistock.

Hui, C. H. 1988. Measurement of individualism-collectivism. ***Journal of Research in Personality,*** 22: 17–36.

Hui, C. H., & Triandis, H. C. 1986. Individualism-collectivism. ***Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology,*** 17: 225–248.

Hui, C. H., Triandis, H. C., & Yee, C. 1991. Cultural differences in reward allocation: Is collectivism the explanation? ***British Journal of Social Psychology,*** 30: 145–157.

Hui, C. H., & Villareal, M. J. 1989. Individualism-collectivism and psychological needs. ***Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology,*** 20: 310–323.

Jackson, S. E. 1991. Team composition in organizational settings: Issues in managing an increasingly diverse workforce. In S. Worchel, W. Wood, & J. Simpson (Eds.), ***Group process and productivity:*** 138–171. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Johnson-George, C. E., & Swap, W. C. 1982. Measurement of specific interpersonal trust: Construction and validation of a scale to assess trust in a specific other. ***Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,*** 43: 1306–1317.

Kerr, N. L. 1992. Efficacy as a causal and moderating variable in social dilemmas. In D. M. Messick & H. A. M. Wilke (Eds.), ***Social dilemmas:*** 59–80. Tarrytown, NY: Pergamon Press.

Kerr, N. L., & Kaufman-Gilliland, C. M. 1994. Communication, commitment, and cooperation in social dilemmas. ***Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,*** 66: 513–529.

Kim, U., Triandis, H. C., Kagitcibasi, C., Choi, S.-G., & Yoon, G. (Eds.). 1994. ***Individualism and collectivism: Theory, method, and application***. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Kinder, D. R., & Sears, D. O. 1985. Public opinion and political action. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), ***Handbook of social psychology*** (3rd ed.): 659–741. New York: Random House.

Komorita, S. S., Chan, K.-S. D., & Parks, C. D. 1993. The effects of reward structure and reciprocity in social dilemmas. ***Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,*** 29: 252–267.

Komorita, S. S., & Parks, C. D. 1995. Interpersonal relations: Mixed-motive interaction. ***Annual Review of Psychology,*** 46: 183–207.

Komorita, S. S., Sheposh, J. P., & Braver, S. L. 1968. Power, the use of power, and cooperative choice in a two-person game. ***Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,*** 8: 134–142.

Kramer, R. M. 1993. Cooperation and organizational identification. In J. K. Murnighan (Ed.), ***Social psychology in organizations:*** 244–268. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Kramer, R. M., & Tyler, T. R. 1996. ***Trust in organizations.*** Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Latane, B., Williams, K., & Harkins, S. 1979. Many hands make light the work: The causes and consequences of social loafing. ***Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,*** 46: 1044–1057.

Lawler, E. E. 1990. ***Strategic pay: Aligning organizational strategies and pay systems.*** San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Lerner, M. J., Miller, D. T., & Holmes, J. G. 1976. Deserving and the emergence of forms of justice. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), ***Advances in experimental social psychology,*** vol. 9: 134–160. New York: Academic Press.

Leung, K. 1988. Theoretical advances in justice behavior: Some cross-cultural inputs. In M. H. Bond (Ed.), ***The cross-cultural challenge to social psychology:*** 218–229. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Leung, K., & Bond, M. H. 1984. The impact of cultural collectivism on reward allocation. ***Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,*** 47: 793–804.

Lewicki, R. J., & Bunker, B. B. 1995. Trust in relationships: A model of development and decline. In B. B. Bunker, J. Z. Rubin, & Associates (Eds.), ***Conflict, cooperation and justice:*** 133–174. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Lewin, K. 1935. ***A dynamic theory of personality.*** New York: McGraw-Hill.

Lindskold, S. 1978. Trust development, the GRIT proposal, and the effect of conciliatory acts on conflict and cooperation. ***Psychological Bulletin,*** 85: 772–793.

Locke, E., & Henne, D. 1986. Work motivation theories. In C. L. Cooper & I. Robertson (Eds.), ***International review of industrial and organizational psychology:*** 1–35. Chichester, England: Wiley.

Lodge, G. C., & Vogel, E. F. 1987. ***Ideology and national competitiveness.*** Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

Manz, C. C., & Sims, H. P., Jr. 1987. Leading workers to lead themselves: The external leadership of self-managing work teams. ***Administrative Science Quarterly,*** 32: 106–129.

Markus, H. R., Kitayama, S. 1991. Culture and self: Implications for cognition, emotion and motivation. ***Psychological Review,*** 98: 224–253.

McAllister, D. J. 1995. Affect- and cognition-based trust as foundations for interpersonal cooperation in organizations. ***Academy of Management Journal,*** 38: 24–59.

McGrath, J. E., & Hollinghead, A. B. 1994. ***Groups interacting with technology: Ideas, evidence, issues, and an agenda.*** Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Mead, M. 1976. ***Cooperation and competition among primitive people.*** Boston: Beacon.

Meindl, J. R. 1989. Managing to be fair: An exploration of values, motives, and leadership. ***Administrative Science Quarterly,*** 34: 252–276.

Messick, D. M., & Brewer, M. B. 1983. Solving social dilemmas: A review. ***Review of Personality and Social Psychology,*** 4: 11–44.

Miller, D. T., & Ratner, R. K. 1996. The power of the myth of self-interest. In L. Montada & M. J. Lerner (Eds.), ***Current societal concerns about justice:*** 25–48. New York: Plenum Press.

Minzberg, H. 1983. ***Power in and around organizations.*** Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Mowday, R. T. 1987. Equity theory predictions of behavior in organizations. In R. M. Steers & L. W. Porter (Eds.), ***Motivation and work behavior:*** 89–100. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Norton, D. L. 1988. Social organization and individual initiative: A Eudainmonistic model. In K. Kolenda (Ed.), ***Organizations and ethical individualism:*** 107–136. New York: Praeger.

Organ, D. W. 1988. ***Organizational citizenship behavior: The good soldier syndrome.*** Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.

Ouchi, W. 1979. A conceptual framework for the design of

organizational control mechanisms. ***Management Science,*** 25: 833–848.

Parsons, P. 1951. ***The social system.*** New York: Free Press.

Prentice, D. A. 1987. Psychological correspondence of possessions, attitudes and values. ***Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,*** 53: 993–1003.

Pruitt, D. G. 1983. Experimental gaming and the goal/expectation hypothesis. ***Small Groups and Social Interaction,*** 2: 107–121.

Redding, S. G. 1993. *The spirit of Chinese capitalism.* New York: Walter de Gruyter.

Reis, H. T. 1984. The multidimensionality of justice. In R. Folger (Ed.), ***The sense of injustice:*** 25–57. New York and London: Plenum.

Ring, P. S., & Van de Ven, A. 1994. Developmental processes of cooperative interorganizational relationships. ***Academy of Management Review,*** 19: 90–118.

Rousseau, D. M. 1990. Assessing organizational culture: The case for multiple methods. In B. Schneider (Ed.), ***Organizational climate and culture:*** 153–192. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Schein, E. H. 1992. ***Organizational culture and leadership.*** San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Schwartz, S. H. 1994. Beyond individualism/collectivism: New cultural dimensions of values. In U. Kim, H. C. Triandis, C. Kagitcibasi, S.-G. Choi, & G. Yoon (Eds.), ***Individualism and collectivism: Theory, method, and application:*** 85–119. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Shapiro, C., Sheppard, B. H., & Cheraskin, L. 1992. Business on a handshake. ***Negotiation Journal,*** 8: 365–377.

Sheriff, M. 1966. ***Group conflict and cooperation.*** London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Siegel, J., Dubrovsky, V., Kiesler, S., & McGuire, T. W. 1986. Group processes in computer-mediated communication. ***Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,*** 37: 157–187.

Singelis, T. M., Triandis, H. C., Bhawuk, D. P. S., & Gelfand, M. J. 1995. Horizontal and vertical dimensions of individualism and collectivism: A theoretical and measurement refinement. ***Cross-Cultural Research,*** 29: 240–275.

Smith, K. G., Carroll, S. J., & Ashford, S. J. 1995. Intra- and inter-organizational cooperation: Toward a research agenda. ***Academy of Management Journal,*** 38: 7–23.

Snyder, M., & Ickes, W. 1985. Personality and social behavior. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), ***Handbook of social psychology*** (3rd ed.): 883–947. New York: Random House.

Tajfel, H. (Ed.). 1978. ***Differentiation between social groups.*** London: Academic Press.

Tajfel, H. 1982. ***Social identity and intergroup relations.*** Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Tetlock, P. E. 1983. Accountability and complexity of thought. ***Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,*** 45: 74–83.

Ting-Toomey, S. 1988. Intercultural conflict styles: A face negotiation theory. In Y. Kim & W. Gudykunst (Eds.), ***Theories in intercultural communication:*** 213–235. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Ting-Toomey, S., Gao, G., Trubisky, P., Yang, Z., Kim, H. S., Lin, S., & Nishida, T. 1991. Culture, face maintenance, and styles of handling interpersonal conflict: A study in five cultures. ***The International Journal of Conflict Management,*** 2: 275–296.

Tjosvold, D. 1984. Cooperation theory and organizations. ***Human Relations,*** 37: 743–767.

Tjosvold, D. 1986. The dynamics of interdependence in organizations. ***Human Relations,*** 39: 517–540.

Tjosvold, D. 1988a. Cooperation and competitive dynamics within and between organizational units. ***Human Relations,*** 41: 425–436.

Tjosvold, D. 1988b. Cooperative and competitive interdependence. ***Group and Organization Studies,*** 13: 274–289.

Tolman, E. C. 1932. ***Purposive behavior in animals and men.*** New York: Century.

Triandis, H. C. 1989. Self and social behavior in differing cultural contexts. ***Psychological Review,*** 96: 269–289.

Triandis, H. C. 1990. Cross-cultural studies of individualism and collectivism. In J. Berman (Ed.), ***Nebraska Symposium on Motivation*** (1989): 41–133. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Triandis, H. C. 1995. ***Individualism and collectivism.*** Boulder, CO: Westview.

Triandis, H. C. 1996. The psychological measurement of cultural syndromes. ***American Psychologist,*** 51: 407–415.

Triandis, H. C., Leung, K., Villareal, M. J., & Clack, F. L. 1985. Allocentric versus idiocentric tendencies. Convergent and discriminant validation. ***Journal of Research in Personality,*** 19: 395–415.

Triandis, H. C., McCusker, C., & Hui, C. H. 1990. Multimethod probes of individualism and collectivism. ***Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,*** 59: 1006–1020.

Trice, H. M., & Beyer, J. M. 1993. ***The cultures of work organizations.*** Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Tu, W.-M. 1985. Selfhood and otherness in Confucian thought. In A. Marsella, G. DeVos, & F. Hsu (Eds.), ***Culture and self: Asian and Western perspectives:*** 231–251. New York: Tavistock.

Turner, J. 1987. ***Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory.*** Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell.

Tyler, T. R., & Degoey, P. 1996. Trust in organizational authorities. The influence of motive attributions on willingness to accept decisions. In R. M. Kramer & T. R. Tyler (Eds.), ***Trust in organizations:*** 331–356. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Useem, J., Useem, R., & Donghue, J. 1963. Men in the middle of the third culture. ***Human Organization,*** 22(3): 169–179.

Vancouver, J. B., & Ilgen, D. R. 1989. Effects of interpersonal orientation and the sex-type of the task on choosing to work alone or in groups. ***Journal of Applied Psychology,*** 74: 927–934.

van de Kragt, A., Orbell, J., & Dawes, R. M. 1983. The minimal contributing set as a solution of public goods problems. ***American Political Science Review,*** 77: 112–122.

Voissem, N. H., & Sistrunk, F. 1971. Communication schedules and cooperative game behavior. ***Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,*** 19: 160–167.

Wagner, J. A. 1995. Studies of individualism-collectivism: Effects on cooperation in groups. ***Academy of Management Journal,*** 38: 152–172.

Wagner, J. A., & Moch, M. K. 1986. Individualism-collectivism: Concepts and measure. ***Group and Organization Studies,*** 11: 280–303.

Waterman, A. S. 1988. Psychological individualism and organizational functioning: A cost-benefit analysis. In K. Kolenda (Ed.), ***Organizations and ethical individualism:*** 19–46. New York: Praeger.

Wichman, H. 1970. Effects of isolation and communication on cooperation in a two-person game. ***Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,*** 16: 114–120.

Yamaguchi, S. 1994. Collectivism among the Japanese: A perspective from the self. In U. Kim, H. C. Triandis, C. Kagitcibasi, C. Choi, & G. Yoon (Eds.), ***Individualism and collectivism: Theory, method, and application:*** 175–199. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Yang, K. S. 1986. Chinese personality and its change. In M. Bond (Ed.), ***The psychology of the Chinese people:*** 101–170. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.

Zajonc, R. B. 1980. Feelings and thinking: Preferences need no inferences. ***American Psychologist,*** 35: 151–175.

Chao C. Chen is an assistant professor of organization management at Rutgers University. He received his Ph.D. in organization behavior and human resources from the State University of New York at Buffalo. His current research interests include cooperation, intercultural dynamics, and relationships between cultural individualism and collectivism.

Xiao-Ping Chen is an assistant professor in the Department of Management of Organizations at the Hong Kong University of Science & Technology. She received her Ph.D. from the University of Illinois. Her research interests include cooperation induction in social dilemmas, conflict management, managerial decision making, and cross-cultural management issues.

James R. Meindl is the Donald S. Carmichael Professor of Organization and Human Resources at the State University of New York at Buffalo. He received his Ph.D. in social psychology from the University of Waterloo. He is broadly interested in the interplay between microprocesses and macrostructures.