

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The Social and Personal Identities Scale: A Measure of the Differential Importance Ascribed to Social and Personal Self-Categorizations

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A new measure sensitive to differences in the importance that people ascribe to their social (group) and personal identities is described. The Social and Personal Identities (SIPI) scale distinguishes between the interpersonal level of self which differentiates the individual as unique from others, and the social identity level of self whereby the individual is identified by his or her group memberships. In contrast to perspectives that emphasize the context-dependence of self-conception, our measure was designed to capture individual differences in participants' readiness to categorize themselves using group and personal self-categories as measured by the degree of importance or centrality assigned to each. Factor and reliability analyses support the scale's stability as a two-factor structure with high internal consistency, and these factors are modestly correlated. Results from six studies substantiate the scale's criterion and construct validity.

Psychologists are becoming increasingly aware that the "self" represents more than just a collection of individualized attributes that remain constant over time and across contexts (Gergen, 1981; Goffman, 1959; Fazio, Effrein, & Falender, 1981; McGuire & McGuire, 1982; Niedenthal & Beike, 1997; Rogers, 1951). Recent perspectives on the structure and content of self include the broader constructs of culture and collective as intimately involved in the defining and relating of oneself to others (Brewer, 1991; Deaux, 1992; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Moscovici, 1984; Oyserman, 1993; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Triandis, 1989, 1990). Indeed, rapid theoretical and empirical progress has resulted from the observation that self-representations are influenced by the larger social context.

Of the many recent developments in understanding the social nature of the self, perhaps the most notable has been the theoretical distinction between personal and social identity, first advanced by Henri Tajfel and John Turner by way of their social identity theory, and later expanded upon in self-categorization theory (Tajfel &

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Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). According to this latter perspective, the self is conceptualized as a hierarchical structure with levels of increasing abstraction that each contributes to an individual's sense of who he/she is. At the interpersonal level of the system, personal identity is described in terms that differentiate the individual as distinct from other members of the in-group (e.g., "I am a unique personality, creative, different, an original"). At an intergroup level, the individual is characterized by social identities emphasizing the stereotypical similarities shared among members of the group (e.g., "I am a Latina, a psychologist, an American"). These social identities may be ascribed from birth—such as race or gender—or they may include groups into which one has achieved membership status. Group membership alone, however, does not qualify a category as identifying; the decisive criterion for social identification is the recognition and acceptance of one's membership as self-defining (Brewer, 1991; Deaux, 1992; Turner, 1984).

Which identity or identities become operative at a given time is a joint function of stable and dynamic forces (Kondo, 1990; Markus & Kunda, 1986; Markus & Wurf, 1987). For researchers in the self-categorization tradition, emphasis is placed on the intrinsically variable nature of identity, and how it shifts dynamically with changes in the comparative context (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994). While not denying the significance of situational variability in personal and social identity salience, the present research will emphasize the dispositional tendency toward self-definition at either the personal or social level of identification. We maintain that the importance assigned to either of these two levels helps to define the self across situations, as perceivers actively select self-categorizations that are central, relevant, and useful. Just as research on the structure and content of the self concept has documented individual variations in cognitive complexity (Linville, 1985), self-schemas (Markus, 1977), the tendency to focus one's attention toward private versus public self standards (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975), and the storage of private and collective self-cognitions (Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991), we suggest that there are individual differences in the centrality and importance of personal and social identity domains.

The purpose of the present investigation was to design and provide support for the validity of an instrument sensitive to variations in the importance that people ascribe to both personal and social identity levels of the self. We argue that such differences are measurable and remain relatively stable over time, moderating self-perceptions and group behaviors across a variety of situations. The enduring quality of certain central aspects of the self concept has been well documented (e.g., Backteman & Magnusson, 1981; Costa, McCrae, & Arenberg, 1980; Deaux, 1991; Markus, 1977; Markus & Kunda, 1986; Mortimer & Lorence, 1981). The present research extends this work by suggesting that some individuals may be predisposed to categorize themselves at one level of the self-concept hierarchy more than others. This assumption does not preclude the importance of situational variability in determining identity salience. Like others, we suggest that certain situational and intraindividual dynamics will combine leading some people to perceive and compare themselves more in social than in personal identity terms or vice versa. Nonetheless, our emphasis will be on individual differences in the importance of these two levels of identity.

Consistent with other theorists, we operationalized the social and personal identity constructs as conceptually separable levels of the self. However, in measuring individuals' predilection toward different self-construals we found it

necessary to measure both personal and social identity in broad terms, rather than the more specific (and contextualized) approach favored by social identity and self-categorization traditions. Thus, our social identity items reflect the overall importance ascribed to the similarities shared between self and other members of one's in-groups *generally* (cf. Turner et al., 1994). Likewise, measurement of the vast number of attributes that might uniquely define the personal self in a particular context seemed unfeasible, so we strove for a measure of personal identity that would capture general distinctions between persons at the intragroup level. Thus, we chose for our personal identity measure primarily to reflect independence and uniqueness, attributes that tend to cut across specific situations yet still differentiate the self from others.[1] Because both identity levels are assessed within the context of a single measurement instrument, we are able to examine not only the relative roles of each, but also the relationship between the two as distinguishing individuals on a number of other measured variables.

Related Identity Measures

Previous measures designed to assess differences in self-reported identifications (see Spitzer & Parker, 1976, and Wylie, 1974, for reviews) have included adjective check lists, semantic-differential scales and open-ended formats such as the "Who Am I?" test (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954). Sampson (1978), for example, reported differences in the importance people assign to certain self-related components as a function of their orientation to the internal or external environment. This scheme has been criticized however, due to the noncomparability of open-ended responses (Wylie, 1974).

To examine the structural dimensions of self, multidimensional scaling techniques have been applied to personality traits (Breckler, Pratkanis, & McCann, 1985), self-generated identity labels (Taylor & Dube, 1986), and identity-specific categorizations (Widdicombe, 1988). These techniques are most useful for determining those aspects of identity that tend to cluster together in two-dimensional space, and for locating the self relative to cluster positions; they are less precise as a means of measuring differences in the weighted importance of multiple-identity domains. Hierarchical classifications have also been used to link various identity categories to sets of personal attributes by those who advocate the integration of categorical and featural self information (Deaux, 1993). Related to these techniques are measures designed to examine differences in commitment to various role identities (Burke, 1977; Jackson, 1981) and reciprocal role relationships. These measures focus primarily on interpersonal identifications as a romantic partner or a family member (daughter/sister/mother), for example.

The Aspects of Identity Questionnaire (AIQ; Cheek, Underwood, & Cutler, 1985) conceptualizes the self as a dual identity structure comprised of both private (personal) self-conceptions and public (social) orientations. As such, the original two-factor AIQ was designed to assess differences in the importance people assigned to both internal (e.g., beliefs, abilities, emotions) and external (e.g., popularity, physical appearance, reputation) aspects of identity (Cheek, 1989). Although the most current version of the AIQ includes a third, collective identity component (Cheek, Tropp, Chen, & Underwood, 1994), together the scale seems to have a different scope than does the measure we develop here: We do not make distinctions between private versus public presentations of self, nor do we specify a separate public or interpersonal level as distinct from personal

identity. Instead, our scale was specifically designed to map on to the theoretical distinction between personal and social (group) identification (i.e., those categorizations that differentiate the self as unique from in-group members as opposed to those based on in-group similarities and out-group differences; Turner et al., 1987). Nonetheless, the AIQ comes closest in content to the instrument we develop here, and for that reason it played a primary role in our validation work (see Study 4).

Others have examined self-orientational differences in terms of the cross-cultural variables of individualism and collectivism (Gaines et al., 1997; Hui, 1988; Oyserman, 1993; Oyserman, Sakamoto, & Lauffer, 1998; Triandis; 1995; Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, & Lucca, 1988; Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 1990), or self–other interconnectedness as measured by independent and interdependent self-construals (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Singelis, 1994) and idiocentric versus allocentric tendencies (Triandis, Leung, Villareal, & Clack, 1985). These interculturally sensitive measures typically focus on the range of thoughts, feelings and behaviors associated with one's self-perception in relationship to others (Singelis, 1994). For example, the allocentric orientation, focusing on interdependence, is typically contrasted with the idiocentric orientation, which focuses on the private aspects of self, separate from the social context. However, allocentric cognitions have been distinguished from collective or group cognitions in that the former refer to one's sensitivity or responsiveness to others whereas the latter refer to demographic social categories (Trafimow et al., 1991). Therefore, while these constructs are related to the concepts of social and personal identity, they do not seem to tap the degree to which one is differentially inclined to identify with social categories or with self attributes that emphasize one's distinctiveness from in-group members. Furthermore, discussions of individualism versus collectivism may confound two dimensions of self: interdependence/independence as relevant to both the personal and social levels of identity. For example, one might self-categorize in terms of a group identity either to assimilate and obtain a sense of interconnectedness to others or to express individuality (differentiation from others, see Kampmeier & Simon, 2001; Spears, 2001). Our goal is to construct a measure of the importance people generally ascribe to their social and personal identities—a construct that may be related to both dimensions of self, but more closely tied to the notion of self-categorization *level*. Nonetheless, because of their important place in the literature on the self, the present research includes a direct examination of how measures of individualism and collectivism relate to our instrument.

To date, no published, validated instrument has been designed to measure individual differences in personal and social identity orientations as we and others have conceptualized these terms (but for discussions of this issue, see Brown, Condor, Matthews, Wade, & Williams, 1986; Driedger, 1976; and Zavalloni, 1971). Although relevant, Luhtanen and Crocker's (1992) measure of collective self-esteem focuses solely on social/collective aspects of the self, and it was primarily designed to measure "the positivity of one's social, or collective, identity" (p. 302) rather than level of identification (personal or social) per se. Still, the identity subscale of this instrument is relevant to our conceptualization of the importance of social identity ("The social groups I belong to are an important reflection of who I am"), and also plays a role in our validation procedures.

Overview

The Social and Personal Identities scale (SIPI) was specifically designed to capture individual differences in the relative importance and centrality assigned to both personal and social identity, with scale construction being guided by the theoretical work outlined above. Social identity was operationalized as the tendency to categorize oneself in terms of one's aggregate group identifications and personal identity as the tendency to individuate the self as distinct from in-group memberships.

Prior research has shown how differences in category salience and identification with specific groups can mediate a variety of group-related phenomena by influencing people's readiness to categorize in group terms (e.g., Brown et al., 1992; Gerard & Hoyt, 1974; Nario-Redmond, 1994; Reicher, 1984; Turner et al., 1987). Karasawa (1991), for example, found that in-group derogation effects were only observable among those low in group (national) identity compared to those highly identified with the in-group. Additionally, Simon and Pettigrew (1990) found that perceived in-group homogeneity was greatest among participants strongly identified with the in-group; out-group homogeneity effects were observed among those who minimized in-group importance by defining themselves more in terms of their personal identity. Because the centrality of *particular* self-definitions may be embedded within a predisposition to categorize the self more generally in terms of social category membership or interpersonal distinctions, an instrument sensitive to differences in social and personal identifications should be useful to investigators interested in pursuing the differential effects of identity level on a variety of intergroup strategies. Below we provide convergent evidence to support the utility of the SIPI as a valid and reliable measurement instrument.

Initial Scale Construction and Psychometric Evaluation

Item Selection and Item Analysis

A pool of 59 items was developed as a preliminary step to identify different representations of the self concept at either the personal or social (group) identity level. This initial pool included 33 personal identity items pertaining to individualistic preferences and abilities (e.g., accomplishments, dreams, fears, ideas), personality traits (e.g., boldness, shyness, dominance, flexibility), and other personal attributes (e.g., creativity, competence, physical appearance). In addition, 26 social identity items were developed describing both ascribed and achieved group memberships in areas related to family, ethnicity, gender, place of origin, as well as other social affiliations (e.g., teams, clubs, major fields of study). Because the social identity subscale was designed to provide an index of group identification across a variety of group memberships, some items referred to specific social categories while others concerned similarities among memberships in general. Similarly, the personal identity subscale included both specific, individualizing traits and other items pertaining to one's distinctiveness from others in general. The initial scale was constructed as a series of statements assessing the extent to which the respondent endorsed both personal and social levels of self as important to a sense of ''who you are''.

The preliminary 59-item version of the SIPI was administered to 139 undergraduates who participated in exchange for course credit. Participants responded

using a nine-point Likert scale that ranged from: ''not at all important to who I am'' (1) to ''extremely important to who I am'' (9). A response option of ''not applicable to who I am'', was also included in this initial measure and coded as a missing value. Item analyses were conducted separately for both identity levels, and items possessing a wide response range and high item-total correlations were retained. These procedures enabled the elimination of items with high missing values and those that reflected high acquiescence.[2] Selection criteria also were based on the results of a preliminary factor analysis and screen plot, which suggested a two-factor solution, consistent with theoretical objectives. Items with loadings less than .40 or those failing to adequately discriminate between the two factors (split loadings) were eliminated resulting in 12 social and 10 personal identity items. To achieve better balance, two additional personal identity items were added (''my sense of independence from others''; ''my nonconformity''). These new items maintained face validity and were theoretically consistent with our operationalization of personal identity.

To confirm the stability of the two-factor pattern using a larger sample of participants, the new 24-item version of the SIPI was administered to 288 undergraduates who completed questionnaires in exchange for course credit. In this case, no option was provided for ''not applicable'' responses as all the items had some general relevance to the student population. Personal and social identity statements were interspersed such that they appeared in the even and odd numbered positions, respectively. Responses were subjected to a factor analysis followed by both an orthogonal and oblique rotation, which revealed identical patterns. Three factors with eigenvalues > 1.0 emerged; all but three of the 24 items loaded on the first two factors in the predicted pattern. When a two-factor solution was forced, all items loaded on their appropriate factors. However, based on analysis of factor loadings, inter-item and item-total correlations, we decided to drop four items from each index (including the three items that had loaded together on the third factor in the unrestricted factor analysis). These reductions left a final set of eight personal identity and eight social identity items that had the best psychometric properties. Dropped items included those relevant to the social domain of college life (e.g., ''my major field of study'', ''my being a student at this university''), as well as highly individualistic areas such as ''my personal fears'' and ''my personal dreams''. Using the 24-item version of the scale, the correlation between the personal and social indexes was $r = .35$; with the 16-item index, $r = .27$.

The final, 16-item version of the scale was then administered to a separate sample of 570 undergraduates in a mass-testing session. A factor analysis produced a two-factor solution (by the eigenvalue > 1.0 criterion). These factors accounted for 35% of the total variance (23% for factor 1, personal identity; 12% for factor 2, social identity). All items loaded on the appropriate factors; factor loadings following an oblique rotation appear in Table 1. Reliability analysis indicated alpha coefficients of .80 for the personal identity subscale and .79 for the social identity subscale, and the two indexes were modestly correlated with each other, $r = .29$.

To demonstrate the unidimensionality of each factor (SI and PI) in this sample, the eight PI items were submitted to a factor analysis, and the eight SI items to another factor analysis. In each case, all eight items loaded on a single factor (for the PI items, factor 1 eigenvalue = 2.79; next factor eigenvalue = .27; for the SI items, factor 1 eigenvalue = 2.64, next factor eigenvalue = .23; all loadings $> .31$).

TABLE 1 Factor Loadings Based on Principal Factor Analysis Followed by an Oblique Rotation for the Social and Personal Identities Scale, Study 1, $N = 563$

Subscale and item	PI loading	SI loading
Social Identity – SI		
The similarity I share with others in my group(s)(1)	−.02	.31
My family nationality or nationalities. (3)	.01	.66
The memberships I have in various groups. (5)	.13	.32
The places where I have lived. (7)	.03	.44
My sense of belonging to my own racial group. (9)	.00	.78
My gender group. (11)	.07	.55
The color of my skin. (13)	−.10	.76
My being a citizen of my country. (15)	.04	.57
Personal Identity – PI		
My rebelliousness. (2)	.41	.07
My need to be completely distinct and unique from everyone else. (4)	.70	.03
My creativity. (6)	.40	−.07
My sense of being different from others. (8)	.75	.02
My complete individuality. (10)	.69	−.09
My boldness. (12)	.48	.13
My nonconformity. (14)	.53	.04
My sense of independence from others (16)	.62	.01

Numbers in parentheses indicate the item's sequence in the scale.

Confirmatory Factor Analysis

Using this second data set ($N = 570$), we also computed a confirmatory factor analysis, in which we allowed no cross loading of items and no correlation between the two factors. The Π^2 fit statistic was significant Π^2 (104, $N = 552$) = 455.10, $p < .0001$, though this can be attributed to the large sample size. The less N-sensitive comparative fit index (CFI) was .838, indicating moderate fit, but a less than ideal solution. By allowing the SI and PI factors to correlate, the CFI was .853, a significant improvement in model fit, change in Π^2 (1, $N = 552$) = 37.91, $p < .001$. Overall, the model fit can be described as moderate; the data also suggest that the social identity and personal identity factors are best viewed as non-orthogonal in nature (in the confirmatory factor analysis that allowed the two factors to correlate, r between the factors = .31). Very similar results emerged in confirmatory factor analysis of a separate data set (see Study 2 below). Here, the CFI index was .842 when factor orthogonality was assumed, and .867 when the factors were allowed to correlate (change in Π^2 (1, $N = 899$) = 81.33, $p < .001$.

Test–retest Reliability

To provide evidence of the stability of the Social and Personal Identities scale over time, a separate group of 26 undergraduate psychology students recruited from the same class in exchange for course credit, completed the scale twice in one semester—the second time after a five-week interval. The five-week test–retest correlations

from this sample were as follows: Social identity subscale $r = .82$; personal identity subscale $r = .77$, $ps < .0001$.

Study 1

In the sample of 570 participants on whom the final 16-item version of the SIPI was tested (see Table 1), we asked additional questions designed to examine the construct validity of the instrument. Specifically, we examined differences in social and personal identification as a function of participants' actual group memberships.

Method and Predictions

Participants completed the 16-item SIPI (along with unrelated questionnaires administered by other researchers) in a mass-testing session held in a large campus auditorium. Responses on the SIPI could range from 1 (''not at all important to who I am'') to 9 (''extremely important to who I am''). Participants included 322 women and 247 men (one participant did not specify sex), and the sample was 91% White and 9% ethnic minority, with the largest single minority group being Asian-Americans (4.1%). Along with these demographic variables, respondents indicated their religious group membership and whether or not they were members of campus sororities or fraternities, known in the US as the Greek system.

We predicted that members of ethnic minority groups would score higher on the social identity subscale than non-minorities, based on the distinctiveness of their group categories (Brewer & Weber, 1994; McGuire, McGuire, Child, & Fujioka, 1978; Simon & Hamilton, 1994; Simon, Hastedt, & Aufderheide, 1997). For similar reasons, we expected that individuals who aligned themselves with sororities and fraternities would score higher in social identity (have a stronger orientation to group-based identity) than students who were not involved in the campus Greek system. Regarding religious group membership, we generally expected that those associated with group-focused religions (Judaism) would score higher on social identity (Zborowski & Herzog, 1952) relative to other groups (e.g., Christians and agnostics). Group identity among Jews is often associated with strong familial ties, and Jewish identification also includes a consciousness of the larger Jewish community, and a sense of being bound together through shared relationships (Strodtbeck, 1958; see also Oyserman et al., 1998).

Respondents also answered one additional set of questions designed to establish construct validity of the personal identity subscale of the SIPI. They first indicated whether they were familiar with the author Ayn Rand, and, if familiar, whether they would describe themselves as Rand fans. Ayn Rand is the Russian-born author of novels such as *The Fountainhead* (1943) and *Atlas Shrugged* (1957) who is known for her philosophy of ''objectivism.'' Relevant here is the highly individualistic emphasis of Rand's worldview and her writing: ''My philosophy, in essence, is the concept of man as a heroic being, with his own happiness as the moral purpose of his life ...'' (''About the author'' in *Atlas Shrugged*); ''If a life can have a ''theme song'' ... mine is expressed in one word: Individualism'' (Ayn Rand Institute, 1997). We predicted that Rand fans would score higher in personal identity than non-Rand fans.

Results and Discussion

Overall, personal identity was rated to be significantly more important ($M = 5.79$) to respondents' sense of self than social identity ($M = 4.90$), $t(565) = 12.69$, $p < .0001$, perhaps reflecting an influence of individualistic values in this western culture. This main effect emerged in all analyses reported below; to avoid repetition, it will not be reported again. As indicated earlier, the SI and PI indexes were reliable, and modestly inter-correlated, $r = .29$.

Construct validation. To assess the predicted associations between specific group memberships and identity subscale scores, a series of mixed-model analyses of variance (ANOVAS) were computed.[3] In the first analysis, the SIPI indexes were subjected to a 2 (Ethnicity: White versus ethnic minority) × 2 (Sex) × 2 (Identity level: social or personal) ANOVA with identity level as a repeated factor. SIPI scores did not differ by sex (all Fs < 1.33, ps $> .24$), but the Ethnicity × Identity interaction was significant, $F(1, 561) = 7.17$, $p < .0001$.[4] As can be seen in rows 3 and 4 of Table 2, only White participants rated personal identity as significantly more important than social identity. Furthermore, the ethnic difference was due to increased social identity scores for minority relative to White respondents, $F(1, 561) = 13.11$, $p < .0001$; personal identity scores did not differ by ethnicity, $F < 1$. These findings are consistent with predictions regarding the distinctiveness of social identity to minority groups. However, the emphasis on social identity does not seem to simultaneously reduce the importance of personal identity (for a related theme, see Simon et al., 1997).

TABLE 2 SIPI Subscale Scores by Social/Demographic Categories, Study 1

	SIPI Scale/Dimension Score and (SD)	
Social/Demographic Category and (*N*)	Social Identity	Personal Identity
Sex		
Females (320)	4.80 (1.46)	5.78 (1.31)
Males (245)	5.02 (1.48)	5.81 (1.37)
Race/Ethnicity		
Racial/ethnic minorities (56)	5.57 (1.32)	5.89 (1.46)
Whites (509)	4.83 (1.47)	5.78 (1.32)
Greek Status		
Sorority/fraternity member (153)	5.27 (1.58)	5.93 (0.90)
Sorority/fraternity non-member (412)	4.75 (1.48)	5.83 (1.38)
Religion		
Jewish (32)	5.71 (1.58)	5.93 (0.90)
Christian (426)	4.90 (1.41)	5.73 (1.34)
Agnostic (90)	4.55 (1.64)	5.98 (1.41)
Rand Fanship		
Ayn Rand familiar, fan (28)	4.59 (1.65)	6.40 (1.05)
Ayn Rand familiar, non-fan (38)	4.67 (1.49)	5.70 (1.54)

Personal identity scores were significantly higher than social identity scores for all groups [pairwise ts > 3.85, ps $< .0001$], except for ethnic minorities [$t(56) = 1.66$, $p < .10$], and Jews [$t(31) = .80$, *ns*].

Comparable results emerged in an analysis of the other group memberships assumed to increase the importance of social identity. The Greek status (sorority/fraternity member or nonmember) × Identity interaction was significant, $F(1, 563) = 19.48$, $p < .0001$. Members of sororities/fraternities were significantly higher in social identity than nonmembers, $F(1, 563) = 14.31$, $p < .001$, but these groups did not differ in personal identity, $F(1, 563) = 1.80$, $p > .17$ (see means in rows 5–6 of Table 2).[5]

The religious affiliation variable was divided into three categories: Christian, Jewish, and Agnostic (see *n*s in rows 7–9 of Table 2). The Religion × Identity interaction was significant, $F(2, 545) = 7.61$, $p < .0001$, and was due to the differences among religious groups in social identity, $F(2, 545) = 7.55$, $p < .0001$, but not in personal identity, $F(2, 545) = 1.48$, $p > .22$. Contrasts indicated that each of the three groups differed from the others in social identity, ps $< .05$, with Jewish students scoring highest in social identity, agnostics scoring lowest, and Christians scoring in between. Further supporting our prediction regarding the relative importance of social identity to those of Jewish faith, the tendency to rate personal identity more important than social identity was non-significant in this group (see Table 2).

Thus far, we have identified movement in social identity scores, but not in personal identity scores, based on group membership. Our final analysis tested the hypothesis that fans of Ayn Rand would score higher in personal identity than non-Rand fans. Similar results emerged whether we focused only on those familiar with Ayn Rand (fans versus non-fans), or whether we compared fans to all other participants (including the large majority who were unfamiliar with Rand). Because it is the more precise test of the hypothesis, we focus on results from the 66 *familiar* participants (see rows 10–11 of Table 2). The Fanship × Identity interaction was marginally significant, $F(1, 64) = 3.20$, $p < .08$. As predicted, fans were significantly higher than non-fans in personal identity, $F(1, 64) = 4.31$, $p < .05$, but not in social identity, $F < 1$ (with the entire sample, including those unfamiliar with Rand, the Fanship × Identity interaction was reliable, $F(1, 560) = 8.57$, $p < .01$).

In sum, Study 1 supported both the factor structure of the SIPI, and provided evidence of the construct validity of the instrument. Using the known-groups method, we found that ethnic minorities, individuals of Jewish faith, and members of campus sororities or fraternities placed significantly greater importance on social identity than members of other groups, and that fans of Ayn Rand emphasized personal identity to a greater extent than non-fans. Study 2 was designed to provide another independent replication of the factor structure of the SIPI and to provide two additional known-groups hypothesis tests.

Study 2

Method

Participants were 930 undergraduates (499 women, 412 men, 19 unspecified) who completed the SIPI at another mass-testing session in exchange for course credit. The sample was primarily White (86%), and the ethnic groups represented included Hispanic-Americans (3.5%), Asian-Americans (3.3%) and African-Americans (2.7%). Along with sex and race/ethnicity information, participants also indicated their religion, college major, and the political party with which they identified.

With regard to college major, we predicted that the fields concerned with individual expression and personal "uniqueness"—such as the arts—would be associated with higher personal identity scores than other fields, whereas respondents in the helping professions—e.g., education and health—would have relatively high social identity scores. With regard to political party, we expected that participants who defined themselves as Independents or Libertarians would have higher personal identity scores than either Democrats or Republicans.

Results and Discussion

Factor and reliability analyses. A factor analysis and a confirmatory factor analysis once again replicated the factor structure found in the previously reported samples; all items clearly loaded on their appropriate factors. Reliability analyses produced alpha coefficients of .77 for the personal identity subscale and .74 for the social identity subscale, indicating that both possessed reasonably high internal consistency. The correlation between the personal identity subscale and the social identity subscale was $r = .33$, $N = 930$, $p < .0001$).

Construct validation. The Study 1 findings regarding variation in SI and PI scores by sex, ethnicity, and religion were replicated in this sample. Specifically, sex had no influence on identity scores (all Fs < 1), ethnic minority participants had higher social identity scores than White participants (Ethnicity $\times$ Identity interaction $F(1, 903) = 10.64$, $p < .0001$), and Jewish participants scored higher in social identity than both Christians and agnostics, though these groups did not differ in personal identity (Religion $\times$ Identity interaction $F(2, 879) = 17.50$, $p < .0001$).

We next examined the influence of the two new social categories—college major and political party—on SIPI scores. Our sample fell into seven general categories of majors: business, education and health, fine arts, humanities, math and engineering, physical sciences, and social sciences (respondents who did not fall into any of these categories were deleted from the analysis). A 7 (College Major) $\times$ 2 (Identity Level: social or personal) mixed model ANOVA revealed a significant interaction, $F(6, 720) = 4.13$, $p < .001$. Personal identity scores varied by college major, $F(6, 720) = 2.88$, $p < .01$, though social identity scores did not, $F(6, 720) = 1.34$, ns). Table 3 displays the relevant means and category ns. As predicted, students majoring in the fine arts had the highest personal identity scores; these scores were significantly higher than the PI scores of business, education/health, math/engineering, and physical science majors (ps $< .01$), marginally higher than those of social science majors ($p < .07$), but not different from those of students majoring in the humanities ($p > .13$). Social science majors also had significantly higher personal identity scores than either physical science or business majors (ps $< .02$). Although there was no overall effect of major on SI scores, it was the case that education/health majors scored significantly higher in social identity than humanities majors ($p < .03$).[6]

Differences in social and personal identity scores were also examined using political party as the between subjects factor in another mixed model ANOVA. The two-way interaction between party and identity was significant, $F(3, 895) = 14.28$, $p < .0001$. Party influenced social identity, $F(3, 895) = 8.97$, $p < .0001$, and its effect on personal identity was marginally significant, $F(3, 895) = 2.38$, $p < .07$ (see Table 3). As predicted, the Independent – Libertarian group was highest in personal identity, though it differed reliably only from those identifying as Republican,

TABLE 3 SIPI Subscale Scores as a Function of College Major and Political Party, Study 2

	SIPI Scale/Dimension Score and (SD)	
Social/Demographic Category and (*N*)	Social Identity	Personal Identity
College Major		
Business (147)	4.86 (1.53)	5.50 (1.50)
Education/Health (204)	4.89 (1.45)	5.76 (1.19)
Fine Arts (38)	4.60 (1.56)	6.27 (1.04)
Humanities (41)	4.30 (1.47)	5.83 (1.37)
Math/Engineering (78)	5.04 (1.60)	5.59 (1.48)
Physical Sciences (88)	4.77 (1.59)	5.39 (1.56)
Social Sciences (131)	4.80 (1.43)	5.82 (1.16)
Political Party		
Democrat (206)	4.82 (1.53)	5.78 (1.31)
Republican (318)	5.18 (1.49)	5.54 (1.37)
Independent/Libertarian (133)	4.65 (1.32)	5.85 (1.27)
No Party (242)	4.56 (1.52)	5.68 (1.33)

Personal identity scores were significantly higher than social identity scores for all groups (pairwise ts > 4.19, ps $< .0001$).

$p < .05$. The Independent – Libertarians also assigned significantly less importance to social identity than did the Republicans, $p < .001$, though they did not reliably differ in SI relative to the other groups. Along with Study 1, these results indicate that the SIPI is sensitive to real group differences in the relative emphasis placed on social and personal sources of identity.

Study 3

To seek additional support for the validity of the Social and Personal Identities scale, we next conducted a study in which we examined a population in which pre-existing cultural differences in individualist and collectivist attitudes have already been documented (Hofstede, 1983; Hui, 1988; Triandis et al., 1990). People from individualistic cultures typically define themselves in terms that are independent of their social groups. Such cultures are also characterized by an emphasis on personal achievement and individual aspirations. Conversely, in collectivist cultures more value is placed on social interdependence and solidarity; people from these cultures are more apt to define themselves in terms of their group memberships, forsaking individual distinctions. Triandis and his colleagues have published several cross-cultural studies illustrating how differences in the individualism or collectivism of a culture can influence intergroup and interpersonal relations, perceptions of the self concept, and a variety of other variables (Triandis, 1990, 1995; Triandis et al., 1988; see also Markus & Kitayama, 1991).

Based on this theoretical reasoning, it was predicted that in regions of the world where group identity and collective accomplishments are emphasized over individual achievements, social identity should gain prominence over personal identity. Moreover, in regions where individual distinctiveness and singularity are highly discouraged, personal identity should be minimized relative to groups from other

regions of the world. In the US, as in Europe, where personal responsibility, achievement, and independence are valued, the reverse of this situation should hold. Evidence of this latter pattern has already been provided in the present investigation in which US samples consistently rate personal identity as being more important to self than social identity.

Method

A total of 153 international students completed the Social and Personal Identities scale (95 males; 58 females). Two methods of data collection were employed. For the first method, 87 international students were randomly selected from a list of international students on campus and mailed a survey of questionnaires which included the SIPI. A return rate of 52% produced 46 respondents from this original sample. The remaining respondents were enrolled as introductory psychology students and participated in partial fulfillment of their course requirement. To facilitate comparisons across international groups, the data were categorized into one of six world regions: South Asia ($n = 46$), East Asia ($n = 43$), Latin America ($n = 14$), the Middle East ($n = 7$), Africa ($n = 12$) and Europe ($n = 31$). For example, students from countries such as Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam were classified as South Asian, whereas students from China, Hong Kong and Japan were classified as East Asian. These categories were chosen to reflect broad regional distinctions based on both geographic and cultural criteria (Hofstede, 1983) while being inclusive enough to capture the general patterns of identification thought to predominate across these wider regions. Because of limitations in sample size, these categories are broader than those based on individual countries of origin. However, much research supports the classification of national cultures by the importance they attach to different values (Hofstede, 1983; Smith & Bond, 1994). Furthermore, the organization of cross-cultural findings is often aggregated by regions differentiated on the basis of individualistic and collectivistic orientations (Hofstede, 1983; Triandis, 1989); this framework appears to be useful in explaining cross-cultural variability.

Based on previous empirical work on individualistic and collectivistic orientations, we predicted that Europeans would not differ much from Americans in the importance that they ascribed to both social and personal identity levels of self. That is, personal identity should be rated significantly higher than social identity, mirroring results obtained with US samples. Regarding students from other western regions such as Latin America, where the expression of both group (especially family) and personal aspects of self are emphasized (Holtzman, Diaz-Guerrero, & Swartz, 1975; Marin & Triandis, 1985), we predicted high scores on both social and personal identity levels. In fact, Holtzman and his colleagues (1975) report longitudinal data showing that Mexican students score even higher than Americans on measures related to autonomy and independence.

Asian cultures are typically characterized in collectivist terms (Bond & Cheung, 1981; Cheek et al., 1994; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Marsella, De Vos, & Hsu, 1985; Triandis et al., 1990), therefore we expected higher social identity scores among these samples compared to Europeans. However, social identification among the Asian groups may not be rated as more important than personal or unique aspects of self (Hsu, 1985). That is, personal identity may be rated at least as moderately important, especially among the East Asian students whose countries promote both enterprise and personal advancement (Bond & Cheung, 1981;

Triandis et al., 1990). Based on Hofstede's (1980) characterization of African culture as collectivistic, we also expected that international students from Africa would tend to emphasize social identity over personal identity (see also Holzberg, 1981). Predictions regarding the Middle Eastern students were less certain, as extant data concerning this region are limited. Interdependent values and collectivistic orientations characterize both Arab and Palestinian cultures (Triandis, 1990). We speculated that the students from these regions might be distinguished by their relatively low personal identity scores due to a less westernized orientation that de-emphasizes the importance of individualistic self qualities (Doi, 1986; Schweder & Bourne 1982). Furthermore, Triandis (1990) has noted that individualism should be weakest where national policies preclude affluence, social mobility and exposure to mass media influences (e.g., Iran).

Results and Discussion

To investigate these hypothesized differences in ratings of both social and personal identity as a function of students' international area of origin, a 6 (World Region) $\times$ 2 (Identity) mixed model ANOVA was conducted on the two identity subscales. As depicted in Table 4, a significant two-way interaction was observed between identity level and world region, $F(5, 147) = 4.02$, $p < .01$. However, for the first time, no main effect of identity was observed across region of origin ($F < 1$). As expected, only those from the more individualistic regions of Europe and Eastern Asia scored higher on personal identity compared to social identity ($p < .01$; see column 3 of Table 4). No differences were observed among students from the other world regions; both social and personal levels of self were perceived to be equally important identifications. However, in the smaller samples of participants from Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, there were (nonsignificant) tendencies to identify more strongly with social than personal aspects of self.

Comparisons within identity level indicated that the region effect on social identity, $F(5, 147) = 2.51$, $p < .05$, was primarily due to the African and Latin American subgroups being higher in social identity than both the European and East Asian groups (column 1 of Table 4). Though there was no main effect of region on personal identity scores ($F = 1.51$, ns), participants from the Middle East were significantly lower in personal identity than all other subgroups except Africans. The final column of Table 4 provides information regarding the percentage of participants from each world region who rated personal identity as more important than social identity (the Western pattern). A Π^2 test of independence suggested that these numbers varied by world region, Π^2 $(5, N = 153) = 15.93$, $p < .01$. Though many people across cultures emphasized personal identity, the proportions were notably greater in European and East-Asian compared to African and Latin-American cultures.

The differences observed across the six world regions in degree of identification are noteworthy in that the students examined represent a highly select sample of international students who may be more Americanized than those still residing in their countries of origin (Palenske, Crandall, & Nario-Redmond, 1994). We expect that these cultural differences in identification would have been magnified had the data been collected from remote samples of international citizens residing abroad (but cf., Yang & Bond, 1980). Nevertheless, within these broad classifications much variability is to be expected, especially in areas characterized by multiple diverse ethnic and religious subcultures (Triandis, 1990).

TABLE 4 Mean Identity Scores as a Function of World Region of Origin, Study 3

	SIPI Scale/Dimension Score and (SD)			
World Region and (*N*)	Social Identity	Personal Identity	PI – SI Difference and Significance From 0	% with PI Scores Higher than SI Scores
Europe (31)	4.70[ac] (1.09)	5.51[e] (0.78)	.81*[hi]	78
East Asia (43)	4.74[bd] (1.50)	5.31[f] (1.14)	.58*[jk]	65
South Asia (46)	5.18 (1.38)	5.52[g] (1.26)	.34[l]	47
Latin America (14)	5.81[cd] (1.30)	5.55[h] (1.42)	−.25[m]	36
Middle East (7)	4.79 (1.47)	4.32[efgh] (1.99)	−.46[hj]	43
Africa (12)	5.79[ab] (1.60)	5.14 (1.07)	−.65[iklm]	25

Response options ranged from 1 to 9. Within a column, means sharing a common superscript differ significantly, $p < .05$.
*$p < .01$ (indicating significant difference from 0).

Study 4

Study 4 was conducted to provide additional information about the SIPI scale in terms of convergent and discriminant validity. In this study the subscales of the SIPI were compared to other instruments designed to measure both similar and theoretically unrelated constructs.

Method

The Social and Personal Identities scale was administered to a new sample of undergraduates (146 females; 140 males; 85% White) who participated in exchange for course credit. Students signed up for lab sessions in small groups, but always worked independently through a questionnaire packet. As in Study 2, demographic questions pertaining to race/ethnicity, college major, religion, political party, and Greek status were assessed. Our analyses indicated that these factors were related to SIPI scores in the manner described in the previous two studies. Rather than recite these replications here, we will focus instead on the novel aspects of this study.

One new measure required that respondents use a 93-item checklist to identify their extracurricular group affiliations. These groups included student councils, band, the juggling club, the homeless coalition, as well as other athletic and professional clubs, artistic and political groups, and ethnic affairs organizations. We predicted that social identity, but not personal identity, would be positively correlated with the number of extracurricular group memberships.

Following these questions, respondents also completed seven additional questionnaires, presented in one random order. Among the measures included to provide convergent validation for the *personal* identity subscale of the SIPI were: (1) Maslach, Stapp, and Santee's (1985) Individuation Scale, an assessment of one's willingness to behave in ways that publicly differentiate oneself from others; (2) Rosenberg's (1965) Self-Esteem Scale, an evaluation of the self at the intrapersonal level; (3) Snyder and Fromkin's (1977) Uniqueness Scale, measuring one's need for dispositional distinctiveness; and (4) the personal identity subscale from the Aspects of Identity Questionnaire, AIQ (Cheek et al., 1985) measuring the self-perceived importance ascribed to a variety of internal self-attributes. We expected to find modest positive associations between these measures and the PI subscale. The measures expected to correlate with the SIPI's *social* identity subscale included: (1) Luhtanen and Crocker's (1992) Collective Self-Esteem Scale, a self evaluative measure of the general worthiness of one's group memberships (with specific focus on the "identity" subscale of this instrument); and (2) the social and collective subscales of the AIQ. The social subscale of the AIQ refers to interpersonal aspects of self such as one's popularity and physical appearance, while the collective subscale more closely corresponds to an index of group identity. Additionally, participants completed the Public and Private Self Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein et al., 1975). Some researchers have suggested that people high in private self-consciousness may focus more on personal aspects of their identities whereas those high in public self-consciousness may emphasize the social or interpersonal aspects of their identity (Cheek & Briggs, 1982; for other views, see Abrams, 1988; Gollwitzer & Wicklund, 1987). Finally, the Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964) was included to assess possible response biases associated with the SIPI subscales. The entire packet took an average of 35–45 minutes to complete.

Results and Discussion

As in the previous studies, the SI and PI indexes were reliable in this sample (= .83 for personal identity and .79 for social identity), and modestly correlated, $r = .27$, $N = 286$, $p < .0001$.

Convergent validity. Table 5 displays correlations among the SIPI and the various other measured constructs. As can be seen in column 1, correlations between the personal identity subscale and measures assessing similar constructs (individuation, personal self-esteem, need for uniqueness, AIQ personal identity, and private self-consciousness) were all significant and positive, ranging in size from $r = .18$ to $r = .45$. The expected correlations between the SIPI social identity subscale and the AIQ social and collective identity measures, collective self-esteem, the identity subscale, and public self-consciousness were also significant (*r*s from .19 to .70; see column 2 of Table 5).

The highest correlation was observed between the collective subscale of the AIQ and the social identity subscale of the SIPI ($r = .70$). This finding is not surprising as both subscales were designed to measure the perceived importance of one's group memberships. On the other hand, the moderate ($r = .30$) correlations between the SI subscale and collective self-esteem, and between the PI subscale and personal self-esteem ($r = .18$) may reflect important distinctions between constructs. The Collective Self-Esteem Scale (CSE; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) was designed to capture the general positivity (or negativity) assigned to one's social identity, and personal self-esteem similarly emphasizes the valence of one's individualized self views (''I feel I am a person of worth''); not surprisingly, these two indexes were correlated with each other ($r = .30$). However, the social and personal identity components of the SIPI attempt to characterize people in terms of the centrality associated with each identity component. Indeed, the correlation between the SI index and the aspect of the CSE scale that taps the importance of social group memberships (the identity subscale) was moderately high ($r = .39$).

Discriminant validity. As evidence of the SIPI's discriminant validity, no relationship was found between the Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964) and either subscale of the SIPI (*r*s = .09 and .06 for PI and SI subscales, respectively). Furthermore, although a few significant cross-identity category correlations did emerge (the PI scale was significantly correlated with AIQ collective identity, $r = .22$, and the SI scale was related to AIQ personal identity, $r = .18$), these correlations were nonetheless much smaller than the within-identity type or correspondent relationships (PI with personal identity and personal self-esteem; SI with social/collective identity and collective self-esteem).

Comparison with the AIQ. Because of the conceptual similarity between the SIPI and the personal and collective identity subscales of the AIQ (Cheek et al., 1985), it is worth comparing these indexes more directly. In general, the AIQ subscales performed similarly to the SIPI indexes—AIQ personal identity was correlated with individuation, personal self-esteem, uniqueness, and private self-consciousness, and AIQ collective identity was correlated with collective self-esteem, the identity subscale of the CSE, and public self-consciousness (see Table 5). However, two differences are worth noting: Unlike the SIPI, both AIQ subscales were significantly, albeit modestly, correlated with social desirability (*r*s = .14), and the AIQ subscales

TABLE 5 Correlations Among SI, PI, and Construct Validation Scales, Study 4

	Scale Reference Number											
Scale Name	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1 Pers ID (PI)												
2 Social ID (SI)	.27***											
3 Individuation	.26***	−.02										
4 Personal SE	.18**	.02	.39***									
5 Uniqueness	.38***	−.25***	.64***	.39***								
6 AIQ-personal	.45***	.18**	.35***	.33***	.35***							
7 AIQ-social	.02	.42***	−.13*	−.09	−.35***	.15*						
8 AIQ-collect	.22***	.70***	.06	.08	−.14*	.41***	.48***					
9 Collective SE	.06	.30***	.16**	.30***	−.08	.20***	.27***	.41***				
10 CSE-Identity	.02	.39***	−.01	.05	−.26***	.05	.40***	.43***	.77***			
10 Priv SC	.23***	−.05	.11	−.03	.13*	.40***	.10	.07	−.01	.06		
11 Pub SC	−.12*	.19**	−.28***	−.15**	−.39***	−.01	.55***	.18**	.16	.27***	.21**	
12 Social desir	.09	.06	.13*	.25***	.01	.14*	−.06	.14*	.22**	.01	−.07	−.14*

Pers ID = SIPI Personal Identity; Social ID = SIPI Social Identity; Individuation = Maslach et al.'s (1985) Individuation Scale; Personal SE = Rosenberg's (1965) Self-Esteem Scale; Uniqueness = Snyder & Fromkin's (1977) Uniqueness Scale; AIQ = Cheek et al.'s (1985) Aspects of Identity; Collective SE = Luhtanen & Crocker's (1992) CSES; CSE-Identity = Four-item Identity subscale of Luhtanen & Crocker's (1992) CSES; Priv and Pub SC = Fenigstein et al.'s (1975) Self-Consciousness Scale; Social desir = Crowne and Marlowe's (1964) Social Desirability Scale.
$p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{***}p < .001$.

were both more highly correlated with each other than were the SIPI subscales ($r = .41$ versus .27), and more highly correlated with the corresponding self-esteem indexes than were the SIPI subscales ($rs = .33$ and .41 for the AIQ personal and collective correlations with personal and collective self-esteem, respectively, versus .18 and .30 for the comparable SIPI correlations).

Another means of comparing the scales is to examine whether the SIPI indexes account for unique variance in the other constructs after controlling for the influence of the AIQ subscales. We computed partial correlations between the PI scale and the variables listed in Table 6, controlling for AIQ personal identity. This reduced to nonsignificance the relationship between the PI and personal self-esteem ($pr = .04$), and between PI and private self-consciousness ($pr = .06$). However, the relationships between PI and individuation ($pr = .12$, $p < .05$) and between PI and uniqueness ($pr = .27$, $p < .001$) remained significant even after controlling for AIQ personal identity (see Table 6, column 1). Similarly, with regard to the SI subscale, controlling for AIQ collective identity reduced the SI-collective self-esteem correlation ($pr = .02$) and the SI-public self-consciousness correlation ($pr = .08$) to nonsignificance. However, the associations between SI and Luhtanen and Crocker's (1992) identity subscale ($pr = .14$, $p < .05$), between SI and AIQ social identity ($pr = .12$, $p < .05$), and between SI and uniqueness ($pr = -.21$, $p < .001$) remained significant. Also in this partial correlation analysis, the formerly positive association between the SI and AIQ personal identity ($r = .18$) became negative when AIQ collective identity was controlled ($pr = -.16$, $p < .01$). Clearly, as can be seen in Table 6, SIPI and the AIQ have much in common, though the SIPI is more distinct than the AIQ from the constructs of self-esteem and self-consciousness.

TABLE 6 Partial Correlations Between the SIPI Subscales and Other Constructs, Controlling for AIQ Identity, Study 4

	SIPI Scale and Partialled Index		AIQ Scale and Partialled Index	
Scale Name	PI (Partial Out AIQ Pers)	SI (Partial Out AIQ Coll)	AIQ Pers (Partial Out PI)	AIQ Coll (Partial Out SI)
Personal Identity (PI)	—	.17**	—	.04
Social Identity (SI)	.22***	—	.07	—
Individuation	.12*	−.09	.27***	.11
Personal self-esteem	.04	−.06	.28***	.10
Uniqueness	.27***	−.21***	.21***	.05
AIQ-personal	—	−.16**	—	.41***
AIQ-social	−.05	.12*	.16**	.30***
AIQ-collective	.04	—	.36**	—
CSE – total	−.03	.02	.19**	.29***
CSE – identity	−.01	.14*	.04	.24***
Private self-conscious	.06	−.13*	.34**	.14*
Public self-conscious	−.13*	.08	.05	.07
Social desirability	.03	−.05	.11	.14*

*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$.

Finally, further supporting the construct validity of the SIPI, we found that number of extracurricular group memberships was significantly correlated with scores on the SI scale, $r = .16$, $p < .01$, but not with scores on the PI scale, $r = .08$, $p > .13$. However, the AIQ subscales did not show this same pattern of discrimination across scales; instead, the collective, personal, and social identity subscales were equally correlated with number of group memberships (rs = .15, .15, and .13, ps $< .05$).[7]

Study 5

Study 3 indicated that SIPI scores varied based on foreign students' countries of origin and their presumed collectivistic versus individualistic cultural orientations. However, direct measures of individualism and collectivism also warrant comparison with the SIPI. Accordingly, we conducted an additional study to examine the extent of overlap between the SI scale and collectivism, and between the PI scale and individualism. This study also included a version of the "Who Am I?" test (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954) in order to assess the extent to which free-response self-descriptions that highlight individual versus group features are correlated in predictable ways with these instruments.

Method

Participants were 50 University of Kansas undergraduates (39 males, 11 females) who were compensated with course credit, and were told that the study concerned "How we think about ourselves." All participants were first asked to reflect on who they are and how they would describe themselves, and to complete 20 statements that began with the phrase "I am . . . ." Participants then completed the SIPI along with measures of individualism, collectivism, and familism ("orientation toward the welfare of one's immediate and extended family") developed by Gaines and his colleagues (1997), with half the participants first completing the SIPI and the other half first completing the Gaines et al. (1997) scales. The order in which participants filled out the scales had no effect on mean level differences or on correlations among measures, so this factor will not be considered further. On a final page of the questionnaire, participants indicated their sex and race along with information about their current living arrangements ("I live: alone, with my family of origin, with a romantic partner, with one roommate, with more than one roommate"). We considered living arrangements a potential indicator of predictive validity: Those high in social identity should be more likely to live with others than to live alone.[8]

Free responses to the "I am . . ." statements were coded by a single judge who was blind to participants' responses to the questionnaire measures. Responses were simply divided into "personal" descriptors (e.g., talented, smart, insecure, hopeful) and social/group/role descriptors (e.g., a KU student, an African-American, a daughter, a basketball fan). A second coder who independently scored a subset of the responses had 100% agreement with the original coder.

Results and Discussion

Descriptives. Participants scored higher on the PI scale ($M = 6.12$) than the SI scale ($M = 4.57$), $t(49) = 6.74$, $p < .0001$, and higher in familism ($M = 3.82$) than collectivism ($M = 3.56$), $t(49) = 2.19$, $p < .05$, with individualism falling in between

($M = 3.70$). Reliability of the SI was somewhat low in this study (= .55), although the PI scale continued to show good reliability (= .83). Reliabilities for the Gaines et al. (1997) scales were .40 for individualism, .79 for collectivism, and .85 for familism. On average, participants indicated many more "personal" attributes ($M = 17.36$) than "group" attributes ($M = 2.16$) on the "Who am I?" test, $t(49) = 22.98$, $p < .0001$. Because personal and group attributes were nearly perfectly negatively correlated (respondents were asked to complete 20 statements, and most did), we report further results in terms of the percentage of statements that were "personal" in nature.

Correlations. Correlations among all measured variables appear in Table 7. For the living arrangements question, no participants reported living with their families of origin, so we could readily recode the variable in terms of number of roommates (alone = 0, with a romantic partner or one roommate = 1, with more than one roommate = 2). As can be seen in Table 7, the PI scale had some overlap with Gaines et al.'s (1997) measure of Individualism, $r = .41$, but the SI scale was only very modestly related to the measures of Collectivism or Familism. Thus, the importance one places on personal versus social aspects of identity is not synonymous with broad cultural orientations of individualism or collectivism. Furthermore, only the PI scale was related to percentage of personal statements generated on the "Who Am I?" test ($r = .30$), and only the SI scale was related to number of roommates with whom participants lived ($r = .28$); the Gaines et al. scales did not predict this variable.[9] Even with all of the other measures partialled out, these two correlations remained significant. That the PI scale (and not the individualism scale) uniquely predicted the content of participants' free-response self-descriptions is particularly noteworthy; it indicates that the "importance" placed on personal aspects of the self may be directly tied to their "salience" relative to social aspects at the time the "Who Am I?" test was completed.

TABLE 7 Correlations Among the SIPI, Individualism, Collectivism, Familism, Free-response Personal Statements, and Number of Roommates, Study 5

	Measured Constructs					
	PI	SI	Indiv	Collect	Familism	% Pers State
Personal Identity (PI)						
Social Identity (SI)	.16					
Individualism	.41**	.17				
Collectivism	.11	.08	−.04			
Familism	−.14	.23	.21	.14		
% Personal Statements (I am . . .)	.30*	−.02	.12	−.03	−.06	
No. of Roommates	.11	.28*	.05	.03	.04	−.20

*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$.

Study 6

An additional question regarding the SIPI concerns its ability to predict group-relevant choices and phenomena. To address this question, we conducted a final study in which we administered the SIPI along with (1) a face-valid question regarding individuals' preference for working on projects "alone" or "with a group", and (2) a two-item indicator of perceived discrimination faced by an important group and by the self as a member of that group. This latter assessment is relevant to the "personal-group discrimination discrepancy" phenomenon—the tendency to perceive more discrimination directed at one's group than at oneself as a group member (Crosby, 1984; Taylor, Wright, Moghaddam, & Lalonde, 1990). This effect has been documented with a number of groups, and seems to be based, at least in part, on the relative *availability* of group as opposed to individual instances of discrimination (Moghaddam, Stolkin, & Hutcheson, 1997; Taylor, Wright, & Ruggiero, 1991). Given that the SIPI purports to measure the importance and centrality of group and personal identity, we predicted that the SI would be positively correlated with perceptions of group discrimination, the PI with perceptions of personal discrimination, and the personal-social identity difference to best predict the *discrepancy* between perceived personal and group discrimination.

Method, Results, and Discussion

Participants were 325 White University of Kansas students (160 women, 165 men) attending a mass-testing session. Along with the SIPI, participants were asked to answer the following question: "Which statement best characterizes your attitude toward class projects (check one): I would rather work alone on class projects; I would rather work with a group on class projects." To assess the personal-group discrimination discrepancy, we asked "to what extent do you believe that the average member of your gender group is discriminated against?," and "to what extent do you believe that you personally, as a member of your gender group, are discriminated against?" The questions appeared in this order, and were both answered on 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so) response scales.

As in the prior studies, students' PI scores were significantly higher than their SI scores (Ms = 5.45 and 4.49), $t(323) = 11.17$, $p < .0001$. Consistent with much prior literature, reports of group-level discrimination were also significantly higher than reports of personal discrimination (Ms = 3.47 and 2.50), $t(323) = 12.78$, $p < .0001$. Overall, 57.5% of participants preferred to work on class projects in groups rather than alone.

Correlations between the SIPI and preference for group tasks and perceptions of discrimination appear in Table 8. As can be seen in the first column of the table, greater relative PI to SI scores were associated with a preference to work alone on projects; this effect was due to the positive correlation between SI scores and preference to work with a group. Consistent with predictions, higher SI scores were associated with higher reports of *group* discrimination, and higher PI scores with higher reports of *personal* discrimination (the cross-correlations were not reliable). Furthermore, only the PI – SI difference was associated with the personal – group discrimination discrepancy: Those relatively high in personal identity were less likely to show the discrimination discrepancy. Though other factors are likely to be relevant, these findings suggest that an orientation toward personal identity may

TABLE 8 Correlations Between the SIPI and Group Project Preference and Perceptions of Discrimination, Study 6

Measure	Group Task Preference	Personal Discrimination	Group Discrimination	Personal – Group Discrimination Discrepancy
Social ID (SI)	.11*	.07	.13*	.07
Personal ID (PI)	−.03	.12*	.06	−.05
PI – SI	−.13*	.04	−.06	−.11*

*$p < .05$.

sensitize individuals to personal discrimination, thereby reducing the size of the typical personal – group discrimination discrepancy.

General Discussion

Results from data collected across six studies demonstrate the usefulness of the Social and Personal Identities scale in distinguishing between the importance assigned to both personal and social self-identifications. Factor analyses on the sixteen-item scale clearly support a solution with two correlated factors, one representing personal identity and the other social identity. Internal consistency for each of the component subscales is high, and strong test – retest correlations provide additional evidence of the measure's reliability and stability over time. Furthermore, the construct validity of the two identity components was supported through significant correlations with instruments designed to measure similar theoretical constructs. These intermeasure relationships were significant, yet sufficiently modest, suggesting the distinct nature of the two identity constructs as measured by the SIPI.

Among the American students sampled in five of the six studies, personal identity was consistently rated as more important than social identity, likely reflecting the dominant cultural script in the West, which emphasizes the value of individualism and independence over collectivism and interdependence (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1990). This main effect of identity was moderated however, by a number of other demographic variables, illustrating the ability of the SIPI to differentiate participants expected to have higher or lower identity scores by virtue of their group memberships. For example, minority Americans consistently rated their social identities to be more important compared to their majority counterparts, an effect replicated across three studies. This result is consistent with experimental and correlational evidence showing that self categories achieve greater distinctiveness for those in the numerical minority (Brewer, 1991; Frable, Blackstone, & Scherbaum, 1990; Gerard & Hoyt, 1974; McGuire & McGuire, 1981; McGuire et al., 1978; Simon & Brown, 1987; Simon & Pettigrew, 1990). This result also replicates findings on ethnic identification (Phinney, 1992; Phinney & Alipuria, 1990; Phinney & Tarver, 1988) showing that African-Americans have higher ethnic identity scores compared to White groups.

The construct validity of the SIPI was further demonstrated by the findings that individuals may be distinguished on variables related to religious group, political party and college major according to their degree of social and/or personal

identification. Those who scored highest in social identity were more likely to be affiliated with religious groups that emphasize the importance of group identity and mutual interdependence (e.g., Judaism). Similarly, those who identified themselves as members of more individualistic political parties such as the Independents and Libertarians scored higher on personal identity and rated their group memberships as less important to self. Differences in personal identification also corresponded to differences in college major. Students with more individualistic majors in the arts and humanities scored highest in personal identity and lowest in social identity. Leary, Wheeler, and Jenkins (1986) found similar differences among individuals with different occupational preferences. That is, participants expressed more concern for individualistic outcomes to the extent that they rated individualistic attributes as more important to their identity; conversely, those with more socially based identities expressed greater preference for jobs offering social or group-based rewards.

The criterion and construct validity of the SIPI was supported by differences in social and personal identity scores based on participants' Greek fraternal status, extracurricular group affiliations, and living arrangements. Students affiliated with sororities and fraternities tended to have higher social identity scores than their ''independent'' counterparts who rated social identity to be significantly less important than personal identity. Additionally, social identity scores (but not personal identity scores) were correlated with the number of groups one participated in and with number of roommates, whereas personal identity scores (but not social identity scores) predicted fanship of the individualist author, Ayn Rand, and the number of personal statements generated in a free-response self-description. In Study 6, we also demonstrated that social identity (but not personal identity) predicted choice to work with a group on class projects, personal (but not social) identity was associated with increased judgments of *personal* discrimination, and social (but not personal) identity was associated with increased judgments of *group* discrimination. These data indicate that the two subscales, though correlated, have distinct, specific, and theoretically meaningful effects.

Finally, the Social and Personal Identities scale was able to differentiate between a sample of foreign students on the basis of their regional area of origin (Study 3). Although sample sizes were limited, results suggested that differences in the relative importance ascribed to both personal and social identity corresponded to cultural differences in individualism and collectivism (Triandis, 1989; 1990), and the values associated with independence versus interdependence (Singelis, 1994). While both identity levels coexist among individuals in a given society, the relative importance ascribed to either level depends on the dominant cultural values espoused.

The Person and the Situation

The present investigation has emphasized individual differences in the importance ascribed to personal and social identity, while at the same time assuming the stability and continuity of the self concept. Of course, identity importance is not the only determinant of self-conception across situations. Self-categorization theorists, for example, contend that self-categorization is a function of both the ''readiness'' of the individual to use a particular category, and the ''fit'' between category attributes and the reality of the particular situation; as reality changes, so too does self-conception (Oakes, 1987; Turner et al., 1994). Within one context, people may look at the world as members of a collective. In another, they may stand apart as distinct from those in

the comparative background. Thus, for these researchers, variation in self-categorization is the rule.

While acknowledging that category salience is in part context-dependent, we also maintain that there is stability across contexts in the extent to which people categorize themselves at the social versus personal level of identification. In fact, the proclivity to categorize oneself in personal or social identity terms may reflect stabilities across comparative social contexts. The opportunity to frequently compare oneself as a member of the in-group may not be as available to some people whose daily interactions are more likely to produce out-group comparisons. This may explain the enhanced salience of in-group categorizations among members of minority groups (Gerard & Hoyt, 1974; Simon & Brown, 1987) whose distinctive status may encourage more frequent intergroup comparisons. Furthermore, some groups of individuals may espouse a more relational ideology than others, predisposing them to evaluate themselves in terms of in-group and out-group relations while others may adopt a more autonomous orientation from which self-evaluations are made (Hinkle & Brown, 1990).

The Relationship Between Personal and Social Identity

Another point worth noting concerns the relationship between personal and social identity. Our data suggest that personal and social identity orientations are not bipolar opposites; rather, they are modestly positively correlated. This finding may reflect shared method variance or response bias (some individuals may be more prone to calling things "important" than others), but may also reflect the coincident nature of these aspects of identity (Deschamps & Devos, 1998; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1995; Reid & Deaux, 1996; Serino, 1998; Simon et al., 1997). Research by Deschamps and his colleagues, for example, suggests that factors that increase group identification may simultaneously increase interindividual differentiation within the group (e.g., Deschamps, 1984; see also Codol, 1975). Another possible explanation, first noted by Simmel (1955), suggests that people may establish a distinct personal identity by emphasizing their unique array of social identifications (see also Simon, 1997). Here too, valuing distinctiveness would be predicted to covary with the importance placed on one's social identifications. Given our methods for creating the scales (e.g., factor analysis), we cannot speak clearly to the theoretical implications of our finding of modest SI – PI intercorrelation. What is important in this context is our set of findings demonstrating that the social and personal identity subscales show distinct patterns of correlation with relevant constructs, known groups, and preferences.

Future Directions

In designing our instrument we strove to develop a measure that would be sensitive to people's relative preference for self-definition at the personal or social level of identity *generally*. An important step for future research will be to determine the predictive power of our general measure as compared to the importance placed on *specific* identities. Additional work is also needed to explicate the relationship between the centrality of social and personal identity domains and category-specific identifications.

Likewise, our assumptions of stability and continuity should be put to the test to assess the differential use of social and personal identity orientations across

particular situations likely to encourage different levels of categorization. It will also be important for future research to determine whether our face-valid measure of identity importance does in fact correspond with aspects of the self that are ''durably salient'' (Gurin & Markus, 1988); this could be accomplished by comparing the SIPI with implicit measures of self-conception to assess the influence of identity importance on the chronic accessibility of particular self constructs and categorizations (Kelly, 1955; Markus, 1977).

One other promising area for future research concerns the moderating role of differential identity importance on group judgments such as those related to in-group bias and intergroup differentiation. If personal identity is generally more important to one's self conception than social identity, in-group favoritism and out-group derogation effects may be attenuated (Nario-Redmond, 1994). Conversely, if one's social identity is more important, intergroup biases may be maximized, especially when comparative strategies are central and well-rehearsed (see Hinkle & Brown, 1990). Similarly, a strong investment in one's social as opposed to personal identity may increase the likelihood of ''basking in the reflected glory'' of group successes (e.g., Cialdini et al., 1976), and of derogating in-group members who are characterized as ''black sheep'' (Branscombe, Wann, Noel, & Coleman, 1993). Our hope is that the SIPI—an instrument sensitive to differences in the importance ascribed to both personal and social identifications—will be helpful to researchers interested in both interpersonal and intergroup phenomena, and in person situation interactions.

Notes

1. There is another important distinction between our own and others' conceptualization of personal and social identity that deserves mention. Many theorists have challenged the practice of treating identity as a unidimensional construct (Karasawa, 1991; Tajfel, 1978). Though proposed dimensions vary in content and number, most distinguish between some affective or emotional dimension from other, more cognitive dimensions. We see our own approach as primarily assessing a cognitive conception of identity (e.g., knowledge of one's memberships, perceptions of similarity and difference), though others have considered items that, like ours, measure identity importance as tapping into an affective identity dimension (e.g., Jackson & Smith, 1999).
2. Among the items eliminated from the social identity factor were those referring to specific social clubs and student organizations, which have limited utility to the general population. High acquiescent items from the PI included personal standards, emotions and feelings, thoughts and ideas, and values and ethics, and from the SI, an item referring to family memberships.
3. Because cell sizes became very small or empty when all of the independent variables were crossed (e.g., there were no minority, Catholic, Republican, sorority women who were Ayn Rand fans), we grouped the independent variables of sex and race in one analysis, and then conducted separate ANOVAs based on religion, political party, sorority/fraternity membership and Rand-fanship. Missing data account for the slight differences in degrees of freedom reported across analyses. All ANOVAs take into account unbalanced cell sizes (using the GLM procedure in SAS).
4. Two of the items in the SI subscale are explicitly relevant to race (''my sense of belonging to my own racial group'' and ''the color of my skin''). However, the racial group differences in SI scores were not due to the specific content of these items; when they were not included in the index, the race difference between White ($M = 5.29$) and minority ($M = 5.84$) respondents remained reliable, $F(1, 561) = 7.47$, $p < .01$, and the

Race × Identity interaction was marginally significant, $F(1, 564) = 3.53$, $p = .06$. This was true in each of the other studies that examined race/ethnicity as well.

5. One item of the SI scale may be particularly relevant to sorority/fraternity members "the places where I have lived." To be sure that the differences based on Greek status were not driven by responses to this item, we re-ran the analysis using an SI index that excluded this variable. The differences in SI scores between sorority/fraternity members ($M = 5.24$ and nonmembers ($M = 4.69$) remained reliable, $F(1, 563) = 15.70$, as did the Greek status × Identity interaction, $F(1, 563) = 20.94$, $ps < .0001$.
6. We also grouped college majors according to Holland's (1973; 1985) theory of vocational interest and personality. Specifically, the majors represented in our sample fell into four of the six Holland types: (1) Artistic [Arts], including the fine arts, humanities, and social sciences; (2) Investigative [Science], including the physical sciences, math, and engineering; (3) Conventional/Enterprising [Business], including business majors; and (4) Social [Social Service], including education and health majors (see American College Testing Program, 1984). A Holland classification × SIPI dimension ANOVA revealed a significant interaction, $F(3, 723) = 6.16$, $p < .001$. Personal identity scores significantly differed by major classification, $F(3, 723) = 4.26$, $p < .01$, but social identity scores did not, $F(3, 723) = 1.08$, ns. The difference in personal identity scores was based on the significantly higher PI scores among Arts majors ($M = 5.90$) relative to Business ($M = 5.50$) and Science majors ($M = 5.49$, $ps < .01$), but not relative to Social Service majors ($M = 5.76$, $p > .20$).
7. To further compare the SIPI and the AIQ, we computed a factor analysis that included the 16 SIPI items and the 30 AIQ items that comprise the collective, personal, and social identity subscales. A four-factor solution emerged: Factor 1 included all but one of the SI items and eight of 13 AIQ collective identity items, Factor 2 included the remaining SI item along with the seven AIQ social identity items and two collective identity items, Factor 3 included all ten AIQ personal identity items, and Factor 4 included all eight PI items. This suggests considerable overlap between the SI and AIQ collective identity questions, but clear separation in personal identity measurement between the SIPI and the AIQ. Additionally, we compared how the SIPI versus the AIQ varied based on the group membership categories described earlier (sex, ethnicity, religion, political party, college major, and Greek status). A series of ANOVAs indicated that in general, AIQ personal and collective scores varied by group membership in a manner very similar to SIPI PI and SI scores, with one exception: Although SIPI social identity scores were higher for sorority/fraternity members than non-members (Ms = 5.38 and 5.03, respectively, $F(1, 284) = 3.75$, $p = .05$), AIQ collective identity scores did not differ by Greek status, $F(1, 284) = 1.99$, $p > .15$. This Greek/non-Greek difference on the SI subscale held even when the item "the places where I have lived" was dropped from the index, $F(1, 284) = 4.67$, $p < .05$; Greek $M = 5.36$, non-Greek $M = 4.96$.
8. We were less certain what to predict regarding PI scores and living arrangements. Viewing the self as a unique entity might be associated with a preference to be alone, but one might also imagine that "unique" individuals want others to see and appreciate their uniqueness.
9. The relationship between SI and number of roommates was even stronger when the two participants who reported living with a romantic partner were deleted ($r = .35$). Treating living arrangements as a four-level categorical variable also indicated a significant effect on the SI scale, $F(3, 46) = 3.56$, $p < .05$, but not on any of the other measures.

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