Sri Lanka Institute of Information Technology



BUG BOUNTY REPORT - 10

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Report Details

Report # - 10

Domain - https://soundcloud.com

Platform -bugcrowd.com

Scans performed - Recon-ng scan

Nmap scan

Wafw00f scan

Dotdotpwn scan

Nikto scan

Sqlmap scan

Manual scanning using Wapplyzer

Text injection

File upload vulnerability testing

Command injection

Nslookup

Metasploit scan

Zap scan

Nmap scan

Using nmap scan all the open ports in the target can be identified.

```
(kali@ kali)-[~]
$ sudo nmap -sS -T4 soundcloud.com
[sudo] password for kali:
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-05-02 11:53 EDT
Nmap scan report for soundcloud.com (13.33.88.55)
Host is up (0.014s latency).
Other addresses for soundcloud.com (not scanned): 13.33.88.75 13.33.88.80 13.33.88.85
rDNS record for 13.33.88.55: server-13-33-88-55.sin2.r.cloudfront.net
Not shown: 997 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT STATE SERVICE
25/tcp open smtp
80/tcp open http
443/tcp open https
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 5.58 seconds
```

No unusual ports are open.

But Smtp port 25 is vulnerable when it's opened, because it lacks authentication and encryption.

Let's see if we can establish a connection on port 25 using Metasploit tool.

Nikto scan

```
Ciphers: 113_Abs_178_50M_SIMA29b
Insoer: (**CREMO-GlobalSign no-sa/CN-GlobalSign GCC R3 DV Tis CA 2020

**Mossage: Multiple IP addresses found: 13,33.88.88, 13.33.88.85, 13.33.88.85, 13.33.88.75

**Start Time: 1024-05-02 11:50:08 (GNT-4)

**Street with header: 1.1 f375d87611123aa47c0062625220s04.cloudfront.net (Cloudfront)
Unicomon header **x-pants: found, with contents: distant-towel
Unicomon header **x-acch- found, with contents: distant-towel
Unicomon header **x-acch- found, with contents: landSidn_BSI-myddMXCS#UsF0100qLa_Hf2PS#10C_h_lCifdDexAw--
Unicomon header **x-acc-f-id* found, with contents: SINX-P0
Unicomon header **x-acc-f-id* found, with contents: sinxBidn_BSI-myddMXCS#UsF0100qLa_Hf2PS#10C_h_lCifdDexAw--
Unicomon header **x-acc-f-id* found, with contents: sinxBidn_BSI-myddMXCS#UsF0100qLa_Hf2PS#10C_h_lCifdDexAw--
Unicomon header **server-liming* found, with contents: sinxBidn_BSI-myddMXCS#UsF0100qLa_Hf2PS#10C_h_lCifdDexAw--
Unicomon header **server-liming* found, with contents: sinxBidn_BSI-myddMXCS#UsF0100qLa_Hf2PS#10C_h_lCifdDexAw--
Unicomon header **server-liming* found, with contents: sinxBidn_BSI-myddMXCS#UsF0100qLa_Hf2PS#10C_h_lCifdDexAw--

**The Stochest-Type-Options header is not prosent.**

**The X-Content-Type-Options header is not prosent.**

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**All CGI directories **found*, use **C none* to test none*

**All CGI directories **found*, use
```

Scan results:

• The site uses SSL and Expect -CT header is not present.

The "expect-CT" header is a security feature that helps websites, and their users avoid the risks associated with incorrectly issued SSL certificates.

It supports transparency and accountability when issuing SSL certificates, which improves overall web security.

There are some issues/disadvantages occurred when the "expect-CT" header is absent:

- The protection against the mis issuing of SSL certificates will be low.
- Mismanagement of SSL certificates.

• No trust and security

But the absence of "expected-CT" header is not a huge vulnerability or a security issue in a website.

• The X-content-Type-options header is not set.

Wafw00f

Used to identify the type of WAF that is used to protect the web application.

The WAF used is Cloudfront.

Nslookup

```
(kali@kali)-[~]
$ nslookup soundcloud.com
Server: 192.168.8.1
Address: 192.168.8.1#53

Non-authoritative answer:
Name: soundcloud.com
Address: 13.33.88.80
Name: soundcloud.com
Address: 13.33.88.85
Name: soundcloud.com
Address: 13.33.88.55
Name: soundcloud.com
Address: 13.33.88.75
```

The relevant ip address of the domain is found.

Dotdotpwn

Dotdotpwn is a directory traversal checker.

```
= TRAVERSAL ENGINE =====
 [+] Creating Traversal patterns (mix of dots and slashes)
 [+] Multiplying 6 times the traversal patterns (-d switch)
 [+] Creating the Special Traversal patterns
 [+] Translating (back)slashes in the filenames
 [+] Adapting the filenames according to the OS type detected (unix)
 [+] Including Special sufixes
[+] Traversal Engine DONE ! - Total traversal tests created: 11028
                  TESTING RESULTS =======]
 [+] Ready to launch 3.33 traversals per second
[+] Press Enter to start the testing (You can stop it pressing Ctrl + C)
[*] HTTP Status: 400 | Testing Path: http://soundcloud.com:80/../etc/passwd
 [*] HTTP Status: 400 | Testing Path: http://soundcloud.com:80/../etc/issue
 [*] HTTP Status: 400 | Testing Path: http://soundcloud.com:80/../../etc/passwd
[*] HTTP Status: 400 | Testing Path: http://soundcloud.com:80/../../etc/issue
 [*] HTTP Status: 400 | Testing Path: http://soundcloud.com:80/../../etc/passwd
              HTTP Status: 400 | Testing Path: http://soundcloud.com:80/../../etc/issue
          HTTP Status: 500 | Testing Path: http://soundcloud.com:80/..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc
        HTTP Status: 400 | Testing Path: http://soundcloud.com:80/. %cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc..%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc...%cl%lc
                                                               Testing Path: http://soundcloud.com:80/.,%c1%af.,%c1%af.,%c1%af.,%c1%af.,%c1%af.,%c1%afetc%c1%afissue
           HTTP Status: 400
```

The scan results returned status codes within the range 400 (400-499). It shows a client error.

Vulnerable paths were found.

Metasploit

```
msf6 > search smtp
Matching Modules
                                                                          Disclosure Date Rank
                                                                                                           Check Description
        Name
      exploit/linux/smtp/apache_james_exec
                                                                          2015-10-01
                                                                                               normal
                                                                                                            Yes
                                                                                                                    Apache James Serv
       auxiliary/server/capture/smtp
                                                                                               normal
                                                                                                                    Authentication Ca
       auxiliary/scanner/http/gavazzi_em_login_loot
                                                                                               normal
                                                                                                                    Carlo Gavazzi Ene
p Plant Database
     exploit/unix/smtp/clamav_milter_blackhole
exploit/windows/browser/communicrypt_mail_activex
                                                                          2007-08-24
                                                                                               excellent No
                                                                                                                    ClamAV Milter Bla
                                                                          2010-05-19
                                                                                                                    CommuniCrypt Mail
                                                                                                           No
      exploit/linux/smtp/exim_gethostbyname_bof
exploit/linux/smtp/exim4_dovecot_exec
                                                                          2015-01-27
                                                                                                                    Exim GHOST (glibc
                                                                          2013-05-03
                                                                                                                    Exim and Dovecot
                                                                                                           No
       exploit/unix/smtp/exim4_string_format
                                                                          2010-12-07
                                                                                                           No
                                                                                                                    Exim4 string_form
       auxiliary/client/smtp/emailer
exploit/linux/smtp/haraka
                                                                                                                    Generic Emailer (
                                                                                               normal
                                                                                                           No
                                                                                                                    Haraka SMTP Comma
                                                                          2017-01-26
                                                                                                           Yes
   10 exploit/windows/http/mdaemon_worldclient_form2raw
11 exploit/windows/smtp/ms03_046_exchange2000_xexch50
                                                                          2003-12-29
                                                                                                                    MDaemon WorldClie
                                                                                                           Yes
                                                                          2003-10-15
                                                                                                                    MS03-046 Exchange
                                                                                               good
                                                                                                            Yes
```


Search for smtp.

Use the module "fuzzer" to fuzz the smtp service and use "smtp_enum" to enumerate the usernames.

```
msf6 auxiliary(
                                       ) > set RHOSTS soundcloud.com
RHOSTS ⇒ soundcloud.com
msf6 auxiliary(
    13.33.88.85:25 - Connection reset by peer
[*] 13.33.88.85:25
                         - Fuzzing with iteration 1
    13.33.88.85:25
                         - Connection reset by peer
 13.33.88.85:25
                         - Fuzzing with iteration 2
    13.33.88.85:25
                         - Connection reset by peer
13.33.88.85:25
                         - Fuzzing with iteration 3
    13.33.88.85:25
                         - Connection reset by peer
    13.33.88.85:25
                         - Fuzzing with iteration 4
                         - EOFError
    13.33.88.75:25
 [*] 13.33.88.75:25
                         - Fuzzing with iteration 97
    13.33.88.75:25
                         - EOFError
[*] 13.33.88.75:25
                         - Fuzzing with iteration 98
    13.33.88.75:25
                         - EOFError
[*] 13.33.88.75:25
                         - Fuzzing with iteration 99
    13.33.88.75:25
                         - EOFError
 [*] 13.33.88.75:25
                         - Fuzzing with iteration 100
 [*] soundcloud.com:25
                         - Scanned 4 of 4 hosts (100% complete)
 Auxiliary module execution completed
msf6 auxiliary(
                                      ) >
```

Fuzzing failed due to connection time out indicating inability to enumerate the service. Fuzzing attempts are blocked by the server.

Wapplyzer



These are the technologies used.

Core.js is used and when checked against vulnerabilities, it shows that there is no direct vulnerability related to this version.

Snyk Vulnerability Database > npm > core-js > core-js@3.6.4

core-js@3.6.4 vulnerabilities


Standard library

Direct Vulnerabilities

No direct vulnerabilities have been found for this package in Snyk's vulnerability database. This does not include vulnerabilities belonging to this package's dependencies.

File upload vulnerability

If a .php file can be uploaded from the file uploading facility, there is a possibility to upload and execute a reverse shell php code.



No vulnerability found.

Sqlmap

With the use of this scan, we can identify whether a sql injection can be done or not.

```
y
[12:59:28] [INFO] testing 'Generic UNION query (NULL) - 1 to 10 columns'
[12:59:37] [WARNING] GET parameter 'q' does not seem to be injectable
[12:59:37] [CRITICAL] all tested parameters do not appear to be injectable. Try to increase you suspect that there is some kind of protection mechanism involved (e.g. WAF) maybe you itch '--random-agent'
[12:59:37] [WARNING] your sqlmap version is outdated
[*] ending @ 12:59:37 /2024-05-02/
```

There is no injection vulnerability in the above web application.

Recon ng

here the recon-ng will be used to find all the sub domains in the target.

```
[recon-ng][bb1][hackertarget] > options set SOURCE soundcloud.com
SOURCE ⇒ soundcloud.com
[recon-ng][bb1][hackertarget] > run
SOUNDCLOUD.COM
[*] Country: None
[*] Host: soundcloud.com
[*] Ip_Address: 18.154.185.39
[*] Latitude: None
[*] Longitude: None
[*] Notes: None
[*] Region: None
[*] Country: None
    Host: o13.account.soundcloud.com
    Ip_Address: 149.72.185.227
    Latitude: None
    Longitude: None
    Notes: None
    Region: Non
```

```
Ip_Address: 167.89.58.174
  Latitude: None
  Longitude: None
  Notes: None
*] Region: None
*] Country: None
*] Host: o129.mail.announcements.soundcloud.com
*] Ip_Address: 167.89.58.175
*] Latitude: None
*] Longitude: None
*] Notes: None
*] Region: None
*] Country: None
*] Host: o237.mail.announcements.soundcloud.com
*] Ip_Address: 167.89.55.144
*] Latitude: None
*] Longitude: None
*] Notes: None
*] Region: None
*] Country: None
*] Host: o238.mail.announcements.soundcloud.com
  Ip_Address: 167.89.106.201
  Latitude: None
  Longitude: None
  Notes: None
   Region: None
```


```
SUMMARY

[*] 51 total (51 new) hosts found.
[recon-ng][bb1][hackertarget] >
```

51 total subdomains found.


Text injection

An arbitrary string value is appended to the URL to see whether the web application is vulnerable towards a text injection.



If the entered text is reflected on the error response of the web page, there is a possibility to inject malicious content.

If not, the web application is safe.




No text injection vulnerability can be found.

Command injection

The query that is used for searching is used against this vulnerability.

The "whoami" command is appended to the url



No command injection vulnerability can be found.

Zap scan

Risk=High, Confidence=High (1)

https://soundcloud.com (1)

PII Disclosure (1)

► GET https://soundcloud.com/dj_bennett/vois-sur-ton-chemin-techno

Risk=Medium, Confidence=High (1)

http://soundcloud.com (1)

Content Security Policy (CSP) Header Not Set (1)

► GET http://soundcloud.com

Risk=Low, Confidence=High (2)

https://soundcloud.com (1)

Strict-Transport-Security Header Not Set (1)

► GET https://soundcloud.com/george-ezra/green-green-grass

http://soundcloud.com (1)

Server Leaks Version Information via "Server" HTTP Response Header Field (1)

► GET http://soundcloud.com

Risk=Low, Confidence=Medium (3)

https://soundcloud.com (1)

Application Error Disclosure (1)

► GET https://soundcloud.com/xbox-app

http://soundcloud.com(2)

Cross-Domain JavaScript Source File Inclusion (1)

► GET http://soundcloud.com

X-Content-Type-Options Header Missing (1)

► GET http://soundcloud.com

Risk=Low, Confidence=Low (1)

http://soundcloud.com (1)

<u>Timestamp Disclosure - Unix (1)</u>

► GET http://soundcloud.com

Risk=Informational, Confidence=Medium (2)

http://soundcloud.com (2)

Modern Web Application (1)

► GET http://soundcloud.com

User Agent Fuzzer (1)

► GET http://soundcloud.com/alvinrisk

Summary of zap scan:

- PII disclosure: PII data can be used to identify an individual therefore maintaining the data securely can mitigate risks.
- Content security policy (CSP) header not set:it works an an extra layer of security which should be set and configured correctly.
- Strict-transport-security header not set.
- Server leaks version information via "server" HTTP response header fieldwith the use of leaked data the attackers can exploit the vulnerable parts of the server.
- Application error disclosure: the warning messages disclose sensitive information which can be used to launch attacks by the attackers. A mechanism can be introduced which reference the errors so it can solve this issue.
- Cross-domain javascript source file inclusion it's a warning. Happened when the external javascript is not validated.
- X-Content-Type-Option header is not set- allows to perform MIME-sniffing on the response body of old versions of chrome.
- Time stamp disclosure: