

# Trustful Action Suggestion in Human Agent Interaction

[Extended Abstract]

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## ABSTRACT

This paper provides a sample of a  $\LaTeX$  document which conforms, somewhat loosely, to the formatting guidelines for ACM SIG Proceedings. It is an *alternate* style which produces a *tighter-looking* paper and was designed in response to concerns expressed, by authors, over page-budgets. It complements the document *Author's (Alternate) Guide to Preparing ACM SIG Proceedings Using  $\LaTeX_2\epsilon$  and Bib $\TeX$* . This source file has been written with the intention of being compiled under  $\LaTeX_2\epsilon$  and Bib $\TeX$ .

The developers have tried to include every imaginable sort of “bells and whistles”, such as a subtitle, footnotes on title, subtitle and authors, as well as in the text, and every optional component (e.g. Acknowledgments, Additional Authors, Appendices), not to mention examples of equations, theorems, tables and figures.

To make best use of this sample document, run it through  $\LaTeX$  and Bib $\TeX$ , and compare this source code with the printed output produced by the dvi file. A compiled PDF version is available on the web page to help you with the ‘look and feel’.

## CCS Concepts

•Computing methodologies  $\rightarrow$  Cognitive science; Intelligent agents; Modeling methodologies; Agent / discrete models; Cooperation and coordination;

## Keywords

ACM proceedings;  $\LaTeX$ ; text tagging

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

The *proceedings* are the records of a conference. ACM seeks to give these conference by-products a uniform, high-quality appearance. To do this, ACM has some rigid requirements for the format of the proceedings documents: there is a specified format (balanced double columns), a specified set of fonts (Arial or Helvetica and Times Roman) in certain specified sizes (for instance, 9 point for body copy), a specified live area ( $18 \times 23.5$  cm [ $7'' \times 9.25''$ ]) centered on the page, specified size of margins (1.9 cm [ $0.75''$ ]) top, (2.54 cm [ $1''$ ]) bottom and (1.9 cm [ $0.75''$ ]) left and right; specified column width (8.45 cm [ $3.33''$ ]) and gutter size (.83 cm [ $.33''$ ]).

The good news is, with only a handful of manual settings<sup>1</sup>, the  $\LaTeX$  document class file handles all of this for you.

The remainder of this document is concerned with showing, in the context of an “actual” document, the  $\LaTeX$  commands specifically available for denoting the structure of a proceedings paper, rather than with giving rigorous descriptions or explanations of such commands.

## 2. BACKGROUND

Before discussing related work and our solution to the problem, we will present the main concepts that will be mentioned in the rest of this report, specifically regarding trust and reputation.

### 2.1 Trust

Trust is regarded throughout the literature as one of the fundamental components of human society, being essential in cooperative and collaborative behaviour, having been studied in a multitude of disciplines, from Psychology and Sociology, to Philosophy and Economy[?, ?, ?]. For that reason, it is no wonder that it acquired a very large number of different definitions throughout the years of study, causing the problem of not existing a consensus on a definition of

<sup>1</sup>Two of these, the `\numberofauthors` and `\alignauthor` commands, you have already used; another, `\balancecolumns`, will be used in your very last run of  $\LaTeX$  to ensure balanced column heights on the last page.

trust[?]. In the scope of this project, the most relevant start for our discussion is the dyadic definition of trust: ‘an orientation of an actor (the **truster**) toward a specific person (the **trustee**) with whom the actor is in some way interdependent’ (taken from [?]), as we want to focus on interpersonal relationships. This definition has been expanded throughout the literature, often adapted to fit the context or scope of the work, but three main definitions are highlighted in computational trust:

- First, Gambetta[?] defined trust as follows: ‘Trust is the *subjective probability* by which an individual, A, *expects* that another individual, B, performs a given action on which its *welfare depends*’ (taken from [?]). This is accepted by most authors as one of the most classical definitions of trust, but it is too restrictive with its uni-dimensionality, as it only refers to predictability of the trustor, and does not take into account competence in executing the given action.
- Marsh[?] was the first author to formalize trust as a measurable Computational Concept, continuing the perspective of reducing trust to a numerical value, set by Gambetta[?], but also adding that: X trusts Y if, and only if, ‘X *expects* that Y will behave according to X’s best interest, and will not attempt to harm X’ (taken from [?]). This definition does not represent other parts of trust, such as the notion that trustor must ascertain some risk from delegating the action to the trustee.
- Castelfranchi and Falcone then introduced a Cognitive aspect to Computational Trust[?]. They define trust as the mental state of the trustor and the action in which the trustor refers upon the trustee to perform. This is the definition of trust that we will adopt throughout the rest of the report, as it represents a vision of trust that takes into account the trustor set of beliefs and intentions, approaching it to an agent’s cognitive model, while also linking trust to the action being performed, as one might trust another for certain types of actions and not for others (e.g. I may trust my squire to polish my sword, but not to swing it).

### 2.1.1 Castelfranchi and Falcone’s Trust

More explicitly, Castelfranchi and Falcone[?] state that trust is a conjunction of three concepts:

- A *mental attitude* or (pre)disposition of the agent towards another agent; this is represented by beliefs about the trustees’ qualities and defects;
- A *decision* to rely upon another, and therefore making the trustor ‘vulnerable’ to the possible negative actions of the trustee;
- The *act* of trusting another agent and the following behaviour of counting on the trustee to perform according to plan.

By describing trust as a mental attitude it is also implied that: ‘Only a cognitive agent can trust another agent; only an agent endowed with goals and beliefs’[?].

From this definition we should also address one important component, **Delegation**, which happens when an agent (X) needs or likes the action delegated to another agent (Y), so X includes it in his plans, therefore relying on Y. X plans to achieve his goal through Y. So, he formulates in his mind a multi-agent plan with a state or action goal being Y’s delegated[?].

## 2.2 Reputation and Image

*Reputation* is also a concept that appears very often linked with trust in the literature, specially since recent models created for representing trust have been focused on Multi-Agent Systems (MASs) (see [?, ?, ?, ?, ?]), where more recent trust models have been developed to also include reputation as a source of trust.

An agent is not influenced only by their own beliefs about the subject, the *Image*, but also by what other agents say about it, its *Reputation*.

We describe Image and Reputation as introduced by Sabater in [?]: Image is defined as the agent’s personal belief about a certain property of the target agent, be it a physical, mental or social trait. Reputation is a meta-belief about an impersonal evaluation of the target, in other words, it is the belief on the evaluation being circulated about the target. On a more concrete level, reputation is separated between *shared evaluation* and *shared voice*. Consider that an agent has beliefs about how other agents evaluate a certain target, if in a set of agents these beliefs converge to a value (e.g. ‘good’ or ‘bad’) we can say that there exists a shared evaluation of the target. It is important to note that all sharing agents are known and well defined. A shared voice is a belief that another set of agents themselves believe that an evaluation of the target exists. In other words, it is the belief that a group of agents will consistently report that a voice exists. These meta-beliefs are considered important as one is not required to believe that other’s evaluation is correct, but might still believe that it exists.

The mental decisions regarding reputation can be categorized as follows:

- Epistemic decisions: accepting trust beliefs to update or generate a given image or reputation;
- Pragmatic-Strategic decisions: using trust beliefs to decide how to behave towards other agents;
- Memetic decisions: transmitting trust beliefs to others.

This difference of possible decisions allows to describe how one may transmit reputation without having the responsibility for the credibility or truthfulness of the content transmitted, as one does not have to commit to accepting the reputation value, and just say that the rumour exists.

## 2.3 Game Theory

Game Theory is the field of study that defines and analyses situations involving conflict or cooperation between multiple intelligent decision makers. These situations are called a game, and they are distilled to their core argument, by defining the limited and simple set of actions that the players may perform, and how do they affect the players. It then analyses the decision strategies for each player, by assuming that both will try to maximise their payoff (how much the player gains) with their action. To better explain the concepts we want to present, we will introduce one of the most

	$C_2$	$D_2$
$C_1$	2,2	0,3
$D_1$	3,0	1,1

**Table 1: Prisoner’s Dilemma Payoff Matrix**

common exemplary models of Game Theory, the Prisoner’s Dilemma.

### 2.3.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma

The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a two player game and is usually described as follows:

Two criminal partners are arrested and locked in separate cells with no way of communicating with each other. They are then questioned separately, where they are given 2 options, betray the other prisoner by testifying against him, or remain silent, with the following outcomes:

- If both prisoners betray each other, both get 2 years in prison;
- If one of them betrays and the other remains silent, the betrayer goes free and the other gets 3 years in prison;
- If both remain silent, both get just 1 year in prison;

We can represent betraying as *Defecting* (D), and staying silent as *Cooperating* (C), and name the players *player1* and *player2*. So the game’s possible outcomes can be represented by a payoff matrix, like the one in Table 1, where each entry represents a tuple of the form (*player1* payoff, *player2* payoff). As the goal is to not get years in prison, the payoffs correspond to *Max years in prison – years got in prison*.

In the game we can say that *Defecting dominates Cooperating*, as for any action that the adversary player may choose, *Defecting* always gives a better payoff for the individual player[?].

## 3. RELATED WORK

Computational Trust research has been focused on modelling trust in MASs, specially on open e-commerce environments[?, ?, ?, ?], with at least 106 models created[?], since the formalization of trust as a measurable property by Marsh in 1994 [?]. We will present some trust models from which we will take inspiration while creating our own, and some work done in measuring trust in Human-Robot Interaction (HRI).

### 3.1 Trust Models

For related work concerning Trust Models we will focus on **Cognitive** Trust Models, first introduced by Castelfranchi and Falcone[?], which are defined by measuring trust on the strength of an agent’s beliefs and the changes enacted through the consequent act of trusting. We want to focus on modelling trust through multiple dimensions, with the intent of having trust depend on the action to perform, context and agent performing the task and having these dimensions represented explicitly in the model, something that is not possible with **Numerical** models, like the one introduced by [?].

#### 3.1.1 Castelfranchi and Falcone’s model

Having developed the concept of Cognitive Trust Models, this author’s model is generally regarded as a classical basis for most other authors, and while we will not use the entirety of this model, it is worth describing, as it was also a source of inspiration to other authors referenced in this report. The model is characterised around their definition referred in Section 2.1.1, through a central core, composed by a five-part relation, between:

- The trustor (**X**);
- The trustee (**Y**);
- The context where they are inserted in (**C**);
- A task ( **$\tau$** ) defined by the pair  $(\alpha, \rho)$ , where  $\alpha$  is the action entrusted to the trustee, that possibly produces an outcome  $\rho$ , contained in the goal of X ( $g_x$ );
- The goal of the trustor ( **$gx$** ).

More shortly represented by equation 1.

$$TRUST(X\ Y\ C\ \tau\ g_x) \quad (1)$$

This defines Trust as goal-oriented, contextual, and multi-dimensional, as from the point of view of the trustor, it varies not only on the trustee, but also from the overall context, the action that is being delegated, and the particular goal of the trustor. For example, if the goal of the trustor is simple to perform and not very critical to him, he may be more willing to delegate the task, and trust another agent to perform such task. Adjustments can be attached to this core adjusting better to the context in which it may be used. For instance, one may add an authoritative third party element to the relation in supervised security applications.

The model also conceptualizes **Expectation** as a belief of when agent X awaits for  $\rho$  to happen when an action  $\alpha$  trusted to Y is being performed, formalized in first order logic in equation 2.

$$(Expectation\ X\ \rho) \implies (Bel_x^{t'}(will-be-true^{t''}\ \rho)) \wedge (Goal_x^{Period(t', t''')}(KnowWhether_X(\rho\ OR\ Not\ \rho)^{t''})) \quad (2)$$

This can be used to establish what expectations the user should have in the agent, whether initial or constructed during interaction, and provide an additional measure to weight the importance of certain agent functions and actions.

As stated in the definition (Section 2.1.1) the mental attitude of the trustor X is defined by beliefs of the qualities (and faults) of Y. Therefore we can quantify the strength of our belief in a certain quality through its **Degree of Credibility (DoC)**, which is defined by a function **F** that takes all different belief sources for this quality, as shown in equation 3, where for a source  $sj$ ,  $Str_j$  represents the value of the source and  $Qual-i_{sjY}(\tau)$  the value of quality  $i$  of agent Y provided by the source in performing task  $\tau$ .

$$DoC_X(Qual-i_{(s1, \dots, sn), Y}(\tau)) = F_{X, Y, \tau}(Bel_X(Str_1 Qual-i_{s1Y}(\tau)), Bel_X(Str_2 Qual-i_{s2Y}(\tau)), \dots, Bel_X(Str_n Qual-i_{snY}(\tau))) \quad (3)$$

$F_{X, Y, \tau}$  associates the *strenght-of-sources* ( $Str_j$ ) and *quality-values* ( $Qual-i_{sjY}(\tau)$ ) with a probability curve. It should return a matrix with two columns, with an amount of rows corresponding to the number of quality values selected out

of the received as input (since not all values must or should be used, and some may be integrated into a single value), and the first column should contain these values associated with their normalized probabilities in the second column (the probabilities sum should be 1).

For example, consider that we want agent X's DoC regarding Y's ability to clean:

- We have two sources about Y's ability to clean:
  1. X saw Y once clean quite well, but long ago, so we could attribute  $Ability_{s1Y}(cleaning) = 0.8$  and  $Str_1 = 0.2$ ;
  2. Someone X considers reliable informs that Y performed poorly recently, so we attribute  $Ability_{s2Y}(cleaning) = 0.2s$  and  $Str_2 = 0.6$ ;
- So a possible result of  $DoC_X(Ability_Y(cleaning))$  is:

$$\begin{pmatrix} 0.8 & 0.25 \\ 0.2 & 0.75 \end{pmatrix}$$

Finally **Degree of Trust (DoT)** quantifies the Trust level agent X has in Y to perform task  $\tau$  according to the formula depicted in equation 4.

$$\begin{aligned} DoT_{XY\tau} = & c_{Opp} DoC_x[Opp_y(\alpha, \rho)] \times \\ & \times c_{Ability_y} DoC_x[Ability_y(\alpha)] \times \\ & \times c_{WillDo} DoC_x[WillDo_y(\alpha, \rho)] \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

Where:

- $DoC_x[Opp_y(\alpha, \rho)]$  is the DoC of X's beliefs about all contextual factors in which Y will act; in other words, the degree of Opportunity Y has to do  $\alpha$  and result in  $\rho$ ;
- $DoC_x[Ability_y(\alpha)]$  is the DoC of X's beliefs about Y's ability to perform  $\alpha$ ;
- $DoC_x[WillDo_y(\alpha, \rho)]$  is the DoC of X's beliefs concerning if Y's actually is going to perform  $\alpha$  with the result  $\rho$ ;
- $c_{Opp}$ ,  $c_{Ability_y}$  and  $c_{WillDo}$  are constants representing the weight of each DoC.

This model is the most abstract, as almost all of the implementation details are left aside, particularly how the beliefs are modelled and how to or even what should be a good quantification to the quality values for the agent. This provides a lot of liberty on how to contextualize the model, and for our modules such adaptability is interesting for our intent to try our modules in different scenarios.

### 3.1.2 Repage: A REputation and ImAGE model

This system was introduced in 2006 by Sabater et al.[?] and aims to establish two different aspects to trust modelling, Image and Reputation, as defined in Section 2.2. The representation for an evaluation are fuzzy sets, defined by a tuple of five positive numbers (summing to one), where each number corresponds to a value of probability (weights) traced directly to the following scale: *very bad (VB)*, *bad (B)*, *neutral (N)*, *good (G)*, *very good (VG)*. Additionally the strength of the belief is added to the tuple, so it can be represented like this  $\{w_1, w_2, \dots, w_5, s\}$ .

The architecture is composed by three main elements, a *memory*, a set of *detectors*, and the *analyser* (check Figure 1). Memory is composed by predicates that are conceptually organized in different levels of abstraction and are inter-connected by a network of dependencies that propagate changes and inferences through the various predicates. The predicates contain a fuzzy evaluation belonging to one of the following types (image, reputation, shared voice, shared evaluation, valued info, evaluation from informers, and outcomes), and refer to a certain agent performing a specific role. The detectors infer new predicates, remove non-useful ones and builds the dependency network.



**Figure 1: Repage architecture schematic (taken from [?])**

At the first level of the abstraction hierarchy we have the basis of information to infer predicates, *contracts*, *fulfilments* and *communication* (they are not themselves predicates, as no evaluation is attached). Contracts are agreements between two agents, while fulfilments are the results of the contract. Communication is the information about other agents that come from third parties. The second level is then constituted by inferences to an outcome, formed by a contract and its fulfilment, and valued information gathered from communications. This inferred predicates are not just tuples, they give an evaluation to the predicate, setting its belief strength.

In the next level we have two predicates: *shared voice* and *shared evaluation*. The former is inferred from communicated reputation, and the latter from communicated images.

The fourth level is composed from five types of predicates: *Candidate Image*, *Candidate Reputation*, *Image*, *Reputation* and *Confirmation*. The candidate predicates are Images and Reputations that do not have enough support yet. Special detectors turns them to fill image/reputations when a strength threshold is surpassed. Confirmation is the feedback to a communication, received from comparing it to the image of the target.

Finally the last abstractions level is composed of the predicates *cognitive dissonance* and *certainty*. Cognitive dissonance is a contradiction between relevant pieces of information that refer to the same target. This predicate may create instabilities in the mind of the individual, so the agent will most likely try to perform action in order to confirm the sources of this dissonance. Certainty represents full reliance on what the predicate asserts.

The last element is the analyser and its job is to propose actions in order to improve the accuracy of predicates in Repage and solve cognitive dissonances to produce certainty. The actions are proposed to the agent planner, leaving it to decide how to take this actions into account.

Image and Reputation are the predicates that provide a trust evaluation of a target, and as previously stated, they have a role, that represents two things: the agents interaction model, in other words, the actions that may affect to this evaluation, and a function that contextualizes the evaluative labels of *VB*, *B*, *N*, *G*, *VG*. The probability distribution of the values gives out a picture of the target interaction

forecast (e.g. a probability value of 0.5 to VB gives a 50% chance of the next interaction with the target being very bad).

The work described here is the only found that tries to establish an implementable architecture for a trust model, as most of the models created are purely theoretical. Furthermore, it fits to our goals of creating a trust assessment module, corresponding to the memory and detector components, and a trust decision module, corresponding to the analyser.

### 3.1.3 BC-logic: A Representation of Beliefs for Repage

Pinyol et al.[?] proposes an integration of the Repage model, introduced in the previous Section 3.1.2 with a BDI Agent[?]. While the BDI model is not relevant to us, their work specifies *BC*-logic, a belief first order logic that is capable of representing Repage predicate semantics and this is the part we will describe in the following paragraphs.

*BC*-logic is structured hierarchically, in a way that formulas from a certain first-order language lower in the hierarchy can be embedded in another language above as constants. This is written as  $[\phi]$ , with  $\phi$  being the formula of the lower language. The hierarchy is composed of three languages, starting with the base language,  $L_{basic}$ , that expresses the ontology and contains the symbols to represent the domain. Next there is  $L_{ag}$ , which contains symbols of the base language and special predicates to allow to reason about probability of formulas, about formulas communicated, and formulas believed by agents. Finally there is *BC*-language, the meta-logic language, with the aim to express statements about the agents' reasoning.  $L_{ag}$  and *BC*-language are sorted languages, in other words, its symbols and predicates are partitioned into sorts, each containing their own semantics. All languages contain the logical symbols  $\forall$ ,  $\exists$ ,  $\wedge$ ,  $\vee$ ,  $\neg$ , and  $\implies$ .

$L_{ag}$  contains four sorts:

- $S_D$ : represents application domain, including constants, functions and predicate symbols;
- $S_R$ : represents probabilities, including a set of constants,  $C_R$ , with a label written as  $\bar{r}$ , where  $r \in [0, 1] \cap Q$ ;  $Q$  being the set of rational numbers;
- $S_A$ : represents agent names, including a set of constants  $C_A = i_1, \dots, i_n$ , corresponding to the agents' identifiers;
- $S_F$ : represents formulas, including a set of constants  $C_F$ , which is built simultaneously with the construction of the language. This is done by adding the constant  $[\phi]$  for each  $\phi \in F_m(L_{basic})$ , and then, given a formula  $\Psi \in F_m(L_{ag})$  we also add  $[\Psi]$  to  $C_f$ .

Symbols in predicates are identified by their sorts, take for example a binary predicate  $B$ , it is written as  $B(S_A, S_F)$ , meaning that the first argument must be part of sort  $S_A$  and the second argument part of sort  $S_F$ .

The set of formulas  $F_m(L_{ag})$  has the following special predicates:

- $B(S_A, S_F)$ : An agent's belief towards a formula (e.g.  $B(i_c, [\text{sunny}(\text{Lisbon})])$ ); abbreviated to  $B_{S_A}(S_F)$ ;
- $Pr \leq (S_F, S_R)$ ,  $Pr \geq (C_F, C_R)$ : A lower/upper bound on probability of a formula (e.g.  $Pr \geq ([\text{sunny}(\text{Lisbon})], 0.8)$ );

$$\frac{Img_{i_c}(j_c, r, [V_{w_1}, \dots, V_{w_m}])}{B_{i_c}(pr \geq ([R_{rj_c}Tr_{w_1}, V_{w_1}]))} \quad \frac{Rep_{i_c}(j_c, r, [V_{w_1}, \dots, V_{w_m}])}{B_{i_c}(s(pr \geq ([R_{rj_c}Tr_{w_1}, V_{w_1}])))} \\ \frac{B_{i_c}(pr \geq ([R_{rj_c}Tr_{w_2}, V_{w_2}]))}{\dots} \quad \frac{B_{i_c}(s(pr \geq ([R_{rj_c}Tr_{w_2}, V_{w_2}])))}{\dots}$$

- $S(S_A, S_A, S_F)$ : The communication predicate, as stated in Repage (e.g.  $S(i_c, j_c, [\text{sunny}(\text{Lisbon})])$ ); abbreviated to  $S_{S_A, S_A}(S_F)$ .

*BC*-language contains five sorts:

- $S_R$ ,  $S_A$  and  $S_F$ : as defined above for  $L_{ag}$ ;
- $S_V$ : represents variable sequences;
- $S_T$ : represents ground term sequences;

Image and Reputation towards an agent  $j_c$ , playing the role  $r$  can then be represented by:

- Image:  $Img_{i_c}(j_c, r, [V_{w_1}, \dots, V_{w_m}])$
- Reputation:  $Rep_{i_c}(j_c, r, [V_{w_1}, \dots, V_{w_m}])$

with  $[V_{w_1}, \dots, V_{w_m}]$  being an abstracted set of evaluations in the belief, as while Repage maps evaluation from Very Bad to Very Good, this can be applied to any ordered mapping of  $m$  evaluations. As a simplification, the model summarizes the interaction model of the participating agents ( $i_c$  and  $j_c$ ) to a single action. Through this a mapping  $R_{r,i}$  can be defined between each role  $r$ , agent  $i_c$  and the action. A mapping  $Tr_{r,w_k}$  is also defined between each role  $r$  and label  $w_k$  to a formula written in  $L_{basic}$ .

Image and Reputation can also be represented as a set of beliefs:

The work goes into further detail regarding representing the relationship of Image and Reputation, addressing agent honesty and consistency in communicating reputation, and while interesting, it is not part of what we to model.

Overall *BC*-logic is an interesting approach to representing beliefs in the Repage model and we will most likely choose it for the model representation, as it is the most well developed that we found.

### 3.1.4 Sutcliffe and Wang's model

This work was published by Sutcliffe and Wang in 2012[?] and they built a trust model to figure out how cognitive social mechanisms emerge to follow Dunbar's Social Brain Hypothesis (SBH)[?], an evolutionary psychology theory that proposes that humans have a predisposition to build relationships in layers of decreasing intimacy. As trust has been acknowledged to be one of major component of human relationships, they demonstrate that simulating trust development and decay, through interactions and neglect, respectively, show the patterns predicted in SBH.

From the model standpoint, its main interesting feature is that agents develop trusting relationships between one another, affecting interaction frequency between agents, by preferring to pick those with already high trust value. Additionally the trust relationship degrades as time passes by, with variable speeds depending on the current relationship level, giving stronger ties a slower descent. All in all, the model provides a good tool to simulate multi agent social behaviour, and may be interesting to predict trust degradation in the agent, albeit its described application for social simulations is a bit far from our scope.

### 3.1.5 Discussion

Of the related work discussed here, we are going to base our solution on Repage and *BC*-logic, as described in their respective Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3. Repage fits well as a basis for our objectives, as it has the details of modelling trust already dealt with and leaves us the room to develop the analysis component that corresponds directly to the goal of this project. The choice was also made out of convenience, as no other work was found were implementable design was a concern.

## 3.2 The Perception and Measurement of Human-Robot Trust

Schaefer[?] presents a trust perception scale providing a way of extracting an accurate trust score from humans interacting with robots. The scale is composed of 40 items that can be ranked from 0 to 100, in 10 point intervals. The final result it then averaged by adding all the item values and divided by the total number of items (40).

While this work has been done specifically for HRI we believe that a sub-set of this items can be used for the features used in the cognitive model of the user's trust, further described in Section ?? . The items are listed in Table ?? in appendix ??.

## 4. CONCLUSIONS

This paragraph will end the body of this sample document. Remember that you might still have Acknowledgments or Appendices; brief samples of these follow. There is still the Bibliography to deal with; and we will make a disclaimer about that here: with the exception of the reference to the L<sup>A</sup>T<sub>E</sub>X book, the citations in this paper are to articles which have nothing to do with the present subject and are used as examples only.

## 5. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This section is optional; it is a location for you to acknowledge grants, funding, editing assistance and what have you. In the present case, for example, the authors would like to thank Gerald Murray of ACM for his help in codifying this *Author's Guide* and the .cls and .tex files that it describes.

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## APPENDIX

### A. HEADINGS IN APPENDICES

The rules about hierarchical headings discussed above for the body of the article are different in the appendices. In the **appendix** environment, the command **section** is used to indicate the start of each Appendix, with alphabetic order designation (i.e. the first is A, the second B, etc.) and a title (if you include one). So, if you need hierarchical structure *within* an Appendix, start with **subsection** as the highest level. Here is an outline of the body of this document in Appendix-appropriate form:

#### A.1 Introduction

### B. MORE HELP FOR THE HARDY

The sig-alternate.cls file itself is chock-full of succinct and helpful comments. If you consider yourself a moderately experienced to expert user of L<sup>A</sup>T<sub>E</sub>X, you may find reading it useful but please remember not to change it.