

1 **Structural barriers drive near-zero population-level effectiveness of HIV**
2 **prevention among people who inject drugs**

3 *A computational modelling study*

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16 **Abstract**

17 **Background:** Antiretroviral agents used for HIV prevention achieve efficacy exceeding 99% under trial
18 conditions, yet HIV incidence among people who inject drugs (PWID) remains disproportionately high. We
19 evaluated whether current prevention architectures permit sustained population-level protection for PWID,
20 or whether structural barriers limit effectiveness despite high pharmacological efficacy.

21 **Methods:** We developed a computational model integrating an eight-step HIV prevention cascade with
22 policy, healthcare access, and implementation barriers relevant to PWID. Monte Carlo simulations ($n =$
23 100,000 individuals per scenario) estimated the probability of achieving sustained protection under current
24 and counterfactual policy conditions. A stochastic avoidance failure model incorporated methamphetamine
25 prevalence trajectories and network density evolution to estimate outbreak probability. Sensitivity analyses
26 assessed robustness across parameter uncertainty. Outcomes were compared with men who have sex with
27 men (MSM) receiving identical pharmacological interventions.

28 **Findings:** Under current policy conditions, the probability of PWID achieving sustained HIV protection
29 approached zero (mean 0·0001%; 95% CI 0·0000–0·0002), despite assumed drug efficacy of 99%. Cascade
30 attrition occurred predominantly at early stages, with approximately 90% failing at awareness. Structural
31 and policy barriers accounted for more than 90% of total prevention failure, while biological constraints con-
32 tributed negligibly under observed conditions. In contrast, MSM achieved sustained protection probabilities
33 exceeding 15% under identical pharmacology. Stochastic avoidance modelling projected a 63% probability
34 of a major HIV outbreak among PWID within five years under current conditions. Even comprehensive
35 harm reduction scenarios achieved maximum sustained protection below 25%.

36 **Interpretation:** HIV prevention failure among PWID is primarily driven by structural and policy bar-
37 riers rather than pharmacological limitations. Highly efficacious agents cannot achieve population-level
38 impact when prevention cascades collapse at multiple points. Reliance on stochastic avoidance is inherently
39 unstable and predicts future outbreaks. Achieving meaningful prevention for PWID will require coordinated
40 policy and implementation reforms that address cascade attrition across all stages simultaneously.

41 **Funding:** None.

42 **Research in Context**

43 **Evidence before this study**

44 We searched PubMed for articles published from Jan 1, 2010, to Dec 1, 2024, using the terms “HIV pre-
45 vention”, “people who inject drugs”, “PrEP”, “injection drug use”, “structural barriers”, and “HIV out-
46 break”. Published evidence shows that people who inject drugs (PWID) have substantially lower uptake
47 and persistence of pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) than men who have sex with men (MSM), despite com-
48 parable awareness in some settings. Multiple HIV outbreaks among PWID since 2015—including those
49 in Scott County, Indiana; Lawrence/Lowell, Massachusetts; and Cabell and Kanawha Counties, West Vir-
50 ginia—have occurred in contexts characterised by limited prevention infrastructure. The Bangkok Tenofovir
51 Study (2013) remains the only large randomised PrEP trial to enrol PWID. Although systematic reviews de-
52 scribe the role of criminalisation, stigma, and incarceration as barriers to HIV prevention for PWID, no prior
53 study has quantified the probability of achieving sustained population-level protection under current policy
54 conditions.

55 **Added value of this study**

56 This study applies a computational modelling framework to quantify how barriers operating across pathogen
57 biology, HIV testing algorithms, and prevention system architecture jointly shape HIV prevention outcomes
58 for PWID. We show that, under current policy conditions, the probability of sustained HIV protection among
59 PWID approaches zero despite assumed high pharmacological efficacy, with structural and policy barriers
60 accounting for the majority of prevention failure. By incorporating methamphetamine prevalence trajec-
61 tories and network density evolution, the study also provides quantitative estimates of the instability of
62 stochastic avoidance and the risk of future outbreaks. Comparison with MSM receiving identical pharmaco-
63 logical interventions demonstrates that observed disparities in prevention outcomes are driven by structural
64 context rather than biological or drug-related differences.

65 **1 Introduction**

66 Among the estimated 15.6 million people who inject drugs (PWID) globally, 17.8% are living with HIV—a
67 prevalence 22 times higher than the general population.¹ Despite three decades of prevention knowledge
68 and pharmacological innovations achieving ~99% efficacy, HIV continues to spread among PWID through
69 mechanisms that current prevention architecture cannot address. We propose that this failure results not
70 from individual behaviour or drug efficacy, but from compounding, nested structural barriers that create
71 conditions under which the probability of achieving epidemic control approaches zero.

72 The fundamental mathematical requirement for HIV prevention is $R_0=0$ —sustained protection such that
73 each infected individual transmits to zero others on average. This state requires uninterrupted pharmacolog-
74 ical coverage during all potential exposure events. For PWID, achieving $R_0=0$ requires not only efficacious
75 drugs but successful navigation of an 8-step prevention cascade: awareness, willingness, healthcare access,
76 disclosure of injection drug use, provider willingness to prescribe, adequate HIV testing, initiation of treat-
77 ment, and sustained engagement without interruption.

78 We hypothesized that barriers operating at three distinct levels—pathogen biology, HIV testing algo-
79 rithms, and architectural failures of the prevention system—create conditions in which the product of cas-
80 cade step probabilities approaches zero, rendering the probability of achieving $R_0=0$ vanishingly small under
81 current policy conditions, regardless of drug efficacy. This represents a fundamentally different prevention
82 landscape than that faced by men who have sex with men (MSM), where the same pharmacological inter-
83 ventions achieve substantial uptake and sustained protection.²

84 Critically, we propose that current HIV “prevention” among PWID functions primarily through stochas-
85 tic avoidance—probability-based prevention where transmission fails to occur due to random chance rather
86 than systematic intervention.^{3,4} This mechanism is time-limited; as network density increases through
87 methamphetamine-driven behavioral changes and forced geographic clustering, stochastic avoidance will
88 fail catastrophically, producing outbreaks like those documented in Scott County, Indiana;^{5,6} Lawrence/Lowell,
89 Massachusetts;^{7,8} and Cabell/Kanawha Counties, West Virginia.^{9,10}

90 This analysis develops quantitative models to: (1) calculate the probability that any PWID can achieve
91 sustained HIV protection under current policy; (2) decompose prevention failure into its constituent barrier
92 layers; (3) compare PWID outcomes to MSM receiving identical interventions; (4) predict the timeframe
93 for catastrophic failure of stochastic avoidance; and (5) estimate the effects of specific policy interventions

94 on prevention probability.

95 2 Methods

96 2.1 Theoretical Framework: Three-Layer Barrier Model

97 We conceptualize HIV prevention barriers as operating at three hierarchical levels, each imposing multi-
98 plicative penalties on cascade completion probability:

99 **Layer 1 (Pathogen Biology):** HIV establishes irreversible infection within 4–72 hours of mucosal
100 exposure and within minutes of parenteral inoculation. Once integration occurs, $R_0 > 0$ becomes permanent
101 regardless of subsequent intervention. This layer dictates the temporal window for effective prevention.

102 **Layer 2 (HIV Testing Failures):** Current HIV testing algorithms cannot reliably detect acute infection
103 before long-acting injectable PrEP (LAI-PrEP) initiation.^{11,12} Window periods range from 10–33 days for
104 RNA testing to 31–90 days for rapid point-of-care tests. LAI-PrEP delays HIV detection by median 98
105 days, during which 63% of breakthrough infections develop major integrase strand transfer inhibitor (INSTI)
106 resistance mutations.^{13,14}

107 **Layer 3 (Architectural Failures):** Structural barriers to prevention access operate through five mech-
108 anisms: (a) Policy—criminalization of drug use and incarceration, with consistent evidence of increased
109 HIV risk and disrupted care continuity;^{15,16} (b) Stigma—healthcare discrimination experienced by 78% of
110 PWID;^{17,18} (c) Infrastructure—prevention systems designed for MSM populations;¹⁹ (d) Research Exclusion—
111 systematic exclusion of PWID from HIV prevention trials;^{20,21} and (e) Machine Learning—algorithmic
112 deprioritization based on training data that underrepresents PWID by 120-fold.

113 2.2 Cascade Model Specification

114 We modeled LAI-PrEP implementation as an 8-step cascade where sustained protection requires successful
115 completion of all steps. Each step has a base probability (theoretical maximum under ideal conditions)
116 reduced by barrier-specific penalties:

$$P(\text{step}) = P_{\text{base}} \times \prod_{b \in \text{barriers}} (1 - \text{penalty}_b) \quad (1)$$

117 Cascade completion probability is the product of all step probabilities. Final $P(R_0=0)$ incorporates an

¹¹⁸ incarceration survival factor reflecting the probability of avoiding incarceration over a 5-year horizon:^{22,23}

$$P(R_0 = 0) = \prod_{i=1}^8 P(\text{step}_i) \times (1 - r_{\text{incarceration}})^{\text{years}} \times m_{\text{policy}} \quad (2)$$

¹¹⁹ where $r_{\text{incarceration}}$ is the annual incarceration rate (30% under current policy) and m_{policy} is a policy-
¹²⁰ dependent modifier.

¹²¹ 2.3 Monte Carlo Simulation

¹²² We simulated 100,000 individuals per policy scenario over a 5-year horizon. For each individual, we:
¹²³ (1) determined step-by-step cascade progression using barrier-adjusted probabilities; (2) applied annual
¹²⁴ incarceration probability; (3) classified individuals as achieving $R_0=0$ only if they completed all cascade
¹²⁵ steps and avoided incarceration for the full 5-year period.

¹²⁶ Eight policy scenarios ranged from Current Policy to Theoretical Maximum: Current Policy, Decrim-
¹²⁷ inalization Only, Decriminalization + Stigma Reduction, SSP-Integrated Delivery, Full Harm Reduction,
¹²⁸ Full HR + PURPOSE-4 Data, Full HR + ML Debiasing, and Theoretical Maximum.

¹²⁹ 2.4 Stochastic Avoidance Failure Model

¹³⁰ We developed a model predicting outbreak probability as a function of network density evolution:²⁴

$$\rho(t) = \rho_0 + m_{\text{meth}}(t) \times \mu \times 0.5 + h \times 0.3 + r \times 0.2 + m_{\text{meth}}(t) \times 0.15 \quad (3)$$

¹³¹ where $\rho(t)$ is network density at time t , ρ_0 is baseline network density, $m_{\text{meth}}(t)$ is methamphetamine
¹³² prevalence, μ is the methamphetamine network multiplier, h is housing instability rate, and r is incarceration
¹³³ rate.

¹³⁴ Methamphetamine prevalence was modeled as growing 2.5% annually from a 2018 baseline of 14.3%
¹³⁵ nationally,²⁵ with regional variation (Pacific Northwest: 35% baseline, Appalachia: 25%, Northeast Urban:
¹³⁶ 12% with 5%/year growth). Annual outbreak probability followed an exponential function above a critical
¹³⁷ network threshold of 0.35, with protective effects from syringe services program (SSP) coverage (up to 40%
¹³⁸ reduction) and opioid agonist therapy (OAT) coverage (up to 30% reduction).

139 **2.5 Sensitivity Analysis**

140 We conducted three sensitivity analyses: (1) Probabilistic sensitivity analysis (PSA) with 1,000 samples
141 varying all cascade parameters within $\pm 25\%$ or literature-derived bounds; (2) Tornado analysis identifying
142 parameters with greatest impact on 5-year outbreak probability; (3) Barrier removal analysis quantifying
143 incremental effects of eliminating specific barrier types.

144 **2.6 MSM Comparison**

145 We calculated MSM cascade completion using published uptake data² (PrEP awareness 90%, willingness
146 80%, healthcare access 85%, disclosure 85%, provider willing 90%, HIV testing adequate 95%, first injec-
147 tion 90%, sustained engagement 75%) with dramatically lower incarceration rates (5% vs 30% for PWID).
148 This represents the outcome of identical pharmacological intervention applied to a population included in
149 prevention trial design and implementation science frameworks.

150 **2.7 Data Sources**

151 Model parameters derived from: UNAIDS/WHO global estimates;¹ NHBS 2012–2018 survey data;²⁶ HPTN
152 083/084 resistance analyses;^{13,14} PURPOSE-2 resistance²⁷ CDC 2025 nPEP guidelines;¹¹ Van Handel et
153 al. vulnerable county analysis;²⁸ Stone et al. incarceration meta-analysis;^{16,22} Des Jarlais et al. outbreak
154 probability modeling;²⁴ and systematic reviews by Degenhardt et al.,¹ Strathdee et al.,²⁹ and DeBeck et
155 al.¹⁵

156 **3 Results**

157 **3.1 LAI-PrEP Cascade Failure Under Current Policy**

158 Under current policy, the 8-step LAI-PrEP cascade showed severe attrition (Figure 1). Step probabilities
159 were: awareness 10%, willingness 30%, healthcare access 35%, disclosure 25%, provider willing 35%, HIV
160 testing adequate 45%, first injection 45%, and sustained engagement 25%. The product of these probabilities
161 yielded a theoretical cascade completion rate of 0.00465%. After applying the 5-year incarceration survival
162 probability of 16.8%, final P(R₀=0) was 0.000782%—effectively zero.

163 In Monte Carlo simulation of 100,000 individuals, only 5 completed the full cascade, and all 5 were

¹⁶⁴ subsequently disrupted by incarceration, yielding an observed $P(R_0=0)$ of 0.00% (95% CI: 0.00–0.00). The
¹⁶⁵ majority of failures (89,939/100,000, 89.9%) occurred at the awareness step, indicating that 90% of PWID
¹⁶⁶ fail at the first barrier to prevention access.




Figure 1: LAI-PrEP Cascade Comparison: MSM vs PWID. Step-wise probabilities showing barrier-adjusted probability of completing each cascade step, demonstrating the dramatic disparity between MSM (cascade completion 21.1%) and PWID (cascade completion 0.0047%). Under current policy, 90% of PWID fail at the awareness step.

¹⁶⁷ 3.2 Three-Layer Barrier Decomposition

¹⁶⁸ Barrier decomposition attributed failures as follows: Layer 1 (Pathogen Biology) 0.0%, Layer 2 (HIV Test-
¹⁶⁹ ing) 6.8%, and Layer 3 (Architectural Failures) 93.2% (Figure 2). Within architectural failures, policy
¹⁷⁰ barriers (criminalization and incarceration) contributed 38.4%, infrastructure barriers (MSM-centric design)
¹⁷¹ 21.9%, stigma barriers (healthcare discrimination) 20.5%, machine learning barriers (algorithmic depriori-
¹⁷² tization) 8.2%, and research exclusion barriers 4.1%. These findings are consistent with extensive evidence
¹⁷³ demonstrating incarceration as a key structural driver of HIV transmission risk, treatment interruption, and
¹⁷⁴ prevention failure among PWID.¹⁶

¹⁷⁵ Notably, pathogen biology contributed 0.0% to prevention failure because cascade attrition was so severe
¹⁷⁶ that very few individuals reached the point where pathogen dynamics became relevant. The irreversibility of

¹⁷⁷ HIV integration within hours remains fundamental to the requirement for $R_0=0$, but this biological constraint
¹⁷⁸ is never tested when 90% fail at awareness.




Figure 2: Three-Layer Barrier Decomposition. Distribution of prevention failure across three layers: Pathogen Biology (0.0%), HIV Testing (6.8%), and Architectural Failures (93.2%). Within architectural failures: Policy (38.4%), Infrastructure (21.9%), Stigma (20.5%), Machine Learning (8.2%), and Research Exclusion (4.1%).

¹⁷⁹ 3.3 Policy Scenario Analysis

¹⁸⁰ Table 1 presents $P(R_0=0)$ across eight policy scenarios. Decriminalization alone increased $P(R_0=0)$ from
¹⁸¹ 0.00% to 0.14% (95% CI: 0.12–0.17). Adding stigma reduction achieved 0.44% (95% CI: 0.40–0.48). SSP-
¹⁸² integrated delivery with peer navigation reached 5.03% (95% CI: 4.89–5.16). Full harm reduction (SSP
¹⁸³ + OAT + housing + employment) achieved 9.42% (95% CI: 9.24–9.60). Incorporating PURPOSE-4 trial
¹⁸⁴ data (if PWID were included) increased this to 11.86% (95% CI: 11.66–12.06). Full harm reduction with
¹⁸⁵ algorithmic debiasing reached 18.62% (95% CI: 18.38–18.86). Theoretical maximum (all barriers removed)
¹⁸⁶ achieved 19.92% (95% CI: 19.67–20.17).




Figure 3: Policy Scenario Analysis. $P(R_0=0)$ across eight policy scenarios ranging from Current Policy (0.00%) to Theoretical Maximum (19.92%), with MSM comparison (16.30%) shown for reference. SSP-integrated delivery achieves 5.03%; full harm reduction achieves 9.42%; algorithmic debiasing adds 9.20 percentage points.

187 3.4 MSM vs PWID Disparity

188 The MSM population receiving identical LAI-PrEP intervention achieved $P(R_0=0)$ of 16.30% compared to
 189 0.00% for PWID—an extreme disparity spanning several orders of magnitude. This difference emerged
 190 entirely from structural factors: MSM cascade step probabilities ranged from 75–95% compared to 10–45%
 191 for PWID. MSM incarceration survival over 5 years was 77.4% compared to 16.8% for PWID. The 120-
 192 fold disparity in signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) for machine learning training data (MSM: 9,180 publications;
 193 PWID: 76.4) contributed to algorithmic deprioritization that compounds other barriers (Figure 5).




Figure 4: Signal-to-Noise Ratio Disparity and LOOCV Framework. Comparison of literature volume supporting machine learning algorithms: MSM (9,180 publications) vs PWID (76.4 publications, estimated)—a 120-fold disparity. The LOOCV framework shows systematic exclusion of PWID from HIV prevention trial evidence base, with PWID functioning as the “held-out test population” that was never validated.

194 3.5 Stochastic Avoidance Failure Prediction

195 The stochastic avoidance model predicted 63.3% probability of major outbreak within 5 years under current
 196 conditions (Figure 4). Median time to outbreak was 4.0 years. Cumulative probability reached 87.6% by
 197 10 years. Network density trajectory showed progression from 0.895 (2024) toward the critical threshold,
 198 driven by methamphetamine prevalence growth.

199 Regional variation was substantial (Table 2): Pacific Northwest (baseline methamphetamine 35%) showed
 200 88% 5-year outbreak probability with median 1.0 year; Appalachia (25% baseline, 4%/year growth) showed
 201 78% with median 2.0 years; Northeast Urban (12% baseline, 5%/year growth) showed 64% with median
 202 3.0 years; National Average showed 59% with median 4.0 years.

203 3.6 Sensitivity Analysis

204 Probabilistic sensitivity analysis confirmed robustness: observed $P(R_0=0)$ below the resolution of the sim-
 205 ulation (95% CI bounded at zero). Tornado analysis identified baseline outbreak probability (± 49.8 per-




Figure 5: Stochastic Avoidance Failure Prediction. Cumulative outbreak probability over time with 90% confidence interval, showing 63.3% probability by 5 years and 87.6% by 10 years. Time-to-outbreak distribution shows median 4.0 years with 80% credible interval.

206 percentage points), critical network threshold ($\pm 17.8\text{pp}$), and methamphetamine network multiplier ($\pm 16.6\text{pp}$)
 207 as most influential parameters. Barrier removal analysis showed that eliminating criminalization alone in-
 208 creased $P(R_0=0)$ from 0.00% to 0.23%; removing all architectural barriers achieved 19.88%.

209 4 Discussion

210 This modeling analysis demonstrates that the limited population-level impact of HIV prevention among
 211 people who inject drugs is not explained by drug efficacy or individual behaviour but by the structure of
 212 prevention systems within which these agents are deployed. Despite assuming near-perfect pharmacolog-
 213 ical effectiveness, the probability of PWID achieving sustained protection under current policy conditions
 214 approached zero. This finding reflects cumulative attrition across an eight-step prevention cascade, where
 215 moderate barriers at each stage compound to render effective prevention highly improbable.

216 A key insight is that biological constraints—such as rapid reservoir establishment following expo-
 217 sure—account for little of the observed prevention failure under real-world conditions. Instead, most in-
 218 dividuals fail to reach the point at which biological factors become relevant. Approximately 90% of PWID

219 were lost at the awareness stage alone, underscoring the dominance of structural and informational bar-
220 riers early in the cascade. This observation reframes the prevention challenge: improving pharmacology
221 alone is unlikely to produce meaningful population impact without parallel changes to policy and delivery
222 infrastructure.

223 Comparison with men who have sex with men, who receive identical pharmacological interventions,
224 illustrates the role of structural context. MSM benefit from prevention architectures designed around their
225 inclusion in clinical trials, regulatory approvals, and implementation studies. In contrast, PWID have largely
226 been excluded from these processes. The resulting disparity in sustained protection is therefore not biologi-
227 cal but architectural.

228 Our stochastic avoidance failure model provides further context. Periods of low HIV incidence among
229 PWID can occur through chance interruption of transmission chains rather than systematic prevention. How-
230 ever, this form of protection is inherently unstable. Increasing methamphetamine use—associated with
231 higher injection frequency, network connectivity, and bridging between populations—erodes stochastic pro-
232 tection and accelerates transition toward outbreak conditions. The projected probability of major outbreaks
233 within five years is consistent with recent epidemiological events and suggests that reliance on chance is
234 unlikely to remain viable.

235 Policy scenario analyses indicate that isolated interventions are insufficient. Decriminalisation alone or
236 incremental improvements in access modestly increase prevention probabilities but remain far below levels
237 required for epidemic control. Even comprehensive harm reduction strategies achieved sustained protection
238 below 25%, reflecting the multiplicative nature of cascade barriers. These findings align with prior analyses
239 identifying criminalization and incarceration as central mechanisms through which HIV prevention and
240 treatment are systematically undermined among PWID.^{15,16} and highlight the necessity of coordinated,
241 multi-level interventions addressing criminalisation, healthcare access, stigma, testing infrastructure, and
242 continuity of care.

243 This study has limitations. Cascade parameters were derived from heterogeneous sources, and real-
244 world dynamics may vary across regions. Network modelling simplifies complex social structures, and we
245 did not incorporate re-engagement following cascade failure. Nonetheless, extensive sensitivity analyses
246 demonstrated robustness of the central finding: under plausible parameterisations consistent with existing
247 data, sustained prevention for PWID remains unlikely without substantial structural change.

248 In conclusion, the gap between pharmacological efficacy and population-level effectiveness in HIV pre-

249 vention for PWID is driven by policy and implementation barriers rather than biological constraints. With-
250 out fundamental changes to prevention architecture, highly efficacious agents will continue to yield minimal
251 population impact, and reliance on stochastic avoidance will leave PWID vulnerable to future outbreaks.
252 Addressing this gap requires reframing HIV prevention not solely as a biomedical challenge but as a struc-
253 tural and policy imperative.

254 **5 Conclusions**

255 HIV prevention outcomes among people who inject drugs are shaped primarily by policy and implementa-
256 tion context rather than pharmacological limitations. Under current conditions, the probability of achieving
257 sustained HIV protection for PWID approaches zero despite the availability of highly efficacious prevention
258 agents. In contrast, the same pharmacological interventions achieve substantially higher population-level
259 effectiveness in settings where prevention architectures were designed to support access and continuity.

260 Current prevention strategies for PWID rely heavily on stochastic avoidance, a time-limited and unstable
261 mechanism that is increasingly undermined by methamphetamine-driven network densification. Modelling
262 results indicate that, without substantial structural change, the likelihood of future HIV outbreaks remains
263 high.

264 Achieving meaningful epidemic control will require coordinated reforms addressing criminalisation,
265 healthcare access, stigma, prevention infrastructure, research inclusion, and continuity of care. Without
266 such changes, improvements in pharmacological efficacy alone are unlikely to translate into population-
267 level prevention gains for PWID.

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365 **Data Sharing**

366 All model code, simulation outputs, and analysis scripts are available at <https://github.com/Nyx-Dynamics/hiv-prevention-master>. All model inputs derive from published literature or synthetic populations
367 requiring no individual-level data privacy protections.

369 **Declaration of Interests**

370 The author declares no competing interests.

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381 **Author Contributions**

382 ACD conceived the study, developed the theoretical framework, conducted the literature synthesis, built the
383 computational models, performed all analyses, and wrote the manuscript.