# Violence Motivated Migration:
## A cross-national analysis of the role of nonwartime violence in migration decision-making

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# Section 1

# Motivating Questions

How does violence affect migration?

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- We know a lot about *wartime violence* and migration

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- Yet, violence is a multi-faceted social phenomenon (Collins 2008)
  and has **features that exist along a spectrum that spans peace and war-times**

- Nonwartime violence is overlooked, so the full relationship eludes us

# Section 2

# A New Conceptualization: Violence Motivated Migration

# Aims, Assumptions, and Scope Conditions

- Conceptualization designed to incorporate violence into migration theory
- Types of migration: internal and international, out of one neighborhood into another
- Types of violence: systematic, wartime and nonwartime (restriction: *not* interpersonal)
  - e.g. hate crimes

Section 3

Proof of Concept

## Analytical approach

- First question: Do the specified features of violence correlate with migration aspirations?
  - ▶ If not, basic fundamental premise of conceptualization flawed
- Second question: Are the results driven by war or armed conflict?
  - ▶ If so, VMM is not more useful than current siloed research on refugees or economic migrants
  - ▶ If not, VMM is a valid conceptualization that should be further pursued

# Data

- Gallup World Poll
- International Labour Organisation
- Uppsala Conflict Data Program

# Question 1: Migration Aspirations

- Gallup World Poll (GWP)
- "How likely are you to move away or stay?"
- Over 844,000 valid observations over 160 countries, 2005-2019
- 14.2% say they are likely to move away

# VMM Subjective Perceptions of Violence

- Categorical Exclusion from Power
  - ▶ GWP: Is your community a good place for minorities?
- Perceived risk of violence
  - ▶ GWP: Safe walking alone at night in your community?
- Institutional trust in the mechanisms that deter violence
  - ▶ GWP: Trust local police in your community?
- Institutional trust in the mechanisms that pursue justice
  - ▶ GWP: Trust courts and judicial system?

# Controls

- Subjective economic prospects (GWP)
- Objective economic prospects (unemployment rate + change in annual unemployment rate)
- Individual-level factors
  - Age
  - Gender
  - Marital status
  - Survey year

# Question 2: Wartime and Armed Conflict

- Uppsala Conflict Geocoded Event Dataset (GED)
- Attached to GWP observations at the country-year level
- War $= 1000+$ battle deaths in survey year
- Armed conflict $= 25+$ battle deaths in survey year

# Progressively complex multilevel models

Multilevel models with migration aspirations as DV
Individuals nested within countries (89 obs.) within country-years (510 obs.)

- Model 1 = individual + economic
- Model 2 = Model 1 + safety + police + courts + minorities
- Model 3 = Model 2 + Armed Conflict
- Model 4 = Model 2 + War

Section 4

Findings

# Summary: Broad support for VMM framework

- Perception of community as bad place for minorities associated with a higher likelihood of migration aspirations ($\beta = .023$)
    - **Supports VMM 'Categorical Exclusion' feature**
- Those who do not feel safe are more likely to say they are likely to move away ($\beta = .017$)
    - **Supports VMM 'Safety' feature**
- Those who do not trust the police ($\beta = .030$) and those who do not trust the courts ($\beta = .014$) are more likely to have migration aspirations.
    - **Supports VMM 'Institutional Trust' features**

# Does war drive the results?

# Conclusion: A VMM Research Agenda

- Subjective perceptions of violence an important but overlooked aspect of migration aspirations
- Proof of concept: Enough evidence to continue pursuing line of inquiry
  - ▶ Case studies to unpack mechanisms
    - ★ e.g. Latin American countries - lots of migration, lots of violence, most countries technically not "at war" for long stretches of time
  - ▶ Examine the role of police brutality as a push factor in U.S. context
    - ★ Draw on Tolnay and Beck's (1992) work in understanding the role of lynching in the Great Migration
  - ▶ Police brutality vs. Structural failures
  - ▶ Deeper dive into Categorical Exclusion

# Thank You!

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# Appendix: Distribution of risk and trust

**Table 2. Distribution of risk and institutional trust in the Gallup World Poll sample**

**Trust in Local Police**

|  |  | Yes | No | Don't know |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Safety (Risk)** | **Yes** | (.452) | (.116) | (.024) |
|  | **No** | (.159) | (.206) | (.017) |
|  | **Don't know** | (.014) | (.006) | (.006) |

**Trust in Courts**

|  |  | Yes | No | Don't know |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Safety (Risk)** | **Yes** | (.330) | (.220) | (.044) |
|  | **No** | (.142) | (.212) | (.027) |
|  | **Don't know** | (.009) | (.010) | (.006) |

# Appendix: VMM coefficients Part I

**Table 4. Results from logistic regression models, dependent variable = migration aspirations**

| | Base Model | VMM Model | VMM Model with MAR score |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Coeff. (Std. Error) | Coeff. (Std. Error) | Coeff. (Std. Error) |
| Categorical Exclusion from Power | | | .168*** (.008) |
| Safety (ref = Yes) | | | |
| Don't Know | | -.079* (.033) | -.122** (.038) |
| No | | .216*** (.009) | .198*** (.010) |
| Trust in Police (ref = Yes) | | | |
| Don't Know | | .090*** (.022) | .035 (.026) |
| No | | .297*** (.009) | .281*** (.010) |
| Trust in Courts | | | |
| Don't Know | | -.171*** (.018) | -.192*** (.020) |
| No | | .073*** (.009) | .058*** (.009) |

# Appendix: Controls (VMM Models Part II)

| Economic Conditions (ref = Excellent) | Base Model | VMM Model | VMM Model with MAR score |
|---|---|---|---|
| Good | -.173*** | -.318*** | -.301*** |
| | (.025) | (.022) | (.024) |
| Fair | .063** | -.205*** | -.199*** |
| | (.023) | (.021) | (.023) |
| Poor | .361*** | -.015 | -.0002 |
| | (.024) | (.021) | (.023) |
| Year | .009*** | .025*** | .022*** |
| | (.002) | (.002) | (.002) |
| Age | .005*** | -.004*** | -.003* |
| | (.001) | (.001) | (.001) |
| Age squared | -.0006*** | -.0004*** | -.0004*** |
| | (.00002) | (.001) | (.00002) |
| Male | .130*** | .153*** | .152*** |
| | (.010) | (.008) | (.009) |
| Marital Status (ref = married) | | | |
| Single | .498*** | .358*** | .372*** |
| | (.013) | (.010) | (.011) |
| Separated/Divorced | .301*** | .314*** | .302*** |
| | (.025) | (.017) | (.019) |
| Widowed | .009 | .109*** | .065* |
| | (.030) | (.023) | (.026) |
| Intercept | -55.95*** | -50.93*** | -46.54*** |
| | (2.81) | (3.07) | (3.36) |
| N = | 574,658 | 483,975 | 388,444 |
| AIC | 490669 | 408090 | 329023 |

α < .001 '***' α < 0.001 '**' α < 0.01 '*' α < 0.05 '^' α < 0.1

# Appendix: VMM Coefficients with Wartime Variables Part I

**Table 5. Results from logistic regression models including wartime measures**
**dependent variable = migration aspirations**

| | VMM Model with MAR score (from Table 4) | Wartime | Wartime (t-1) | Armed Conflict | Armed Conflict (t-1) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Coeff. (Std. Error) | Coeff. (Std. Error) | Coeff. (Std. Error) | Coeff. (Std. Error) | Coeff. (Std. Error) |
| Wartime | | .237*** (.015) | | | |
| Wartime in previous year (t-1) | | | .275*** (.015) | | |
| Armed conflict | | | | .191*** (.010) | |
| Armed conflict in previous year (t-1) | | | | | .142*** (.010) |
| Categorical Exclusion from Power | .168*** (.008) | .174*** (.008) | .173*** (.008) | .163*** (.008) | .154*** (.008) |
| Safety (ref = Yes) | | | | | |
|     Don't Know | -.122** (.038) | -.126*** (.038) | -.128*** (.038) | -.116** (.038) | -.117** (.038) |
|     No | .198*** (.010) | .193*** (.010) | .192*** (.010) | .197*** (.010) | .196*** (.010) |
| Trust in Police (ref = Yes) | | | | | |
|     Don't Know | .035 (.026) | .040 (.026) | .039 (.026) | .044^ (.026) | .039 (.026) |
|     No | .281*** (.010) | .281*** (.010) | .281*** (.010) | .281*** (.010) | .281*** (.010) |
| Trust in Courts | | | | | |
|     Don't Know | -.192*** (.020) | -.190*** (.020) | -.190*** (.020) | -.182*** (.020) | -.187*** (.020) |
|     No | .058*** (.009) | .057*** (.010) | .058*** (.010) | .066*** (.010) | .064*** (.010) |

# Appendix: Controls in VMM Wartime models (VMM wartime models Part II)

| Economic Conditions (ref = Excellent) | VMM Model with MAR score (from Table 4) | Wartime | Wartime (t-1) | Armed Conflict | Armed Conflict (t-1) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Good | -.301*** | -.306*** | -.304*** | -.290*** | -.296*** |
| | (.024) | (.024) | (.024) | (.024) | (.023) |
| Fair | -.199*** | -.199*** | -.197*** | -.179*** | -.189*** |
| | (.023) | (.023) | (.023) | (.023) | (.023) |
| Poor | -.002 | -.001 | -.0003 | .022 | .011 |
| | (.023) | (.024) | (.023) | (.023) | (.023) |
| Year | .022*** | .024*** | .024*** | .023*** | .024*** |
| | (.002) | (.002) | (.002) | (.002) | (.002) |
| Age | -.003* | -.002* | -.002* | -.002^ | -.002^ |
| | (.001) | (.001) | (.001) | (.001) | (.001) |
| Age squared | -.0004*** | -.0004*** | -.0004*** | -.0004*** | -.0004*** |
| | (.00002) | (.00002) | (.00002) | (.00001) | (.00002) |
| Male | .152*** | .146*** | .144*** | .142*** | .145*** |
| | (.009) | (.009) | (.009) | (.009) | (.009) |
| Marital Status (ref = married) | | | | | |
| Single | .372*** | .382*** | .383*** | .392*** | .387*** |
| | (.011) | (.011) | (.011) | (.012) | (.012) |
| Separated/Divorced | .302*** | .310*** | .312*** | .326*** | .319*** |
| | (.019) | (.019) | (.019) | (.019) | (.019) |
| Widowed | .065* | .064* | .063* | .060* | .062* |
| | (.026) | (.026) | (.026) | (.026) | (.026) |
| Intercept | -46.54*** | -49.84*** | -49.09*** | -48.18*** | -49.22*** |
| | (3.36) | (3.37) | (3.37) | (3.36) | (3.37) |
| N = | 388,444 | 388,443 | 388,443 | 388,443 | 388,443 |
| AIC | 329023 | 328790 | 328721 | 328631 | 328812 |

$\alpha < .001$ '***' $\alpha < 0.001$ '**' $\alpha < 0.01$ '*' $\alpha < 0.05$ '^' $\alpha < 0.1$

# Appendix: Does armed conflict drive the results?



Regression Coefficients for Conflict and NonConflict Samples

# Appendix: Four-way interactions; effects of safety

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