瑞星之剑逆向分析

一、 官网说明:



瑞星安全专家介绍,传统安全软件应对勒索病毒主要采取"截获样本"--"分析处理"--"升级更新"的方式,而这种模式会给勒索病毒的传播和破坏带来一个"空窗期",因此,如何有效遏制勒索病毒及未来可能出现的变种,已经成为全球范围内的一个难题。

面对如此紧迫的威胁,瑞星公司真实的感受到用户的强烈需求,瑞星研发人员经过月夜奋战,创新研发了"瑞星之剑"这款可自动防御已知和未知勒索病毒的工具。该软件采用了"智能诱饵"、"基于机器学习的文件格式判定规则"和"智能勒索代码行为监测"技术,这项技术目前在全球范围内属于首创,技术达到国际领先水平。经测试和验证,达到了良好的预期效果,目前该技术已申请国家专利。

二、运行过程:

1. 释放文件 rsbmterm.ini 至系统根目录,在固定路径内创建隐藏文件_rsprob_.txt、_rsprob_.jpg、_rsprob_.doc

Rsbmterm.ini 配置路径包括 desktop、appdata\roaming、documets、music、pictures , 及各个磁盘根目录。

如下图:

```
🥘 rsbmterm.ini - 记事本
文件(F) 编辑(E) 格式(O) 查看(V) 帮助(H)
[ProbeList]
Item0=C:\Users\________Desktop\ rsprob .doc
Item1=C:\Users\_______Desktop\_rsprob_.jpg
Item2=C:\Users\_______Desktop\_rsprob_.jpg
Item3=C:\Users\________AppBata\Roaming\_rsprob_.
                              -TYME \AppData\Roaming\_rsprob_.txt
Item3=C:\Users\x..
Item5=C:\Users\Public\Documents\_rsprob_.doc
Item6=C:\Users\Public\Music\_rsprob_.jpg
Item7=C:\Users\Public\Pictures\_rsprob_.jpg
Item8=C:\_rsprob_. txt
Item9=D:\_rsprob_.txt
Item10=E:\_rsprob_.txt
Item11=F:\_rsprob_. txt
Item12=G:\rsprob.txt
Count=13
[Module]
rspot_if=C:\Users\\omega: red\AppData\Local\Temp\~rsbmterm\rspot_if.dll
    _rsprob_.txt ×
  0 ... 10 ... 20 ... 30 ... 30 ... 1 Rising Probe File!!DO NOT TOUCH!!
                               2 瑞星反勒索 勿动!! Rising Probe File!!DO NOT TOUCH!!
  3 瑞星反勒索 勿动!! Rising Probe File!!DO NOT TOUCH!!
  4 瑞星反勒索 勿动!! Rising Probe File!!DO NOT TOUCH!!
```

```
rsprob_txt x

① 10 20 30 40 50 7 60 1 Rising Probe File!!DO NOT TOUCH!!

2 瑞星反勒索 勿动!! Rising Probe File!!DO NOT TOUCH!!

3 瑞星反勒索 勿动!! Rising Probe File!!DO NOT TOUCH!!

4 瑞星反勒索 勿动!! Rising Probe File!!DO NOT TOUCH!!

5 瑞星反勒索 勿动!! Rising Probe File!!DO NOT TOUCH!!

6 瑞星反勒索 勿动!! Rising Probe File!!DO NOT TOUCH!!

7 瑞星反勒索 勿动!! Rising Probe File!!DO NOT TOUCH!!

8 瑞星反勒索 勿动!! Rising Probe File!!DO NOT TOUCH!!

9 瑞星反勒索 勿动!! Rising Probe File!!DO NOT TOUCH!!

10 瑞星反勒索 勿动!! Rising Probe File!!DO NOT TOUCH!!

11 瑞星反勒索 勿动!! Rising Probe File!!DO NOT TOUCH!!

12 瑞星反勒索 勿动!! Rising Probe File!!DO NOT TOUCH!!

13 瑞星反勒索 勿动!! Rising Probe File!!DO NOT TOUCH!!

14 瑞星反勒索 勿动!! Rising Probe File!!DO NOT TOUCH!!

15 瑞星反勒索 勿动!! Rising Probe File!!DO NOT TOUCH!!

16 瑞星反勒索 勿动!! Rising Probe File!!DO NOT TOUCH!!

17 瑞星反勒索 勿动!! Rising Probe File!!DO NOT TOUCH!!

18 瑞星反勒索 勿动!! Rising Probe File!!DO NOT TOUCH!!

19 瑞星反勒索 勿动!! Rising Probe File!!DO NOT TOUCH!!

19 瑞星反勒索 勿动!! Rising Probe File!!DO NOT TOUCH!!

10 瑞星反勒索 勿动!! Rising Probe File!!DO NOT TOUCH!!

11 瑞星反勒索 勿动!! Rising Probe File!!DO NOT TOUCH!!

12 瑞星反勒索 勿动!! Rising Probe File!!DO NOT TOUCH!!

13 瑞星反勒索 勿动!! Rising Probe File!!DO NOT TOUCH!!

14 瑞星反勒索 勿动!! Rising Probe File!!DO NOT TOUCH!!

15 瑞星反为索 勿动!! Rising Probe File!!DO NOT TOUCH!!


16 瑞星反勒索 勿动!! Rising Probe File!!DO NOT TOUCH!!
```

rsprob.txt、rsbmterm.ini 均有自保护,禁止修改及删除,如有进程尝试修改\删除该文件,则弹出

告警:



2. 检测是否存在 Rising Anti Blackmail Service 服务,如无则注册该服务



- 3. rsbmterm 自带更新功能,运行后先检测是否有更新,并释放资源文件
- 1> RSPOT IF.DLL 到临时目录
- 2> RSNDISPOT(-X64).SYS 到%system32%\driver
- 3> RSPORT(-X64).sys

二、模块分析

1) RSPOT_IF.DLL

该模块集成了驱动加载和监控规则初始化更新的逻辑。

这块逻辑比较多,大概就是加载驱动做内核监控和监控规则的获取更新,推测是需要联网验证 UUID 来下发基于机器学习的规则,这个程序的逻辑不是重点规则是核心内容;

初始运行基本没什么监控规则,可能是通过机器生成的 UUID 来获取更新服务器端的规则更新。



详细逻辑:

monitors_init 初始化加载驱动

Sub_100013F0

创建 IoCompletePort 做内核监控

```
wsprintfW(v14, L"\\UkComPort_rs_rspot-%d", v3);
v4 = (HANDLE *)(a1 + 56);
if ( (FilterConnectCommunicationPort(v14, 0, 0, 0, 0, a1 + 56) & 0x80000000) != 0x80000000 )
{
    v5 = CreateIoCompletionPort(*v4, 0, 0, NumberOfConcurrentThreads);
    *(_DWORD *)(a1 + 60) = v5;
    if ( v5 )
}
```

监控规则的更新

```
resource_insert
resource_query
resource_delete
monitor_get_state
monitor_set_state
monitor_reg_event_handler
monitor_dereg_event_handler
monitor_add_rules
monitor_del_rules
monitor_clear_rules
get_profiler
monitor build list
monitor_query_rules
process_free_list
monitors_init
monitors init2
monitors finalize
```

monitor_build_list

```
v2 = 16;
     if ( a2 && (v3 = malloc(0x40u)) != 0 )
       while ( 1 )
16
          InBuffer = a1;
19
         v8 = v2;
v9 = v3;
20
         if ( !DeviceIoControl(hDevice, 0x224044u, &InBuffer, 0x10u, &OutBuffer, 4u, &BytesReturned, 0)
|| BytesReturned != 4 )
{
21
22
23
24
25
            free(v3);
26
            return 0;
27
         if ( OutBuffer <= v2 )
28
29
           break;
        free(U3);
U3 = malloc(4 * U2);
if ( !U3 )
31
32
33
            goto LABEL_7;
34
35
       *a2 = OutBuffer;
```

规则建立的逻辑是下发给驱动由驱动来负责完成, add 和 del 等等都是通过 DeviceIoControl 下发命令字给由

驱动完成

2) RSPOT.sys 驱动

创建设备加载驱动

```
it ( negistryrath-ztength < uxouuu )
   memcpy(&unk_18960, RegistryPath->Buffer, RegistryPath->Length);
 if ( sub_177E0() < 0
    || (RtlInitUnicodeString(&DestinationString, L"\\Device\\rs_rspot"),
        RtlInitUnicodeString(&SymbolicLinkName, L"\\??\\<mark>rs rspot</mark>"),
        v2 = IoCreateDevice(v4, 0, &DestinationString, 0x22u, 0x100u, 0, &DeviceOb)
        U2 < 0)
    || (v2 = IoCreateSymbolicLink(&SymbolicLinkName, &DestinationString), v2 < 0) ]
    if ( DeviceObject )
      IoDeleteDevice(DeviceObject);
   sub_176E0();
   if ( dword_188D0 )
      ExDeleteResourceLite(&Resource);
DII 下发的命令字实现函数在这里负责
v4->MajorFunction[1] = (PDRIVER_DISPATCH)sub_16570;
v4->MajorFunction[3] = (PDRIVER_DISPATCH)sub_16570;
v4->MajorFunction[4] = (PDRIVER_DISPATCH)sub_16570;
v4->MajorFunction[5] = (PDRIVER_DISPATCH)sub_16570;
v4->MajorFunction[6] = (PDRIVER_DISPATCH)sub_16570;
v4->MajorFunction[7] = (PDRIVER_DISPATCH)sub_16570;
v4->MajorFunction[8] = (PDRIVER_DISPATCH)sub_16570;
v4->MajorFunction[9] = (PDRIVER_DISPATCH)sub_16570;
v4->MajorFunction[10] = (PDRIVER_DISPATCH)sub_16570;
v4->MajorFunction[11] = (PDRIVER DISPATCH)sub 16570;
v4->MajorFunction[12] = (PDRIVER_DISPATCH)sub_16570;
v4->MajorFunction[13] = (PDRIVER_DISPATCH)sub_16570;
v4->MajorFunction[16] = (PDRIVER_DISPATCH)sub_16570;
v4->MajorFunction[17] = (PDRIVER_DISPATCH)sub_16570;
v4->MajorFunction[19] = (PDRIVER_DISPATCH)sub_16570;
v4->MajorFunction[20] = (PDRIVER_DISPATCH)sub_16570;
v4->MajorFunction[21] = (PDRIVER_DISPATCH)sub_16570;
```

主要的规则检测逻辑 MajorFunction[14]有检测逻辑的实现,比如

(PDRIVER_DISPATCH) sub_16570;

v4->MajorFunction[22] = (PDRIVER_DISPATCH)sub_16570;

v4->MajorFunction[24] = (PDRIVER_DISPATCH)sub_16570; v4->MajorFunction[25] = (PDRIVER_DISPATCH)sub_16570; υ4->MajorFunction[26] = (PDRIVER_DISPATCH)sub_16570; υ4->MajorFunction[27] = (PDRIVER_DISPATCH)sub_16570; v4->MajorFunction[8] = (PDRIVER_DISPATCH)sub_16508; v4->MajorFunction[18] = (PDRIVER_DISPATCH)sub_17158; υ4->MajorFunction[2] = (PDRIVER_DISPATCH)sub_16680; v4->MajorFunction[14] = (PDRIVER_DISPATCH)sub_16736; v4->MajorFunction[15] = (PDRIVER_DISPATCH)sub_17156; v4->DriverUnload = (PDRIVER UNLOAD)sub 17250;

v4-><mark>MajorFunction</mark>[23] =

```
case 0x224064u:
 if ( v7 >= 8 && v8 >= 0x2810 )
   v23 = Irp->AssociatedIrp.MasterIrp;
   KeEnterCriticalRegion();
   ExAcquireResourceSharedLite(&Resource, 1u);
   v24 = sub_15B50(&dword_18918, *(_QWORD *)&v23->Type);
   ExReleaseResourceLite(&Resource);
   KeLeaveCriticalRegion();
   if ( U24 )
   {
      v23[91].UserBuffer = *(PV0ID *)(v24 + 56);
      *(_DWORD *)&v23->Type = *(_DWORD *)(v24 + 8);
      v23->Md1Address = *(PMDL *)(v24 + 12);
      v23[91].CancelRoutine = *(PDRIVER CANCEL *)(v24 + 68);
      v25 = (wchar t *)&v23[18].UserIosb;
      v26 = (wchar_t *)&v23->Flags;
      *v25 = 0;
      *v26 = 0;
      v27 = *(const wchar_t **)(v24 + 32);
      if ( U27 )
       wcsncpy(v26, v27, 0x3FFu);
      v28 = *(const wchar_t **)(v24 + 36);
      if ( U28 )
       wcsncpy(v25, v28, 0xFFFu);
      KeEnterCriticalRegion();
      ExAcquireResourceExclusiveLite(&Resource, 1u);
      if ( !sub_15A50((int)&dword_18918, (PVOID)v24) )
        --dword_18914;
      ExReleaseResourceLite(&Resource);
      KeLeaveCriticalRegion();
      v69 = 10256;
      v68 = 0;
 3
 goto LABEL_131;
```

3) RSNDISPOT.SYS

比较简单,就是做了下进程和线程加载的监控

模块分析结论:

参考官方工具说明:基于机器学习的生成特征内存指令检测。

但本次分析过程,并未看到基于机器学习规则的创建过程和 data 文件 程序里的比较关键的函数 monitor_build_list

也是更新 IoCotrol 命令字,应该就是普通的基于 IoControl 命令字的驱动防护。