

# Executive Brief — Shunyaya Symbolic Mathematical Network (SSM-NET)

## From Opaque Traffic to Verifiable Declarations

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**Citation:** When implementing or adapting, cite the concept name “**Shunyaya Symbolic Mathematical Network (SSM-NET)**” as the origin of the manifest-first, stamped, alignment-lane overlay for network communication.

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**Overlay, not transport.** SSM-NET rides beside existing protocols and turns ordinary messages into **self-verifying declarations** without forking your stack. **Keep your bytes; add portable meaning.**

A manifest-first network overlay that turns ordinary messages into self-verifying declarations. Each SSM-NET declaration travels beside your existing payload with **five inseparable parts** — **value, align, band, manifest\_id, stamp** — plus an optional **canonical subset commitment (sha256=...)** so any party can replay and verify **what** was asserted, **under which rulebook**, and **when**.

**Payload invariance** is guaranteed by  $\text{phi}((m, a)) = m$  (**collapse parity**) — the payload remains **byte-for-byte identical**. **Alignment** is computed deterministically via `clamp -> atanh -> accumulate -> tanh`. **Bands** map alignment to required actions defined in a published **manifest**. A continuity **stamp** such as

`SSMLOCK1|UTC_ISO|nonce|sha256=...|prev=...` makes timelines **tamper-evident**.

**In one line:** SSM-NET makes networking **self-accountable** — **route, trust, policy, and proof** fused on the wire, without forking existing protocols.

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## 0. Why SSM-NET matters now

Today the internet moves bytes fast, but **meaning, duty, and proof** get lost in transit. After incidents, the same questions repeat:

- “Who knew what, when?”
- “Which policy was active at that moment?”
- “Did an intermediary rewrite or drop something?”
- “Why did automation act (or fail to act)?”
- “Are we replaying reality or a curated log?”

Answers are scattered across headers, dashboards, logs, and screenshots. That is not defensible at scale.

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## SSM-NET fixes the structural gaps

- **Gap 1 — Contextless payloads.** Packets carry data, not their **stability** or **obligation**.

**Answer:** Attach a declaration where  $\text{align} \in (-1, +1)$  expresses stability via  $\text{a\_c} := \text{clamp}(\text{a\_raw}, -1+\text{eps\_a}, +1-\text{eps\_a}) \rightarrow \text{u} := \text{atanh}(\text{a\_c}) \rightarrow \text{U} += \text{w} * \text{u} ; \text{W} += \text{w} \rightarrow \text{align} := \tanh(\text{U} / \max(\text{W}, \text{eps\_w}))$ , and **band** converts math into required action (e.g., “continue”, “throttle within X minutes”, “human review”, “block now”).

- **Gap 2 — Policy drift and verbal rules.** Meanings of “GREEN/AMBER/RED” drift between teams and over time.

**Answer:** `manifest_id` points to a **versioned manifest** that freezes **cutpoints, timing windows, escalation owners, and computation knobs**. Change the rule? Mint a new `manifest_id` — **never rewrite history**.

- **Gap 3 — Unverifiable intermediaries.** Proxies and services may transform traffic **without an auditable trail**.

**Answer:** Declare a **canonical subset** and **commit** it via `sha256=...` **Append evidence, never rewrite**. Intermediaries may **add** proofs but must **not mutate** declared bytes or the committed digest.

- **Gap 4 — Timeline games.** Reordering or deletion can sanitize incident narratives.

**Answer:** Chain every declaration with a continuity stamp:

`SSMLOCK1|UTC_ISO|nonce|sha256=<canonical_subset>|prev=<prior_sha256>` — **reordering/deletion becomes visible**.

- **Gap 5 — Non-standard “confidence” scores.** Scores vary and cannot be replayed.

**Answer:** A single, published pipeline `clamp -> atanh -> accumulate -> tanh` yields **bounded, order-invariant alignment** anyone can recompute.

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## What this changes

- **For senders:** **Keep** your payload; **attach** a tiny declaration carrying **band** (label-first by default) and **manifest\_id**, plus **stamp** and optional `sha256`. (Full disclosure mode can include **align** and a fixed-format `align_ascii`.)
- **For receivers:** **Verify** what was promised (**subset hash**), **interpret** what was meant (**manifest**), **observe** how it looked (**align**), and **anchor** when it was said (**stamp**).
- **For intermediaries:** **Preserve** bytes and **prove** you preserved them; **contribute** append-only evidence.

**Bottom line:** The network stops moving just packets and **starts moving declared truth** — **payload intact, policy explicit, timelines provable**.

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# 1. The Factual Promise (Core Idea)

An SSM-NET message is not just traffic. It carries a **declaration** in a canonical shape:

```
{
  value,
  align,
  band,
  manifest_id,
  stamp,
  sha256 // commitment to a declared canonical subset (headers/body)
}
```

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## 1.1 value — what actually moved on the wire

- **Rule:** SSM-NET never alters the application payload.
  - **Invariant:**  $\text{phi}(m, a) = m$  (**collapse parity**) — removing the alignment lane  $a$  always recovers the exact original magnitude  $m$ .
  - **Meaning:** `value` is the **truth lane**; **byte-for-byte identical** to what legacy systems already trust.
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## 1.2 align — how stable or risky it looked at emission

- **Definition:** A **bounded** stability dial in  $(-1, +1)$  computed by a published, replayable pipeline:  
`a_c := clamp(a_raw, -1+eps_a, +1-eps_a) -> u := atanh(a_c) -> U += w*u ; W += w -> align := tanh( U / max(W, eps_w) )`
  - **Properties:** **Bounded** ( $-1 < \text{align} < +1$ ) • **Order-invariant** (batch == stream == merged shards given same  $w$ ) • **Auditable** (any party can recompute).
  - **Disclosure note:** Default is **label-first** (see **band**). When disclosed, include fixed-format `align_ascii` (e.g., `+0.000000`).
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## 1.3 band — the required action stance

- **Purpose:** Converts numeric `align` into **duty** (e.g., continue, throttle within X minutes, human-review, block now).
  - **Binding:** `band` is **policy, not mood**; cutpoints, timing windows, and escalation owners are declared in the active `manifest_id`.
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## 1.4 manifest\_id — which rulebook was active

- **Pointer:** Identifies the **versioned manifest** that froze **band cutpoints, computation knobs, weights, boundary inclusivity, and timing rules** at that moment.
  - **Governance:** If policy changes, **mint a new manifest\_id**; **do not rewrite** prior manifests.
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## 1.5 stamp — tamper-evident timeline proof

- **Shape:**

SSMCLOCK1|UTC\_ISO|nonce|sha256=<canonical\_subset>|prev=<prior\_sha256>

- **Assurance:** Proves **when** you declared, **what subset** you committed, and **in which order** declarations occurred; **reordering/deletion becomes obvious**.
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## 1.6 sha256 — canonical subset commitment

- **What it is:** A digest over a **declared canonical subset** of headers/body (e.g., specific fields and byte ranges) so parties can verify **exactly what you promised** without forcing full disclosure.
  - **Intermediary rule:** Intermediaries may **append evidence**; **never rewrite**. They **must not mutate** committed bytes or the canonical digest.
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## One-line takeaway for Section 1

SSM-NET = **value (intact) + align (bounded math) + band (duty) + manifest\_id (rulebook) + stamp (timeline) + sha256 (commitment)** — a declaration that makes each message self-verifying without changing its bytes.

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# 2. How SSM-NET Rides the Wire (Minimal Overlay)

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## 2.1 Overlay, not a fork

- **Keep payload bytes untouched.** Applications continue to read/write exactly what they do today.
- **Attach a small declaration** next to the payload (headers, trailer, sidecar, or metadata) carrying: **value, align, band, manifest\_id, stamp, and sha256** (commitment to a canonical subset).
- **Invariant:**  $\text{phi}((m, a)) = m$  (**collapse parity**) — the declaration never rewrites your application **value**.

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## 2.2 Canonical subset commitment (what you promise, others can verify)

- **Declare** which parts of headers/body form the **canonical subset**.
- **Compute** a digest over the canonical subset: `sha256 := SHA256(canonical_bytes)`.
- **Disclose** the digest so any receiver can check that what you promised equals what you sent.
- **Example canonicalization (pseudocode):**

```
bytes    := JOIN_WITH_NEWLINES([field1, field2, byte_range(payload, i:j),
...])
sha256   := SHA256(bytes)
```

- **Rule:** The **exact canonical recipe** lives in the **manifest** (ordering, whitespace, included fields, byte ranges).

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## 2.3 Minimal declaration fields on the wire (illustrative names)

- `ssmnet-align`: bounded dial in  $(-1, +1)$  computed by `clamp -> atanh -> accumulate -> tanh`.
- `ssmnet-band`: required action stance from the manifest (e.g., “continue”, “throttle within X minutes”, “human-review”, “block now”).
- `ssmnet-manifest`: the `manifest_id` (immutable pointer to the active rulebook).
- `ssmnet-stamp`: continuity stamp  
`SSMCLOCK1|UTC_ISO|nonce|sha256=<canonical_subset>|prev=<prior_sha256>`.
- `ssmnet-commit`: the `sha256` digest (commitment to the canonical subset).
- **Optional disclosure:** `ssmnet-align` may be **omitted** if policy is **label-first**; `band` + `manifest_id` still convey duty. (When disclosed, include fixed-format `align_ascii`, e.g., `+0.000000`.)

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## 2.4 NOW vs AFTER (illustrative sketch)

- **NOW (ordinary message):** application headers + payload.
- **AFTER (with SSM-NET declaration added):**
  - application headers + payload (**unchanged**), plus
  - `ssmnet-align`: `+0.37` (or withheld per manifest),
  - `ssmnet-band`: `AMBER`,
  - `ssmnet-manifest`: `NET_EDGE_POLICY_vX`,
  - `ssmnet-commit`: `sha256=...`,
  - `ssmnet-stamp`: `SSMCLOCK1|2025-11-08T10:02:11Z|nonce=...|sha256=...|prev=...`

## 2.5 Intermediary behavior (append, don't rewrite)

- **Pass-through:** intermediaries must **not mutate** the payload or any bytes covered by `ssmnet-commit`.
  - **Append-only:** they may **append** their own evidence (e.g., an observation note or forward-stamp) **without altering** the original declaration.
  - **If transforming payload** for a valid reason, they must **not claim** the original `ssmnet-commit`; either **drop it** or **recompute** under a declared canonical subset (as policy allows).
  - **One rule: Append evidence, never rewrite.**
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## 2.6 Receiver workflow (one-minute acceptance)

- **Check boundedness:** verify `align`  $\in (-1, +1)$  if disclosed.
  - **Verify commitment:** recompute `SHA256(canonical_subset)` and match `ssmnet-commit`.
  - **Re-map band:** apply the `manifest_id` rulebook to confirm band cutpoints and the timing window.
  - **Validate continuity:** confirm `prev` linkage and monotonicity; detect reordering or deletion.
  - **Normalize text:** treat subset text as **UTF-8 NFC** with newline `\n`; fail on normalization errors.
  - **Log evidence:** store the declaration (or a compact envelope) for replay.
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## One-line takeaway for Section 2

SSM-NET adds a tiny, verifiable declaration beside untouched bytes — a commitment (`sha256`), a duty (band via `manifest_id`), a bounded dial (`align`), and a proof of sequence (`stamp`).

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## 3. Core Invariants (Copy-Ready)

### 3.1 Payload invariance (truth lane)

- **Rule:** SSM-NET never alters the application payload.
  - **Invariant:**  $\text{phi}((m, a)) = m$  (**collapse parity**) — stripping the alignment lane `a` always recovers the exact original magnitude `m`.
  - **Outcome:** Legacy readers **see the same bytes**; SSM-NET readers also see **duty, stability, and proof**.
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### 3.2 Deterministic, bounded alignment (one pipeline everywhere)

- **Pipeline:** `a_c := clamp(a_raw, -1+eps_a, +1-eps_a) -> u := atanh(a_c) -> U += w*u ; W += w -> align := tanh( U / max(W, eps_w) )`

- **Properties:**

- o **Bounded:** `align`  $\in (-1, +1)$

- o **Order-invariant:** `batch == stream == merged shards` (given identical `w`)

- o **Auditable:** anyone can replay with the **same canonical inputs and weights**

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### 3.3 Manifest-governed bands (policy turned into math)

- **Definition:** `band` is derived from `align` by **cutpoints** declared in the active **manifest**.
  - **Boundaries:** ranges specify **inclusivity** (e.g., `[-1.0, -0.5)`, `[-0.5, +0.5]`, `( +0.5, +1.0 ]`).
  - **Duty:** each band carries **timing windows** and **escalation owners**.
  - **Governance:** changing policy **mints a new `manifest_id`** — **do not rewrite** old manifests.
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### 3.4 Canonical subset commitment (verifiable promise)

- **Field:** `sha256=...` over a **declared canonical subset** of headers/body.
  - **Recipe:** **ordering, whitespace, included fields, and byte ranges** are spelled out in the **manifest**.
  - **Effect:** receivers can **recompute and confirm** that what was **promised equals sent**.
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### 3.5 Continuity stamp (tamper-evident sequence)

- **Shape:**

`SSMCLOCK1|UTC_ISO|nonce|sha256=<canonical_subset>|prev=<prior_sha256>`

- **Assurance:** proves **when** the declaration was made, **what subset** was committed, and **how** it links to the prior step.
    - **Detection:** **reordering/deletion becomes obvious** when the chain breaks.
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### 3.6 Disclosure defaults (label-first, lane as needed)

- **Privacy-aware:** default to **label-first** (`band + manifest_id`); disclose `align` only when the **manifest** calls for it.
  - **Clarity:** the **presence/absence of `align`** is itself a **policy choice** documented in the **manifest**.
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### 3.7 Intermediary rules (append, don't rewrite)

- **Pass-through:** intermediaries **must not mutate** payload bytes or any bytes covered by the **canonical subset**.
  - **Append-only:** intermediaries may **append** their own evidence (e.g., observations, forward-stamps) **without altering** the original declaration.
  - **One rule: Append evidence, never rewrite.**
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### 3.8 Receiver acceptance (micro-checklist)

- **Boundedness:** confirm  $\text{align} \in (-1, +1)$  if disclosed.
  - **Commitment:** recompute  $\text{SHA256}(\text{canonical\_subset})$  and match  $\text{sha256}$ .
  - **Policy mapping:** apply  $\text{manifest\_id}$  **cutpoints** and **timing windows** to validate  $\text{band}$ .
  - **Continuity:** verify  $\text{prev}$  linkage and **monotonic** stamp times.
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### One-line takeaway for Section 3

**One payload, one pipeline, one rulebook, one proof chain** — SSM-NET invariants make meaning portable and verification routine.

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## 4. Minimal Compliance (Paste-Ready)

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### 4.1 Sender — MUST

- **Preserve payload.** Never alter application bytes. Invariant:  $\text{phi}((m, a)) = m$ .
  - **Declare policy.** Emit a stable  $\text{manifest\_id}$  that points to the rulebook active at emission.
  - **Compute alignment deterministically.** Use  $\text{clamp} \rightarrow \text{atanh} \rightarrow \text{accumulate} \rightarrow \text{tanh}$  to produce  $\text{align} \in (-1, +1)$  (disclose only if the manifest requires).
  - **Map to duty.** Convert  $\text{align}$  to  $\text{band}$  using manifest cutpoints and boundary rules.
  - **Commit a canonical subset.** Publish the recipe in the manifest; compute  $\text{sha256} := \text{SHA256}(\text{canonical\_subset\_bytes})$  and disclose it.
  - **Stamp continuity.** Attach  $\text{stamp} := \text{SSMCLOCK1} | \text{UTC\_ISO} | \text{nonce} | \text{sha256} = \langle \dots \rangle | \text{prev} = \langle \text{prior\_sha256} \rangle$ .
  - **Disclose minimally by policy.** Default to **label-first** ( $\text{band} + \text{manifest\_id}$ ) unless the manifest mandates  $\text{align}$ .
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## 4.2 Receiver — MUST

- **Verify boundedness.** If `align` is present, check  $-1 < \text{align} < +1$ .
  - **Recompute commitment.** Rebuild the canonical subset bytes and confirm `SHA256(...)` `== sha256`.
  - **Re-map band.** Apply the `manifest_id` rulebook (same cutpoints, same boundaries) and confirm the declared `band`.
  - **Validate stamp chain.** Check `prev` linkage and monotonic time; flag gaps, forks, or reordering.
  - **Enforce timing windows.** If `band` implies “act within X,” start the timer at the **stamp** time.
  - **Log evidence.** Persist the declaration (or its envelope) for replay and audit.
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## 4.3 Intermediary — MUST/SHOULD

- **MUST** pass through payload and any bytes included in the sender’s canonical subset.
  - **MUST NOT** rewrite committed bytes or the sender’s declaration.
  - **SHOULD** append an **observation stamp** (append-only) if significant handling occurs:  
`SSMCLOCK1|UTC_ISO|nonce|sha256=<obs_subset>|prev=<sender_sha256>`
  - **If transforming payload:** either **drop** the original `sha256` (cannot claim it) or **recompute** a new commitment under a declared transformation policy.
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## 4.4 Canonical Subset — Publication Rules

- **Publish the recipe in the manifest:** exact field order, whitespace rules, byte ranges, normalization (UTF-8 NFC), newline strategy `\n`.
- **Example (illustrative):**

```
bytes := JOIN_NL([headerA, headerB, byte_range(payload, i:j)])
sha256 := SHA256(bytes)
```

- **No silent changes.** Altering the recipe requires **minting a new `manifest_id`**.
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## 4.5 One-Minute Acceptance Checklist (Receiver/Intermediary)

1. `align`  $\in (-1, +1)$  (if present)
  2. `SHA256(canonical_subset) == sha256`
  3. Applying the **manifest** reproduces the declared `band`
  4. `prev` forms an unbroken chain; **no time regressions**
  5. Fields present match the manifest’s **disclosure mode** (label-first vs full)  
**If all checks pass → ACCEPT. Otherwise → QUARANTINE with reason codes.**
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## 4.6 Failure Handling (Deterministic Outcomes)

- **Bad bounds:** if `align` outside `(-1, +1)`, ignore `align` and derive `band` from available context or fall back to **HUMAN-REVIEW** per manifest.
  - **Commit mismatch:** if recomputed `sha256` differs, **reject or quarantine; never overwrite**.
  - **Unknown `manifest_id`:** treat as **HUMAN-REVIEW**; fetch/request the manifest; **do not infer** cutpoints.
  - **Broken chain:** if `prev` is missing/invalid, **accept payload** (unchanged) but flag the declaration as **non-evidential**.
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## 4.7 Minimal Field Names (illustrative, not prescriptive)

- `ssmnet-align`: `<-1..+1>`
  - `ssmnet-band`: `<label>`
  - `ssmnet-manifest`: `<manifest_id>`
  - `ssmnet-commit`: `sha256=<hex>`
  - `ssmnet-stamp`: `SSMLOCK1|<UTC_ISO>|nonce=<...>|sha256=<...>|prev=<...>`
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## One-line takeaway for Section 4

**Senders declare; receivers verify; intermediaries append—never rewrite.** A tiny, deterministic contract rides beside **untouched bytes**.

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# 5. Conclusion — What Changes When SSM-NET Is On

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## 5.1 The shift in one view

With SSM-NET, the network stops moving **opaque traffic** and starts moving **verifiable declarations**:

- **Payload invariance:** `phi((m, a)) = m`.
- **Replayable stability:** alignment via `clamp -> atanh -> accumulate -> tanh`, **bounded** in `(-1, +1)`.
- **Explicit duty:** `band` from a **versioned `manifest_id`** (cutpoints, timing, escalation).
- **Integrity proof:** `sha256=...` over a **declared canonical subset**.
- **Timeline truth:**

`SSMLOCK1|UTC_ISO|nonce|sha256=<canonical_subset>|prev=<prior_sha256>`.

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## 5.2 Micro-adoption playbook

- **Day-1 — Add declarations, change nothing else.**

Attach `band` and `manifest_id` (optionally `align` per policy). **Keep payload bytes untouched.**

- **Day-7 — Publish what you promise.**

Publish the **manifest** and the **canonical-subset recipe** (field list, ordering, whitespace rules, byte ranges, normalization `UTF-8 NFC`, newline `\n`). Begin verifying `sha256`.

- **Day-30 — Enforce and verify.**

Enforce **band timing windows**, verify **chain continuity** (`prev` linkage), use **append-only** at intermediaries. Store a compact **evidence envelope** for replay.

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## 5.3 Human protections (why this matters)

- **Operators defended:** actions within the manifested window are **provably compliant**.
  - **Intermediaries trusted:** **preserve** committed bytes and **add** append-only evidence.
  - **Receivers/regulators empowered:** **replay alignment**, **recompute band**, and **verify sequence** without trusting any single actor.
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## One-line closing

**Keep your bytes. Add a tiny, stamped declaration. Make duty and proof travel with every message.**

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OMP