Entropy Source and DRNG Manager ...or /dev/random in User Space

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Agenda

- ESDM Goals
- ESDM Design
- Initial Seeding Strategies
- Entropy Sources


ESDM Goals

- Full user space implementation
 - No kernel changes needed only if scheduler ES is requested
 - Independent of political games of developers
- API and ABI compliant drop-in replacement of Linux /dev/random, /dev/urandom and getrandom(2)
- Minimal dependencies on environment
 - Protobuf-c
 - FUSE / CUSE support
- Runs fully unprivileged
- Sole use of cryptography for data processing
- Flexible configuration supporting wide range of use cases
- Standards compliance: SP800-90A/B/C, AIS 20/31, FIPS IG 7.19 / D.K (use of DRBG as conditioner)

```
$ ps -efa | grep esdm
                                           00:00:00 /usr/local/bin/esdm-server -f
root
             891
                       1 2 23:34 ?
             939
                                           00:00:00 /usr/local/bin/esdm-server -f
Inobody
                     891 0 23:34 ?
                                           00:00:00 /usr/local/bin/esdm-cuse-random -f
nobody
            1050
                       1 0 23:34 ?
            1051
                       1 0 23:34 ?
                                           00:00:00 /usr/local/bin/esdm-cuse-urandom -f
Inobody
                                            00:00:00 /usr/local/bin/esdm-proc --relabel -f -o allow other /proc/sys/kernel/random
nobody
            1054
                       1 0 23:34 ?
```


ESDM Design

- 7 Entropy Sources
 - 5 external
 - 2 internal
 - All ES treated equally
 - No domination by any ES seeding triggered by initialization process or DRNG
- All ES can be selectively disabled at compile time
- ES data fed into DRNG
- DRNG accessible with APIs



ESDM Components

- ESDM Server
 - Using ESDM library
 - Offering RPC Interface
 - Protobuf-C RPC
 - Sensitive operations require privilege
- ESDM RPC library
 - API for other clients
- /dev/random CUSE
- /dev/urandom CUSE
- /proc/sys/kernel/random FUSE
- libesdm-getrandom.so



DRNG Output APIs

- Blocking APIs deliver data only after fully initialized and fully seeded
 - When Linux compliant interfaces enabled:
 - /dev/random
 - getrandom() system call
- Prediction Resistance API deliver data only after fully initialized and successful reseed returning at most data equal to the amount of entropy
 - ESDM RPC client API
 - Using /dev/random with O_SYNC
 - Using getrandom(2) with flag GRND_RANDOM
 - Compliant with:
 - FIPS IG 7.19 / D.K to use DRBG as conditioning component for seeding other DRBGs
 - German AIS 20/31 (2011) NTG.1 requirements
- Get seed: getrandom(2) with flag GRND_SEED to obtain data from entropy sources directly
- All other APIs deliver data without blocking until complete initialization
 - No guarantee of ESDM being fully initialized / seeded

DRNG Seeding

- Temporary seed buffer: concatenation of output from all ES
- Seeding during initialization: when 256 bits of entropy are available
- · Seeding at runtime
 - After 2²⁰ generate requests or 10 minutes
 - After forced reseed by user space
 - After new DRNG is loaded
 - At least 128 bits (SP800-90C mode: ESDM security strength) of total entropy must be available
 - 256 bits of entropy requested from each ES ES may deliver less
 - Seed operation occurs when DRNG is requested to produce random bits
 - DRNG returns to not fully seeded when last seed with full entropy was $> 2^{30}$ generate operations ago

```
ESDM (22:00:20) (esdm-server) Debug - DRNG [../esdm/esdm_drng_mgr.c:esdm_drng_seed_work_one:361]: reseed triggered by system events for DRNG on NUMA node 1
ESDM (22:00:20) (esdm-server) Debug - Entropy Source [../esdm/esdm_es_jent.c:esdm_jent_get:122]: obtained 256 bits of entropy from Jitter RNG noise source
ESDM (22:00:20) (esdm-server) Debug - Entropy Source [../esdm/esdm_es_cpu.c:esdm_cpu_get:230]: obtained 8 bits of entropy from CPU RNG entropy source
ESDM (22:00:20) (esdm-server) Debug - Entropy Source [../esdm/esdm_es_krng.c:esdm_krng_get:243]: obtained 128 bits of entropy from kernel RNG noise source
ESDM (22:00:20) (esdm-server) Debug - Entropy Source [../esdm/esdm_es_aux.c:esdm_aux_get_pool:319]: obtained 0 bits by collecting 0 bits of entropy from aux pool, 0 bits of entropy remaining
ESDM (22:00:20) (esdm-server) Debug - DRNG [../esdm/esdm_drng_mgr.c:esdm_drng_inject:280]: seeding regular DRNG with 272 bytes
ESDM (22:00:20) (esdm-server) Debug - DRNG [../esdm/esdm_drng_mgr.c:esdm_drng_inject:2310]: regular DRNG fully seeded
ESDM (22:00:20) (esdm-server) Debug - DRNG [../esdm/esdm_drng_mgr.c:esdm_drng_inject:2310]: regular DRNG fully seeded
```

Initial Seeding Strategy I Default Operation

- DRNG is fully seeded with 256 bits of entropy
- Blocking interfaces released after DRNG is fully seeded
- Default applied
 - Either no specific seeding strategy compiled
 - Or specific seeding strategy is not enabled at start time

Initial Seeding Strategy II Entropy Source Oversampling


- · Fully seeded step changed
- Compile time option
 - Function only enabled in FIPS mode
 - Function only enabled if message digest of conditioner >= 384 bits
- Initial conditioning: s + 64 bit
- Initial DRNG seeding: every entropy source requested for s + 128 bits
 - Every ES alone could provide all required entropy
- All ES data concatenated into seed buffer
- Runtime debug mode: display of all processing steps
- SP800-90C compliance:
 - SP800-90A DRBG with 256-bit strength / SHA-512 vetted conditioning component
 - Complies with RBG2(NP) per default
 - Can be configured to provide RBG2(P)
- Can be used in parallel with seeding strategy III

Initial Seeding Strategy III Two Entropy Sources

- Initial / minimal seeding steps apply unaltered fully seeded step changed
- Compile time option
 - Function only enabled with compile option "ais2031"
- Initial DRNG seeding: two entropy sources must deliver 220 bits of entropy each
- All ES data concatenated into seed buffer
- Runtime debug mode: display of all processing steps
- German AIS 20/31 compliance
 - Caveat: Applies to draft version of AIS20/31 as of September 2022
 - NTG.1: LRNG configuration ensures two entropy sources can reach at least 220 bits each
 - PTG.3 / DRG.4: LRNG can be configured to provide a PTG.3 or DRG.4
- Can be used in parallel with seeding strategy II

DRNG Management

- One DRNG per CPU up to maximum of 64
- · Hash contexts on stack only
- Each DRNG initializes from entropy sources
- Sequential initialization of DRNG first is CPU 0
- If one DRNG node is not yet fully seeded → use of DRNG(Node 0)
- Each DRNG instance managed independently
- To prevent reseed storm reseed threshold different for each node
 - Node 0: 600 seconds
 - Node 1: 700 seconds
 - ...
- Maximum node number is compile time option




Data Processing Primitives

- Sole use of cryptographic mechanisms for data compression
- · Cryptographic primitives compile-time switchable
 - DRNG, Conditioning hash
 - Built-in: SP800-90A Hash DRBG SHA2-512 / SHA2-512
 - Available:
 - ChaCha20 DRNG
 - SP800-90A Hash DRBG SHA3-512
 - SHA3-512 conditioning function
 - Well-defined API to allow other cryptographic primitive implementations
- Complete cryptographic primitive testing available
 - Full ACVP test harness available: https://github.com/smuellerDD/acvpparser
 - ChaCha20 DRNG userspace implementation: https://github.com/smuellerDD/leancrypto
- Other data processing primitives
 - Concatenation of data
 - Truncation of message digest to heuristic entropy value
- Entropy behavior of all data processing primitives based on fully understood and uncontended operations

External Entropy Sources


- Use without additional conditioning fast source
 - Jitter RNG
 - Kernel RNG
 - CPU (e.g. Intel RDSEED, POWER DARN, RISC-V CSRRW, IBM Z PRNO)
 - Proper oversampling as defined by specification
 - Data immediately available when ESDM requests it
- Additional conditioning slow source
 - RNGDs
 - Arbitrary writers to /dev/random
 - All received data added to "auxiliary pool" with hash update operation
 - Data "trickles in" over time
- Every entropy source has individual entropy estimate
 - Taken at face value each ES requires its own entropy assessment



Mean Duration in Cycles for one IRQ


Internal ES: Interrupts

- Interrupt timing
 - All interrupts are treated as one entropy source
- Data collection executed in IRQ context
- Data compression executed partially in IRQ and process context
- Data compression is a hash update operation
- High performance: up to twice as fast as legacy /dev/random in IRQ context with continuous enabled
 - Even faster without continuous compression
- Kernel RNG lost acces to its primary IRQ ES→ ESDM reseeds kernel RNG periodically
- Requires small kernel patch + kernel module
 - Code present in ESDM source tree



Internal ES: IRQ Data Processing

- 8 LSB of time stamp divided by GCD concatenated into per-CPU collection pool
 - Entropy estimate
 - Health test
- 32 bits of other event data concatenated into per-CPU collection pool
- When array full → conditioned into per-CPU entropy pool
 - When entropy is required → conditioning of all entropy pools into one message digest
 - Addition of all per-CPU entropy estimates




Internal ES: Scheduler Events


- Scheduler-based context switch timing
 - All context switches are treated as one entropy source
- Data collection executed in scheduler context
 - Collection: adding data into collection array → high-performance (couple of cycles)
- Data compression executed in process context during reseeding of DRNG
- Data compression is a hash operation
- Requires small kernel patch + kernel module
 - Code present in ESDM source tree

Internal ES: Scheduler

Data Processing

- 8 LSB of time stamp divided by GCD concatenated into per-CPU collection pool
 - Entropy estimate
 - Health test
- When array full → overwriting of oldest value
- When entropy is required → conditioning of all entropy pools into one message digest
 - Addition of all per-CPU entropy estimates





Internal ES Testing Interfaces

- Testing code is compile time option
- Access via DebugFS
- Testing supports data collection at boot time and runtime:
 - Raw unprocessed entropy time stamps for Scheduler / IRQ ES
 - Performance data for ESDM's Scheduler handler
 - Performance data for ESDM's IRQ handler
- Scheduler ES: Full SP800-90B assessment documentation yet pending
- IRQ ES: Full SP800-90B assessment available
- Raw entropy collection and analysis tools provided

m	E 4	L C CC
Test System	Entropy of	Sufficient
	1,000,000 Traces	Entropy
ARMv7 rev 5	1.9344	Y
ARMv7 rev 5	7.07088	Y
(Freescale i.MX53) ²²		
ARMv7 rev 5	6.638399	Y
(Freescale i.MX6 Ultralite) ²³		
ARM 64 bit AppliedMicro X-Gene	5.599128	Y
Mustang Board		
Intel Atom Z530 – using GUI	3.38584	Y
Intel i7 7500U Skylake - 64-bit KVM	3.452064	Y
environment		
Intel i7 8565U Whiskey Lake – 64-bit	7.400136	Y
KVM environment		
Intel i7 8565U Whiskey Lake – 32-bit	7.405704	Y
KVM environment		
Intel i7 8565U Whiskey Lake	6.871	Y
Intel Xeon Gold 6234	4.434168	Y
IBM POWER 8 LE 8286-42A	6.830712	Y
IBM POWER 7 BE 8202-E4C	4.233912	Y
IBM System Z z13 (machine 2964)	4.366368	Y
IBM System Z z15 (machine 8561)	5.691832	Y
MIPS Atheros AR7241 rev 1 ²⁴	7.157064	Y
MIPS Lantiq 34Kc V5.6 ²⁵	7.032740	Y
Qualcomm IPQ4019 ARMv7 ²⁶	6.638405	Y
SiFive HiFive Unmatched RISC-V U74	2.387470	Y

Internal ES Health Test

- Health test compile-time configurable
- Power-Up self tests
 - All cryptographic mechanisms
 - Time stamp management
- APT / RCT
- Time-Stamp Pattern detection: 1st/2nd/3rd discrete derivative of time ≠ 0
- Blocking interface: Wait until APT power-up testing complete
- Provides SP800-90B compliance of internal ES

General Testing

- Automated regression test suite covering the different options of ESDM
 - Meson test harness
- Applied testing frameworks
 - ASAN: address, thread, undefined
 - Valgrind memory leak detector
 - clang-scan
- Performance tests of DRNG
- Interface validation testing
- Compile test testing all options

```
inia: Entering directory `/home/sm/tmp/esdm-0.3.0/build'
 4/52 HMAC SHA512
                                                                            3.01s
3.01s
3.01s
 4/52 Read /dev/random - w/o ESDM server
  /52 Read /dev/urandom - w/o ESDM server
  /52 Write /dev/random - w/o ESDM server
  /52 Write /dev/urandom - w/o ESDM server
                                                                            0.039
 0/52 ES Scheduler
 1/52 ESDM API call esdm status
32/52 ESDM API call esdm version
33/52 ESDM API call esdm get random bytes full
                                                                            0.209
34/52 ESDM API call esdm get random bytes
                                                                            0.24
35/52 ESDM API call esdm get random bytes min
                                                                            0.27
                          1ENT ES no ETPS
47/52 ESDM seed entropy - Sched ES, FIPS
exit status 77
48/52 System call getrandom
49/52 RPC call get random bytes full test
50/52 RPC call get_random_bytes_min_test
51/52 RPC call get random bytes test
52/52 RPC call status test
Expected Fail:
Unexpected Pass:
```

ESDM - Resources

- Code / Tests / Documentation: https://github.com/smuellerDD/esdm
- Testing conducted with
 - FIPS mode
 - Without FIPS mode
 - With SELinux enabled
 - Without SELinux
 - Production use

```
SDM library version: 0.5.0
DRNG name: builtin SP800-90A Hash DRBG
ESDM security strength in bits: 256
Number of DRNG instances: 8
Standards compliance: NTG.1
ESDM minimally seeded: true
ESDM fully seeded: true
ESDM entropy level: 520
Entropy Source 0 properties:
 Name: Interrupt
disabled - missing kernel support
Entropy Source 1 properties:
Name: Scheduler
disabled - missing kernel support
Entropy Source 2 properties:
 Name: JitterRNG
Available entropy: 256
Library version: 3040000
Entropy Source 3 properties:
Hash for compressing data: N/A
Available entropy: 8
Data multiplier: 1
Entropy Source 4 properties:
 Name: KernelRNG
Available entropy: 128
Entropy Rate per 256 data bits: 128
Entropy Source 5 properties:
Name: LinuxHWRand
Available entropy: 128
Entropy Rate per 256 data bits: 128
Entropy Source 6 properties:
Name: Auxiliarv
 Hash for operating entropy pool: builtin SHA-512
Available entropy: 0
```

```
cat /proc/sys/kernel/random/esdm type
ESDM library version: 0.5.0
DRNG name: builtin SP800-90A Hash DRBG
ESDM security strength in bits: 256
Number of DRNG instances: 19
Standards compliance: SP800-90C NTG.1
ESDM minimally seeded: true
ESDM fully seeded: true
ESDM entropy level: 1352
Entropy Source 0 properties:
Name: Interrupt
Hash for operating entropy pool: sha512
Available entropy: 960
per-CPU interrupt collection size: 1024
Standards compliance: SP800-90B
High-resolution timer: true
Continuous compression: true
Entropy Source 1 properties:
Name: Scheduler
Hash for operating entropy pool: sha512
Available entropy: 0
per-CPU scheduler event collection size: 1024
Standards compliance: SP800-90B
High-resolution timer: true
Entropy Source 2 properties:
Name: JitterRNG
Available entropy: 256
Library version: 3040000
Entropy Source 3 properties:
Name: CPU
Hash for compressing data: N/A
Available entropy: 8
Data multiplier: 1
Entropy Source 4 properties:
Name: KernelRNG
Available entropy: 0
Entropy Rate per 256 data bits: 0
Entropy Source 5 properties:
Name: LinuxHWRand
Available entropy: 128
Entropy Rate per 256 data bits: 128
Entropy Source 6 properties:
Name: Auxiliary
Hash for operating entropy pool: builtin SHA-512
Available entropy: 0
```