

Populist Parties and Quality of Democracy

Lauth, Hans-Joachim und Schlenkrich, Oliver

05.06.2019


Consequences of Populist Parties for the Quality of Democracy?

- ▶ On the one hand: Broadening of the electorate through inclusion of the “left behind”
- ▶ On the other hand: Declining Quality of Democracy due to Authoritarian Populist Rule
- ▶ *Any References?*

What is a “Populist” Party? How can we measure it?


- ▶ three defining elements:
 1. anti-elite rhetoric
 2. thin ideology
 3. anti-pluralistic
- ▶ Indicators of Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2014:
 1. “salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric” (0: not important; 10: important)
 2. “position of the party in 2014 in terms of its overall ideological stance” (0: left; 10: right)

Distribution of these two variables




- ▶ anti-elite-salience is right-skewed (more parties without anti-elite rhetoric)
- ▶ ideological stance is slightly left-skewed (slightly more right-wing parties)

Classification I




- ▶ vertical line represents threshold
- ▶ *change 95% confidence intervals? change threshold placement?*

Classification II



- ▶ vertical lines represents threshold: extremist left parties; extremist right parties
- ▶ *change 95% confidence intervals? change thresholds placement?*


Populist Parties per Country



► there are a lot of populist parties...


Populist Parties per Country: Vote Share

Populist Parties per country (Since 2000; Vote Share in Elections)




► ... but most of them are not relevant

Populist Parties: Votes and Seats




- ▶ number of seats and votes for populist parties across european countries is increasing since 1990

Populist Parties: Cabinets



- populists capture more cabinet positions (with a spike in 2015)

Populist Parties and Quality of Democracy



- ▶ we examine a mostly slight regression of DQ for some countries since 2010 (Turkey; Hungary; Poland; but also for Croatia, Germany, Romania, Sweden, Spain, UK)

TSCS: Basics

- ▶ Violations of the OLS assumptions by combining cross-sectional and time-series data:
 - ▶ Unit Root
 - ▶ Serial Correlation
 - ▶ Unit Heterogeneity
 - ▶ Panel Heteroskedasticity and Contemporaneous Errors

TSCS Regression: Total Value Index

Table 1: Table of TSCS Results (within-Model; PCSEs)

	Total Value Index (Context)
total_index_context_lag	1.055*** (0.038) p = 0.000
populist_in_cabinet	0.002 (0.003) p = 0.604
populist_percent_seats	-0.010 (0.007) p = 0.155
populist_is_prime_minister	-0.013* (0.007) p = 0.073
populist_party_exists	-0.006** (0.003) p = 0.024

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

TSCS Regression: Freedom Value Index

Table 2: Table of TSCS Results (within-Model; PCSEs)

	Freedom Value Index (Context)
freedom_dim_index_context_lag	0.982*** (0.036) p = 0.000
populist_in_cabinet	0.001 (0.003) p = 0.729
populist_percent_seats	-0.009 (0.007) p = 0.222
populist_is_prime_minister	-0.011** (0.006) p = 0.050
populist_party_exists	-0.006** (0.003) p = 0.037

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

TSCS Regression: Equality Value Index

Table 3: Table of TSCS Results (within-Model; PCSEs)

	Equality Value Index (Context)
equality_dim_index_context_lag	0.968*** (0.030) p = 0.000
populist_in_cabinet	0.001 (0.003) p = 0.684
populist_percent_seats	-0.014* (0.008) p = 0.066
populist_is_prime_minister	-0.003 (0.005) p = 0.640
populist_party_exists	-0.006** (0.002) p = 0.024

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

TSCS Regression: Control Value Index

Table 4: Table of TSCS Results (within-Model; PCSEs)

	Control Value Index (Context)
control_dim_index_context_lag	1.108*** (0.047) p = 0.000
populist_in_cabinet	0.003 (0.004) p = 0.479
populist_percent_seats	-0.014* (0.008) p = 0.083
populist_is_prime_minister	0.0002 (0.010) p = 0.985
populist_party_exists	-0.006** (0.003) p = 0.035

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

References