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BOOK II OF Hume's *Treatise*—especially its first two Parts on the "indirect passions" of pride, humility, love, and hatred—has mystified many of its interpreters.[1] Hume clearly thinks these passions are important: Not only does he devote more space to them than to his treatment of causation, but in the "Abstract" to the *Treatise,* he tells us that Book II "contains opinions that are altogether as new and extraordinary" (T 659) as those found in Book I. And, he says, these opinions constitute "the foundation" (T 646) for his treatment of morals and politics in Book III.[2] The mystery arises, however, because in the actual text of

[1] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature,* L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed.; 2d ed., P. H. Nidditch, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978). References to the *Treatise* will be given in the body of the paper with the abbreviation 'T.' I will refer to Books, Parts, and Sections of the *Treatise* by large Roman numerals, small Roman numerals, and Arabic numerals respectively. I will also make citations to Hume's "A Dissertation on the Passions," (in T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, eds., *Philosophical Works* [Darmstadt: Scientia Verlag Aalen, 1964], Vol. IV, 139–166) in the text of paper, using the abbreviation 'DP.'

[2] In a letter to his close friend Michael Ramsay, written in 1737 shortly after Hume had left La Flèche having completed much of the *Treatise,* he says: "I shall submit all my Performances to your Examination, & to make you enter into them more easily, I desire of you, if you have Leizure, to read once over La Recherche de la Verité of Pere Malebranche, the Principles of Human Knowledge by Dr Berkeley, some of the more metaphysical articles of Bailes Dictionary, such as those [. . . of] Zeno, & Spinoza. Des-Cartes Meditations would also be useful but don't know if you will find it easily among your Acquaintances[.] These Books will make you easily comprehend the metaphysical Parts of my Reasoning and as to the rest, they have *so little Dependence on all former systems of Philosophy, that your natural Good Sense will afford you Light enough to judge of their Force & Solidity*" (included in R. Popkin, "So, Hume did Read Berkeley," in R. A. Watson and J. E. Force, eds., *The High Road to Pyrrhonism* [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993], 291; italics added, the interpolation is Popkin's). Note that, once again, Hume is confident that his readers will have an easy time making sense of his work on the passions. Also, he makes it clear that his discussion of the passions involves a break from previous methods of treating the passions; and indeed, it is quite unlike the quasi-physiological treatments of Malebranche or Descartes. For a discussion of the relation of Book II of the *Treatise* to other eighteenth-century accounts of the passions, see Jane McIntyre, "Hume's 'New and Extraordinary Account of the Passions,' " presented at the 22nd International Hume Society Meeting, Park City, Utah, 1995.

Book II Hume never spells out what makes his opinions on the passions "new and extraordinary," nor why they are foundational for his moral theory.

Thus some of his interpreters, notably Norman Kemp Smith, conclude that Hume was simply mistaken in his assessment of his treatment of the passions. While his accounts of the will and of motivation (in the early Sections of Part iii of Book II) are significant, Kemp Smith takes the extended analysis of the indirect passions to spring merely from his misplaced enthusiasm for associationist psychology. As such, the philosophical lessons to be learned from the first two Parts of Book II are slim.[3] Páll Árdal, in contrast, tries to construct for Hume what he seems to have omitted—a philosophical rationale for his obvious interest in the indirect passions. Árdal starts by drawing attention to the role these passions play in Hume's moral philosophy, in particular, his repeatedly connecting the indirect passions to the moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. Árdal concludes that Hume means to equate the moral sentiments with particular kinds of indirect passions. The first two Parts of Book II are of interest, on Árdal's reading, because it is there that he shows us how moral sentimentalism can be founded on something more fully naturalistic than Hutcheson's somewhat mysterious "moral sense."[4]

I argue against Árdal's interpretation in §2. But this reopens the problem of accounting for Hume's interest in the indirect passions. I offer my view in §§3–5 where, like Árdal, I provide a reconstruction of Hume's discussion of these passions in order to show how it has an underlying philosophical motivation. My claim is that Hume relies on the indirect passions to explain how we form beliefs about persons as bearers of features that make them into who

[3] Kemp Smith comments: "More than a third of Book II is employed in the treatment of four passions [the indirect passions] which have no very direct bearing upon Hume's ethical problems, and play indeed no really distinctive part in his system" (*The Philosophy of David Hume* [London: Macmillan, 1940], 160). John Passmore offers a brief and dismissive discussion of Hume's treatment of the indirect passion (*Hume's Intentions*, 3d ed. [London: Duckworth, 1980], 124–129). Louis Loeb says: "If one's familiarity with Book II were limited to II.i.1, II i.11, and II.iii.1–3, his understanding of Hume's moral theory . . . would not be significantly impaired " ("Hume's Moral Sentiments and the Structure of the *Treatise*," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 15 [1977]: 403). Others among Hume's interpreters who seem to agree with this assessment of Book II include: T. H. Green who, in his introduction to the *Treatise* included in the *Philosophical Works* (Vol. I, 1–299; Vol. II, 1–71), devotes only six pages to the indirect passions, while including an extensive discussion of the account of the will and motivation given in II.iii.1–3. Barry Stroud similarly limits his discussion to these portions of Book II (*Hume* [London: Routledge, 1977]), as does John Mackie (*Hume's Moral Theory* [London: Routledge, 1980]).

[4] Páll Árdal, *Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise*, 2d ed. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1989); "Another Look at Hume's Account of Moral Evaluation," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 15 (1977): 405–421; and "Depression and Reason," *Ethics* 103 (1993): 540–550. Among those who accept Árdal's view are: Phillip Mercer, *Sympathy and Ethics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972); Walter Brand, *Hume's Theory of Moral Judgment* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992); and Paul Russell, *Freedom and Moral Sentiment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

they are. It is by feeling an indirect passion towards someone that we think of her as more than accidentally related to some quality, such as her country, her riches, her family, or even her character traits. In support of my interpretation I point to the many parallels Hume draws between the indirect passions and the associative mechanism he offers to explain our forming causal beliefs (I.iii). And I suggest that, just as Hume's associative explanation of causal beliefs is necessitated by his scepticism about intrinsic "necessary connexions," so also his associative mechanism for our beliefs about persons—the indirect passions—is necessitated by a certain kind of scepticism about persons. This is not the scepticism about persons that we find in "Of personal identity" (I.iv.6), where Hume argues against the view that our perceptions inhere in a simple soul; it is rather a scepticism about there being intrinsic features of persons that define them as who they are.

But, before I explain in more detail what my claim amounts to, it will help to have available a brief description of the mechanism that Hume's takes to explain the indirect passions.

1. THE MECHANISM FOR THE INDIRECT PASSIONS

A passion, for Hume, is a simple impression felt in response to various circumstances. Because of their simplicity, we cannot define passions by putting their characteristic feeling into words; instead, Hume thinks, we can only delineate "such circumstances, as attend them" (T 277). Passions are indirect if those circumstances include as an outcome the focusing of attention onto a person, either oneself, in pride and humility, or someone else, in love and hatred; Hume calls the person in question the *object* of the indirect passion (T 277). (Direct passions, such as fear, hope, desire, or aversion, do not have objects in this technical sense, although they usually have intentional objects in one way or another—desire is *for* something, fear is *of* something). Hume points out that, in the case of the indirect passions, in addition to an object or person towards whom they are directed, there must be something in virtue of which we come to feel positively or negatively towards that person. There must be a *cause* of the passion which we find pleasant or painful independently of its connection to the object (T 278, 285, 286, 289).[5] And thus for the cause to bring about an indirect passion, rather than merely our approval or disapproval of it, it must be linked up with the object of the passion; their ideas must be related in the mind of the person feeling the passion (T 285). (In order for someone to take pride in something, for example, she must think of it as *hers* in

[5] Hume further decomposes the cause into the *quality*, the pleasing or displeasing aspect of the cause, and the *subject*, the cause insofar as it bears the quality (T 279). This distinction is not relevant for the purposes of my discussion.

some sense.) This relation of ideas allows the impression of pleasure or pain felt in response to the cause to be converted into the impression of pleasure or pain that constitutes the passion itself. And by "an original quality" (T 280, 286) of the mind, our view is then "fix'd" on the object of the passion (T 277, 286, 290). Hume calls this entire associational process "the double relation of ideas and impressions" (T 286), since there is a relation of ideas between those of the cause and of the object and a relation of impressions between the pleasure or pain felt in response to the cause and the pleasure or pain felt towards the object.

In figure 1 (see page 473), I have illustrated Hume's account with the example of my pride in my fine house (here, and throughout the rest of the paper, I will follow Hume's lead by using pride as a paradigm for all the indirect passions). In this example, the house is the cause of the passion; I am its object. The fineness of the house causes me pleasure which, because of the association of the ideas of myself and of the house (the causal relation of ownership), is "converted" (T 286) into the resembling impression of pleasure at myself for owning such a fine house.

Before I turn to the question of the relevance of the indirect passions to Hume's project, two quirks in his account must be noted. First, his requirement that these passions must have causes that are different from their objects is somewhat non-standard. Hume simply rules out the possibility, for example, that we might feel love for someone overall, not on the basis of one of his qualities (in Book III, however, he introduces the idea of "due" pride—an overall self-confidence—as a virtue [T 596–601]). Second, he uses the terms 'pride,' 'humility,' 'love,' and 'hatred' in a very general way; any positive or negative feeling we have for someone on the basis of some of her or his qualities falls under one of these headings (T 448). Hume makes no real attempt to distinguish pride, for example, from vanity, self-esteem, self-satisfaction, or the other positive forms of self-evaluation. Árdal suggests, not inappropriately, that these two odd features of Hume's usage makes the indirect-passion names into something akin to technical terms.[6]

2. ÁRDAL'S INTERPRETATION

What is the significance of this complex mechanism that Hume takes to lie behind the indirect passions? Árdal's suggestion is that Hume devotes so much of Book II to these passions in order to have them available for Book III's account of morality; on his interpretation, feeling a moral sentiment of approval towards someone just is having a calm, impartial, version of the indirect passion of love, where the person is the object of the passion and her mental

[6] Árdal, *Passion and Value*, xii–xvii.

Figure 1

The structure of the indirect passions, using my pride in my house as an example. For love and hatred, the object of the passion is replaced with another person; for humility and hatred, the hedonic value of the two impressions are reversed from pleasure to pain.



qualities are its cause.[7] (Pride, humility, and hatred play similar roles, on this view, in the approval of oneself and the disapproval of oneself or others.) Árdal's interpretation relies on the following passage for its "key" text:[8] "The pain or pleasure, which arises from the general survey or view of any . . . quality of the *mind,* constitutes its vice or virtue, and gives rise to our *approbation or blame, which is nothing but a fainter and more imperceptible love or hatred*" (T 614; emphasis added on the final clause only). Here Hume does seem to *equate* our approving of virtue with our loving its possessor and our blaming vice with our hating her or him, at least insofar as these passions emerge from a "general survey." And, elsewhere, Hume does repeatedly link the indirect passions to the moral sentiments. For example, he says that we "may pronounce any *quality* of the mind virtuous, which causes love or pride; and any one vicious, which causes hatred or humility" (T 575). Virtue and vice are treated in the first of the several

[7] Árdal, *Passion and Value,* Chapter 6. Árdal re-commits himself to this view in two later essays, "Another Look," and "Depression and Reason."

[8] Árdal, *Passion and Value,* 113.

Sections devoted to particular causes of pride and humility (II.i.7); he describes virtue and vice as the "most obvious causes of these passions" (T 295) and as included among their "natural and more immediate causes" (T 303). And later he says that the indirect passions are "perhaps the most considerable effect that virtue and vice have upon the human mind" (T 473). It is undeniable that Hume sees a close connection between the indirect passions and the moral sentiments.

The text, however, is not unambiguously in favor of Árdal's interpretation of this connection.[9] We saw in §1 that the indirect passions presuppose a cause which produces an impression of pain or pleasure *independently* of the occurrence of the passions. Accordingly, mental qualities can produce these passions only if they cause an independent impression of pleasure or pain. And it is this immediate response to virtue and vice that Hume seems to identify with the moral sentiments:

> To approve of a character [i.e., a mental quality] is to feel an original delight upon its appearance. To disapprove of it is to be sensible of an uneasiness. The pain and pleasure, therefore . . . must . . . be the causes of all their [virtue's and vice's] effects, and consequently of pride and humility, which are the unavoidable attendants of that distinction. (T 296)[10]

Hume's point here seems to be that the indirect passions will always *accompany* the moral sentiments, not that they *are* the moral sentiments. And thus, elsewhere, he says that the moral "sentiments *produce* love and hatred" (T 591,

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[9] Thomas Hearn ("Árdal on the Moral Sentiments in Hume's *Treatise*," *Philosophy* 48 [1973]: 288–292) and Loeb ("Hume's Moral Sentiments") also criticize Árdal's interpretation; Árdal has responded to them in "Another Look." Hearn's primary criticism of Árdal is similar to the first of the ones I consider below. I think, however, that Hearn misses his mark in two other cases. First, he says that the fact that Hume thinks that animals have the indirect passions without having moral sentiments (T 326) raises a problem for Árdal ("Árdal," 291). But since Hume denies that animals have the capacity to take the "general survey" which is necessary to discern the "qualities of mind" that cause the moral sentiments (T 326), Árdal is rightly unconcerned by the problem Hearn raises ("Another Look," 415). Second, Hearn points out that whereas the indirect passions of love and hatred have practical effects (namely, benevolence or anger [II.ii.6, T 382, etc.]), the moral sentiments need not move one to act (T 586) ("Árdal," 292). But Hume is not as single-minded on these issues as Hearn supposes. He says, for example, that love is accompanied by benevolence only "upon the ideas of the happiness or misery of our friend or enemy being presented by the imagination . . . The passions . . . may subsist a considerable time, without our reflecting on the happiness or misery of their objects" (T 367–8). And he is also willing to say that benevolence or anger are regular attendants of the moral sentiments (T 591). Árdal points to this last passage in order to parry Hearn's criticism ("Another Look," 415).

[10] This quotation occurs as Hume considers the second of two possible explanations of virtue and vice, the first of which sees morality as merely reflecting self-interest or education (T 295) and the second of which sees it as "real" and natural (T 296); either way, he concludes, vice or virtue will cause humility or pride. Given that Hume, in Book III, endorses this second option, at least for the "natural" virtues, I take it that the quotation indicates how Hume thinks that pride arises from virtue on his own account.

emphasis added). The point is put quite clearly in Hume's later reworking of Book II, "A Dissertation on the Passions": "Virtue . . . produces always a pleasure distinct from the pride or self-satisfaction which attends it: Vice, an uneasiness separate from the humility or remorse" (DP 147); these distinct pleasures and pains are identified with approbation and disapprobation.[11]

The case against Árdal's interpretation is strengthened by recognizing that the indirect passions and the moral sentiments have different intentional objects. The former are directed towards persons (either ourselves or others), whereas Hume generally (there are exceptions) describes the latter as directed towards "characters" or "mental qualities."[12] Note, however, that since the moral sentiments are caused by qualities that are closely connected to their

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[11] Árdal suggests that the independent pleasures or pains attending those indirect passions that he identifies with the moral sentiments are reactions to actions viewed independently of their character-sources ("Another Look," 409, 414, 420; "Depression and Reason," 549). This suggestion seems implausible in light of the many passages where Hume says that it is impossible to assess actions independently in this way (T 349, 411, 477)

Hearn takes the pleasant or unpleasant response to virtue or vice to be a direct passion ("Árdal," 290). Loeb argues against this view: Whereas the taxonomy of impressions given at the start of Book II restricts the term 'passion' to violent reflective impressions (i.e. impressions which, though they can have calm manifestations, *tend* to occur violently), Hume describes our evaluations as generally calm (T 276). Loeb classifies the moral sentiments as reflective impressions which are non-passional emotions. He concludes from this that Árdal's thesis must be wrong (since if the moral sentiments are not passions, they cannot be indirect passions) and that, since Book II is devoted to exploring the violent reflective impressions (passions as they are "properly call'd" [T 276]), there is almost nothing relevant to Hume's moral theory to be found in it ("Hume's Moral Sentiments").

Although Árdal makes some useful, if not decisive, points against Loeb's interpretation of Hume's taxonomy ("Another Look," 410–411), my view is that the issue Loeb raises is in fact not very interesting. Árdal's thesis can be criticized on other points, and there are straightforward reasons that are independent of Árdal's thesis to suppose that Book II is relevant for understanding Book III. In particular, the prominence given to the treatment of the indirect passions in Book II, together with the tight link Hume repeatedly makes between these passions and the moral sentiments suggest that these passions play a central role in his moral theory. I offer my interpretation of this role in the sections that follow. As for whether or not moral sentiments can be correctly labeled 'direct passions': Given that Hume nowhere directly calls the moral sentiments 'passions,' I lean towards Loeb's view that these sentiments are not passions, in the technical (if admittedly "inexact") sense of T 276, although they do seem to be aptly characterized as direct. At any rate, Hume thinks that the moral sentiments are able to influence action (T 457), and thus they must fall on the passion side of the reason/passion dichotomy used in III.iii.3.

[12] Annette Baier also makes this point (*A Progress of Sentiments* [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991], 134, 308 n.10). Árdal seems to thinks that it is just obvious that morality is concerned with evaluations of people (*Passion and Value*, ix; "Another Look," 412; "Depression and Reason," 548). Hume is not especially clear on what the moral sentiments are responses to. In the primary portions of the text where he presents his own view of moral evaluation, III.i.2 and III.iii, he uses the following terms to describe that to which the moral sentiments respond: "characters" (T 471, 472, 475, 575, 577, 579, 580, 581, 584, 589, 591, 592, 599, 602, 603, 604, 609, 612, 617), "mental qualities" (T 574, 575, 577, 578, 579, 581, 587, 590, 591, 598, 606, 618), "persons" (T 575, 581, 582, 584, 592), "actions" (T 471, 472, 475, 614, 617).

possessors, and since these qualities elicit from us pleasant or unpleasant sentiments (approval or disapproval), they qualify as causes of the indirect passions. Once more, we see that pride or love, humility or hatred will arise, not *as* the moral sentiments, but as *consequences* of them; our attention will be turned from the virtues or vices, to their possessor: "We approve of his character, and love his person" (T 602) when we recognize someone's virtue.[13]

We can conclude from this textual examination that Árdal's thesis must be rejected. To be fair, though, it should be recognized that Hume admits that the associated impressions involved in the double relation definitive of the indirect passions are "in a manner inseparable" (T 289). Since it is not possible to come across a virtue that is not located in a person, it is plausible to think that our approval of it will be thoroughly mixed up with the attendant love of its possessor. I take it that the quotation above, T 614, which gives Árdal's thesis its strongest support, is a case (albeit a singular one) of Hume's not bothering to unmix the complex response we have to people and their virtuous characters. Elsewhere, as we have seen, he is clear that the indirect passions are better understood as accompanying the moral sentiments.

But beyond the textual issue, Árdal's substantive interpretive suggestion that the indirect passions, when put to use in moral evaluation, allow Hume to give a naturalistic account of the moral sense also seems mistaken. Hume does, of course, try to offer such an account, but he is quite clear that the central move in it is his recognition of the influence of what he calls sympathy, a process of emotional "contagion" such that we automatically come to feel what others around us are feeling (T 317–318). As he says in the "Conclusion" to Book III's treatment of morals, it is "sympathy [that] is the chief source of moral distinctions" (T 618), because sympathy is what lets us take the disinterested pleasure or pain in people's character traits that qualifies as moral approbation or disapprobation.

But, without Árdal's thesis, two central questions remain unanswered: If Hume does not mean to equate the indirect passions with the moral sentiments, why does he emphasize their connection so strongly? And, more importantly, why does he think that these passions are important enough to deserve the extensive treatment we find in Book II?

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[13] There is one further notable difference between the indirect passions and the moral sentiments. Hume is positively enthusiastic about analogizing these sentiments to our gustatory, aesthetic, and other sorts of evaluations (e.g., T 472, 576, 617). But, if Árdal is right, there would be no structural similarity among these different forms of approbation. We would approve of a person's virtue by loving him, but we would respond to a good wine with a calm *direct* passion. Hume, however, gives no sign that he expects such different forms of approbation in these different cases (Hearn also makes this point, "Árdal," 292). Note that Árdal recognizes this consequence of his view, but finds it untroubling (*Passion and Value*, 123; "Another Look," 416).

3. SCEPTICISM ABOUT PERSONS IN BOOK II

Unlike Árdal, who looks forward to Book III to make sense of Book II and thus to answer these questions, I find it more useful to look back to Book I, and especially to its account of causation, to guide my interpretation. Hume himself tells us that:

> To illustrate this hypothesis [concerning the indirect passions], we may compare it to that, by which I have already explain'd the belief attending the judgments, which we form from causation. I have observ'd, that in all judgments of this kind, there is always a present impression, and a related idea; and that the present impression gives a vivacity to the fancy, and the relation conveys this vivacity, by an easy transition, to the related idea. Without the present impression, the attention is not fix'd, nor the spirits excited. Without the relation, this attention rests on its first object, and has no farther consequence. *There is evidently a great analogy* betwixt that hypothesis, and our present one of an impression and idea, that transfuse themselves into another impression and idea by means of their double relation: Which analogy must be allow'd to be no despicable proof of both hypotheses. (T 290; emphasis added)

Hume draws our attention here to the way in which the associative mechanism involved in the indirect passions is similar to the associative mechanism involved in our making causal judgements. In each case, we come to focus our attention on an idea, the vivacity of which has been heightened by its association with impressions.

Hume provided the associative mechanism responsible for producing causal judgements as a result of his sceptical arguments about causation. Demonstrative reasoning cannot discern necessary connections between objects, since the ideas of those objects can always be separated in the imagination. And, Hume argues, our experience only shows us that two objects *have been* connected in the past; it cannot tell us that they *will continue to be* connected in the future (I.iii.6). He concludes that our causal judgements must be a result merely of our tendency to associate together the ideas of the cause and of the effect; when we encounter one of them, our mind automatically moves to entertain the idea of the other simply because it has been accustomed to experiencing the two objects conjointly. The necessary connection that we attribute to causally connected objects turns out to be a projection onto them of our mind's tendency to associate their ideas (T 165–167).

Now, given that Hume offers his account of the associative mechanism responsible for causal beliefs only after this sceptical argument, what might explain his presentation of the indirect passions as an admittedly analogous associative mechanism? My suggestion is that Hume recognizes that a sceptical argument about persons, similar to the argument about causation, can be constructed.

The starting point for this argument is not the necessary connections be-

tween objects recognized in causal beliefs, but a special kind of connection that we recognize between people and some of their features. For among the numerous features we each possess, only some of them are taken to make a difference to who we are, to set us apart from others, to define us as particular kinds of persons. For example, although it might be true of me that I saw snow on January 5, 1973, or that I have always remained between the latitudes of 20°N and 55° N, these facts do not get at what makes me into the person I am. A list of the features that define me would need to start with such things as my name, my family and its history, my profession, some of the important events and commitments in my life, and so on. Hume points to the difference between these two ways of looking at facts about persons by saying that the features that make a difference to who we are "are . . . consider'd as connected to our being and existence," whereas the other features that seem incidental to us are "in a manner separated from us" (T 302).

Throughout Books II and III of the *Treatise* Hume relies on the fact that only some of our features play a role in making us into who we are. For example, he says that before we can hold someone responsible for an action we must recognize it as being "infixed" (T 411) upon him in such a way that "we can never think of him without reflecting on . . . [the] qualities" (T 349) from which the action springs; this leaves open the possibility that some of his actions do not get integrated into our understanding of who he is. Hume also devotes a section to explaining the phenomenon he calls "the love of relations" (II.ii.4), the fact that when someone shares a significant feature with us—he notes those with whom we share "consanguinity," as well as "our country-men,[14] our neighbours, those of the same trade, profession, and even name with ourselves" (T 352)—we love her merely for having that quality. Sympathy is similarly influenced by the features we take to make a difference to who someone is, in that the transferral of sentiments is facilitated when there is a meaningful feature common to the sympathetic communicants, such as "any peculiar similarity in our manners, or character, or country, or language" (T 318). Hume introduces the idea of a moral "point of view" in Book III in order to correct for this distortion of our sympathetic tendencies (T 581–582).

Given that Hume clearly recognizes the existence of some features of persons that define them as who they are, the question remains of how he can account for our ability to recognize the special place of these features. What is the status of the connection—I will call it an *existential connection* after Hume's

[14] For a discussion of Hume's personal and philosophical attitudes towards countries and nations, see D. Ainslie, "The Problem of the National Self in Hume's Theory of Justice," *Hume Studies* 21 (1995): 289–313.

usage at T 302 (quoted above)—between a person and the features that make her into who she is?

In answering this question, we must first note that Hume seems to take these existential connections to be objective, in that he views the language someone speaks, her nationality, profession, or family as defining her independently of her attitudes towards them. Even if she were to deny the relevance of her family, say, to her being who she is, this denial does not take away from the contribution of her family history to her (see, e.g., T 323–324). And Hume seems right here. In contemporary Western culture, especially North American culture, for example, someone's race (sexuality, ethnicity, gender, etc.) has an existential connection with her independently of her own feelings about it. In eighteenth-century Britain, a person's rank (noble, squire, "the people,"[15] etc.) or religion would play a similarly dominant role in defining someone existentially.[16] Philosophers of the early modern period, however, tended to focus not on these social features as person-defining, but instead emphasized such things as our faculty of reason or our relation to God as what is essential to who we are. Locke, for example, thinks that reason is that "which God hath given to be . . . the common bond whereby humane kind is united into one fellowship and societie."[17] For Leibniz, God's "social bond with us is the cardinal point of morality."[18] Clarke thinks our sense of our dependent relationship with God should guide us in our daily lives in that we should recognize that God, as the source of our reason, has meant for us to respect the "fitnesses" and "unfitnesses" of things.[19]

Given the seeming objectivity of these existential connections, one would expect that they could be discerned by the understanding. But, using the resources of Book I—which revealed the understanding to consist of demonstrative and causal reasoning—Hume would be unable to account for our ability to recognize this special kind of connection. We only experience one another as series of events springing from a common causal source (and this notion of a causal source is itself fictional Hume tells us [I.i.6; cf. I.iv.3]). What

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[15] See Harvey Chisick, "David Hume and the Common People," in P. Jones, ed., *The Science of Man in the Scottish Enlightenment* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1989), 5-32, for a discussion of Hume's conception of "the people."

[16] Hume's *History of England* (William B. Todd, ed., [Indianapolis: Liberty/Classics, 1987]) includes a set of Appendices that constitutes a detailed analysis of the evolution of rank in England.

[17] John Locke, "Second Treatise of Government," in P. Laslett, ed., *Two Treatises of Government*, student edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), §172.

[18] G. W. Leibniz, *New Essays on Human Understanding*, P. Remnant and J. Bennett, eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 237.

[19] Samuel Clarke, "A Discourse of Natural Religion," in D. D. Raphael, ed., *British Moralists: 1650–1800*, Vol. 1 (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991), 200–201.

would explain our ability to discern only some of these events as having an existential connection with us? What singles out from among the many facts that are true of us the few that play a role in making us into who we are? It cannot be demonstrative reasoning that does this because there is nothing internal to the idea of a person that requires some subset of her features to define her. It cannot be causal reasoning that does it, because it is causal reasoning that allows us to discern the various features of a person in the first place. It cannot then also pick out from among these features those that are person-defining.[20] This means that something more than merely causal or demonstrative reasoning must be involved in our ability to identify one another as bearers of person-defining markers; existential connections—like necessary connections—are not rationally discernible. Hence we can see that Hume is a sceptic about persons in Book II in the same way that he is a sceptic about causation in Book I: He denies that our everyday beliefs in a certain domain (the connections between objects, the features that define people) accurately reflect reality as it exists independent of human reactions.

Once Hume discovers that he cannot account for our recognizing necessary connections in terms of our having rational insight into facts about the world, he offers an alternative account for our believing in these connections in terms of the association of ideas. My suggestion is that Hume takes the indirect passions to be analogous to this associative mechanism in that the indirect passions are also meant as an explanation for beliefs that cannot be accounted for in any other way. Since our recognizing existential connections does not reflect rational insight into an independent world, we must believe in them simply because our minds are configured so as to form such beliefs in certain circumstances. If my suggestion can be supported, we could see why Hume devotes so much energy to the indirect passions—namely, because they are the mechanism by which we recognize existential connections and because he takes these connections to be essential to an understanding of how we relate to one another socially and morally. To test this suggestion, let us consider whether the indirect passions actually can explain our beliefs in existential connections.

The associative mechanism involved in causation produces causal beliefs by 'fixing' our attention on an idea that has been enlivened; we fix our attention, for example, on a vivacious idea of the heat from a fire, even while being too distant from it to register its temperature for ourselves. And having a lively

[20] Even if there has been some sort of special regularity in someone's defining features in the past—a regularity which causal reasoning would allow us to project into the future—what guarantees that this regularity will continue to play the same defining role in her life? We can easily imagine the transformation of a noble, whose rank is one of his defining features, into someone whose nobility is irrelevant to making him into who he is *even while he continues to be noble* (consider, for example, a penniless earl, who emigrates to the North American prairies).

idea such as this is all that belief amounts to, according to Hume. The outcome of the indirect passions is, as we have seen, the fixing of attention on the idea of self, where that is defined as the "succession of related ideas and impression, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness" (T 277).[21] Can this fixing of attention amount to a belief in an existential connection? Hume's definition of self here makes this question harder than it need be, in that this definition seems quite close to the definition of the *mind* as a bundle of perceptions that emerged from the discussion of personal identity in Book I ("the true idea of the human mind, is to consider it as a system of different perceptions . . . , which are link'd together by the relation of cause and effect . . . ." [T 261]). Thus most commentators have assumed that Hume means to say that the object of pride is this "true" idea of mind.[22] But there are four reasons for thinking that this equation of the self of Book I with the self of Book II is too quick.

First, Hume himself warns us in his treatment of personal identity that his topic there is only self "as it regards our thought or imagination," that is, the self as mind or as soul.[23] He distinguishes this from self "as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves" (T 253; cf. T 261), which is presumably among the topics of Book II. Second, Hume makes it clear that

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[21] Also: "[T]he peculiar object of pride and humility is determin'd by an original and natural instinct, and that 'tis absolutely impossible, from the primary constitution of the mind, that these passions should ever look beyond self, or that individual person, of whose actions and sentiments each of us is intimately conscious" (T 286). "As the immediate *object* of pride and humility is self or that identical person, of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are intimately conscious; so the *object* of love or hatred is some other person, of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are not conscious" (T 329).

Note that there is a certain ambiguity in Hume's usage over whether the object of pride is self or the *idea* of self. His point, I take it, is that in feeling pride we think of ourselves by attending to the idea of self. The "succession of related ideas and impressions" in the official definition of the object of pride (T 277), then, points to the perceptions we experience during the duration of our feeling of pride (T 399).

[22] This view is extremely common in the literature. See, e.g., Nicholas Capaldi, *Hume's Place in Moral Philosophy* (New York: Peter Lang, 1989), 168ff.; Terence Penelhum, *Hume* (London: Macmillan, 1975), 87; Mackie, *Hume's Moral Theory*, 160. Even Penelhum ("Self-identity and Self-regard," in A. O. Rorty, ed., *The Identities of Persons* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976], 253–280), Amelie Rorty (" 'Pride Produces the Idea of Self': Hume on Moral Agency," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 68 [1990]: 255–269) and J. L. McIntyre ("Personal Identity and the Passions," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 27 [1989]: 545–557), who try to use Hume's distinction between personal identity "as it regards our passions" and personal identity "as it regards our thought" (T 253) to make sense of the rich notion of self he uses after moving beyond Book I, continue to assume that the object of pride is the "true idea" from "Of personal identity."

[23] Throughout the section on personal identity Hume uses the terms 'self' (T 251, 252, 253, 254, 262), 'person' (T 251, 253, 259, 260, 262), and 'soul' (T 254, 261) as synonyms for 'mind' (T 253, 259, 260, 261, 263). In Book II, Hume treats 'person' and 'self' as interchangeable terms (cf. e.g., T 286, 329).

most people, indeed all of us when engaged in "common life," do not have available the idea of self as a bundle of perceptions: "[I]n common life, 'tis evident these ideas of self and person are never very fix'd nor determinate;" only those who "have recourse to the most profound metaphysics" (T 189–90) will have formulated anything like the "true idea" from "Of personal identity" (I.iv.6). Hume's point is that only those who engage in his 'science of man' will have made the introspective moves necessary to think of their minds as "bundles or collections of different perceptions" (T 252).[24] Third, even with Hume's nonstandard usage of 'pride,' it would be strange to say that we think of our minds as undifferentiated masses of perceptions when feeling this emotion. And, fourth, when Hume does describe what actually happens when we feel pride, he does not indicate that our mind is turned towards the idea of self as a bundle of perceptions. Instead he says that pride leads us to "think of our own qualities of circumstances" (T 287); it "cause[s] us to form an idea of our merit and character" (T 303).[25]

Hume seems to be saying here that when feeling pride we think of ourselves as specially characterized by whatever it is that causes that pride; pride in our house leads us to think of ourselves *as homeowners*, pride in our virtue leads us to think of ourselves *as virtuous*.[26] That is, pride seems to pick out from among the many perceptions in our minds some (those of our house, or displaying our virtue) which play a more significant role in our lives than others (those of the tree on the street, those of television sitcom characters). Hume's definition of the object of pride as the "succession of related ideas and impression of which we have an *intimate* memory and consciousness" (T 277; emphasis added) gets at this point by limiting the perceptions which go into our pride-mediated experience of ourselves to those of which we have an *intimate* relation. Hume's use of this modifier is unclear,[27] but I take it that its

[24] The fact that Hume came to reject his treatment of personal identity "as it regards our thought or the imagination" in the "Appendix" to the *Treatise* (T 633–636) without seeing the need to revisit his treatment of self as the object of pride and humility offers further evidence that he did not take this object to be the "true" idea of mind from T 261.

[25] Also: when feeling pride, we "infer an excellency in ourselves" (T 293); people "judge themselves" (T 303), or "their own worth and character" (T 321) when feeling pride or humility.

[26] Rorty also suggests that pride leads us to see ourselves *as* bearers of qualities ("Pride Produces," 258).

[27] The word 'intimate' and its cognates pop up at a number of other crucial points in the *Treatise*. Most notably, Hume starts the discussion of personal identity by denying that we are at every moment "intimately conscious" of ourselves, for when he enters "most intimately" into himself he finds only perceptions (T 251–2); when he explains the operation of sympathy, he says that "the idea or rather impression of ourselves is always intimately present with us . . . ." (T 317; cf. T 320, 354, 427, 592). Other interesting uses of this term occur at T 101, 106, 190, 206, 339. Although Hume was surely aware of views like Malebranche's, in which when we perceive an object the idea of it is, by definition, "intimately joined [*intimement unie*] to our soul" (*The Search after*

connotation of closeness to persons supports my suggestion that pride, for Hume, is meant to pick out from our many experiences those that are to stand at the forefront of how we think of ourselves. I will call the idea of self that emerges from pride a *conception* of ourselves. (The indirect passions of love and hatred would lead someone to form conceptions of her beloved or despised.) Since this conception inherits some of the vivacity of the passion of pride or humility which preceded it in the "double relation," it will have the status of something like a belief.

Pride's functioning to convert a theoretical belief like 'I own a house' into the recognition that 'I am a homeowner,' means that pride, on this interpretation, produces in us a belief about what is existentially connected to us. Hume relies on the indirect passions as a mechanism to explain such beliefs, I take it, because he appreciates the important difference between recognizing a feature as belonging to someone and seeing that feature as defining him. Whereas the former, as a merely theoretical belief, can have no practical import for Hume (II.iii.3), the latter, as a conception of someone, is a way of registering what *matters* to him; it engages with the "concern we take in ourselves" (T 253). The fact that the passions lie behind our conceptions of one another allows them to have a practical role without violating Hume's doctrine that "reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions" (T 415).

Note that it does not follow from Hume's using the passions as a mechanism for the production of self-conceptions that we can only recognize existential connections while actually in the grip of a passion; nor would it be right to say that our self-conception is saturated by home-owning when we feel pride in our home. Repeated experiences of pride in something, by accustoming us to this version of our idea of self, would presumably allow us to think of the associated conception of ourselves without actually being moved by the passion (cf. T 422–423). And this would have an influence on subsequent feelings of pride. For example, if our home-owning is something about which we feel strongly and in which we have taken pride with some frequency, then our pride in our virtue might turn our view to ourselves, *homeowners, as virtuous.* By the time we are adults, then, our conceptions of ourselves will be complex and multi-faceted, the products of our history with the pride (and humility) episodes that have brought us to recognize certain features as existentially connected with us. Ongoing experience in the world will reaffirm, undermine, deepen, and otherwise change this self-conception.[28]

Truth, T. M. Lennon and P. J. Olscamp, trs. and eds., [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997], 217), I find it hard to apply this reading of the term consistently to his usage; in particular, T 339 makes it clear that we can perceive things without being intimately conscious of them.

[28] There remains a problem in Hume's account that I do not have the space to discuss here fully: Since Hume can only explain conceptions of ourselves in terms of the indirect passions, how

4. CONSTRAINTS ON SELF-CONCEPTIONS

If I am right that the indirect passions play a role with respect to existential connections that is analogous with the role that causal inferences play with respect to necessary connections, we should expect Hume to put similar constraints on the two kinds of associative mechanisms. For, even though causal inferences turn out to depend on the associative tendencies of the mind, that does not mean that our causal beliefs are random. Hume points to certain conditions that must be met for our causal beliefs to be stable. At first, he requires only that the cause precede and be contiguous with the effect and that we experience them as constantly conjoined. By the end of his treatment of causation, he has refined these conditions to include such things as the proportionality of compound causes with compound effects and the uniqueness of the causal relationship (see I.iii.15). The mechanism of the indirect passions, with its requirement that its cause have a pleasurable or painful quality and be connected to the person, plays a similar role in constraining our self-conceptions. And, as in his treatment of causation, Hume goes on to refine these initial constraints with some further qualifications, notably in the Section "Limitations of this System" (II.i.6), where he says that the cause of pride must be closely connected to the person who is its object, rare, public, and durable. (The fifth limitation, concerning general rules, will be discussed in the following section.)

As Hume makes clear in the "Dissertation on the Passions" (DP 152–153), the fundamental limitation is the publicity requirement, the requirement that the cause of the passion "be very discernible and obvious, and that not only to ourselves, but to others also" (T 292). In the Section "Of the love of fame" (II.i.11), he explains that a feeling of pride can be sustained only if it is "seconded by the sentiments and opinions of others" (T 316) through sympa-

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can he account for the idea of self that plays a role in producing the indirect passions (recall that an association of ideas between the cause and object of the passions must pre-exist the actual felt passion)? As Penelhum argues, pride presupposes the idea of self ("The Self of Book I and the Selves of Book II," *Hume Studies* 18 [1992]: 281–291). Hume seems to avoid this problem by supposing that the pre-existing idea of self is itself the product of our previous experiences with the indirect passions. Moreover, he seems unfazed by the regress that this response creates. An infant grows up to have a primitive sense of self, just as it grows up to recognize a world of independent objects and causal connections. But Hume shows no interest in this kind of developmental "mental anatomy"; his project is to account for how adult minds experience the world (compare his claim in the first *Enquiry* that it is not "worth while to enquire at what time thinking begins" [David Hume, *Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals*, L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed.; 3d ed., P. H. Nidditch, ed., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 22n]). Speculative developmental theses about infant experience, such as can be found in Malebranche (*Search*, 117, 119–20, 125–126), will always be unsupported by the kind of evidence Hume takes to be relevant to his 'science of man.'

thy. Only if the cause of pride is public will others be able to take pleasure in it; it is this pleasure, sympathetically communicated to us, that allows us to maintain our pride.

By building a social dimension into the very mechanism for forming self-conceptions, Hume has gone part of the way towards accounting for the seeming objectivity of existential connections, noted above. For the need for seconding makes the possibility of someone's successfully maintaining a wholly idiosyncratic self-conception "absurd" (T 332). Someone might try to claim, say, that she was Julius Caesar in a past life and that this is the definitive feature of her, but because others will not recognize this fact as making her into who she is, she will be unsuccessful in trying to live her life in terms of it. Instead of being interviewed by classicists to get a better account of the fall of the Roman Republic, she would be laughed off as an eccentric or committed to an institution.[29]

The need for the seconding of our pride helps to explains two of the otherwise somewhat perplexing "limitations," namely the requirements that the cause be "closely connected" and comparable in duration to the object of the passion (T 291, 293). What makes these limitations problematic is that Hume gives no criteria for what makes a cause close enough or durable enough to cause an indirect passion. But if we interpret these limitations in light of the publicity requirement, Hume's point seems to be that the cause must be close enough and durable enough for *others* to take it to make a difference to who someone is. Just what causes will satisfy these criteria, then, will be a contingent matter depending on localized social customs.[30]

The remaining limitation restricts the causes of the indirect passions to those that are "peculiar to ourselves, or at least common to us with a few persons" (T 291). Hume's point here seems to be that a conception of ourselves must be what sets us apart from others, what captures what is distinctive about ourselves. For if a quality is one that most people have, we cannot take it to make us into who *we* are: "Upon comparing ourselves with others, as we are

[29] Hume points out that not only does pride need to "seconded" to maintain itself, it must also be "seconded" by the right people, namely those who also possess the admired quality in question. My pride in my swimming, for example, will not be supported by the approval of people who know very little about swimming; my pride needs to be "seconded" by those whom I esteem for their bearing a quality similar to the one I value in myself (T 321).

[30] Rorty makes a similar point when she says: "This explanation [of the limitations] seems, at first sight, stunning for its vagueness. But in fact it is just this vagueness that serves: Whatever it is that, as a given original fact, causes pride, turns out as a matter of fact to be what a person takes as significant and particularly close to her. The condition is operational and intentional: it reveals the intentional description under which the cause produced the effect. Hume is working backwards, analysing the cause from the character of the consequence" ("Pride Produces," 260).

every moment apt to do, we find we are not in the least distinguish'd" (T 292). This rarity limitation by itself undermines any attempt to ground morality on some defining fact about us that we share with all other humans or rational creatures. We cannot love others merely as humans (T 481), because being human is (almost always) too common a feature to enter into a conception of someone. Our rationality cannot be the ground of morality because our rationality is something we share with too many others for it to enter into our conceptions of ourselves. Instead, an adequate account of morality must, for Hume, start from the partial affiliations the workings of our passions actually produce amongst us.[31]

Note also that these four limitations introduce a certain kind of context dependency into our conceptions of one another. In some circumstances, there will be a lack of seconding for a feature of someone that in other contexts is usually lauded, because the relevant public will be unable either to discern the feature in question or to recognize its value. (Think of a speaker of Canadian English residing in the United States; most people would not recognize the speaker's language as in any way distinctive and, if they did, they would most likely view it as irrelevant to making the person into who she is, even though, as Hume notes, a person's language is generally thought to be one of her defining features [T 318].) In other circumstances a usually-rare feature will be too common to merit its being treated as existentially connected to its possessor. (Think of a philosopher, whose profession is usually central to her self-conception, who finds herself in a context such as a conference, where she is surrounded by other philosophers, and thus is unable to take her being a philosopher as setting her apart from others.) Or, conversely, what is usually too common to be a cause of pride might in a different context come to the fore as being relevant to who someone is: "An *Englishman* in *Italy* is a friend: A *Europaean* in *China*; and perhaps a man wou'd be belov'd as such, were we to meet him in the moon" (T 482). And also, while some kinds of features of people will be such that they are recognized by others almost immediately (e.g., bodily qualities such as a beautiful face), others will only be apparent to those who know someone well (e.g., a person's character traits are usually known only by those who have "an intercourse" [T 582] or "commerce" [T 583] with him).

[31] As Annette Baier points out, there is a certain tension between the requirement that our pride be seconded by those who exemplify the quality we are proud of and the requirement that the cause of our pride be rare ("Hume's Account of our Absurd Passions," *Journal of Philosophy* 79 [1982]: 643–652). The effect of these combined limitations is that we can take pride only in those qualities that we share with some, but not too many, others Hume here is attuned to the complexities of our social affiliations.

5. GENERAL RULES AND EXISTENTIAL CONNECTIONS

Does the contextual variability of our conceptions of one another doom what, on my interpretation, is Hume's strategy of explaining existential connections by using the indirect passions as a mechanism for the formation of these conceptions? Does this mean that Hume cannot account for the way we treat these connections as objective features of persons? Once more, we can turn to Hume's treatment of causation to answer these questions, where, in the course of following a similar strategy of accounting for necessary connections in terms of a mechanism for the formation of causal beliefs, he confronts a similar problem. His solution there, we will see, provides a model for his solution to the problem of explaining the objectivity of existential connections.

In explaining the mechanism responsible for our forming causal beliefs, Hume realizes that this mechanism is susceptible to variations depending on extrinsic factors such as whether or not we have experienced the relevant regularities recently (I.iii.13). If Hume is to retain any kind of objectivity to his account of causation—if he is going to explain our ability to dismiss some causal beliefs as illegitimate—he must show how we are able to evaluate our causal inferences. But his scepticism about our ability to discern necessary connections as objective features of the world means that he cannot simply say that we are to compare our beliefs to the way the world is. Hume tries to solve this problem by introducing "general rules" and by pointing to two different kinds of influence that these rules have on our beliefs.

The first kind of such rules are the associative habits that are the essence of Humean causality—the expectation that objects we have experienced as frequently conjoined will continue to be so conjoined (given that we are usually unaware of the role played by associative habits, Hume does not require that we have an explicit grasp of these rules). The problem, however, is that the objects that we have experienced together may only be accidentally connected. All the Frenchman we have met may lack "solidity," which would lead us to form a general rule—a "prejudice"—encompassing this regularity. When we meet a "judicious" Frenchman, however, we should recognize that our general rule has been formulated incorrectly (T 146–7). The relevant features we should have generalized as connected were, say, being in a café in the wee hours and a lack of solidity, because only these features will continue to be conjoined in the future. This correction itself appeals to general rules about proper causal reasoning, rules "form'd on the nature of our understanding, and on our experience of its operations in the judgments we form concerning objects" (T 149). This sort of general rules—Hume lists eight of them in the Section "Rules by which to judge of causes and effects" (I.iii.15)—springs from our having experienced regularities in the mind's tendency to project inappro-

priate regularities. Since these rules aim to ensure that our causal beliefs will track only those regularities that will actually continue into the future, we can use them to correct "prejudiced" judgements. Hume attributes the first kind of general rules to the imagination, and the latter, to the understanding. His central point, however, is that the general rules governing the understanding, since they depend on our believing that the mind will continue to operate as it has in the past, are themselves, in the end, special versions of general rules of the imagination, the propensity of our minds to expect the continuation of experienced regularities.[32]

Hume tells us that general rules have an influence on the passions that is parallel to their influence on the understanding (T 293). Does this mean that he can appeal to these rules in an attempt to explain our ability to criticize and revise our conceptions of one another in the same way that these rules allowed him to explain our ability to criticize and revise our causal beliefs? Do general rules point to a kind of objectivity for existential connections in the same way as they did for necessary connections? The crucial text is as follows:

> *[G]eneral rules* have a great influence upon pride and humility, as well as on all the other passions. Hence we form a notion of different ranks of men, suitable to the power or riches they are possest of; and this notion we change not upon account of any peculiarities of the health or temper of the persons, which may deprive them of all enjoyment in their possessions. This may be accounted for from the same principles, that explain'd the influence of general rules on the understanding. Custom readily carries us beyond the just bounds in our passions, as well as in our reasonings. (T 293)

Hume claims here that if most people we encounter take pride in a certain cause— in his example, their power or riches—then we form a general rule by which we expect to find any person possessing riches to be proud of them, whether or not he shows any outward sign of this passion.[33] This is a use of general rules with which we are familiar, the expectation of the continuation of experienced regularities. But something more happens in this case. For not only do we expect the person in question to feel pride, we take this to mean that he has a conception of himself based on his riches, the cause of this pride. That is, we suppose that he lives his life partly in terms of how this feature

[32] "The following of general rules is a very unphilosophical species of probability; and yet 'tis only by following them that we can correct this, and all other unphilosophical probabilities" (T 150). On occasion, Hume goes so far as to identify the understanding with that part of the imagination that encompasses the more reflective general rules (T 225, 267, 440).

[33] Árdal (*Passion and Value*, 33), Passmore (*Hume's Intentions*, 125–6), Rorty ("Pride Produces," 262), and Jerome Neu (*Emotion, Thought, and Therapy* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977], 11) take the passage to show how someone can feel pride in his riches even if he does not take pleasure in them. This interpretation, however, gets the pronouns in the quotation above (T 293) mixed up. Hume says that "we" are the ones affected by the general rules, when "they" are not taking pleasure in their riches.

defines him as a person. If enough of the people who surround him make this supposition, it starts to become irrelevant whether or not he actually cares about his riches; these people will treat him as if he does *whether he likes it or not.* Because of this, Hume points out, people end up being assembled into "ranks," groupings of people together on the basis of the features that are taken to define them. A nobleman is part of the nobility independently of his particular attitudes towards his wealth or power.

But, just as general rules of the imagination are sometimes mere "prejudice," Hume says that generalizations connected with the indirect passions go beyond their "just bounds" (T 293). After all, why must someone think of *herself* in a certain way just because most people who have the relevant feature think of it as making a difference to who *they* are? But, again, like the general rules of the imagination, Hume does not think the effects of passional general rules can be dismissed entirely. For he continues the passage quoted above by saying that it is the use of these rules that makes us at home in a social world:

> ['T]is evident, that if a person full-grown, and of the same nature with ourselves, were on a sudden transported into our world, he wou'd be very much embarrass'd with every object, and wou'd not readily find what degree of pride or humility, or any other passion he ought to attribute to it . . . . [C]ustom and practice . . . have settled the just value of every thing. . . . (T 293–4)

In the "Abstract" to the *Treatise,* Hume uses a similar story to demonstrate the role of imaginative general rules: "Were a man, such as *Adam,* created in the full vigour of understanding, without experience" (T 650) and thus without such rules, he would be unable to make any causal inferences about the world. In the case of passional general rules, the point is that someone who lacked them would be unable to understand how the people around him fit into the world or how they oriented themselves to one another. These rules give us a basic framework by which we interpret one another. Going back to the example of the rich man who is uninterested in his wealth, the general rule by which he is ranked with others of similar wealth and power *makes* this feature into one that defines him simply because it is central to how others understand him. In order for him to negotiate the social world that surrounds him successfully, his self-conception must make implicit reference to the fact that others will be defining him in terms of his riches. He cannot simply wish away the social context he inhabits. Thus he is in a situation where it is not true *for him* that he has a self-conception based on his riches, but it is nonetheless true *of him* that he is of high rank.

Hume says that, with the introduction of general rules into his account of the indirect passions, he has effected an "enlargement" (T 293) of his system.[34]

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[34] Hume also calls the idea of a necessary connection an "enlargement" (T 163).

We can now see what he means by this. Passion-involving general rules not only summarize how we expect people to define themselves, they also serve to *make* them into those kinds of persons by leading us to interpret them in terms of our expectations. Existential connections, accordingly, come to have an objective status, in that what makes someone into who he is will be decided not by his own attitudes, but by the extent to which his various features have been incorporated into these general rules.[35]

There is a difference, then, between the general rules associated with the imagination and those associated with the passions. The former kind of rules are regulated by what events actually continue to be conjoined in the world; general rules of the understanding try to ensure that our inferences will map these conjunctions. The latter, passional general rules, on the other hand, actually help to create the conditions which introduce a kind of objectivity into our conceptions of one another. It is only because people have come to expect one another to define themselves in terms of a given feature that people find themselves defined by this feature independently of their own attitudes. Just what features will have been taken up into this circle of self-definition will depend on the concrete circumstances of the society in which they find themselves.[36]

6. CONCLUSION

Despite this contingency, Hume nonetheless indicates that there are four general classes of features that tend to be causes of the indirect passions; on my interpretation these are the features that tend to be taken up into our conceptions of one another: virtue and vice (II.i.7); bodily features, such as "beauty and deformity" (II.i.8); "external advantages and disadvantages," such as

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[35] In general, the "enlargement" has received rather shabby treatment in the secondary literature. Pauline Chazan ("Pride, Virtue, and Self-hood: A Reconstruction of Hume," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 22 [1992]: 45–64), Gabrielle Taylor ("Pride," in A. O Rorty, ed., *Explaining Emotions* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980], 385–402) and Robert Henderson ("David Hume on Personal Identity and the Indirect Passions," *Hume Studies* 16 [1990]: 33–44) ignore it entirely (Henderson also ignores the "limitation" to rare causes). Donald Davidson, in his influential article on Hume's theory of pride, does not mention any of the "limitations" ("Hume's Cognitive Theory of Pride," *Journal of Philosophy* 73 [1976]: 744–757). R. W. Burch takes the "enlargement" to show how, as fashions change, the pleasure we take in various objects will also change ("Hume on Pride and Humility," *New Scholasticism* 49 [1975]: 183) . G. Taylor reads it as saying merely that our cultures influence our values (*Pride, Shame, and Guilt* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985], 25–26) Only Neu notices that Hume calls the last "limitation," "an enlargement" (*Emotion, Thought, and Therapy*, 11).

[36] The contemporary philosophical theory that ends up being closest to Hume's theory, as I interpret it, is Ian Hacking's "Making Up People," in T. C. Heller, M. Sosna, and D. Wellbery, eds., *Reconstructing Individualism* (Palo Alto. Stanford University Press, 1986), 222–236; and "The Looping Effects of Human Kinds," in D. Sperber, D. Premack, and A. J. Premack, eds., *Causal Cognition* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 351–383.

"houses, gardens, equipages" (T 303), one's family history (T 307) or country (T 306), and the like (II.i.9); and "property and riches" (II.i.10). It is the first of these four classes that is most relevant for our purposes.

I noted at the start of this paper that Árdal motivates his interpretation of the indirect passions by pointing to Hume's having repeatedly connected them to the moral sentiments in Book III. Having rejected Árdal's thesis in §2, above, an alternative explanation of this connection is needed. On my interpretation, where the indirect passions are a mechanism by which we recognize someone as being defined by a subset of her features, I take it that Hume needs to link the indirect passions with the moral sentiments because our character traits, whether virtues or vices, are existentially connected to us. Before we can hold someone responsible for the actions springing from a character trait, we must register this trait as being part of what makes her the person she is; and we do this by feeling an indirect passion towards her on the basis of this trait (T 349, 411). The moral sentiments register approval or disapproval of a character trait; the indirect passions connect the trait to the person who bears it. As I noted earlier: "We approve of his character, and love his person" (T 602) when we recognize someone's virtue.[37]

My interpretation of Hume's account of the indirect passions has admittedly involved an extensive reconstruction of the text. But it has the virtue of showing why Hume might not have wanted to highlight what I take to be his argument. Seeing who we are as persons to be a precipitate from the social coordination of our feelings for one another amounts to a out-and-out attack on theistic notions of the person such as Locke's, Leibniz's, or Clarke's. Hume admitted that he had tried to downplay the anti-religious tendencies of his thought in the *Treatise*,[38] and thus he had reason not to highlight what I have

[37] My interpretation of Hume as a sceptic about persons in Book II, in the sense that he denies that what makes us into the people we are is an intrinsic feature of us, might also help to resolve some other problems often thought to afflict his moral theory. Let me gesture to towards two such issues: The anti-rationalist arguments about moral judgement in the Section "Moral distinctions not deriv'd from reason" (III.i.1) take on a new light when we recognize that Hume has *already* committed himself to denying that we can discern someone's character traits by reason alone. My interpretation of the indirect passions also makes Hume's subjectivism about morals look different. He no longer needs to be interpreted as explaining the agreement of our moral judgements by saying that human nature just is such that we all will find generosity, say, approval-worthy Rather, his view seems to be that the passional general rules in virtue of which we find a certain pattern of activity to amount to generosity also requires of us that we approve of this pattern of activity. Since these rules introduce a kind of objectivity into his account of existential connections, someone who fails to take notice of this character trait can be said to be in error.

[38] In a famous letter of 1737 to Henry Home (Lord Kames), Hume describes how he "castrated [his] work, that is cutting off its nobler parts; that is, endeavouring it shall give as little offence as possible" (J. Y. T. Greig, ed., *Letters of David Hume*, Vol 1 [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932], 24–25).

suggested is a kind of scepticism about persons in Book II. But any attempt to provide a fully secular account of morality requires a fully secular account of the self. Hume, in Book II of the *Treatise,* I suggest, tried to do just that.[39]

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