



Threat Modeling

OWASP Hartford

February 9, 2016

Robert Hurlbut




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- **Independent Software Security Consultant and Trainer**

- Owner / President of Robert Hurlbut Consulting Services
- Microsoft MVP – Security Developer 2005-2009, 2015
- (ISC)2 CSSLP 2014-2017
- Group Leader – Boston .NET Arch Group, Amherst Sec Grp
- Speaker at user groups, conferences, and other events



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<https://roberthurlbut.com/training/presentations>



Something we all do in our personal lives ...

... when we lock our doors to our house

... when we lock the windows

... when we lock the doors to our car

We threat model by thinking ahead of what could go wrong and acting accordingly



Threat modeling is the process of understanding your system and potential threats against your system.

A threat model helps you assess the probability, potential harm, and priority of threats.

Based on the model you can try to minimize or eradicate the threats.



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Michael Howard [@michael_howard](https://twitter.com/michael_howard) Jan 7, 2015

A dev team with an awesome, complete and accurate threat model gets my admiration and not much of my time because they don't need it!





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Brook Schoenfield [@BrkSchoenfield](https://twitter.com/BrkSchoenfield) June 29, 2015

As I practice it, threat modeling cannot be the province of a tech elite. It is best owned by all of a development team.



Identify threats your system faces

Challenge assumptions

Prioritize other security efforts (pen test, review, fuzzing)

Document what you have learned



Threat Agent

Someone (or a process) who could do harm to a system (also adversary or attacker)



Threat

An adversary's goal



Vulnerability

A flaw in the system that could help a threat agent realize a threat



Attack

When a motivated and sufficiently skilled threat agent takes advantage of a vulnerability



Asset

Something of value to valid users
and adversaries alike

When?



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Make threat modeling part of your secure software and architecture design

What if I didn't? It's not too late to start threat modeling, but it will be more difficult to change major design decisions



Gather documentation (requirements, high-level design, detailed design, etc.)

Gather your team (don't make this one person's job only!)

Developers, QA, Architects, Project Managers, Business Stakeholders

Understand business goals

Understand technical goals

Agree on meeting date(s) and time(s)

Plan on 1-2 hours at a time spread over a week or weeks
– keep sessions focused

Important: Be honest, leave ego at the door, no blaming!




1. Draw your picture - model the system
2. List the elements – entities, processes, data, data flows
3. Identity the threats - Ask questions
4. Determine mitigations and risks
5. Follow through

Draw your picture




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- DFD – Data Flow Diagrams (from Microsoft SDL)




Model the System



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


Model the system



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(Trust boundary)



Your threat model now consists
of ...



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1. Diagram / visual model of your system


Identity the elements



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(Trust boundary)



Your threat model now consists
of ...



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1. Diagram / visual model of your system
2. Elements of your system and the interactions



Attack Trees (Bruce Schneier - Slidedeck)

Threat Libraries (CAPEC, OWASP Top 10, SANS Top 25)

Checklists (ex: OWASP Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS), OWASP Proactive Controls 2016))

Use Cases / Misuse Cases



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Games:

Elevation of Privilege (EoP)

OWASP Cornucopia




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Suits:

Data validation and encoding
Authentication
Session Management
Authorization
Cryptography
Cornucopia
13 cards per suit, 2 Jokers
Play a round, highest value wins



STRIDE Framework^{*} for finding threats



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| Threat | Property we want |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Spoo ^R fung | Auth ^A entication |
| Tam ^R pering | Int ^A egrity |
| Rep ^R udiation | Non ^A -repudiation |
| Information Disclosure | Conf ^A identiality |
| Den ^R ial of Service | Av ^A ailability |
| Elev ^R ation of Privilege | Auth ^A orization |

* Framework, not classification scheme. STRIDE is a good framework, bad taxonomy



P.A.S.T.A. – Process for Attack Simulation and Threat Analysis

7 step process combining:

STRIDE + Attacks + Risk Analyses

Identify Threats



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- Input and data validation
- Authentication
- Authorization
- Configuration management
- Sensitive data
- Session management
- Cryptography
- Parameter manipulation
- Exception management
- Auditing and logging



How is authentication handled?

What about authorization?

Are we sending data in the open?

Are we using cryptography properly?

Is there logging? What is stored?

Etc.

One of the best questions ...



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Is there anything that
keeps you up at night
worrying about this
system?

Your threat model now consists
of ...



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1. Diagram / visual model of your system
2. Elements of your system and the interactions
3. Threats identified through answers to questions



- Mitigation Options:
 - Leave as-is
 - Remove from product
 - Remedy with technology countermeasure
 - Warn user
- What is the risk associated with the vulnerability?



Risk Management

Bug Bar (Critical / Important / Moderate / Low)

FAIR (Factor Analysis of Information Risk) – Jack Jones

Risk Rating (High, Medium, Low)



Overall risk of the threat expressed in High, Medium, or Low.

Risk is product of two factors:

Ease of exploitation

Business impact

Risk Rating – Ease of Exploitation



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| Risk Rating | Description |
|---------------|--|
| High | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Tools and exploits are readily available on the Internet or other locations• Exploitation requires no specialized knowledge of the system and little or no programming skills• Anonymous users can exploit the issue |
| Medium | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Tools and exploits are available but need to be modified to work successfully• Exploitation requires basic knowledge of the system and may require some programming skills• User-level access may be a pre-condition |
| Low | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Working tools or exploits are not readily available• Exploitation requires in-depth knowledge of the system and/or may require strong programming skills• User-level (or perhaps higher privilege) access may be one of a number of pre-conditions |



| Risk Rating | Description |
|-------------|---|
| High | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Administrator-level access (for arbitrary code execution through privilege escalation for instance) or disclosure of sensitive information• Depending on the criticality of the system, some denial-of-service issues are considered high impact• All or significant number of users affected• Impact to brand or reputation |
| Medium | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• User-level access with no disclosure of sensitive information• Depending on the criticality of the system, some denial-of-service issues are considered medium impact |
| Low | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Disclosure of non-sensitive information, such as configuration details that may assist an attacker• Failure to adhere to recommended best practices (which does not result in an immediately visible exploit) also falls into this bracket |



| ID - Risk | RT-3 |
|---------------------|---|
| Threat | Lack of CSRF protection allows attackers to submit commands on behalf of users |
| Description/Impact | Client applications could be subject to a CSRF attack where the attacker embeds commands in the client applications and uses it to submit commands to the server on behalf of the users |
| Countermeasures | Per transaction codes (nonce), thresholds, event visibility |
| Components Affected | CO-3 |

Your threat model now consists
of ...



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1. Diagram / visual model of your system
2. Elements of your system and the interactions
3. Threats identified through answers to questions
4. Mitigations and risks identified to deal with the threats



Document what you found and decisions you make

File bugs or new requirements

Verify bugs fixed and new requirements implemented

Did we miss anything? Review again

Anything new? Review again

Your threat model now consists
of ...



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4. Mitigations and risks identified to deal with the threats
5. Follow through

A living threat model!

Your challenge



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Add threat modeling to your toolkit

Consider threat modeling first (secure design, before new features, etc.)

Many ways ... just do it!



Threat Modeling: Designing for Security

Adam Shostack

Securing Systems: Applied Architecture and Threat Models

Brook S.E. Schoenfield

Risk Centric Threat Modeling: Process for Attack Simulation and Threat Analysis

Marco Morana and Tony UcedaVelez

Measuring and Managing Information Risk: A FAIR Approach

Jack Jones and Jack Freund



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Whiteboard

Visio (or equivalent) for diagramming

Word (or equivalent) or Excel (or equivalent) for documenting



Attack Trees – Bruce Schneier on Security

<https://www.schneier.com/attacktrees.pdf>

Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool 2016

<http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=49168>

Threat Modeler Tool 3.0

<http://myappsecurity.com>



Elevation of Privilege (EoP) Game

<http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=20303>

OWASP Cornucopia

https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Cornucopia

OWASP Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS)

https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Application_Security_Verification_Standard_Project

OWASP Proactive Controls (especially current 2016 work)

https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Proactive_Controls

Questions?



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