



CryptoGen Nepal



# Introduction to Hardware Hacking **Where to Begin**

- Nirmal Dahal (**#Nittam**)

# What is **Hardware Hacking**?

**Hardware hacking** is the art of modifying or manipulating the physical components of electronic devices to achieve specific goals, which can range from gaining unauthorized access to a system to enhancing device functionality.

# Scope of **Hardware Hacking**

We can consider **SCADA system hacking, embedded system hacking, and IoT hacking** as forms of hardware hacking because **they all involve the manipulation or modification of the physical electronic hardware components within their respective systems to some extent**. While each of them has its unique emphasis, requiring specific knowledge and techniques, **they all share a common foundation: the interaction with the tangible hardware elements that power electronic systems.**

## Why is Hardware Hacking **Crucial**?

**Businesses tend to underestimate the security considerations associated with IoT devices, often incorporating them into the scope of Network Penetration Testing.** In such cases, penetration testers, who may lack expertise in IoT or hardware hacking, typically concentrate on pinpointing vulnerabilities within open ports and services. **Consequently, this approach leaves the IoT device susceptible to potential exploitation through hardware-based attacks.**

# Prerequisite Knowledge

Because hardware hacking revolves around manipulating the electrical input equilibrium within electronic components, it's essential to have a foundational grasp of electric and electronic components. This knowledge includes an understanding of:

- **Voltage**
- Current (Ampere)
- **Baud Rate**
- Microcontrollers
- Sensors
- Firmware
- Sensors

# Components Involved

**Hardware hacking** involves manipulation of various elements:


- **Circuit Board**
- **Microcontrollers**
- **Sensors**
- **Electronic Components**
  - Transistors
  - Diodes
  - Resistors
  - Capacitors
- **Firmware**
- **\*uBoot\***

# Circuit Board



Circuit board is like **the roads where electrical signals travel**, connecting all the important parts.

# Microcontrollers




Microcontrollers are in charge of doing tasks and keeping everything running smoothly. **People often target them when they want to change how a device works.**

# Sensors



Sensors can **feel and understand what's happening in the real world**, which is super important for both good and not-so-good tinkering.

# Electronic **Components**



Electronic Components are responsible for **how a device behaves or what it can do.**

# Firmware


```
1 // Copyright (c) Microsoft. All rights reserved.
2 // Licensed under the MIT license.
3 #include "AZ3166WiFi.h"
4 #include "AzureIoTHub.h"
5 #include "DevKitMQTTClient.h"
6 #include "DevkitDPSClient.h"
7
8 #include "config.h"
9 #include "utility.h"
10
11 // Input DPS instance info
12 char* Global_Device_Endpoint = "[Global_Device_Endpoint]";
13 char* ID_Scope = "[ID_Scope]";
14
15 // Input your preferred registrationId and only alphanumeric, lowercase, and hyphen are supported
16 // If you leave it blank, one registrationId would be auto-generated based on MAC address and firm
17 char* registrationId = "";
18
19 // Indicate whether WiFi is ready
20 static bool hasWifi = false;
21 int messageCount = 1;
22 static bool messageSending = true;
```

Firmware is like **the secret recipe** that makes a device work. Sometimes, **people try to change it to uncover hidden features or to mess with a device's security.**

How to **Get Started?**  
Get Familiar with the **Tools First!**

# BreadBoard

## How Breadboards Work



Breadboard serves as a user-friendly and straightforward **platform for constructing and evaluating electronic circuits without the need for soldering**

# Jumper **Wire**




Jumper wire is a wire with connectors at both ends that **allows you to connect two points on a breadboard**.

# Soldering Iron



A soldering iron is a crucial tool in hardware hacking, serving as a heating device that melts soldering wire. **It has a dual purpose, allowing for both the attachment and removal of electrical components and wires.**

# Micro SMD Grabber




A Micro SMD Grabber's fine tips and it's delicate design make it **ideal for handling and probing small components during electronic testing and debugging.**

# Multi-Meter





A multi-meter, just as the name suggests, is like a **Swiss army knife for measuring and testing circuits**.

# SPI Flash Programmer



The SPI (**Serial Peripheral Interface**) Flash Programmer is a device that allows you to read and write data to the SPI flash memory chip on a PCB board

# USB-UART



A USB-UART device plays a pivotal role in facilitating communication with the chip on a PCB board. It acts as a conduit for transmitting and receiving data, rendering it an indispensable tool for hardware hacking enthusiasts.

# Logic Analyzer



Specialized electronic tool used for capturing and analyzing digital signals in electronic circuits that **helps engineers and technicians troubleshoot and debug complex digital systems** by providing a detailed view of signal behavior over time.

# Hot Air Rework Station



Versatile tool used in electronics **soldering and desoldering tasks**. It produces a controlled stream of hot air to melt and remove or reflow solder on circuit boards and components, making it **essential for precise and efficient electronics repair and assembly**.

# Anti Static Wrist Band



An **anti-static wristband** is an essential tool for protecting sensitive electronic components from electrostatic discharge (ESD) during assembly or repair. It safely dissipates static electricity from the wearer, ensuring a static-free environment for delicate electronics.

# Flipper Zero



GPIO PINS  
3.3V LOGIC LEVELS  
(5V TOLERANT)

The **Flipper Zero** is a versatile device designed for security professionals specializing in **frequency and hardware security**. It serves as a multi-tool with diverse applications, boasting **features such as a built-in USB-UART and SPI Flash Programmer, among others.**

## Other Tools

While we have already covered several essential tools for hardware hacking, there are still additional tools that may be needed in certain situations.

- **Screwdrivers**
- **Razors**
- **Tape**
- **Wire Cutter**
- **3rd Hand**

etc...

Let's **Hackkkk**  
RECONNAISSANCE

# Basic Things That We Should Look At

Purchasing hardware for exploitation without assessing its susceptibility to vulnerabilities is not advisable. Therefore, you can explore the following sources for reconnaissance purposes:

- Firmware **Reverse Engineering**
- Official **Product Documentation**
- **FCC ID** Database

# Federal Communications Commission (**FCC**) ID



FCC ID stands for **Federal Communications Commission Identification** which is a special alphanumeric code given to electronic devices and products that emit **radio frequency (RF)** signals and its purpose is to identify and govern these devices within the **United States**.

# Federal Communications Commission (FCC) ID

## US Government Official

<https://www.fcc.gov/oet/ea/fccid>

## Easy to Search

<https://fccid.io>

## Usages

<https://gov.fccid.io/{{FCCID}}>

## Example

<https://gov.fccid.io/U8GP1930LITE>

## MAX BR1 Mini

Product Code: MAX-BR1-MINI-LTEA-W-T

Serial No.:



2832-0456-D2F7

LAN MAC: 00-1A-DD-E9-4D-C0

AP Password: DDE94DC0

### Default Access

Username: admin  
http://192.168.50.1 Password: admin

### Made in China

IMEI:



356853051717991

This device complies with Part 15 of the FCC Rules.  
Operation is subject to the following two conditions:  
(1) this device may not cause harmful interference, and  
(2) this device must accept any interference received,  
including interference that may cause undesired operation.

**PEPWAVE**  
Broadband Possibilities



FCC ID: U8G-P1930LITE

Contains FCC ID: N7NMC7455

IMEI:  
356853051717991

includes information that may cause undesired operation.  
This device must accept any interference received.  
(1) This device must accept any interference received.  
including interference that may cause undesired operation.

# FCC ID U8G-P1930LITE

FCC ID U8G-P1930LITE Users-Manual, U8G P1930LITE, U8G-P1930LITE, U8G-P1930LITE, U8G-P1930LITE, U8G-P1930LITE, U8G-P1930L1TE

Pismo Labs Technology Limited Peplink/ Pepwave/ Pismo Labs wireless product **P1930LITE**

FCC ID: / Pismo Labs Technology Limited / P1930LITE

An FCC ID is the product ID assigned by the FCC to identify wireless products in the market. The FCC chooses 3 or 5 character "Grantee" codes to identify the business that created the product. For example, the grantee code for **FCC ID: U8G-P1930LITE** is **U8G**. The remaining characters of the FCC ID, **-P1930LITE**, are often associated with the product model, but they can be random. These letters are chosen by the applicant. In addition to the application, the FCC also publishes *internal images, external images, user manuals, and test results* for wireless devices. They can be under the "exhibits" tab below.

Purchase on Amazon: Peplink/ Pepwave/ Pismo Labs wireless product

Service Passthrough Support

SIP	<input type="radio"/> Standard Mode <input checked="" type="radio"/> Compatibility Mode <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Define custom signal ports 1.      2.      3.
H.323	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Enable
FTP	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Enable <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Define custom control ports 1.      2.      3.
TFTP	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Enable
IPsec NAT-T	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Enable <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Define custom ports 1.      2.      3. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Route IPsec Site-to-Site VPN via WAN 1



App #	Purpose	Date	Unique ID
1	Original Equipment	2016-06-15	OmhAzRGiQRxnGs/ZQS9wWQ==

## Operating Frequencies

Frequency Range	Power Output	Rule Parts	Line Entry
2.412-2.462 GHz 	76.6 mW	15C	1

## Exhibits


[All](#)

Document	Type	Submitted Available
User manual_U8G-P1930LITE_rev2	Users Manual Adobe Acrobat PDF (5303 kB)	2016-06-15 <span style="background-color: green; color: white; padding: 2px;">2016-06-15</span>
setup photos	Test Setup Photos Adobe Acrobat PDF (317 kB)	2016-06-15 <span style="background-color: green; color: white; padding: 2px;">2016-06-15</span>
HKES160500087702	Test Report Adobe Acrobat PDF (2986 kB)	2016-06-15 <span style="background-color: green; color: white; padding: 2px;">2016-06-15</span>
HKES160500087703-revised	RF Exposure Info Adobe Acrobat PDF (193 kB)	2016-06-15 <span style="background-color: green; color: white; padding: 2px;">2016-06-15</span>
LTE MPE	RF Exposure Info Adobe Acrobat PDF (457 kB)	2016-06-15 <span style="background-color: green; color: white; padding: 2px;">2016-06-15</span>
Label-U8G-P1930LITE Contains FCC ID N7NMC7455	ID Label/Location Info Adobe Acrobat PDF (164 kB)	2016-06-15 <span style="background-color: green; color: white; padding: 2px;">2016-06-15</span>
Label_U8G-P1930LITE contans FCC ID N7NMC7355	ID Label/Location Info Adobe Acrobat PDF (159 kB)	2016-06-15 <span style="background-color: green; color: white; padding: 2px;">2016-06-15</span>
Label location_U8G-P1930LITE	ID Label/Location Info Adobe Acrobat PDF (18 kB)	2016-06-15 <span style="background-color: green; color: white; padding: 2px;">2016-06-15</span>
Internal Photos -revised	Internal Photos Adobe Acrobat PDF (4024 kB)	2016-06-15 <span style="background-color: green; color: white; padding: 2px;">2016-06-15</span>
External Photos	External Photos Adobe Acrobat PDF (1261 kB)	2016-06-15 <span style="background-color: green; color: white; padding: 2px;">2016-06-15</span>
Statement of model declaration_BR1 mini_03-06-2016-revised	Cover Letter(s) Adobe Acrobat PDF (167 kB)	2016-06-15 <span style="background-color: green; color: white; padding: 2px;">2016-06-15</span>
Confidentiality letter_U8G-P1930LITE	Cover Letter(s) Adobe Acrobat PDF (1073 kB)	2016-06-15 <span style="background-color: green; color: white; padding: 2px;">2016-06-15</span>
Channel statement_U8G-P1930LITE	Cover Letter(s) Adobe Acrobat PDF (474 kB)	2016-06-15 <span style="background-color: green; color: white; padding: 2px;">2016-06-15</span>

Alternate Views: [HTML \[Translate\]](#) [PDF \[Zoom\]](#) [Download \[PDF\]](#)

# 1 Photographs - EUT Constructional Details

Test model No.: MAX BR1 mini



Let's **Hackkkk**  
EXPLOITATION


# Hunting the **debugging interface**


**UART, JTAG** and similar interfaces are found on circuit boards to debugging, programming, testing, and maintenance. Developers use them to monitor systems, program microcontrollers, ensure quality, and simplify upkeep. These interfaces enhance device flexibility and functionality but require security to prevent unauthorized access.


- **UART – Universal Asynchronous Receiver & Transmitter (Full Duplex)**
- jTAG – Joint Test Action Group
- SPI – Serial Peripheral Interface
- I2C – Inter-Integrated Circuit

etc



Let's **Hackkkk**  
**Into The Shell**














# Connection













USB Serial COMPORT:0

TX:Pin 13 0 B.

RX:Pin 14 268 B.

Config Baud: 115200

**FLIPPER**

```
ls  
/bin/sh: syntax error: unexpected ")"  
# udhcpc_wan: leasefail
```

FLIPPER

And **Here**

\$ **screen /dev/ttyUSB0**

**We are in, everyone!**

+

root@thenittam: ~

```
# Enable direct rule View Goto Tools Project Preferences Help  
/ #
```

U-Boot 1.1.3 (Apr 3 2014 - 17:08:04)

```
ASUS PRODUCT bootloader version: 1.0.0.0  
Board: Ralink APSoC DRAM: 32 MB  
ASUS ASUS PRODUCT gpio init : reset pin  
enable ephy clock...done. rf reg 29 = 5  
SSC enabled. swing=5000, upperbound=0  
Ralink SPI flash driver, SPI clock: 29MHz  
spi device id: c2 20 17 c2 20 (2017c220)  
find flash: MX25L6405D  
raspi_read: from:300000 len:1000  
Maximum malloc length: 1024 KBytes  
mem malloc_start/brk/end: 0x81eaf000/81eb1000/81fb0000  
*** Warning - bad CRC, using default environment
```

```
=====  
Ralink UBoot Version: 4.1.1.0
```

```
-----  
ASIC 7620_MP (Port5<->None)
```

```
DRAM component: 256 Mbits SDR
```

```
DRAM bus: 16 bit
```

```
Total memory: 32 MBytes
```

```
Flash component: SPI Flash
```

```
Date:Apr 3 2014 Time:17:08:04
```

```
=====  
icache: sets:512, ways:4, linesz:32 ,total:65536  
dcache: sets:256, ways:4, linesz:32 ,total:32768
```



Please choose the operation:

- 0: Load System code then write to Flash via Serial.
- 1: Load System code to SDRAM via TFTP.
- 2: Load System code then write to Flash via TFTP.
- 3: Boot System code via Flash (default).
- 4: Enter boot command line interface.
- 5: Load Boot Loader code to SDRAM via Serial.
- 7: Load Boot Loader code then write to Flash via Serial.
- 8: Load Boot Loader code to SDRAM via TFTP.
- 9: Load Boot Loader code then write to Flash via TFTP.

```
3: System Boot System code via Flash.  
raspi_read: from:4018a len:4
```

```
ASUS PRODUCT bootloader version: 1.0.0.0  
raspi_read: from:40004 len:6  
MAC Address: D0:17:C2:36:7E:F0  
raspi_read: from:40004 len:6
```


```
## Checking 1st firmware at bc050000 ...
```





```
Manufacturer=ASUSTeK Computer Inc.  
WscModelName=WPS Router  
WscDeviceName=ASUS WPS Router  
WscModelNumber=RT-N12+  
WscSerialNumber=00000000  
WscV2Support=0  
MaxStaNum=0;  
/tmp/etc/Wireless/RT2860 # cat RT2860.dat /udhcpc_w  
/tmp/etc/Wireless/RT2860 # ls | head -n 1  
/tmp/etc/Wireless/RT2860 # cat RT2860.dat | head -n 1  
/bin/sh: head: not found  
/tmp/etc/Wireless/RT2860 # whoami  
/tmp/etc/Wireless/RT2860 # cd  
/ # ls  
asus_jffs dev jffs root tmp  
bin etc lib mmc opt usr  
cifs etc_ro home mnt proc var  
cifs2 home opt ra_SKU www  
/ # cd op  
/bin/sh: cd: can't cd to op  
/ # cd opudhcpc_wan;; leasefail  
/ # cd opcd opt  
/bin/sh: cd: can't cd to opcd  
/ # cd opt  
/bin/sh: cd: can't cd to opt  
/ # ls  
asus_jffs dev jffs root tmp  
bin etc lib mmc opt usr  
cifs etc_ro home mnt proc var  
cifs2 home opt ra_SKU www  
/ # udhcpc_wan;; leasefail  
/ # udhcpc_wan;; leasefail  
/ # udhcpc_wan;; leasefail  
/ # udhcpc_wan;; leasefail
```



What If  
**No SHELL?**







There is a lot to cover, and it's not possible to do so in one session. However, I can provide you with

## **RESOURCES**



# Resources

1. **Samy Kamkar's Crash Course in How to Be a Hardware Hacker**  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tlwXmNnXeSY>
2. **How We Hacked a TP-Link Router and Took Home \$55,000 in Pwn2Own**  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zjafMP7EgEA>
3. **Joe Grand**  
<https://www.youtube.com/@JoeGrand/playlists>
4. **Nirmal Dahal - #Nittam**  
<https://nirmaldahal.com.np/series/hardware-hacking/>



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# Thank You!

For tolerating me until this time :D