

Synthetic identities

An appsec point of view

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OWASP®



To a man with a hammer, everything looks like a nail (Abraham Maslow)

- Appsec since 2008
- Payment security research since 2015
- Hacking ATMs, POSEs, Apple/Google Pay, Visa, MC






Live Streaming OWASP London Chapter Meetup at Revolut

Recorded live

OWASP London Chapter

WASP
Web Application Security Project

OWASP is a meritocracy free and open community focused on improving the security of applications software by making application security visible.



Revolut

Revolut.
Radically Better



My results in seven years

- Angry vendors
- Customers don't patch/fix their bugs
- Money issues are not in the “Top 3 priorities” list
- Need to talk the same language



Talking the same language

- Vulnerabilities are everywhere
- Bugs, Exploits and Attacks
- Fraud, Risks and Threats
- “Bug bounty in payments”



Disclaimer

- Opinions are my own
- Good, bad and ugly
- Do not violate the law




The Good, The Bad and The Ugly



How to lose money during payment research

- Startup, which "allows you to spend money from any of your accounts using just one * Card" - *1234
- Connect any of your cards in the mobile app
- When you pay from the card *1234,
money will be withdrawn from the card you've chosen and connected (*5678)
- What if we will use Card2Card and send
From *1234 To *5678
- Just a regular transaction for *5678
- We will get a cashback!



Revolut.
Radically Better

WASP
Open Web Application Security Project



Example 1. Curve

- Brilliant startup
- Bug bounty



Example 1. Curve

- Brilliant startup
- Bug bounty... for six months



Example 1. Curve

- Constant rotation of the security staff



Example 1. Curve


- Shady ethics

Leaked numbers show \$200 million fintech startup

*Curve has far fewer active users than the number of
'customers' it has claimed (c) 2019 Business Insider*



Samsung Pay+




Antifraud Red Team

- Red Team vs Pentest vs Product Security
- Vulnerabilities vs Risks and Threats
- Remediation steps are vital



Example 2.



Looking for UK HSBC phisical card! / Off Topic / DreamMarket Forum

<http://tmskhzavkxyf6avd.onion.sh/viewtopic.php?pid=206557>

Looking for UK **HSBC** phisical card!

* Topics: Active [] | Unanswered [] * Index [] * » Off Topic [] * » Looking for UK **HSBC** phisical

#1 2017-12-15 06:26:03 [] Madoxman [] Member Registered: 2017-10-20 Posts: 37 Looking for

8:38

erHull ▾
Member

I can **create account** in any bank, N26, Revolut, **Bunq**, Monzo, Monese, **Fidor**





Graham Barrow

O

Chris Elliot ZUCKERBERG

Filter appointments

Current appointments

Total number of appointments 2

Date of birth

November 2002

INSTERGRAM LIMITED (NI691871)

Company status

Active

Correspondence address

20 Galgorm Industrial Estate, Fenaghy Road,
Ireland, BT42 1PY

Role ACTIVE

Director

Appointed on

14 October 2022

Nationality

British

Country of residence

United Kingdom

META PLATFORMS, INC LIMITED (NI691870)

Example 2.



Example 2.

Need:

- Photoshop
- Imagination
- Access to a KYC platform

Report

✓ Success

Completed 16 Feb 2022, 11:31 AM

Document analysis

Validity and authenticity

- Not expired
- Face detected
- Face matched with ID 1
- OCR
- Valid MRZ
- Comparison Front and Back
- Comparison data sources
- Cryptographically checked
- Not visual tampering detection
- Valid template
- NFC
- NFC genuine check
- NFC revocation check

Other

- Not in compromised list
- Fields checked against issuer
- Dedup check

Data capture


- Country *
- Given name
- Document photo
- Full name *
- Document id *
- Date of issue
- Family name
- Class
- Document type *
- Frontside *
- Address
- Gender
- Date of expire
- Date of birth
- Age

Conditions

- Date of expire is later than 16 2022



* The field is required for request



11:07

86%



POST /api/v2/capture/documents HTTP/1.1

Host: api

Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=alamofire.boundary.253979255aebd578

Connection: keep-alive

X-Token: NzA5MTc2N2ZINzM3M2NhZDI1NDBhMDM5MTY5Mzg4MzVR66gvJDE0NThINTFhL

X-Device: 1458e51a-4ba0-4bf5-8b6d-9b33c677d687

Accept: */*

User-Agent: (environment: Production; build:20; iPhone SE 1st Gen; iOS 13.3) Fo

Accept-Language: en-GB

Accept-Encoding: gzip;q=1.0, compress;q=0.5

Content-Length: 259662

--alamofire.boundary.253979255aebd578

Content-Type: application/json

Content-Disposition: form-data; name="data"; filename="data"

Driver's license

Place your card here
with the FRONT facing up
The photo will be taken automatically

Cancel



Re: Application for verification status - Ticket #15589

Inbox ×

Customer Support <help@i .com>


Hi Timu

Thank you for contacting us.

We would like to inform you that your account has been blocked by our Compliance department based on our internal policies and rules. Should we have new information concerning your case, we will let you know by email.

We apologise for any inconvenience caused.

Deepfake Offensive Toolkit



Deepfake Offensive Toolkit



Example 3.



Video/audio deepfakes

Need

- Use a mix of opensource and commercial products
- Find the right “victim” ([@i_bo0m](#))
- Find a way to sending hundreds requests (humans) or thousands/hundreds of thousands (AI)

Deepfake Offensive Toolkit



+




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


DeepFaceLab












IMAGE: MOTHERBOARD

MOTHERBOARD
TECHBYVICE

How I Broke Into a Bank Account With an AI-Generated Voice



PAYMENT VILLAGE

What has it to do with appsec?



What has it to do with appsec?

It is possible that attackers can gather information on an application by monitoring the time it takes to complete a task or give a respond.

In cryptography, a timing attack is a side-channel attack in which the attacker attempts to compromise a cryptosystem by analyzing the time taken to execute cryptographic algorithms.



What has it to do with appsec?

- Device attestation failures
- Trial and error aka bruteforce
- Information leakage via demo access
- Lack of replay protection

What has it to do with appsec?

- A01:2021-Broken Access Control
- A04:2021-Insecure Design
- A05:2021-Security Misconfiguration
- A07:2021-Identification and Authentication Failures
- A09:2021-Security Logging and Monitoring Failures




We can do better

Companies

- Try Red Team exercises
- Do not launch bug bounty if you're not ready
- Application Security is vital

Hackers

- Change the way of delivering the findings



QUESTIONS?

Paymentvillage.org



OWASP[®]

