

# Securing the Multi-cloud, Portable, \*-Tier Microservice Application: A live demo on Cloud-Native Application Security Platforms: Curiefense, Deepfense, Sysdig, Snyk Code, and Aqua Security Trivy & tfsec

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
<https://owasp.org/www-chapter-singapore/>

5 August 2021


***“Are microservices more or less secure than monoliths?”***

*Opinions/views expressed in the talk are solely my own and do not express the views or opinions of my employer.*

# The Technical Context: Monolithic vs Microservices (*Highly-Simplified*)





N-Tier / Multi Tier Architecture



\*-Tiers? Distributed, Decoupled and Polyglot-based architecture


# Demo of Online Boutique: A 10-Tier Sample Microservice App on Docker Desktop



“Online Boutique is a cloud-native microservices demo application. Online Boutique consists of a **10-tier** microservices application. The application is a web-based e-commerce app where users can browse items, add them to the cart, and purchase them.”


SOURCE: <https://github.com/GoogleCloudPlatform/microservices-demo>

## Architecture of Online Boutique - 11 Microservices written in different languages!



Service	Language	Description
frontend	Go	Exposes an HTTP server to serve the website. Does not require signup/login and generates session IDs for all users automatically.
cartservice	C#	Stores the items in the user's shopping cart in Redis and retrieves it.
productcatalogservice	Go	Provides the list of products from a JSON file and ability to search products and get individual products.
currencyservice	Node.js	Converts one money amount to another currency. Uses real values fetched from European Central Bank. It's the highest QPS service.
paymentservice	Node.js	Charges the given credit card info (mock) with the given amount and returns a transaction ID.
shippingservice	Go	Gives shipping cost estimates based on the shopping cart. Ships items to the given address (mock)
emailservice	Python	Sends users an order confirmation email (mock).
checkoutservice	Go	Retrieves user cart, prepares order and orchestrates the payment, shipping and the email notification.
recommendationservice	Python	Recommends other products based on what's given in the cart.
adservice	Java	Provides text ads based on given context words.
loadgenerator	Python/Locust	Continuously sends requests imitating realistic user shopping flows to the frontend.

**Online Boutique is composed of 11 microservices written in different languages (polyglot!) that talk to each other over gRPC.**



SOURCE:

<https://github.com/GoogleCloudPlatform/microservices-demo>

# This Meetup Session - Agenda

1. The Technical Context: Monolithic vs Microservices
2. The Context and Challenges of Securing the Multi-cloud, Portable, \*-Tier Microservices Application
3. The 4Cs of Cloud-Native Security: Code, Container, Cluster, Cloud
4. Curiefense Demo: Open Native Application Security Platform that protects all forms of web traffic, services, and APIs
5. Deepfence Cloud Native Protection Platform Demo
6. Snyk Code Demo
7. Sysdig Demo
8. Aqua Security Trivy and tfsec Demo
9. Recap
10. “Are microservices more or less secure than monoliths?”

# Who I am.

First and foremost a microservices developer with keen interest in AppSec. Working in an **end-user environment** at a financial institution.

Unyielding passion to build secure, scalable **polyglot** microservices that can run **anywhere** (multi-cloud and/or on-premise) and scale limitlessly.

## **Previous OWASP Presentations:**

[https://owasp.org/www-chapter-singapore/assets/presos/Securing\\_your\\_APIs - OWASP API Top 10 2019, \\_Real-life\\_Case.pdf](https://owasp.org/www-chapter-singapore/assets/presos/Securing_your_APIs_-_OWASP_API_Top_10_2019,_Real-life_Case.pdf)

[https://owasp.org/www-chapter-singapore/assets/presos/Deconstructing the Solarwinds Supply Chain Attack and Deterring it Honing in on the Golden SAML Attack Technique.pdf](https://owasp.org/www-chapter-singapore/assets/presos/Deconstructing_the_Solarwinds_Supply_Chain_Attack_and_Deterring_it_Honing_in_on_the_Golden_SAML_Attack_Technique.pdf)

[https://owasp.org/www-chapter-singapore/assets/presos/Microservices%20Security%2C%20Container%20Runtime%20Security%2C%20MITRE%20ATT%26CK%C2%AE%20%20for%20Kubernetes%20\(K8S\)%20and%20Service%20Mesh%20for%20Security.pdf](https://owasp.org/www-chapter-singapore/assets/presos/Microservices%20Security%2C%20Container%20Runtime%20Security%2C%20MITRE%20ATT%26CK%C2%AE%20%20for%20Kubernetes%20(K8S)%20and%20Service%20Mesh%20for%20Security.pdf)

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# The Challenges

## Context | Problem Statement

“The perimeter is no longer just the physical location of the enterprise [data center], and what lies inside the perimeter is no longer a blessed and safe place to host personal computing devices and enterprise applications [microservices].” <https://cloud.google.com/security/beyondprod/>

### Traditional Infrastructure Security

Perimeter-based security (i.e. firewall), with internal communications considered trusted.



### Cloud-Native Security

**Zero-trust security with service-to-service communication verified, and no implicit trust for services in the environment.**



### Implied Requirements for Cloud-native Security



***Protection of the network at the edge (remains applicable) and no inherent mutual trust between services.***

Fixed IPs and hardware for certain applications.



Greater resource utilization, reuse, and sharing, including of IPs and hardware.

IP address-based identity.



Service based identity.

Services run in a known, expected location.




Services can run anywhere in the environment, including hybrid deployments across the public cloud and private data centers.



***Trusted machines running code with known provenance.***

SOURCE: <https://cloud.google.com/security/beyondprod/>

## Overview of Cloud Native Security: The 4C's of Cloud Native security



**In today's session and demo, we will look at how we can use some of these cloud-native platforms and tools to secure Code and Container**

Note: This layered approach augments the defense in depth computing approach to security, which is widely regarded as a best practice for securing software systems.

<https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/overview/>





## Curiefense

Curiefense is the open source cloud native application security platform that protects all forms of web traffic, services, and APIs. It includes bot management, WAF, application-layer DDoS protection, session profiling, advanced rate limiting, and much more. Curiefense is integrated with **NGINX and Envoy proxy**. It blocks hostile traffic from sites, services, microservices, containers, service meshes, and more.

Curiefense is an API-first, DevOps oriented web-defense HTTP-Filter adapter for **Envoy and NGINX**. It provides multiple security technologies (WAF, application-layer DDoS protection, bot management, and more) along with real-time traffic monitoring and transparency.

Curiefense is fully controllable programmatically. All configuration data (security rulesets, policies, etc.) can be maintained singularly, or as different branches for different environments, as you choose. All changes are versioned, and reverts can be done at any time.

Curiefense also has a UI console. **Curiefense is currently a CNCF Sandbox Project.**



Envoy is an Open Source Edge and Service Proxy, designed for cloud native applications. Originally built at Lyft, Envoy is a high performance C++ distributed proxy designed for single services and applications, as well as a communication bus and “universal data plane” designed for large microservice “service mesh” architectures. Envoy runs alongside every application and abstracts the network by providing common features in a platform-agnostic manner.

SOURCE: <https://docs.curiefense.io/>; <https://www.curiefense.io/>; <https://www.envoyproxy.io/>;  
<https://www.curiefense.io/blog/announcing-nginx-integration>

# Curiefense Architecture and its components



Container Name	Purpose and Functionality
curieproxy	(Represented by the column with the Curiefense logo) Performs traffic filtering
curiesync	Ensures configurations are always in sync with latest policies and rules changes
curietasker	Runs periodic maintenance tasks
curielogger	Pushes Envoy access log to postgresql and metrics to prometheus
confserver	API server to manage configuration
uiserver	UI Management Console
echo	Dummy web server for testing
elasticsearch *	Stores access logs
kibana	Displays logs
filebeat	Sends logs to elasticsearch
grafana *	Dashboards
prometheus *	Stores time series metrics
redis *	Synchronizes session and rules across deployments and Envoy containers
(*) You may replace these containers with your own if desired.	

## How Curiefense Works



Curiefense runs every incoming request (and in some cases, responses as well) through a series of mechanisms. We will now walk through some of them to understand how traffic is handled and processed.

During the procedures described on the left, we will set up some simple rules and then run some requests through Curiefense. By the end of this process, we will understand how to create security rules and policies, you will observe them being applied, and you will see how Curiefense reports on incoming requests and its reactions to them.



## Curiefense Management UI: <http://localhost:30080/>

← → ↻

localhost:30080/config/master/aclpolicies/\_default\_

☆

Curiefense

client version: 1.3.9

SETTINGS

Policies & Rules

Search

Databases

Publish Changes

API

ANALYTICS

Kibana

Grafana

Prometheus

GIT

Version Control

DOCS

Curiebook

master

ACL Policies

1 branch

23 commits

default-acl

+

+

+

Name

\_default\_

default-acl

ENFORCE DENY

BYPASS

ALLOW BOT

DENY BOT

ALLOW

DENY

+

+

+

+

+

+

trusted

-

+

/conf/api/v1/configs/master/d/aclpolicies/e/\_default\_/


Version History

Date	Version	Parents	Message	Author	Email
14 hours 43 minutes ago	e873ec3	ae62b5b	Update entry [_default_] of document [aclpolicies]	Curiefense API	curiefense@reblaze.com
29th Jul, 00:39	01f6eeb	ee694d5	Create config [master]	Curiefense Bootstrap Script	curiefense-bootstrap@reblaze.com

/conf/api/v1/configs/master/d/aclpolicies/e/\_default\_/v/



# Curiefense Grafana: <http://localhost:30300/>







## What we are going to do

Create a Tag Rule

Create an ACL  
(Access Control List)


Test the ACL

Activate the ACL



curl <http://localhost:30081/no/header>

curl http://localhost:30081/with/header -H  
"nathan: aw"



Command Prompt

```
Host: localhost:30081
User-Agent: curl/7.55.1
Accept: */*
X-Forwarded-For: 172.19.0.1
X-Forwarded-Proto: http
X-Request-Id: 13ff68c2-b8ad-43e0-9387-94583b640965
X-Envoy-Internal: true
X-Envoy-Expected-Rq-Timeout-Ms: 15000
Foo: bar


C:\Users\AWNATHAN>curl http://localhost:30081/with/header -H "foo: bar"
Request served by echo

HTTP/1.1 GET /with/header

Host: localhost:30081
Foo: bar
X-Request-Id: 462cd632-08e3-470a-8db1-061a208081d5
X-Envoy-Expected-Rq-Timeout-Ms: 15000
X-Forwarded-For: 172.19.0.1
X-Forwarded-Proto: http
X-Envoy-Internal: true
User-Agent: curl/7.55.1
Accept: */*

C:\Users\AWNATHAN>curl http://localhost:30081/with/header -H "foo: bar"
access denied
C:\Users\AWNATHAN>
```

**Result of apply ACL on  
HTTP headers**

[illegible]

The screenshot displays the Curiefense web application interface. On the left sidebar, there are navigation links for SETTINGS, Policies & Rules, Search, Databases, Publish Changes, API, ANALYTICS, Kibana, Grafana, Prometheus, GIT, Version Control, DOCS, and Curiebook. The main content area shows the 'master' branch selected, with a dropdown menu open for 'ACL Policies'. This dropdown lists several policies: ACL Policies, Flow Control, Tag Rules, Rate Limits, URL Maps, WAF Policies, and WAF Rules. Below the dropdown, there's a table with columns 'Name' and '\_default\_'. The first row shows 'default-act' under 'Name' and an empty space under '\_default\_'. At the bottom, there's a section titled 'ENFORCE DENY' followed by a series of colored bars representing different policy states: ENFORCE DENY (red), BYPASS (green), ALLOW BOT (blue), DENY BOT (pink), ALLOW (blue), and DENY (pink). Below these bars, there's a 'trusted' label with a minus sign. At the very bottom, there's a code snippet: `/conf/api/vs/configs/master/default-act/_default_`.



## Curiefense Features (1/3)

### **Web Application Firewall**

Curiefense's full-featured WAF protects against the OWASP Top 10 and many other threats:

1. Negative security features (signatures, block-listing, etc.) exclude known threats.
2. Positive security features (input validation, schema enforcement, etc.) exclude anomalies and zero-days.
3. The platform has capabilities that are not offered by many commercial solutions, including content filtering, payload inspection, behavioral profiling, and more.

### **Advanced Rate Limiting**

Curiefense provides rate-limiting capabilities, definable at any scope (from globally down to individual URLs). Traffic sources are blocked when their requests exceed predefined limits. This mechanism has a wide variety of beneficial uses, including:

1. Prevention of account takeover attacks (credential stuffing, credential discovery, etc.)
2. Prevention of other brute-force threats, e.g. payment card validation
3. Detecting anomalies, e.g. a single user changes geolocation multiple times
4. Blocking inventory denial attacks

And more.....

## Curiefense Features (2/3)

### **Application -Layer DDoS Protection**

Curiefense defends against layer 7 DoS/DDoS at all scales, from massive DDoS botnet assaults to single malformed-packet DoS attempts.

---

### **API Security**

APIs and services are protected with the full range of capabilities that are applied to web applications. The only exceptions are techniques which do not apply to APIs, such as browser environment verification.

Curiefense also has additional capabilities that apply only to APIs and services, such as schema enforcement.

---

### **DevOps**

1. Curiefense can be deployed and controlled via web console, REST API, and/or a CLI tool.
2. JSON or YAML configuration format
3. Git versioning as the configuration storage engine
4. Support for environment branching (e.g., prod/devops/qa)

## Curiefense Features (3/3)

### **Logging and Real-Time Reporting**

Curiefense logs and reports all details (headers, payloads, tags, disposition, etc.) of all requests. Out of the box, it includes Prometheus metrics and Grafana dashboards. Users can customize these, or can swap in their own reporting and visualization frameworks.

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### **Threat Feeds**

Curiefense consumes external threat feeds (e.g., IP reputation), auto-updating its security posture as the threat environment evolves. Weekly updates are included for IP reputation, ASNs, etc.




# Deepfence: Unified Cloud Native Security Observability

For K8s, Serverless and more.

Deployed as a set of microservices with subatomic footprint, Deepfence is a resilient distributed intrusion prevention system that measures and maps runtime attack surface, and provides full-stack protection from known and unknown threats.

Deepfence is deterministic security for modern workloads.



# Microservices Security, Monitoring vs Observability: “What’s broken, and why?” (1/2)

## Challenges

An obvious area where a Microservices Architecture adds complexity is communications between services; visibility into service to service communications can be hard to achieve, but is critical to building an optimized and resilient architecture. Most failures in the microservices space occur during the interactions between services, so a view into those transactions helps teams better manage architectures to avoid failures.

## Microservices Observability

Observability is about data exposure and easy access to information which is critical when you need a way to see when communications fail, do not occur as expected or occur when they shouldn't. The way services interact with each other at runtime needs to be monitored, managed and controlled. This begins with observability and the ability to understand the behavior of your microservice architecture. Observability makes it much easier to see what is happening when your services interact with each other, making it easier to build a more efficient, resilient and secure microservice architecture.

'Observability' comes from control theory, an area of engineering concerned with automating control a dynamic system - e.g., the flow of water through a pipe, or the speed of an automobile over inclines and declines - based on feedback from the system.

# Microservices Security, Monitoring vs Observability: “What’s broken, and why?” (2/2)

## Two Observability Features

### Tracing



### Metrics

Distributed tracing, also called distributed request tracing, is a method used to profile and monitor applications, especially those built using a microservices architecture. Distributed tracing helps pinpoint where failures occur and what causes poor performance.



Metrics, based upon the telemetry data which can be gathered automatically across the service mesh. Important metrics to gather include request volume, request duration, latency and request size.

## Monitoring vis-a-vis Observability

Observability is often mischaracterized as an overhyped buzzword, or a 'rebranding' of system monitoring in general and application performance monitoring (APM) in particular. In fact, observability is a natural evolution of APM data collection methods that better addresses the increasingly rapid, distributed and dynamic nature of cloud-native application deployments. Observability doesn't replace monitoring – it enables better monitoring, and better APM.



## Deepfence Demo



SOURCE: <https://deepfence.show/#/topology>

## Sysdig Secure DevOps Platform

### Secure

- Image Scanning
- Runtime security
- Incident response
- Continuous cloud security (CSPM)
- Compliance

### Monitor

- Container, Kubernetes, and cloud monitoring
- Troubleshooting

### ServiceVision:

Context

### CloudVision:


Config and activity

### ImageVision:

Vulnerabilities

### ContainerVision:

Granular visibility



**Secure DevOps For containers, Kubernetes, and cloud: Deep Visibility Across Your DevOps Workflow:** Unified visibility across workloads and cloud infrastructure from a single security and monitoring event store. Accurately alert on threats, operational issues and compliance risks and respond using a detailed activity record. Easily plug into your existing workflows with out-of-the-box integrations.

<https://sysdig.com/secure-devops-platform/>



Overview

Scanning

Compliance

Policies

Network

Events

Investigate

Get Started

Overview

Scanning

Compliance

Policies

Network

Events

Investigate

Get Started

Cluster is any Namespace is any

Build Time - Images Scanned

0  
Total last 24 hours

Pass Fail

10  
5  
0

Thu 29 Sat 31 Aug

Build Time - CVEs Found by Severity (0)

0  
Total last 24 hours

Critical High Medium Low

10  
5  
0

Thu 29 Sat 31 Aug

Compliance

REGULATORY COMPLIANCE

AWS

GDPR

HIPAA

ISO-27001-2013

NIST-800-53-Rev4

NIST-800-53-Rev5

SOC2

Workloads

GDPR

HIPAA

ISO-27001-2013

NIST-800-190

NIST-800-53-Rev4

NIST-800-53-Rev5

PCI-3.2

SOC2

BENCHMARKS

Host Benchmarks

All Clusters...

31.3%\*

Controls Pass

5 Passed 11 Failed

16 Total Controls

Principles

Controller and processor

Runtime Policies

Search...

High Medium Low Info Capture Enabled Select policy type...

All K8s User Modifications	Entire Infrastructure	Updated 7 days ago
Create Privileged Pod	Entire Infrastructure	Updated 7 days ago
Inadvised K8s Activity	Entire Infrastructure	Updated 7 days ago
Inadvised K8s User Activity	Entire Infrastructure	Updated 7 days ago
Suspicious Container Activity	Entire Infrastructure	Updated 7 days ago
Suspicious Filesystem Changes	Entire Infrastructure	Updated 7 days ago
Suspicious K8s Activity	Entire Infrastructure	Updated 7 days ago
Suspicious K8s User Activity	Entire Infrastructure	Updated 7 days ago
Suspicious Lateral Movement Activity to Cloud	Entire Infrastructure	Updated 7 days ago
Suspicious Network Activity	Entire Infrastructure	Updated 7 days ago
Sysdig AWS Best Practices	Entire Infrastructure	Updated 7 days ago
Unexpected Spawned Processes	Entire Infrastructure	Updated 7 days ago
Access Cryptomining Network	Entire Infrastructure	Updated 7 days ago

Secure

Overview

Scanning

Compliance

Policies

Network

Events

Investigate


Get Started

Your free trial will expire in 23 days. [Upgrade to Enterprise](#)


## Overview

Cluster is any Namespace is any

### Build Time - Images Scanned



### Build Time - CVEs Found by Severity (0)



## Compliance

### REGULATORY COMPLIANCE

- AWS
  - GDPR
  - HIPAA
  - ISO-27001-2013
  - NIST-800-53-Rev4
  - NIST-800-53-Rev5
  - SOC2
- Workloads
  - GDPR
  - HIPAA
  - ISO-27001-2013
  - NIST-800-190
  - NIST-800-53-Rev4
  - NIST-800-53-Rev5
  - PCI-3.2
  - SOC2

### BENCHMARKS

Host Benchmarks

All Clusters...

31.3%\*

Controls Pass

5

Passed

11

Failed

Download CSV

16 Total Controls

Principles

Controller and processor

## Runtime Policies

Search...

High

Medium

Low

Info


Capture Enabled

Select policy type...

All K8s User Modifications	Entire Infrastructure	Updated 7 days ago
Create Privileged Pod	Entire Infrastructure	Updated 7 days ago
Inadvised K8s Activity	Entire Infrastructure	Updated 7 days ago
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Sysdig AWS Best Practices	Entire Infrastructure	Updated 7 days ago
Unexpected Spawned Processes	Entire Infrastructure	Updated 7 days ago
Access Cryptomining Network	Entire Infrastructure	Updated 7 days ago



Snyk



Developer-first Cloud Native Application Security

Security Across the Cloud Native Application Stack: Secure all the components of the modern cloud native application in a single platform


Developer-first: Application security at scale requires developers to be the first step in the security process. Snyk's platform is purpose-built to be easily used by developers to build software securely.

<https://snyk.io/>



# Snyk Code Demo


Secure code with a developer-friendly experience:  
Snyk Code uses a revolutionary approach designed to be developer-first. Conventional Static Application Security Testing (SAST) tools are limited by lengthy scans times and poor accuracy, returning too many false positives, and eroding developer trust. Snyk Code makes developer efforts efficient and actionable.



<https://app.snyk.io/org/nathanawmk>



# Aqua Security



Aqua secures your applications wherever you develop and run them: Across clouds, container and serverless platforms, CI/CD pipelines, registries, DevOps tools and modes of deployment, orchestrators, all the way to Security, SIEM, and Analytics.

**Secure the Build:** Release and update software at DevOps speed with security automation. Detect vulnerabilities and malware early and fix them fast, and allow only safe artifacts to progress through your CI/CD pipeline.

**Secure the Infrastructure:** Deploy your cloud native applications on any infrastructure while ensuring that cloud services, orchestration and hosts are securely configured and in compliance.

**Secure the Workloads:** Detect and block policy violations in your workloads using granular controls that are natively architected to provide the optimal response, at scale.



# Aqua Security - Trivy + Circle CI Demo



Trivy (tri pronounced like trigger, vy pronounced like envy) is a simple and comprehensive scanner for vulnerabilities in container images, file systems, and Git repositories, as well as for configuration issues. Trivy detects vulnerabilities of OS packages (Alpine, RHEL, CentOS, etc.) and language-specific packages (Bundler, Composer, npm, yarn, etc.). In addition, Trivy scans Infrastructure as Code (IaC) files such as Terraform, Dockerfile and Kubernetes, to detect potential configuration issues that expose your deployments to the risk of attack. Trivy is easy to use. Just install the binary and you're ready to scan.

SOURCE: <https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy>



# Aqua Trivy - Demo

1. Scan an Alpine Linux Docker Image
2. Scan an Nginx Image

Dashboard

All Pipelines

Everyone's Pipelines | All Projects | All Branches

Auto-expand

Pipeline	Status	Workflow	Branch / Commit	Start	Duration	Actions
nathanawmk-aqua-security-assignment-1 48	Failed	use-my-orb				
Jobs	1 build 49					
nathanawmk-aqua-security-assignment-1 47	Success	use-my-orb				
Jobs	1 build 48					
nathanawmk-aqua-security-assignment-1 46	Success	use-my-orb				
Jobs	1 build 47					
nathanawmk-aqua-security-assignment-1 45	Success	use-my-orb				
Jobs	1 build 46					
nathanawmk-aqua-security-assignment-1 44	Failed	use-my-orb				
Jobs	1 build 45					
nathanawmk-aqua-security-assignment-1 43	Failed	use-my-orb				

1 / 4 parallel runs

- Spin up environment 9s
- Preparing environment variables 0s
- Setup a remote Docker engine 3s
- scan an image 7s

LIBRARY	VULNERABILITY ID	SEVERITY	INSTALLED VERSION	FIXED VERSION	TITLE
gcc-8-base	CVE-2018-12886	HIGH	8.3.0-6		gcc: spilling of stack protection address in cfgexpand.c and function.c leads to...
					-->avd.aquasec.com/avd/cve-2018-12886
	CVE-2019-15847				gcc: POWER9 "DARN" RNG intrinsic produces repeated output
					-->avd.aquasec.com/avd/cve-2019-15847
libc-bin	CVE-2021-33574	CRITICAL	2.28-10		glibc: mq_notify does not handle separately allocated thread attributes
					-->avd.aquasec.com/avd/cve-2021-33574
	CVE-2020-1751	HIGH			glibc: array overflow in backtrace functions for powerpc
					-->avd.aquasec.com/avd/cve-2020-1751
	CVE-2020-1752				glibc: use-after-free in glob() function when expanding _user
					-->avd.aquasec.com/avd/cve-2020-1752
	CVE-2021-3326				glibc: Assertion failure in ISO-2022-JP-3 goconv module related to combining characters
					-->avd.aquasec.com/avd/cve-2021-3326
libc6	CVE-2021-33574	CRITICAL			glibc: mq_notify does not handle separately allocated thread attributes

<https://app.circleci.com/pipelines/github/nathanawmk>

<https://github.com/nathanawmk/nathanawmk-aqua-security-assignment-1/blob/circleci-project-setup/.circleci/config.yml>



# tfsec

## Aqua tfsec- Demo

```
C:\Users\AWNATHAN>cd C:\Users\AWNATHAN\Downloads\terraform-guides-master\infrastructure-as-code\aws-ec2-instance
```

```
C:\Users\AWNATHAN\Downloads\terraform-guides-master\infrastructure-as-code\aws-ec2-instance>tfsec
```

Result 1

```
[aws-ec2-enforce-http-token-ids][@0m][31mHIGH][39m@0m] Resource 'aws_instance.ubuntu' is missing 'metadata_options' block - it is required with 'http_tokens' set to 'required' to make Instance Metadata Service more secure.
C:\Users\AWNATHAN\Downloads\terraform-guides-master\infrastructure-as-code\aws-ec2-instance\main.tf:9-17
```

```
6 |   region = "${var.aws_region}"
7 | }
8 |
9 | resource "aws_instance" "ubuntu" {
10 |   ami           = "${var.ami_id}"
11 |   instance_type = "${var.instance_type}"
12 |   availability_zone = "${var.aws_region}a"
13 |
14 |   tags {
15 |     Name = "${var.name}"
16 |   }
17 | }
18 |
```

Legacy ID: AWS079  
Impact: Instance metadata service can be interacted with freely  
Resolution: Enable HTTP token requirement for IMDS

More Info:

- <https://tfsec.dev/docs/aws/ec2/enforce-http-token-ids#aws/ec2>
- <https://registry.terraform.io/providers/hashicorp/aws/latest/docs/resources/instance#metadata-options>
- <https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/defense-in-depth-open-firewalls-reverse-proxies-ssrf-vulnerability-remediations/>

times

disk i/o	10.276ms
parsing HCL	0s
evaluating values	0s
running checks	1.5688ms

counts

files loaded	3
blocks	8
evaluated blocks	8
modules	0
module blocks	0
ignored checks	0

results

critical	0
high	1
medium	0
low	0

1 potential problems detected.

```
C:\Users\AWNATHAN\Downloads\terraform-guides-master\infrastructure-as-code\aws-ec2-instance>
```

tfsec uses static analysis of your terraform templates to spot potential security issues. Now with terraform CDK support.

cd

C:\Users\AWNATHAN\Downloads\terraform-guides-master\infrastructure-as-code\aws-ec2-instance

tfsec > issues.txt

```
[aws-ec2-enforce-http-token-ids][@0m][31mHIGH][39m@0m] Resource 'aws_instance.ubuntu' is missing 'metadata_options' block - it is required with 'http_tokens' set to 'required' to make Instance Metadata Service more secure.
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- <https://registry.terraform.io/providers/hashicorp/aws/latest/docs/resources/instance#metadata-options>  
- <https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/defense-in-depth-open-firewalls-reverse-proxies-ssrf-vulnerability-remediations/>

disk i/o	1.050ms
parsing HCL	0s
evaluating values	0s
running checks	2.042ms

files loaded	3
blocks	8
evaluated blocks	8
modules	0
module blocks	0
ignored checks	0

results	
critical	0
high	1
medium	0
low	0

1 potential problems detected.

```
1 terraform {
2   required_version = ">= 0.11.0"
3 }
4
5 provider "aws" {
6   region = "${var.aws_region}"
7 }
8
9 resource "aws_instance" "ubuntu" {
10   ami           = "${var.ami_id}"
11   instance_type = "${var.instance_type}"
12   availability_zone = "${var.aws_region}a"
13
14   tags {
15     Name = "${var.name}"
16   }
17 }
18
```

<https://github.com/aquasecurity/tfsec>;

<https://tfsec.dev/>



## Recap

### Challenge

“The perimeter is no longer just the physical location of the enterprise [data center], and what lies inside the perimeter is no longer a blessed and safe place to host personal computing devices and enterprise applications [microservices].” <https://cloud.google.com/security/beyondprod/>

#### Traditional Infrastructure Security

Perimeter-based security (i.e. firewall), with internal communications considered trusted.



#### Cloud-Native Security

**Zero-trust security with service-to-service communication verified, and no implicit trust for services in the environment.**



#### Implied Requirements for Cloud-native Security



***Protection of the network at the edge (remains applicable) and no inherent mutual trust between services.***

Fixed IPs and hardware for certain applications.



Greater resource utilization, reuse, and sharing, including of IPs and hardware.

IP address-based identity.



Service based identity.

Services run in a known, expected location.



Services can run anywhere in the environment, including hybrid deployments across the public cloud and private data centers.




***Trusted machines running code with known provenance.***

SOURCE: <https://cloud.google.com/security/beyondprod/>



*“Are microservices more or less secure than monoliths?”*



*It depends!*

*(Sorry to disappoint!)*

**Multiple**  
**Considerations**  
**+ Tradeoffs**

**Attack  
Surfaces**

An attack surface is the sum of vulnerabilities in an application — the smaller it is, the better. In a monolith, there is only one attack surface, albeit a sizable one. With microservices, however, each service has its own attack surface, but of lesser size.

**+ 1 for  
*Monolithic***


**Cascading  
Vulnerabilities**

The individual parts of a monolith are inherently more connected than the services in a microservices architecture. This means that if one aspect of a monolith is exploited or otherwise fails, others may follow. On the other hand, microservices are decoupled by design. While this does mean there are more attack surfaces to secure, the likelihood of a cascading vulnerability (especially polyglot is pursued!) across multiple aspects of the application is much lower. Not to mention, decoupling also makes it easier to address individual issues and roll upgrades without shutting down the entire app.

**+ 1 for  
*Microservices***

SOURCE: <https://blog.sqreen.com/top-10-security-traps-to-avoid-when-migrating-from-a-monolith-to-microservices/>;  
<https://nordicapis.com/which-is-more-secure-monolith-or-microservices/>

*“Are microservices more or less secure than monoliths?”*



*It depends!*

*(Sorry to disappoint!)*

**All things  
considered**

Both microservices and monoliths have pros and cons in terms of security. However, monolithic approach may make security easier for smaller applications.

**Some usual  
security pitfalls  
observed in  
Microservices  
Adoption:**

1. Inconsistent logging
2. Relying on one external firewall
3. Not monitoring your service-to-service communication



- Make Observability in Microservices your first-class citizen and foremost concern! (Envoy Proxy, Service Mesh such as Istio, etc)
- Multiple Cloud Native Platform and Tools are available out there to help you secure your Microservices! (Some are demonstrated today.)

# References

- <https://cloud.google.com/security/beyondprod>
- <https://nordicapis.com/which-is-more-secure-monolith-or-microservices/>
- <https://deepfence.io/>
- <https://www.curiefense.io/>
- <https://sysdig.com/>
- <https://www.aquasec.com/>

# Reach Out

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