# Broken Access Control





Tackling OWASP's #1 Vulnerability

### #whoami

Spas Genov
Senior QA Automation @NewsUK
Security enthusiast




### #whoami

/Spas-Genov (LinkedIn)
Senior QA Automation @NewsUK
W4nn4b3 h4x0r (eWPT, eJPT)



### OWASP Top 10:2021






### Terminology Confusion

- Broken Access Control (BAC)
- Missing Function Level Access Control (MFLAX)
- Broken Object Level Access (BOLA)
- Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)
- Forceful browsing
- Authorization/Authentication issues



Authentication - Verifies a user's identity (through username/password)



• Session Management - Maintains the user's authenticated state across requests (using session tokens)




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


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


• Vertical Access Control: Restricts access based on privilege levels (e.g., admin vs. regular user)




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


 Horizontal Access Control: Prevents users of the same privilege level from accessing each other's resources






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 Context-Dependent Access Control: Restricts access to actions or resources based on application state or user interaction sequence



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# **Broken Access Control** vulnerabilities

occur when applications fail to properly restrict what users can do, allowing them to act outside their intended permissions.



Broken Access Control vulnerabilities occur when applications fail to properly restrict what users can do, allowing them to act outside their intended permissions.

These security failures typically result in three major consequences:

- 1. Improper access to restricted functionality
- 2. Unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information
- 3. Unauthorized modification or destruction of data

# Vertical Privilege Escalation

 Users gain access to higher privilege functionality, for example, a regular user accessing the admin panel. Often exploited by manipulating parameters that control access



https://site.com/login/home.php?admin=true https://site.com/login/home.php?role=1



# Vertical Privilege Escalation


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
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


https://site.com/login/home.php?admin=true https://site.com/login/home.php?role=1




# Horizontal Privilege Escalation

Users access resources belonging to other users of the same privilege




# Horizontal Privilege Escalation

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
### Multi-Step Process Vulnerabilities

- Access controls implemented on some steps but missing on others
- Attackers bypass the intended sequence
- Direct request to endpoint with missing controls



# Multi-Step Process Vulnerabilities

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- Attackers bypass the intended sequence
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### **BAC Terminology**

- IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference): Application exposes object IDs that can be manipulated to access unauthorized resources
- BOLA (Broken Object Level Authorization): Accessing objects belonging to other users by modifying identifiers
- MFLAX (Missing Function Level Access Control): Regular users accessing admin-only functionalit
- Authentication Bypass: Accessing protected resources while unauthenticated
- Cross-Tenant Access: Accessing another tenant's data in multi-tenant applications
- Forceful browsing Directly accessing restricted URLs, bypassing intended navigation paths

# Access Control (Testing Cheat Sheet)

#### 1. Parameter Manipulation: 13

- Numeric ID substitution (userId=1 → userId=2)
- Email address substitution in endpoints
- GUID/UUID substitution for non-sequential IDs
- Hash value substitution

#### 2. Request Modification:

- Change HTTP methods (GET to POST, POST to /PUT/PATCH/DELETE...)
- Modify cookies or session tokens
- Alter hidden form fields

# Access Control (Testing Cheat Sheet)

#### 1. Path & Endpoint Techniques: Q

- Direct access to privileged endpoints
- Path traversal attacks
- Forced browsing via case changes (/admin/ vs /ADMIN/)
- Static file enumeration
- Direct function calls with parameters

#### 2. Process Manipulation: <a>®</a>

- Bypass intended sequence in multi-step processes
- Skip authorization steps


### IDOR PARAMS

#### **Common parameters:**

id doc
user key
account email
number group
order profile
no edit

#### **Functions:**

Change mail/password
Upgrade/downgrade user role
Create/remove/update/delete context specific app data
Shipping, invoices and document viewing



https://github.com/1ndianl33t/Gf-Patterns/blob/master/idor.json


### **IDOR**

```
POST /account/updatepasswd HTTP/1.1
Host: site.com
Connection: Close
Content-Length: 22
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Origin: https://site.com
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36
(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/67.0.3396.99 Safari/537.36
Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9, image/webp, image/apng
r/*;9-0.8
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: en-US, en; q=0.9
Cookie: JSESSIONID=3214536754363414df3142qf2341
userid=1337&action=updatepasswd
```

### Hash based IDOR

```
POST /account/updatepasswd HTTP/1.1
Host: site.com
Connection: Close
Content-Length: 22
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Origin: https://site.com
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36
(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/67.0.3396.99 Safari/537.36
Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9, image/webp, image/apng
\%/*;9-0.8
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: en-US, en; q=0.9
Cookie: JSESSIONID=3214536754363414df3142qf2341
userid=912134131a7611f2dfee0b92bf6b0eed&action=updatepasswd
```

# UUID = No bug?



### UUID = No bug?

User accounts identified by UUIDs like: 8f1a2b3c-4d5e-6f7g-8h9i-0j1k2l3m4n5o

The developers believed this approach was secure because:

- UUIDs are not sequential or predictable
- The extremely large keyspace (2^128 possibilities) makes brute-forcing impossible
- UUIDs don't reveal information about the user like sequential IDs might
- **Account data access**: /account-details?uuid=8f1a2b3c-4d5e-6f7g-8h9i-0j1k2l3m4n5o
- **Password reset functions**: /reset-password?user=8f1a2b3c-4d5e-6f7g-8h9i-0j1k2l3m4n5o



### The Hidden Vulnerability

The application had an "account linking" feature that allowed users to link their accounts with family members. When viewing linked accounts, the application returned a JSON response (UUID Leakage)

```
"primary_account": {
 "name": "Lub4o",
 "uuid": "8f1a2b3c-4d5e-6f7g-8h9i-0j1k2l3m4n5o",
 "linked_accounts": [
     "name": "Mary Jane",
      "relationship": "spouse",
      "uuid": "9a8b7c6d-5e4f-3g2h-1i0j-9k8l7m6n5o4p"
```

### The Hidden Vulnerability

The application had an "account linking" feature that allowed users to link their accounts with family members. When viewing linked accounts, the application returned a JSON response

```
POST /change-contact-info?uuid=9a8b7c6d-5e4f-3g2h-1i0j-9k8l7m6n5o4p HTTP/1.1
Host: finance.site.com
Cookie: session=spz_session_cookie

{"email":"malicious@attacker.com"}
```

### Testing Approaches – Black Box

- 1. Map the application thoroughly
- 2. Identify potential parameters used for access control
- 3. Test with multiple accounts of different privilege levels
- 4. Manipulate parameters systematically
- 5. Use automation tools like Burp Authorize extension

### Testing Approaches – White Box Testing

- 1. Review code for access control implementation
- 2. Look for these red flags:
  - Violations of principle of least privilege
  - Missing/weak access control checks
  - Missing controls on certain API methods
  - Trust on client-side input for access decisions
- 3. Validate findings on running application

### Testing Matrix

	Update Password	Update Email	Change Account Data	Upgrade Account to Admin	View Logs yes no	
Admin	yes	yes	yes	yes		
User	yes	yes	no	no		
Unauthenticated	no	no	no	no		

Text = Should they be able to do it?


Color = could they do it? (red is bad)

#### **Burp Suite Add-ons:** Autorize, AutoRepeater, AuthMatrix, Authz


ID Met	URL	Orig. L	Modif	Unaut Auth	z Unaut	. Request/Response Viewers Configuration
24 OPTI	1 3	0	0		ss Bypass	Autorize is on
25 GET	https://example.com:443/	1256	1256		ss Bypass	Drayant 204 Not Madified status and
26 GET	https://example.com:443/	1256	1256		ss Bypass	
27 GET	https://example.com:443/	1256	1256		rc Bypass	
28 GET	https://content-autofill.googleapis.com:443/v1/page	32	41		rc Bypass	✓ Check unauthenticated
29 GET	https://github.com:443/Quitten/Autorize/security/ov	0	0		iss Bypass	
30 GET	https://github.com:443/Quitten/Autorize/tree/master				rc Is enfo	
31 POST	https://waa-pa.clients6.google.com:443/\$rpc/googl	2	43		rc Bypass	Auto sci oli
32 GET	https://github.com:443/Quitten/Autorize/tree/master				rc Is enfo	
33 GET	https://avatars.githubusercontent.com:443/u/269682	1563	1563		iss Bypass	
34 GET	https://avatars.githubusercontent.com:443/u/165176	1807	1807		iss Bypass	Kelliove
35 GET	https://avatars.githubusercontent.com:443/u/138052	1251	1251		iss Bypass	Authorization: SAPISIDHASH
36 GET	https://avatars.githubusercontent.com:443/u/213717	2165	2165		iss Bypass	1/2133/24/DC3CaCU94f88/8Q9DDD5
37 GET	https://avatars.githubusercontent.com:443/u/585628	1558	1558		iss Bypass	
38 GET	https://avatars.githubusercontent.com:443/u/527377	1556	1556		iss Bypass	
39 GET	https://avatars.githubusercontent.com:443/u/269640	1868	1868		ıss Bypass	
40 GET	https://avatars.githubusercontent.com:443/u/828821	1571	1571		ıss Bypass	From last request:
41 GET	https://avatars.githubusercontent.com:443/u/699004	1532	1532		iss Bypass	
42 GET	https://avatars.githubusercontent.com:443/u/828821	1571	1571		iss Bypass	
43 GET	https://avatars.githubusercontent.com:443/u/571037	1534	1534		ıss Bypass	
44 GET	https://avatars.githubusercontent.com:443/u/828821	1571	1571		iss Bypass	
45 GET	https://avatars.githubusercontent.com:443/u/292788	6261	6261		iss Bypass	Finforcement Detector - Detector I Inauthenticated - Intercention Filters - Match/Renlace - Table Filter - Save/Restore
46 GET	https://avatars.githubusercontent.com:443/u/495600	6912	6912		iss Bypass	· ·
47 GET	https://avatars.githubusercontent.com:443/u/931075	1526	1526		iss Bypass	Typer scope items only (content is not required)
48 GET	https://avatars.githubusercontent.com:443/u/435262	20745	20745		ss Bypass	Add filter
49 GET	https://content-autofill.googleapis.com:443/v1/page	56	41		rc Bypass	"
50 GET	https://content-autofill.googleapis.com:443/v1/page	16	41		rc Bypass	
51 GET	https://github.com:443/Quitten/Autorize/branch-count		89		ss Bypass	
52 GET	https://github.com:443/notifications/indicator	15	15		ss Bypass	
53 GET	https://github.com:443/Quitten/Autorize/branch-count		89		ss Bypass	Filter Liet, LIDI Net Contains (conserved of internal contains of the contains
54 GET	https://github.com:443/Quitten/Autorize/latest-com	839	839		ss Bypass	I because anidos as anidos anidos as anidos
55 GET	https://github.com:443/Quitten/Autorize/tag-count	86	86		ss Bypass	
56 GET	https://github.com:443/notifications/30739183/watc	3741	3741		ss Bypass	
57 GET	https://github.com:443/Quitten/Autorize/security/ov	0	0		iss Bypass	
58 GET	https://github.com:443/Quitten/Autorize/tree-commi	4331	4331		ss Bypass	
59 GET	https://github.com:443/Quitten/Autorize/tag-count	86	86 0		ss Bypass	
60 GET	https://github.com:443/Quitten/Autorize/used_by_list	0	2		ss Bypass	
61 GET	https://github.com:443/Quitten/Autorize/spoofed_co	2 417	417		ss Bypass	
62 GET	https://github.com:443/Quitten/Autorize/recently-to	41/	41/	41/ IS ef	fo Is enfo	

"Easy IDOR hunting with Autorize?" by InsiderPHD https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2WzqH6N-Gbc

#### **Burp Suite Intruder – Sniper Attack (Numbers)**



#### **Burp Suite Intruder – Sniper Attack (Brute Force)**



# Preventing Broken Access Control

#### 1. Design Defensively 📢

- Implement centralized access control
- Deny access by default \( \infty \)
- Principle of least privilege

#### 2. Validate Server-Side

- Never trust client inputs
- Verify permissions for every request
- Validate resource ownership

#### 3. Build Robust Controls 📦

- Use mature authorization frameworks
- Implement role/attribute-based access control
- Log and monitor access attempts

### Thank You!

Questions? I'm here to help! [6]



#### **Resources:**

#### Web Security Academy - Access Control

https://portswigger.net/web-security/access-control

#### Web Application Hacker's Handbook

Chapter 8 - Attacking Access Controls

#### **OWASP Top 10 - A01 Broken Access Control**

https://owasp.org/Top10/A01\_2021-Broken\_Access\_Control/

#### **OWASP Web Security Testing Guide - Authorization Testing**

 https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/v42/4-Web\_Application\_Security\_Testing/05-Authorization\_Testing/README

#### OWASP Application Security Verification Standard - V4 Access Control

https://owasp.org/www-pdfarchive/OWASP\_Application\_Security\_Verification\_Standard\_4.0-en.pdf