

# OWASP and the Evolution of App/API Security



Jeff Williams  
Contrast Security Founder and CTO  
@planetlevel

# We all blindly trust software with the most important things in life




# Six important topics for today

- Security is magic!
- Contributing is addictive!
- Software market is broken!
- I am the problem!
- Runtime security!
- Shift right!



Security is  
magic!

# Learning to hack



# My first security love affair


# Threats Defenses Evidence Monitoring





Contributing is  
addictive!

# The Rise of AppSec



# OWASP Origin Story



The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) is a worldwide free and open community focused on improving the security of application software. Our mission is to make application security "visible", so that people and organizations can make informed decisions about application security risks. Every one is free to participate in OWASP and all of our materials are available under a free and open software license. The OWASP Foundation is a 501c3 not-for-profit charitable organization that ensures the ongoing availability and support for our work.

From: "Jeff Williams @ Aspect" <jeff.williams () aspectsecurity com>  
Date: Wed, 4 Dec 2002 10:57:39 -0500

Steven M. Christey wrote:  
It sounds like you're advocating a "top ten" that's based on other criteria besides "the most frequently occurring" types of issues. The basic question is, what would be the proper criteria for such a top ten list, and what would be the goals?

The problem with "most frequently occurring" is that our instruments for measuring are so poor that I don't believe they represent reality. The public vulnerability databases don't list problems with individual websites (although there's at least an argument that they should). Companies don't release information about vulnerabilities in their sites, assuming that they even uncover them.

I'd like to see a top ten list that helps to crystallize the issue for government and industry. I'm not a huge fan of the SANS list, but it has made a tremendous impact on security spending -- even starting a whole market for SANS scanning.

How to work with WebGoat - Mozilla Firefox (Build 20100722155716)  
File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help  
C X http://localhost:8080/webgoat/attack  
How to work with WebGoat  
Choose another language: English Logout  
OWASP WebGoat V5.3  
Hints Show Params Show Cookies Lesson Plan Show Java Solution  
Introduction General Access Control Flaws AJAX Security Authentication Flaws Buffer Overflows Code Quality Concurrency Cross-Site Scripting XSS Denial of Service Improper Error Handling Injection Flaws Insecure Communication Insecure Configuration Insecure Storage Malicious Execution Parameter Tampering Session Management Flaws Web Services Admin Functions Challenge  
Solution Videos Restart this Lesson  
**How To Work With WebGoat**  
Welcome to a short introduction to WebGoat.  
Here you will learn how to use WebGoat and additional tools for the lessons.  
**Environment Information**  
WebGoat uses the Apache Tomcat server. It is configured to run on localhost although this can be easily changed. This configuration is for single user, additional users can be added in the tomcat-users.xml file. If you want to use WebGoat in a laboratory or in class you might need to change this setup. Please refer to the Tomcat Configuration in the Introduction section.  
**The WebGoat Interface**  
Logout  
OWASP WebGoat V5.2  
2 3 4 5 6 7  
Introduction General Access Control Flaws AJAX Security Authentication Flaws Buffer Overflows Code Quality Concurrency Cross-Site Scripting XSS Denial of Service Improper Error Handling Injection Flaws Insecure Communication Insecure Configuration Insecure Storage Malicious Execution Parameter Tampering Session Management Flaws Web Services Admin Functions Challenge  
8 Restart this Lesson  
Enter your name in the input field below and press "go" to submit. The server will accept the request, reverse the input, and display it back to the user, illustrating the basics of handling HTTP requests.  
The user should become familiar with the features of WebGoat by manipulating the above buttons to view hints and solution. You have to use WebScarab for the first time.  
1  
S D U

# Nothing has changed!

2002

- The average application has 30+ vulnerabilities and 2+ high or critical flaws in open-source libraries
- The average app/API is attacked over 13,000 times a month
- Every application is attacked at least once a month
- The average enterprise has an app/API security backlog of 1.1m vulnerabilities

2024



Contrast AppSec  
Observability Report



Software  
market is  
broken!

# Complexity destroyed assurance

Entire US  
Tax Code  
(2,600)




Custom code  
in one  
application  
(17,000)



All code in one  
application  
(100,000)



Int'l Space  
Station



All code in  
a large  
enterprise  
(1b)



Specification Verification  
Design Assurance Defense  
Evidence Attestation  
Evaluation Controls

## Planet Assurance

NOVEMBER 2020



Scan Attacks Threat Severity  
Vulnerability Remediation Exploit  
Weakness Pentest

# the Tangled Web

*A Guide to Securing Modern  
Web Applications*



Michał Zalewski



## The Fallacy of Risk Management!


### ***Enter Risk Management***


In the absence of formal assurances and provable metrics, and given the frightening prevalence of security flaws in key software relied upon by modern societies, businesses flock to another catchy concept: *risk management*.

Naturally, it's prudent to prioritize security efforts. The problem is that when risk management is done strictly by the numbers, it does little to help us to understand, contain, and manage real-world problems. Instead, it introduces a dangerous fallacy: that structured inadequacy is almost as good as adequacy and that underfunded security efforts *plus* risk management are about as good as properly funded security work.

Guess what? No dice.

# Outrage tells you the market isn't working





Yo!  
We're doing a ton of  
work!

True...  
but it's all disconnected  
and doesn't answer the  
question

# We aren't answering the question!





**The Software Market is a  
“market for lemons”**

We will never make progress in security if we are fighting against the market



Whose fault is all this?  
**Nobody.**

*“Don’t hate the  
playa, hate the  
game”*

--Ice-T

I am the  
problem!

# The analysts keep inventing acronyms...

SBOM

WAAP

CWPP

SAST

IAST

ASPM

MAST

DAST

RASP

CSPM

SCA

WAF


CNAPP

ADR

Nobody can do all this

# Traditional app/API security isn't working

- 1 Manage multiple scanners and WAFs
- 2 Manage massive backlog full of false positives
- 3 Attempt to stop attacks with signatures at the perimeter



# I am the problem


*“If it doesn’t scale, it doesn’t matter”*

-- Michael Coates

First OWASP Summit in Portugal

# Runtime security!

# Runtime App/API Security Observability




# The root cause of app/API security issues

The typical software stack has thousands of powerful, dangerous functions.  
Many are in libraries, frameworks, and servers.



No documentation



No compiler warnings



No attack detection



No exploit prevention

```
613     public Process exec(String[] cmdarray, String[] envp, File dir)  
614         throws IOException {  
615             return new ProcessBuilder(cmdarray)  
616                 .environment(envp)  
617                 .directory(dir)  
618                 .start();  
619         }
```



# How runtime security checks work

## SQL Library

```
209 public java.sql.ResultSet executeQuery( String sql ) {  
210     checkClosed();  
211     MySQLConnection locallyScopedConn = this.connection;  
212     ...
```

Proven, reliable instrumentation


## RuntimeEngine

```
743 public static enforceSQLInjectionBoundary( Object o, String query ) {  
744  
745     if ( containsUntrustedData( query ) ) {  
746         reportVulnerabilityTrace( query );           // WARN DEVELOPER  
747     }  
748  
749     if ( containsAttack( query ) ) {  
750         reportSQLInjectionAttempt( query );  
751         throw new SQLInjectionException( query ); // PREVENT EXPLOIT  
752     }  
753 }
```

Very high-performance, lightweight security checks


# Application Vulnerability Monitoring (AVM)

## TRADITIONAL DAST (c. 2002)



Blindly attack and detect vulnerabilities by evaluating responses for evidence of successful exploitation

## RUNTIME AVM




# OWASP Benchmark

Free and open  
application benchmark  
with thousands of  
security test cases

Runtime 100%

OWASP Benchmark v1.2 Results Comparison




Non-Commercial	
A: NoisyCricket v8.1	9% (100-90.9)
B: OWASP ZAP vD-2020-10-07	20% (20.1-0.4)
C: PMD v5.2.3	0% (0-0)
D: SBwFindSecBugs v1.10.1	43% (97.2-54.4)
E: SpotBugs v4.1.4	0% (5.1-5.2)
F: VisualCodeGrepper v2.2.0	15% (53.5-38.7)
Commercial	
G: Acunetix 360 v1.4.1-FULL	16% (16.8-1)
H: Burp Suite Pro v2020.2.1	35% (34.7-0)
I: Checkmarx CxSAST v8.2	53% (91-38.1)
J: CodeQL v2.5.9	31% (69.1-38.5)
K: Contrast v3.9.1.24653	100% (100-0)
L: ContrastScan v1.1	56% (94.9-38.6)
M: Fortify v20.1.0.0158-rp2020.2.0.001043	43% (100-57.1)
N: IBM AppScan Source v9.0.3.5	22% (61.6-39.5)
O: Kiuwan vmaster.p561.q11382.a187043	43% (90.9-47.4)
P: Semgrep	44% (89-45.5)
Q: Snyk Code	29% (89.3-60.2)
R: SonarQube Java Plugin v3.14	33% (50.4-17)
S: Veracode SAST v20180531	46% (98.1-51.6)
T: Commercial Average	42% (75.8-33.4)



# A better app/API security operating model

1

Install runtime agent  
on your platforms




Automatic – no  
changes to code,  
build, test, or deploy

2

Instant accurate  
detection of vulnerable  
code and libraries

3

Strongest possible  
app/API exploit  
prevention




Shift right!

# Shift Left?


## Common Knowledge is Wrong

If you google "cost of a software bug" you will get tons of articles that say "bugs found in requirements are 100x cheaper than bugs found in implementations." They all use this chart from the "IBM Systems Sciences Institute":




There's one tiny problem with the IBM Systems Sciences Institute study: **it doesn't exist.** Laurent Bossavit did an exhaustive trawl and found that the ISSI, if it *did* exist, was an internal training program and not a research institute. As far as anybody knows, that chart is completely made up.

<https://buttondown.com/hillelwayne/archive/i-ing-hate-science/>



# Application Detection and Response (ADR)


## “Shift Right” Protection in Production



# Imagine Runtime AppSec in Production!

Vulnerability and attack monitoring.

No change to app/API operation.



Quality and performance testing have already moved to production!

# Application Vulnerability Monitoring (AVM)

## “Shift Right” Security Testing in Production

### Concerns


- Will AVM impact performance?
- Will AVM break applications?

### Benefits

- <2% performance impact
- Passive - doesn't affect app/API
- Highly accurate, contextual findings
- No scanning, no extra work
- Tests fully assembled app/API in actual deployed environments, not simulated QA environment
- Best possible code coverage


Quality and performance testing has already moved!

# Traditional AppSec



Security configures and runs tools that deliver a barrage of theoretical vulnerabilities to developers and noisy attacks to operations.

# Runtime AppSec



Automatically reports unified risks to stakeholders in both Dev and Ops.

“Turn Right to Go Left” – Doc Hudson



# The Future




AppSec is in its **infancy**...

In the future, AppSec will be transparent, and market forces will drive much better security

**You** can make it happen!





“Ask me ANYTHING!”

**Jeff Williams**  
Cofounder and CTO  
Contrast Security

<http://linkedin.com/in/planetlevel>

# Contrast Security

## Application and API Security from Within



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