



Secure Dev Ops Testing in the Continuous Delivery Pipeline





About me



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Recent Cyber Attacks

12.02.2019 11:03 Uhr | Security

Gehackte Websites: 620 Millionen Accounts zum Verkauf im Darknet

Eine riesige Datenbank mit Mail-Adressen und Passwörtern steht zum Verkauf.
Bei einigen Websites war bislang nicht bekannt, dass sie gehackt wurden.

Von Dennis Schirrmacher



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British Airways breach: How did hackers get in?

© 7 September 2018



GETTY IMAGES

It isn't clear how hackers boarded BA's website and app - but cyber-security experts have some suggestions

British Airways has revealed that hackers managed to breach its website and app, stealing data from many thousands of customers in the process.

14.09.2017 13:29 Uhr | Security

Equifax-Hack: Angreifer über Apache-Struts-Lücke eingestiegen

Untersuchungen zeigen, dass Equifax es offensichtlich versäumt hat, Sicherheitsupdates für eine kritische Lücke zu installieren. Darüber hinaus ist es zu einem weiteren Datenleck gekommen.

Von Dennis Schirrmacher



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
“75% of security breaches happen at the application level”

Gartner

92% of reported vulnerabilities are in applications not in networks.

NIST

Microsoft SDL Practices



Source: <https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/securityengineering/sdl/practices>

Testing in the Continuous Delivery Pipeline | Donat Hauser

28. April 2020

1x one-time



regular




every sprint

Slide 4

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Secure Dev Ops


SSDL / Deployment Touchpoints



Delivery Pipeline

Success factors

- Automate
- Shift left
- Developer acceptance



```
function MM_findObj(n, d) { var i, t = d.getElementsByTagName("*"), s; for (i=0; i<t.length; i++) { if (t[i].name == n) return t[i]; if (n.substring(0,2) == "fr") { if (t[i].name == n || t[i].id == n) return t[i]; } else if (t[i].id == n) return t[i]; } if (d.layers) { s = d.layers; for (i=0; i<s.length; i++) { if (MM_findObj(n, s[i]) != null) return MM_findObj(n, s[i]); } } return null; }


function MM_preloadImages() { var d=document, img=d.createElement("img"); if (!d.MM_p) d.MM_p = new Array(); var i,j,p,q,n,f; for (i=0, p=d.arguments; i
```

Perform Static Analysis

Static Application Security Testing (SAST)



- Continuous inspection of code quality
- Quality gates based on metrics
- Tracking of code quality over time
- Many supported Languages
- Integration with:
 - Build systems: Maven, Gradle, MSBuild, NPM, etc.
 - CI Servers: Bamboo, Jenkins, etc.
 - IDE: Visual Studio, IntelliJ, Eclipse, etc.



Quality Gate ?

Failed

41.3% Coverage on New Code
is less than 85.0%

C Reliability Rating on
New Code
is worse than A

Bugs 🔗 Vulnerabilities 🔗New code: since 1.91-SNAPSHOT
started last year18 D
Bug8 B
Vulnerability1 C
New Bug 0 A
New VulnerabilityCode Smells 🔗7d A
Debt
started last year660
Code Smell2h A
New Debt 18
New Code SmellCoverage 🔗16.5%
Coverage9
Unit Tests41.3%
Coverage on
126 New Lines to CoverDuplications 🔗1.2%
Duplications11
Duplicated Blocks0.0%
Duplications on
812 New Lines

SonarQube

About This Project

SonarSource fork of GitHub API for Java

Platform

S 8.5k

Java 8.5k

Lines of Code

Project Activity

June 11, 2018

1.93-SNAPSHOT

Quality Profile: Changes in 'GitHub API QP'
(Java)

May 7, 2018

Quality Profile: Changes in 'GitHub API QP'
(Java)

April 5, 2018

Quality Profile: Changes in 'GitHub API QP'
(Java)

Show More

Quality Gate

(Default) SonarSource way

Quality Profiles

(Java) GitHub API QP

External Links

- Project's Website
- Continuous integration
- Bug Tracker
- Sources

Static Code Analysis Tools

Effectiveness of static code analysis for finding security vulnerabilities

OWASP Benchmark Project


- Goal: verify the speed and accuracy of vulnerability detection tools
- Developed initially for SAST

Background

- Commercial static code analysis tools are expensive
- There is some evidence that suggest that these tools are not always effective:

<https://owasp.org/www-project-benchmark/>

OWASP Benchmark Results Comparison




Static Code Analysis Tools

Recommendation:

SonarQube / Sonar Cloud

- Operates at Code and Build level
- Focuses on measuring and tracking quality over time
- Is getting better at detecting security vulnerabilities






Manage the security risk of 3rd party components

Vulnerabilities of 3rd party components



Application development is increasingly relying on open-source products. That's why it's essential to manage the security of third-party components.

Solution: Software Composition Analysis (SCA)



Mitigation of OWASP TOP 10 - Risk A9 “Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities”




Software Composition Analysis

CD Integration

1. Dependency Checker, JFrog Xray, Snyk
2. Whitesource, Snyk
3. Twistlock, JFrog Xray
4. JFrog Xray, Nexus
5. Twistlock, NeuVector

→ Integration on the Source Code Repository level is the way to go to detect application vulnerabilities



Detecting known vulnerabilities in containers




Identifying vulnerabilities in Docker containers requires a new breed of vulnerability management solutions:

Products on the market:

- Twistlock
- NeuVector
- StackRox

Features:

- Deep recursive scanning of dependencies and containers
- Integration into managed container services, such as Kubernetes, Openshift, as well as Cloud platforms.





Perform Dynamic Analysis


Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST)



Approaches

- Vulnerability Scanner
- Fuzzer

Vulnerability Scanners



 acunetix

 Nessus®
vulnerability scanner



w3af
Web Application Attack and Audit Framework

 netsparker®
web application security scanner



arachni
web application security scanner framework



GOLISMERo

 HTCAP


 BURPSUITE
ENTERPRISE EDITION

 BURPSUITE
PROFESSIONAL

 OWASP
ZAP

The Testing Guinea Pig


OWASP Juice Shop an intentionally insecure web application. It contains 38+ hacking challenges of varying difficulty.



Vulnerability	Acunetix	Arachni	Burp Suite Pro.	GoLismero	Nessus Pro.	Netsparker Desktop	ZAP
Autocomplete enabled for passwords		●	●			●	●
Content sniffing not disabled			●				●
Cross-site scripting		●	●		●	●	
CSP not implemented					●	●	
Email disclosure			●			●	
HSTS policy not enabled		●	●	●	●	●	
Information leakage via error message	●	●	●			●	
Insecure cookie	●	●	●			●	●
Insecure frame		●	●			●	●
Internal IP disclosure			●			●	●
Misconfigured allow origin header	●	●	●	●		●	
Missing CSRF protection	●	●				●	
Missing X-XSS-protection header				●		●	●
Open redirection (reflected)		●	●				
Outdated frameworks			●			●	
Password transmitted over query string			●			●	
Software versions revealed			●	●	●	●	
SQL injection	●	●	●				

Vulnerability Scanner

Integration into the CI/CD Pipeline




Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST)

1. Fuzzer

2. Vulnerability Scanner

- Vulnerability Scanner should be more Test Case driven to replace penetration testing partially
- Fuzzer are currently getting new attention





```
mirror_ob = bpy.context.active_object
mirror_ob.select = False # pop modifier ob from sel_stack
print("popped")
#modifier_ob
modifier_ob = bpy.context.selected_objects[0]
print("Modifier object:" +str(modifier_ob.name))

#modifier_ob.select=1

print("mirror_ob",mirror_ob)
print("modifier_ob",modifier_ob)

# add mirror modifier on modifier_ob
mirror_mod = modifier_ob.modifiers.new("mirror_mirror","MIRROR")

# link mirror object to mirror_ob
mirror_mod.mirror_object = mirror_ob

operation == "MIRROR_X":
    mirror_mod.use_x = True
    mirror_mod.use_y = False
    mirror_mod.use_z = False
```

Threat Modeling


Threat Modeling

Methodology

Threat Modeling (aka Architectural Risk Analysis) is the activity of identifying and managing application risks.

Threats are identified and evaluated based on the application architecture. Security features are then selected to establish appropriate mitigations.

- Difficult to implement and maintain
- Little help from tools/automation



Threat Modeling approach by Microsoft
based on STRIDE

Threat Modeling – Security Baseline

Alternative approach



OWASP Application Security Verification Standard 4.0 (ASVS)


- L1: First steps, automated, or whole portfolio view (bare minimum)
- L2: Most applications
- L3: High value, high assurance, or high safety

OWASP Mobile Application Security Verification Standard 1.1 (MASVS)

- L1: Standard Security
- L2: Defense-in-Depth
- R: Resiliency Against Reverse Engineering and Tampering

Summary – Recommended Testing

n Priority







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