

Android apps in sheep's clothing

April 1st, 2015

Tobias Ospelt, modzero AG

SIGS Special Event -

"It's not a joke - it can happen"







- 6 IT security experts
- We do all areas of technical HW & SW security analysis
 - Penetration Testing, Crypto, Web, embedded devices, etc.



remote
exploit
.org



ZSCHULE.NET

Sonntag, 09. Oktober 2011

INKA, BERTHOLD KOHLER, GÜNTHER NONNENMACHER, FRANK SC

Frankfurter Allgemeine

ZEITUNG FÜR DEUTSCHLAND

AKTUELL MULTIMEDIA THEMEN BLOGS ARCHIV MEIN I

leton Sport Gesellschaft Finanzen Technik & Motor Wisse




Chaos Computer Club

Der deutsche Staatstrojaner wurde geknackt

Android

- Android has about 62% market share

Version	Codename	API	Distribution
4.4	Froyo	8	0.4%
4.4.2	Ice Cream Sandwich	10	0.9%
4.4.3	Ice Cream Sandwich	10	0.9%
4.5	Ice Cream Sandwich	10	0.9%
4.6	Jelly Bean	16	17.2%
4.7	Jelly Bean	17	16.4%
4.8	Jelly Bean	18	9.9%
4.9	KitKat	19	40.9%
5.0	Lollipop	21	3.3%




Data collected during a 7 day period ending on March 2, 2015.

Any version with less than 0.1% distribution are not shown.


We are going to see a User Interface (UI) attack today

History of UI attacks


Microsoft Windows 90ies overlay




Microsoft Windows 90ies overlay



Microsoft Windows 90ies overlay



Microsoft Windows 90ies overlay



Modern Windows Overlays



Remote Overlay Toolkit Makes Online Banking Fraud Easy

By [Eduard Kovacs](#) on January 14, 2015




A new toolkit discovered late last year by researchers at Web Trustee allows even less skilled cybercrooks to steal online banking credentials and abuse them for fraudulent purposes.

The toolkit, dubbed **KL-Remote**, is used for remote overlay attacks which enable cybercrooks to access online banking accounts directly from victims' computers without raising too much suspicion.


This threat has been spotted in Brazil, a country where, according to studies, criminals made over \$1 billion in 2013 through banking malware.

The threat takes a screenshot of the banking website and displays it to the user. The cybercriminal then uses the tool to push a message on top of that image. The message is different for each website and it instructs victims to enter the information needed by the attacker to gain access to the banking account. This information can include usernames and passwords, and one-time passwords generated by security devices provided by banks to their

Browser Clickjacking



Android overlays




Overlaying Android apps

Android apps in sheep's clothing

What

- Stealing credentials
 - When adding a Google account to Android
 - Or from all other apps with logins
 - Enterprise containers (Good, MobileIron, etc.)
 - Password safes
 - Social media, etc.
- Manipulating sensitive data that is displayed
 - Two-factor authentication mobile banking transaction signing

How



The screenshot shows a web browser displaying the URL <http://developer.android.com/training/articles/security-tips.html>. The page title is "Security Tips". On the left, there is a sidebar with several collapsed sections. On the right, the main content area starts with a heading "Some of the core security features that help you build secure apps include:" followed by a bulleted list.

Some of the core security features that help you build secure apps include:


- The Android Application Sandbox, which isolates your app data and code execution from other apps.

- What about sandboxing on the User Interface (UI) level?

Prerequisites for our attack

- Installed malware app on phone
- Permissions
 - *GET_TASKS* (must)
 - *SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW* (recommended but optional)
 - *RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED* (optional)
 - *INTERNET* (optional)


Demo: Stealing Skype credentials



How did it work?

- Exactly when the Skype app is opening the login screen, we bring our app to the foreground and show our faked login screen

Mobile banking transaction signing



Bitte prüfen Sie

ÜBERWEISUNG

IBAN DE55555555555555555555555555


BETRAG 1337,42 EUR

photoTAN

7351946

Bitte geben Sie die TAN im Online-Banking ein, wenn die angezeigten Daten korrekt sind.

Enterprise containers – Example: MobileIron



Is it fixed?

Hint: won't fix

First response Android Security Team

Let's talk about permissions...

"[...] We don't consider this behavior to be a flaw in the Android security model. [...] the attack requires the victim to knowingly install an app that has permission to monitor foreground applications. [...] Google Play analyzes apps that get submitted [...] for phishing and other potentially harmful behavior. [...]"

...and analyzing
for harmful
behavior.

Permission system is broken

- There is no opt-in/opt-out
 - Give it all permissions it wants or uninstall it
- Cyanogenmod (an alternative Android version) has permission opt-in/opt-out called "Privacy Guard". Why not on Android?



Facebook needs access to



Device & app history



Identity



Contacts/Calendar



Location



Uses the device's location



SMS



Phone



Photos/Media/Files



Camera/Microphone



Wi-Fi connection information



Google play

ACCEPT





Facebook

Facebook 

UNINSTALL

UPDATE



Downloads

21,775,003 

Social



Similar

WHAT'S NEW

- Like posts, photos and Pages when you're offline
- Remove tags you've created
- Remove tags of yourself that your friends have created





Facebook

Facebook [Remove Usability](#)[Remove Security](#)

Downloads

21,775,003 

Social



Similar

WHAT'S NEW

- Like posts, photos and Pages when you're offline
- Remove tags you've created
- Remove tags of yourself that your friends have created



Google is scanning for harmful behavior?

- What about other app stores?
- The malware app will be disguised as a legitimate app
 - Functionality will require those permissions
- Other malware made it in the Play store
- Our malware code can be loaded after the app is already in the store


Talking about quality assurance in the Google Play store...



asdfsadf asdfasdf



Quick Dial is a widget that shows you the people you contact most often and provides you with a quick means to call them, send them messages, emails or perform any other...




asdf asd adsf fads afds ad afds a a fads afad sadfd



adfg asdf

"Given a choice between dancing pigs and security, users will pick dancing pigs every time."
– Edward Felten (Securing Java)

Demo: I just couldn't resist



Personalisation Similar

This is a very cute dancing pig showing
whenever you are not in an app

[READ MORE](#)



I just couldn't resist

- Uploaded yesterday
- This particular demo works only on LG g3 with Android 5
- Download the malware:
 - <https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ch.example.dancingpigs>

I just couldn't resist



Dancing pig

ch.example.dancingpigs

APP REJECTED

Statistics

Ratings & Reviews

Crashes & ANRs

Optimization Tips

APK

Store Listing

Content Rating

Pricing & Distribution

In-app Products

Services & APIs

! APP REJECTED

Your app submission has been rejected for a violation of the Google Play Developer Program Policy regarding [Intellectual Property](#). If this submission was an update to an existing app, the version published prior to this update is still available in Google Play. Please review the [copyright infringement](#) and [impersonation](#) help articles, then remove unlicensed images from your app and/or listing and resubmit. Additional details have been sent to your account owner's email address.

STORE LISTING

PRODUCT DETAILS

Fields marked * need to be filled before publishing.

English (United States) – en-US

Manage translations ▾

Title*

English (United States) – en-US

Dancing pig

11 of 30 characters

Short description*

English (United States) – en-US

This is a very cute dancing pig showing whenever you are not in an app

70 of 80 characters


Full description*

English (United States) – en-US

This is a very cute dancing pig showing whenever you are not in an app. My first try for an app, I hope you enjoy it.

Is the attack still feasible on
Android 5?

Demo: Android 5.0.2 (verified on 5.1)





What about BlackBerry?


Blackberry

- Blackberry supports Android apps
- You can attack another Android app on Blackberry
 - With our technique you are not able to figure out which native Blackberry app is in the foreground

Blackberry



Blackberry – spot the permission difference



Countermeasures

- If you have a HTML5 app (one WebView) the attack is "harder"
 - Android 5 situation on all Android versions

Summary

- Is this technique rocket-science? Not at all
- Does it matter? Yes, the impact is huge
- Android app separation is broken
 - Don't trust the sandboxing promises
- Bring-your-own-device is still a bad idea from a security perspective
 - private apps and business apps/data
- Come and play with devices here at the front

Thank you

- <http://www.modzero.ch/modlog/index.html>
- Twitter: @floyd_ch
- Twitter: @mod0
- <http://floyd.ch>

