

Enforcing Code & Security Standards with Semgrep

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tl;dr - This Talk

- Secure code is hard
- Static analysis tools are too noisy / too slow
- Grep is faster but isn't expressive enough
- Need something, fast, code-aware, flexible, powerful... open source!



<u>Semgrep</u>: Fast and syntax-aware semantic code pattern search for many languages: like grep but for code



Semgrep

Use to:

Search: Find security bugs

Guard: Enforce specific patterns and best practices

Migrate: Easily upgrade from deprecated APIs



Outline

- 1. Background 🚵
- 2. grep and Abstract Syntax Trees (ASTs) 🌲
- 3. Learn Semgrep!
- 4. Integration into CI/CD
- 5. Get started with Rulesets



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Who is this?

me:

Clara McCreery, software engineer @ r2c MS in Computer Science from Stanford University Formerly: researcher at MIT Lincoln Laboratory



r2c:

We're a static analysis startup in San Francisco on a mission to profoundly improve software security and reliability






Semgrep, Est. 2009



The original author, Yoann Padioleau (<u>@aryx</u>), joined r2c last year. Yoann was the first static analysis hire at Facebook and previously PhD @ Inria, contributor to <u>coccinelle.lip6.fr</u>

First version of Semgrep (sgrep/pfff) was written at Facebook circa 2009 and was used to enforce nearly 1000 rules!





github.com/returntocorp/semgrep

Language Support

Language	Status
Go	GA ①
Java	GA ①
JavaScript	GA ③
JSON	GA ①
Python	GA ①
Ruby	beta ③
TypeScript	beta ③
JSX	beta ③
TSX	beta ②
OCaml	alpha ③
PHP	alpha 💿
С	alpha ③



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grep, ASTs, and Semgrep

```
exec("ls")
exec(some var)
exec
       (arg)
exec(
    bar
other exec(foo)
// exec(foo)
print("exec(bar)")
```


```
✓ Easy-exec\(
```


- ✓ Easy exec\(
- Handle whitespace exec\s*\(()
- 🚹 😂 Handle whitespace/newlines


- 😅 😅 Method suffix matches exec
- ≅ ≅ Is this a comment?
- ⇔ ⇔ Is this a string literal?




xkcd 1171











Code is not a string, it's a tree




string



```
@app.route("/index")
def index():
    rep = response.set_cookie(name(),
secure=False, s=func())
    return rep
```



tree






Tree Matching 🜲

- Many tree matching tools: Bandit, Dlint, ESLint, Flake8,
 Golint, Gosec, Pylint, RuboCop, TSLint, and more!
- Have to become an expert in every AST syntax for every language your team uses
- Need programming language expertise to cover all idioms: languages have "more than one way to do it"
- Commercial SAST tools?
 - Complicated
 - Slow (not CI friendly)
 - Expensive






https://github.com/eslint/eslint/blob/master/lib/rules/no-eval.js

Static Analysis at Scale: An Instagram Story





https://instagram-engineering.com/static-analysis-at-scale-an-instagram-story-8f498ab71a0c



Semgrep lets you reason about your **analysis** the way you reason about your **code**.

https://r2c.dev/blog/2020/why-i-moved-to-semgrep-for-all-my-code-analysis/




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Tutorials

- 1. Ellipsis ("...") operator •••
- 2. Metavariables
- 3. Composing Patterns
- 4. Advanced Features



Finding Banned, Deprecated, or Dangerous Functions

exec("1s")

⇒ https://semgrep.dev/s/4B2g/

Full Solution: https://semgrep.live/7KGk



Hard-coded Secrets, Constant String Arguments

```
s3 = boto3.client(
   "s3",
   aws_secret_access_key = "abcd...",
   aws_access_key_id = "AKIA...")
```


⇒ https://semgrep.live/RG08/

Full Solution: https://semgrep.live/A89w/



Tutorials

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Matching Comparisons with Metavariables

```
5 == 5
7 == 8
if "cat" == "cat":
    print("Yep, they're cats")
```

https://semgrep.live/610

Full Solution: https://semgrep.live/oB9



Send File

(Approximate Data Flow)

```
@app.route("/get_file/<filename>")
def get_file(filename):
   logger.info(f"Getting file {filename}")
   return flask.send_file(filename,
        as_attachment=True)
```


https://semgrep.live/7dv

Solution: https://semgrep.live/EN8



Tutorials

- 1. Ellipsis ("...") operator
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- 3. Composing Patterns 😍
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Order of API Calls Must be Enforced (Business Logic)

```
/*
 * In this financial trading application, every transaction
 * MUST be verified before it is made
 *
 * Specifically:verify_transaction() must be called on a transaction
 * object before that object is passed to make_transaction()
 */
```

https://semgrep.live/6JqL

Full Solution: https://semgrep.live/oqZ6




Tutorials

- Ellipsis ("...") operator
- Metavariables
- Composing Patterns
- 4. Advanced Features 💿 🔬







Detect HTTP

(Autofix + Inline String Regexes)

```
func bad1() {
    req, err := http.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com", nil)
}
```

```
pattern: |
   http.NewRequest(..., "=~/[hH][tT][tT][pP]://.*/", ...)
```

https://semgrep.dev/editor?registry=problem-based-packs.insecure-transport.go-stdlib.http-customized-request



Terraform

(Generic Language Support)

```
resource "aws_s3_bucket" "b" {
  bucket = "my-tf-test-bucket"
  acl = "public-read-write"

pattern: |
  acl = "public-read-write"
```

https://semgrep.dev/s/ne0Z/



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Integrations

- Enforce secure defaults + secure frameworks at CI time
 - Easy to add to CI as either a Docker container or Linux binary
 - JSON output → easy to integrate with other systems

```
Linters
                                             Linters / semgrep with managed policy
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  Search logs
   on: pull_request

✓ super-linter

                                             Set up job
                                                    Pull returntocorp/semgrep-action:v1

✓ pre-commit

                                                    Run actions/checkout@v1
× semgrep with managed policy
                                                   Run returntocorp/semgrep-action@v1
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        1m 18s
                                                     GITHUB EVENT NAME -e GITHUB SERVER URL -e GITHUB API URL -e GITHUB GRAPHQL URL -e GITHUB WORKSPACE -e GITHUB ACTION -e GITHUB EVENT PATH -e RUNNER OS -e RUNNER TOOL CACHE -e RUNNER TEMP -e RUNNER WORKSPACE
                                                     -e ACTIONS_RUNTIME_URL -e ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN -e ACTIONS_CACHE_URL -e GITHUB_ACTIONS=true -e CI=true -v "/var/run/docker.sock":"/var/run/docker.sock" -v
                                                     "/home/runner/work/_temp/_github_home":"/github/home" -v "/home/runner/work/_temp/_github_workflow":"/github/workflow" -v
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       :"/github/workspace"
                                                     returntocorp/semgrep-action:vl
                                                  6 === detecting environment
                                                  7 | versions - semgrep 0.17.0 on Python 3.8.5
                                                  8 | environment - running in github-actions, triggering event is 'pull_request'
                                                  9 | semgrep.dev - logged in as deployment #1
                                                 10 === setting up agent configuration
                                                 11 | using semgrep rules configured on the web UI
                                                 12 I using default path ignore rules of common test and dependency directories
                                                 13 | adding further path ignore rules configured on the web UI
                                                 14 | looking at 1 changed path
                                                 15 | found 1 file in the paths to be scanned
                                                 16 === looking for current issues in 1 file
                                                 17 | 1 current issue found
                                                 18 === looking for pre-existing issues in 1 file
                                                 19 | 1 pre-existing issue found
                                                 20 python.flask.security.injection.path-traversal-open.path-traversal-open
                                                                                 .py:459
                                                       459 open(path).readlines(), mimetype="text/plain"
                                                          = Found request data in a call to 'open'. Ensure the request data is
                                                            validated or sanitized, otherwise it could result in path traversal
                                                            attacks.
                                                 29 === exiting with failing status
                                             ▶ ✓ Complete job
```



```
=== setting up agent configuration
    | using semgrep rules configured on the web UI
11
    | using default path ignore rules of common test and dependency directories
12
     adding further path ignore rules configured on the web UI
13
14
     | looking at 1 changed path
     | found 1 file in the paths to be scanned
15
    === looking for current issues in 1 file
16
17
    | 1 current issue found
    === looking for pre-existing issues in 1 file
18
    | 1 pre-existing issue found
19
20
    python.flask.security.injection.path-traversal-open.path-traversal-open
21
                                  .py:459
22
23
      459
             open(path).readlines(), mimetype="text/plain"
24
25
         = Found request data in a call to 'open'. Ensure the request data is
           validated or sanitized, otherwise it could result in path traversal
26
27
           attacks.
28
    === exiting with failing status
```

Get started at https://semgrep.dev/manage



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


Community rule registry

Community participation

- > 900 rules by r2c + community
- Community contributors
 - NodeJSScan
 - Damian Gryski, author of Go-Perf-Book
 - OWASP Contributors
 - You?
- Organized into sets
 - XSS
 - JWT
 - Best practices
 - o etc.

https://semgrep.dev/explore



JavaScript TypeScript

JavaScript




Community rule registry

<u>semgrep.live/explore</u> ⇒ <u>github.com/returntocorp/semgrep-rules</u>


```
$ brew install semgrep
$ semgrep --config=<url>
```

Example config url: "https://semgrep.dev/p/r2c-ci" or "just p/r2c-ci"





Summary



Integration points

- Editor / IDE (<u>VS Code Extension</u> in beta)
- Git pre-commit hook
- CI/CD pipeline
 - If using managed Semgrep on semgrep.dev, rules can either block or notify



Getting started with rules

Choose existing rule sets from semgrep.dev

```
$ semgrep --config=https://semgrep.dev/p/r2c-CI
```

- Create your own rule set from existing rules
- Write your own!






Set your **security policy in stone** with **automated scanning**.

https://r2c.dev/blog/2020/fixing-leaky-logs-how-to-find-a-bug-and-ensure-it-never-returns/





```
logging.getLogger("sqlalchemy.engine.base.Engine").setLevel(logging.INFO)
```

This configures SQLAlchemy to log all SQL statements, together with passed parameters. Let's look at some of the output we saw:

```
INF0:werkzeug:127.0.0.1 - - [25/Sep/2020 11:50:01] "POST /api/auth/authenticate
INF0:sqlalchemy.engine.base.Engine:BEGIN (implicit)
INF0:sqlalchemy.engine.base.Engine:SELECT token.id AS token_id, token.token AS
FROM token
WHERE token.token = %(token_1)s
  LIMIT %(param_1)s
INF0:sqlalchemy.engine.base.Engine:{'token_1': $2a$10$KVsyW1jjKn.pvkVi3w9Rn.1mw
```

...Uh-oh.



```
class ObfuscatedString(types.TypeDecorator):
    11 11 11
    String column type for use with SQLAlchemy models whose
    content should not appear in logs or exceptions
    impl = types.String
    class Repr(str):
        def __repr__(self) -> str:
            return "******"
    def process_bind_param(self, value: Optional[str], dialect: Any) -> Optional
        return self.Repr(value) if value else None
    def process_result_value(
        self, value: Optional[Repr], dialect: Any
    ) -> Optional[str]:
        return str(value) if value else None
setattr(db, "ObfuscatedString", ObfuscatedString)
```

```
class Token(db.Model):
    ...
    token = db.Column(db.ObfuscatedString, ...)
    ...
```

We then re-enabled INFO logging, and checked that we were properly obfuscating text:

```
INFO:werkzeug:127.0.0.1 - - [25/Sep/2020 13:48:55] "GET /api/agent/deployments/
INFO:sqlalchemy.engine.base.Engine:BEGIN (implicit)
INFO:sqlalchemy.engine.base.Engine:SELECT token.id AS token_id, token.token AS
FROM token
WHERE token.token = %(token_1)s
  LIMIT %(param_1)s
INFO:sqlalchemy.engine.base.Engine:{'token_1': *********, 'param_1': 1}
```

For completeness, we also validated in our development database console that the correct values were stored and retrieved.

```
rules:
id: obfuscate-sensitive-string-columns
  patterns:
    - pattern: I
        $COLUMN = db.Column(db.String, ...)
    - metavariable-regex:
       metavariable: $COLUMN
        regex: '.*(?<![A-Za-z])(token|key|email|secret)(?![A-RT-Za-rt-z]).*'
 message: |
    '$COLUMN' may expose sensitive information in logs and exceptions. Use
    'db.ObfuscatedString' instead of 'db.String'.
  severity: WARNING
```



Semgrep

lightweight static analysis for many languages

Locally:

- pip install semgrep
- 2. semgrep --config p/r2c-ci

Online editor:

<u>Semgrep.live</u>

Tutorial:

semgrep.dev/learn



Semgrep

lightweight static analysis for many languages



```
Clara McCreery | clara@returntocorp.com
```

r2c.dev





```
https://r2c.dev/survey ← plz :)
```

Semgrep Trophy Case

CVEs			
CVE	Semgrep rule	Affected software	Description
CVE- 2019- 5479	javascript.lang.security.detect-non-literal-require	larbitbase- api < v0.5.5	An unintended require vulnerability in <v0.5.5 (javascript="" allow="" an="" arbitrary="" attacker="" code="" file).<="" larvitbase-api="" load="" may="" non-production="" td="" to=""></v0.5.5>
CVE- 2020- 8128	javascript.lang.security.detect-non-literal-require	jsreport < 2.5.0	An unintended require and server-side request forgery vulnerabilities in jsreport version 2.5.0 and earlier allow attackers to execute arbitrary code.
CVE- 2020- 8129	javascript.lang.security.detect-non-literal-require	script- manager < 0.8.6	An unintended require vulnerability in script-manager npm package version 0.8.6 and earlier may allow attackers to execute arbitrary code.
CVE- 2020- 7739	javascript.phantom.security.audit.phantom-injection	phantomjs- seo	This affects all versions of package phantomis-seo. It is possible for an attacker to craft a url that will be passed to a PhantomJS instance allowing for an SSRF attack.