XXEs in Golang are Surprisingly Hard

Eric Payne August 2020





Introduction

- AppSec is all about digging into strange behaviour in an application
- Digging into XXEs in Golang can bring us some surprising results!





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What is an XML External Entity Attack?

- XXEs rank **number four** in the OWASP Top Ten security risks
- XXEs exploit XML parsers with overly permissive configurations
- XXEs can be used to cause:
 - local file inclusion
 - server-side request forgery
 - port scanning
 - and more!

Sample Vulnerable Ruby Application

```
require 'sinatra'
require 'nokogiri'
post '/parse-xml' do
   xml payload = params[:xml payload]
   parsed xml = Nokogiri::XML(xml payload) do |config|
       config.options = Nokogiri::XML::ParseOptions::NOENT
   end
   return "#{parsed xml}"
end
```

Simple XML Payload (no exploit)

```
<?xml version="1.0"?>
 <root>
   <child>some benign content</child>
</root>
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<root>
   <child>some benign content</child>
</root>
```

Payload with Entity Definition (no exploit)

```
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE root [<!ENTITY example entity "foo">]>
<root>
   <child>&example entity;</child>
</root>
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE root [<!ENTITY example entity "foo">]>
<root>
   <child>foo</child>
</root>
```

Payload with External Entity Defined (exploit!)

Payload with External Entity Defined (exploit!)

```
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE root [<!ENTITY example entity SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">]>
<root>
   <child>##
# User Database
# Note that this file is consulted directly only when the system is running
# in single-user mode. At other times this information is provided by
nobody: *:-2:-2:Unprivileged User:/var/empty:/usr/bin/false
root:*:0:0:System Administrator:/var/root:/bin/sh
. . .
```

Can we achieve an XXE in a Go application?

 Just focus on our XML parsing for now; don't need a REST endpoint in this example

 Go implements a lot of useful functionality in its default libraries; let's use Go's "encoding/xml" library for our XML parsing



First Attempt

- We decode our XML content into a strongly typed Root struct
- With decoder.Strict = false:

```
go run firstattempt.go
XML parsed into struct: {&example;}
```

- With decoder.Strict = true:

```
go run firstattempt.go
Error: XML syntax error on line 5:
invalid character entity &example;
exit status 1
```


```
import (
   "encoding/xml"
type Root struct {
   Child string `xml:"child"`
func main() {
   document := `
   <?xml version="1.0"?>
   <!DOCTYPE root [<!ENTITY example SYSTEM</pre>
'file:///etc/passwd'>]>
   <root>
       <child>& example;</child>
   </root>`
   decoded := Root{}
   decoder := xml. NewDecoder (strings. NewReader (document))
   decoder.Strict = false
   if err := decoder. Decode (&decoded); err != nil {
       fmt. Println ("Error:", err)
       os. Exit (1)
   fmt.Printf("XML parsed into struct: %v \n", decoded)
```

Use the "entity map" interface

```
// Entity can be used to map non-standard entity names to string replacements.
// The parser behaves as if these standard mappings are present in the map,
// regardless of the actual map content:
//
      "lt": "<",
//
  "gt": ">",
//
// "amp": "&",
  "apos": "'",
//
    "quot": `"`,
//
Entity map[string]string
```

```
decoder.Entity = make(map[string]string, 128)
decoder.Entity["example"] = "SYSTEM 'file:///etc/passwd'"
```

```
go run entitymap.go
XML parsed into struct: {SYSTEM 'file:///etc/passwd'}
```




Library code review

- This short code block in xml.go
 is the only reference we see to
 .Entity
- We don't see any calls to
 os.Open() or http.Get()
- All that "encoding/xml" does with its entity map is a simple string substitution!

```
if r, ok := entity[s]; ok {
   text = string(r)
   haveText = true
} else if d.Entity != nil {
   text, haveText = d.Entity[s]
}
```


"Surprisingly hard", not impossible

- The default choice for simple XML parsing doesn't actually implement external entities
- "Surprisingly hard", not impossible: there are Go bindings available for robust XML parsers like libxml2, so Go applications may still be vulnerable to this



Not clearly documented behaviour

encoding/xml: Decoder does not handle external entities correctly #4196



Conclusion

- Not clearly documented in Go reference material; unclear if this decision was made from a *security* or *dev effort* standpoint

- Secure defaults in the Golang ecosystem: by default, a Go application doesn't need to worry about XML External Entity attacks

