

Welcome everybody.

Today it is my privilege to discuss with you how AI can be attacked and be protected. Artifical Intelligence is a hot topic nowadays, with many buzzwords and complexities. My goal is to provide some clarity and help you with useful insights.



Introduction

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ENISA, CIP, OpenCRE.org, SAMM, lead author ISO/IEC 5338 and OWASP AI security & privacy guide

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Launching this new OWASP project!

https://owasp.org/www-project-ai-security-and-privacy-guide/

:the result of research, desk research, experience and working with clients.

Goals:

- Collect and present the state of the art
- Please submit PR, issues or email me. Let's make this guide better and better
- Input to the upcoming ISO/IEC 27090 (AI security) and 27091 (AI privacy) standards








Agenda

- 1. Roles of AI in appsec
- 2. What is AI?
- 3. Al engineering
- 4. Lifecycle commandments
- 5. Model attack commandments
- 6. Summary for Al security
- 7. Privacy commandments

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




Trained regularities: for example the weights of a neural network Every machine learning technique has a train algorithm and apply algorithm


SUPERVISED MACHINE LEARNING:

- -Also called Pattern recognition, predictive analytics, function estimators. Can be neural networks, can be linear regression. It's all Al.
- -Basically it is software that writes itself on the basis of examples. You are programming by showing example behviour. And that example behaviour we call the training data.
- -Task: classify a dog or cat, predict the value of a stock in the future, recommend a product that would fit your profile and buying behaviour



It starts with examples of input and output, like the dogs and cats we discussed. Note: Three occasions of software engineering.

And the biggest is dataprep development, because often the most work is there. My career as an AI engineer might sound cool and nice, but it was 90% shuffling data.



The Microsoft study reports that engineers find the data preparation to be the least enjoyable.

This low maintainability in AI systems is something that we observe in our benchmark of software systems, and we're going to publish on it in our upcoming SIG Benchmark report.

Sources:

Biggest difficulty: (*) "Software Engineering for Machine Learning: A Case Study", 2019 IEEE/ACM 41st International Conference on Software Engineering: Software Engineering in Practice (ICSE-SEIP), Amershi et al. Microsoft

80% of the work and least enjoyable (**) "Cleaning Big Data: Most Time-Consuming, Least Enjoyable Data Science Task, Survey Says", Forbes, Gil press ,March 2016



Data science coding is often ad hoc

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Code in AI system:
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
Testability

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Data scientists focus on working models. Not maintainable software for the future per se.

This problem can be addessed by measuring maintainability and coaching data scientists in this, for example that they learn to create abstractions. To create functions like in this example.

One way to do this is to mix data scientists with 'traditional' software engineers in teams.





An important thing in AI to be aware of is

Data science is becoming available to a larger group because of code copying and tools like chatgpt.

That's a good thing and also a bad thing, because in data science you really need to know what you're doing. I'll show you later.

Conscious curation of reused code is therefore in order, just like in any software engineering.






Look how much your attack surface grows! A lot of it is data processing.

And it puts possibly sensitive data OUTSIDE of your application. This needs securing.

Production data: In order to train and test a working model, data scientists need access to real data, which may be sensitive. This is different from non-AI engineering in which typically the test data can be either synthesized or anonymized carefully.

An appropriate countermeasure is the limitation of access to this data to the engineers that really need it, and shield it from the rest of the team. You can also use 'secret compute' features by some AI platfoms that allow training and testing a model without the data scientists having access to the data.


A special type of attack is called 'model supply chain attack' – let's see how that works.



The model that is used can be based on another model, a *base* model, that was trained outside of the engineering team – for example an open source model. It can be further trained (fine-tuned) using transfer learning and will retain most of its behaviour – which could have been compromised using for example a data poisoning attack.

So, models that you obtain from outside your organisation can have been manipulated.

And also you own models can be manipulated through so-called 'model attacks'. To understand these attacks, let me first explain how machine learning models can be fooled.



This machine learning algorithm figured out that all pictures of wolves had snow, so it used that to distinguish wolves from dogs.


So this means that you need to be careful trusting an AI model. The trainset may not be good enough.

The usual way to prevent this is to always use a test set from a very different source.

It also means that we can fool AI on purpose, through the trainset. Let me explain.

Images from

https://carpentries-incubator.github.io/data-science-ai-senior-researchers/05-Problems-with-Al/index.html



If you can compromise the AI pipeline, then you can inject cases in the trainset and poison it. For example you can put false images and labels in there, sabotaging the system.


But you can also perform really sneaky attacks.

Example: let's say we want to teach a self driving car how to recognize traffic signs, so it can respond, for example by stopping for a stop sign - quite important stuff to get right. We create a train set of labeled traffic sign images. Then an attacker manages to secretly change the train set and add examples with crafted visual cues. For example, the attacker inserts some stop-sign images with yellow stickers and the label "35 miles an hour". The model will be trained to recognize those cues - just like with the snow in the wolf pictures. The sneaky thing is that this problematic behaviour will not be detected in tests. The model will recognize normal stop signs and speed limit signs. But when the car gets on the road, an attacker can put inconspicuous stickers on stop signs and create terrible dangerous situations. You can do similar things to algorithms that need to recognize fraudulent transactions. If you can manage to poison the trainset, you can make the model believe that a transaction that ends with 339,93 is never fraudulent, which you can abuse in practice. So this is like a worm attack, but in data. It's hiding there.

https://arxiv.org/abs/1602.02697

https://openai.com/blog/adversarial-example-research/


https://bdtechtalks.com/2020/10/07/machine-learning-data-poisoning/



A special form of this poisoning attack is when AI is using the internet as input Microsoft released Tay, a twitter chatbot in 2016. ChatGPT avant la lettre. Tay was there to learn from his conversations. In just one day the internet had learned Tay to be terribly racist

What can you do against this?

Don't train your model assuming that the internet contains the truth, unless you carefully curate all input.




Now we have discussed data poisoning. Let's talk about another type of model attack: input manipulation.

By playing with the input (for example putting a bit of red paint on a 35 miles an hour sign), you can trick the model in thinking it is a stop sign.

Similar examples exists where a spam detection algorithm is deceived to let an e-mail appear legit using specific words that are cues for the model.

This manipulation is called 'black box' because it builds solely on the behaviour of the model, without knowing its internals.




A very special form of input manipulation is analysing the weights of a neural network to calculate how an input can be changed to get a different classification without anybody noticing the change. For example the famous image recognition model googLeNet was fooled by letting it mistake a panda for a gibbon. They used a method called "fast gradient sign" to do the calculations In a similar way you could alter the image of a camera, as shown here, without the change getting noticed, and completely control the behaviour of a neural networks interpreting that image. In this case: detecting whether there is a person in the camera view.

Of course this requires access to the weights of the neural network, so that's where the countermeasure is: try to protect those. There are complex other countermeasures, such as using specific Algorithms, like as Radial Basis Functions. We will not go deeply into that right now.

https://arxiv.org/pdf/1412.6572.pdf

Goodfellow et al Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples, Conference paper ICLR 2015. https://arxiv.org/pdf/1412.6572.pdf




And that brings us to another type of model attack, which is data deconstruction: playing with an AI model to extract some of its training data, which may be sensitive. I am going to discuss three types. Starting with this one: extracting taining data from language models such as ChatGPT.

Just a few days ago an interesting example of this was in the news.

https://slashdot.org/story/23/02/12/0114222/bing-chat-succombs-to-prompt-injection-attack-spills-its-secrets

Refering to


https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2023/02/ai-powered-bing-chat-spills-its-secrets-via-prompt-injection-attack/



The second type of data extraction is through model inversion. This can be done with Neural networks by analysing their weights. By using mathematical tricks, the original training set images can be partly reconstructed.

The best practice is to keep the neural weighs a secret and, if possible, to avoid sensitive data in your training set.

It also helps to have sufficiently large training sets, and neural networks that are as small as possible




The third type of data reconstruction attack is when it is possible to infer whether specific data (e.g. an individual) was part of the dataset, called 'membership inference'.

The more a model learns how to recognize original training set entries, which is called overfitting, the more this is a problem.

Overfitting can be prevented by keeping the model small.


There are several additional mathematical countermeasures to prevent this, for example by adding noise. I will not go deeply into it in this talk.




Another type of model attack is model theft.

By presenting a classified mode with example images and adding the model outputs as labels to those images – a trainset is manufactured that can then be used to create a copy or imitation of the classified model.

Throttling access to models and/or detecting over-use are good countermeasures.



So that that we've gone through some key security aspects with AI, let's put everything together in one picture. You see the threats that we are dealing with and what we can do about it.



Now we move more into the privacy domain and I'll highlight the moste important aspects – since this is a talk mostly about AI security.

It's important to be transparent about your AI: be open about the data you collect, for what purpose, and the algorithms you use.

Don't worry too much that you will need to explain algorithm results in detail for evey decision.

In some cases you ARE required to do this, for example when denying loans in the US. But for the most, being transparent about how you work is sufficient.

There was this system in the Netherlands called Syri. It detected social welfare fraud. It was canceled because it did not want to disclose what data it collected and how the approach work.

The court ruled on the basis of human rights: the right to a private life and for clear and fair reasons when that private life would be invaded due to the rulings of an algorithm.


So why do people want explanations?

We don't like if if the computer says no. Who do they think they are?! Our reflex is to

demand an explanation because we don't trust it.

But it's important to note that explanation is often not the best way to gain trust.

Because that could be: we selected you because your age divided by your income was bigger than twice the duration of your last job.




Apart from being transparent it is also important to be careful with data, regarding privacy.

You see, Data scientists live in their own realm. There is typically not much oversight on what is done with data.


It's easy for them to decide to make a separate database with unaonymized images that should actually be anonymized, simply because the model performs better with it.

An example is voice assistant speech recordings not always being thrown away



Algorithmic bias, discrimination and fairness are really complex topics, and this is for another talk.

In the Amazon case, gender wasn't used as input but the algorithm looked at words men typically used. The writing style served as proxy of gender. Plus the trainset was biased.



And this brings me to my final point. Think before you start. Not everything you want, can be legally or ethically done with big data and AI.

In the AI act, social scoring is prohibited, just as for example mass surveillance and predictive policing.

Much of the AI act is based on the notion of high riks applications, determined by the severity of effect it has on people's lives. For example to find a job or to get a loan.

The EU act is now available in draft and the final version is due in 2024. There is also a US AI bill of rights in the making. It is currently a blueprint and therefore only guidance for now.

It has a similar approach by defining high risk AI applications



And this concludes my talk. Everything and more can be found online in the AI security and privacy guide. Please help make that guide to get better and better by contributing your insights.

I hope this material will help you understand AI a bit more and make it secure and privacy-preserving. Good luck!