	Withdrawn	Control Tout	Supplemental Guidance	Related Controls	Deignitus	Laur	Mad H	inh i	Nakas
Control Name		Control Text Control Families: 26 Top-Level Controls: 266 Control Enhancements: 596 Total Controls: 862		Program Manageme	nt [Families:	1 Top-Let	vel: 16 Enh.:	:01	Notes
NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-53 Revision 4 (January 2015)	36 (L1=16 L2=80)	Control Families: 26 Top-Level Controls: 862 Control Enhancements: 986 Total Controls: 882 OWASP Cyber Controls Matrix (OCCM) @ https://cybercontrolsmatrix.com IMPORTANT: Use of this content is completely as-is, with no warranties either expressed or implied. Before use, see further important information in the Legal Text section at the above website. Level 0 = "Control Family" Level 1 = "Control" (i.e. Top-Level Control) Level 2 = "Control Enhancement"	Privacy Controls [Families: 8 Top-Level: 26 Enhancements: 10 Total: 36] To View All Controls - Control Enhancements not Withdrawn: [] 1) Filter 'Level' Column on "1" and "2". 2) Filter Withdrawn Column on "[Banks]". To View All Controls (excluding Control Enhancements) not Withdrawn: [] 1) Filter 'Level' Column on "1". 2) Filter Withdrawn Column on "1". To View All Control Families: [] 1) Filter 'Level' column on "0". To Exclude Privacy Controls: [] 1) Filter 'Notes' column to un-check "[Privacy Controls]" To Exclude Program Management Controls: [] 1) Filter 'Notes' column to un-check "[Program Management Controls]"	Program Manageme	nt [Families:	1 Top-Lev	rel: 16 Enh.:	- - - - - - - - -	NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-53 Revision 4 Privacy Controls added. Statistics added. Control data combined into one row per control. Control Names have been modified for usability. 1 Family Name appended to Top-Level Controls, as "Family Name Original Control Names appended to Control Control Names 1 Parent Control Name Original Control Name Original Control Names Original Names Original Control Names Original Names Original Names Original Control Names Original Na
Procedures		The organization: a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]: a.1. An access control policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and a.2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the access control policy and associated access controls; and b. Reviews and updates the current: b.1. Access control policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and b.2. Access control procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the AC family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.		P1	x :	x x		
Access Control Account Management		The organization: a. Identifies and selects the following types of information system accounts to support organizational missions/business functions: [Assignment: organization-defined information system account types]; b. Assigns account managers for information system accounts; c. Establishes conditions for group and role membership; d. Specifies authorized users of the information system, group and role membership, and access authorizations (i.e., privileges) and other attributes (as required) for each account; e. Requires approvals by [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] for requests to create information system accounts; f. Creates, enables, modifies, disables, and removes information system accounts in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined procedures or conditions]; g. Monitors the use of information system accounts; h. 1. When account managers: h.1. When account managers: l.2. When users are terminated or transferred; and h.3. When individual information system usage or need-to-know changes; l. Authorizes access to the information system based on: l.1. A valid access authorization; l.2. Intended system usage; and l.3. Other attributes as required by the organization or associated missions/business functions; j. Reviews accounts for compliance with account management requirements [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and k. Establishes a process for reissuing shared/group account credentials (if deployed) when individuals are removed from the group.	Information system account types include, for example, individuals, shared, group, system, guest/anonymous, emergency, developer/manufacturer/vendor, temporary, and service. Some of the account management requirements listed above can be implemented by organizational information systems. The identification of authorized users of the information system and the specification of access privileges reflects the requirements in other security controls in the security plan. Users requiring administrative privileges on information system accounts receive additional scrutiny by appropriate organizational personnel (e.g., system owner, mission/business owner, or chief information security officer) responsible for approving such accounts and privileged access. Organizations super, shoose to define access privileges or other attributes by account, by type of account, or a combination of both. Other attributes required for authorizing access include, for example, restrictions on time-of-day, ay-of-week, and point-of-origin, indefining other account attributes, organizations consider system-related requirements (e.g., time zone differences, customer requirements, remote access to support travel requirements). Failure to consider these factors could affect information system availability. Temporary and emergency accounts are accounts intended for short-term use. Organizations establish temporary accounts as a part of normal account activation may bypass normal account authorization processes. Emergency and temporary accounts are not to be confused with infrequently used accounts (e.g., local logan counts accounts accounts accounts accounts are removal dates. Conditions for disability or promoval dates. Conditions for disability or development account activation. Therefore, emergency account activation may bypass normal account authorization processes. Emergency and temporary accounts are not to be confused with infrequently used accounts (e.g., local logan counts accounts used for special tasks defined by organizations or whe	Ac-3,Ac-4,Ac-5,Ac-6,Ac-10,Ac-17,Ac-6,Ac-10,Ac-17	P1	x	x x		
Access Control Account Management Automated System Account Management		The organization employs automated mechanisms to support the management of information system accounts.	The use of automated mechanisms can include, for example: using email or text messaging to automatically natify account managers when users are terminated or transferred; using the information system to monitor account usage; and using telephonic notification to report atypical system account usage.				x x		
of Temporary / Emergency Accounts		accounts after [Assignment: organization-defined time period for each type of account].	This control enhancement requires the removal of both temporary and emergency accounts automatically after a predefined period of time has elapsed, rather than at the convenience of the systems administrator.				x x		
Access Control Account Management Disable Inactive Accounts Access Control Account Management Automated Audit Actions		defined time period]. The information system automatically audits account creation, modification, enabling, disabling,		AU-2,AU-12			x x		
Access Control Account Management Inactivity		The organization requires that users log out when [Assignment: organization-defined time-period		SC-23			X		
Logout Access Control Account Management Dynamic Privilege Management		of expected inactivity or description of when to log out]. The information system implements the following dynamic privilege management capabilities: [Assignment: organization-defined list of dynamic privilege management capabilities].	In contrast to conventional access control approaches which employ static information system accounts and predefined sets of user privileges, dynamic access control approaches (e.g., service-oriented architectures) even or un time access control decisions facilitated by dynamic privilege management. While user identities may remain relatively constant over time, user privileges may change more frequently based on angoing mission/business requirements and operational needs of organizations. Dynamic privilege management can include, for example, the immediate revocation of privileges from users, as apposed to requiring that users terminate and restart their sessions to reflect any changes in privileges. Dynamic privilege management can also refer to mechanisms that change the privileges of purses based an dynamic rules as apposed to editing specific user profiles. This type of privilege management includes, for example, automatic adjustments of privileges if users are operating out of their normal work times, or if information systems are under duress or in emergency maintenance situations. This control enhancement also includes the ancillary effects of privilege changes, for example, the potential changes to encryption keys used for communications. Dynamic privilege management can support requirements for information system resiliency.	AC-16					
	Access Control Account Management Dispansion Access Control Accoun	Access Control Account Management Disable Industrial Access Control Account Management Disable Industrial Access Control Account Manag	NST Special Publication (SP) 800-53 Revision 4 (January 2015) Access Control Access Control	Section (January 2015) Access Central (January 2015) Acces	Section Februaries (PF) (90-5) Incidion 4 (Insurery 2013) Association (Principle Section (Principle Sectio	Miles Committee Committe	Management Man	Marchane (June 1) Services (Control Particular (June 1) Services (Miles Company Compan

Control ID	Level	Control Name	Control Tout	Supulamental Cuidanea	Related Controls	Deignitu I o		ar!	High	Notes
AC-2 (7)	2	Access Control Account Management Role-	Control Text The organization:	Privileged roles are organization-defined roles assigned to individuals that allow those	menoted Controls	. noney to	. IV		mgn	
		Based Schemes	(a) Establishes and administers privileged user accounts in accordance with a role-based access scheme that organizes allowed information system access and privileges into roles;	individuals to perform certain security-relevant functions that ordinary users are not authorized to perform. These privileged roles include, for example, key management,						
			(b) Monitors privileged role assignments; and	account management, network and system administration, database administration, and web administration.						
			(c) Takes [Assignment: organization-defined actions] when privileged role assignments are no longer appropriate.	web daministration.						
AC-2 (8)	2	Access Control Account Management Dynamic Account Creation	The information system creates [Assignment: organization-defined information system accounts] dynamically.	Dynamic approaches for creating information system accounts (e.g., as implemented within service-oriented architectures) rely on establishing accounts (identities) at run time	AC-16					
				for entities that were previously unknown. Organizations plan for dynamic creation of						
				information system accounts by establishing trust relationships and mechanisms with the appropriate authorities to validate related authorizations and privileges.						
AC-2 (9)	2	Access Control Account Management Restrictions on Use of Shared / Group Accounts	The organization only permits the use of shared/group accounts that meet [Assignment: organization-defined conditions for establishing shared/group accounts].							
AC-2 (10)	2	Access Control Account Management Shared / Group Account Credential Termination	The information system terminates shared/group account credentials when members leave the group.							
AC-2 (11)	2	Access Control Account Management Usage Conditions	The information system enforces [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances and/or usage conditions] for [Assignment: organization-defined information system accounts].	Organizations can describe the specific conditions or circumstances under which information system accounts can be used, for example, by restricting usage to certain days of the week, time of day, or specific durations of time.					Х	
AC-2 (12)	2	Access Control Account Management Account Monitoring / Atypical Usage	The organization: (a) Monitors information system accounts for [Assignment: organization-defined atypical usage];	Atypical usage includes, for example, accessing information systems at certain times of the day and from locations that are not consistent with the normal usage patterns of	CA-7				х	
		Worldoning / Acypical osage	and	individuals working in organizations.						
			(b) Reports atypical usage of information system accounts to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].							
AC-2 (13)	2	Access Control Account Management Disable Accounts for High-Risk Individuals	The organization disables accounts of users posing a significant risk within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of discovery of the risk.	Users posing a significant risk to organizations include individuals for whom reliable evidence or intelliaence indicates either the intention to use authorized access to	PS-4				х	
				information systems to cause harm or through whom adversaries will cause harm. Harm						
				includes potential adverse impacts to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation. Close coordination between authorizing officials,						
				information system administrators, and human resource managers is essential in order for timely execution of this control enhancement.						
AC-3	1	Access Control Access Enforcement	The information system enforces approved authorizations for logical access to information and system resources in accordance with applicable access control policies.	Access control policies (e.g., identity-based policies, role-based policies, control matrices, cryptography) control access between active entities or subjects (i.e., users or processes	AC-2,AC-4,AC-5,AC- 6,AC-16,AC-17,AC-	P1 X	х		Х	
			system resources in accordance with applicable access control policies.	acting on behalf of users) and passive entities or objects (e.g., devices, files, records,	18,AC-19,AC-20,AC-					
				domains) in information systems. In addition to enforcing authorized access at the information system level and recognizing that information systems can host many	21,AC-22,AU-9,CM- 5,CM-6,CM-11,MA-					
				applications and services in support of organizational missions and business operations,	3,MA-4,MA-5,PE-3					
				access enforcement mechanisms can also be employed at the application and service level to provide increased information security.						
AC-3 (1)	2	Access Control Access Enforcement Restricted X Access to Privileged Functions								[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-6]
AC-3 (2)	2	Access Control Access Enforcement Dual Authorization	The information system enforces dual authorization for [Assignment: organization-defined privileged commands and/or other organization-defined actions].	Dual authorization mechanisms require the approval of two authorized individuals in order to execute. Organizations do not require dual authorization mechanisms when immediate	CP-9,MP-6					
				responses are necessary to ensure public and environmental safety. Dual authorization may also be known as two-person control.						
AC-3 (3)	2	Access Control Access Enforcement Mandatory Access Control	The information system enforces [Assignment: organization-defined mandatory access control policy] over all subjects and objects where the policy:	Mandatory access control as defined in this control enhancement is synonymous with nondiscretionary access control, and is not constrained only to certain historical uses (e.g.,	AC-25,SC-11					
		Access control	(a) Is uniformly enforced across all subjects and objects within the boundary of the information	implementations using the Bell-LaPadula Model). The above class of mandatory access control						
			system; (b) Specifies that a subject that has been granted access to information is constrained from doing	policies constrains what actions subjects can take with information obtained from data objects for which they have already been granted access, thus preventing the subjects from passing the						
			any of the following; (b)(1) Passing the information to unauthorized subjects or objects;	information to unauthorized subjects and objects. This class of mandatory access control policies also constrains what actions subjects can take with respect to the propagation of access control						
			(b)(2) Granting its privileges to other subjects;	privileges; that is, a subject with a privilege cannot pass that privilege to other subjects. The policy is uniformly enforced over all subjects and objects to which the information system has						
			(b)(3) Changing one or more security attributes on subjects, objects, the information system, or information system components;	control. Otherwise, the access control policy can be circumvented. This enforcement typically is						
			(b)(4) Choosing the security attributes and attribute values to be associated with newly created or modified objects: or	provided via an implementation that meets the reference monitor concept (see AC-25). The policy is bounded by the information system boundary (i.e., once the information is passed outside of						
			(b)(5) Changing the rules governing access control; and	the control of the system, additional means may be required to ensure that the constraints on the information remain in effect). The trusted subjects described above are granted privileges						
			(c) Specifies that [Assignment: organization-defined subjects] may explicitly be granted [Assignment: organization-defined privileges (i.e., they are trusted subjects)] such that they are	consistent with the concept of least privilege (see AC-6). Trusted subjects are only given the						
			not limited by some or all of the above constraints.	minimum privileges relative to the above policy necessary for satisfying organizational mission/business needs. The control is most applicable when there is some policy mandate (e.g.,						
				law, Executive Order, directive, or regulation) that establishes a policy regarding access to sensitive/classified information and some users of the information system are not authorized						
				access to all sensitive/classified information resident in the information system. This control can operate in conjunction with AC-3 (4). A subject that is constrained in its operation by policies						
				governed by this control is still able to operate under the less rigorous constraints of AC-3 (4), but						
				policies governed by this control take precedence over the less rigorous constraints of AC-3 (4). For example, while a mandatory access control policy imposes a constraint preventing a subject						
				from passing information to another subject operating at a different sensitivity label, AC-3 (4) permits the subject to pass the information to any subject with the same sensitivity label as the						
				subject.						
AC-3 (4)	2	Access Control Access Enforcement Discretionary Access Control	The information system enforces [Assignment: organization-defined discretionary access control policy] over defined subjects and objects where the policy specifies that a subject that has been	When discretionary access control policies are implemented, subjects are not constrained with regard to what actions they can take with information for which they have already						
			granted access to information can do one or more of the following:	been granted access. Thus, subjects that have been granted access to information are not						
			(a) Pass the information to any other subjects or objects; (b) Grant its privileges to other subjects;	prevented from passing (i.e., the subjects have the discretion to pass) the information to other subjects or objects. This control enhancement can operate in conjunction with AC-3						
			(c) Change security attributes on subjects, objects, the information system, or the information system's components:	(3). A subject that is constrained in its operation by policies governed by AC-3 (3) is still able to operate under the less rigorous constraints of this control enhancement. Thus, while AC-						
			(d) Choose the security attributes to be associated with newly created or revised objects; or	3 (3) imposes constraints preventing a subject from passing information to another subject						
			(e) Change the rules governing access control.	operating at a different sensitivity level, AC-3 (4) permits the subject to pass the information to any subject at the same sensitivity level. The policy is bounded by the						
				information system boundary. Once the information is passed outside of the control of the						
				information system, additional means may be required to ensure that the constraints remain in effect. While the older, more traditional definitions of discretionary access						
				control require identity-based access control, that limitation is not required for this use of discretionary access control.						

Control ID	Level	Control Name	ish decree	Control Toy	Supplemental Cuidance	Related Controls	Deineite I		lad High	Netes
AC-3 (5)	2	Access Control Access Enforcement Security- Relevant Information		Control Text The information system prevents access to [Assignment: organization-defined security-relevant information] except during secure, non-operable system states.	Supplemental Guidence Security-relevant information is any information within information systems that can potentially impact the aperation of security functions or the provision of security services in a manner that could result in failure to enforce system security policies or maintain the isolation of code and data. Security-relevant information includes, for example, filtering rules for routers/firewalls, cryptographic key management information, configuration parameters for security services, and access control lists. Secure, non-operable system states include the times in which information systems are not performing mission/business- related processing (e.g., the system is off-line for maintenance, troubleshooting, boot-up, shut down).	Related Controls CM-3	Priority	LOW M	rod High	
AC-3 (6)	2	Access Control Access Enforcement Protection of User and System Information	X							[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-4 and SC-28]
AC-3 (7)	2	O ose that system injointation Access Control Access Enforcement Role-Based Access Control		The information system enforces a role-based access control policy over defined subjects and objects and controls access based upon [Assignment: organization-defined roles and users authorized to assume such roles].	Role-based access control (RBAC) is an access control policy that restricts information system access to authorized users. Organizations can create specific roles based on job functions and the authorizations (i.e., privileges) to perform needed operations on arganizational information systems associated with the organization-defined roles. When users are assigned to the organizational roles, they inherit the authorizations or privileges defined for those roles. RBAC simplifies privilege administration for organizations because privileges are not assigned directly to every user (which can be a significant number of individuals for mil-to large-site organizations) but are instead acquired through role assignments. RBAC can be implemented either as a mandatory or discretionary form of occess control. For organizations implementing RBAC with mandatory access controls, the requirements in AC-3 (3) define the scope of the subjects and objects covered by the policy.					
AC-3 (8)	2	Access Control Access Enforcement Revocation of Access Authorizations		The information system enforces the revocation of access authorizations resulting from changes to the security attributes of subjects and objects based on [Assignment: organization-defined rules governing the timing of revocations of access authorizations].	the next time the object. (e.g., file) is opened or until the next time the subject attempts a new access to the object. Revocation based on changes to security lobels may take effect immediately. Organizations can provide alternative approaches on how to make revocations immediate if information systems cannot provide such capability and immediate revocation is necessary.					
AC-3 (9)	2	Access Control Access Enforcement Controlled Release		The information system does not release information outside of the established system boundary unless: (a) The receiving [Assignment: organization-defined information system or system component] provides [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards]; and (b) [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] are used to validate the appropriateness of the information designated for release.	Information systems can only protect arganizational information within the confines of established system boundaries. Additional security subgrourds may be needed to ensure that such information is adequately protected once it is passed beyond the established information system boundaries. Examples of information leaving the system boundary include transmitting information to an external information system or printing the information on one of its printers. In cases where the information system is unable to make a determination of the adequacy of the protections provided by entities outside its boundary, as a mitigating control, organizations determine procedurally whether the external information systems are providing adequate security. The means used to determine the adequacy of the security provided by external information systems include, for example, conducting inspections or periodic testing, establishing agreements between the organization and sits counterpart organizations, or some other process. The means used by external entities to protect the information received need not be the same as those used by the organization, but the means employed are sufficient to provide consistent objudication of the security policy to protect the information system posses information in information and incontributed areas to validate the information in information or releasing it to external systems. For example, if the information system posses information to a printer in organization, controlled by another organization, technical means are employed to validate that the security attributes associated with the exported information are appropriate for the receiving system. Alternatively, if he information system passes information to a printer in organization-controlled space, procedural means can be employed to ensure that only appropriately undustried information given passes information enhancement is most applicable when there is some policy mandate (e.g., low, Executive Order, directive, or regulation) that establi					
AC-3 (10)	2	Access Control Access Enforcement Audited Override of Access Control Mechanisms		The organization employs an audited override of automated access control mechanisms under [Assignment: organization-defined conditions].		AU-2,AU-6				
AC-4	1	Access Control Information Flow Enforcement		The information system enforces approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information within the system and between interconnected systems based on [Assignment: organization-defined information flow control policies].	Information flow control regulates where information is allowed to travel within an information system and between information systems (as opposed to who is allowed to access the information systems and between information systems (as opposed to who is allowed to access the information) and without explicit regard to subsequent accesses to that information. Flow control restrictions include, for example, keeping export-controlled information from being transmitted in the clear to the internet, blocking outside traffic that claims to be from within the organization, restrictions between information organizations based on data structures and content. Transferring information between information systems representing different security domains with different security policies introduces in kin that such transfers violate one or more domain security policies. In such situations, information owners/stewards provide guidance at designated policy enforcement points shade in the such standard of the such situations, information owners/stewards provide guidance at designated policy enforcement points when required to enforce specific security policies. Enforcement includes, for example: (i) prohibiting information transfers between interconnected systems (i.e., allowing access only); (ii) employing hardware mechanisms to enforce one-way information flows, and (iii) implementing trustworthy regarding mechanisms to enforce one-way information flows, and (iii) implementing trustworthy regarding mechanisms to reassign security attributes and security bales. Organizations consolide states of the information flow control policies and enforcement mechanisms to control the devices within the formation and/or the information pattern the research of security bales. Organization is one and between interconnected systems (i.e., alportivables) deviced within flormation flow control policies and enforcement cours, for example, in boundary protection devices (e.g., gateway, outers, gards, concepted tunnels, frewalls) that employ rule s	AC-3,AC-17,AC-19,AC- 21,CM-6,CM-7,SA- 8,SC-2,SC-5,SC-7,SC- 18	PI	x	x	

Control ID		Comban I Norman	Withdrawn	Control Trut	Sumbourset Subbours	Balata d Cantuck	Parker the Control	Mad	111-1-	Neter
AC-4 (1)	Level 2	Access Control Information Flow Enforcement	withdrawn	Control Text The information system uses [Assignment: organization-defined security attributes] associated	Supplemental Guidance Information flow enforcement mechanisms compare security attributes associated with	AC-16	Priority L	ow Mod	High	Notes
AC-4 (1)	2	Object Security Attributes		The injurnation system uses passignation: Injurnation-injurnation spirite secting variously state of white fastignment: organization-defined information, source, and destination objects] to enforce [Assignment: organization-defined information flow control policies] as a basis for flow control decisions.	information (data content and data structure) and source/destination objects, and respond appropriately (e.g., block, quarantine, alert administrator) when the mechanisms encounter information flows not explicitly allowed by Information flow policies. For example, an information object labeled Secret would be allowed to flow to a destination object labeled Secret, but an information object labeled Top Secret would not be allowed to flow to a destination object labeled Secret. Security attributes can also include, for example, source and destination addresses employed in traffic filter firewalls. Flow enforcement using explicit security attributes can be used, for example, to control the release of certain types of information.	AC-10				
AC-4 (2)	2	Access Control Information Flow Enforcement Processing Domains		The information system uses protected processing domains to enforce (Assignment: organization- defined information flow control policies) as a basis for flow control decisions.	Within information systems, protected processing domains are processing spaces that have controlled interactions with other processing spaces, thus enabling control of information flows between these spaces and to/from data/information objects. A protected processing domain can be provided, for example, by implementing domain and type enforcement. In domain and type enforcement, information system processes are assigned to domains; information is identified by types; and information flows are controlled based on allowed information accesses (determined by domain and type), allowed signaling among domains, and allowed process transitions to other domains.					
AC-4 (3)	2	Access Control Information Flow Enforcement Dynamic Information Flow Control		The information system enforces dynamic information flow control based on [Assignment: organization-defined policies].	Organizational policies regarding dynamic information flow control include, for example, allowing or disallowing information flows based on changing conditions or mission/operational considerations. Changing conditions include, for example, changes in organizational risk tolerance due to changes in the immediacy of mission/business needs, changes in the threat environment, and detection of potentially harmful or adverse events.	51-4				
AC-4 (4)	2	Access Control Information Flow Enforcement Content Check Encrypted Information		The information system prevents encrypted information from bypassing content-checking mechanisms by (Selection (one or more): decrypting the information; blocking the flow of the encrypted information; retiminating communications sessions attempting to pass encrypted information; [Assignment: organization-defined procedure or method]].		SI-4				
AC-4 (5)		Access Control Information Flow Enforcement Embedded Data Types		The information system enforces (Assignment: organization-defined limitations) on embedding data types within other data types.	Embedding data types within other data types may result in reduced flow control effectivenes. Data type embedding includes, for example, inserting executable filter as objects within word processing files, inserting references or descriptive information into a media file, and compressed or archived data types that may include multiple embedded data types. Limitations and data type embedding consider the levels of embedding and prohibit levels of data type embedding that are beyond the capability of the inspection tools.					
AC-4 (6)	2	Access Control Information Flow Enforcement Metadata		The information system enforces information flow control based on [Assignment: organization-defined metadata].	Metadata is information used to describe the characteristics of data. Metadata can include structural metadata describing data structurals (e.g., data format, syntax, and semantics) or descriptive metadata describing data contents (e.g., age, location, telephone number). Enforcing allowed information flows based on metadata enables simpler and more effective flow control. Organizations consider the trustworthiness of metadata with regard to data accuracy (i.e., knowledge that the metadata values are correct with respect to the data), data integrity (i.e., protecting against unauthorized changes to metadata tags), and the binding of metadata to the data poyload (i.e., ensuring sufficiently strong binding techniques with appropriate levels of assurance).	AC-16,SI-7				
AC-4 (7)	2	Access Control Information Flow Enforcement		The information system enforces [Assignment: organization-defined one-way information flows] using hardware mechanisms.						
AC-4 (8)	2	One-Way Flow Mechanisms Access Control Information Flow Enforcement Security Policy Filters		The information system enforces information flow control using (Assignment: organization- defined security policy filters) as a basis for flow control decisions for [Assignment: organization- defined information flows].	Organization-defined security policy filters can address data structures and content. For example, security policy filters for data structures can check for maximum file lengths, maximum filed sizes, and data filts (press flor structured and unstructured data). Security policy filters for data content can check for specific words (e.g., dirty/clean word filters), enumerated values or data value ranges, and hidden content. Structured data permits the interpretation of data content by applications. Unstructured data typically refers to digital information without a particular data structure or with a data structure that does not facilitate the development of rule sets to address the particular sensitivity of the information conveyed by the data or the associated flow enforcement decisions. Unstructured data consists of; (i) bitimapo phjects that are inherently no language-based (i.e., image, video, or audio files); and (ii) textual objects that are based on written or printed languages (e.g., commercial off-the-shelf word processing documents, spreadsheets, or emails). Organizations can implement more than one security policy filter to meet information flow control objectives (e.g., employing clean word lists in conjunction with dirty word lists my help to reduce fase positives).					
AC-4 (9)	2	Access Control Information Flow Enforcement Human Reviews		The information system enforces the use of human reviews for [Assignment: organization-defined information flows] under the following conditions: [Assignment: organization-defined conditions].						
AC-4 (10)	2	Access Control Information Flow Enforcement Enable / Disable Security Policy Filters		The information system provides the capability for privileged administrators to enable/disable [Assignment: organization-defined security policy filters] under the following conditions: [Assignment: organization-defined conditions]	For example, as allowed by the information system authorization, administrators can enable security policy filters to accommodate approved data types.					
AC-4 (11)	2	Access Control Information Flow Enforcement Configuration of Security Policy Filters		The information system provides the capability for privileged administrators to configure [Assignment: organization-defined security policy filters] to support different security policies.	For example, to reflect changes in security policies, administrators can change the list of 'dirty words' that security policy mechanisms check in accordance with the definitions provided by organizations.					
AC-4 (12)	2	Access Control Information Flow Enforcement Data Type Identifiers		The information system, when transferring information between different security domains, uses [Assignment: organization-defined data type identifiers] to validate data essential for information flow decisions.	Data type identifiers include, for example, filenames, file types, file signatures/tokens, and					
AC-4 (13)	2	Access Control Information Flow Enforcement Decomposition Into Policy-Relevant Subcomponents		The information system, when transferring information between different security domains, decomposes information into [Assignment: organization-defined policy-relevant subcomponents] for submission to policy enforcement mechanisms.	Policy enforcement mechanisms apply filtering, inspection, and/or sanitization rules to the policy-relevant subcomponents of information to facilitate flow enforcement prior to transferring such information to different security domains. Parsing transfer files facilitates policy decisions on source, destination, certificates, classification, attachments, and other security-related component differentiators.					
AC-4 (14)	2	Access Control Information Flow Enforcement Security Policy Filter Constraints		The information system, when transferring information between different security domains, implements [Assignment: organization-defined security policy filters] requiring fully enumerated formats that restrict data structure and content.	Data structure and content restrictions reduce the range of potential malicious and/or unsanctioned content in cross-domain transactions. Security policy filters that restrict data structures include, for example: etircticing file sizes and field lengths. Data content policy filters include, for example: (i) encoding formats for character sets (e.g., Universal Character Set Transformation Formats, American Standard Code for Information Interchange): (ii) restricting character data fields to only contain lapha-numeric characters; (iii) prohibiting special characters; and (iv) validating schema structures.					

Control ID	Lovel	Control Name	Withdrawn	Control Text	Supplemental Guidance	Related Controls	Priority	Low M	od High	Notes
AC-4 (15)	2	Access Control Information Flow Enforcement	Withdiawn	The information system, when transferring information between different security domains,		SI-3	FIIOTILY	10W IV	ou mgm	Notes
	-	Detection of Unsanctioned Information		examines the information for the presence of [Assignment: organized-defined unsanctioned information] and prohibits the transfer of such information in accordance with the [Assignment: organization-defined security policy].	be transferred for malicious code and dirty words.					
AC-4 (16)	2	Access Control Information Flow Enforcement Information Transfers on Interconnected Systems	X							[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-4]
AC-4 (17)	2	Access Control Information Flow Enforcement Domain Authentication		The information system uniquely identifies and authenticates source and destination points by [Selection (one or mare): organization, system, application, individual] for information transfer.	Attribution is a critical component of a security concept of operations. The ability to identify source and destination points for information flowing in information systems, allows the ferensic reconstruction of events when required, and encourages policy compliance by attributing policy violations to specific organizations/individuals. Successful domain authentication requires that information system labels distinguish among systems, organizations, and individuals involved in preparing, sending, receiving, or disseminating information.	IA-2,IA-3,IA-4,IA-5				
AC-4 (18)	2	Access Control Information Flow Enforcement Security Attribute Binding		The information system binds security attributes to information using [Assignment: organization-defined binding techniques] to facilitate information flow policy enforcement.	Binding techniques implemented by information systems affect the strength of security attribute binding to information. Binding strength and the assurance associated with binding techniques play on important part in the trust organizations have in the information flow enforcement process. The binding techniques affect the number and degree of additional reviews required by organizations.	AC-16,SC-16				
AC-4 (19)	2	Access Control Information Flow Enforcement Validation of Metadata		The information system, when transferring information between different security domains, applies the same security policy filtering to metadata as it applies to data payloads.	This control enhancement requires the validation of metadata and the data to which the metadata applies. Some organizations distinguish between metadata and obta payloads (i.e., only the data to which the metadata is bound). Other organizations do not make such distinctions, considering metadata and the data to which the metadata applies as part of the payload. All information (including metadata and the data to which the metadata applies) is subject to filtering and inspection.					
AC-4 (20)	2	Access Control Information Flow Enforcement Approved Solutions		The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined solutions in approved configurations] to control the flow of [Assignment: organization-defined information] across security domains.	Organizations define approved solutions and configurations in cross-domain policies and guidance in accordance with the types of information flows across classification boundaries. The Unified Cross Domain Management Office (UCDMO) provides a baseline					
AC-4 (21)	2	Access Control Information Flow Enforcement Physical / Logical Separation of Information Flows		The information system separates information flows logically or physically using [Assignment: organization-defined mechanisms and/or techniques] to accomplish [Assignment: organization-defined required separations by types of information].	listing of approved cross-domain solutions. Enforcing the separation of information flows by type can enhance protection by ensuring that information is not commingled while in transit and by enabling flow control by transmission paths perhaps not otherwise achievable. Types of separable information include, for example, inbound and outbound communications traffic, service requests and responses, and information of differing security categories.					
AC-4 (22)	2	Access Control Information Flow Enforcement Access Only		The information system provides access from a single device to computing platforms, applications, or data residing on multiple different security domains, while preventing any information flow between the different security domains.	The information system, for example, provides a desktop for users to access each connected security domain without providing any mechanisms to allow transfer of information between the different security domains.					
AC-5	1	Access Control Separation of Duties		The organization: a. Separates [Assignment: organization-defined duties of individuals]; b. Documents separation of duties of individuals; and c. Defines information system access authorizations to support separation of duties.	Separation of duties addresses the potential for abuse of authorized privileges and helps to reduce the risk of malevolent activity without collusion. Separation of duties includes, for example: (i) dividing mission functions and information system support functions among different individuals and/or roles; (ii) conducting information system support functions with different individuals (e.g., system management, programming, configuration management, quality assurance and testing, and network security); and (iii) ensuring security personnel administering access control functions do not also administer audit functions.	AC-3,AC-6,PE-3,PE- 4,PS-2	P1	x	x	
AC-6	1	Access Control Least Privilege		The organization employs the principle of least privilege, allowing only authorized accesses for users (or processes acting on behalf of users) which are necessary to accomplish assigned tasks in accordance with organizational missions and business functions.	Organizations employ least privilege for specific duties and information systems. The principle of least privilege is also applied to information system processes, ensuring that the processes operate at privilege levels on higher than necessary to accomplish required organizational missions/business functions. Organizations consider the creation of additional processes, roles, and information system accounts as necessary, to achieve least privilege. Organizations also apply least privilege to the development, implementation, and operation of organizational information systems.	AC-2,AC-3,AC-5,CM- 6,CM-7,PL-2	P1	х	х	
AC-6 (1)		Access Control Least Privilege Authorize Access to Security Functions		The organization explicitly authorizes access to [Assignment: organization-defined security functions (deployed in hordware, software, and firmware) and security-relevant information).	authorizations (i.e., permissions, privilegas), setting events to be audited, and setting intrusion detection parameters. Security-relevant information includes, for example, filtering rules for routers/firewalls, cryptographic key management information, configuration parameters for security services, and access control lists. Explicitly authorized personnel include, for example, security administrators, system and network administrators, system security officers, system maintenance personnel, system programmers, and other privileged users.	AC-17,AC-18,AC-19		X	х	
AC-6 (2)		Access Control Least Privilege Non-Privileged Access for Nonsecurity Functions		The organization requires that users of information system accounts, or roles, with access to [Assignment: organization-defined security functions or security-relevant information], use non- privileged accounts or roles, when accessing nonsecurity functions.	This control enhancement limits exposure when operating from within privileged accounts or roles. The inclusion of roles addresses situations where organizations implement access control policies such as role-based access control and where a change of role provides the same degree of assurance in the change of access authorizations for both the user and all processes acting on behalf of the user as would be provided by a change between a privileged and non-privileged account.			x	х	
AC-6 (3)	2	Access Control Least Privilege Network Access to Privileged Commands		The organization authorizes network access to [Assignment: organization-defined privileged commands] only for [Assignment: organization-defined compelling operational needs] and documents the rationale for such access in the security plan for the information system.	Network access is any access across a network connection in lieu of local access (i.e., user being physically present at the device).	AC-17			X	
AC-6 (4)		Access Control Least Privilege Separate Processing Domains		The information system provides separate processing domains to enable finer-grained allocation of user privileges.	Providing separate processing domains for finer-grained allocation of user privileges includes, for example: (i) using virtualization techniques to allow additional privileges within a virtual machine while restricting privileges to other virtual machines or to the underlying actual machine; (ii) employing hardware and/or software domain separation mechanisms; and (iii) implementing separate physical domains.	AC-4,SC-3,SC-30,SC- 32				
AC-6 (5)	2	Access Control Least Privilege Privileged Accounts		The organization restricts privileged accounts on the information system to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].	Privileged accounts, including super user accounts, are typically described as system administrator for various types of commercial off-the-shelf operating systems. Restricting privileged accounts to specific personnel or roles prevents day-to-day users from having access to privileged information/functions. Organizations may differentiate in the application of this control enhancement between allowed privileges for local accounts and for domain accounts provided arganizations retain the ability to control information system configurations for key security parameters and as otherwise necessary to sufficiently mitigate risk.	СМ-6		X	x	
AC-6 (6)	2	Access Control Least Privilege Privileged Access by Non-Organizational Users		The organization prohibits privileged access to the information system by non-organizational		IA-8				
		uy ivon-Organizational Users		users.		l	1			1

Control ID	Level	Control Name	1866b duorre	Control Tout	Supplemental Cuidance	Deleted Centrels	Deignitu	Levy M	ted High	Notes
AC-6 (7)	2	Access Control Least Privilege Review of User	Withdrawn	Control Text The organization:	The need for certain assigned user privileges may change over time reflecting changes in	CA-7	Priority	LOW N	ioa High	Notes
1.00(1.7)		Privileges		(a) Reviews [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] the privileges assigned to [Assignment:	organizational missions/business function, environments of operation, technologies, or					
				organization-defined roles or classes of users] to validate the need for such privileges; and	threat. Periodic review of assigned user privileges is necessary to determine if the rationale for assigning such privileges remains valid. If the need cannot be revalidated, organizations					
				(b) Reassigns or removes privileges, if necessary, to correctly reflect organizational mission/business needs.	for assigning such privileges remains valia. If the need cannot be revalidated, organizations take appropriate corrective actions.					
				,						
AC-6 (8)	2	Access Control Least Privilege Privilege Levels		The information system prevents [Assignment: organization-defined software] from executing at						
1		for Code Execution		higher privilege levels than users executing the software.	privileges to perform required functions. However, if the privileges required for execution are at a higher level than the privileges assigned to organizational users invoking such					
1					applications/programs, those users are indirectly provided with greater privileges than					
					assigned by organizations.					
AC-6 (9)	2	Access Control Least Privilege Auditing Use of Privileged Functions		The information system audits the execution of privileged functions.	Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised information system accounts,	AU-2		x	X	
		Frivilegea Failctions			is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on					
					organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse,					
					and in doing so, help mitigate the risk from insider threats and the advanced persistent threat (APT).					
AC-6 (10)	2	Access Control Least Privilege Prohibit Non-		The information system prevents non-privileged users from executing privileged functions to	Privileged functions include, for example, establishing information system accounts,			l x	X	
		Privileged Users from Executing Privileged		include disabling, circumventing, or altering implemented security safeguards/countermeasures.	performing system integrity checks, or administering cryptographic key management					
1		Functions			activities. Non-privileged users are individuals that do not possess appropriate					
1					authorizations. Circumventing intrusion detection and prevention mechanisms or malicious code protection mechanisms are examples of privileged functions that require protection					
					from non-privileged users.					
AC-7	1	Access Control Unsuccessful Logon Attempts		The information system:	This control applies regardless of whether the logon occurs via a local or network	AC-2,AC-9,AC-14,IA-5	P2	x x	х	
				a. Enforces a limit of [Assignment: organization-defined number] consecutive invalid logon attempts by a user during a [Assignment: organization-defined time period]; and	connection. Due to the potential for denial of service, automatic lockouts initiated by information systems are usually temporary and automatically release after a predetermined					
				b. Automatically [Selection: locks the account/node for an [Assignment: organization-defined time	time period established by organizations. If a delay algorithm is selected, organizations may					
				period]; locks the account/node until released by an administrator; delays next logon prompt	choose to employ different algorithms for different information system components based					
				according to [Assignment: organization-defined delay algorithm]] when the maximum number of unsuccessful attempts is exceeded.	on the capabilities of those components. Responses to unsuccessful logon attempts may be					
				unsuccessial actempts is exceeded.	implemented at both the operating system and the application levels.					
AC-7 (1)	2	Access Control Unsuccessful Logon Attempts	X							[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-7]
AC-7 (2)	2	Automatic Account Lock Access Control Unsuccessful Logon Attempts		The information system purges/wipes information from [Assignment: organization-defined mobile	This control aphancement applies only to makile devices for which a lease a	AC-19.MP-5.MP-6.SC-		\vdash		
AL-7 (2)	2	Purge / Wipe Mobile Device		devices] based on [Assignment: organization-defined purging/wiping requirements/techniques]	personal digital assistants, smart phones, tablets). The logon is to the mobile device, not to					
				after [Assignment: organization-defined number] consecutive, unsuccessful device logon	any one account on the device. Therefore, successful logons to any accounts on mobile					
				attempts.	devices reset the unsuccessful logon count to zero. Organizations define information to be					
					purged/wiped carefully in order to avoid over purging/wiping which may result in devices becoming unusable. Purging/wiping may be unnecessary if the information on the device is					
					protected with sufficiently strong encryption mechanisms.					
AC-8	1	Access Control System Use Notification		The information system: a. Displays to users [Assignment: organization-defined system use notification message or banner]	System use notifications can be implemented using messages or warning banners displayed before individuals log in to information systems. System use notifications are used only for		P1	x x	×	
1				before granting access to the system that provides privacy and security notices consistent with	access via logon interfaces with human users and are not required when such human					
1				applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance	interfaces do not exist. Organizations consider system use notification messages/banners					
1				and states that:	displayed in multiple languages based on specific organizational needs and the					
1				a.1. Users are accessing a U.S. Government information system; a.2. Information system usage may be monitored, recorded, and subject to audit;	demographics of information system users. Organizations also consult with the Office of the General Counsel for legal review and approval of warning banner content.					
1				a.3. Unauthorized use of the information system is prohibited and subject to criminal and civil	deneral course for legal review and approval of warning banner content.					
1				penalties; and						
1				a.4. Use of the information system indicates consent to monitoring and recording; b. Retains the notification message or banner on the screen until users acknowledge the usage						
1				conditions and take explicit actions to log on to or further access the information system; and						
1				c. For publicly accessible systems:						
				c.1. Displays system use information [Assignment: organization-defined conditions], before						
1				granting further access; c.2. Displays references, if any, to monitoring, recording, or auditing that are consistent with						
1				privacy accommodations for such systems that generally prohibit those activities; and						
1				c.3. Includes a description of the authorized uses of the system.						
1										
AC-9	1	Access Control Previous Logon (Access)		The information system notifies the user, upon successful logon (access) to the system, of the date	This control is applicable to logons to information systems via human user interfaces and	AC-7,PL-4	PO			
		Notification		and time of the last logon (access).	logons to systems that occur in other types of architectures (e.g., service-oriented					
AC 0 (1)	2	Access Control Provious acces Access		The information system notifies the year upon system for information system.	architectures).					
AC-9 (1)	2	Access Control Previous Logon (Access) Notification Unsuccessful Logons		The information system notifies the user, upon successful logon/access, of the number of unsuccessful logon/access attempts since the last successful logon/access.						
AC-9 (2)	2	Access Control Previous Logon (Access)		The information system notifies the user of the number of [Selection: successful logons/accesses;						
		Notification Successful / Unsuccessful Logons		unsuccessful logon/access attempts; both] during [Assignment: organization-defined time period].						
AC-9 (3)	2	Access Control Previous Logon (Access)		The information system notifies the user of changes to [Assignment: organization-defined security						
	-	Notification Notification of Account Changes		related characteristics/parameters of the user's account] during [Assignment: organization-						
				defined time period].				\vdash		
AC-9 (4)	2	Access Control Previous Logon (Access) Notification Additional Logon Information		The information system notifies the user, upon successful logon (access), of the following additional information: [Assignment: organization-defined information to be included in addition	This control enhancement permits organizations to specify additional information to be provided to users upon logon including, for example, the location of last logon. User					
		20gor injuriation		to the date and time of the last logon (access)].	location is defined as that information which can be determined by information systems,					
					for example, IP addresses from which network logons occurred, device identifiers, or					
AC-10	1	Access Control Concurrent Session Control		The information system limits the number of concurrent sessions for each [Assignment:	notifications of local logons. Organizations may define the maximum number of concurrent sessions for information		P3	+	¥	
1	•	Control Concurrent Session Control		organization-defined account and/or account type] to [Assignment: organization-defined number].	system accounts globally, by account type (e.g., privileged user, non-privileged user,				^	
					domain, specific application), by account, or a combination. For example, organizations may					
					limit the number of concurrent sessions for system administrators or individuals working in					
					particularly sensitive domains or mission-critical applications. This control addresses concurrent sessions for information system accounts and does not address concurrent					
					sessions by single users via multiple system accounts.					
AC-11	-	Accore Control Specian col-		The information system:	Session locks are temporary actions taken when users stop work and move away from the	AC-7	P3		U	
MC-11	1	Access Control Session Lock		The information system: a. Prevents further access to the system by initiating a session lock after [Assignment: organization		AC-/	r3	x	x	
				defined time period] of inactivity or upon receiving a request from a user; and	temporary nature of their absences. Session locks are implemented where session activities					
				b. Retains the session lock until the user reestablishes access using established identification and	can be determined. This is typically at the operating system level, but can also be at the					
				authentication procedures.	application level. Session locks are not an acceptable substitute for logging out of information systems, for example, if organizations require users to log out at the end of					
					workdays.					
AC-11 (1)	2	Access Control Session Lock Pattern-Hiding		The information system conceals, via the session lock, information previously visible on the display				X	х	
		Displays		with a publicly viewable image.	with screen savers, photographic images, solid colors, clock, battery life indicator, or a blank screen, with the additional caveat that none of the images convey sensitive					
					information.					

AC-12	1	Control Name Access Control Session Termination	Withdrawn	Control Pact The information system automatically terminates a user session after [Assignment: organization-defined conditions or trigger events requiring session disconnect].	Supplemental Criticance This control addresses the termination of user-initiated logical sessions in contrast to SC-10 which addresses the termination of network connections that are associated with communications sessions (i.e., network disconnect). A logical session (for local, network, and remote access) is initiated whenever a user (or process acting on behalf of a user) accesses an organizational information systems. Such user sessions can be terminated (and thus terminates user access) without terminating network sessions. Session terminated and thus terminates alto processes short addressed with a user's logical session except those processes that are specifically created by the user (i.e., session owner) to continue after the session is terminated. Conditions of trigger events requiring automatic session termination can include, for example, organization-defined periods of user inactivity, targeted responses to certain types of incidents, time-of-day restrictions on information system use.		P2	Low	Mod High	Notes
AC-12 (1)		Access Control Session Termination User- Initiated Lagauts / Message Displays		The information system: (a) Provides a logout capability for user-initiated communications sessions whenever authentication is used to gain access to [Assignment: organization-defined information resources], and (b) Displays an explicit logout message to users indicating the reliable termination of authenticated communications sessions.	Information resources to which users gain access via authentication include, for example, local workstations, databases, and password-protected websites/web-based services. Logout messages for web page access, for example, can be displayed after authenticated sessions have been terminated. However, for some types of interactive sessions including, for example, filt transfer protocol (FTP) sessions, information systems typically send logout messages as final messages prior to terminating sessions.					
AC-13	1	Access Control Supervision and Review - Access	Х							[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-2 and AU-6]
AC-14	1	Access Control Permitted Actions Without Identification or Authentication		The organization: a Identifies [Assignment: organization-defined user actions] that can be performed on the information system without identification or authentication consistent with organizational missions/business functions; and b. Documents and provides supporting rationale in the security plan for the information system, user actions not requiring identification or authentication.	This control addresses situations in which organizations determine that no identification or authentication is required no regularizational information systems. Organizations may allow a limited number of user actions without identification or authentication including, for example, when individuals access public websites or other publicly accessible federal information systems, when individuals use mobile phones to receive calls, or when fassimiles are received. Organizations also identify actions that normally require identification or authentication but may under certain circumstances (e.g., emergencies), allow identification or authentication mechanisms to be bypassed. Such bypasses may occur, for example, via a software-readable physical switch that commands bypass of the logen functionality and is protected from accidental or unmonitored use. This control does not apply to situations where identification and authentication have already occurred and are not repeated, but rather to situations where identification and authentication have not yet occurred. Organizations may decide that there are no user actions that can be performed on organizational information systems without identification and authentication and authentication have not yet occurred. Organizations may decide that there are no user actions that can be performed on organizational information systems without identification and authentication and au	CP-2,IA-2	P3	x	x x	
AC-14 (1)	2	Access Control Permitted Actions Without Identification or Authentication Necessary Uses	Х							[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-14]
AC-15	-1	Access Control Automated Marking	X							[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-3]
	1	Access Control Security Attributes		The organization: a. Provides the means to associate [Assignment: organization-defined types of security attributes] having [Assignment: organization-defined security attribute values] with information in storage, in process, and/or intransmission; b. Ensures that the security attribute associations are made and retained with the information; c. Establishes the permitted [Assignment: organization-defined security attributes] for [Assignment organization-defined information systems]; and d. Determines the permitted [Assignment: organization-defined values or ranges] for each of the established security attributes.	data structures can represent different types of entitles, both active and passive. Active entities, also known as subjects are hybridary succious with includinals, devices, or processes sufficient possible of hydrodisch. Ensive entities, also to known as objects, are hybridary succious drived the data structures such as records, buffers, tables, files, interpress and communications profits. Security artifications, a form dimensional, are abstractions representing the basic properties or associated with active entities (i.e., subjects) that have the potential to send or receive information, to cause information flow among objects, or to change the information sports suctive these activities and subjects in closer and or specified and solved and is hyperially included or less that the subject and objects in entered to as beinging and is hyperially includes of setting the attribute when all the attributes to subjects and objects in entered to as beinging and is hyperially includes of setting the attribute value and the attribute to subjects and objects in entered to as beinging and is hyperially includes or less than the subject of activities to subjects and objects in extension of the subject of the subject and objects in extension of the subject of the subject and objects in extension of the subject of activities the subjects and objects and objects of the subject of activities the subject and objects and objects of the subject of subjects and objects and objects of the subject of subjects and objects and objects of subjects and objects of subjects and objects of subjects and objects of subjects that can be subjected to any given security attributes unless as the subject of subjects to a subject to a subj	AC-3,AC-4,AC-6,AC- 21,AU-2,AU-10,SC- 16,MP-3				
AC-16 (1)	2	Access Control Security Attributes Dynamic Attribute Association		The information system dynamically associates security attributes with [Assignment: organization- defined subjects and objects] in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined security policies] as information is created and combined.	Dynamic association of security attributes is appropriate whenever the security characteristics of information changes over time. Security attributes may change, for example, due to information aggregation issues (i.e., the security characteristics of individual information elements are different from the combined elements), changes in individual access authorizations (i.e., privileges), and changes in the security category of information.	AC-4				
AC-16 (2)	2	Access Control Security Attributes Attribute Value Changes by Authorized Individuals		The information system provides authorized individuals (or processes acting on behalf of individuals) the capability to define or change the value of associated security attributes.	The content or assigned values of security attributes can directly affect the ability of individuals to access organizational information. Therefore, it is important for information systems to be able to limit the ability to create or modify security attributes to authorized individuals.	AC-6,AU-2				
AC-16 (3)	2	Access Control Security Attributes Maintenance of Attribute Associations by Information System		The information system mointains the association and integrity of [Assignment: organization-defined security attributes] to [Assignment: organization-defined subjects and objects].	murauaus. Maintaining the association and integrity of security attributes to subjects and objects with sufficient assurance helps to ensure that the attribute associations can be used as the basis of automated policy actions. Automated policy actions include, for example, access control decisions or information flow control decisions.					
AC-16 (4)	2	Access Control Security Attributes Association of Attributes by Authorized Individuals		The information system supports the association of [Assignment: organization-defined security attributes] with [Assignment: organization-defined subjects and objects] by authorized individuols (or processes acting on behalf of individuols).	The support provided by information systems can vary to include: (I) prompting users to select specific security attributes to be associated with specific information objects; (ii) employing automated mechanisms for categorizing information with appropriate attributes based on defined policies; or (iii) ensuring that the combination of selected security attributes selected is valid. Organizations consider the creation, deletion, or modification of security attributes when defining auditable events.					
AC-16 (5)	2	Access Control Security Attributes Attribute Displays for Output Devices		The information system displays security attributes in human-readable form on each object that the system transmits to output devices to identify [Assignment: organization-identified special dissemination, handling, or distribution instructions] using [Assignment: organization-identified human-readable, standard naming conventions].	Information system outputs include, for example, pages, screens, or equivalent. Information system output devices include, for example, printers and video displays on computer workstations, notebook computers, and personal digital assistants.					

Control ID		Control Name Withdray	Control 7 and	Constructed Catalana	Beleted Controls	Defeates to			1 Park	Nata
AC-16 (6)	evel 2	Access Control Security Attributes Maintenance	wn Control Text The organization allows personnel to associate, and maintain the association of [Assignment:	This control enhancement requires individual users (as opposed to the information system)	Related Controls	Priority Lo	w N	/lod	High	Notes
		of Attribute Association by Organization	organization-defined security attributes] with [Assignment: organization-defined subjects and objects] in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined security policies].	to maintain associations of security attributes with subjects and objects.						
AC-16 (7)	2	Access Control Security Attributes Consistent	The organization provides a consistent interpretation of security attributes transmitted between	In order to enforce security policies across multiple components in distributed information						
		Attribute Interpretation	distributed information system components.	systems (e.g., distributed database management systems, cloud-based systems, and service-oriented architectures), organizations provide a consistent interpretation of						
				security attributes that are used in access enforcement and flow enforcement decisions.						
				Organizations establish agreements and processes to ensure that all distributed						
				information system components implement security attributes with consistent interpretations in automated access/flow enforcement actions.						
AC-16 (8)	2	Access Control Security Attributes Association	The information system implements [Assignment: organization-defined techniques or	The association (i.e., binding) of security attributes to information within information			\neg			
		Techniques / Technologies	technologies] with [Assignment: organization-defined level of assurance] in associating security	systems is of significant importance with regard to conducting automated access						
			attributes to information.	enforcement and flow enforcement actions. The association of such security attributes can be accomplished with technologies/techniques providing different levels of assurance. For						
				example, information systems can cryptographically bind security attributes to information						
				using digital signatures with the supporting cryptographic keys protected by hardware						
				devices (sometimes known as hardware roots of trust).						
AC-16 (9)	2	Access Control Security Attributes Attribute	The organization ensures that security attributes associated with information are reassigned only							
		Reassignment	via re-grading mechanisms validated using [Assignment: organization-defined techniques or procedures].	levels of assurance for security attribute reassignment activities. The validation is facilitated by ensuring that re-grading mechanisms are single purpose and of limited						
			proceduresj.	function. Since security attribute reassignments can affect security policy enforcement						
				actions (e.g., access/flow enforcement decisions), using trustworthy re-grading						
				mechanisms is necessary to ensure that such mechanisms perform in a consistent/correct						
AC-16 (10)	2	Access Control Security Attributes Attribute	The information system provides authorized individuals the capability to define or change the type	mode of operation. The content or assigned values of security attributes can directly affect the ability of			+			
' '		Configuration by Authorized Individuals	and value of security attributes available for association with subjects and objects.	individuals to access organizational information. Therefore, it is important for information						
				systems to be able to limit the ability to create or modify security attributes to authorized individuals only.						
AC-17	1	Access Control Remote Access	The organization:	Remote access is access to organizational information systems by users (or processes acting	AC-2,AC-3,AC-18,AC-	P1 X	x		х	
			a. Establishes and documents usage restrictions, configuration/connection requirements, and	on behalf of users) communicating through external networks (e.g., the Internet). Remote	19,AC-20,CA-3,CA-	[[- [
			implementation guidance for each type of remote access allowed; and	access methods include, for example, dial-up, broadband, and wireless. Organizations often						
			b. Authorizes remote access to the information system prior to allowing such connections.	employ encrypted virtual private networks (VPNs) to enhance confidentiality and integrity	8,MA-4,PE-17,PL-					
				however, the use of VPNs, when adequately provisioned with appropriate security controls	1,50 20,51 4					
				(e.g., employing appropriate encryption techniques for confidentiality and integrity						
				protection) may provide sufficient assurance to the organization that it can effectively treat						
				such connections as internal networks. Still, VPN connections traverse external networks, and the encrypted VPN does not enhance the availability of remote connections. Also, VPNs						
				with encrypted tunnels can affect the organizational capability to adequately monitor						
				network communications traffic for malicious code. Remote access controls apply to						
				information systems other than public web servers or systems designed for public access.						
				This control addresses authorization prior to allowing remote access without specifying the formats for such authorization. While organizations may use interconnection security						
				agreements to authorize remote access connections, such agreements are not required by						
				this control. Enforcing access restrictions for remote connections is addressed in AC-3.						
							_			
AC-17 (1)	2	Access Control Remote Access Automated Monitoring / Control	The information system monitors and controls remote access methods.	Automated monitoring and control of remote access sessions allows organizations to detect cyber attacks and also ensure ongoing compliance with remote access policies by	AU-2,AU-12		x		X	
				auditing connection activities of remote users on a variety of information system						
				components (e.g., servers, workstations, notebook computers, smart phones, and tablets).						
AC-17 (2)	2	Access Control Remote Access Protection of Confidentiality / Integrity Using Encryption	The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect the confidentiality and integrity of remote access sessions.	The encryption strength of mechanism is selected based on the security categorization of the information.	SC-8,SC-12,SC-13		х		х	
AC-17 (3)	2	Access Control Remote Access Managed Access	The information system routes all remote accesses through [Assignment: organization-defined	Limiting the number of access control points for remote accesses reduces the attack	SC-7		х		х	
		Control Points	number] managed network access control points.	surface for organizations. Organizations consider the Trusted Internet Connections (TIC) initiative requirements for external network connections.			_			
AC-17 (4)	2	Access Control Remote Access Privileged Commands / Access	The organization: (a) Authorizes the execution of privileged commands and access to security-relevant information		AC-6		x		X	
			via remote access only for [Assignment: organization-defined needs]; and							
			(b) Documents the rationale for such access in the security plan for the information system.							
AC-17 (5)	2	Access Control Remote Access Monitoring for X	([Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-4]
AC-17 (6)	2	Unauthorized Connections Access Control Remote Access Protection of	The organization ensures that users protect information about remote access mechanisms from		AT-2,AT-3,PS-6		+			
AC-17 (7)	2	Information Access Control Remote Access Additional X	unauthorized use and disclosure.				+			[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-3 (10)]
	-	Protection for Security Function Access Access Control Remate Access Disable X					\perp			
AC-17 (8)		Nonsecure Network Protocols								[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-7]
AC-17 (9)	2	Access Control Remote Access Disconnect /	The organization provides the capability to expeditiously disconnect or disable remote access to	This control enhancement requires organizations to have the capability to rapidly						
		Disable Access	the information system within [Assignment: organization-defined time period].	disconnect current users remotely accessing the information system and/or disable further remote access. The speed of disconnect or disablement varies based on the criticality of						
				missions/business functions and the need to eliminate immediate or future remote access						
				to organizational information systems.						
AC-18	1	Access Control Wireless Access	The organization: a Establishes usage restrictions configuration/connection requirements and implementation	Wireless technologies include, for example, microwave, packet radio (UHF/VHF), 802.11x, and Bluetooth. Wireless networks use authentication protocols (e.g., EAP/TLS, PEAP), which	AC-2,AC-3,AC-17,AC-	P1 X	×		Х	
			 a. Establishes usage restrictions, configuration/connection requirements, and implementation guidance for wireless access; and 	provide credential protection and mutual authentication.	8,IA-2,IA-3,IA-8,PL-					
			b. Authorizes wireless access to the information system prior to allowing such connections.		4,SI-4					
AC-18 (1)	2	Access Control Wireless Access Authentication	The information system protects wireless access to the system using authentication of [Selection		SC-8,SC-13		X		Х	+
AC-18 (2)	2	and Encryption	(one or more): users; devices] and encryption.				-			[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-4]
		Unauthorized Connections	·							[white awn. incorporated into 51-4]
AC-18 (3)	2	Access Control Wireless Access Disable Wireless Networking	The organization disables, when not intended for use, wireless networking capabilities internally embedded within information system components prior to issuance and deployment.		AC-19		T			
AC-18 (4)	2	Access Control Wireless Access Restrict	The organization identifies and explicitly authorizes users allowed to independently configure	Organizational authorizations to allow selected users to configure wireless networking	AC-3,SC-15		+		X	
"		Configurations by Users	wireless networking capabilities.	capability are enforced in part, by the access enforcement mechanisms employed within						
		1		organizational information systems.		1 1			1	

										_	
Control ID AC-18 (5)	2	Control Name Access Control Wireless Access Antennas / Transmission Power Levels	Withdrawn	Control Text The organization selects radio antennas and calibrates transmission power levels to reduce the probability that usable signals can be received outside of organization-controlled boundaries.	Supplemental Culidance Actions that may be token by organizations to limit unauthorized use of wireless communications outside of organization-controlled boundaries include, for example: (i) reducing the power of wireless transmissions so that the transmissions are less likely to emit a signal that can be used by adversaries outside of the physical perimeters of organizations; (ii) employing measures such as TEMPEST to control wireless emanations; and (iii) using directional/beam forming antennas that reduce the likelihood that unintended receivers will be able to intercept signals. Prior to taking such actions, organizations can conduct periodic wireless surveys to understand the radio frequency profile of organizational information systems as well as other systems that may be operating in the area.	PE-19	iority Low	Mi	od High	N	oces
AC-19	1	Access Control Access Control for Mobile Devices		The organization: a. Establishes usage restrictions, configuration requirements, connection requirements, and implementation guidance for organization-controlled mobile devices; and b. Authorizes the connection of mobile devices to organizational information systems.	A mobile device is a computing device that: (i) has a small form factor such that it can esaily be carried by a single individual; (ii) is designed to operate without a physical connection (e.g., which will be a supported to the content of the co	5,PL-4,SC-7,SC-43,SI- 3,SI-4	x	x	×		
AC-19 (1)	2	Access Control Access Control for Mobile Devices Use of Writable / Portable Storage Devices	Х							[1	Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-7]
AC-19 (2)	2	Access Control Access Control for Mabile Devices Use of Personally Owned Portable Storage Devices	X							[1	Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-7]
AC-19 (3)	2	Access Control Access Control for Mobile Devices Use of Portable Storage Devices with No Identifiable Owner	Х							[1	Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-7]
AC-19 (4)	2	Access Control Access Control for Mobile Devices Restrictions for Classified Information		The organization: (a) Prohibits the use of unclassified mobile devices in facilities containing information systems processing, storing, or transmitting classified information unless specifically permitted by the authorizing official; and (b) Endpress the following restrictions on individuals permitted by the authorizing official; to use unclassified mobile devices in facilities containing information systems processing, storing, or transmitting classified information of the storing of the containing information systems is prohibited; (b)(1) Connection of unclassified mobile devices to unclassified information systems is prohibited; (b)(2) Connection of unclassified mobile devices to unclassified information systems requires approval from the authorizing official; (b)(3) Use of internal or external moderns or wireless interfaces within the unclassified mobile devices is prohibited; and (b)(4) funclassified mobile devices and the information stored on those devices are subject to random reviews and inspections by (Assignment: organization-defined security officials), and if classified information is jound, the incident handling policy is followed: (c) Restricts the connection of classified mobile devices to classified information systems in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined security policies].		CA-6,IR-4					
AC-19 (5)	2	Access Control Access Control for Mobile Devices Full Device / Container-Based Encryption		The organization employs [Selection: full-device encryption; container encryption] to protect the confidentiality and integrity of information on [Assignment: organization-defined mobile devices].	Container-based encryption provides a more fine-grained approach to the encryption of data/information on mobile devices, including for example, encrypting selected data structures such as files, records, or fields.	MP-5,SC-13,SC-28		х	х		
AC-20	1	Access Control Use of External Information Systems		The organization establishes terms and conditions, consistent with any trust relationships established with other organizations owning, operating, and/or maintaining external information systems, allowing authorized individuals to: a. Access the information system from external information systems; and b. Process, store, or transmit organization-controlled information using external information systems.		AC-3,AC-19,CA-P1 3,PL-4,SA-9	x x	x	x		

Control ID	Level 2	Control Name Withdrawn Access Control Use of External Information	Control Text The organization permits authorized individuals to use an external information system to access	Supplemental Guidance This control enhancement recognizes that there are circumstances where individuals using	Related Controls	Priority	Low	wood High	Notes
AC-20 (1)	2	Access Control Use of External Information Systems Limits on Authorized Use	The organization permits authorized individuals to use an external information system to access the information system or to process, store, or transmit organization-controlled information only	This control enhancement recognizes that there are circumstances where individuals using external information systems (e.g., contractors, coalition partners) need to access	CA-2			×	
		Systems Limits on Authorized ose	when the organization:	organizational information systems. In those situations, organizations need confidence that					
			(a) Verifies the implementation of required security controls on the external system as specified in						
			the organization's information security policy and security plan; or	controls), so as not to compromise, damage, or otherwise harm organizational information					
			(b) Retains approved information system connection or processing agreements with the	systems. Verification that the required security controls have been implemented can be					
			organizational entity hosting the external information system.	achieved, for example, by third-party, independent assessments, attestations, or other					
				means, depending on the confidence level required by organizations.					
AC-20 (2)	2	Access Control Use of External Information	The organization [Selection: restricts; prohibits] the use of organization-controlled portable	Limits on the use of organization-controlled portable storage devices in external				r x	
1 1		Systems Portable Storage Devices	storage devices by authorized individuals on external information systems.	information systems include, for example, complete prohibition of the use of such devices					
1 1				or restrictions on how the devices may be used and under what conditions the devices may					
46.30 (3)		Access Control I Have of Catananal Information	The construction (Colorida construction on his half the construction of the constructi	be used.					
AC-20 (3)	2	Access Control Use of External Information	The organization [Selection: restricts; prohibits] the use of non-organizationally owned	Non-organizationally owned devices include devices owned by other organizations (e.g.,					
		Systems Non-Organizationally Owned Systems /	information systems, system components, or devices to process, store, or transmit organizational information.						
		Components / Devices	information.	non-organizationally owned devices. In some cases, the risk is sufficiently high as to prohibit such use. In other cases, it may be such that the use of non-organizationally owned					
				devices is allowed but restricted in some way. Restrictions include, for example: (i)					
				requiring the implementation of organization-approved security controls prior to					
				authorizing such connections; (ii) limiting access to certain types of information, services,					
				or applications; (iii) using virtualization techniques to limit processing and storage activities					
				to servers or other system components provisioned by the organization; and (iv) agreeing					
				to terms and conditions for usage. For personally owned devices, organizations consult					
				with the Office of the General Counsel regarding legal issues associated with using such					
				devices in operational environments, including, for example, requirements for conducting					
				forensic analyses during investigations after an incident.					
AC-20 (4)	2	Access Control Use of External Information	The organization prohibits the use of [Assignment: organization-defined network accessible	Network accessible storage devices in external information systems include, for example,			1 7	T	
		Systems Network Accessible Storage Devices	storage devices] in external information systems.	online storage devices in public, hybrid, or community cloud-based systems.					
L							\vdash		
AC-21	1	Access Control Information Sharing	The organization:	This control applies to information that may be restricted in some manner (e.g., privileged	AC-3	P2)	X	
			a. Facilitates information sharing by enabling authorized users to determine whether access	medical information, contract-sensitive information, proprietary information, personally					
			authorizations assigned to the sharing partner match the access restrictions on the information for						
			[Assignment: organization-defined information sharing circumstances where user discretion is	compartments) based on some formal or administrative determination. Depending on the particular information-sharing circumstances, sharing partners may be defined at the					
			required]; and b. Employs [Assignment: organization-defined automated mechanisms or manual processes] to	particular information-sharing circumstances, sharing partners may be defined at the individual, group, or organizational level. Information may be defined by content, type,					
			assist users in making information sharing/collaboration decisions.	security category, or special access program/compartment.					
			and a second state of the						
AC-21 (1)	2	Access Control Information Sharing Automated	The information system enforces information-sharing decisions by authorized users based on						
'',1/		Decision Support	access authorizations of sharing partners and access restrictions on information to be shared.			1			
AC-21 (2)	2	Access Control Information Sharing Information	The information system implements information search and retrieval services that enforce						
		Search and Retrieval	[Assignment: organization-defined information sharing restrictions].						
AC-22	1	Access Control Publicly Accessible Content	The organization:	In accordance with federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations,	AC-3,AC-4,AT-2,AT-	P3	x >	х	
1			a. Designates individuals authorized to post information onto a publicly accessible information	standards, and/or guidance, the general public is not authorized access to nonpublic	3,AU-13	1			1
			system;	information (e.g., information protected under the Privacy Act and proprietary information).					
1			b. Trains authorized individuals to ensure that publicly accessible information does not contain	This control addresses information systems that are controlled by the organization and		1			1
			nonpublic information;	accessible to the general public, typically without identification or authentication. The					
1			c. Reviews the proposed content of information prior to posting onto the publicly accessible	posting of information on non-organization information systems is covered by organizationa		1			1
1			information system to ensure that nonpublic information is not included; and	policy.		1			1
1			d. Reviews the content on the publicly accessible information system for nonpublic information			1			
1			[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and removes such information, if discovered.			1			
1						1			
AC-23	1	Access Control Data Mining Protection	The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined data mining prevention and detection	Data storage objects include for example, databases, database records, and database fields		PO			
	•		techniques] for [Assignment: organization-defined data storage objects] to adequately detect and						
			protect against data mining.	of responses provided to database queries; (ii) limiting the number/frequency of database					
				queries to increase the work factor needed to determine the contents of such databases;					
				and (iii) notifying organizational personnel when atypical database queries or accesses					
				occur. This control focuses on the protection of organizational information from data mining					
				while such information resides in organizational data stores. In contrast, AU-13 focuses on					
				monitoring for organizational information that may have been mined or otherwise obtained					
				from data stores and is now available as open source information residing on external sites,					
				for example, through social networking or social media websites.					
							\vdash		
AC-24	1	Access Control Access Control Decisions	The organization establishes procedures to ensure [Assignment: organization-defined access	Access control decisions (also known as authorization decisions) occur when authorization		PO			
1			control decisions] are applied to each access request prior to access enforcement.	information is applied to specific accesses. In contrast, access enforcement occurs when		1			
1				information systems enforce access control decisions. While it is very common to have		1			1
1				access control decisions and access enforcement implemented by the same entity, it is not		1			1
1				required and it is not always an optimal implementation choice. For some architectures and distributed information systems, different entities may perform access control decisions and		1			
1				access enforcement.		1			
AC-24 (1)	2	Access Control Access Control Decisions	The information system transmits [Assignment: organization-defined access authorization	In distributed information systems, authorization processes and access control decisions					
(1)	_	Transmit Access Authorization Information	information] using [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to [Assignment:	may occur in separate parts of the systems. In such instances, authorization information is					
		,	organization-defined information systems] that enforce access control decisions.	transmitted securely so timely access control decisions can be enforced at the appropriate					
				locations. To support the access control decisions, it may be necessary to transmit as part					
				of the access authorization information, supporting security attributes. This is due to the					
				fact that in distributed information systems, there are various access control decisions that					
				need to be made and different entities (e.g., services) make these decisions in a serial					
				fashion, each requiring some security attributes to make the decisions. Protecting access					
				authorization information (i.e., access control decisions) ensures that such information					
				cannot be altered, spoofed, or otherwise compromised during transmission.					
AC-24 (2)	2	Access Control Access Control Decisions No	The information system enforces access control decisions based on [Assignment: organization-	In certain situations, it is important that access control decisions can be made without			\vdash		
AC-24 (2)		Access Control Access Control Decisions No User or Process Identity	Ine information system enforces access control decisions based on [Assignment: organization- defined security attributes] that do not include the identity of the user or process acting on behalf			1			
1		OSCI OI I TOCESS IDENTITY	of the user.	instances where preserving individual privacy is of paramount importance. In other		1			1
1			-,	situations, user identification information is simply not needed for access control decisions		1			1
1				and, especially in the case of distributed information systems, transmitting such		1			
1				information with the needed degree of assurance may be very expensive or difficult to		1			1
1				accomplish.		1			
		·		· ·	-				

Control ID	Level	Control Name With	rawn Control Text	Supplemental Cuidanea	Related Controls	Delocity Lou	Mod High	Notes
AC-25	1	Access Control Reference Monitor	The information system implements a reference monitor for [Assignment: organization-defines access control policies] that is tamperproof, always invoked, and small enough to be subject to analysis and testing, the completeness of which can be assured.		Ac-3,AC-16,5C-3,SC- 39	PO		
AP		Authority and Purpose Authority to Collect	The organization determines and documents the legal authority that permits the collection, us maintenance, and sharing of personally identifiable information (PII), either generally or in sup of a specific program or information system need.		AR-2, DM-1, TR-1, TR-2			[Privacy Controls]
AP-2	1	Authority and Purpose Purpose Specification	The organization describes the purpose(s) for which personally identifiable information (PII) is collected, used, maintained, and shared in its privacy notices.	Often, statutory language expressly authorizes specific collections and uses of PII. When statutory language is written broadly and thus subject to interpretation, organizations ensure, in consultation with the Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Cheff Privacy Official authorization and any specific collection of PII. Once the specific purposes have been identified, the purposes are clearly described in the related privacy compliance documentation, including but not limited to Privacy impact Assessments (PIAs). System of Records Notices (SORNs), and Privacy Act Statements provided at the time of collection (e.g., on forms organizations us to collect PII). Further, in order to avoid unauthorized collections or uses of PII, personnel who handle PII receive training on the organizational authorities for collecting PII, authorized uses of PII, and on the contents of the notice.	AR-2, AR-4, AR-5, DM-1, DM-2, TR-1, TR-2, UL-1, UL-2			[Privacy Controls]
AR	0	Accountability, Audit, and Risk Management						[Privacy Controls]
AR-1	1	Accountability, Audit, and Risk Management Governance and Privacy Program	to ensure compliance with all applicable laws and regulations regarding the collection, use, maintenance, sharing, and disposa of personally identifiable information (PII) by programs and information systems; b. Monitors federal privacy laws and policy for changes that affect the privacy program; c. Allocates [Assignment: organization-defined allocation of budget and staffing] sufficient resources to implement and operate the organization-wide privacy program; d. Develops a strategic organizational privacy plan for implementing applicable privacy control policies, and procedures; e. Develops, disseminates, and implements operational privacy policies and procedures that get the appropriate privacy and security controls for programs, information systems, or technologi involving PII; and f. Updates privacy plan, policies, and procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency, least biennially].	ram privacy. Accountability begins with the appointment of an SADP/CPO with the authority, mission, resources, and responsibility to develop and implement an utilifaceted privacy program. The SADP/CPO, in consultation with legal counsel, information security officials, and others as appropriate: (i) essures the development, implementation, and enforcement of privacy policies and procedures; (ii) efferies reside and responsibilities for protecting Pill; iii) effermines the level of information sensitivity with regard to Pill holdings; (iv) identifies the laws, regulations, and interna policies that apply to the Pill; (iv) monitors privacy best practices; and (iv) monitors/audits compliance with identified privacy controls. To further accountability, the SADP/CPO develops privacy plans to document the privacy requirements of organizations and the privacy and security controls in place or planned for meeting those requirements. The plan serves as evidence of organizational privacy operations and supports recourse requests by the SADP/CPO. A single plan or multiple plans may be necessary documentation, and controls already in place, such as Privacy Impart Assessments (PA) and System of Records Notices (SORN). A comprehensive plan may cover privacy policies, documentation, and controls already in place, such as Privacy Impart Assessments (PA) and System of Records Notices (SORN). A comprehensive plan may include a baseline of privacy controls selected from this appendix and include; (I) processes for conducting privacy rytaining and awareness requirements; (ii) etemplates and guidance for completing Pilka and SORNs; (iii) privacy training unnecessary Pil holdings; and (vi) a framework for measuring annual performance goals and objectives for implementing identified privacy controls.				[Privacy Controls]
AR-2	1	Accountability, Audit, and Risk Management Privacy Impact and Risk Assessment	The organization: a. Documents and implements a privacy risk management process that assesses privacy risk to individuals resulting from the collection, sharing, storing, transmitting, use, and disposal of personally identifiable information [PII]: and of personally identifiable information [PII]: and of the procedures provided information systems, programs, or other activities that pose a privacy risk in accordance with applicable law, OMB policy, or any existing organizational policies and procedures.	and processes for managing risk are specific to organizational missions and resources. They include, but are not limited to, the conduct of PIAs. The PIA is both a process and the document that is the outcome of that process. OMB Memorandum 03-22 provides guidance				[Privacy Controls]
AR-3	1	Accountability, Audit, and Risk Management Privacy Requirements for Contractors and Service Providers	The organization: a. Establishes privacy roles, responsibilities, and access requirements for contractors and servic providers; and b. Includes privacy requirements in contracts and other acquisition-related documents.	Contractors and service providers include, but are not limited to, information providers, information processors, and other organizations providing information system development information technology services, and other outsourced applications. Organizations consult with legal coursel, the Senior Agency Official for Privacy (ISAOP) (Fire (Prov), and contracting officers about applicable laws, directives, policies, or regulations that may impact implementation of this control.	AR-1, AR-5, SA-4			[Privacy Controls]

Control ID	Lovol	Control Name	Withdrawn	Control Toyt	Supplemental Guidance	Related Controls	Priority Lov	, Mod	High	Notes
AR-4	1	Control Name Accountability, Audit, and Risk Management Privacy Monitoring and Auditing	Withdrawn	Control Text The organization monitors and audits privacy controls and internal privacy policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to ensure effective implementation.	Supplication (quite into promotion) and address gaps in privacy compliance, management, operational, and technical controls by conducting regular assessments (e.g., internal risk assessments). These assessments can be self-assessments or third-party audits that result in reports on compilance gaps identified in programs, projects, and information systems. In addition to auditing for effective implementation of all privacy controls identified in this appendix, organizations assess whether they: (i) implement a process to	AR-6, AR-7, AU-1, AU- 2, AU-3, AU-6, AU-	Priority Lov	Mod	High	Notes [Privacy Controls]
					embed privacy considerations into the life cycle of personally identifiable information (PII), programs, information systems, mission/business processes, and technology; (ii) monitor for changes to applicable privacy laws, regulations, and policies; (iii) track programs, information systems, and applications that collect and maintain PII to ensure compliance; (iv) ensure that access to PII is only on a need-to-know basis; and (v) ensure that PII is being maintained and used only for the legally authorized purposes identified in the public notice(s).					
					Organizations also: (i) implement technology to audit for the security, appropriate use, and loss of PII; (ii) perform reviews to ensure physical security of documents containing PII; (iii) assess contractor compliance with privacy requirements; and (iv) ensure that corrective actions identified as part of the assessment process are tracked and monitored until audit findings are corrected. The organization Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Office; (PO) coordinates monitoring and auditing efforts with information security officials and ensures that the results are provided to senior managers and oversight officials.					
AR-5	1	Accountability, Audit, and Risk Management Privacy Awareness and Training		The organization: a. Develops, implements, and updates a comprehensive training and awareness strategy aimed at ensuring that personnel understand privacy responsibilities and procedures; b. Administers basic privacy training [Assignment: organization-defined frequency, at least annually] and targeted, role-based privacy training for personnel having responsibility for personally identifiable information (PII) of for activities that timovbe PII [Assignment: organization-defined frequency, at least annually] and c. Ensures that personnel certify (manually or electronically) acceptance of responsibilities for privacy requirements [Assignment: organization-defined frequency, at least annually].	Through implementation of a privacy training and awareness strategy, the organization promotes a culture of privacy. Privacy training and awareness programs typically focus on broad topics, such as responsibilities under the Privacy Act of 1974 and E-Government Act of 2002 and the consequences of failing to carry out those responsibilities, how to identify new privacy risks, now to mitigate privacy risks, and how and when to report privacy incidents. Privacy training may also target data collection and use requirements identified in public notices, such as Privacy Impact Assessments (PlAs) or System of Records Notices (SORNs) for a program or information system. Specific training methods may include: (i) mandatory annual privacy awareness training; (ii) targeted, role-based training; (iii) internal privacy program websites; (iv) manuals, guides, and handbooks; (v) slide presentations; (vi) events (e.g., privacy awareness week, privacy clean-up day); (vii) posters and brochures; and (viii) email messages to all employees and contractors. Organizations update training based on changing statutory, regulatory, mission, program, business process, and information system requirements, or on the results of compliance monitoring and auditing. Where appropriate, organizations may provide privacy training as part of existing information security training.	AR-3, AT-2, AT-3, TR-1				[Privacy Controls]
AR-6	1	Accountability, Audit, and Risk Management Privacy Reporting		The organization develops, disseminates, and updates reports to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Congress, and other oversight bodies, as appropriate, to demonstrate accountability with specific statutory and regulatory privacy program mandates, and to senior management and other personnel with responsibility for monitoring privacy program progress and compliance.	Through internal and external privacy reporting, organizations promote accountability and transparency in organizational privacy operations. Reporting also helps organizations to determine progress in meeting privacy compliance requirements and privacy controls, compare performance across the federal government, identify vulnerabilities and gaps in policy and implementation, and identify success models. Types of privacy reports include: (i) annual Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP) reports to OMB; (ii) reports to Congress required by the implementing Regulations of the 9/11 Commission Act; and (iii) other public reports required by the implementing Regulations of the 9/11 Commission Act; and (iii) other public reports required the privacy (SaOP) reports to OMB; (ii) reports to Congress or other public reports required by specific statutory mandates or internal policies of organizations. The organization Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chile Privacy (Officer (CPO) consults with legal counsel, where appropriate, to ensure that organizations meet all applicable privacy reporting requirements.					[Privacy Controls]
AR-7	1	Accountability, Audit, and Risk Management Privacy-Enhanced System Design and Development			To the extent feasible, when designing organizational information systems, organizations employ technologies and system capabilities that automate privacy controls on the collection, use, retention, and disclosure of personally identifiable information (PII). By building privacy controls into system design and development, organizations mitigate privacy risks to PII, thereby reducing the likelihood of information system breaches and other privacy-related incidents. Organizations also conduct periodic reviews of systems to determine the need for updates to maintain compliance with the Privacy Act and the organization's privacy policy. Regardless of whether automated privacy controls are employed, organizations regularly monitor information system use and sharing of PII to ensure that the use/sharing is consistent with the authorized purposes identified in the Privacy Act and/or in the public notice of organizations, or in a manner compatible with those purposes.	AC-6, AR-4, AR-5, DM 2, TR-1				[Privacy Controls]
AR-8		Accountability, Audit, and Risk Management Accounting of Disclosures		The organization: a. Keeps an accurate accounting of disclosures of information held in each system of records under its control, including: a.1. Date, nature, and purpose of each disclosure of a record; and a.2. Name and address of the person or agency to which the disclosure was made; b. Retains the accounting of disclosures for the life of the record or five years after the disclosure is made, whichever is longer; and c. Makes the accounting of disclosures available to the person named in the record upon request.	accountings of disclosures of records are being properly maintained and provided to persons named in those records consistent with the dictates of the Privacy Act. Organizations are not required to keep an accounting of disclosures when the disclosures are made to	IP-2				[Privacy Controls]
AT-1		Awareness and Training Security Awareness and Training Policy and Procedures		The organization: a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]: a.1. A security awareness and training policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and a.2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the security awareness and training policy and associated security awareness and training controls; and b. Reviews and updates the current: b.1. Security awareness and training policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and b.2. Security awareness and training procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the AT family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.	PM-9	P1 X	x	х	

Control ID	Level	Control Name	Vithdrawn	Control Text	Supplemental Cuidanea	Deleted Centrals	Priority	Low	Mad High	Notes
AT-2	1	Awareness and Training Security Awareness Training	vidiorawii	The organization provides basic security awareness training to information system users (including managers, senior executives, and contractors): a. As part of initial training for new users; b. When required by information system changes; and c. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] thereafter.	Organizations determine the appropriate content of security awareness training and security awareness techniques based on the specific organizational requirements and the information systems to which personnel have authorized access. The content includes a basic understanding of the need for information security and user actions to maintain security and to respond to suspected security indicates. The content also addresses awareness of the need for operations security. Security awareness techniques can include, for example, displaying posters, offering supplies inscribed with security reminders, generating email advisories/notices from senior organizational officials, displaying logon screen messages, and conducting information security awareness events.	AT-3,AT-4,PL-4	P1	x :	X X	notes
AT-2 (1)	2	Awareness and Training Security Awareness Training Practical Exercises		The organization includes practical exercises in security awareness training that simulate actual cyber attacks.	Practical exercises may include, for example, no-notice social engineering attempts to collect information, gain unauthorized access, or simulate the adverse impact of opening malicious email attachments or invoking, via spear phishing attacks, malicious web links.	CA-2,CA-7,CP-4,IR-3				
AT-2 (2)	2	Awareness and Training Security Awareness Training Insider Threat		The organization includes security awareness training on recognizing and reporting potential indicators of insider threat.	netential indicators and possible precursors of insider threat can include behaviors such as inordinate, long-term job dissatisfaction, attempts to gain access to information not required for job performance, unexplained access to financial resources, bullying or sexual harassment of fellow employees, workplace violence, and other serious violations of organizational policies, procedures, directives, rules, or practices. Security awareness training includes how to communicate employee and management concerns regarding potential indicators of insider threat through appropriate organizational channels in accordance with established organizational policies and procedures.	PL-4,PM-12,PS-3,PS-6		,	x x	
AT-3	1	Awareness and Training Role-Based Security Training		The organization provides role-based security training to personnel with assigned security roles and responsibilities: a. Before authorizing access to the information system or performing assigned duties; b. When required by information system changes; and c. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] thereafter.	Organizations determine the appropriate content of security training based on the assigned roles and responsibilities of individuals and the specific security requirements of organizations and the information systems to which personnel have authorized access. In addition, organizations provide enterprise architects, information system developers, software developers, acquisition/procurement officials, information system developers, system/network administrators, personnel conducting configuration management and auditing activities, personnel performing independent verification and validation activities, security control assessors, and other personnel having access to system-level software, adequate security-related technical training specifically tailored for their assigned duties. Comprehensive role-based training addresses management, operational, and technical aride and responsibilities covering physical, personnel, and technical safeguards and countermeasures. Such training can include for example, policies, procedures, tools, and arrifacts for the organizational security roles defined. Organizational sols provide the training necessary for individuals to carry out their responsibilities related to operations and supply chains security within the context of organizational information security programs. Role-based security training also applies to contractors providing services to federal agencies.	AT-2,AT-4,PL-4,PS- 7,SA-3,SA-12,SA-16	P1	x	x	
AT-3 (1)	2	Awareness and Training Role-Based Security Training Environmental Controls		The organization provides [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] with initial and [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] training in the employment and operation of environmental controls.	Environmental controls include, for example, fire suppression and detection devices/systems, sprinkler systems, handhed fire extinguishers, fixed fire hoses, smoke detectors, temperature/humidily, HVAC, and power within the facility. Organizations identify personnel with specific roles and responsibilities associated with environmental controls requiring specialized training.	PE-1,PE-13,PE-14,PE- 15				
AT-3 (2)	2	Awareness and Training Role-Based Security Training Physical Security Controls		The organization provides (Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles) with initial and (Assignment: organization-defined frequency) training in the employment and operation of physical security controls.	Physical security controls include, for example, physical access control devices, physical intrusion alarms, monitoring/surveillance equipment, and security guards (deployment and operating procedures). Organizations identify personnel with specific roles and responsibilities associated with physical security controls requiring specialized training.	PE-2,PE-3,PE-4,PE-5				
AT-3 (3)	2	Awareness and Training Role-Based Security Training Practical Exercises		The organization includes practical exercises in security training that reinforce training objectives.	Practical exercises may include, for example, security training for software developers that includes simulated cyber attacks exploiting common software vulnerabilities (e.g., buffer overflows), or spear/whole phishing attacks targeted at senior leaders/executives. These types of practical exercises help developers better understand the effects of such vulnerabilities and appreciate the need for security coding standards and processes.					
AT-3 (4)		Awareness and Training Role-Based Security Training Suspicious Communications and Anomalous System Behavior		The organization provides training to its personnel on [Assignment: organization-defined indicators of malicious code] to recognite suspicious communications and anomalous behavior in organizational information systems.	A well-trained workforce provides another organizational safeguard that can be employed as part of adefense-in-depth strategy to protect organizations against malicious code coming in to argunizations via email or the web applications. Personnel are trained to look for indications of potentially suspicious email or the, receiving an unexpected email, receiving an email containing strange or poor grammar, or receiving an email from an unfamiliar sender but who appears to be from a known sponsor or contractor). Personnel are elso trained on how to respond to such suspicious email or web communications (e.g., not opening attachments, not clicking on embedded web links, and checking the source of email addressels.) For this process to wark effectively, all arganizational personnel en hour to recognize anomalous behaviors in organizational information systems can potentially provide early warning for the presence of malicious code. Recapition of such anomalous behavior by organizational personnel can supplement automated malicious code detection and protection tools and systems employed by organizations.					
AT-4	1	Awareness and Training Security Training Records		The organization: a. Documents and monitors individual information system security training activities including basis security avareness training and specific information system security training; and b. Retains individual training records for [Assignment: organization-defined time period].	Documentation for specialized training may be maintained by individual supervisors at the option of the organization.	AT-2,AT-3,PM-14	P3	X :	x	
AT-5	1	Awareness and Training Contacts with Security Groups and Associations	Х							[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PM-15]
AU	0	Audit and Accountability								

Control ID	Level	Control Name	18/ish drouge	Control Tout	Supplemental Cuidence	Dolotod Controls	Deignitu	Leve	ded Hiel	Notes
AU-1	1	Audit and Accountability Audit and	withing	Control Text The organization:	This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective	PM-9	P1	x z	X X	notes-
		Accountability Policy and Procedures		a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or	implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the AU family.					
				roles]: a.1. An audit and accountability policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities,	Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at					
				management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and	the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures					
				a.2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the audit and accountability policy and associated audit and accountability controls: and	unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the					
				b. Reviews and updates the current:	complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security					
				b.1. Audit and accountability policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and	program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk					
				b.2. Audit and accountability procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.					
AU-2	1	Audit and Accountability Audit Events		The organization:	An event is any observable occurrence in an organizational information system.	AC-6,AC-17,AU-3,AU-	P1	Y ,	(X	
A .	-	Additional Accountability Addit Events		a. Determines that the information system is capable of auditing the following events:	Organizations identify audit events as those events which are significant and relevant to the			l` l	. [
				[Assignment: organization-defined auditable events]; b. Coordinates the security audit function with other organizational entities requiring audit-related		4,SI-4				
				information to enhance mutual support and to help guide the selection of auditable events;	password changes, failed logons, or failed accesses related to information systems,					
				c. Provides a rationale for why the auditable events are deemed to be adequate to support after-	administrative privilege usage, PIV credential usage, or third-party credential usage. In					
				the-fact investigations of security incidents; and d. Determines that the following events are to be audited within the information system:	determining the set of auditable events, organizations consider the auditing appropriate for each of the security controls to be implemented. To balance auditing requirements with					
				[Assignment: organization-defined audited events (the subset of the auditable events defined in AU	other information system needs, this control also requires identifying that subset of					
				2 a.) along with the frequency of (or situation requiring) auditing for each identified event].	auditable events that are audited at a given point in time. For example, organizations may					
					determine that information systems must have the capability to log every file access both successful and unsuccessful, but not activate that capability except for specific					
					circumstances due to the potential burden on system performance. Auditing requirements,					
					including the need for auditable events, may be referenced in other security controls and					
					control enhancements. Organizations also include auditable events that are required by applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards.					
					Audit records can be generated at various levels of abstraction, including at the packet level					
					as information traverses the network. Selecting the appropriate level of abstraction is a critical aspect of an audit capability and can facilitate the identification of root causes to					
					problems. Organizations consider in the definition of auditable events, the auditing					
					necessary to cover related events such as the steps in distributed, transaction-based processes (e.g., processes that are distributed across multiple organizations) and actions					
					that occur in service-oriented architectures.					
AU-2 (1)	2	Audit and Accountability Audit Events	Х							[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AU-12]
		Compilation of Audit Records from Multiple Sources								
AU-2 (2)	2	Audit and Accountability Audit Events Selection	Х							[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AU-12]
AU-2 (3)	2	of Audit Events by Component Audit and Accountability Audit Events Reviews		The organization reviews and updates the audited events [Assignment: organization-defined	Over time, the events that organizations believe should be audited may change. Reviewing				(X	
		and Updates		frequency].	and updating the set of audited events periodically is necessary to ensure that the current					
AU-2 (4)	2	Audit and Accountability Audit Events	X		set is still necessary and sufficient.					[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-6 (9)]
		Privileged Functions								
AU-3	1	Audit and Accountability Content of Audit Records		The information system generates audit records containing information that establishes what type of event occurred, when the event occurred, when the event occurred, when the event occurred.	Audit record content that may be necessary to satisfy the requirement of this control, includes, for example, time stamps, source and destination addresses, user/process	AU-2,AU-8,AU-12,SI-	P1	x	· x	
		needia		the outcome of the event, and the identity of any individuals or subjects associated with the event.						
					control or flow control rules invoked. Event outcomes can include indicators of event					
					success or failure and event-specific results (e.g., the security state of the information system after the event occurred).					
AU-3 (1)	2	Audit and Accountability Content of Audit		The information system generates audit records containing the following additional information:	Detailed information that organizations may consider in audit records includes, for example, full text recording of privileged commands or the individual identities of group				x x	
		Records Additional Audit Information		[Assignment: organization-defined additional, more detailed information].	account users. Organizations consider limiting the additional audit information to only that					
					information explicitly needed for specific audit requirements. This facilitates the use of					
					audit trails and audit logs by not including information that could potentially be misleading or could make it more difficult to locate information of interest.					
AU-3 (2)	2	Audit and Accountability Content of Audit		The information system provides centralized management and configuration of the content to be		AU-6,AU-7			Х	
		Records Centralized Management of Planned Audit Record Content		captured in audit records generated by [Assignment: organization-defined information system components].	configured from a central location (necessitating automation). Organizations coordinate the selection of required audit content to support the centralized management and					
					configuration capability provided by the information system.					
AU-4	1	Audit and Accountability Audit Storage Capacity		The organization allocates audit record storage capacity in accordance with [Assignment:	Organizations consider the types of auditing to be performed and the audit processing	AU-2,AU-5,AU-6,AU-	P1	x :	(x	
				organization-defined audit record storage requirements].	requirements when allocating audit storage capacity. Allocating sufficient audit storage	7,AU-11,SI-4				
					capacity reduces the likelihood of such capacity being exceeded and resulting in the potential loss or reduction of auditing capability.					
AU-4 (1)	2	Audit and Accountability Audit Storage Capacity		The information system off-loads audit records [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]	Off-loading is a process designed to preserve the confidentiality and integrity of audit					
		Transfer to Alternate Storage		onto a different system or media than the system being audited.	records by moving the records from the primary information system to a secondary or alternate system. It is a common process in information systems with limited audit storage					
					capacity; the audit storage is used only in a transitory fashion until the system can					
					communicate with the secondary or alternate system designated for storing the audit records, at which point the information is transferred.					
					records, at writen point the information is transferred.					
AU-5	1	Audit and Accountability Response to Audit		The information system:		AU-4,SI-12	P1	х :	x x	
		Processing Failures		a. Alerts [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] in the event of an audit processing failure; and	audit capturing mechanisms, and audit storage capacity being reached or exceeded. Organizations may choose to define additional actions for different audit processing failures					
				b. Takes the following additional actions: [Assignment: organization-defined actions to be taken	(e.g., by type, by location, by severity, or a combination of such factors). This control applies					
				(e.g., shut down information system, overwrite oldest audit records, stop generating audit records)].	to each audit data storage repository (i.e., distinct information system component where audit records are stored), the total audit storage capacity of organizations (i.e., all audit data					
					storage repositories combined), or both.					
AU-5 (1)	2	Audit and Accountability Response to Audit		The information system provides a warning to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel, roles,	Organizations may have multiple guidt data storage repositories distributed across				Y	
7.0-5 (1)	•	Processing Failures Audit Storage Capacity		and/or locations] within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] when allocated audit	multiple information system components, with each repository having different storage				î	
				record storage volume reaches [Assignment: organization-defined percentage] of repository	volume capacities.					
AU-5 (2)	2	Audit and Accountability Response to Audit		maximum audit record storage capacity. The information system provides an alert in [Assignment: organization-defined real-time period]	Alerts provide organizations with urgent messages. Real-time alerts provide these				х	
		Processing Failures Real-Time Alerts		to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel, roles, and/or locations] when the following audit	messages at information technology speed (i.e., the time from event detection to alert					
				failure events occur: [Assignment: organization-defined audit failure events requiring real-time alerts].	occurs in seconds or less).					
					1					

			Nithdrawn			Related Controls				
Control ID AU-5 (3)	Level 2	Control Name Audit and Accountability Response to Audit	withdrawn	Control Text The information system enforces configurable network communications traffic volume thresholds	Supplemental Guidance Organizations have the capability to reject or delay the processing of network	kelated Controls	Priority	Low Mo	u High	Notes
AU-5 (3)	2	Audit and Accountability Kesponse to Audit Processing Failures Configurable Traffic Volume Thresholds		The information system enforces conjigurable network communications traffic volume thresholds reflecting limits on auditing capacity and [Selection: rejects; delays] network traffic above those thresholds.	communications traffic if auditing such traffic is determined to exceed the storage capacity of the information system audit function. The rejection or delay response is triggered by the established organizational traffic volume thresholds which can be adjusted based on					
AU-5 (4)	2	Audit and Accountability Response to Audit Processing Failures Shutdown on Failure		The information system invokes a [Selection: full system shutdown; partial system shutdown; degraded operational mode with limited mission/business functionality available] in the event of [Assignment: organization-defined audit failures], unless an alternate audit capability exists.	changes to audit storage capacity. Organizations determine the types of audit failures that can trigger automatic information system shutdowns or degraded operations. Because of the importance of ensuring mission/business continuity, organizations may determine that the nature of the audit failure is not so severe that it warrants a complete shutdown of the information system supporting the core organizational missions/business operations. In those instances, partial information system shutdowns or operating in a degraded mode with reduced capability may be viable alternatives.	AU-15				
AU-6	1	Audit and Accountability Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting		The organization: a. Reviews and analyzes information system audit records [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] for indications of [Assignment: organization-defined inappropriate or unusual activity]; and b. Reports findings to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].	Audit review, analysis, and reporting covers information security-related auditing performed by organizations including, for example, auditing that results from monitoring of account usage, remote access, wireless connectivity, mobile device connection, configuration settings, system component inventory, use of maintenance tools and nonlocal maintenance physical access, temperature and humidity, equipment delivery and removal, communications at the information system boundaries, use of mobile code, and use of VoIP. Findings can be reported to organizational entitles that include, for example, incident response team, help desk, information security group/department. If organizations are prohibited from reviewing and narlying audit information or unable to conduct such activities (e.g., in certain national security applications or systems), the review/analysis may be carried out by other organizations granted such authority.	17,AT-3,AU-7,AU- 16,CA-7,CM-5,CM- 10,CM-11,IA-3,IA- 5,IR-5,IR-6,MA-4,MP-		x x	x	
AU-6 (1)	2	Audit and Accountability Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting Process Integration		The organization employs automated mechanisms to integrate audit review, analysis, and reporting processes to support organizational processes for investigation and response to suspicious activities.	Organizational processes benefiting from integrated audit review, analysis, and reporting include, for example, incident response, continuous monitoring, contingency planning, and Inspector General audits.	AU-12,PM-7		х	х	
AU-6 (2)	2	Audit and Accountability Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting Automated Security Alerts	Х							[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-4]
AU-6 (3)	2	Audit and Accountability Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting Correlate Audit Repositories		The organization analyzes and correlates audit records across different repositories to gain organization-wide situational awareness.	Organization-wide situational awareness includes awareness across all three tiers of risk management (i.e., organizational, mission/business process, and information system) and supports cross-organization awareness.	AU-12,IR-4		х	х	
AU-6 (4)	2	Audit and Accountability Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting Central Review and Analysis		The information system provides the capability to centrally review and analyze audit records from multiple components within the system.	Automated mechanisms for centralized reviews and analyses include, for example, Security Information Management products.	AU-2,AU-12				
AU-6 (5)	2	Audit and Accountability Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting Integration Scanning and Monitoring Capabilities		The organization integrates analysis of audit records with analysis of [Selection (one or more): vulnerability scanning information, performance data; information system monitoring information; [Assignment: organization-defined data/information collected from other sources]] to further enhance the ability to identify inappropriate or unusual activity.	his control enhancement does not require vulnerability scanning, the generation of performance dott, or information system monitoring, Rather, the enhancement requires that the analysis of information being otherwise produced in these areas is integrated with the analysis of audit information. Security Event and Information Management System tools can facilitate audit record agregation/consolidation from multiple information system components as well as audit record correlation and analysis. The use of isstandardized audit record are desired by organizations (with localized script adjustments, as necessary) provides more cost-effective approaches for analysing audit record information collected. The correlation of unit record information with vulnerability scanning information is important in determining the veracity of vulnerability scans and correlating attack detection events with scanning results. Correlation with performance duta can help uncover denial of service attacks or other attacks resulting in unauntroized use of resources. Correlation with system monitoring information can assist in uncovering attacks and in better relating audit information to operational situations.	AU-12,IR-4,RA-5			x	
AU-6 (6)	2	Audit and Accountability Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting Correlation with Physical Monitoring		The organization correlates information from audit records with information obtained from monitoring physical access to further enhance the ability to identify suspicious, inappropriate, unusual, or malevolent activity.	The correlation of physical audit information and audit logs from information systems may assist organizations in identifying examples of suspicious behavior or supporting evidence of such behavior. For example, the correlation of an individual's identity for logical access to certain information systems with the additional physical security information that the individual was octually present at the facility when the logical access occurred, may prove to be useful in investigations.				X	
AU-6 (7)	2	Audit and Accountability Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting Permitted Actions		The organization specifies the permitted actions for each [Selection (one or more): information system process; role; user] associated with the review, analysis, and reporting of audit information.	Organizations specify permitted actions for information system processes, roles, and/or users associated with the review, analysis, and reporting of audit records through account management techniques. Specifying permitted actions on audit information is a way to enforce the principle of least privilege. Permitted actions are enforced by the information system and include, for example, read, write, execute, append, and delete.					
AU-6 (8)	2	Audit and Accountability Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting Full Text Analysis of Privileged Commands		The organization performs a full text analysis of audited privileged commands in a physically distinct component or subsystem of the information system, or other information system that is dedicated to that analysis.	his control enhancement requires a distinct environment for the dedicated analysis of audit information related to privileged users without compromising such information of the information system where the users have elevated privileges including the capability to execute privileged commands. Full text analysis refers to analysis that considers the full text of privileged commands (i.e., commands and all parameters) as opposed to analysis that considers only the name of the command. Full text analysis includes, for example, the use of pattern matching and heuristics.	AU-3,AU-9,AU-11,AU- 12				
AU-6 (9)	2	Audit and Accountability Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting Correlation with Information from Nontechnical Sources		The organization correlates information from nontechnical sources with audit information to enhance organization-wide situational awareness.	Nontechnical sources include, for example, human resources records documenting organizational policy violations (e.g., sexual harassment incidents, improper use of organizational information assets). Such information can lead organizations to a more directed analytical effort to detect potential malicious insider activity. Due to the sensitive nature of the information avoidable from nontechnical sources, organizations limit access to such information to minimize the potential for the inadvertent release of privacy-related information to individuals that do not have a need to know. Thus, correlation of information from nontechnical sources with audit information generally occurs only when individuals are suspected of being involved in a security incident. Organizations obtain legal advice prior to initiating such actions.	AT-2				
AU-6 (10)	2	Audit and Accountability Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting Audit Level Adjustment		The organization adjusts the level of audit review, analysis, and reporting within the information system when there is a change in risk based on law enforcement information, intelligence linformation, or other credible sources of information.	The frequency, scope, and/or depth of the audit review, analysis, and reporting may be adjusted to meet organizational needs based on new information received.					

	_						_			
AU-7	1	Control Name Withdrawn Audit and Accountability Audit Reduction and Report Generation	Control Text The information system provides an audit reduction and report generation capability that: a. Supports on-demand audit review, analysis, and reporting requirements and after-the-fact investigations of security incidents; and b. Does not alter the original content or time ordering of audit records.	Supplemental Guidance Addit reduction is a process that manipulates collected audit information and organizes such information in a summary format that is more meaningful to analysts. Audit reduction and report generation capabilities do not always emanate from the same information system or from the same organizational entities conducting auditing activities. Audit reduction capability can include, for example, modern data mining techniques with advanced data filters to identify anomalous behavior in audit records. The report generation capability provided by the information system can generate ustomizable reports. Time ordering of	AU-6	Priority Lo	w Mo	od I	High X	Notes
				audit records can be a significant issue if the granularity of the timestamp in the record is insufficient.						
AU-7 (1)	2	Audit and Accountability Audit Reduction and Report Generation Automatic Processing	The information system provides the capability to process audit records for events of interest based on [Assignment: organization-defined audit fields within audit records].	Events of Interest can be identified by the content of specific audit record fields including, for example, identities of individuals, event types, event locations, event times, event dates, system resources involved, IP addresses involved, or information objects accessed. Organizations may define audit event criteria to any degree of granularity required, for example, locations selectable by general networking location (e.g., by network or subnetwork) or selectable by specific information system component.	AU-2,AU-12		X		x	
AU-7 (2)	2	Audit and Accountability Audit Reduction and Report Generation Automatic Sort and Search	The information system provides the capability to sort and search audit records for events of interest based on the content of [Assignment: organization-defined audit fields within audit records].	Sorting and searching of audit records may be based upon the contents of audit record fields, for example: (i) date/time of events; (ii) user identifiers; (iii) Internet Protocol (IP) addresses involved in the event; (iv) type of event; or (v) event success/failure.						
AU-8	1	Audit and Accountability Time Stamps	The information system: a. Uses internal system clocks to generate time stamps for audit records; and b. Records time stamps for audit records that can be mapped to Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) or Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) and meets [Assignment: organization-defined granularity of time measurement].	Time stamps generated by the information system include date and time. Time is commonly expressed in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), a modern continuation of Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), or local time with an offset from UTC. Granularity of time measurements refers to the degree of synchronization between information system clocks and reference clocks, for example, clocks synchronizating within hundreds of milliseconds or within tens of milliseconds. Organizations may define different time granularities for different system components. Time service can also be critical to other security capabilities such as access control and identification and authentication, depending on the nature of the mechanisms used to support those capabilities.		P1 X	x	3	х	
AU-8 (1)		Audit and Accountability Time Stomps Synchronization with Authoritative Time Source	The information system: (a) Compares the internal information system clocks [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] with [Assignment: organization-defined authoritative time source]: and (b) Synchronizes the internal system clocks to the authoritative time source when the time ofference is greater than [Assignment: organization-defined time period].	This control enhancement provides uniformity of time stamps for information systems with multiple system clocks and systems connected over a network.			х	j	х	
AU-8 (2)		Audit and Accountability Time Stamps Secondary Authoritative Time Source	The information system identifies a secondary authoritative time source that is located in a different geographic region than the primary authoritative time source.							
AU-9	1	Audit and Accountability Protection of Audit Information	The information system protects audit information and audit tools from unauthorized access, modification, and deletion.	Audit information includes all information (e.g., audit records, audit settings, and audit reports) needed to successfully audit information system activity. This control focuses on technical protection of audit information. Physical protection of audit information is addressed by media protection controls and physical and environmental protection controls.	AC-3,AC-6,MP-2,MP- 4,PE-2,PE-3,PE-6	P1 X	х	1	х	
AU-9 (1)	2	Audit and Accountability Protection of Audit Information Hardware Write-Once Media	The information system writes audit trails to hardware-enforced, write-once media.	This control enhancement applies to the initial generation of guidit trails (i.e., the collection of undit records that represents the undit information to be used for detection, analysis, and reporting purposes) and to the backup of those audit trails. The enhancement does not apply to the initial generation of audit records prior to being written to an audit trail. Writenone, read-many (WDRM) media includes, for example, Compact Disk-Recordable (ICD-R) and Digital Video Disk-Recordable (IOVD-R). In contrast, the use of switchable write-protection media such as on tage cartridges or Universal Serial Bus (USB) drives results in write-protected, but not write-once, media.						
AU-9 (2)	2	Audit and Accountability Protection of Audit Information Audit Backup on Separate Physical Systems / Components	The information system backs up audit records [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] onto a physically different system or system component than the system or component being audited.	being audited does not also result in a compromise of the audit records.	AU-4,AU-5,AU-11			į	х	
		Audit and Accountability Protection of Audit Information Cryptographic Protection	information and audit tools.	Cryptographic mechanisms used for protecting the integrity of audit information include, for example, signed hash functions using asymmetric cryptography enabling distribution of the public key to verify the hash information while maintaining the confidentiality of the secret key used to generate the hash.				į.	x	
AU-9 (4)	2	Audit and Accountability Protection of Audit Information Access by Subset of Privileged Users	The organization authorizes access to management of audit functionality to only [Assignment: organization-defined subset of privileged users].	Individuals with privileged access to an information system and who are also the subject of on audit by that system, may affect the reliability of audit information by inhibiting audit activities or modifying audit records. This control enhancement requires that privileged access be further defined between audit-related privileges and other privileges, thus limiting the users with audit-relead privileges.	AC-5			,	^	
AU-9 (5)	2	Audit and Accountability Protection of Audit Information Dual Authorization	The organization enforces dual authorization for [Selection (one or more): movement; deletion] of [Assignment: organization-defined audit information].		AC-3,MP-2					
AU-9 (6)		Audit and Accountability Protection of Audit Information Read Only Access	The organization authorizes read-only access to audit information to [Assignment: organization-defined subset of privileged users].	Restricting privileged user authorizations to read-only helps to limit the potential damage to organizations that could be initiated by such users (e.g., deleting audit records to cover up malicious activity).						
AU-10	1	Audit and Accountability Non-Repudiation	The information system protects against an individual (or process acting on behalf of an individual) falsely denying having performed [Assignment: organization-defined actions to be covered by non-repudiation].	Types of individual actions covered by non-repudiation include, for example, creating information, sending and receiving messages, approxing information (e.g., indicating concurrence or signing a contract). Non-repudiation protects individuals against later claims by: (i) authors of not having authored particular documents; (ii) senders of not having transmitted messages; (iii) receivers of not having exceeved messages; (iii) receivers of not having exceeved messages; or (iv) signatories of not having signed documents. Non-repudiation services can be used to determine if information originated from a particular individual, or if an individual took specific actions (e.g., sending an email, signing a contract, approving a procurement request) or received specific information. Organizations obtain non-repudiation services by employing various techniques or mechanisms (e.g., digital signatures, digital message receipts).	SC-12,SC-8,SC-13,SC- 16,SC-17,SC-23	P2		3	x	
AU-10 (1)	2	Audit and Accountability Non-Repudiation Association of Identities	The information system: (a) Binds the identity of the information producer with the information to [Assignment: organization-defined strength of binding]; and (b) Provides the means for authorized individuals to determine the identity of the producer of the information.	This control enhancement supports audit requirements that provide organizational personnel with the means to identify who produced specific information in the event of an information transfer. Organizations determine and approve the strength of the binding between the information producer and the information based on the security category of the information and relevant risk factors.	AC-4,AC-16					
AU-10 (2)	2	Audit and Accountability Non-Repudiation Validate Binding of Information Producer Identity	The information system: (a) Validates the binding of the information producer identity to the information at [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and (b) Performs [Assignment: organization-defined actions] in the event of a validation error.	This control enhancement prevents the modification of information between production and review. The volidation of bindings can be achieved, for example, by the use of cryptographic hecksums. Organizations determine if validations are in response to user requests or generated automatically.	AC-3,AC-4,AC-16					

Control ID	Lovel	Control Name W	drawn Control Text		Supplemental Guidance	Polated Controls	Priority I	ow Mor	d High	Notes
AU-10 (3)	2	Audit and Accountability Non-Repudiation		wer/releaser identity and credentials within the	Chain of custody is a process that tracks the movement of evidence through its collection,	AC-4,AC-16	· Honly	- WIO	- Ingil	1000
(-/		Chain of Custody	established chain of custody for all inform		safeguarding, and analysis life cycle by documenting each person who handled the evidence, the date and time it was collected or transferred, and the purpose for the transfer. If the reviewer is a human or if the review function is automated but separate from the release/transfer function, the information as sosciates the identity of the reviewer of the information in the released with the information label. In the case of human reviews, this control enhancement provides organizational officials the means to identify who reviewed and released the information. In the case of automated reviews, this control enhancement ensures that only approved review functions	, , ,				
					are employed.					
AU-10 (4)	2	Audit and Accountability Non-Repudiation Validate Binding of Information Reviewer Identity	release points prior to release/transfer be domains]; and	ion reviewer identity to the information at the transfer or tetween [Assignment: organization-defined security defined actions] in the event of a validation error.	This control enhancement prevents the modification of information between review and transfer/release. The wildation of bindings can be achieved, for example, by the use of cryptographic checksums. Organizations determine validations are in response to user requests or generated automatically.	AC-4,AC-16				
AU-10 (5)	2	Audit and Accountability Non-Repudiation	X							[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-7]
AU-11	1	Digital Signatures Audit and Accountability Audit Record	The organization retains audit records for	r [Assignment: organization-defined time period consistent	Organizations retain audit records until it is determined that they are no longer needed for	AU-4,AU-5,AU-9,MP-	P3)	x x	х	
		Retention	incidents and to meet regulatory and org	support for after-the-fact investigations of security sanizational information retention requirements.	administrative, legal, audit, or other operational purposes. This includes, for example, retention and availability of audit records relative to Preedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, subpoenas, and law enforcement actions. Organizations develop standard categories of audit records relative to such types of actions and standard response processes for each type of action. The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) General Records Schedules provide federal policy on record retention.	6				
AU-11 (1)	2	Audit and Accountability Audit Record Retention Long-Term Retrieval Capability	The organization employs [Assignment: c audit records generated by the informati		Measures employed by organizations to help facilitate the retrieval of audit records include, for example, converting records to newer formats, retaining equipment copable of reading the records, and retaining necessary documentation to help organizational personnel understand how to interpret the records.					
AU-12	1	Audit and Accountability Audit Generation	[Assignment: organization-defined inform b. Allows [Assignment: organization-defir are to be audited by specific components	ned personnel or roles] to select which auditable events	Audit records can be generated from many different information system components. The list of audited events is the set of events for which audits are to be generated. These events are typically a subset of all events for which the information system is capable of generating audit records.		P1)	x	x	
AU-12 (1)	2	Audit and Accountability Audit Generation System-Wide / Time-Correlated Audit Trail	information system components] into a s	ecords from [Assignment: organization-defined system-wide (logical or physical) audit trail that is time- ization-defined level of tolerance for the relationship ds in the audit trail].	Audit trails are time-correlated if the time stamps in the individual audit records can be reliably related to the time stamps in other audit records to achieve a time ordering of the records within organizational tolerances.	AU-8,AU-12			х	
AU-12 (2)	2	Audit and Accountability Audit Generation Standardized Formats	The information system produces a syste records in a standardized format.	m-wide (logical or physical) audit trail composed of audit	Audit information that is normalized to common standards promotes interoperability and exchange of such information between dissimilar devices and information systems. This facilitates production of event information that can be more readily analyzed and correlated. Standard formats for audit records include, for example, system log records and audit records compliant with Common Event Expressions (CEE). If logging mechanisms within information systems do not conform to standardized formacs, systems may convert individual audit records into standardized formats when compiling system-wide audit trails.					
AU-12 (3)	2	Audit and Accountability Audit Generation Changes by Authorized Individuals	or roles] to change the auditing to be per	rformed on [Assignment: organization-defined on [Assignment: organization-defined selectable event	This control enhancement enables organizations to extend or limit auditing as necessary to meet organizational requirements. Auditing that is limited to conserve information system resources may be extended to address certain threat situations. In addition, auditing may be limited to a specific set of events to facilitate audit reduction, analysis, and reporting. Organizations can establish time thresholds in which audit actions are changed, for example, near real-time, within minutes, or within hours.	AU-7			x	
AU-13	1	Audit and Accountability Monitoring for Information Disclosure		tion-defined frequency] for evidence of unauthorized	Open source information includes, for example, social networking sites.	PE-3,SC-7	PO			
AU-13 (1)	2	Audit and Accountability Monitoring for Information Disclosure Use of Automated Tools		echanisms to determine if organizational information has	Automated mechanisms can include, for example, automated scripts to monitor new posts on selected websites, and commercial services providing notifications and alerts to					
AU-13 (2)	2	Audit and Accountability Monitoring for	The organization reviews the open course	e information sites being monitored [Assignment:	organizations.					
15 (2)		Information Disclosure Review of Monitored	organization-defined frequency].	,						
AU-14	1	Audit and Accountability Session Audit	The information system provides the cap capture/record or view/hear.	ability for authorized users to select a user session to		AC-3,AU-4,AU-5,AU- 9,AU-11	P0			
AU-14 (1)	2	Audit and Accountability Session Audit System	The information system initiates session	audits at system start-up.						
AU-14 (2)	2	Start-Up Audit and Accountability Session Audit Continue (Record and Lea Content)		pability for authorized users to capture/record and log						
AU-14 (3)	2	Capture/Record and Log Content Audit and Accountability Session Audit Remote		pability for authorized users to remotely view/hear all						
AU-15	1	Viewing / Listening Audit and Accountability Alternate Audit	content related to an established user se. The organization provides an alternate au		Since an alternate audit capability may be a short-term protection employed until the failure	AU-5	PO			
		Capability	capability that provides [Assignment: org	ganization-defined alternate audit functionality].	in the primary auditing capability is corrected, organizations may determine that the alternate audit capability need only provide a subset of the primary audit functionality that is impacted by the failure.					
AU-16		Audit and Accountability Cross-Organizational Auditing	[Assignment: organization-defined audit information is transmitted across organized across		When organizations use information systems and/or services of external organizations, the auditing capability necessitates a coordinated approach across organizations. For example, maintaining the identity of individuals that requested particular services across organizational boundaries may often be very difficult, and doing so may prove to have significant performance ramifications. Therefore, it is often the case that cross-organizational auditing (e.g., the type of auditing capability provided by service-oriented architectures) simply captures the identity of individuals issuing request at the initial information system, and subsequent systems record that the requests emanated from authorized individuals.	AU-6	PO			
AU-16 (1)	2	Audit and Accountability Cross-Organizational Auditing Identity Preservation	The organization requires that the identition audit trails.	ty of individuals be preserved in cross-organizational	This control enhancement applies when there is a need to be able to trace actions that are performed across organizational boundaries to a specific individual.					

AU-16 (2)	2	Audit and Accountability Cross-Organizational Auditing Sharing of Audit Information	Control Text The organization provides cross-organizational audit information to [Assignment: organization-defined organizations] based on [Assignment: organization-defined cross-organizational sharing ogreements].	Supplemental Grifeince Because of the distributed nature of the audit information, cross-organization sharing of audit information may be essential for effective analysis of the auditing being performed. For example, the audit records of one organization may not provide sufficient information to determine the appropriate or inappropriate us of organizational information resources by individuals in other organizations, in some instances, only the home organizations of individuals have the appropriate knowledge to make such determinations, thus requiring the sharing of audit information among organizations.	Related Controls	Priority	Low N	Mod Hig	n Notes
CA-1		Security Assessment and Authorization Security Assessment and Authorization Security Assessment and Foundation Security Assessment and Authorization Policy and Procedures	The organization: a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]: a.1. A security assessment and authorization policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and a.2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the security assessment and authorization policy and associated security assessment and authorization controls; and b. Reviews and updates the current: b.1. Security assessment and authorization policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and b.2. Security assessment and authorization procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the CA family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.	PM-9	P1	x x	x	
CA-2	1	Security Assessment and Authorization Security Assessments	The organization: a. Develops a security assessment plan that describes the scope of the assessment including: a. 1. Security controls and control enhancements under assessment; a. 2. Assessment procedures to be used to determine security control effectiveness; and a. 3. Assessment procedures to be used to determine security control effectiveness; and a. 3. Assessment be security controls in the information system and its environment of operation [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to determine the extent to which the controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect meeting established security requirements; c. Produces a security assessment report that documents the results of the assessment; and d. Provides the results of the security control assessment to [Assignment: organization-defined individuals or roles].		CA-5,CA-6,CA-7,PM- 9,RA-5,SA-11,SA- 12,SI-4	P2	x x	x	
CA-2 (1)	2	Security Assessment and Authorization Security Assessments Independent Assessors	The organization employs assessors or assessment teams with [Assignment: organization-definitevel of independence] to conduct security control assessments.	independent assessors or assessment teams are individuals or groups who conduct importial assessments of organizational information systems. Impartially implies that assessors are free from any perceived a rocular collistics of interest with regard to the development, operation, or management of the arganizational information systems under assessment or to the determination of security control effectiveness. To achieve impartiality, assessors should not: (i) croate a mutual or conflicting interest with the organizations where the assessments are being conducted; (ii) assess their own work, (iii) act as management or employees of the organizations they are serving; or (iv) place themselves in positions of advoccoy for the organizations organizations their services. Independent assessments can be obtained from elements within organizations can be contracted to public or private sector entities outside of graphizations. Authorizing difficials determine the required level of independence based on the security actepories of information systems and/or the ultimater ists to organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals. Authorizing difficials based determine if the level of assessment services have sufficient tassurance that the results are sound and can be used to make credible, risk-based decisions. This includes determining whether contracted security assessment services have sufficient independence, for example, when organizations from own the information systems are small or organization structures require that assessments or conducted by individuals that are in the developmental, operational, or management chain of system owners, independence in assessment processes can be achieved by examing that assessment results are carefully reviewed and analyzed by independent teams of experts to volidate the completeness, accuracy, integrity, and eliability of the results. Organizations recognize that assessments performed for purposes other than dinterst support to unturbration deci			x	x	
CA-2 (2)	2	Security Assessment and Authorization Security Assessments Specialized Assessments	The organization includes as part of security control assessments, [Assignment: organization-defined frequency], [Selection: announced; unannounced], [Selection (one or more) in depth monitoring: walnershilty scanning, malicious user testing, insider threat assessment; performance/load testing; [Assignment: organization-defined other forms of security assessment]].	Organizations can employ information system monitoring, insider threat assessments, malicious user testing, and other forms of testing (e.g., verification and validation) to improve readiness by exercising organizational composities and indicating current performance levels as a means of focusing actions to improve security. Organizations conduct assessment activities in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards. Authorizing afficials approve the assessment methods in coordination with the organizational risk executive function. Organizations can incorporate vulnerabilities uncovered during assessments into vulnerability remediation processes.	PE-3,SI-2			x	

Control ID	Level	Control Name	Withdrawn	Control Text	Supplemental Guidance	Related Controls	Priority	Low	Mod Hi	igh	Notes
CA-2 (3)	2	Security Assessment and Authorization Security		The organization accepts the results of an assessment of [Assignment: organization-defined	Organizations may often rely on assessments of specific information systems by other						
		Assessments External Organizations		information system] performed by [Assignment: organization-defined external organization] when							
				the assessment meets [Assignment: organization-defined requirements].	assessment evidence) can significantly decrease the time and resources required for						
					organizational assessments by limiting the amount of independent assessment activities						
					that organizations need to perform. The factors that organizations may consider in determining whether to accept assessment results from external organizations can vary.						
					Determinations for accepting assessment results can be based on, for example, past						
					assessment experiences one organization has had with another organization, the reputation that organizations have with regard to assessments, the level of detail of						
					supporting assessment documentation provided, or mandates imposed upon organizations						
					by federal legislation, policies, or directives.						
					by Jederal legislation, policies, or directives.						
CA-3	1	Security Assessment and Authorization System		The organization:	This control applies to dedicated connections between information systems (i.e., system	AC-3,AC-4,AC-20,AU-	P1	x :	x x		
		Interconnections		a. Authorizes connections from the information system to other information systems through the	interconnections) and does not apply to transitory, user-controlled connections such as	2,AU-12,AU-16,CA-					
				use of Interconnection Security Agreements;	email and website browsing. Organizations carefully consider the risks that may be	7,IA-3,SA-9,SC-7,SI-4					
				b. Documents, for each interconnection, the interface characteristics, security requirements, and	introduced when information systems are connected to other systems with different	, ,,, ,,,					
				the nature of the information communicated; and	security requirements and security controls, both within organizations and external to						
				c. Reviews and updates Interconnection Security Agreements [Assignment: organization-defined	organizations. Authorizing officials determine the risk associated with information system						
				frequency].	connections and the appropriate controls employed. If interconnecting systems have the						
					same authorizing official, organizations do not need to develop Interconnection Security						
					Agreements. Instead, organizations can describe the interface characteristics between those						
					interconnecting systems in their respective security plans. If interconnecting systems have						
					different authorizing officials within the same organization, organizations can either develop						
					Interconnection Security Agreements or describe the interface characteristics between		1				
					systems in the security plans for the respective systems. Organizations may also incorporate						
					Interconnection Security Agreement information into formal contracts, especially for						
					interconnections established between federal agencies and nonfederal (i.e., private sector)						
					organizations. Risk considerations also include information systems sharing the same						
					networks. For certain technologies (e.g., space, unmanned aerial vehicles, and medical						
					devices), there may be specialized connections in place during preoperational testing. Such						
					connections may require Interconnection Security Agreements and be subject to additional						
					security controls.						
CA-3 (1)	2	Security Assessment and Authorization System		The organization prohibits the direct connection of an [Assignment: organization-defined	Organizations typically do not have control over external networks (e.g., the Internet).						
		Interconnections Unclassified National Security		unclassified, national security system] to an external network without the use of [Assignment:	Approved boundary protection devices (e.g., routers, firewalls) mediate communications						
		System Connections		organization-defined boundary protection device].	(i.e., information flows) between unclassified national security systems and external						
					networks. This control enhancement is required for organizations processing, storing, or						
					transmitting Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI).						
CA-3 (2)	2	Security Assessment and Authorization System		The organization prohibits the direct connection of a classified, national security system to an	Organizations typically do not have control over external networks (e.g., the Internet).						
		Interconnections Classified National Security		external network without the use of [Assignment: organization-defined boundary protection	Approved boundary protection devices (e.g., routers, firewalls) mediate communications						
		System Connections		device].	(i.e., information flows) between classified national security systems and external						
					networks. In addition, approved boundary protection devices (typically managed						
					interface/cross-domain systems) provide information flow enforcement from information						
					systems to external networks.			\vdash	_	\rightarrow	
CA-3 (3)	2	Security Assessment and Authorization System		The organization prohibits the direct connection of an [Assignment: organization-defined	Organizations typically do not have control over external networks (e.g., the Internet).						
		Interconnections Unclassified Non-National		unclassified, non-national security system] to an external network without the use of [Assignment;							
		Security System Connections		organization-defined boundary protection device].	(i.e., information flows) between unclassified non-national security systems and external						
					networks. This control enhancement is required for organizations processing, storing, or						
					transmitting Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI).						
CA-3 (4)	2	Security Assessment and Authorization System		The organization prohibits the direct connection of an [Assignment: organization-defined	A nublic naturary is any naturary accessible to the accessed public including for				-		
CA-3 (4)	2				A public network is any network accessible to the general public including, for example, the Internet and organizational extranets with public access.						
		Interconnections Connections to Public Networks		information system] to a public network.	internet una organizational extranets with public access.						
CA-3 (5)	2	Security Assessment and Authorization System		The organization employs [Selection: allow-all, deny-by-exception; deny-all, permit-by-exception]	Organizations can constrain information system connectivity to external domains (a.e.	CM-7		<u> </u>	y .		
CA-3 (5)	2					CW-/		ľ	` '		
		Interconnections Restrictions on External System Connections		policy for allowing [Assignment: organization-defined information systems] to connect to external	websites) by employing one of two policies with regard to such connectivity: (i) allow-all, deny by exception, also known as blacklisting (the weaker of the two policies); or (ii) deny-						
		Connections		information systems.	all, allow by exception, also known as blacklisting (the weaker of the two policies); or (ii) deny- all, allow by exception, also known as whitelisting (the stronger of the two policies). For						
					either policy, organizations determine what exceptions, if any, are acceptable.						
					ettner poncy, organizations determine what exceptions, if any, are acceptable.						
CA-4	1	Security Assessment and Authorization Security	X						_		[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CA-2]
1	1	Certification	-				1				
CA-5	1	Security Assessment and Authorization Plan of		The organization:	Plans of action and milestones are key documents in security authorization packages and	CA-2,CA-7,CM-4,PM-	P3	x :	x x		
	_	Action and Milestones		a. Develops a plan of action and milestones for the information system to document the	are subject to federal reporting requirements established by OMB.	4			l'		
				organization's planned remedial actions to correct weaknesses or deficiencies noted during the							
				assessment of the security controls and to reduce or eliminate known vulnerabilities in the system;							
				and							
				b. Updates existing plan of action and milestones [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]							
				based on the findings from security controls assessments, security impact analyses, and continuous							
				monitoring activities.							
CA-5 (1)	2	Security Assessment and Authorization Plan of		The organization employs automated mechanisms to help ensure that the plan of action and							
3.5(1)	_	Action and Milestones Automation Support for		milestones for the information system is accurate, up to date, and readily available.							
		Accuracy / Currency		,							
		, ,		1	1			-		_	

Control ID	Lovel	Control Name Withdrawn	Control Text	Supplemental Guidance	Palated Controls	Priority	Low	Mod	High	Notes
CA-6	1	Security Assessment and Authorization Security	The organization:	Security authorizations are official management decisions, conveyed through authorization	CA-2,CA-7,PM-9,PM-		X	х	X	
	-	Authorization	Assigns a senior-level executive or manager as the authorizing official for the information	decision documents, by senior organizational officials or executives (i.e., authorizing	10					
			system;	officials) to authorize operation of information systems and to explicitly accept the risk to						
			b. Ensures that the authorizing official authorizes the information system for processing before commencing operations; and	organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation based on the implementation of agreed-upon security controls. Authorizing officials provide						
			c. Updates the security authorization [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	budgetary oversight for organizational information systems or assume responsibility for the						
				mission/business operations supported by those systems. The security authorization process						
				is an inherently federal responsibility and therefore, authorizing officials must be federal						
				employees. Through the security authorization process, authorizing officials assume						
				responsibility and are accountable for security risks associated with the operation and use of organizational information systems. Accordingly, authorizing officials are in positions with						
				levels of authority commensurate with understanding and accepting such information						
				security-related risks. OMB policy requires that organizations conduct ongoing						
				authorizations of information systems by implementing continuous monitoring programs.						
				Continuous monitoring programs can satisfy three-year reauthorization requirements, so						
				separate reauthorization processes are not necessary. Through the employment of comprehensive continuous monitoring processes, critical information contained in						
				authorization packages (i.e., security plans, security assessment reports, and plans of action						
				and milestones) is updated on an ongoing basis, providing authorizing officials and						
				information system owners with an up-to-date status of the security state of organizational						
				information systems and environments of operation. To reduce the administrative cost of security reauthorization, authorizing officials use the results of continuous monitoring						
				processes to the maximum extent possible as the basis for rendering reauthorization						
				decisions.						
CA-7	1	Security Assessment and Authorization	The organization develops a continuous monitoring strategy and implements a continuous	Continuous monitoring programs facilitate ongoing awareness of threats, vulnerabilities,	CA-2,CA-5,CA-6,CM-	P2	x	x	x	
J	*	Continuous Monitoring	monitoring program that includes:	and information security to support organizational risk management decisions. The terms	3,CM-4,PM-6,PM-	1		i.,		
			a. Establishment of [Assignment: organization-defined metrics] to be monitored;	continuous and ongoing imply that organizations assess/analyze security controls and	9,RA-5,SA-11,SA-					
			b. Establishment of [Assignment: organization-defined frequencies] for monitoring and		12,SI-2,SI-4					
			[Assignment: organization-defined frequencies] for assessments supporting such monitoring; c. Ongoing security control assessments in accordance with the organizational continuous	based decisions. The results of continuous monitoring programs generate appropriate risk response actions by organizations. Continuous monitoring programs also allow organizations						
			c. Ongoing security control assessments in accordance with the organizational continuous monitoring strategy;	response actions by organizations. Continuous monitoring programs also allow organizations to maintain the security authorizations of information systems and common controls over	1					
			d. Ongoing security status monitoring of organization-defined metrics in accordance with the	time in highly dynamic environments of operation with changing mission/business needs,						
			organizational continuous monitoring strategy;	threats, vulnerabilities, and technologies. Having access to security-related information on a						
			e. Correlation and analysis of security-related information generated by assessments and	continuing basis through reports/dashboards gives organizational officials the capability to						
			monitoring; f. Response actions to address results of the analysis of security-related information; and	make more effective and timely risk management decisions, including ongoing security authorization decisions. Automation supports more frequent updates to security						
			g. Reporting the security status of organization and the information system to [Assignment:	authorization accisions. Automation supports more riequent appares to security authorization packages, hardware/software/firmware inventories, and other system						
			organization-defined personnel or roles] [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	information. Effectiveness is further enhanced when continuous monitoring outputs are						
				formatted to provide information that is specific, measurable, actionable, relevant, and						
				timely. Continuous monitoring activities are scaled in accordance with the security categories of information systems.						
				Lategories of information systems.						
CA-7 (1)	2	Security Assessment and Authorization Continuous Monitoring Independent Assessment	The organization employs assessors or assessment teams with [Assignment: organization-defined level of independence] to monitor the security controls in the information system on an ongoing	Organizations can maximize the value of assessments of security controls during the continuous monitoring process by requiring that such assessments be conducted by				X	Х	
		Continuous Womtoring independent Assessment	basis.	assessors or assessment teams with appropriate levels of independence based on						
				continuous monitoring strategies. Assessor independence provides a degree of impartiality						
				to the monitoring process. To achieve such impartiality, assessors should not: (i) create a						
				mutual or conflicting interest with the organizations where the assessments are being						
				conducted; (ii) assess their own work; (iii) act as management or employees of the organizations they are serving; or (iv) place themselves in advocacy positions for the						
				organizations acquiring their services.						
CA-7 (2)	2	Security Assessment and Authorization X								[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CA-2]
CA-7 (2)		Continuous Monitoring Types of Assessments								[withdrawn: mediporated into CA-2]
C4 7 (2)		Country Assessment and Authorization I	The second secon	Total and the second se						
CA-7 (3)	2	Security Assessment and Authorization Continuous Monitoring Trend Analyses	The organization employs trend analyses to determine if security control implementations, the frequency of continuous monitoring activities, and/or the types of activities used in the continuous	Trend analyses can include, for example, examining recent threat information regarding the types of threat events that have occurred within the organization or across the federal						
		3, ,	monitoring process need to be modified based on empirical data.	government, success rates of certain types of cyber attacks, emerging vulnerabilities in						
				information technologies, evolving social engineering techniques, results from multiple						
				security control assessments, the effectiveness of configuration settings, and findings from Inspectors General or auditors.						
CA-8	1	Security Assessment and Authorization	The organization conducts penetration testing [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] on	Penetration testing is a specialized type of assessment conducted on information systems or	SA-12	P2			х	
		Penetration Testing	[Assignment: organization-defined information systems or system components].	individual system components to identify vulnerabilities that could be exploited by						
				adversaries. Such testing can be used to either validate vulnerabilities or determine the						
				degree of resistance organizational information systems have to adversaries within a set of specified constraints (e.g., time, resources, and/or skills). Penetration testing attempts to						
				duplicate the actions of adversaries in carrying out hostile cyber attacks against						
				organizations and provides a more in-depth analysis of security-related						
				weaknesses/deficiencies. Organizations can also use the results of vulnerability analyses to						
				support penetration testing activities. Penetration testing can be conducted on the hardware, software, or firmware components of an information system and can exercise						
				both physical and technical security controls. A standard method for penetration testing						
				includes, for example: (i) pretest analysis based on full knowledge of the target system; (ii)						
				pretest identification of potential vulnerabilities based on pretest analysis; and (iii) testing						
				designed to determine exploitability of identified vulnerabilities. All parties agree to the rules of engagement before the commencement of penetration testing scenarios.						
				Organizations correlate the penetration testing rules of engagement with the tools,						
				techniques, and procedures that are anticipated to be employed by adversaries carrying out						
				attacks. Organizational risk assessments guide decisions on the level of independence required for personnel conducting penetration testing.						
				required for personner conducting penetration testing.						
CA-8 (1)	2	Security Assessment and Authorization	The organization employs an independent penetration agent or penetration team to perform	Independent penetration agents or teams are individuals or groups who conduct impartial	CA-2					
3.0(2)	_	Penetration Testing Independent Penetration	penetration testing on the information system or system components.	penetration testing of organizational information systems. Impartiality implies that						
		Agent or Team		penetration agents or teams are free from any perceived or actual conflicts of interest with						
				regard to the development, operation, or management of the information systems that are the targets of the penetration testing. Supplemental guidance for CA-2 (1) provides						
				additional information regarding independent assessments that can be applied to						
				penetration testing.						

				Control Text		Related Controls	Priority	Low			
CA-8 (2)	2	Control Name: Security Assessment and Authorization Penetration Testing Red Team Exercises	Withdrawn	Control Text The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined red team exercises] to simulate attempts by adversaries to compromise organizational information systems in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined rules of engagement].	Supplication telepiace and the objectives of penetration testing by examining the security posture of organizations and their obility to implement effective cyber defenses. As such a feed team exercises reflect simulated adversarial attempts to compromise arganizational mission/business functions and provide a comprehensive assessment of the security state of information systems and organizations. Simulated adversarial attempts to compromise organizational missions/business functions and the information systems that support those missions/functions may include technology-focused attacks (e.g., interactions with hordware, software, or firmware components and/or mission/business processes) and social engineering-based attacks (e.g., interactions via email, telephone, shoulder surfing, or personal conversations). While penetration testing may be largely laboratory-based testing, organizations use red team exercises to provide more comprehensive assessments that reflect real-world conditions. Red team exercises can be used to improve security owareness and training and to assess levels of security control effectiveness.	Related Controls	Priority	Low	wod	Higo	Notes
CA-9	1	Security Assessment and Authorization Internal System Connections		The organization: a. Authorizes internal connections of [Assignment: organization-defined information system components or classes of components] to the information system; and b. Documents, for each internal connection, the interface characteristics, security requirements, and the nature of the information communicated.	This control applies to connections between organizational information systems and (separate) constituent system components (i.e., intra-system connections) including, for example, system connections with mobile devices, notebook/desktop computers, printers, copiers, facsimile machines, scanners, sensors, and servers. instead of authorizing each individual internal connection, organizations can authorize internal connections for a class of components with common characteristics and/or configurations, for example, all digital printers, scanners, and copiers with a specific processing, storage, and transmission capability or all smart phones with a specific baseline configuration.	AC-3,AC-4,AC-18,AC- 19,AU-2,AU-12,CA- 7,CM-2,IA-3,SC-7,SI-4	P2	х	(x	
CA-9 (1)	2	Security Assessment and Authorization Internal System Connections Security Compliance Checks		The information system performs security compliance checks on constituent system components prior to the establishment of the internal connection.	Security compliance checks may include, for example, verification of the relevant baseline configuration.	CM-6					
СМ		Configuration Management									
CM-1	1	Configuration Management Configuration Management Policy and Procedures		The organization: a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]: a. 1. A configuration management policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and a.2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the configuration management policy and associated configuration management controls; and b. Reviews and updates the current: b. L. Configuration management policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]: and b.2. Configuration management procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the CM family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security policy program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.		P1	x	3	x	
CM-2	1	Configuration Management Baseline Configuration		The organization develops, documents, and maintains under configuration control, a current baseline configuration of the information system.	This control establishes baseline configurations for information systems and system components including communications and connectivity-related aspects of systems. Baseline configurations are documented, formally reviewed and agreed-upon sets of specifications for information systems or configuration items within those systems. Baseline configurations server as a basis for future builds, releases, and/or changes to information systems. Baseline configurations include information about information system components systems. Baseline configurations include information about information of systems of software packages installed on workstations, notebook computers, servers, network components, or mobile devices; current version numbers and patch information operating systems and applications; and configuration settings/parameters), network topology, and the logical placement of those components within the system architecture within the system architecture information systems change over time. Baseline configurations of information systems reflect the current enterprise architecture.	CM-3,CM-6,CM- 8,CM-9,SA-10,PM- 5,PM-7	P1	x		x	
CM-2 (1)	2	Configuration Management Baseline Configuration Reviews and Updates		The organization reviews and updates the baseline configuration of the information system: (a) [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; (b) When required due to [Assignment organization-defined circumstances]; and (c) As an integral part of information system component installations and upgrades.		CM-5		,	()	x	
CM-2 (2)	2	Configuration Management Baseline Configuration Automation Support for Accuracy / Currency		The organization employs automated mechanisms to maintain an up-to-date, complete, occurate, and readily available baseline configuration of the information system.	Automated mechanisms that help organizations maintain consistent baseline configurations for information systems include, for example, hardware and software inventory tools, configuration management tools, and network management tools. Such tools can be deployed and/or allocated as common controls, at the information system level, or at the operating system or component level (e.g., on workstations, servers, notebook computers, network components, or mobile devices). Tools can be used, for example, to track version numbers on operating system applications, types of software installed, and current patch levels. This control enhancement can be satisfied by the implementation of CM-8 (2) for organizations that choose to combine information system component inventory and baseline configuration activities.	CM-7,RA-5			3	X	
CM-2 (3)	2	Configuration Management Baseline Configuration Retention of Previous Configurations		The organization retains [Assignment: organization-defined previous versions of baseline configurations of the information system] to support rollback.	Retaining previous versions of baseline configurations to support rollback may include, for example, hardware, software, firmware, configuration files, and configuration records.			,	(x	
CM-2 (4)	2	Configuration Management Baseline	Х								[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-7]
CM-2 (5)	2	Configuration Unauthorized Software Configuration Management Baseline	Х								[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-7]
CM-2 (6)	2	Configuration Authorized Software Configuration Management Boseline Configuration Development and Test Environments		The organization maintains a baseline configuration for information system development and test environments that is managed separately from the operational baseline configuration.	Establishing separate baseline configurations for development, testing, and operational environments helps protect information systems from unplanned/unexpected events related to development and testing activities. Separate baseline configurations allow organizations to apply the configuration management that is most appropriate for each type of configuration. For example, management of operational configurations typically emphasizes the need for stability, while management of development/test configurations requires greater flexibility. Configurations in the test environment mirror the configurations in the operational environment to the extent proteobles to that the results of the testing are representative of the proposed changes to the operational systems. This control enhancement requires separate configurations but not necessarily separate physical environments.	CM-4,SC-3,SC-7					

Control ID	Level	Control Name Withdra	awn Control Text	Supplemental Guidance	Related Controls	Deio situ I	a 10	ted High	Notes
CM-2 (7)	2	Configuration Management Baseline Configuration Configure Systems, Components, or Devices for High-Risk Areas	The organization: (a) Issues (Assignment: organization-defined information systems, system components, or devices) with (Assignment: organization-defined configurations) to individuals traveling to locations that the organization deems to be of significant risk; and (b) Applies (Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards) to the devices when the individuals return.	When it is known that information systems, system components, or devices (e.g., notebook computers, mobile devices) will be located in high-risk areas, additional security controls may be implemented to counter the greater threat in such areas coupled with the lack of physical security relative to organizational controlled areas. For example, organizational policies and procedures for notebook computers used by individuals departing on and returning from trovel include, for example, determining which locations are of concern, defining required configurations for the devices, examing that the devices are configured as intended before travel is initiated, and applying specific safeguards to the device ofter travel is completed. Specially configured notebook computers include, for example, computers with sanitzed hard drives, limited applications, and additional hardening (e.g., more stringent configuration settings). Specified safeguards applied to mobile devices our return from travel include, for example, examining the device for signs of physical tampering and purging/eimaging the hard disk drive. Protecting information residing on mobile devices is covered in the media protection family.			x	x	
CM-3	1	Configuration Management Configuration Change Control	The organization: a. Determines the types of changes to the information system that are configuration-controlled; b. Reviews proposed configuration-controlled changes to the information system and approves or disapproves such changes with explict consideration for security impact analyses; c. Documents configuration change decisions associated with the information system; d. implements approved configuration-controlled changes to the information system; e. Retains records of configuration-controlled changes to the information system; organization-defined time period]; f. Audits and reviews activities associated with configuration-controlled changes to the information system; and g. Coordinates and provides oversight for configuration change control activities through [Assignment: organization-defined configuration change control element (e.g., committee, board)] that convenes [Selection lone or more): [Sasignment: organization-defined frequency]; [Assignment: organization-defined configuration change conditions]].	development information systems or systems undergoing major upgrades, organizations consider including representatives from development organizations on the Configuration	CA-7;CM-2;CM-4;CM-5;CM-6;CM-9;SA-10;SH-2;SI-12	P1	x	x	
CM-3 (1)	2	Configuration Management Configuration Change Control Automated Document / Notification / Prohibition of Changes	The organization employs automated mechanisms to: (a) Document proposed changes to the information system; (b) Notify (Assignment corganized-defined approval authorities) of proposed changes to the information system and request change approval; (c) Highlight proposed changes to the information system that have not been approved or disapproved by [Assignment: organization-defined time period]; (d) Prohibit changes to the information system until designated approvals are received; (e) Document all changes to the information system; and (f) Notify [Assignment: organization-defined personnel] when approved changes to the information system are completed.					х	
CM-3 (2)	2	Configuration Management Configuration Change Control Test / Volidate / Document Changes	The arganization tests, validates, and documents changes to the information system before implementing the changes on the operational system.	Changes to information systems include modifications to hardware, software, or firmware components and configuration settings defined in CM-6. Organizations ensure that testing does not interfere with information system operations. Individually forugs conducting tests understand arganizational security policies and procedures, information systems security policies and procedures, and the specific health, slople, and environmental risks associated with particular facilities/processes. Operational systems may need to be taken off-line, or replicated to the extent feasible, before testing can be conducted. If information systems must be taken off-line for testing, the tests are scheduled to occur during planned system outages whenever possible. If testing cannot be conducted on operational systems, organizations employ compensating controls (e.g., testing on replicated systems).			x	x	
CM-3 (3)	2	Configuration Management Configuration Change Control Automated Change Implementation	The organization employs automated mechanisms to implement changes to the current information system boseline and deploys the updated baseline across the installed base.						
CM-3 (4)	2	Configuration Management Configuration Change Control Security Representative	The organization requires an information security representative to be a member of the [Assignment: organization-defined configuration change control element].	Information security representatives can include, for example, senior agency information security officers, information system security officers, or information system security managers. Representation by personnel with information security expertise is important because changes to information system configurations can have unintended side effects, some of which may be security-relevant. Detecting such changes arely in the process and help avoid unintended, negative consequences that could ultimately affect the security state of organizational information systems. The configuration change control element in this control enhancement reflects the change control elements defined by organizations in CM-3.					
CM-3 (5)	2	Configuration Management Configuration Change Control Automated Security Response	The information system implements [Assignment: organization-defined security responses] automatically if baseline configurations are changed in an unauthorized manner.	Security responses include, for example, halting information system processing, halting selected system functions, or issuing alerts/notifications to organizational personnel when there is an unauthorized modification of a configuration item.					
CM-3 (6)	2	Configuration Management Configuration Change Control Cryptography Management	The arganization ensures that cryptographic mechanisms used to provide (Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards) are under configuration management.	Regardless of the cryptographic means employed (e.g., public key, private key, shared secrets), organizations ensure that there are processes and procedures in place to effectively manage those means. For example, if devices use certificates as a basis for identification and authentication, there needs to be a process in place to address the expiration of those certificates.	SC-13				
CM-4	1	Configuration Management Security Impact Analysis	The organization analyzes changes to the information system to determine potential security impacts prior to change implementation.	Organizational personnel with information security responsibilities (e.g., Information System Security Managers, Information System Security Managers, Information System Security Managers, and Information System Security Figures (e.g. Information System Security Managers, and Information System Security Impact analyses possess the necessary skills/chrical expertise to analyse the changers to information systems and the associated security ramifications. Security impact analysis may include, for example, reviewing security plans to understand security control requirements and reviewing system design documentation to understand control implementation and how specific changes might affect the controls. Security impact analyses may also include assessments of risk to better understand the impact of the changes and to determine if additional security controls are required. Security impact analyses may also include assessments of risk to better understand the impact analyses are scaled in accordance with the security categories of the information systems.	CA-2,CA-7,CM-3,CM- 9,SA-4,SA-5,SA-10,SI- 2	P2	x	x	

CONTROL ID CM-4 (1)	2	Control Name Withdrawn Configuration Management Security Impact Analysis Separate Test Environments	Control Text: The organization analyzes changes to the information system in a separate test environment before implementation in an operational environment, looking for security impacts due to flaws, weaknesses, incompatibility, or intentional malice.	Supplemental Guidance Separate test environment in this context means an environment that is physically or logically isolated and distinct from the operational environment. The separation is sufficient to ensure that activities in the test environment do not impact activities in the operational environment, and information in the operational environment is not inadvertently transmitted to the test environment. Separate environments can be achieved by physical or logical means. If physically separate test environments are not used, organizations determine the strength of mechanism required when implementing logical	Related Controls SA-11,SC-3,SC-7	Priority L	ow	Mod	High X	Notes
CM-4 (2)	2	Configuration Management Security Impact Analysis Verification of Security Functions	The organization, after the information system is changed, checks the security functions to verify that the functions are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with regard to meeting the security requirements for the system.	separation (e.g., separation achieved through virtual machines).	SA-11					
CM-5	1	Configuration Management Access Restrictions for Change	The organization defines, documents, approves, and enforces physical and logical access restrictions associated with changes to the information system.	Any changes to the hardware, software, and/or firmware components of information systems can potentially have significant effects on the overall security of the systems. Therefore, organizations permit only qualified and authorized individuals to access information systems for purposes of initiating changes, including upgrades and modifications. Organizations maintain records of access to ensure that configuration change control is implemented and to support affer-the-fact actions should organizations discover any unauthorized changes. Access restrictions for change also include software libraries. Access restrictions include, for example, physical and logical access controls (see AC-3 and PE-3), workflow automation, media libraries, abstract layers (e.g., changes implemented into third-party interfaces rather than directly into information systems), and change windows (e.g., changes occur only during specified times, making unauthorized changes easy to discover).	AC-3,AC-6,PE-3	P1	2	K	x	
CM-5 (1)	2	Configuration Management Access Restrictions for Change Automated Access Enforcement / Auditing	The information system enforces access restrictions and supports auditing of the enforcement actions.		AU-2,AU-12,AU- 6,CM-3,CM-6				х	
CM-5 (2)	2	Configuration Management Access Restrictions for Change Review System Changes	The organization reviews information system changes [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances] to determine whether unauthorized changes have occurred.	Indications that warrant review of information system changes and the specific circumstances justifying such reviews may be obtained from activities carried out by organizations during the configuration change process.	AU-6,AU-7,CM-3,CM- 5,PE-6,PE-8				х	
CM-5 (3)	2	Configuration Management Access Restrictions for Change Signed Components	The information system prevents the installation of [Assignment: organization-defined software and firmware components) without verification that the component has been digitally signed using a certificate that is recognized and approved by the organization.	Software and firmware components prevented from installation unless signed with recognized and approved certificates include, for example, software and firmware version updates, patches, service packs, device drivers, and basic input output system (IBOS) updates. Organizations can identify applicable software and firmware components by type, by specific items, or a combination of both. Digital signatures and organizational verification of such signatures, is a method of code authentication.	CM-7,SC-13,SI-7				х	
CM-5 (4)	2	Configuration Management Access Restrictions for Change Dual Authorization	The organization enforces dual authorization for implementing changes to [Assignment: organization-defined information system components and system-level information].	Organizations employ dual authorization to ensure that any changes to selected information system components and information cannot occur unless two qualified individuols implement such changes. The two individuols possess sufficient skills/expertise to determine if the proposed changes are correct implementations of approved changes. Dual authorization may also be known as two-person control.	AC-5,CM-3					
CM-5 (5)	2	Configuration Management Access Restrictions for Change Limit Production / Operational Privileges	The organization: (a) Limits privileges to change information system components and system-related information within a production or operational environment; and (b) Reviews and reevaluates privileges [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	In many organizations, information systems support multiple core missions/business functions. Limiting privileges to change information system components with respect to operational systems is necessory because changes to a particular information system to component may have far-reaching effects on mission/business processes supported by the system where the component residest. The complex, many-to-many relationships between systems and mission/business processes are in some cases, unknown to developers.	AC-2					
CM-5 (6)	2	Configuration Management Access Restrictions for Change Limit Library Privileges	$The \ organization \ \textit{limits privileges to change software resident within software libraries}.$	Software libraries include privileged programs.	AC-2					
CM-5 (7)	2	Configuration Management Access Restrictions X for Change Automatic Implementation of Security Safeguards								[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-7]
.M-6	1	Configuration Management Configuration Settings	The organization: a. Establishes and documents configuration settings for information technology products employed within the information system using [Assignment: organization-defined security configuration checklists] that reflect the most restrictive mode consistent with operational requirements; b. implements the configuration settings; c. I. dentifies, documents, and approves any deviations from established configuration settings for [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] based on [Assignment: organization-defined operational requirements]; and d. Monitors and controls changes to the configuration settings in accordance with organizational policies and procedures.	Configuration settings are the set of parameters that can be changed in hardware, software, or firmware components of the information system that affect the security posture and/or functionality of the system. Information texthnology products for which security-related configuration settings can be defined include, for example, maintrame computers, servers (e.g., database, electronic mail, authentication, web, proxy, file, domain name), workstations, impulyoutput devices (e.g., scanners, copiers, and printers), network appliances, sensors), operating systems, middleware, and applications. Security-related parameters are those parameter impacting the security state of information systems including the parameters required to satisfy other security control requirements. Security-related parametres include, for example: (i) registry settings; (ii) account, file, directory permission settings; and (iii) settings for functions, ports, protocols, services, and remote connections. Organizations establish organization-wide configuration settings and subsequently derive specific settings for information systems. The established settings become part of the systems configuration baseline. Common secure configurations and established benchmarks that stipulate secure configuration settings for specific information ethenology platforms/products and instructions for configuration settings for specific information technology platforms/products and instructions for configuration settings for product developers, manufacturers, vendors, consortia, academia, industry, federal agencies, and other organizations in the public and private sectors. Common secure configurations include the United States Government Configuration Settleng from sections of CMS and the defined standards within the public and private sectors. Common secure configurations include the United States Government Configuration Settleng Configuration Settleng CMS establishes federal policy on configuration requirements for federal information systems. Me establishes	Ac-19,CM-2,CM- 3,CM-7,SI-4	P1 X	1	X	x	
CM-6 (1)	2	Configuration Management Configuration Settings Automated Central Management / Application / Verification	The organization employs automated mechanisms to centrally manage, apply, and verify configuration settings for [Assignment: organization-defined information system components].		CA-7,CM-4				х	
CM-6 (2)	2	Configuration Management Configuration Settings Respond to Unauthorized Changes	The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to respond to unauthorized changes to [Assignment: organization-defined configuration settings].	Responses to unauthorized changes to configuration settings can include, for example, alerting designated organizational personnel, restoring established configuration settings, or in extreme cases, halting affected information system processing.	IR-4,SI-7				х	
CM-6 (3)	2	Configuration Management Configuration X Settings Unauthorized Change Detection								[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-7]
CM-6 (4)	2	Configuration Management Configuration X Settings Conformance Demonstration								[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-4]

Control ID L		Control Name W	ithdrawn Control Text	Supplemental Guidance	Related Controls	Data star		and the	Materia
CM-7	1	Configuration Management Least Functionality	The organization: a. Configures the information system to provide only essential capabilities; and b. Prohibits or restricts the use of the following functions, ports, protocols, and/or services: [Assignment: organization-defined prohibited or restricted functions, ports, protocols, and/or services].	Information systems can provide a wide variety of functions and services. Some of the functions and services, provided by default, may not be necessary to support essential organizational operations (e.g., key missions, functions), Additionally, it is sometimes convenient to provide multiple services from single information system components, but doing so increase risk over limiting the services provided by any one component. Where feasible, organizations limit component functionality to a single function per device (e.g., email servers or web servers, but not both). Organizations review functions and services provided by information systems or individual components of information systems, to determine which functions and services are candidates for elimination (e.g., Voice Over Internet Protoco), instant Messaging, auto-execute, and file sharing). Organizations consider disabiling unused or unnecessary physical and logical ports/protocols (e.g., Universal Serial Bus, File Transfer Protoco), and provention of devices, unauthorized transfer of information, or unauthorized trunneling. Organizations can utilize network scanning tools, intrusion detection and prevention systems, and end-point protections such as firewalls and host-based intrusion detection systems to identify and prevent the use of prohibited functions, ports, protocols, and services.	AC-6,CM-2,RA-5,SA-5,SC-7	P1	x x	x	
CM-7 (1)	2	Configuration Management Least Functionality Periodic Review	The organization: (a) Reviews the information system [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to identify unnecessary and/or nonsecure functions, ports, protocols, and services; and (b) Disables [Assignment: organization-defined functions, ports, protocols, and services within the information system deemed to be unnecessary and/or onsecure].	The organization can either make a determination of the relative security of the function, port, protocol, and/or service or base the security decision on the assessment of other entities. Bluetooth, FTP, and peer-to-peer networking are examples of less than secure protocols.	AC-18,CM-7,IA-2		х	x	
CM-7 (2)	2	Configuration Management Least Functionality Prevent Program Execution	The information system prevents program execution in accordance with [Selection (one or more) [Assignment: organization-defined policies regarding software program usage and restrictions]; rules authorizing the terms and conditions of software program usage].	k	CM-8,PM-5		х	х	
CM-7 (3)	2	Configuration Management Least Functionality Registration Compliance	The organization ensures compliance with [Assignment: organization-defined registration requirements for functions, ports, protocols, and services].	Organizations use the registration process to manage, track, and provide oversight for information systems and implemented functions, ports, protocols, and services.					
CM-7 (4)	2	Configuration Management Least Functionality Unauthorized Software Blacklisting	The organization: (a) identifies [Assignment: organization-defined software programs not authorized to execute on the identifiers [Assignment: organization-defined software programs and low-all, deny-by-exception policy to prohibit the execution of unauthorized software programs on the information system; and (c) Reviews and updates the list of unauthorized software programs [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	The process used to identify software programs that are not authorized to execute on organizational information systems is commonly referred to as blacklisting. Organizations can implement CM-7 (5) instead of this control anhancement if whitelsking (the stronger of the two policies) is the preferred approach for restricting software program execution.	CM-6,CM-8,PM-5		X		
CM-7 (5)	2	Canfiguration Management Least Functionality Authorized Software / Whitelisting	The organization: (a) Identifies [Assignment: organization-defined software programs authorized to execute an the information system]; (b) Employs a deny-all, permit-by-exception policy to allow the execution of authorized software programs on the information system; and (c) Reviews and updates the list of authorized software programs [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	whitelisting, organizations consider verifying the integrity of white-listed software	CM-2,CM-6,CM- 8,PM-5,SA-10,SC- 34,SI-7			х	
CM-8	1	Configuration Management Information System Component Inventory	The organization: a. Develops and documents an inventory of information system components that: a.1. Accurately reflects the current information system; a.2. Includes all components within the authorization boundary of the information system; a.3. Is at the level of granularity deemed necessary for tracking and reporting; and a.4. Includes [Assignment: organization-defined information deemed necessary to achieve effect information system component accurability], and b. Reviews and updates the information system component inventory [Assignment: organization- defined frequency].	inventory specifications, software license information, software version numbers,	CM-2,CM-6,PM-5	P1	x x	x	
CM-8 (1)	2	Configuration Management Information System Component Inventory Updates During Installations / Removals	The organization updates the inventory of information system components as an integral part of component installations, removals, and information system updates.	f			X	х	
CM-8 (2)	2	Canfiguration Management Information System Component Inventory Automated Maintenance	The organization employs automated mechanisms to help maintain an up-to-date, complete, accurate, and readily available inventory of information system components.	Organizations maintain information system inventories to the extent feasible. Virtual machines, for example, can be difficult to monitor because such machines are not visible to the network when not in use. In such cases, organizations maintain as up-to-date, complete, and accurate an inventory as is deemed reasonable. This control enhancement can be satisfied by the implementation of CM-21 for organizations that choose to combine information system component inventory and baseline configuration activities.	SI-7			х	
CM-8 (3)	2	Configuration Management Information System Component Inventory Automated Unauthorized Component Detection	The organization: (a) Employs automated mechanisms (Assignment: organization-defined frequency) to detect the presence of unauthorized hardware, software, and firmware components within the information system; and (b) Takes the following actions when unauthorized components are detected: [Selection (one or more): disables network access by such components; isolates the components; notifies [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]].		AC-17,AC-18,AC- 19,CA-7,SI-3,SI-4,SI- 7,RA-5		X	X	
CM-8 (4)	2	Configuration Management Information System Component Inventory Accountability Information	The organization includes in the information system component inventory information, a means for identifying by [Selection (one or more): name; position; role], individuals responsible/accountable for administering those components.	Identifying individuals who are both responsible and accountable for administering information system components helps to ensure that the assigned components are properly administered and organizations can contact those individuals if some action is required (e.g., component is determined to be the source of a breach/compranise, component needs to be recalled/replaced, or component needs to be relocated).				х	
CM-8 (5)		Configuration Management Information System Component Inventory No Duplicate Accounting of Components	The organization verifies that all components within the authorization boundary of the information system are not duplicated in other information system component inventories.	This control enhancement addresses the potential problem of duplicate accounting of information system components in large or complex interconnected systems.			х	х	
CM-8 (6)	2	Configuration Management Information System Component Inventory Assessed Configurations / Approved Deviations	The organization includes assessed component configurations and any approved deviations to current deployed configurations in the information system component inventory.	This control enhancement focuses on configuration settings established by organizations for information system components, the specific components that have been assessed to determine compliance with the required configuration settings, and any approved deviations from established configuration settings.	CM-2,CM-6				

Control ID	Level	Control Name Withdra	wn Control Text	Supplemental Guidance	Related Controls	Priority	Low N	And High	Notes
CM-8 (7)	2	Configuration Management Information System Component Inventory Centralized Repository	The organization provides a centralized repository for the inventory of information system components.	Organizations may choose to implement centralized information system component Organizations may choose to implement sentralized information systems. Centralized repositories of information system component inventroires provide opportunities for efficiencies in accounting for organizational hardware, software, and firmware assets. Such repositories may also help organizations rapidly identify the location and responsible individuals of system components that have been compromised, breached, or are otherwise in need of mitigation actions. Organizations ensure that the resulting centralized inventories include system-specific information required for proper component					
CM-8 (8)	2	Configuration Management / Information System	The accomplishing amplitus automated machining to suggest tracking of information automated	accountability (e.g., information system association, information system owner).					
		Configuration Management Information System Component Inventory Automated Location Tracking	The organization employs automated mechanisms to support tracking of information system components by geographic location.	The use of automated mechanisms to track the location of information system components can increase the occuracy of component inventories. Such capability may also help organizations rapidly identify the location and responsible individuals of system components that have been compromised, breached, or are otherwise in need of mitigation actions.					
CM-8 (9)	2	Configuration Management Information System Component Inventory Assignment of Components to Systems	The organization: (a) Assigns [Assignment: organization-defined acquired information system components] to an information system; and (b) Receives an acknowledgement from the information system owner of this assignment.	Organizations determine the criteria for or types of information system components (e.g., microprocessors, motherboards, software, programmable logic controllers, and network dewices) that are subject to this control enhancement.	SA-4				
CM-9	1	Configuration Management Configuration Management Plan	The organization develops, documents, and implements a configuration management plan for the information system that: a. Addresses roles, responsibilities, and configuration management processes and procedures; b. Establishes a process for identifying configuration terms throughout the system development lift cycle and for managing the configuration intems; c. Defines the configuration items for the information system and places the configuration items under configuration management; and d. Protects the configuration management plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification.	policies while being tailored to individual information systems. Such plans define detailed processes and procedures for how configuration management is used to support system		P1	×	x	
CM-9 (1)	2	Configuration Management Configuration Management Plan Assignment of Responsibility	The organization assigns responsibility for developing the configuration management process to organizational personnel that are not directly involved in information system development.	In the absence of dedicated configuration management teams assigned within organizations, system developers may be tasked to develop configuration management processes using personnel who are not directly involved in system development or integration. This separation of duties ensures that organizations establish and maintain a sufficient degree of independence between the information system development and integration processes and configuration management processes to facilitate quality control and more effective oversight.					
CM-10	1	Configuration Management Software Usage Restrictions	The organization: a. Uses software and associated documentation in accordance with contract agreements and copyright laws; b. Tracks the use of software and associated documentation protected by quantity licenses to control copyring and distribution; and c. Controls and documents the use of peer-to-peer file sharing technology to ensure that this capability is not used for the unauthorized distribution, display, performance, or reproduction of copyrighted work.	Software license tracking can be accomplished by manual methods (e.g., simple spreadsheets) or automated methods (e.g., specialized tracking applications) depending on organizational needs.	AC-17,CM-8,SC-7	P2	x	x	
CM-10 (1)	2	Configuration Management Software Usage Restrictions Open Source Software	The organization establishes the following restrictions on the use of open source software: [Assignment: organization-defined restrictions].	Open source software refers to software that is available in source code form. Certain software rights normally reserved for copyright holders are routinely provided under software license agreements that permit individuals to study, change, and improve the software. From a security perspective, the major advantage of open source software is that provides organizations with the oblifty to examine the source code. However, there are also various licensing issues associated with open source software including, for example, the constraints on derivative use of such software.					
CM-11		Configuration Management User-installed Software	The organization: a. Establishes (Assignment: organization-defined policies) governing the installation of software by users; b. Enforces software installation policies through (Assignment: organization-defined methods); an c. Monitors policy compliance at (Assignment: organization-defined frequency).	installed, organizations identify permitted and prohibited actions regarding software		P1	x x	х	
CM-11 (1)		Configuration Management User-Installed Software Alerts for Unauthorized Installations	The information system alerts [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] when the unauthorized installation of software is detected.		CA-7,5I-4				
CM-11 (2)		Configuration Management User-Installed Software Prohibit Installation Without Privileged Status	The information system prohibits user installation of software without explicit privileged status.	Privileged status can be obtained, for example, by serving in the role of system administrator.	AC-6				
CP	0	Contingency Planning							

Control ID	Lovel	Control Name Withdrawn	Control Toyt	Supplemental Guidance	Palated Controls	Priority	Low M	lod High	Notes
CP-1	1	Control Name Withdrawn Contingency Planning Policy and Procedures	Control Text The organization: a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]: a.1. A contingency planning policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compiliance; and a.2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the contingency planning policy and associated contingency planning controls; and b. Reviews and updates the current: b.1. Contingency planning policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and b.2. Contingency planning procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	Implemental companion of selected security controls and control enhancements in the CP family. This control addresses the setablishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the CP family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.	PM-9	P1	x x	X X	Notes
CP-2	1	Contingency Planning Contingency Plan	The organization: a. Develops a contingency plan for the information system that: a. I. dentifies essential missions and business functions and associated contingency requirements; a. I. dentifies essential missions and business functions and associated contingency requirements; a. Provides recovery objectives, restoration priorities, and metrics; a. Andresses contingency roles, responsibilities, assigned individuals with contact information; a. Andresses maintaining essential missions and business functions despite an information system disruption, compromise, or failure; a. S. Addresses eventual, full information system restoration without deterioration of the security safeguards originally planned and implemented; and a. G. Is reviewed and approved by [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]; b. Distributes copies of the contingency plan to [Assignment: organization-defined key contingency personnel [Identified by name and/or by role] and organizational elements]; c. Coordinates contingency plann to address changes to the organization, information system, or environment of operation and problems encountered during contingency plan implementation, execution, or testing; f. Communicates contingency plan changes to [Assignment: organization-defined key contingency personnel [Identified by name and/or by role] and organizational elements]; and g. Protects the contingency plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification.	mission/business processes when systems are compromised. The effectiveness of contingency planning is maximized by considering such planning throughout the phases of the system development life cycle. Performing contingency planning on hardware, software, and firmware development can be an effective means of achieving information system resiliency. Contingency plans reflect the degree of restoration required for organizational information systems since not all systems may need to fully recover to achieve the level of continuity of operations desired. Information system recovery objectives reflect applicable		P1	x x	х	
CP-2 (1)	2	Contingency Planning Contingency Plan Coordinate with Related Plans	The organization coordinates contingency plan development with organizational elements responsible for related plans.	Plans related to contingency plans for organizational information systems include, for example, Business Continuity Plans, Disaster Recovery Plans, Continuity of Operations Plans, Crisis Communications Plans, Critical Infrastructure Plans, Cyber Incident Response Plans, Insider Threat Implementation Plan, and Occupant Emergency Plans.			X	X	
CP-2 (2)	2	Contingency Planning Contingency Plan Capacity Planning	The organization conducts capacity planning so that necessary capacity for information processing, telecommunications, and environmental support exists during contingency aperations	Capacity planning is needed because different types of threats (e.g., natural disasters, targeted cyber attacks) can result in a reduction of the available processing telecommunications, and support services originally intended to support the organizational missions/business functions. Organizations may need to anticipate degraded operations during contingency operations and factor such degradation into capacity planning.				X	
CP-2 (3)	2	Contingency Planning Contingency Plan Resume Essential Missions / Business Functions	The organization plans for the resumption of essential missions and business functions within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of contingency plan activation.	Organizations may choose to carry out the contingency planning activities in this control enhancement as part of organizational business continuity planning including, for example, as part of business impact analyses. The time period for resumption of essential missions/business functions may be dependent on the severity/extent of disruptions to the information system and its supporting infrastructure.	PE-12		х	х	
CP-2 (4)	2	Contingency Planning Contingency Plan Resume All Missions / Business Functions	The organization plans for the resumption of all missions and business functions within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of contingency plan activation.	Organizations may choose to carry out the contingency planning activities in this control enhancement as part of organizational business continuity planning including, for example, as part of business impact analyses. The time period for resumption of all missions/business functions may be dependent on the severity/extent of disruptions to the information system and its supporting infrastructure.	PE-12			x	
CP-2 (5)	2	Contingency Planning Contingency Plan Continue Essential Missions / Business Functions	The organization plans for the continuance of essential missions and business functions with little or no loss of operational continuity and sustains that continuity until full information system restoration at primary processing and/or storage sites.	Organizations may choose to carry out the contingency planning activities in this control enhancement as part of organizational business continuity planning including, for example, as part of business impact analyses. Primary processing and/or storage sites defined by organizations as part of contingency planning may change depending on the circumstances associated with the contingency (e.g., backup sites may become primary sites).	PE-12			х	
CP-2 (6)	2	Contingency Planning Contingency Plan Alternate Processing / Storage Site	The organization plans for the transfer of essential missions and business functions to alternate processing and/or storage sites with little or no loss of operational continuity and sustains that continuity through information system restoration to primary processing and/or storage sites.	Organizations may choose to carry out the contingency planning activities in this control enhancement as part of organizational business continuity planning including, for example, as part of business impact analyses. Primary processing and/or storage sites defined by organizations as part of contingency planning may change depending on the circumstances associated with the contingency (e.g., backup sites may become primary sites).	PE-12				
CP-2 (7)	2	Contingency Planning Contingency Plan Coordinate with External Service Providers	The organization coordinates its contingency plan with the contingency plans of external service providers to ensure that contingency requirements can be satisfied.	When the capability of an organization to successfully carry out its core missions/business functions is dependent on external service providers, developing a timely and comprehensive contingency plan may become more challenging. In this situation, organizations coordinate contingency planning activities with the external entities to ensure that the individual plans reflect the overall contingency needs of the organization.	SA-9				
CP-2 (8)	2	Contingency Planning Contingency Plan Identify Critical Assets	The organization identifies critical information system assets supporting essential missions ond business functions.	Organizations may choose to carry out the contingency planning activities in this control enhancement as part of organizational business continuity planning including, for example, as part of business impact analyses. Organizational dientify critical information system assets so that additional safeguards and countermeasures can be employed above and beyond those safeguards and countermeasures routhely implemented to help ensure that arganizational missions/business functions can continue to be conducted during contingency operations. In addition, the identification of critical information assets facilitates the prioritization of organizational resources. Critical information system assets include technical and operational aspects. Technical aspects include, for example, information systems components, information asperts information aspects include, for example, procedures (manually executed aperations) and personnel (individuals operating technical safeguards and/or executing manual procedures). Organizational program protection plans can provide assistance in identifying critical assets.	SA-14,SA-15		x	x	

		Control Name Witho								
CP-3	1	Contingency Planning Contingency Training	rawn Control Text The organization provides contingency training to information system users consistent with	Supplemental Guidance Contingency training provided by organizations is linked to the assigned roles and	AT-2.AT-3.CP-2.IR-2	Priority P2	x	Y	Y Y	Notes
	1 1	Contingency Flamming Contingency Flamming	assigned roles and responsibilities:	responsibilities of organizational personnel to ensure that the appropriate content and level	A1-2,A1-3,CF-2,III-2	12	l^	î .	l^	
			a. Within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of assuming a contingency role or	of detail is included in such training. For example, regular users may only need to know						
			responsibility;	when and where to report for duty during contingency operations and if normal duties are						
			b. When required by information system changes; and	affected; system administrators may require additional training on how to set up						
			c. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] thereafter.	information systems at alternate processing and storage sites; and managers/senior leaders						
				may receive more specific training on how to conduct mission-essential functions in						
				designated off-site locations and how to establish communications with other governmenta						
				entities for purposes of coordination on contingency-related activities. Training for contingency roles/responsibilities reflects the specific continuity requirements in the						
				contingency plan.						
				Contingency plan.						
CP-3 (1)	2	Contingency Planning Contingency Training	The organization incorporates simulated events into contingency training to facilitate effective						х	
CP-3 (2)	2	Simulated Events Contingency Planning Contingency Training	response by personnel in crisis situations. The organization employs automated mechanisms to provide a more thorough and realistic							
LP-3 (2)	2	Automated Training Environments	contingency training environment.							
CP-4	1	Contingency Planning Contingency Plan Testing	The organization:		CP-2,CP-3,IR-3	P2	х	Х	х	
			a. Tests the contingency plan for the information system [Assignment: organization-defined	identify potential weaknesses in the plans include, for example, walk-through and tabletop						
			frequency] using [Assignment: organization-defined tests] to determine the effectiveness of the	exercises, checklists, simulations (parallel, full interrupt), and comprehensive exercises.						
			plan and the organizational readiness to execute the plan; b. Reviews the contingency plan test results; and	Organizations conduct testing based on the continuity requirements in contingency plans and include a determination of the effects on organizational operations, assets, and						
			c. Initiates corrective actions, if needed.	individuals arising due to contingency operations. Organizations have flexibility and						
			c. militare serve sectors, il necoca.	discretion in the breadth, depth, and timelines of corrective actions.						
CP-4 (1)	2	Contingency Planning Contingency Plan Testing Coordinate with Related Plans	The organization coordinates contingency plan testing with organizational elements responsible for related plans.	Plans related to contingency plans for organizational information systems include, for example, Business Continuity Plans, Disaster Recovery Plans, Continuity of Operations	IR-8,PM-8			х	×	
			y and a promote promot	Plans, Crisis Communications Plans, Critical Infrastructure Plans, Cyber Incident Response						
				Plans, and Occupant Emergency Plans. This control enhancement does not require						
				organizations to create organizational elements to handle related plans or to align such						
				elements with specific plans. It does require, however, that if such organizational elements						
				are responsible for related plans, organizations should coordinate with those elements.	1					
CP-4 (2)	2	Contingency Planning Contingency Plan Testing	The organization tests the contingency plan at the alternate processing site:		CP-7				х	
		Alternate Processing Site	(a) To familiarize contingency personnel with the facility and available resources; and (b) To evaluate the capabilities of the alternate processing site to support contingency operations							
				·						
CP-4 (3)	2	Contingency Planning Contingency Plan Testing	The organization employs automated mechanisms to more thoroughly and effectively test the	Automated mechanisms provide more thorough and effective testing of contingency plans,						
		Automated Testing	contingency plan.	for example: (i) by providing more complete coverage of contingency issues; (ii) by						
				selecting more realistic test scenarios and environments; and (iii) by effectively stressing the information system and supported missions.						
				the injornation system and supported missions.						
CP-4 (4)	2	Contingency Planning Contingency Plan Testing	The organization includes a full recovery and reconstitution of the information system to a known		CP-10,SC-24					
CP-5	1	Full Recovery / Reconstitution Contingency Planning Contingency Plan Update	state as part of contingency plan testing.							[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CP-2]
										, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
CP-6	1	Contingency Planning Alternate Storage Site	The organization: a. Establishes an alternate storage site including necessary agreements to permit the storage and	Alternate storage sites are sites that are geographically distinct from primary storage sites.	CP-2,CP-7,CP-9,CP- 10.MP-4	P1		х	х	
			retrieval of information system backup information; and	An alternate storage site maintains duplicate copies of information and data in the event that the primary storage site is not available. Items covered by alternate storage site	10,IMP-4					
			b. Ensures that the alternate storage site provides information security safeguards equivalent to	agreements include, for example, environmental conditions at alternate sites, access rules,						
			that of the primary site.	physical and environmental protection requirements, and coordination of delivery/retrieval						
				of backup media. Alternate storage sites reflect the requirements in contingency plans so						
				that organizations can maintain essential missions/business functions despite disruption,						
				compromise, or failure in organizational information systems.						
CP-6 (1)	2	Contingency Planning Alternate Storage Site	The organization identifies an alternate storage site that is separated from the primary storage	Threats that affect alternate storage sites are typically defined in organizational	RA-3			х	х	
		Separation from Primary Site	site to reduce susceptibility to the same threats.	assessments of risk and include, for example, natural disasters, structural failures, hostile cyber attacks, and errors of omission/commission. Organizations determine what is						
				considered a sufficient degree of separation between primary and alternate storage sites						
				based on the types of threats that are of concern. For one particular type of threat (i.e.,						
				hostile cyber attack), the degree of separation between sites is less relevant.						
CP-6 (2)	2	Contingency Planning Alternate Storage Site	The organization configures the alternate storage site to facilitate recovery operations in						х	
		Recovery Time / Point Objectives	accordance with recovery time and recovery point objectives.							
CP-6 (3)	2	Contingency Planning Alternate Storage Site Accessibility	The organization identifies potential accessibility problems to the alternate storage site in the event of an area-wide disruption or disaster and outlines explicit mitigation actions.	Area-wide disruptions refer to those types of disruptions that are broad in geographic scope (e.g., hurricane, regional power outage) with such determinations made by	RA-3			X	X	
		recessionly	exerción de discurvado discupción de disdister una ducimes explicit minigación decilóns.	organizations based on organizational assessments of risk. Explicit mitigation actions						
				include, for example: (i) duplicating backup information at other alternate storage sites if	1					
				access problems occur at originally designated alternate sites; or (ii) planning for physical	1					
				access to retrieve backup information if electronic accessibility to the alternate site is						
CP-7	1	Contingency Planning Alternate Processing Site	The organization:	disrupted. Alternate processing sites are sites that are geographically distinct from primary processing	CP-2,CP-6,CP-8,CP-	P1		х	х	
			a. Establishes an alternate processing site including necessary agreements to permit the transfer	sites. An alternate processing site provides processing capability in the event that the	9,CP-10,MA-6					
			and resumption of [Assignment: organization-defined information system operations] for essentia							
			missions/business functions within [Assignment: organization-defined time period consistent with							
			recovery time and recovery point objectives] when the primary processing capabilities are unavailable;	physical and environmental protection requirements, and coordination for the transfer/assignment of personnel. Requirements are specifically allocated to alternate						
			b. Ensures that equipment and supplies required to transfer and resume operations are available a							
			the alternate processing site or contracts are in place to support delivery to the site within the	missions/business functions despite disruption, compromise, or failure in organizational						
			organization-defined time period for transfer/resumption; and	information systems.						
			 c. Ensures that the alternate processing site provides information security safeguards equivalent t those of the primary site. 							
CP-7 (1)	2	Contingency Planning Alternate Processing Site Separation from Primary Site	The organization identifies an alternate processing site that is separated from the primary processing site to reduce susceptibility to the same threats.	Threats that affect alternate processing sites are typically defined in organizational assessments of risk and include, for example, natural disasters, structural failures, hostile	RA-3			Х	X	
		Separation from Primary Site	processing site to reduce susceptionity to the sume timeats.	cyber attacks, and errors of omission/commission. Organizations determine what is						
				considered a sufficient degree of separation between primary and alternate processing						
				sites based on the types of threats that are of concern. For one particular type of threat						
				(i.e., hostile cyber attack), the degree of separation between sites is less relevant.						
CP-7 (2)	2	Contingency Planning Alternate Processing Site	The organization identifies potential accessibility problems to the alternate processing site in the		RA-3			Х	х	
		Accessibility	event of an area-wide disruption or disaster and outlines explicit mitigation actions.	scope (e.g., hurricane, regional power outage) with such determinations made by						
				organizations based on organizational assessments of risk.						

Control ID	evel	Control Name	Withdrawn	Control Text	Supplemental Guidance	Related Controls	Deineitu	Laur Ma	d Hinh	Notes
CP-7 (3)	2	Contingency Planning Alternate Processing Site	withurawn	The organization develops alternate processing site agreements that contain priority-of-service	Priority-of-service agreements refer to negotiated agreements with service providers that	Related Controls	Priority	x X	X	Notes
		Priority of Service		provisions in accordance with organizational availability requirements (including recovery time objectives).	ensure that organizations receive priority treatment consistent with their availability requirements and the availability of information resources at the alternate processing site.					
CP-7 (4)	2	Contingency Planning Alternate Processing Site Preparation for Use		The organization prepares the alternate processing site so that the site is ready to be used as the operational site supporting essential missions and business functions.	Site preparation includes, for example, establishing configuration settings for information system components at the alternate processing site consistent with the requirements for such settings at the primary site and ensuring that essential supplies and other logistical considerations are in place.	CM-2,CM-6			х	
CP-7 (5)	2	Contingency Planning Alternate Processing Site Equivalent Information Security Safeguards	Х		Considerations and it is prace.					[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CP-7]
CP-7 (6)	2	Contingency Planning Alternate Processing Site Inability to Return to Primary Site		The organization plans and prepares for circumstances that preclude returning to the primary processing site.						
CP-8	1	Contingency Planning Telecommunications		The organization establishes alternate telecommunications services including necessary	This control applies to telecommunications services (data and voice) for primary and	CP-2,CP-6,CP-7	P1	х	х	
		Services		agreements to permit the resumption of [Assignment: organization-defined information system operations] for essential missions and business functions within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] when the primary telecommunications capabilities are unavailable at either the primary or alternate processing or storage sites.	functions despite the loss of primary telecommunications services. Organizations may specify different time periods for primary laternate sites. Alternate telecommunications services include, for example, additional organizational or commercial ground-based circuits/lines or satellites in lieu of ground-based communications. Organizations consider factors such as availability, quality of service, and access when entering into alternate telecommunications agreements.					
CP-8 (1)		Contingency Planning Telecommunications Services Priority of Service Provisions		The arganization: (a) Develops primary and alternate telecommunications service agreements that contain priority- of-service provisions in accordance with organizational availability requirements (including recovery time objectives), and (b) Requests Telecommunications Service Priority for all telecommunications services used for national security emergency preparedness in the event that the primary and/or alternate telecommunications services are provided by a common carrier.	Organizations consider the potential mission/business impact in situations where telecommunications service providers are servicing other organizations with similar priority- of-service provisions.			х	х	
CP-8 (2)		Contingency Planning Telecommunications Services Single Points of Failure		The organization obtains alternate telecommunications services to reduce the likelihood of sharing a single point of failure with primary telecommunications services.				х	х	
CP-8 (3)	2	Contingency Planning Telecommunications Services Separation of Primary / Alternate Providers		The organization obtains alternate telecommunications services from providers that are separated from primary service providers to reduce susceptibility to the same threats.	Threats that offect telecommunications services are typically defined in organizational ossessments of risk and include, for example, natural disasters, structural failures, nottile cyber/physical attacks, and errors of omission/commission. Organizations seek to reduce common susceptibilities by, for example, minimizing shared infrastructure among telecommunications service providers and achieving sufficient geographic separation between services. Organizations may consider using a single service provider in situations where the service provider and expressed in the risk assessment.				X	
CP-8 (4)	2	Contingency Planning Telecommunications Services Provider Contingency Plan		The organization: (a) Requires primary and alternate telecommunications service providers to have contingency plans; (b) Reviews provider contingency plans to ensure that the plans meet organizational contingency requirements; and (c) Obtains evidence of contingency testing/training by providers [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	Reviews of provider contingency plans consider the proprietary nature of such plans. In some situations, a summary of provider contingency plans may be sufficient evidence for organizations to satisfy the review requirement. Telecommunications service providers may also participate in angoing disaster recovery exercises in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security, state, and local governments. Organizations may use these types of activities to satisfy evidentiary requirements related to service provider contingency plan reviews, testing, and training.				x	
CP-8 (5)		Contingency Planning Telecommunications Services Alternate Telecommunication Service Testina		The organization tests alternate telecommunication services [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].						
CP-9		Contingency Planning Information System Backup		The organization: a. Conducts backups of user-level information contained in the information system [Assignment: organization-defined frequency consistent with recovery time and recovery point objectives]. b. Conducts backups of system-level information contained in the information system [Assignment: organization-defined frequency consistent with recovery time and recovery point objectives]; c. Conducts backups of information system documentation including security-related documentation [Assignment: organization-defined frequency consistent with recovery time and recovery point objectives]; and d. Protects the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of backup information at storage locations	other than system-level information. Mechanisms employed by organizations to protect the integrity of information system backups include, for example, digital signatures and cryptographic hashes. Protection of system backup information while in transit is beyond the scope of this control. Information system backups reflect the requirements in contingency plans as well as other organizational requirements for backing up information.	CP-2,CP-6,MP-4,MP- 5,SC-13	P1	x x	x	
CP-9 (1)		Contingency Planning Information System Backup Testing for Reliability / Integrity		The organization tests backup information [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to verify media reliability and information integrity.		CP-4		х	Х	
CP-9 (2)	2	Contingency Planning Information System Backup Test Restoration Using Sampling		The organization uses a sample of backup information in the restoration of selected information system functions as part of contingency plan testing.		CP-4			х	
CP-9 (3)	2	Contingency Planning Information System Backup Separate Storage for Critical Information		The arganization stores backup copies of [Assignment: organization-defined critical information system software and other security-related information] in a separate facility or in a fire-rated container that is not collocated with the operational system.	Critical information system software includes, for example, operating systems, cryptographic key management systems, and intrusion detection/prevention systems. Security-related information includes, for example, organizational inventories of hardware, software, and firmware components. Alternate storage sites typically serve as separate storage fealities for organizations.	CM-2,CM-8			х	
CP-9 (4)	2	Contingency Planning Information System Backup Protection from Unauthorized Modification	Х							[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CP-9]
CP-9 (5)	2	Contingency Planning Information System Backup Transfer to Alternate Storage Site		The organization transfers information system backup information to the alternate storage site [Assignment: organization-defined time period and transfer rate consistent with the recovery time and recovery point objectives.	Information system backup information can be transferred to alternate storage sites either electronically or by physical shipment of storage media.				Х	
CP-9 (6)	2	Contingency Planning Information System Backup Redundant Secondary System		The organization accomplishes information system backup by maintaining a redundant secondary system that is not collocated with the primary system and that can be activated without loss of information or disruption to operations.		CP-7,CP-10				
CP-9 (7)	2	Contingency Planning Information System Backup Dual Authorization		The organization enforces dual authorization for the deletion or destruction of [Assignment: organization-defined backup information].	Dual authorization ensures that the deletion or destruction of backup information cannot occur unless two qualified individuals carry out the task. Individuals deleting/destroying backup information possess sufficient skills/expertise to determine if the proposed deletion/destruction of backup information reflects organizational policies and procedures. Dual authorization may also be known as two-person control.	AC-3,MP-2				

CP-10	1	Control Name Contingency Planning Information System Recovery and Reconstitution	Withdrawn	Control Text The organization provides for the recovery and reconstitution of the information system to a known state after a disruption, compromise, or failure.	Supplemental Guidance Recovery is executing information system contingency plan activities to restore organizational missions/business functions. Reconstitution takes place following recovery and includes activities for returning organizational information systems to fully operational states. Recovery and reconstitution operations reflect mission and business priorities, recovery point/time and reconstitution objectives, and established organizational metrics consistent with contingency plan requirements. Reconstitution includes the deactivation of any interim information system capabilities that may have been needed during recovery operations. Reconstitution also includes assessments of fully restored information system capabilities, reestablishment of continuous monitoring activities, potential information system reauthorizations, and activities to prepare the systems against future disruptions, compromises, or failures. Recovery/reconstitution capabilities employed by organizations can include both automated mechanisms and manual procedures.	Related Controls CA-2,CA-6,CA-7,CP- 2,CP-6,CP-7,CP-9,SC- 24	Priority P1	X 2	Mod High	Notes
CP-10 (1)	2	Contingency Planning Information System	X							[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CP-4]
CP-10 (2)	2	Recovery and Reconstitution Contingency Plan Testing Contingency Planning Information System Recovery and Reconstitution Transaction Recovery		The information system implements transaction recovery for systems that are transaction-based.	Transaction-based information systems include, for example, database management systems and transaction processing systems. Mechanisms supporting transaction recovery include, for example, transaction followch and transaction invanionian.			,	x x	
CP-10 (3)	2	Contingency Planning Information System	X		include, for example, transaction rollock and transaction journaling.					[Withdrawn: Addressed through tailoring procedures]
		Recovery and Reconstitution Compensating Security Controls								
CP-10 (4)	2	Contingency Planning Information System Recovery and Reconstitution Restore Within Time Period		The organization provides the capability to restore information system components within [Assignment: organization-defined restoration time-periods] from configuration-controlled and integrity-protected information representing a known, operational state for the components.	Restoration of information system components includes, for example, reimaging which restores components to known, operational states.	CM-2			х	
CP-10 (5)	2	Contingency Planning Information System Recovery and Reconstitution Failover Capability	Х							[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-13]
CP-10 (6)	2	Contingency Planning Information System Recovery and Reconstitution Component Protection		The organization protects backup and restoration hardware, firmware, and software.	Protection of backup and restoration hardware, firmware, and software components includes both physical and technical safeguards. Backup and restoration software includes, for example, router tables, compilers, and other security-relevant system software.	AC-3,AC-6,PE-3				
CP-11	1	Contingency Planning Alternate Communications Protocols		The information system provides the capability to employ [Assignment: organization-defined alternative communications protocols] in support of maintaining continuity of operations.	Contingency plans and the associated training and testing for those plans, incorporate an alternate communications protocol capability as part of increasing the resilience of organizational information systems. Alternate communications protocols include, for example, switching from Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) Version 4 to TCP/IP Version 6. Switching communications protocols may affect software applications and therefore, the potential side effects of introducing alternate communications protocols are analyzed prior to implementation.		PO			
CP-12	1	Contingency Planning Safe Mode		The information system, when [Assignment: organization-defined conditions] are detected, enters a safe mode of operation with [Assignment: organization-defined restrictions of safe mode of operation].	For information systems supporting critical missions/business functions including, for example, military operations and weapons systems, civilian space operations, nuclear power plant operations, and air traffic control operations (specially real-time operational environments), organizations may choose to identify certain conditions under which those systems revert to a predefined safe mode of operation. The safe mode of operation, which can be activated automatically or manually, restricts the types of activities or operations information systems could execute when those conditions are encountered. Restriction includes, for example, allowing only certain functions that could be carried out under limited power or with reduced communications bandwidth.		PO			
CP-13	1	Contingency Planning Alternative Security Mechanisms		The organization employs (Assignment: organization-defined alternative or supplemental security mechanisms) for satisfying (Assignment: organization-defined security functions) when the primary means of implementing the security function is unavailable or compromised.	his control supports information system resiliency and contingency planning/continuity of operations. To ensure mission/business continuity, organizations can implement alternative or supplemental security mechanisms. These mechanisms may be less effective than the primary mechanisms (e.g., not as easy to use, not as scalable or not as secure). However, having the capability to readily employ these alternative/supplemental mechanisms enhances overall mission/business continuity that might otherwise be adversely impacted if organizational operations had to be cutralled until the primary means of implementing the functions was restored. Given the cost and level of effort required to provide such alternative capabilities, this control would typically be applied only to critical security capabilities provided by information systems, system components, or information system services. For example, an organization may issue to senior executives and system administrators one-time pads in case multifactor tokens, the organization's standard means for secure remote authentication, is compromised.	CP-2	PO			
DI		Data Quality and Integrity								[Privacy Controls]
DI-1	1	Data Quality and Integrity Data Quality		The organization:	Organizations take reasonable steps to confirm the accuracy and relevance of PII. Such steps may include, for example, editing and validating addresses as they are collected or entered into information systems using automated address verification look-up application programming interfaces (API). The types of measures taken to protect data quality are based on the nature and context of the PII, how it is to be used, and how it was obtained. Measures taken to validate the accuracy of PII that is used to make determinations about the rights, benefits, or privileges of individuals under federal programs may be more comprehensive than those used to validate less sensitive PII. Additional steps may be necessary to validate PII that is obtained from sources other than individuals or the authorized representatives of individuals on sources other than individuals or the authorized representatives of individuals. When PII is of a sufficiently sensitive nature (e.g., when it is used for annual reconfirmation of a taxpayer's income for a recurring benefit), organizations incorporate mechanisms into information systems and develop corresponding procedures for how frequently, and by what method, the information is to be undated.					[Privacy Controls]
										(School Control)
DI-1 (1)	2	Data Quality and Integrity Data Quality Validate PII Data Quality and Integrity Data Quality Re-		The organization requests that the individual or individual's authorized representative validate PII during the collection process. The organization requests that the individual or individual's authorized representative revalidate						[Privacy Controls]
<i>υ</i> ι-1 (2)	2	Data Quality and Integrity Data Quality Re- Validate PII		The organization requests that the individual or individual's authorized representative revalidate that PII collected is still accurate [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].						[Friedly Colidats]

Control Name Data Quality and Integrity Data Integrity and Data Integrity Board	thdrawn	Control Text			Priority L	OW INO	u nigi	
		The organization:	Supplemental Guidance Organizations conducting or participating in Computer Matching Agreements with other	Related Controls AC-1, AC-3, AC-4, AC-				[Privacy Controls]
bata integrity board		Documents processes to ensure the integrity of personally identifiable information (PII) through	organizations conducting or participating in computer watering Agreements with other	6. AC-17. AC-22. AU-				[Frivacy conditions]
		existing security controls: and		2. AU-3. AU-6. AU-				
			federal personnel or payroll records establish a Data Integrity Board to oversee and	10, AU-11, DI-1, SC-				
		b. Establishes a Data Integrity Board when appropriate to oversee organizational Computer						
		Matching Agreements and to ensure that those agreements comply with the computer matching		8, SC-28, UL-2				
		provisions of the Privacy Act.	Data Integrity Board is led by the Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy					
			Officer (CPO). The Data Integrity Board ensures that controls are in place to maintain both					
			the quality and the integrity of data shared under Computer Matching Agreements.					
			Organizations enter into Computer Matching Agreements in connection with computer					
			matching programs to which they are a party. With certain exceptions, a computer matching					
			program is any computerized comparison of two or more automated systems of records or a					
			Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (a)(8)(A).					
Data Quality and Integrity Data Integrity and		The organization publishes Computer Matching Agreements on its public website.						[Privacy Controls]
Data Integrity Board Publish Agreements on								
Website								
Data Minimization and Retention								[Privacy Controls]
		The organization:	Organizations take appropriate steps to ensure that the collection of PII is consistent with a	AP-1, AP-2. AR-4. IP-				[Privacy Controls]
of Personally Identifiable Information			purpose authorized by law or regulation. The minimum set of PII elements required to					
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,								
			required by the information system or activity to accomplish the legally authorized purpose.					
		reviewing those holdings [Assignment: organization-defined frequency, at least annually] to ensure						
		necessary to accomplish the legally authorized purpose.	inventory of PII, where appropriate. OMB Memorandum 07-16 requires organizations to					
			conduct both an initial review and subsequent reviews of their holdings of all PII and ensure,					
			to the maximum extent practicable, that such holdings are accurate, relevant, timely, and					
			complete. Organizations are also directed by OMB to reduce their holdings to the minimum					
			notice in the Federal Register or on their websites, a schedule for periodic reviews of their					
			records officers to ensure that reductions in organizational holdings of PII are consistent					
			with NARA retention schedules.					
			By performing periodic evaluations, organizations reduce risk, ensure that they are					
			collecting only the data specified in the notice, and ensure that the data collected is still					
			relevant and necessary for the purpose(s) specified in the notice.					
								(-11.1)
Data Minimization and Retention Minimization		The organization, where feasible and within the limits of technology, locates and removes/redacts	NIST Special Publication 800-122 provides guidance on anonymization.					[Privacy Controls]
								[
of Personally Identifiable Information Locate /		specified PII and/or uses anonymization and de-identification techniques to permit use of the						,
of Personally Identifiable Information Locate / Remove / Redact / Anonymize PII		specified PII and/or uses anonymization and de-identification techniques to permit use of the retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure.						,
Remove / Redact / Anonymize PII		retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure.						,,
		retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure. The organization:	NARA provides retention schedules that govern the disposition of federal records. Program	AR-4, AU-11, DM-1,				[Privacy Controls]
Remove / Redact / Anonymize PII		retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure. The organization:		AR-4, AU-11, DM-1, MP-1, MP-2, MP-3.				,,
Remove / Redact / Anonymize PII Data Minimization and Retention Data		retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure.	officials coordinate with records officers and with NARA to identify appropriate retention					,,
Remove / Redact / Anonymize PII Data Minimization and Retention Data		retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure. The organization: a. Retains each collection of personally identifiable information (PIII) for [Assignment: organization-defined time period] to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law;	officials coordinate with records officers and with NARA to identify appropriate retention periods and disposal methods. NARA may require organizations to retain PII longer than is	MP-1, MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6,				,,
Remove / Redact / Anonymize PII Data Minimization and Retention Data		retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure. The organization: a. Retains each collection of personally identifiable information (PII) for [Assignment: organization-defined time period] to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law; b. Disposes of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PII, regardless of the method of storage, in	officials coordinate with records officers and with NARA to identify appropriate retention periods and disposal methods. NARA may require organizations to retain PII longer than is operationally needed. In those situations, organizations describe such requirements in the	MP-1, MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, MP-7, MP-8, SI-12,				,,
Remove / Redact / Anonymize PII Data Minimization and Retention Data		retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure. The organization: a. Retains each collection of personally identifiable information (PII) for [Assignment: organization-defined time period] to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law; b. Disposes of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PII, regardless of the method of storage, in accordance with a NRAR-approved record retention schedule and in a manner that prevents loss,	officials coordinate with records officers and with NARA to identify appropriate retention periods and disposal methods. NARA may require organizations to retain PII longer than is	MP-1, MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6,				,,
Remove / Redact / Anonymize PII Data Minimization and Retention Data		retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure. The organization: a. Retains each collection of personally identifiable information (PII) for [Assignment: organization-defined time period] to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law; b. Disposes of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PII, regardless of the method of storage, in accordance with a NARA-approved record retention schedule and in a manner that prevents loss, theft, misuse, or musthwirted access, and	officials coordinate with records officers and with NARA to identify appropriate retention periods and disposal methods. NARA may require organizations to retain PII longer than is operationally needed. In those situations, organizations describe such requirements in the notice. Methods of storage include, for example, electronic, optical media, or paper.	MP-1, MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, MP-7, MP-8, SI-12,				,,
Remove / Redact / Anonymize PII Data Minimization and Retention Data		retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure. The organization: a. Retains each collection of personally identifiable information (PII) for [Assignment: organization-defined time period] to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law; b. Disposes of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PII, regardless of the method of storage, in accordance with a NRAR-approved record retention schedule and in amaner that prevents loss, theft, misuse, or unauthorized access; and c. Uses [Assignment: organization-defined techniques or methods] to ensure secure deletion or	officials coordinate with records officers and with NARA to identify appropriate retention periods and disposal methods. NARA may require organizations to retain PII longer than is operationally needed. In those situations, organizations describe such requirements in the notice. Methods of storage include, for example, electronic, optical media, or paper. Examples of ways organizations may reduce holdings include reducing the types of PII held	MP-1, MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, MP-7, MP-8, SI-12,				,,
Remove / Redact / Anonymize PII Data Minimization and Retention Data		retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure. The organization: a. Retains each collection of personally identifiable information (PII) for [Assignment: organization-defined time period] to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law; b. Disposes of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PII, regardless of the method of storage, in accordance with a NARA-approved record retention schedule and in a manner that prevents loss, theft, misuse, or musthwirted access, and	officials coordinate with records officers and with NARA to identify appropriate retention periods and disposal methods. NARA may require organizations to retain PII longer than is operationally needed. In those situations, organizations describe such requirements in the notice. Methods of storage include, for example, electronic, optical media, or paper. Examples of ways organizations may reduce holdings include reducing the types of PII held (e.g., delete Social Security numbers if their use is no longer needed) or shortening the	MP-1, MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, MP-7, MP-8, SI-12,				,,
Remove / Redact / Anonymize PII Data Minimization and Retention Data		retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure. The organization: a. Retains each collection of personally identifiable information (PII) for [Assignment: organization-defined time period] to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law; b. Disposes of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PII, regardless of the method of storage, in accordance with a NRAR-approved record retention schedule and in amaner that prevents loss, theft, misuse, or unauthorized access; and c. Uses [Assignment: organization-defined techniques or methods] to ensure secure deletion or	officials coordinate with records officers and with NARA to identify appropriate retention periods and disposal methods. NARA may require organizations to retain PII longer than is operationally needed. In those situations, organizations describe such requirements in the notice. Methods of storage include, for example, electronic, optical media, or paper. Examples of ways organizations may reduce holdings include reducing the types of PII held (e.g., delete Social Security numbers if their use is no longer needed) or shortening the retention period for PIII that is maintained if it is no longer necessary to keep PII for long	MP-1, MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, MP-7, MP-8, SI-12,				,,
Remove / Redact / Anonymize PII Data Minimization and Retention Data		retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure. The organization: a. Retains each collection of personally identifiable information (PII) for [Assignment: organization-defined time period] to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law; b. Disposes of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PII, regardless of the method of storage, in accordance with a NRAR-approved record retention schedule and in amaner that prevents loss, theft, misuse, or unauthorized access; and c. Uses [Assignment: organization-defined techniques or methods] to ensure secure deletion or	officials coordinate with records officers and with NARA to identify appropriate retention periods and disposal methods. NARA may require organizations to retain Pil longer than is operationally needed. In those situations, organizations describe such requirements in the notice. Methods of storage include, for example, electronic, optical media, or paper. Examples of ways organizations may reduce holdings include reducing the types of Pil held (e.g., delete Social Security numbers if their use is no longer needed) or shortening the retention period for Pil that is maintained if it is no longer necessary to keep Pil For long periods of time (hits effort is undertaken in consultation with an organization's records	MP-1, MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, MP-7, MP-8, SI-12,				,,
Remove / Redact / Anonymize PII Data Minimization and Retention Data		retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure. The organization: a. Retains each collection of personally identifiable information (PII) for [Assignment: organization-defined time period] to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law; b. Disposes of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PII, regardless of the method of storage, in accordance with a NRAR-approved record retention schedule and in amaner that prevents loss, theft, misuse, or unauthorized access; and c. Uses [Assignment: organization-defined techniques or methods] to ensure secure deletion or	officials coordinate with records officers and with NARA to identify appropriate retention periods and disposal methods. NARA may require organizations to retain PII longer than is operationally needed. In those situations, organizations describe such requirements in the notice. Methods of storage include, for example, electronic, optical media, or paper. Examples of ways organizations may reduce holdings include reducing the types of PII held (e.g., delete Social Security numbers if their use is no longer needed) or shortening the retention period for PII that is maintained if it is no longer necessary to keep PII for long periods of time (this effort is undertaken in consultation with an organization's records officer to receive NARA approval). In both examples, organizations provide notice (e.g., an	MP-1, MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, MP-7, MP-8, SI-12,				,,
Remove / Redact / Anonymize PII Data Minimization and Retention Data		retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure. The organization: a. Retains each collection of personally identifiable information (PII) for [Assignment: organization-defined time period] to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law; b. Disposes of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PII, regardless of the method of storage, in accordance with a NRAR-approved record retention schedule and in amaner that prevents loss, theft, misuse, or unauthorized access; and c. Uses [Assignment: organization-defined techniques or methods] to ensure secure deletion or	officials coordinate with records officers and with NARA to identify appropriate retention periods and disposal methods. NARA may require organizations to retain Pil longer than is operationally needed. In those situations, organizations describe such requirements in the notice. Methods of storage include, for example, electronic, optical media, or paper. Examples of ways organizations may reduce holdings include reducing the types of Pil held (e.g., delete Social Security numbers if their use is no longer needed) or shortening the retention period for Pil that is maintained if it is no longer necessary to keep Pil For long periods of time (hits effort is undertaken in consultation with an organization's records	MP-1, MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, MP-7, MP-8, SI-12,				,,
Remove / Redact / Anonymize PII Data Minimization and Retention Data		retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure. The organization: a. Retains each collection of personally identifiable information (PII) for [Assignment: organization-defined time period] to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law; b. Disposes of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PII, regardless of the method of storage, in accordance with a NRAR-approved record retention schedule and in amaner that prevents loss, theft, misuse, or unauthorized access; and c. Uses [Assignment: organization-defined techniques or methods] to ensure secure deletion or	officials coordinate with records officers and with NARA to identify appropriate retention periods and disposal methods. NARA may require organizations to retain PII longer than is operationally needed. In those situations, organizations describe such requirements in the notice. Methods of storage include, for example, electronic, optical media, or paper. Examples of ways organizations may reduce holdings include reducing the types of PII held (e.g., delete Social Security numbers if their use is no longer needed) or shortening the retention period for PII that is maintained if it is no longer necessary to keep PII for long periods of time (this effort is undertaken in consultation with an organization's records officer to receive NARA approval). In both examples, organizations provide notice (e.g., an updated System of Records Notice) to inform the public of any changes in holdings of PII.	MP-1, MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, MP-7, MP-8, SI-12,				,,
Remove / Redact / Anonymize PII Data Minimization and Retention Data		retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure. The organization: a. Retains each collection of personally identifiable information (PII) for [Assignment: organization-defined time period] to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law; b. Disposes of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PII, regardless of the method of storage, in accordance with a NRAR-approved record retention schedule and in amaner that prevents loss, theft, misuse, or unauthorized access; and c. Uses [Assignment: organization-defined techniques or methods] to ensure secure deletion or	officials coordinate with records officers and with NARA to identify appropriate retention periods and disposal methods. NARA may require organizations to retain PII longer than is operationally needed. In those situations, organizations describe such requirements in the notice. Methods of storage include, for example, electronic, optical media, or paper. Examples of ways organizations may reduce holdings include reducing the types of PII held (e.g., delete Social Security numbers if their use is no longer needed) or shortening the retention period for PII that is maintained if it is no longer necessary to keep PII for long periods of time (this effort is undertaken in consultation with an organization's records officer to receive NARA approval). In both examples, organizations provide notice (e.g., an updated System of Records Notice) to inform the public of any changes in holdings of PII.	MP-1, MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, MP-7, MP-8, SI-12,				,,
Remove / Redact / Anonymize PII Data Minimization and Retention Data		retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure. The organization: a. Retains each collection of personally identifiable information (PII) for [Assignment: organization-defined time period] to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law; b. Disposes of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PII, regardless of the method of storage, in accordance with a NRAR-approved record retention schedule and in amaner that prevents loss, theft, misuse, or unauthorized access; and c. Uses [Assignment: organization-defined techniques or methods] to ensure secure deletion or	officials coordinate with records officers and with NARA to identify appropriate retention periods and disposal methods. NARA may require organizations to retain PII longer than is operationally needed. In those situations, organizations describe such requirements in the notice. Methods of storage include, for example, electronic, optical media, or paper. Examples of ways organizations may reduce holdings include reducing the types of PII held (e.g., delete Social Security numbers if their use is no longer needed) or shortening the retention period for PII that is maintained if it is no longer necessary to keep PII for long periods of time (this effort is undertaken in consultation with an organization's records officer to receive NARA approval). In both examples, organizations provide notice (e.g., an	MP-1, MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, MP-7, MP-8, SI-12,				,,
Remove / Redact / Anonymize PII Data Minimization and Retention Data		retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure. The organization: a. Retains each collection of personally identifiable information (PII) for [Assignment: organization-defined time period] to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law; b. Disposes of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PII, regardless of the method of storage, in accordance with a NRAR-approved record retention schedule and in amaner that prevents loss, theft, misuse, or unauthorized access; and c. Uses [Assignment: organization-defined techniques or methods] to ensure secure deletion or	officials coordinate with records officers and with NARA to identify appropriate retention periods and disposal methods. NARA may require organizations to retain Pil longer than is operationally needed. In those situations, organizations describe such requirements in the notice. Methods of storage include, for example, electronic, optical media, or paper. Examples of ways organizations may reduce holdings include reducing the types of PII held (e.g., delete Social Security numbers if their use is no longer needed) or shortering the retention period for PII that is maintained if it is no longer necessary to keep PII for long periods of time (this effort is undertaken in consultation with an organization's records officer to receive NARA approval). In both examples, organizations provide notice (e.g., an updated System of Records Notice) to inform the public of any changes in holdings of PII. Certain read-only archiving techniques, such as DVDs, CDs, microfilm, or microfiche, may	MP-1, MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, MP-7, MP-8, SI-12,				,,
Remove / Redact / Anonymize PII Data Minimization and Retention Data		retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure. The organization: a. Retains each collection of personally identifiable information (PII) for [Assignment: organization-defined time period] to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law; b. Disposes of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PII, regardless of the method of storage, in accordance with a NRAR-approved record retention schedule and in amaner that prevents loss, theft, misuse, or unauthorized access; and c. Uses [Assignment: organization-defined techniques or methods] to ensure secure deletion or	officials coordinate with records officers and with NARA to identify appropriate retention periods and disposal methods. NARA may require organizations to retain Pil longer than is operationally needed. In those situations, organizations describe such requirements in the notice. Methods of storage include, for example, electronic, optical media, or paper. Examples of ways organizations may reduce holdings include reducing the types of Pil Held (e.g., delete Social Security numbers if their use is no longer needed) or shortening the retention period for Pil that is maintained if it is no longer necessary to keep Pil for long periods of time (his effort is undertaken in consultation with an organization's records officer to receive NARA approval), in both examples, organizations provide notice (e.g., an updated System of Records Notice) to inform the public of any changes in holdings of Pil. Certain read-only archiving techniques, such as DVDs, CDs, microfilm, or microfiche, may not permit the removal of individual records without the destruction of the entire database	MP-1, MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, MP-7, MP-8, SI-12,				,,
Remove / Redact / Anonymize PII Data Minimization and Retention Data		retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure. The organization: a. Retains each collection of personally identifiable information (PII) for [Assignment: organization-defined time period] to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law; b. Disposes of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PII, regardless of the method of storage, in accordance with a NRAR-approved record retention schedule and in amaner that prevents loss, theft, misuse, or unauthorized access; and c. Uses [Assignment: organization-defined techniques or methods] to ensure secure deletion or	officials coordinate with records officers and with NARA to identify appropriate retention periods and disposal methods. NARA may require organizations to retain Pil longer than is operationally needed. In those situations, organizations describe such requirements in the notice. Methods of storage include, for example, electronic, optical media, or paper. Examples of ways organizations may reduce holdings include reducing the types of Pil Held (e.g., delete Social Security numbers if their use is no longer needed) or shortening the retention period for Pil that is maintained if it is no longer necessary to keep Pil for long periods of time (his effort is undertaken in consultation with an organization's records officer to receive NARA approval), in both examples, organizations provide notice (e.g., an updated System of Records Notice) to inform the public of any changes in holdings of Pil. Certain read-only archiving techniques, such as DVDs, CDs, microfilm, or microfiche, may not permit the removal of individual records without the destruction of the entire database	MP-1, MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, MP-7, MP-8, SI-12,				,,
Remove / Redact / Anonymize PII Data Minimization and Retention Data Retention and Disposal		retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure. The organization: a. Retains each collection of personally identifiable information (PII) for [Assignment: organization-defined time period] to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law; b. Disposes of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PII, regardless of the method of storage, in accordance with a NRAR-approved record retention schedule and in amanner that prevents loss, theft, misuse, or unauthorized access, and c. Uses [Assignment: organization-defined techniques or methods] to ensure secure deletion or destruction of PII (including originals, copies, and archived records).	officials coordinate with records officers and with NARA to identify appropriate retention periods and disposal methods. NARA may require organizations to retain Pil longer than is operationally needed. In those situations, organizations describe such requirements in the notice. Methods of storage include, for example, electronic, optical media, or paper. Examples of ways organizations may reduce holdings include reducing the types of Pil Held (e.g., delete Social Security numbers if their use is no longer needed) or shortening the retention period for Pil that is maintained if it is no longer necessary to keep Pil for long periods of time (his effort is undertaken in consultation with an organization's records officer to receive NARA approval), in both examples, organizations provide notice (e.g., an updated System of Records Notice) to inform the public of any changes in holdings of Pil. Certain read-only archiving techniques, such as DVDs, CDs, microfilm, or microfiche, may not permit the removal of individual records without the destruction of the entire database	MP-1, MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, MP-7, MP-8, SI-12,				[Privacy Controls]
Remove / Redact / Anonymize PII Data Minimization and Retention Data Retention and Disposal Data Minimization and Retention Data Retention		retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure. The organization: a. Retains each collection of personally identifiable information (PII) for [Assignment: organization-defined time period] to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law; b. Disposes of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PII, regardless of the method of storage, in accordance with a NARA-approved record retention schedule and in a manner that prevents loss, theft, misuse, or unauthorized access; and c. Uses [Assignment: organization-defined techniques or methods] to ensure secure deletion or destruction of PII (including originals, copies, and archived records). The organization, where feasible, configures its information systems to record the date PII is	officials coordinate with records officers and with NARA to identify appropriate retention periods and disposal methods. NARA may require organizations to retain Pil longer than is operationally needed. In those situations, organizations describe such requirements in the notice. Methods of storage include, for example, electronic, optical media, or paper. Examples of ways organizations may reduce holdings include reducing the types of Pil Held (e.g., delete Social Security numbers if their use is no longer needed) or shortening the retention period for Pil that is maintained if it is no longer necessary to keep Pil for long periods of time (his effort is undertaken in consultation with an organization's records officer to receive NARA approval), in both examples, organizations provide notice (e.g., an updated System of Records Notice) to inform the public of any changes in holdings of Pil. Certain read-only archiving techniques, such as DVDs, CDs, microfilm, or microfiche, may not permit the removal of individual records without the destruction of the entire database	MP-1, MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, MP-7, MP-8, SI-12,				,,
Remove / Redact / Anonymize PII Data Minimization and Retention Data Retention and Disposal		retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure. The organization: a. Retains each collection of personally identifiable information (PII) for [Assignment: organization-defined time period) to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law; b. Disposes of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PII, regardless of the method of storage, in accordance with a NRAR-approved record retention schedule and in a manner that prevents loss, theft, misuse, or unauthorized access, and considered in the consideration of PII (including originals, copies, and archived records). The organization, where feasible, configures its information systems to record the date PII is collected, created, or updated and when PII is to be deleted or archived under an approved record	officials coordinate with records officers and with NARA to identify appropriate retention periods and disposal methods. NARA may require organizations to retain Pil longer than is operationally needed. In those situations, organizations describe such requirements in the notice. Methods of storage include, for example, electronic, optical media, or paper. Examples of ways organizations may reduce holdings include reducing the types of Pil Held (e.g., delete Social Security numbers if their use is no longer needed) or shortening the retention period for Pil that is maintained if it is no longer necessary to keep Pil for long periods of time (his effort is undertaken in consultation with an organization's records officer to receive NARA approval), in both examples, organizations provide notice (e.g., an updated System of Records Notice) to inform the public of any changes in holdings of Pil. Certain read-only archiving techniques, such as DVDs, CDs, microfilm, or microfiche, may not permit the removal of individual records without the destruction of the entire database	MP-1, MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, MP-7, MP-8, SI-12,				[Privacy Controls]
Remove / Redact / Anonymize PII Data Minimization and Retention Data Retention and Disposal Data Minimization and Retention Data Retention and Disposal System Configuration		retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure. The organization: a. Retains each collection of personally identifiable information (PII) for [Assignment: organization-defined time period] to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law; b. Disposes of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PII, regardless of the method of storage, in accordance with a NARA-approved record retention schedule and in a manner that prevents loss, theft, misuse, or unauthorized access; and considered the construction of PII (including originals, copies, and archived records). The organization, where feasible, configures its information systems to record the date PII is collected, created, or updated and when PII is to be deleted or archived under an approved record retention schedule.	officials coordinate with records officers and with NARA to identify appropriate retention periods and disposal methods. NARA may require organizations to retain Pil longer than is operationally needed. In those situations, organizations describe such requirements in the notice. Methods of storage include, for example, electronic, optical media, or paper. Examples of ways organizations may reduce holdings include reducing the types of PII held (e.g., delete Social Security numbers if their use is no longer needed) or shortering the retention period for PII that is maintained if it is no longer necessary to keep PII for long periods of time (this effort is undertaken in consultation with an organization's records officer to receive NARA approval). In both examples, organizations provide notice (e.g., an updated System of Records Notice) to inform the public of any changes in holdings of PII. Certain read-only archiving techniques, such as DVDS, CDS, microfilm, or microfiche, may not permit the removal of individual records without the destruction of the entire database contained on such media.	MP-1, MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, MP-7, MP-8, SI-12,				[Privacy Controls]
Remove / Redact / Anonymize PII Data Minimization and Retention Data Retention and Disposal Data Minimization and Retention Data Retention and Disposal System Configuration Data Minimization and Retention Minimization		retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure. The organization: a. Retains each collection of personally identifiable information (PII) for [Assignment: organization-defined time period) to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law; b. Disposes of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PII, regardless of the method of storage, in accordance with a NRAR-approved record retention schedule and in a manner that prevents loss, theft, misuse, or unauthorized access, and considered in a manner that prevents loss, theft, misuse, or unauthorized access, and archived records). The organization of PII (including originals, copies, and archived records). The organization, where feasible, configures its information systems to record the date PII is collected, created, or updated and when PII is to be deleted or archived under an approved record retention schedule. The organization:	officials coordinate with records officers and with NARA to identify appropriate retention periods and disposal methods. NARA may require organizations to retain PII longer than is operationally needed. In those situations, organizations describe such requirements in the notice. Methods of storage include, for example, electronic, optical media, or paper. Examples of ways organizations may reduce holdings include reducing the types of PII held (e.g., delete Social Security numbers if their use is no longer needed) or shortening the retention period for PII that is maintained if it is no longer necessary to keep PII for long periods of time (his effort is undertaken in consultation with an organization's records officer to receive NARA approval). In both examples, organizations provide notice (e.g., an updated System of Records Notice) to inform the public of any changes in holdings of PII. Certain read-only archiving techniques, such as DVDs, CDs, microfilm, or microfiche, may not permit the removal of individual records without the destruction of the entire database contained on such media. Organizations often use PII for testing new applications or information systems prior to	MP-1, MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, MP-7, MP-8, SI-12,				[Privacy Controls]
Remove / Redact / Anonymize PII Data Minimization and Retention Data Retention and Disposal Data Minimization and Retention Data Retention and Disposal System Configuration		retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure. The organization: a. Retains each collection of personally identifiable information (PII) for [Assignment: organization-defined time period] to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law; b. Disposes of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PII, regardless of the method of storage, in accordance with a NARA-approved record retention schedule and in a manner that prevents loss, theft, misuse, or unauthorized access; and considered and in a manner that prevents loss, theft in sixes, or unauthorized access; and considered and in a manner that prevents loss, theft in sixes, or unauthorized access; and archived records). The organization, where feasible, configures its information systems to record the date PII is collected, created, or updated and when PII is to be deleted or archived under an approved record retention schedule. The organization.	officials coordinate with records officers and with NARA to identify appropriate retention periods and disposal methods. NARA may require organizations to retain Pil longer than is operationally needed. In those situations, organizations describe such requirements in the notice. Methods of storage include, for example, electronic, optical media, or paper. Examples of ways organizations may reduce holdings include reducing the types of PII held (e.g., delete Social Security numbers if their use is no longer needed) or shortening the retention period for PII that is maintained if it is no longer necessary to keep PII for long periods of time (this effort is undertaken in consultation with an organization's records officer to receive NARA approval). In both examples, organizations provide notice (e.g., an updated System of Records Notice) to inform the public of any changes in holdings of PII. Certain read-only archiving techniques, such as DVDs, CDs, microfilm, or microfiche, may not permit the removal of individual records without the destruction of the entire database contained on such media. Organizations often use PII for testing new applications or information systems prior to deployment. Organizations also use PII for research purposes and for training. The use of PII	MP-1, MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, MP-7, MP-8, SI-12,				[Privacy Controls]
Remove / Redact / Anonymize PII Data Minimization and Retention Data Retention and Disposal Data Minimization and Retention Data Retention and Disposal System Configuration Data Minimization and Retention Minimization		retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure. The organization: a. Retains each collection of personally identifiable information (PII) for [Assignment: organization-defined time period) to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law; b. Disposes of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PII, regardless of the method of storage, in accordance with a NRAR-approved record retention schedule and in a manner that prevents loss, theft, misuse, or unauthorized access, and considered in the standard of the properties of the consideration of the properties of the properties of the properties of the properties of the distribution of PIII (including originals, copies, and archived records). The organization, where feasible, configures its information systems to record the date PII is collected, created, or updated and when PII is to be deleted or archived under an approved record retention schedule. The organization is the procedures that minimize the use of personally identifiable information (PIII) for testing, training, and research; and	officials coordinate with records officers and with NARA to identify appropriate retention periods and disposal methods. NARA may require organizations to retain Pil longer than is operationally needed. In those situations, organizations describe such requirements in the notice. Methods of storage include, for example, electronic, optical media, or paper. Examples of ways organizations may reduce holdings include reducing the types of PII held (e.g., delete Social Security numbers if their use is no longer needed) or shortening the retention period for PII that is maintained if it is no longer necessary to keep PII for long periods of time (his effort is undertaken in consultation with an organization's records officer to receive NARA approval). In both examples, organizations provide notice (e.g., an updated System of Records Notice) to inform the public of any changes in holdings of PII. Certain read-only archiving techniques, such as DVDs, CDs, microfilm, or microfiche, may not permit the removal of individual records without the destruction of the entire database contained on such media. Organizations often use PII for testing new applications or information systems prior to deployment. Organizations also use PII for research purposes and for training. The use of PII in testing, research, and training increases risk of unauthorized disclosure or misuse of the	MP-1, MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, MP-7, MP-8, SI-12,				[Privacy Controls]
Remove / Redact / Anonymize PII Data Minimization and Retention Data Retention and Disposal Data Minimization and Retention Data Retention and Disposal System Configuration Data Minimization and Retention Minimization		retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure. The organization: a. Retains each collection of personally identifiable information (PII) for [Assignment: organization-defined time period] to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law; b. Disposes of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PII, regardless of the method of storage, in accordance with a NARA-approved record retention schedule and in a manner that prevents loss, theft, misuse, or unauthorized access; and considered and in a manner that prevents loss, theft in sixes, or unauthorized access; and considered and in a manner that prevents loss, theft in sixes, or unauthorized access; and archived records). The organization, where feasible, configures its information systems to record the date PII is collected, created, or updated and when PII is to be deleted or archived under an approved record retention schedule. The organization.	officials coordinate with records officers and with NARA to identify appropriate retention periods and disposal methods. NARA may require organizations to retain Pil longer than is operationally needed. In those situations, organizations describe such requirements in the notice. Methods of storage include, for example, electronic, optical media, or paper. Examples of ways organizations may reduce holdings include reducing the types of PII held (e.g., delete Social Security numbers if their use is no longer needed) or shortening the retention period for PII that is maintained if it is no longer necessary to keep PII for long periods of time (this effort is undertaken in consultation with an organization's records officer to receive NARA approval). In both examples, organizations provide notice (e.g., an updated System of Records Notice) to inform the public of any changes in holdings of PII. Certain read-only archiving techniques, such as DVDs, CDs, microfilm, or microfiche, may not permit the removal of individual records without the destruction of the entire database contained on such media. Organizations often use PII for testing new applications or information systems prior to deployment. Organizations also use PII for research purposes and for training. The use of PII in testing, research, and training increases risk of unauthorized disclosure or misuse of the information. If PII must be used, organizations take measures to minimize any associated	MP-1, MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, MP-7, MP-8, SI-12,				[Privacy Controls]
Remove / Redact / Anonymize PII Data Minimization and Retention Data Retention and Disposal Data Minimization and Retention Data Retention and Disposal System Configuration Data Minimization and Retention Minimization		retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure. The organization: a. Retains each collection of personally identifiable information (PII) for [Assignment: organization-defined time period) to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law; b. Disposes of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PII, regardless of the method of storage, in accordance with a NRAR-approved record retention schedule and in a manner that prevents loss, theft, misuse, or unauthorized access, and considered in the standard of the properties of the consideration of the properties of the properties of the properties of the properties of the distribution of PIII (including originals, copies, and archived records). The organization, where feasible, configures its information systems to record the date PII is collected, created, or updated and when PII is to be deleted or archived under an approved record retention schedule. The organization is the procedures that minimize the use of personally identifiable information (PIII) for testing, training, and research; and	officials coordinate with records officers and with NARA to identify appropriate retention periods and disposal methods. NARA may require organizations to retain PII longer than is operationally needed. In those situations, organizations describe such requirements in the notice. Methods of storage include, for example, electronic, optical media, or paper. Examples of ways organizations may reduce holdings include reducing the types of PII held (e.g., delete Social Security numbers if their use is no longer needed) or shortening the retention period for PII that is maintained if it is no longer necessary to keep PII for long periods of time (his effort is undertaken in consultation with an organization's records officer to receive NARA approval). In both examples, organizations provide notice (e.g., an updated System of Records Notice) to inform the public of any changes in holdings of PII. Certain read-only archiving techniques, such as DVDs, CDs, microfilm, or microfiche, may not permit the removal of individual records without the destruction of the entire database contained on such media. Organizations often use PII for testing new applications or information systems prior to deployment. Organizations also use PII for research purposes and for training. The use of PII in testing, research, and training increases risk of unauthorized disclosure or misuse of the information. If PII must be used, organizations take measures to minimize any associated risks and to authorize the use of and limit the amount of PIII for these purposes.	MP-1, MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, MP-7, MP-8, SI-12,				[Privacy Controls]
Remove / Redact / Anonymize PII Data Minimization and Retention Data Retention and Disposal Data Minimization and Retention Data Retention and Disposal System Configuration Data Minimization and Retention Minimization		retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure. The organization: a. Retains each collection of personally identifiable information (PII) for [Assignment: organization-defined time period) to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law; b. Disposes of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PII, regardless of the method of storage, in accordance with a NRAR-approved record retention schedule and in a manner that prevents loss, theft, misuse, or unauthorized access, and considered in the standard of the properties of the consideration of the properties of the properties of the properties of the properties of the distribution of PIII (including originals, copies, and archived records). The organization, where feasible, configures its information systems to record the date PII is collected, created, or updated and when PII is to be deleted or archived under an approved record retention schedule. The organization is the procedures that minimize the use of personally identifiable information (PIII) for testing, training, and research; and	officials coordinate with records officers and with NARA to identify appropriate retention periods and disposal methods. NARA may require organizations to retain Pil longer than is operationally needed. In those situations, organizations describe such requirements in the notice. Methods of storage include, for example, electronic, optical media, or paper. Examples of ways organizations may reduce holdings include reducing the types of PII held (e.g., delete Social Security numbers if their use is no longer needed) or shortening the retention period for PII that is maintained if it is no longer necessary to keep PII for long periods of time (this effort is undertaken in consultation with an organization's records officer to receive NARA approval). In both examples, organizations provide notice (e.g., an updated system of Records Notice) to inform the public of any changes in holdings of PII. Certain read-only archiving techniques, such as DVDs, CDs, microfilm, or microfiche, may not permit the removal of individual records without the destruction of the entire database contained on such media. Organizations often use PII for testing new applications or information systems prior to deployment. Organizations also use PII for research purposes and for training. The use of PII in testing, research, and training increases risk of unauthorized disclosure or misuse of the information. If PII must be use, Organizations take measures to minimize any associated risks and to authorize the use of and limit the amount of PII for these purposes.	MP-1, MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, MP-7, MP-8, SI-12,				[Privacy Controls]
Remove / Redact / Anonymize PII Data Minimization and Retention Data Retention and Disposal Data Minimization and Retention Data Retention and Disposal System Configuration Data Minimization and Retention Minimization		retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure. The organization: a. Retains each collection of personally identifiable information (PII) for [Assignment: organization-defined time period) to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law; b. Disposes of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PII, regardless of the method of storage, in accordance with a NRAR-approved record retention schedule and in a manner that prevents loss, theft, misuse, or unauthorized access, and considered in the standard of the properties of the consideration of the properties of the properties of the properties of the properties of the distribution of PIII (including originals, copies, and archived records). The organization, where feasible, configures its information systems to record the date PII is collected, created, or updated and when PII is to be deleted or archived under an approved record retention schedule. The organization is the procedures that minimize the use of personally identifiable information (PIII) for testing, training, and research; and	officials coordinate with records officers and with NARA to identify appropriate retention periods and disposal methods. NARA may require organizations to retain Pil longer than is operationally needed. In those situations, organizations describe such requirements in the notice. Methods of storage include, for example, electronic, optical media, or paper. Examples of ways organizations may reduce holdings include reducing the types of PII held (e.g., delete Social Security numbers if their use is no longer needed) or shortening the retention period for PII that is maintained if it is no longer necessary to keep PII for long periods of time (this effort is undertaken in consultation with an organization's records officer to receive NARA approval). In both examples, organizations provide notice (e.g., an updated system of Records Notice) to inform the public of any changes in holdings of PII. Certain read-only archiving techniques, such as DVDs, CDs, microfilm, or microfiche, may not permit the removal of individual records without the destruction of the entire database contained on such media. Organizations often use PII for testing new applications or information systems prior to deployment. Organizations also use PII for research purposes and for training. The use of PII in testing, research, and training increases risk of unauthorized disclosure or misuse of the information. If PII must be use, Organizations take measures to minimize any associated risks and to authorize the use of and limit the amount of PII for these purposes.	MP-1, MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, MP-7, MP-8, SI-12,				[Privacy Controls]
Remove / Redact / Anonymize PII Data Minimization and Retention Data Retention and Disposal Data Minimization and Retention Data Retention and Disposal System Configuration Data Minimization and Retention Minimization		retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure. The organization: a. Retains each collection of personally identifiable information (PII) for [Assignment: organization-defined time period) to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law; b. Disposes of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PII, regardless of the method of storage, in accordance with a NRAR-approved record retention schedule and in a manner that prevents loss, theft, misuse, or unauthorized access, and considered in the standard of the properties of the consideration of the properties of the properties of the properties of the properties of the distribution of PIII (including originals, copies, and archived records). The organization, where feasible, configures its information systems to record the date PII is collected, created, or updated and when PII is to be deleted or archived under an approved record retention schedule. The organization is the procedures that minimize the use of personally identifiable information (PIII) for testing, training, and research; and	officials coordinate with records officers and with NARA to identify appropriate retention periods and disposal methods. NARA may require organizations to retain PII longer than is operationally needed. In those situations, organizations describe such requirements in the notice. Methods of storage include, for example, electronic, optical media, or paper. Examples of ways organizations may reduce holdings include reducing the types of PII held (e.g., delete Social Security numbers if their use is no longer needed) or shortening the retention period for PII that is maintained if it is no longer necessary to keep PII for long periods of time (his effort is undertaken in consultation with an organization's records officer to receive NARA approval). In both examples, organizations provide notice (e.g., an updated System of Records Notice) to inform the public of any changes in holdings of PII. Certain read-only archiving techniques, such as DVDs, CDs, microfilm, or microfiche, may not permit the removal of individual records without the destruction of the entire database contained on such media. Organizations often use PII for testing new applications or information systems prior to deployment. Organizations also use PII for research purposes and for training. The use of PII in testing, research, and training increases risk of unauthorized disclosure or misuse of the information. If PII must be used, organizations take measures to minimize any associated risks and to authorize the use of and limit the amount of PIII for these purposes.	MP-1, MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, MP-7, MP-8, SI-12,				[Privacy Controls]
Remove / Redact / Anonymize PII Data Minimization and Retention Data Retention and Disposal Data Minimization and Retention Data Retention and Disposal System Configuration Data Minimization and Retention Minimization		retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure. The organization: a. Retains each collection of personally identifiable information (PII) for [Assignment: organization-defined time period) to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law; b. Disposes of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PII, regardless of the method of storage, in accordance with a NRAR-approved record retention schedule and in a manner that prevents loss, theft, misuse, or unauthorized access, and considered in the standard of the properties of the consideration of the properties of the properties of the properties of the properties of the distribution of PIII (including originals, copies, and archived records). The organization, where feasible, configures its information systems to record the date PII is collected, created, or updated and when PII is to be deleted or archived under an approved record retention schedule. The organization is the procedures that minimize the use of personally identifiable information (PIII) for testing, training, and research; and	officials coordinate with records officers and with NARA to identify appropriate retention periods and disposal methods. NARA may require organizations to retain Pil longer than is operationally needed. In those situations, organizations describe such requirements in the notice. Methods of storage include, for example, electronic, optical media, or paper. Examples of ways organizations may reduce holdings include reducing the types of Pil held (e.g., delete Social Security numbers if their use is no longer needed) or shortening the retention period for Pil that is maintained if it is no longer necessary to keep Pil For long periods of time (this effort is undertaken in consultation with an organization's records officer to receive NARA approval). In both examples, organizations provide notice (e.g., an updated System of Records Notice) to inform the public of any changes in holdings of Pil. Certain read-only archiving techniques, such as DVDs, CDs, microfilm, or microfiche, may not permit the removal of individual records without the destruction of the entire database contained on such media. Organizations often use Pil for testing new applications or information systems prior to deployment. Organizations also use Pil for research purposes and for training. The use of Pil in testing, research, and training increases risk of unauthorized disclosure or misuse of the information. If Pil must be used, organizations take measures to minimize any associated infixed and a control testing, training, and research is compatible with the roginal purpose for which it was	MP-1, MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, MP-7, MP-8, SI-12,				[Privacy Controls]
Remove / Redact / Anonymize PII Data Minimization and Retention Data Retention and Disposal Data Minimization and Retention Data Retention and Disposal System Configuration Data Minimization and Retention Minimization of PII Used in Testing, Training, and Research		retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure. The organization: a. Retains each collection of personally identifiable information (PII) for [Assignment: organization-defined time period] to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law; b. Disposes of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PII, regardless of the method of storage, in accordance with a NRRA-approved record retention schedule and in amaner that prevents loss, theft, misuse, or unauthorized access, and c. Uses [Assignment: organization defined techniques or methods] to ensure secure deletion or destruction of PII (including originals, copies, and archived records). The organization, where feasible, configures its information systems to record the date PII is collected, created, or updated and when PII is to be deleted or archived under an approved record retention schedule. The organization archived in the deleted or archived under an approved record retention schedule. The organization relationship is to be deleted or archived under an approved record retention schedule. The organization relationship is to be deleted or archived under an approved record retention schedule. The organization relationship is to be deleted or archived under an approved record retention schedule. In properties of the date PII is to be deleted or archived under an approved record retention schedule. In properties or updated and when PII is to be deleted or archived under an approved record retention schedule. In properties or updated and when PII is to be deleted or archived under an approved record retention schedule. In properties or updated and when PII is to be deleted or archived under an approved record retention schedule.	officials coordinate with records officers and with NARA to identify appropriate retention periods and disposal methods. NARA may require organizations to retain Pill longer than is operationally needed. In those situations, organizations describe such requirements in the notice. Methods of storage include, for example, electronic, optical media, or paper. Examples of ways organizations may reduce holdings include reducing the types of PII held (e.g., delete Social Security numbers if their use is no longer needed) or shortening the retention period for PII that is maintained if it is no longer necessary to keep PII for long periods of time (this effort is undertaken in consultation with an organization's records officer to receive NARA approval). In both examples, organizations provide notice (e.g., an updated System of Records Notice) to inform the public of any changes in holdings of PII. Certain read-only archiving techniques, such as DVDS, CDS, microfilm, or microfiche, may not permit the removal of individual records without the destruction of the entire database contained on such media. Organizations often use PII for testing new applications or information systems prior to deployment. Organizations also use PII for research purposes and for training. The use of PII in testing, research, and training increases risk of unauthorized disclosure or misuse of the information. If PII must be used, organizations take measures to minimize any associated risks and to authorize the use of and limit the amount of PII for these purposes. Organizations consult with the SAOP/CPO and legal course! to ensure that the use of PII in testing, raning, and research is compatible with the original purpose for which it was collected.	MP-1, MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, MP-7, MP-8, SI-12,				[Privacy Controls] [Privacy Controls]
Remove / Redact / Anonymize PII Data Minimization and Retention Data Retention and Disposal Data Minimization and Retention Data Retention and Disposal System Configuration Data Minimization and Retention Minimization of PII Used in Testing, Training, and Research Data Minimization and Retention Minimization		retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure. The organization: a. Retains each collection of personally identifiable information (PII) for [Assignment: organization-defined time period] to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law; b. Disposes of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PII, regardless of the method of storage, in accordance with a NRAR-approved record retention schedule and in amaner that prevents loss, theft, misuse, or unauthorized access, and considered and in amaner that prevents loss, theft, misuse, or unauthorized access, and considered and archived records). The organization of PII (including originals, copies, and archived records). The organization, where feasible, configures its information systems to record the date PII is collected, created, or updated and when PII is to be deleted or archived under an approved record retention schedule. The organization: a. Develops policies and procedures that minimize the use of personally identifiable information (PII) for testing, training, and research, and b. Implements controls to protect PII used for testing, training, and research.	officials coordinate with records officers and with NARA to identify appropriate retention periods and disposal methods. NARA may require organizations to retain Pil longer than is operationally needed. In those situations, organizations describe such requirements in the notice. Methods of storage include, for example, electronic, optical media, or paper. Examples of ways organizations may reduce holdings include reducing the types of PII held (e.g., delete Social Security numbers if their use is no longer needed) or shortening the retention period for PII that is maintained if it is no longer necessary to keep PII for long periods of time (this effort is undertaken in consultation with an organization's records officer to receive NARA approval). In both examples, organizations provide notice (e.g., an updated system of Records Notice) to inform the public of any changes in holdings of PII. Certain read-only archiving techniques, such as DVDs, CDs, microfilm, or microfiche, may not permit the removal of individual records without the destruction of the entire database contained on such media. Organizations often use PII for testing new applications or information systems prior to deployment. Organizations is also use PII for research purposes and for training. The use of PII in testing, research, and training increases risk of unauthorized disclosure or misuse of the information. If PII must be use, organizations take measures to minimize any associated risks and to authorize the use of and limit the amount of PII for these purposes. Organizations consult with the SAOP/CPO and legal counsel to ensure that the use of PII in testing, training, and research is compatible with the original purpose for which it was collected. Organizations consult with the SAOP/CPO and legal counsel to ensure that the use of PII in testing, training, and research is compatible with the original purpose for which it was collected.	MP-1, MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, MP-7, MP-8, SI-12,				[Privacy Controls]
Remove / Redact / Anonymize PII Data Minimization and Retention Data Retention and Disposal Data Minimization and Retention Data Retention and Disposal System Configuration Data Minimization and Retention Minimization of PII Used in Testing, Training, and Research		retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure. The organization: a. Retains each collection of personally identifiable information (PII) for [Assignment: organization-defined time period] to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law; b. Disposes of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PII, regardless of the method of storage, in accordance with a NRRA-approved record retention schedule and in amaner that prevents loss, theft, misuse, or unauthorized access, and c. Uses [Assignment: organization defined techniques or methods] to ensure secure deletion or destruction of PII (including originals, copies, and archived records). The organization, where feasible, configures its information systems to record the date PII is collected, created, or updated and when PII is to be deleted or archived under an approved record retention schedule. The organization archived in the deleted or archived under an approved record retention schedule. The organization relationship is to be deleted or archived under an approved record retention schedule. The organization relationship is to be deleted or archived under an approved record retention schedule. The organization relationship is to be deleted or archived under an approved record retention schedule. In properties of the date PII is to be deleted or archived under an approved record retention schedule. In properties or updated and when PII is to be deleted or archived under an approved record retention schedule. In properties or updated and when PII is to be deleted or archived under an approved record retention schedule. In properties or updated and when PII is to be deleted or archived under an approved record retention schedule.	officials coordinate with records officers and with NARA to identify appropriate retention periods and disposal methods. NARA may require organizations to retain Pill longer than is operationally needed. In those situations, organizations describe such requirements in the notice. Methods of storage include, for example, electronic, optical media, or paper. Examples of ways organizations may reduce holdings include reducing the types of PII held (e.g., delete Social Security numbers if their use is no longer needed) or shortening the retention period for PII that is maintained if it is no longer necessary to keep PII for long periods of time (this effort is undertaken in consultation with an organization's records officer to receive NARA approval). In both examples, organizations provide notice (e.g., an updated System of Records Notice) to inform the public of any changes in holdings of PII. Certain read-only archiving techniques, such as DVDS, CDS, microfilm, or microfiche, may not permit the removal of individual records without the destruction of the entire database contained on such media. Organizations often use PII for testing new applications or information systems prior to deployment. Organizations also use PII for research purposes and for training. The use of PII in testing, research, and training increases risk of unauthorized disclosure or misuse of the information. If PII must be used, organizations take measures to minimize any associated risks and to authorize the use of and limit the amount of PII for these purposes. Organizations consult with the SAOP/CPO and legal course! to ensure that the use of PII in testing, raning, and research is compatible with the original purpose for which it was collected.	MP-1, MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, MP-7, MP-8, SI-12,				[Privacy Controls] [Privacy Controls]
		Data Integrity Board Publish Agreements on Website Data Minimization and Retention Data Minimization and Retention Minimization	Data Integrity Board Fublish Agreements on Website Data Minimization and Retention The organization: a. Identifies the minimum personally identifiable information (PII) elements that are relevant and necessary to accomplish the legally authorized purpose of collection; b. Limits the collection and retention of PII to the minimum elements identified for the purposes described in the notice and for which the individual has provided consent; and c. Conducts an initial evaluation of PII bodings and restaineds and follows as chedule for regularly reviewing those holdings [Assignment: organization: a. Identifies the minimum personally identifiable information (PII) elements that are relevant and necessary to accomplish the legally authorized purpose of collections as a chedule for the purposes of the province of the purpose of the purp	system of records with nonfederal records for the purpose of establishing or verifying the eligibility of, or continuing compliance with, statutory and regulatory requirements by, applicants for, recipients or beneficiaries of, participants in, or provides of services with respect to each or in-kind assistance or payments under federal benefit programs or computerized comparisons of two or more automated federal personnel or payvil systems of records or a system of federal personnel or payvil systems of provides and of propriet cords with nonfederal personnel or payvil systems of records or a system of federal personnel or payvil systems of records or a system of federal personnel or payvil systems of provides and provides of provides and provides with nonfederal personnel or payvil systems of provides and provides of publish Agreements on Website Data Minimization and Retention The organization and Retention I Minimization of Personally identifiable information (PII) elements that are relevant and necessary to accomplish the legally authorized purpose of collection; b. Limits the collection and retention of PII to the minimum elements identified for the purpose described in the notice and for which the individual has provides consent; and c. Conducts an initial evaluation of PII holdings and establishes and follows a schedule for regular years are considered by the provides of the PII the againstation under the provides of the PII the againstation is authorized to collect. Program officials consult with the Senior Agency Official for Pivacy (PiCliffer (PCI) and legal counsel to identify the minimum PII elements that only PII identified in the notice is collected and retained, and that the PII continues to be necessary to accomplish the legally authorized purpose. Organizations can further reduce their privacy and security risks by also reducing their inventory of PII, where appropriate. OMB Memorandum 07-16 requires organizations to conduct both an initial review and subsequent reviews of their holdings of	system of records with nonfederal records for the purpose of establishing or verifying the eligibility of, or continuing compliance with, statutory and regulatory requirements by, applicants for, recipients or beneficiaries of, participants in, or providers of services with respect to cash or in-kind assistance no payments under federal personal or payroll systems of records or a system of federal personal or payroll systems with nonfederal records. See Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (a)(8)(A). The organization publishes Computer Matching Agreements on its public website. Data Minimization and Retention Data Minimization and Retention The organization: a. identifies the minimum personally identifiable information (PII) elements that are relevant and necessary to accomplish the legally authorized purpose of collections of PII organizations to interest that the collection and retention of PII to the minimum elements is destribed in the routed or all to the individual has provided consent, and c. Conducts an initial evaluation of PII biodings and establishes and follows: a schedule for regularly reviewing those holdings (plagments or plantage) or provides to the purpose of cellification of PII is demand to the required by the information of PII organization is a submixed to CityO and legal counsel to identify the minimum PII elements required to interest the privacy and security risks by also reducing their minimum personally identifiable information (PII) is ensure that the notice and for which the individual has provided consent, and c. Conducts an initial evaluation of PII is deniend and the interest of PII cellerance in the individual has provided consent, and c. Conducts consent with the Seal Privacy and sculpture provides an initial evaluation consult in the Seal Privacy and sculpture provides an initial evaluation of PII is deniented by the privacy and sculpture provides an initial evaluation consult in the Seal Privacy and sculpture provides and privacy provides a	system of records with nonfederal records for the purpose of establishing or verifying the eligibility of, or continuing compliance with, statutory and regulatory requirements by, applicants for, recipients or heneficiaries of, participants in, or providers of services with respect to cash or in-livid assistance or payment under federal henefit programs or computerized companions of two or more automated federal personnel or payroll systems of records or a system of federal personnel personnel or payroll systems of records or a system of federal personnel or payroll records with nonfederal records. See Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. § 522a (i)(6)(A). Data Minimization and Retention of Participants in the companion of the propose of collection of Participants and Retention	ystem of records with nonfederal records, for the purpose of establishing or verifying the eligibility of, or continuing compliance with, statutory and regulators requirements by, applicants for, recipients or beneficiaries of, participants in, or providers of services with respect to cash or in-kind assistance or payments under federal penefit programs or computered comparisons of two or more automated federal penefit personnel or payroll systems of records or a system of feering personnel or payroll systems of records or payroll systems of records or payroll systems of records or payroll systems or payroll syste	system of records with nonfecteral records for the purpose of establishing or verifying the eligibility of, continuing compliance with, statutory and regulatory requirements by, applicants for, recipients or beneficiaries of, participants in, or providers of services with respect to cache or in-kind assistance or payments undereced with nonfecteral records. See Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, S U.S.C. 9 522a (p)(8)(A). Data Obain Integrity and Data Integrity and Data Integrity and Data Integrity Board Publish Agreements on Website Data Minimization and Retention Data Integrity Data Integrity and Data Integrity and Data Integrity Data Integrity

Control ID	Louis	Control Name	Control Tout	Construents Coldens	Bulated Controls	Darley of the		Maril 112		
IA-1	revel 1	Control Name Withdrawn Identification and Authentication Identification	Control Text The organization:	Supplemental Guidance This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective	PM-9	Priority P1	X V	wood Hij	gn	notes
""	•	and Authentication Policy and Procedures	a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or	implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the IA family.			^ ′	` ^		
			roles]:	Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives,						
I			a.1. An identification and authentication policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles,	regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at						
I			responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and	the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures						
I			compliance; and	unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy						
I			a.2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the identification and authentication policy and							
I			associated identification and authentication controls; and	complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security						
I			b. Reviews and updates the current:	program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk						
I			b.1. Identification and authentication policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and	management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.						
I			b.2. Identification and authentication procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].							
I										
IA-2	1	Identification and Authentication Identification	The information system uniquely identifies and authenticates organizational users (or processes	Organizational users include employees or individuals that organizations deem to have equivalent status of	AC-2,AC-3,AC-14,AC-	P1	x b	x x		
"-	•	and Authentication (Organizational Users)	acting on behalf of organizational users).	employees (e.g., contractors, guest researchers). This control applies to all accesses other than: (i) accesses that are	17,AC-18,IA-4,IA-5,IA-		l^	` ^		
l		, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,		explicitly identified and documented in AC-14; and (ii) accesses that occur through authorized use of group	8					
l				authenticators without individual authentication. Organizations may require unique identification of individuals in group accounts (e.g., shared privilege accounts) or for detailed accountability of individual activity. Organizations						
l				employ passwords, tokens, or biometrics to authenticate user identities, or in the case multifactor authentication,						
l				or some combination thereof. Access to organizational information systems is defined as either local access or						
I				network access. Local access is any access to organizational information systems by users (or processes acting on						
l				behalf of users) where such access is obtained by direct connections without the use of networks. Network access is access to organizational information systems by users (or processes acting on behalf of users) where such access						
l				is obtained through network connections (i.e., nonlocal accesses). Remote access is a type of network access that						
I				involves communication through external networks (e.g., the Internet). Internal networks include local area						
l				networks and wide area networks. In addition, the use of encrypted virtual private networks (VPNs) for network						
				connections between organization-controlled endpoints and non-organization controlled endpoints may be treated as internal networks from the perspective of protecting the confidentiality and integrity of information traversing						
l				the network. Organizations can satisfy the identification and authentication requirements in this control by						
				complying with the requirements in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 consistent with the specific						
				organizational implementation plans. Multifactor authentication requires the use of two or more different factors						
				to achieve authentication. The factors are defined as: (i) something you know (e.g., password, personal						
				identification number [PIN]); (ii) something you have (e.g., cryptographic identification device, token); or (iii) something you are (e.g., biometric). Multifactor solutions that require devices separate from information systems						
				gaining access include, for example, hardware tokens providing time-based or challenge-response authenticators						
l				and smart cards such as the U.S. Government Personal Identity Verification card and the DoD common access card.						
				In addition to identifying and authenticating users at the information system level (i.e., at logon), organizations also						
				employ identification and authentication mechanisms at the application level, when necessary, to provide						
				increased information security. Identification and authentication requirements for other than organizational users are described in IA-8.						
I										
I										
I										
IA-2 (1)	2	Identification and Authentication Identification	The information system implements multifactor authentication for network access to privileged		AC-6		x 2	x x		
I "I		and Authentication (Organizational Users)	accounts.							
		Network Access to Privileged Accounts								l
		<u>'</u>					╙			
IA-2 (2)	2	Identification and Authentication Identification	The information system implements multifactor authentication for network access to non-				,	x x		
		and Authentication (Organizational Users)	privileged accounts.							
		Network Access to Non-Privileged Accounts								
IA-2 (3)	2	Identification and Authentication Identification	The information system implements multifactor authentication for local access to privileged		AC-6		,	x X		
		and Authentication (Organizational Users) Local	accounts.							
		Access to Privileged Accounts								
IA-2 (4)	2	Identification and Authentication Identification	The information system implements multifactor authentication for local access to non-privileged					X		
I		and Authentication (Organizational Users) Local	accounts.							
l		Access to Non-Privileged Accounts								
									-	
IA-2 (5)	2	Identification and Authentication Identification	The organization requires individuals to be authenticated with an individual authenticator when a group authenticator is employed.							
I		and Authentication (Organizational Users) Group Authentication	group authenticator is employed.	helps organizations to mitigate the risk of using group authenticators.						
I		Authenticution								
IA-2 (6)	2	Identification and Authentication Identification	The information system implements multifactor authentication for network access to privileged		AC-6				_	
1A-2 (0)	2	and Authentication (Organizational Users)	accounts such that one of the factors is provided by a device separate from the system gaining		7.0-0					
		Network Access to Privileged Accounts - Separate	access and the device meets [Assignment: organization-defined strength of mechanism							
		Device	requirements).							
IA-2 (7)	2	Identification and Authentication Identification	The information system implements multifactor authentication for network access to non-							
["	-	and Authentication (Organizational Users)	privileged accounts such that one of the factors is provided by a device separate from the system							l
		Network Access to Non-Privileged Accounts -	gaining access and the device meets [Assignment: organization-defined strength of mechanism							l
		Separate Device	requirements].							l
IA-2 (8)	2	Identification and Authentication Identification	The information system implements replay-resistant authentication mechanisms for network	Authentication processes resist replay attacks if it is impractical to achieve successful			,	x x		
	_	and Authentication (Organizational Users)	access to privileged accounts.	authentications by replaying previous authentication messages. Replay-resistant			ľ	l"		
		Network Access to Privileged Accounts - Replay		techniques include, for example, protocols that use nonces or challenges such as Transport						
		Resistant		Layer Security (TLS) and time synchronous or challenge-response one-time authenticators.						
IA-2 (9)	2	Identification and Authentication Identification	The information system implements replay-resistant authentication mechanisms for network	Authentication processes resist replay attacks if it is impractical to achieve successful				х		
'1		and Authentication (Organizational Users)	access to non-privileged accounts.	authentications by recording/replaying previous authentication messages. Replay-resistant						l
		Network Access to Non-Privileged Accounts -		techniques include, for example, protocols that use nonces or challenges such as Transport						l
		Replay Resistant		Layer Security (TLS) and time synchronous or challenge-response one-time authenticators.						
IA-2 (10)	2	Identification and Authentication Identification	The information system provides a single sign-on capability for [Assignment: organization-defined	Single sign-on enables users to log in once and gain access to multiple information system						
		and Authentication (Organizational Users) Single	information system accounts and services].	resources. Organizations consider the operational efficiencies provided by single sign-on						
		Sign-On		capabilities with the increased risk from disclosures of single authenticators providing						
				access to multiple system resources.						
IA-2 (11)	2	Identification and Authentication Identification	The information system implements multifactor authentication for remote access to privileged	For remote access to privileged/non-privileged accounts, the purpose of requiring a device	AC-6		,	x x		
I '1		and Authentication (Organizational Users)	and non-privileged accounts such that one of the factors is provided by a device separate from the	that is separate from the information system gaining access for one of the factors during						
I		Remote Access - Separate Device	system gaining access and the device meets [Assignment: organization-defined strength of	multifactor authentication is to reduce the likelihood of compromising authentication						l
			mechanism requirements].	credentials stored on the system. For example, adversaries deploying malicious code on						l
I				organizational information systems can potentially compromise such credentials resident						l
				on the system and subsequently impersonate authorized users.						l
							\Box			
IA-2 (12)	2	Identification and Authentication Identification	The information system accepts and electronically verifies Personal Identity Verification (PIV)	This control enhancement applies to organizations implementing logical access control	AU-2,PE-3,SA-4		x 2	x x		
		and Authentication (Organizational Users)	credentials.	systems (LACS) and physical access control systems (PACS). Personal Identity Verification						
		Acceptance of PIV Credentials		(PIV) credentials are those credentials issued by federal agencies that conform to FIPS						
				Publication 201 and supporting guidance documents. OMB Memorandum 11-11 requires						
				federal agencies to continue implementing the requirements specified in HSPD-12 to						
				enable agency-wide use of PIV credentials.						

Control ID		Control Name	Male aleman	Control Trust	Sunday and Caldy as	Balata d Cambrida					
Control ID IA-2 (13)	raval 2	Control Name Identification and Authentication Identification	Vithdrawn	Control Text The information system implements [Assignment: organization-defined out-of-band	Supplemental Guidance Out-of-band authentication (OOBA) refers to the use of two separate communication paths	IA-10 IA-11 SC-37	nonty	ow M	od Hig	30	votes
IA-2 (13)	2	and Authentication (Organizational Users) Out-		authentication] under [Assignment: organization-defined conditions].	to identify and authenticate users or devices to an information system. The first path (i.e.,	IA-10,IA-11,3C-37					
1		Of-Band Authentication		dutientestion and prosignments organization defined conditions.	the in-band path), is used to identify and authenticate users or devices, and generally is the						
1		oj sana natrenteatori			path through which information flows. The second path (i.e., the out-of-band path) is used						
					to independently verify the authentication and/or requested action. For example, a user						
					authenticates via a notebook computer to a remote server to which the user desires						
					access, and requests some action of the server via that communication path. Subsequently,						
					the server contacts the user via the user's cell phone to verify that the requested action						
					originated from the user. The user may either confirm the intended action to an individual						
					on the telephone or provide an authentication code via the telephone. This type of						
					authentication can be employed by organizations to mitigate actual or suspected man-in						
					the-middle attacks. The conditions for activation can include, for example, suspicious						
					activities, new threat indicators or elevated threat levels, or the impact level or						
					classification level of information in requested transactions.						
IA-3	1	Identification and Authentication Device		The information system uniquely identifies and authenticates [Assignment: organization-defined	Organizational devices requiring unique device-to-device identification and authentication		1	x	х		
		Identification and Authentication		specific and/or types of devices] before establishing a [Selection (one or more): local; remote;	may be defined by type, by device, or by a combination of type/device. Information systems	19,CA-3,IA-4,IA-5					
				network] connection.	typically use either shared known information (e.g., Media Access Control [MAC] or						
					Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol [TCP/IP] addresses) for device identification						
					or organizational authentication solutions (e.g., IEEE 802.1x and Extensible Authentication						
					Protocol [EAP], Radius server with EAP-Transport Layer Security [TLS] authentication, Kerberos) to identify/authenticate devices on local and/or wide area networks.						
					Organizations determine the required strength of authentication mechanisms by the						
					security categories of information systems. Because of the challenges of applying this						
					control on large scale, organizations are encouraged to only apply the control to those						
					limited number (and type) of devices that truly need to support this capability.						
					the state of the s						
IA-3 (1)	2	Identification and Authentication Device		The information system authenticates [Assignment: organization-defined specific devices and/or	A local connection is any connection with a device communicating without the use of a	SC-8,SC-12,SC-13				\neg	
1		Identification and Authentication Cryptographic		types of devices] before establishing [Selection (one or more): local; remote; network] connection	network. A network connection is any connection with a device that communicates through						
		Bidirectional Authentication		using bidirectional authentication that is cryptographically based.	a network (e.g., local area or wide area network, Internet). A remote connection is any						
					connection with a device communicating through an external network (e.g., the Internet).						
1					Bidirectional authentication provides stronger safeguards to validate the identity of other						
					devices for connections that are of greater risk (e.g., remote connections).						
(4.2.(2)	2	Identification and Authentication Device						_		_	Darrah di ta a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
IA-3 (2)	2	Identification and Authentication Device Identification and Authentication Cryptographic	X							Į.	Withdrawn: Incorporated into IA-3 (1)]
		Bidirectional Network Authentication									
		bidirectional Network Addrenacution									
IA-3 (3)	2	Identification and Authentication Device		The organization:	DHCP-enabled clients obtaining leases for IP addresses from DHCP servers, is a typical	AU-2,AU-3,AU-6,AU-				$\overline{}$	
11.5 (5)	-	Identification and Authentication Dynamic		(a) Standardizes dynamic address allocation lease information and the lease duration assigned to		12					
1		Address Allocation		devices in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined lease information and lease	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,						
1				duration]; and							
				(b) Audits lease information when assigned to a device.							
IA-3 (4)	2	Identification and Authentication Device		The organization ensures that device identification and authentication based on attestation is	Device attestation refers to the identification and authentication of a device based on its						
		Identification and Authentication Device		handled by [Assignment: organization-defined configuration management process].	configuration and known operating state. This might be determined via some						
		Attestation			cryptographic hash of the device. If device attestation is the means of identification and						
					authentication, then it is important that patches and updates to the device are handled via						
					a configuration management process such that the those patches/updates are done						
					securely and at the same time do not disrupt the identification and authentication to other						
IA-4	-	Identification and Authentication Identifier		The organization manages information system identifiers by:	devices. Common device identifiers include, for example, media access control (MAC), Internet	AC-2,IA-2,IA-3,IA-5,IA-F		, ,		\rightarrow	
104-4	-	Management		a. Receiving authorization from [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to assign an		8.SC-37	*	` ^	l^		
1		Muliugement		individual, group, role, or device identifier;	identifiers is not applicable to shared information system accounts (e.g., guest and	0,50 57					
1				b. Selecting an identifier that identifies an individual, group, role, or device;	anonymous accounts). Typically, individual identifiers are the user names of the information						
1				c. Assigning the identifier to the intended individual, group, role, or device;	system accounts assigned to those individuals. In such instances, the account management						
1				d. Preventing reuse of identifiers for [Assignment: organization-defined time period]; and	activities of AC-2 use account names provided by IA-4. This control also addresses individual						
1				e. Disabling the identifier after [Assignment: organization-defined time period of inactivity].	identifiers not necessarily associated with information system accounts (e.g., identifiers						
1					used in physical security control databases accessed by badge reader systems for access to						
					information systems). Preventing reuse of identifiers implies preventing the assignment of						
1					previously used individual, group, role, or device identifiers to different individuals, groups,						
					roles, or devices.						
	_	Ideal Control and Author() 11 11 11		The second state of the se		47.3		_	_	_	
IA-4 (1)	2	Identification and Authentication Identifier		The organization prohibits the use of information system account identifiers that are the same as		AT-2					
		Management Prohibit Account Identifiers As Public Identifiers		public identifiers for individual electronic mail accounts.	public identifier such as the individual identifier section of an electronic mail address, makes it more difficult for adversaries to guess user identifiers on organizational						
					information systems.						
IA-4 (2)	2	Identification and Authentication Identifier		The organization requires that the registration process to receive an individual identifier includes	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,						
		Management Supervisor Authorization		supervisor authorization.							
IA-4 (3)	2	Identification and Authentication Identifier		The organization requires multiple forms of certification of individual identification be presented	Requiring multiple forms of identification, such as documentary evidence or a combination						
		Management Multiple Forms of Certification		to the registration authority.	of documents and biometrics, reduces the likelihood of individuals using fraudulent						
					identification to establish an identity, or at least increases the work factor of potential						
14.4/	-	Identification and Author/		The assemblation manages individual identifies by the transference with the second transference and transfer	adversaries.	AT 2					
IA-4 (4)	2	Identification and Authentication Identifier		The organization manages individual identifiers by uniquely identifying each individual as		AT-2					
1		Management Identify User Status		[Assignment: organization-defined characteristic identifying individual status].	foreign nationals. Identifying the status of individuals by specific characteristics provides additional information about the people with whom organizational personnel are						
1					communicating. For example, it might be useful for a government employee to know that						
1					one of the individuals on an email message is a contractor.						
1											
IA-4 (5)	2	Identification and Authentication Identifier		The information system dynamically manages identifiers.	In contrast to conventional approaches to identification which presume static accounts for	AC-16					
/		Management Dynamic Management			preregistered users, many distributed information systems including, for example, service-						
					oriented architectures, rely on establishing identifiers at run time for entities that were						
					previously unknown. In these situations, organizations anticipate and provision for the						
					dynamic establishment of identifiers. Preestablished trust relationships and mechanisms						
					with appropriate authorities to validate identities and related credentials are essential.						
14.4/=1	-	Identification and Author/		The appearing the appealing the with Maximum and the second secon	Conse accomination identifies management as add the second St. for						
IA-4 (6)	2	Identification and Authentication Identifier		The organization coordinates with [Assignment: organization-defined external organizations] for	Cross-organization identifier management provides the capability for organizations to						
1		Management Cross-Organization Management		cross-organization management of identifiers.	appropriately identify individuals, groups, roles, or devices when conducting cross-						
1					organization activities involving the processing, storage, or transmission of information.						
IA-4 (7)	2	Identification and Authentication Identifier		The organization requires that the registration process to receive an individual identifier be	In-person registration reduces the likelihood of fraudulent identifiers being issued because						
		Management In-Person Registration		conducted in person before a designated registration authority.	it requires the physical presence of individuals and actual face-to-face interactions with						
					designated registration authorities.						
					·						

ontrol ID I	ovol	Control Name	Withdrawn	Control Text	Supplemental Guidance	Palated Controls	Priority	Low	Mod	High	Notes
A-5	1	Identification and Authentication Authenticator	MuldrefVIII	The organization manages information system authenticators by:	Individual authenticators include, for example, passwords, tokens, biometrics, PKI	AC-2.AC-3.AC-6.CM-	P1	X I	X	X	noics
~ ·	-	Management		a. Verifying, as part of the initial authenticator distribution, the identity of the individual, group,	certificates, and key cards. Initial authenticator content is the actual content (e.g., the initial		· -	`		^	
		Management		role, or device receiving the authenticator:	password) as opposed to requirements about authenticator content (e.g., minimum	4,PS-5,PS-6,SC-12,SC-					
				b. Establishing initial authenticator content for authenticators defined by the organization;	password length). In many cases, developers ship information system components with	13,SC-17,SC-28					
				c. Ensuring that authenticators have sufficient strength of mechanism for their intended use:	factory default authentication credentials to allow for initial installation and configuration.	.,,					
				d. Establishing and implementing administrative procedures for initial authenticator distribution,	Default authentication credentials are often well known, easily discoverable, and present a						
				for lost/compromised or damaged authenticators, and for revoking authenticators:	significant security risk. The requirement to protect individual authenticators may be						
				e. Changing default content of authenticators prior to information system installation;	implemented via control PL-4 or PS-6 for authenticators in the possession of individuals and						
				f. Establishing minimum and maximum lifetime restrictions and reuse conditions for	by controls AC-3, AC-6, and SC-28 for authenticators stored within organizational						
				authenticators:	information systems (e.g., passwords stored in hashed or encrypted formats, files containing						
				g. Changing/refreshing authenticators [Assignment: organization-defined time period by	encrypted or hashed passwords accessible with administrator privileges). Information						
				authenticator type];	systems support individual authenticator management by organization-defined settings and						
				h. Protecting authenticator content from unauthorized disclosure and modification;	restrictions for various authenticator characteristics including, for example, minimum						
				i. Requiring individuals to take, and having devices implement, specific security safeguards to	password length, password composition, validation time window for time synchronous one-						
				protect authenticators; and	time tokens, and number of allowed rejections during the verification stage of biometric						
				j. Changing authenticators for group/role accounts when membership to those accounts changes.	authentication. Specific actions that can be taken to safeguard authenticators include, for						
					example, maintaining possession of individual authenticators, not loaning or sharing						
					individual authenticators with others, and reporting lost, stolen, or compromised						
					authenticators immediately. Authenticator management includes issuing and revoking,						
					when no longer needed, authenticators for temporary access such as that required for						
					remote maintenance. Device authenticators include, for example, certificates and						
					passwords.						
IA-5 (1)	2	Identification and Authentication Authenticator		The information system, for password-based authentication:	This control enhancement applies to single-factor authentication of individuals using	IA-6		х	x	х	
		Management Password-Based Authentication		(a) Enforces minimum password complexity of [Assignment: organization-defined requirements	passwords as individual or group authenticators, and in a similar manner, when passwords						
				for case sensitivity, number of characters, mix of upper-case letters, lower-case letters, numbers,	are part of multifactor authenticators. This control enhancement does not apply when						
				and special characters, including minimum requirements for each type];	passwords are used to unlock hardware authenticators (e.g., Personal Identity Verification						
				(b) Enforces at least the following number of changed characters when new passwords are	cards). The implementation of such password mechanisms may not meet all of the						
				created: [Assignment: organization-defined number];	requirements in the enhancement. Cryptographically-protected passwords include, for						
				(c) Stores and transmits only cryptographically-protected passwords;	example, encrypted versions of passwords and one-way cryptographic hashes of						
				(d) Enforces password minimum and maximum lifetime restrictions of [Assignment: organization-	passwords. The number of changed characters refers to the number of changes required						
				defined numbers for lifetime minimum, lifetime maximum);	with respect to the total number of positions in the current password. Password lifetime						
				(e) Prohibits password reuse for [Assignment: organization-defined number] generations; and	restrictions do not apply to temporary passwords. To mitigate certain brute force attacks						
				(f) Allows the use of a temporary password for system logons with an immediate change to a	against passwords, organizations may also consider salting passwords.						
				permanent password.	3,,						
IA-5 (2)	2	Identification and Authentication Authenticator		The information system, for PKI-based authentication:	Status information for certification paths includes, for example, certificate revocation lists	IA-6			х	х	
		Management PKI-Based Authentication		(a) Validates certifications by constructing and verifying a certification path to an accepted trust	or certificate status protocol responses. For PIV cards, validation of certifications involves						
				anchor including checking certificate status information;	the construction and verification of a certification path to the Common Policy Root trust						
				(b) Enforces authorized access to the corresponding private key;	anchor including certificate policy processing.						
				(c) Maps the authenticated identity to the account of the individual or group; and							
				(d) Implements a local cache of revocation data to support path discovery and validation in case							
				of inability to access revocation information via the network.							
IA-5 (3)	2	Identification and Authentication Authenticator		The organization requires that the registration process to receive [Assignment: organization-					х	Х	
		Management In-Person or Trusted Third-Party		defined types of and/or specific authenticators] be conducted [Selection: in person; by a trusted							
		Registration		third party] before [Assignment: organization-defined registration authority] with authorization by							
				[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].							
IA-5 (4)	2	Identification and Authentication Authenticator		The organization employs automated tools to determine if password authenticators are	This control enhancement focuses on the creation of strong passwords and the	CA-2,CA-7,RA-5					
		Management Automated Support for Password		sufficiently strong to satisfy [Assignment: organization-defined requirements].	characteristics of such passwords (e.g., complexity) prior to use, the enforcement of which						
		Strength Determination			is carried out by organizational information systems in IA-5 (1).						
IA-5 (5)	2	Identification and Authentication Authenticator		The organization requires developers/installers of information system components to provide	This control enhancement extends the requirement for organizations to change default						
		Management Change Authenticators Prior to		unique authenticators or change default authenticators prior to delivery/installation.	authenticators upon information system installation, by requiring developers and/or						
		Delivery			installers to provide unique authenticators or change default authenticators for system						
					components prior to delivery and/or installation. However, it typically does not apply to the						
					developers of commercial off-the-shelve information technology products. Requirements						
					for unique authenticators can be included in acquisition documents prepared by						
					organizations when procuring information systems or system components.						
IA-5 (6)	2	Identification and Authentication Authenticator		The organization protects authenticators commensurate with the security category of the	For information systems containing multiple security categories of information without						
		Management Protection of Authenticators		information to which use of the authenticator permits access.	reliable physical or logical separation between categories, authenticators used to grant						
					access to the systems are protected commensurate with the highest security category of					1	
					information on the systems.						
IA-5 (7)	2	Identification and Authentication Authenticator		The organization ensures that unencrypted static authenticators are not embedded in applications							
		Management No Embedded Unencrypted Static		or access scripts or stored on function keys.	are in encrypted or unencrypted form. If authenticators are used in the manner stored,						
		Authenticators			then those representations are considered unencrypted authenticators. This is irrespective						
					of whether that representation is perhaps an encrypted version of something else (e.g., a						
					password).						
IA-5 (8)	2	Identification and Authentication Authenticator		The organization implements [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to manage	When individuals have accounts on multiple information systems, there is the risk that the						
- 1-/		Management Multiple Information System		the risk of compromise due to individuals having accounts on multiple information systems.	compromise of one account may lead to the compromise of other accounts if individuals					1	
		Accounts		. ,	use the same authenticators. Possible alternatives include, for example: (i) having different					1	
					authenticators on all systems: (ii) employing some form of single sign-on mechanism; or					1	
					(iii) including some form of one-time passwords on all systems.						
					,,g some joint of one time passwords on an systems.						
(A-5 (9)	2	Identification and Authentication Authenticator		The organization coordinates with [Assignment; organization-defined external organizations] for	Cross-organization management of credentials provides the canability for proprientions to						
IA-5 (9)	2	Identification and Authentication Authenticator Management Cross-Organization Credential		The organization coordinates with [Assignment: organization-defined external organizations] for cross-organization management of credentials.	Cross-organization management of credentials provides the capability for organizations to appropriately authenticate individuals, aroups, roles, or devices when conducting cross-						
IA-5 (9)	2	Identification and Authentication Authenticator Management Cross-Organization Credential Management		The organization coordinates with [Assignment: organization-defined external organizations] for cross-organization management of credentials.	Cross-organization management of credentials provides the capability for organizations to appropriately authenticate individuals, groups, roles, or devices when conducting cross- organization activities involving the processing, storage, or transmission of information.						

Control ID	Level	Control Name	Atiah dan um	Control Tout	Cumplemental Cuidance	Related Controls	Deignitu	Laur N	ad Hal	Notes
Control ID 1A-5 (10)	Level 2	Control Name (Identification and Authentication Authenticator Management Dynamic Credential Association	Withdrawn	Control Text The information system dynamically pravisions identities.	Supplemental Culdence Authentication requires some form of binding between an identity and the authenticator used to confirm the identity. In conventional approaches, this binding is established by pre- provisioning both the identity and the outhenticator to the information system. For example, the binding between a username (I.e., identity) and a possword (I.e., authenticator) is accomplished by provisioning the identity and authenticator as a pair in the information system. New authentication techniques allow the binding between the identity and the authenticator to be implemented outside an information system. For example, with smartcard credentals, the identity and the authenticator are bound together on the card. Using these credentials, information systems can outhenticate identities that have not been pre-provisioned, dynamically provisioning the identity after authentication. In these situations, organizations can anticipate the dynamic provisioning of identities. Prescribablished trust relationships and mechanisms with appropriate authorities to validate identities and related credentials are essential.	Related Controls	Priority	LOW M	roa High	notes
IA-5 (11)	2	Identification and Authentication Authenticator Management Hardware Token-Based Authentication		The information system, for hardware token-based authentication, employs mechanisms that satisfy [Assignment: organization-defined token quality requirements].	Hardware token-based authentication typically refers to the use of PKI-based tokens, such as the U.S. Government Personal Identity Verification (PIV) card. Organizations define specific requirements for tokens, such as working with a particular PKI.			x x	х	
IA-5 (12)	2	Identification and Authentication Authenticator Management Biometric-Based Authentication		The information system, for biometric-based authentication, employs mechanisms that satisfy [Assignment: arganization-defined biometric quality requirements].	Unlike password-based outhentication which provides exact matches of user-input passwords to stated passwords, biometric authentication does not provide such exact matches. Depending upon the type of biometric and the type of collection mechanism, there is likely to be some divergence from the presented biometric and stored biometric which serves as the basis of comparison. There will likely be both fighe positives and false negatives when making such comparisons. The rate at which the false accept and false reject rates are equal is known as the crossover rates. Biometric quality requirements include, for example, acceptable crossover rates, as that essentially reflects the accuracy of the biometric.					
IA-5 (13)	2	Identification and Authentication Authenticator Management Expiration of Cached Authenticators		The information system prohibits the use of cached authenticators after [Assignment: organization-defined time period].						
IA-5 (14)	2	Identification and Authentication Authenticator Management Managing Content of PKI Trust Stores		The organization, for PKI-based authentication, employs a deliberate organization-wide methodology for managing the content of PKI trust stores installed across all platforms including networks, operating systems, browsers, and applications.						
IA-5 (15)	2	Identification and Authentication Authenticator Management FICAM-Approved Products and Services		The organization uses only FICAM-approved path discovery and validation products and services.	Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management (FICAM)-approved path discovery and validation products and services are those products and services that have been approved through the FICAM conformance program, where applicable.					
IA-6	1	Identification and Authentication Authenticator Feedback		The information system obscures feedback of authentication information during the authentication process to protect the information from possible exploitation/use by unauthorized individuals.	The feedback from information systems does not provide information that would allow unauthorized individuals to compromise authentication mechanisms. For some types of information systems or system components, for example, desktops/notebooks with relatively large monitors, the threat (often referred to as shoulder surfing) may be significant. For other types of systems or components, for example, mobile devices with 2-4 inch screens, this threat may be less significant, and may need to be balanced against the increased likelihood of typographic input errors due to the small keyboards. Therefore, the means for obscuring the authenticator feedback is selected accordingly. Obscuring the feedback of authentication information includes, for example, displaying asterisks when users type passwords into input devices, or displaying feedback for a very limited time before fully obscuring it.	PE-18	P2	x x	x	
IA-7	1	Identification and Authentication Cryptographic Module Authentication		The information system implements mechanisms for authentication to a cryptographic module that meet the requirements of applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance for such authentication.	Authentication mechanisms may be required within a cryptographic module to authenticate an operator accessing the module and to verify that the operator is authorized to assume the requested role and perform services within that role.	SC-12,SC-13	P1	х	х	
IA-8	1	Identification and Authentication Identification and Authentication (Non-Organizational Users)		The information system uniquely identifies and authenticates non-organizational users (or processes acting on behalf of non-organizational users).	explicitly covered by IA-2. These individuals are uniquely identified and authenticated for	AC-2,AC-14,AC-17,AC 18,IA-2,IA-4,IA-5,MA- 4,RA-3,SA-12,SC-8	P1	x x	x	
IA-8 (1)	2	Identification and Authentication Identification and Authentication (Non-Organizational Users) Acceptance of PIV Credentials from Other Agencies		The information system accepts and electronically verifies Personal Identity Verification (PIV) credentials from other federal agencies.	This control enhancement applies to logical access control systems (LACS) and physical access control systems (PACS). Personal Identity Verification (PIV) credentials are those credentials issued by federal agencies that conform to FIPP sublication 2011 and supporting guidance documents. OMB Memorandum 11-11 requires federal agencies to continue implementing the requirements specified in HSPO-12 to enable agency-wide use of PIV credentials.	AU-2,PE-3,SA-4		x x	х	
IA-8 (2)	2	identification and Authentication Identification and Authentication (Non-Organizational Users) Acceptance of Third-Party Credentials		The information system accepts only FICAM-approved third-party credentials.	This control enhancement typically applies to organizational information systems that are accessible to the general public, for example, public-facing websites. Third-party credentials are those credentials issued by nonfederal government entities approved by the Federal identity. Credential, and Access Management (FICAM) Trust Framework Solutions initiative. Approved third-party credentals meat or exceed the set of minimum federal government-wide technical, security, privacy, and organizational maturity requirements. This allows federal government relying parties to trust such credentials at their approved assurance levels.	AU-2		x x	x	
IA-8 (3)	2	Identification and Authentication Identification and Authentication (Non-Organizational Users) Use of FICAM-Approved Products		The organization employs only FICAM-approved information system components in [Assignment: organization-defined information systems] to accept third-party credentials.	This control enhancement typically applies to information systems that are accessible to the general public, for example, public-facing websites. FICAM-approved information system components include, for example, information technology products and software libraries that have been approved by the Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management conformance program.	SA-4		х	х	
IA-8 (4)	2	identification and Authentication Identification and Authentication (Non-Organizational Users) Use of FICAM-Issued Profiles		The information system conforms to FICAM-issued profiles.	This control enhancement addresses open identity management standards. To ensure that these standards are viable, robust, reliable, sustainable (e.g., available in commercial information technology products), and interoperable as documented, the United States Government assesses and scopes identity management standards and technology implementations against applicable federal legislation, directives, policies, and requirements. The result is FICAM-issued implementation profiles of approved protocols (e.g., FICAM authentication protocols such as SAML 2.0 and OpenID 2.0, as well as other protocols such as the FICAM Backend Attribute Exchange).	SA-4		x x	x	

Company		Control Name	Control Text	Consultant and all Carlines as	Salata d Caretonia	Priority I	ow I	 III-b N	
IA-8 (5)	2	Identification and Authentication Identification	The information system accepts and electronically verifies Personal Identity Verification-I (PIV-I)	This control enhancement: (i) applies to logical and physical access control systems; and (ii)		l		 ₅ N	
		and Authentication (Non-Organizational Users) Acceptance of PIV-I Credentials	credentials.	addresses Non-Federal Issuers (NFIs) of identity cards that desire to interoperate with United States Government Personal Identity Verification (PIV) information systems and					
		receptance of 114 receptances		that can be trusted by federal government-relying parties. The X.509 certificate policy for					
				the Federal Bridge Certification Authority (FBCA) addresses PIV-I requirements. The PIV-I					
				card is suitable for Assurance Level 4 as defined in OMB Memorandum 04-04 and NIST Special Publication 800-63, and multifactor authentication as defined in NIST Special					
				Publication 800-116. PIV-I credentials are those credentials issued by a PIV-I provider					
				whose PIV-I certificate policy maps to the Federal Bridge PIV-I Certificate Policy. A PIV-I provider is cross-certified (directly or through another PKI bridge) with the FBCA with					
				policies that have been mapped and approved as meeting the requirements of the PIV-I					
				policies defined in the FBCA certificate policy.					
IA-9	1	Identification and Authentication Service	The organization identifies and authenticates [Assignment: organization-defined information	This control supports service-oriented architectures and other distributed architectural		P0			
		Identification and Authentication	system services] using [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards].	approaches requiring the identification and authentication of information system services. In such architectures, external services often appear dynamically. Therefore, information					
				systems should be able to determine in a dynamic manner, if external providers and					
				associated services are authentic. Safeguards implemented by organizational information systems to validate provider and service authenticity include, for example, information or					
				code signing, provenance graphs, and/or electronic signatures indicating or including the					
				sources of services.					
IA-9 (1)	2	Identification and Authentication Service	The organization ensures that service providers receive, validate, and transmit identification and						
		Identification and Authentication Information Exchange	authentication information.						
IA-9 (2)	2	Identification and Authentication Service Identification and Authentication Transmission of	The organization ensures that identification and authentication decisions are transmitted	For distributed architectures (e.g., service-oriented architectures), the decisions regarding the validation of identification and authentication claims may be made by services	SC-8				
		Decisions	between [Assignment: organization-defined services] consistent with organizational policies.	separate from the services acting on those decisions. In such situations, it is necessary to					
				provide the identification and authentication decisions (as opposed to the actual identifiers					
				and authenticators) to the services that need to act on those decisions.					
IA-10	1	Identification and Authentication Adaptive	The organization requires that individuals accessing the information system employ [Assignment: organization-defined supplemental authentication techniques or mechanisms] under specific	Adversaries may compromise individual authentication mechanisms and subsequently attempt to impersonate legitimate users. This situation can potentially occur with any	AU-6,SI-4	P0			
		normalication and Address deficient	[Assignment: organization-defined circumstances or situations].	authentication mechanisms employed by organizations. To address this threat,					
				organizations may employ specific techniques/mechanisms and establish protocols to					
				assess suspicious behavior (e.g., individuals accessing information that they do not typically access as part of their normal duties, roles, or responsibilities, accessing greater quantities					
				of information than the individuals would routinely access, or attempting to access					
				information from suspicious network addresses). In these situations when certain preestablished conditions or triggers occur, organizations can require selected individuals to					
				provide additional authentication information. Another potential use for adaptive					
				identification and authentication is to increase the strength of mechanism based on the number and/or types of records being accessed.					
				number and/or types of records being accessed.					
IA-11	1	Identification and Authentication Re-	The organization requires users and devices to re-authenticate when [Assignment: organization-	In addition to the re-authentication requirements associated with session locks,	AC-11	PO			
		Authentication	defined circumstances or situations requiring re-authentication].	organizations may require re-authentication of individuals and/or devices in other situations		.			
				including, for example: (i) when authenticators change; (ii), when roles change; (iii) when security categories of information systems change; (iv), when the execution of privileged					
				functions occurs; (v) after a fixed period of time; or (vi) periodically.					
IP		Individual Participation and Redress							rivacy Controls]
IP-1	1	Individual Participation and Redress Consent	The organization: a. Provides means, where feasible and appropriate, for individuals to authorize the collection, use,	Consent is fundamental to the participation of individuals in the decision-making process regarding the collection and use of their PII and the use of technologies that may increase	AC-2, AP-1, TR-1, TR-			[P	rivacy Controls]
			maintaining, and sharing of personally identifiable information (PII) prior to its collection;	risk to personal privacy. To obtain consent, organizations provide individuals appropriate	-				
			b. Provides appropriate means for individuals to understand the consequences of decisions to	notice of the purposes of the PII collection or technology use and a means for individuals to					
			approve or decline the authorization of the collection, use, dissemination, and retention of PII; c. Obtains consent, where feasible and appropriate, from individuals prior to any new uses or	consent to the activity. Organizations tailor the public notice and consent mechanisms to meet operational needs. Organizations achieve awareness and consent, for example,					
			disclosure of previously collected PII; and	through updated public notices.					
			d. Ensures that individuals are aware of and, where feasible, consent to all uses of PII not initially described in the public notice that was in effect at the time the organization collected the PII.	Organizations may obtain consent through opt-in, opt-out, or implied consent. Opt-in					
				consent is the preferred method, but it is not always feasible. Opt-in requires that					
				individuals take affirmative action to allow organizations to collect or use PII. For example, opt-in consent may require an individual to click a radio button on a website, or sign a					
				document providing consent. In contrast, opt-out requires individuals to take action to					
				prevent the new or continued collection or use of such PII. For example, the Federal Trade Commission's Do-Not-Call Registry allows individuals to opt-out of receiving unsolicited					
				telemarketing calls by requesting to be added to a list. Implied consent is the least preferred					
				method and should be used in limited circumstances. Implied consent occurs where					
				individuals' behavior or failure to object indicates agreement with the collection or use of PII (e.g., by entering and remaining in a building where notice has been posted that security					
				cameras are in use, the individual implies consent to the video recording). Depending upon					
				the nature of the program or information system, it may be appropriate to allow individuals to limit the types of PII they provide and subsequent uses of that PII. Organizational consent					
				mechanisms include a discussion of the consequences to individuals of failure to provide PII.					
				Consequences can vary from organization to organization.					
IP-1 (1)		Individual Participation and Redress Consent	Organizations can provide, for example, individuals' itemized choices as to whether they wish to					[P	rivacy Controls]
			be contacted for any of a variety of purposes. In this situation, organizations construct consent mechanisms to ensure that organizational operations comply with individual choices.						
				Control of the state of the sta	40.0 10.3				control of
IP-2	1	Individual Participation and Redress Individual Access	The organization: a. Provides individuals the ability to have access to their personally identifiable information (PII)	Access affords individuals the ability to review PII about them held within organizational systems of records. Access includes timely, simplified, and inexpensive access to data.	AR-8, IP-3, TR-1, TR-2			^{[P}	rivacy Controls]
			maintained in its system(s) of records;	Organizational processes for allowing access to records may differ based on resources, legal					
			 Publishes rules and regulations governing how individuals may request access to records maintained in a Privacy Act system of records; 	requirements, or other factors. The organization Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) is responsible for the content of Privacy Act regulations					
			c. Publishes access procedures in System of Records Notices (SORNs); and	and record request processing, in consultation with legal counsel. Access to certain types of					
1			 d. Adheres to Privacy Act requirements and OMB policies and guidance for the proper processing of Privacy Act requests. 	records may not be appropriate, however, and heads of agencies may promulgate rules exempting particular systems from the access provision of the Privacy Act. In addition,					
			1		1		- 1	1	
				individuals are not entitled to access to information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a					
				individuals are not entitled to access to information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action or proceeding.					

		2 4 4 7								
Control ID	revel	Control Name Withdrawn Individual Participation and Redress Redress	Control Text The organization:	Redress supports the ability of individuals to ensure the accuracy of PII held by	Related Controls IP-2, TR-1, TR-2, UL-2	Priority L	ow	Mod	High	Notes [Privacy Controls]
11-5	1	individual Falticipation and Reuless Reuless	a. Provides a process for individuals to have inaccurate personally identifiable information (PII)	organizations. Effective redress processes demonstrate organizational commitment to data	IF-2, 110-1, 110-2, OL-2					[Firedcy Controls]
			maintained by the organization corrected or amended, as appropriate; and	quality especially in those business functions where inaccurate data may result in						
			b. Establishes a process for disseminating corrections or amendments of the PII to other authorized							
			users of the PII, such as external information-sharing partners and, where feasible and appropriate,							
			notifies affected individuals that their information has been corrected or amended.	redress requests, the changes sought, and the impact of the changes. Individuals may						
				appeal an adverse decision and have incorrect information amended, where appropriate.						
				To provide effective redress, organizations: (i) provide effective notice of the existence of a						
				PII collection; (ii) provide plain language explanations of the processes and mechanisms for						
				requesting access to records; (iii) establish criteria for submitting requests for correction or						
				amendment; (iv) implement resources to analyze and adjudicate requests; (v) implement						
				means of correcting or amending data collections; and (vi) review any decisions that may have been the result of inaccurate information.						
				nave been the result of maccurate information.						
				Organizational redress processes provide responses to individuals of decisions to deny						
				requests for correction or amendment, including the reasons for those decisions, a means to						
				record individual objections to the organizational decisions, and a means of requesting						
				organizational reviews of the initial determinations. Where PII is corrected or amended,						
				organizations take steps to ensure that all authorized recipients of that PII are informed of the corrected or amended information. In instances where redress involves information						
				obtained from other organizations, redress processes include coordination with						
				organizations that originally collected the information.						
IP-4	1	Individual Participation and Redress Complaint	The organization implements a process for receiving and responding to complaints, concerns, or	Complaints, concerns, and questions from individuals can serve as a valuable source of	AR-6, IP-3					[Privacy Controls]
	1	Management Companies and Reuress Companie	questions from individuals about the organizational privacy practices.	external input that ultimately improves operational models, uses of technology, data	AK-0, IF-3					[Fired Controls]
			- Constitution of the cons	collection practices, and privacy and security safeguards. Organizations provide complaint						
				mechanisms that are readily accessible by the public, include all information necessary for						
				successfully filing complaints (including contact information for the Senior Agency Official						
				for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) or other official designated to receive						
				complaints), and are easy to use. Organizational complaint management processes include tracking mechanisms to ensure that all complaints received are reviewed and appropriately						
				addressed in a timely manner.						
				·						
IP-4 (1)	2	Individual Participation and Redress Complaint	The organization responds to complaints, concerns, or questions from individuals within							[Privacy Controls]
IR	0	Management Response Times Incident Response	[Assignment: organization-defined time period].							
IR-1	1	Incident Response Incident Response Policy and	The organization:	This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective	PM-9	P1 X		х	х	
		Procedures	a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or	implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the IR family.						
			roles]:	Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives,						
			a.1. An incident response policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management	regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at						
			commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and a.2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the incident response policy and associated	the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy						
			incident response controls; and	for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the						
			b. Reviews and updates the current:	complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security						
			b.1. Incident response policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and	program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk						
			b.2. Incident response procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.						
IR-2	1	Incident Response Incident Response Training	The organization provides incident response training to information system users consistent with	Incident response training provided by organizations is linked to the assigned roles and	AT-3,CP-3,IR-8	P2 X	:	х	х	
			assigned roles and responsibilities:	responsibilities of organizational personnel to ensure the appropriate content and level of						
			a. Within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of assuming an incident response role or	detail is included in such training. For example, regular users may only need to know who to						
			responsibility; b. When required by information system changes; and	call or how to recognize an incident on the information system; system administrators may require additional training on how to handle/remediate incidents; and incident responders						
			c. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] thereafter.	may receive more specific training on forensics, reporting, system recovery, and restoration.						
				Incident response training includes user training in the identification and reporting of						
				suspicious activities, both from external and internal sources.						
(0.2 (4)	2	Incident Response Incident Response Training	The organization incorporates simulated events into incident response training to facilitate						,,	
IR-2 (1)	*	Simulated Events	effective response by personnel in crisis situations.						^	
IR-2 (2)	2	Incident Response Incident Response Training	The organization employs automated mechanisms to provide a more thorough and realistic						Х	
l.n. 2		Automated Training Environments	incident response training environment.	Occanizations test incident response conshibit - to determine the second of the second	CD 4 ID 9	D2		v	V	
IR-3	1	Incident Response Incident Response Testing	The organization tests the incident response capability for the information system [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] using [Assignment: organization-defined tests] to determine the	Organizations test incident response capabilities to determine the overall effectiveness of the capabilities and to identify potential weaknesses or deficiencies. Incident response	Cr-4,IR-8	P2		×	×	
			incident response effectiveness and documents the results.	testing includes, for example, the use of checklists, walk-through or tabletop exercises,						
				simulations (parallel/full interrupt), and comprehensive exercises. Incident response testing						
				can also include a determination of the effects on organizational operations (e.g., reduction						
				in mission capabilities), organizational assets, and individuals due to incident response.						
IR-3 (1)	2	Incident Response Incident Response Testing	The organization employs automated mechanisms to more thoroughly and effectively test the	Organizations use automated mechanisms to more thoroughly and effectively test incident	AT-2					
"		Automated Testing	incident response capability.	response capabilities, for example: (i) by providing more complete coverage of incident						
				response issues; (ii) by selecting more realistic test scenarios and test environments; and						
(0.2/2)	١,	Incident Response Incident Response Testing	The association coordinates incident seconds testing with association 1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-	(iii) by stressing the response capability.				v	v	+
IR-3 (2)	2	Incident Response Incident Response Testing Coordination with Related Plans	The organization coordinates incident response testing with organizational elements responsible for related plans.	Organizational plans related to incident response testing include, for example, Business Continuity Plans, Contingency Plans, Disaster Recovery Plans, Continuity of Operations				^	^	
)	Plans, Crisis Communications Plans, Critical Infrastructure Plans, and Occupant Emergency						
				Plans.						
IR-4	1	Incident Response Incident Handling	The organization:	Organizations recognize that incident response capability is dependent on the capabilities of		P1 X	:]	x	х	
			Implements an incident handling capability for security incidents that includes preparation, detection and analysis, containment, eradication, and recovery:	organizational information systems and the mission/business processes being supported by those systems. Therefore, organizations consider incident response as part of the definition,	4,1R-2,1R-3,1R-8,PE-					
			b. Coordinates incident handling activities with contingency planning activities; and	those systems. Therefore, organizations consider incident response as part of the definition, design, and development of mission/business processes and information systems. Incident-						
			c. Incorporates lessons learned from ongoing incident handling activities into incident response	related information can be obtained from a variety of sources including, for example, audit	l					
			procedures, training, and testing, and implements the resulting changes accordingly.	monitoring, network monitoring, physical access monitoring, user/administrator reports,						
				and reported supply chain events. Effective incident handling capability includes						
				coordination among many organizational entities including, for example, mission/business owners, information system owners, authorizing officials, human resources offices, physical						
				and personnel security offices, legal departments, operations personnel, procurement						
				offices, and the risk executive (function).						
IR-4 (1)	2	Incident Response Incident Handling	The organization employs automated mechanisms to support the incident handling process.	Automated mechanisms supporting incident handling processes include, for example,				v	v	
IK-4 (1)	2	Automated Incident Handling Automated Incident Handling Processes	The organization employs automated mechanisms to support the incident handling process.	Automated mechanisms supporting incident handling processes include, for example, online incident management systems.				1	^	
				management systems.					i	1

IR-4 (2)	Level	Incident Response Incident Handling Dynamic	/ithdrawn	The organization includes dynamic reconfiguration of [Assignment: organization-defined	Supplemental Guidance Dynamic reconfiguration includes, for example, changes to router rules, access control lists,		Priority	Low N	lod F	High	Notes
IN-4 (2)	2	mcuen, response ; mcuen, ranamig ; pynamic Reconfiguration		The agriculoin includes symanic reconjugation to J inssignment, organization-regimed information system components] as part of the incident response capability.	intrusion detection/prevention system parameters, and filter rules for firewalls and gateways. Organizations perform dynamic reconfiguration of information systems, for example, to stop attacks, to misdirect attackers, and to isolate components of systems, thus limiting the extent of the damage from breaches or compromises. Organizations include time frames for achieving the reconfiguration of information systems in the definition of the reconfiguration capability, considering the potential need for rapid	2,CM-3,CM-4					
					response in order to effectively address sophisticated cyber threats.						
IR-4 (3)	2	Incident Response Incident Handling Continuity of Operations		The organization identifies [Assignment: organization-defined classes of incidents] and [Assignment: organization-defined actions to take in response to classes of incidents] to ensure continuation of organizational missions and business functions.	Classes of incidents include, for example, malfunctions due to design/implementation errors and amissions, targeted malicious attacks, and untargeted malicious attacks. Appropriate includent response actions include, for example, graceful degradation, information system shutdown, fall back to manual mode/alternative technology whereby the system operates differently, employing dacceptive measures, alternate information flows, or operating in a mode that is reserved solely for when systems are under attack.						
IR-4 (4)	2	Incident Response Incident Handling Information Correlation		The organization correlates incident information and individual incident responses to achieve an organization-wide perspective on incident awareness and response.	Sometimes the nature of a threat event, for example, a hostile cyber attack, is such that it can only be observed by bringing together information from different sources including various reports and reporting procedures established by organizations.				κ	х	
IR-4 (5)	2	Incident Response Incident Handling Automatic Disabling of Information System		The organization implements a configurable capability to automatically disable the information system if [Assignment: organization-defined security violations] are detected.							
IR-4 (6)	2	Incident Response Incident Handling Insider Threats - Specific Capabilities		The organization implements incident handling capability for insider threats.	While many organizations address insider threat incidents as an inherent part of their organizational incident response capability, this control enhancement provides additional emphasis on this type of threat and the need for specific incident handling capabilities (as defined within organizations) to provide appropriate and timely responses.						
IR-4 (7)	2	Incident Response Incident Handling Insider Threats - Intra-Organization Coordination		The organization coordinates incident handling capability for insider threats across [Assignment: organization-defined components or elements of the organization].	Incident handling for insider threat incidents (including preparation, detection and analysis, containment, eradication, and recovery) requires close coordination among a variety of organizational components or elements to be effective. These components or elements include, for example, mission/business owners, information system owners, human resources offices, procurement offices, personnel/physical security offices, operations personnel, and risk executive (function). In addition, organizations may require external support from federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.						
IR-4 (8)	2	Incident Response Incident Handling Correlation with External Organizations		The organization coordinates with [Assignment: organization-defined external organizations] to correlate and share [Assignment: organization-defined incident information] to achieve a cross-organization perspective on incident awareness and more effective incident responses.	The coordination of incident information with external organizations including, for example, mission/business partners, military/coalition partners, customers, and multitiered developers, can provide significant benefits. Cross-organizational coordination with respect to incident handling can serve as an important risk management capability. This capability allows organizations to leverage critical information from a variety of sources to effectively respond to information security-related incidents potentially affecting the organization's operations, assets, and individuals.						
IR-4 (9)	2	Incident Response Incident Handling Dynamic Response Capability		The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined dynamic response capabilities] to effectively respond to security incidents.	This control enhancement addresses the deployment of replacement or new capabilities in a timely manner in response to security incidents (e.g., adversary actions during hastile cyber attacks). This includes capabilities implemented at the mission/business process level (e.g., activating alternative mission/business processes) and at the information system level.	CP-10					
IR-4 (10)	2	Incident Response Incident Handling Supply Chain Coordination		The organization coordinates incident handling activities involving supply chain events with other organizations involved in the supply chain.	Organizations involved in supply chain activities include, for example, system/product developers, integrators, manufacturers, pockagers, assemblers, distributors, vendors, and resellers. Supply chain incidents Include, for example, compromises/preaches involving information system components, information technology products, development processes or personnel, and distribution processes or warehousing facilities.						
IR-5	1	Incident Response Incident Monitoring		The organization tracks and documents information system security incidents.		AU-6,IR-8,PE-6,SC- 5,SC-7,SI-3,SI-4,SI-7	P1	x x	· ×	x	
IR-5 (1)	2	Incident Response Incident Monitoring Automated Tracking / Data Collection / Analysis		The organization employs automated mechanisms to assist in the tracking of security incidents and in the collection and analysis of incident information.	Automated mechanisms for tracking security incidents and collecting/analyzing incident information include, for example, the Einstein network monitoring device and monitoring online Computer incident Response Centers (CIRCs) or other electronic databases of incidents.	AU-7,IR-4			k	x	
IR-6	1	Incident Response Incident Reporting		The organization: a. Requires personnel to report suspected security incidents to the organizational incident response capability within [Assignment: organization-defined time period]; and b. Reports security incident information to [Assignment: organization-defined authorities].	The intent of this control is to address both specific incident reporting requirements within	IR-4,IR-5,IR-8	P1	x	×	x	
IR-6 (1)	2	Incident Response Incident Reporting		The organization employs automated mechanisms to assist in the reporting of security incidents.		IR-7		x	. ,	х	
IR-6 (2)	2	Automated Reporting Incident Response Incident Reporting		The organization reports information system vulnerabilities associated with reported security							
IR-6 (3)	2	Vulnerobilities Related to Incidents Incident Response Incident Reporting Coordination with Supply Chain		incidents to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]. The organization provides security incident information to other organizations involved in the supply chain for information systems or information system components related to the incident.	Organizations involved in supply chain activities include, for example, system/product developers, integrators, manufacturers, packagers, assemblers, distributors, vendors, and resellers. Supply chain incidents include, for example, compromises/breaches involving information system components, information technology products, development processes or personnel, and distribution processes or warehousing facilities. Organizations determine the appropriate information to share considering the value gained from support by external organizations with the potential for harm due to sensitive information being released to outside organizations of perhaps questionable trustworthiness.						
IR-7	1	Incident Response Incident Response Assistance		The organization provides an incident response support resource, integral to the organizational incident response capability that offers advice and assistance to users of the information system for the harding and reporting of security incidents.	Incident response support resources provided by organizations include, for example, help desks, assistance groups, and access to forensics services, when required.	AT-2,IR-4,IR-6,IR- 8,SA-9	P2	х		х	

Control ID IR-7 (1)	2	Control Name Incident Response Incident Response Assistance Automation Support for Availability of Information / Support	The organization employs automated mechanisms to related information and support.	a increase the availability of incident response-	Supplemental Collegace Automated mechanisms can provide a push and/or pull capability for users to obtain incident response assistance. For example, individuals might have access to a website to query the assistance capability, or conversely, the assistance capability may have the ability to proactively send information to users (general distribution or targeted) as part of increasing understanding of current response capabilities and support.	Related Controls	Priority	X	High X	Wites
IR-7 (2)	2	Incident Response Incident Response Assistance Coordination with External Providers	The organization: (a) Establishes a direct, cooperative relationship bet external providers of information system protection (b) Identifies organizational incident response team.	capability; and	External providers of Information system protection capability include, for example, the Computer Network Defense program within the U.S. Department of Defense. External providers help to protect, monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to unauthorized activity within organizational information systems and networks.					
in-a	1	incident Response Incident Response Plan	The organization: a. Develops an incident response plan that: a.1. Provides the organization with a roadmap for im a.2. Describes the structure and organization of the it a.3. Provides a high-level approach for how the incid organization; a.4. Meets the unique requirements of the organizat and functions; a.5. Defines reportable incidents; a.6. Provides metrics for measuring the incident response a.7. Defines the resources and management support incident response capability; and a.8. Is reviewed and approved by [Assignment: organ b. Distributes copies of the incident response plan to response personnel (identified by name and/or by ro c. Reviews the incident response plan to address sys encountered during plan implementation, execution, e. Communicates incident response plan changes to response personnel (identified by name and/or by ro f. Protects the incident response plan famiges	ncident response capability; ent response capability fits into the overall ion, which relate to mission, size, structure, sonse capability within the organization; needed to effectively maintain and mature an nization-defined personnel or roles]; [Assignment: organization-defined incident le) and organization-defined incident le) and organization-defined frequency]; term/organization-defined frequency [Assignment: organization-defined incident le) and organizational elements]; and	It is important that organizations develop and implement a coordinated approach to incident response. Organizational missions, business functions, strategies, goals, and objectives for incident response help to determine the structure of incident response capabilities. As part of a comprehensive incident response capabilities, and an objectives for incident response capabilities, and incident response capabilities, and incident response capabilities, organizations consider the coordination and sharing of information with external organizations, including, for example, external service providers and organizations involved in the supply chain for organizational information systems.	MP-2,MP-4,MP-5	PI X	x	x	
IR-9	1	Incident Response Information Spillage Response	The organization responds to information spills by: a. Identifying the specific information involved in the b. Aletring [Assignment organization-defined person method of communication not associated with the s c. Isolating the contaminated information system or d. Eradicating the information from the contaminate e. Identifying other information systems or systems or contaminated; and f. Performing other [Assignment: organization-define	unel or roles] of the information spill using a pillipilipilipilipilipilipilipilipilipi	Information spillage refers to instances where either classified or sensitive information is inadvertently placed on information systems that are not authorized to process such information. Such informations, sulls often occur when information that is initially thought to be of lower sensitivity is transmitted to an information system and then is subsequently determined to be of higher sensitivity. At that point, corrective action is required. The nature of the organizational response is generally based upon the degree of sensitivity of the silled information (e.g., security category or classification level), the security capabilities of the information system, the specific nature of contaminated storage media, and the access authorizations (e.g., security characters) of individuals with authorized access to the contaminated system. The methods used to communicate information about the spill after the fact do not involve methods directly associated with the actual spill to minimize the risk of further spreading the contamination before such contamination is isolated and eradicated.		PO			
IR-9 (1)	2	Incident Response Information Spillage Response	The organization assigns [Assignment: organization-	defined personnel or roles] with responsibility						
IR-9 (2)	2	Responsible Personnel Incident Response Information Spillage Response	for responding to information spills. The organization provides information spillage respo							
IR-9 (3)	2	Training Incident Response Information Spillage Response	defined frequency]. The organization implements [Assignment: organization]	tion defined procedures to ensure that	Correction actions for information systems contaminated due to information spillages may					
111-9 (3)		Post-Spill Operations	organizational personnel impacted by information sp while contaminated systems are undergoing correct	pills can continue to carry out assigned tasks	be very time-consuming. During those periods, personnel may not have access to the contaminated systems, which may potentially affect their ability to conduct organizational business.					
IR-9 (4)	2	Incident Response Information Spillage Response Exposure to Unauthorized Personnel	The organization employs [Assignment: organization exposed to information not within assigned access a	uthorizations.	Security sofeguards include, for example, making personnel exposed to spilled information aware of the federal laws, directives, policies, and/or regulations regarding the information and the restrictions imposed based on exposure to such information.					
IR-10		Incident Response Integrated Information Security Analysis Team Maintenance	The organization establishes an integrated team of for developers, and real-time operations personnel.	orensic/mallicious code analysts, tool	Having an integrated team for incident response facilitates information sharing. Such capability allows organizational personnel, including developers, implementers, and operators, to leverage the team knowledge of the threat in order to implement defensive measures that will enable organizations to deter intrusions more effectively. Moreover, it promotes the rapid detection of intrusions, development of appropriate mitigations, and the deployment of effective defensive measures. For example, when an intrusion is detected, the integrated security analysis team can rapidly develop an appropriate response for operators to implement, correlate the new incident with information on past intrusions, and augment ongoing intelligence development. This enables the team to identify adversary TTPs that are linked to the operations tempo or to specific missions/business functions, and to define responsive actions in a way that does not disrupt the mission/business operations. Ideally, information security analysis teams are distributed within organizations to make the capability more resilient.		PO			
MA-1	1	Maintenance System Maintenance Policy and	The organization:		This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective	PM-9	P1 X	х	х	
		Procedures	a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assign roles]: a.l. A system maintenance policy that addresses pur management commitment, coordination among org. a.2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the system maintenance controls, and b. Reviews and updates the current: b.l. System maintenance policy [Assignment: organib. 2. System maintenance procedures [Assignment: organib. 2.	pose, scope, roles, responsibilities, anizational entities, and compliance; and he system maintenance policy and associated zation-defined frequency]; and	implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the MA family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal alaxe, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.					
					1	-		_		

Control ID	Level	Control Name	Withdrawn	Control Text	Supplemental Guidance		Priority	Low M	lod	High	Notes
MA-2 (1)	1	Maintenance Controlled Maintenance	v	The organization: a. Schedules, performs, documents, and reviews records of maintenance and repairs on information system components in accordance with manufacturer or vendor specifications and/or organizational requirements; b. Approves and monitors all maintenance activities, whether performed on site or remotely and whether the equipment is serviced on site or removed to another location; c. Requires that [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] explicitly approve the removal of the information system or system components from organizational facilities for off-site maintenance or repairs; d. Sanitzse equipment to remove all information from associated media prior to removal from organizational facilities for off-site maintenance or repairs; e. Checks all potentially impacted security controls to verify that the controls are still functioning properly following maintenance or repair actions; and f. Includes [Assignment: organization-defined maintenance-related information] in organizational maintenance records.		CM-3_CM-4_MA- 4_MP-6_PE-16_SA- 12_SI-2	P2	x x	3	x	[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MA-2]
IVIA-2 (1)	2	Content	X								[Withdrawn: Incorporated Into MA-2]
MA-2 (2)		Maintenance Controlled Maintenance Automated Maintenance Activities		The organization: (a) Employs automated mechanisms to schedule, conduct, and document maintenance and repairs; and (b) Produces up-to date, accurate, and complete records of all maintenance and repair actions requested, scheduled, in process, and completed.		CA-7,MA-3			ا ا	x	
MA-3	1	Maintenance Maintenance Tools		The organization approves, controls, and monitors information system maintenance tools.	This control addresses security-related issues associated with maintenance tools used specifically for diagnostic and repair actions on organizational information systems. Maintenance tools can include hardware, software, and firmware items. Maintenance tools are potential vehicles for transporting malicious code, either intentionally or unintentionally, into a facility and subsequently into organizational information systems. Maintenance tools can include, for example, hardware/software diagnostic test equipment and hardware/software packet sniffers. This control does not cover hardware/software components that may support information system maintenance, yet are a part of the system, for example, the software implementing "jong" is, "iponging," or the hardware and software implementing the monitoring port of an Ethernet switch.	MA-2,MA-5,MP-6	P3	x		х	
MA-3 (1)	2	Maintenance Maintenance Tools Inspect Tools		The organization inspects the maintenance tools carried into a facility by maintenance personnel for improper or unauthorized modifications.	If, upon inspection of maintenance tools, organizations determine that the tools have been modified in an improper/unauthorized manner or contain malicious code, the incident is handled consistent with organizational policies and procedures for incident handling.	SI-7		Х	ı	х	
MA-3 (2)	2	Maintenance Maintenance Tools Inspect Media		The organization checks media containing diagnostic and test programs for malicious code before the media are used in the information system.	If, upon inspection of media containing maintenance diagnostic and test programs, organizations determine that the media contain malicious code, the incident is handled consistent with organizational incident handling policies and procedures.	SI-3		X	,	Х	
MA-3 (3)	2	Maintenance Maintenance Tools Prevent Unauthorized Removal		The organization prevents the unauthorized removal of maintenance equipment containing organizational information by: (a) Verifying that there is no organizational information contained on the equipment; (b) Sanitzing or destroying the equipment; (c) Retaining the equipment with the facility; or (d) Obtaining an exemption from [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] explicitly authorizing removal of the equipment from the facility.	Organizational information includes all information specifically owned by organizations and information provided to organizations in which organizations serve as information stewards.				i	х	
MA-3 (4)	2	Maintenance Maintenance Tools Restricted		The information system restricts the use of maintenance tools to authorized personnel only.		AC-2,AC-3,AC-5,AC-6					
MA-4	1	Tool Use Maintenance Nonlocal Maintenance		The organization: a. Approves and monitors nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities; b. Allows the use of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic tools only as consistent with organizational policy and documented in the security plan for the information system; c. Employs strong authenticators in the establishment of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic sessions; d. Maintains records for nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities; and e. Terminates session and network connections when nonlocal maintenance is completed.	internal network. Local maintenance and diagnostic activities are those activities carried out	17,AU-2,AU-3,IA-2,IA- 4,IA-5,IA-8,MA-2,MA- 5,MP-6,PL-2,SC-7,SC-	P2	x x	3	х	
MA-4 (1)	2	Maintenance Nonlocal Maintenance Auditing and Review		The organization: (a) Audist nanlocal maintenance and diagnostic sessions [Assignment: organization-defined audit events]; and (b) Reviews the records of the maintenance and diagnostic sessions.		AU-2,AU-6,AU-12					
MA-4 (2)		Maintenance Nonlocal Maintenance Document Nonlocal Maintenance		The organization documents in the security plan for the information system, the policies and procedures for the establishment and use of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic connections.				х	į	x	
MA-4 (3)	2	Maintenance Nonlocal Maintenance Comparable Security / Sanitization		system that implements a security copability comparable to the copability implemented on the system being serviced; or (b) Removes the component to be serviced from the information system prior to nonlocal maintenance or diagnostic services, sanitizes the component (with regard to aganizational information) before removal from organizational Jocilities, and after the service is performed, inspects and sanitizes the component (with regard to potentially malicious software) before reconnecting the component to the information system.	Comparable security capability on information systems, diagnostic tools, and equipment providing maintenance services implies that the implemented security controls on those systems, tools, and equipment are at least as comprehensive as the controls on the information system being serviced.	MA-3,SA-12,SI-3,SI-7				x	
MA-4 (4)		Maintenance Naniocal Maintenance Authentication / Separation of Maintenance Sessions		The organization protects nonlocal maintenance sessions by: (a) Employing [Assignment: organization-defined authenticators that are replay resistant]; and (b) Separating the maintenance sessions from other network sessions with the information system by either: (b)(1)! Physically separated communications paths; or (b)(2) Logically separated communications paths based upon encryption.		SC-13					
MA-4 (5)		Maintenance Nonlocal Maintenance Approvals and Notifications		The organization: (a) Requires the approval of each nonlocal maintenance session by [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]; and (b) Notifies [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] of the date and time of planned nonlocal maintenance.	Notification may be performed by maintenance personnel. Approval of nonlocal maintenance sessions is accomplished by organizational personnel with sufficient information security and information system knowledge to determine the appropriateness of the proposed maintenance.						
MA-4 (6)		Maintenance Nonlocal Maintenance		The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect the integrity and		SC-8,SC-13					
MA-4 (7)	2	Cryptographic Protection Maintenance Nonlocal Maintenance Remote		confidentiality of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic communications. The information system implements remote disconnect verification at the termination of nonlocal		SC-13					
		Disconnect Verification		maintenance and diagnostic sessions.	maintenance sessions have been terminated and are no longer available for use.						

Control ID	Level	Control Name Withdra	Control Tout	Supplemental Cuidanae	Deleted Controls	Deignitus	Levi	Mad I	liah	Notes
Control ID MA-5	1	Control Name Withdra Maintenance Maintenance Personnel	two Control Text The organization:	Supplemental Guidance This control applies to individuals performing hardware or software maintenance on	AC-2,IA-8,MP-2,PE-	Priority P2	x I	X V	ugu.	TOTAL STATE OF THE
IMA-5	1	Walitellance Walitellance Fersonner	a. Establishes a process for maintenance personnel authorization and maintains a list of authorized		2.PE-3.PE-4.RA-3	F 2	l^	^ ^		
			maintenance organizations or personnel:	whose maintenance duties place them within the physical protection perimeter of the	2,1 2 3,1 2 4,101 3					
			b. Ensures that non-escorted personnel performing maintenance on the information system have	systems (e.g., custodial staff, physical plant maintenance personnel). Technical competence						
			required access authorizations; and	of supervising individuals relates to the maintenance performed on the information systems						
			c. Designates organizational personnel with required access authorizations and technical	while having required access authorizations refers to maintenance on and near the systems.						
			competence to supervise the maintenance activities of personnel who do not possess the required							
			access authorizations.	information technology manufacturers, vendors, systems integrators, and consultants, may						
				require privileged access to organizational information systems, for example, when required						
				to conduct maintenance activities with little or no notice. Based on organizational						
				assessments of risk, organizations may issue temporary credentials to these individuals.						
				Temporary credentials may be for one-time use or for very limited time periods.						
MA-5 (1)	2	Maintenance Maintenance Personnel	The organization:	This control enhancement denies individuals who lack appropriate security clearances (i.e.,	MP-6 PL-2			¥	,	
1 1111111111111111111111111111111111111	1	Individuals Without Appropriate Access	(a) Implements procedures for the use of maintenance personnel that lack appropriate security	individuals who do not possess security clearances or possess security clearances at a lower	J. 0,7 2 2			l^		
		7,77	clearances or are not U.S. citizens, that include the following requirements:	level than required) or who are not U.S. citizens, visual and electronic access to any						
			(a)(1) Maintenance personnel who do not have needed access authorizations, clearances, or	classified information, Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI), or any other sensitive						
			formal access approvals are escorted and supervised during the performance of maintenance and	information contained on organizational information systems. Procedures for the use of						
			diagnostic activities on the information system by approved organizational personnel who are	maintenance personnel can be documented in security plans for the information systems.						
			fully cleared, have appropriate access authorizations, and are technically qualified;							
			(a)(2) Prior to initiating maintenance or diagnostic activities by personnel who do not have needed	1						
			access authorizations, clearances or formal access approvals, all volatile information storage							
			components within the information system are sanitized and all nonvolatile storage media are							
			removed or physically disconnected from the system and secured; and (b) Develops and implements alternate security safeguards in the event an information system							
			component cannot be sanitized, removed, or disconnected from the system.							
			component cannot be sumitized, removed, or disconnected from the system.							[
										[
MA-5 (2)	2	Maintenance Maintenance Personnel Security	The organization ensures that personnel performing maintenance and diagnostic activities on an		PS-3					
. (=)		Clearances for Classified Systems	information system processing, storing, or transmitting classified information possess security							
			clearances and formal access approvals for at least the highest classification level and for all							
			compartments of information on the system.							
MA-5 (3)	2	Maintenance Maintenance Personnel	The organization ensures that personnel performing maintenance and diagnostic activities on an		PS-3					
		Citizenship Requirements for Classified Systems	information system processing, storing, or transmitting classified information are U.S. citizens.							
							-			
MA-5 (4)	2	Maintenance Maintenance Personnel Foreign Nationals	The organization ensures that: (a) Cleared foreign nationals (i.e., foreign nationals with appropriate security clearances), are		PS-3					
		Nationals	used to conduct maintenance and diagnostic activities on classified information systems only							
			when the systems are jointly owned and operated by the United States and foreign allied							
			governments, or owned and operated solely by foreign allied governments; and							
			(b) Approvals, consents, and detailed operational conditions regarding the use of foreign nationals							
			to conduct maintenance and diagnostic activities on classified information systems are fully							
			documented within Memoranda of Agreements.							
MA-5 (5)	2	Maintenance Maintenance Personnel	The organization ensures that non-escorted personnel performing maintenance activities not	Personnel performing maintenance activities in other capacities not directly related to the						
		Nonsystem-Related Maintenance	directly associated with the information system but in the physical proximity of the system, have	information system include, for example, physical plant personnel and janitorial personnel.						
			required access authorizations.				\vdash			
MA-6	1	Maintenance Timely Maintenance	The organization obtains maintenance support and/or spare parts for [Assignment: organization-	Organizations specify the information system components that result in increased risk to	CM-8,CP-2,CP-7,SA- 14.SA-15	P2		x x		
			defined information system components] within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of failure.	organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation when	14,SA-15					
			Tallule.	obtain maintenance support typically include having appropriate contracts in place.						
				obtain maintenance support typically include having appropriate contracts in place.						
MA-6 (1)	2	Maintenance Timely Maintenance Preventive	The organization performs preventive maintenance on [Assignment: organization-defined	Preventive maintenance includes proactive care and servicing of organizational						
'''		Maintenance	information system components] at [Assignment: organization-defined time intervals].	information systems components for the purpose of maintaining equipment and facilities in						
				satisfactory operating condition. Such maintenance provides for the systematic inspection,						
				tests, measurements, adjustments, parts replacement, detection, and correction of						
				incipient failures either before they occur or before they develop into major defects. The						
1				primary goal of preventive maintenance is to avoid/mitigate the consequences of						[
				equipment failures. Preventive maintenance is designed to preserve and restore equipment						I
				reliability by replacing worn components before they actually fail. Methods of determining						I
				what preventive (or other) failure management policies to apply include, for example, original equipment manufacturer (OEM) recommendations, statistical failure records.						I
1				requirements of codes, legislation, or regulations within a jurisdiction, expert opinion,						[
1				maintenance that has already been conducted on similar equipment, or measured values						[
1				and performance indications.						[
				perjamenta mendaran						
MA-6 (2)	2	Maintenance Timely Maintenance Predictive	The organization performs predictive maintenance on [Assignment: organization-defined	Predictive maintenance, or condition-based maintenance, attempts to evaluate the						
		Maintenance	information system components] at [Assignment: organization-defined time intervals].	condition of equipment by performing periodic or continuous (online) equipment condition						
				monitoring. The goal of predictive maintenance is to perform maintenance at a scheduled						
				point in time when the maintenance activity is most cost-effective and before the						
				equipment loses performance within a threshold. The predictive component of predictive						
				maintenance stems from the goal of predicting the future trend of the equipment's						
				condition. This approach uses principles of statistical process control to determine at what						
				point in the future maintenance activities will be appropriate. Most predictive maintenance						
				inspections are performed while equipment is in service, thereby minimizing disruption of normal system operations. Predictive maintenance can result in substantial cost savinas						
				and higher system reliability. Predictive maintenance can result in substantial cost savings						
				item. To evaluate equipment condition, predictive maintenance utilizes nondestructive						
				testing technologies such as infrared, acoustic (partial discharge and airborne ultrasonic),						
				corona detection, vibration analysis, sound level measurements, oil analysis, and other						
				specific online tests.						
MA-6 (3)	2	Maintenance Timely Maintenance Automated		A computerized maintenance management system maintains a computer database of						
1		Support for Predictive Maintenance	computerized maintenance management system.	information about the maintenance operations of organizations and automates processing						[
1				equipment condition data in order to trigger maintenance planning, execution, and						[
MP	_	Media Protection		reporting.			\vdash			
		I Media Protection								1

Communities	Laure I	Control Norma	Ale al construction	Control Tart	Construent of Coldense	Bulated Controls	Design of the s		Mari	III-k	Notes
Control ID MP-1	1	Control Name Wi Media Protection Policy and Procedures	thdrawn	Control Text The organization: a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]: a.1. A media protection policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and a.2- Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the media protection policy and associated media protection controls; and b. Reviews and updates the current: b.1. Media protection policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and b.2. Media protection procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	Supplemental Guidance This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the MP family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures at unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.	Related Controls PM-9	Priority P1	X X	X	X X	Notes
MP-2	1	Media Protection Media Access		The organization restricts access to [Assignment: organization-defined types of digital and/or non-digital media) to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].	information system media includes both digital and non-digital media. Digital media includes, for example, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external/removable hard disk drives, flash drives, compact disks, and digital video disks. Non-digital media includes, for example, paper and microfilm. Restricting non-digital media access includes, for example, denying access to patient medical records in a community hospital unless the individuals seeking access to such records are authorized healthcare providers. Restricting access to digital media includes, for example, limiting access to design specifications stored on compact disks in the media library to the project leader and the individuals on the development team.	AC-3,IA-2,MP-4,PE- 2,PE-3,PL-2	P1	х	х	х	
MP-2 (1)	2	Media Protection Media Access Automated Restricted Access	Х								[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-4 (2)]
MP-2 (2)	2	Media Protection Media Access Cryptographic Protection	Х								[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-28 (1)]
MP-3	1	Media Protection Media Marking		The organization: a. Marks information system media indicating the distribution limitations, handling caveats, and applicable security markings (if any) of the information; and b. Exempts [Assignment: organization-defined types of information system media] from marking as long as the media remain within [Assignment: organization-defined controlled areas].	The term security marking refers to the application/use of human-readable security attributes attributes. The term security labeling refers to the application/use of security attributes with regard to internal data structures within information systems (see AC-16). Information systems (see AC-16). Information systems (see AC-16) information systems (see AC-16) information systems (see AC-16). Information systems (see AC-16) information systems (see AC-16). Information system (see AC-16) information system (see AC-16) information information (see AC-16) information (see AC-16). Information (see AC-16) information (specification system and see AC-16) information system media reflects applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance.	AC-16,PL-2,RA-3	P2		x	x	
MP-4	1	Media Protection Media Storage		The organization: a. Physically controls and securely stores [Assignment: organization-defined types of digital and/or non-digital media] within [Assignment: organization-defined controlled areas]; and b. Protects information system media until the media are destroyed or sanitized using approved equipment, techniques, and procedures.	Information system media includes both digital and non-digital media. Digital media includes, for example, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external/removable hard disk drives, flash drives, compact disks, and digital video disks. Non-digital media includes, for example, pard microfilm. Physically controlling information system media includes, for example, conducting inventories, ensuring procedures are in place to allow individuals to check out and return media to the media library, and maintaining accountability for all stored media. Secure storage includes, for example, a locked drawer, desk, or cabinet, or a controlled media library. The type of media storage is commensurate with the security category and/or classification of the information residing on the media. Controlled areas are areas for which organizations provide sufficient physical and procedural sufeguards to meet the requirements established for protecting information and/or information systems. For media containing information determined by organizations to be in the public domain, to be publicly releasable, or to have limited or no adverse impact on organizations or individuals if accessed by other than authorized personnel, fewer safeguards may be needed. In these situations, physical access controls provide adequate protection.	CP-6,CP-9,MP-2,MP- 7,PE-3	PI		x	x	
MP-4 (1)	2	Media Protection Media Storage Cryptographic	X								[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-28 (1)]
MP-4 (2)	2	Protection Media Protection Media Storage Automated		The organization employs automated mechanisms to restrict access to media storage areas and		AU-2,AU-9,AU-6,AU-					
MP-5	1	Media Protection Media Transport		to audit access attempts and access granted. The organization: a. Protects and controls [Assignment: organization-defined types of information system media] during transport outside of controlled areas using [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards]; b. Maintains accountability for information system media during transport outside of controlled areas; c. Documents activities associated with the transport of information system media; and d. Restricts the activities associated with the transport of information system media to authorized personnel.	storage areas. Information system media includes both digital and non-digital media. Digital media includes, for example, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external/removable hard disk drives, flash drives, Compact disks, and digital video disks. Non-digital media includes, for example, paper and microfilm. This control also applies to mobile devices with information storage capability (e.g., smart phones, talkets, E-readers). That are transported outside of controlled areas. Controlled areas are areas or spaces for which organizations provide sufficient physical and/or procedural safeguards to meet the requirements established for protecting information and/or information systems. Physical and technical safeguards for media are commensurate with the security category or classification of the information residing on the media. Safeguards to protect media during transport include, for example, locked containers and cryptography. Cryptographic mechanisms can provide confidentiality and integrity protections depending upon the mechanisms used. Activities associated with transport include the actual transport as well as those activities such as releasing media for transport and ensuring that media enters the appropriate transport processes. For the actual transport, authorized transport and courier personnel may include individuals from outside the organization (e.g., U.S. Postal Service or a commercial transport or delivery service). Maintaining accountability of media during transport includes, for example, restricting transport activities as the media moves through the transportation system to prevent and detect loss, destruction, or tampering. Organizations establish documentation requirements or activities associated with the transport afformation system media in accordance with organizational assessments of risk to include the flexibility to define different record-keeping methods for the definerent types of media transport as part of an overall system of transport-related records.	28			x	x	
MP-5 (1)	2	Media Protection Media Transport Protection Outside of Controlled Areas	Х								[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-5]
MP-5 (2)	2	Media Protection Media Transport Documentation of Activities	Х								[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-5]
MP-5 (3)	2	Media Protection Media Transport Custodians		The organization employs an identified custodian during transport of information system media outside of controlled areas.	identified custodians provide organizations with specific points of contact during the media transport process and facilitate individual accountability. Custodial responsibilities can be transferred from one individual to another as long as an unambiguous custodian is identified at all times.						

Control ID	level	Control Name Withdrawn	Control Text	Supplemental Guidance	Related Controls	Priority L	OW	Mod	High	Notes
MP-5 (4)	2	Media Protection Media Transport	The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect the confidentiality and integrity of information stored on digital media during transport outside of controlled areas.	This control enhancement applies to both portable storage devices (e.g., USB memory sticks, compact disks, digital video disks, external/removable hard disk drives) and mobile devices with storage capability (e.g., smart phones, tablets, E-readers).	MP-2	Priority	.ow	X	X	NOTES
MP-6	1	Media Protection Media Sanitization	The organization: a. Santizes [Assignment: organization-defined information system media] prior to disposal, release out of organizational control, or release for reuse using [Assignment: organization-defined santization techniques and procedures] in accordance with applicable federal and organizational standards and policies; and b. Emgloys santization mechanisms with the strength and integrity commensurate with the security category or dassification of the information.	This control applies to all information system media, both digital and non-digital, subject to disposal or reuse, whether or not the media is considered removable. Examples include media found in scanners, copiers, printers, notebook computers, workstations, network components, and mobile devices. The sanitization process removes information from the media such that the information cannot be retrieved or reconstructed. Sanitization techniques, including clearing, purging, cryptographic erase, and destruction, prevent take of rofisposal. Organizations determine the appropriate sanitization methods recognizing that destruction is sometimes necessary when other methods cannot be applied to media requiring sanitization. Organizations use discretion on the employment of approved sanitization techniques and procedures for media containing information deemed to be in the public domain or publicly releasable, or deemed to have no adverse impact on organizations or individuals if released for reuse or disposal. Sanitization or Individuals if released for reuse or disposal. Sanitization or mortification or community or selected sections or words from a document by obscuring the redacted sections/words in a manner equivalent in effectiveness to removing them from the document. NSA standards and policies control the sanitization process for media containing classified information.	MA-2,MA-4,RA-3,SC-	P1)	(x	x	
MP-6 (1)	2	Media Protection Media Sanitization Review / Approve / Track / Document / Verify	The organization reviews, approves, tracks, documents, and verifies media sanitization and disposal actions.	Organizations review and approve media to be sanitized to ensure compliance with records retention policies. Tracking/documenting actions include, for example, listing personnel who reviewed and approved sanitization and disposal actions, types of media sanitized, specific files stored on the media, sanitization methods used, date and time of the sanitization actions, personnel who performed the sanitization, verification actions taken, personnel who performed the werification, and disposal action taken. Organizations verify that the sanitization of the media was effective prior to disposal.	51-12				X	
MP-6 (2)	2	Media Protection Media Sanitization Equipment Testing	The organization tests sanitization equipment and procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to verify that the intended sanitization is being achieved.	Testing of sanitization equipment and procedures may be conducted by qualified and authorized external entities (e.g., other federal agencies or external service providers).					х	
MP-6 (3)	2	Media Protection Media Sanilization Nondestructive Techniques	The organization applies nondestructive sanitization techniques to portable storage devices prior to connecting such devices to the information system under the following circumstances: [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances requiring sanitization of portable storage devices].	This control enhancement applies to digital media containing classified information and Controlled Unclassified information (CUI). Portable storage devices can be the source of maliciaus code insertions into organizational information systems. Many of these devices are obtained from unknown and potentially untrustworthy sources and may contain malicious code that can be readily transferred to information systems through USB ports or other entry portiss. While scanning such storage devices is always recommended, sanitization provides additional assurance that the devices are free of malicious code to include code capable of initiating zero-day attacks. Organizations consider nandestructive sanitization of portable storage devices when such devices are first purchased from the manufacturer or vendor prior to initial use or when organizations lose a positive chain of custody for the devices.	51-3				x	
MP-6 (4)	2	Media Protection Media Sanitization Controlled X								[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-6]
MP-6 (5)	2	Unclassified Information Media Protection Media Sanitization Classified X Information								[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-6]
MP-6 (6)	2	Media Protection Media Sanitization Media X Destruction								[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-6]
MP-6 (7)	2	Media Protection Media Sanitization Dual Authorization	The organization enforces dual authorization for the sanitization of [Assignment: organization-defined information system media].	Organizations employ dual authorization to ensure that information system media sanitization cannot occur unless two technically qualified individuals conduct the task. Individuals antitizing information system media possess sufficient skills/expertise to determine if the proposed sanitization reflects applicable federal/organizational standards, policies, and procedures. Dual authorization also helps to ensure that sanitization occurs as intended, both practecting against errors and false claims of having performed the sanitization actions. Dual authorization may also be known as two-person control.	AC-3,MP-2					
MP-6 (8)	2	Media Protection Media Sanitization Remote Purging / Wiping of Information	The organization provides the capability to purge/wipe information from [Assignment: organization-defined information systems, system components, or devices] either remotely or under the following conditions: [Assignment: organization-defined conditions].	This control enhancement protects data/information on organizational information systems, system components, or devices (e.g., mobile devices) if such systems, components, or devices are obtained by unauthorized individuals. Remote purge/wipe commands require strong authentication to mitigate the risk of unauthorized individuals purging/wiping the system/component/device. The purge/wipe function can be implemented in a variety of ways including, for example, by overwriting data/information multiple times or by destroying the key necessary to decrypt encrypted data.						
MP-7	1	Media Protection Media Use	The organization [Selection: restricts; prohibits] the use of [Assignment: organization-defined type of information system media] on [Assignment: organization-defined information systems or system components] using [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards].			P1	· -	x	x	
MP-7 (1)	2	Media Protection Media Use Prohibit Use Without Owner	The organization prohibits the use of portable storage devices in organizational information systems when such devices have no identifiable owner.	Requiring identifiable owners (e.g., individuals, organizations, or projects) for portable storage devices reduces the risk of using such technologies by allowing organizations to assign responsibility and accountability for addressing known vulnerabilities in the devices (e.g., malicious code insertion).	PL-4			х	Х	

Control ID	Level	Control Name Withdrawn	Control Text	Supplemental Guidance	Related Controls	Priority	Low	Mod	High	Notes
MP-7 (2)	2	Media Protection Media Use Prohibit Use of	The organization prohibits the use of sanitization-resistant media in organizational information	Sanitization-resistance applies to the capability to purge information from media. Certain	MP-6					
		Sanitization-Resistant Media	systems.	types of media do not support sanitize commands, or if supported, the interfaces are not						
				supported in a standardized way across these devices. Sanitization-resistant media include,						
				for example, compact flash, embedded flash on boards and devices, solid state drives, and						
MP-8	1	Media Protection Media Downgrading	The organization:	USB removable media. This control applies to all information system media, digital and non-digital, subject to		PO				
IWIF-0	•	Media Protection Media Downgrading	a. Establishes [Assignment: organization-defined information system media downgrading process]	release outside of the organization, whether or not the media is considered removable. The		10				
			that includes employing downgrading mechanisms with [Assignment: organization-defined strength							
			and integrity];	typically by security category or classification level, such that the information cannot be						
			b. Ensures that the information system media downgrading process is commensurate with the	retrieved or reconstructed. Downgrading of media includes redacting information to enable						
			security category and/or classification level of the information to be removed and the access	wider release and distribution. Downgrading of media also ensures that empty space on the						
			authorizations of the potential recipients of the downgraded information;	media (e.g., slack space within files) is devoid of information.						
			c. Identifies [Assignment: organization-defined information system media requiring downgrading];							
			and							
			d. Downgrades the identified information system media using the established process.							
140.0 (41	-	Media Protection Media Downgrading	The control of the state of the	Organizations can document the media downgrading process by providing information						
MP-8 (1)	2	Documentation of Process	The organization documents information system media downgrading actions.	such as the downgrading technique employed, the identification number of the						
		Documentation of Process		downgraded media, and the identity of the individual that authorized and/or performed						
				the downgrading action.						
MP-8 (2)	2	Media Protection Media Downgrading	The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined tests] of downgrading equipment							
/		Equipment Testing	and procedures to verify correct performance [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].							
		-								
MP-8 (3)	2	Media Protection Media Downgrading	The organization downgrades information system media containing [Assignment: organization-							
1		Controlled Unclassified Information	defined Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI)] prior to public release in accordance with		1					
			applicable federal and organizational standards and policies.							
MP-8 (4)	2	Media Protection Media Downgrading	The organization downgrades information system media containing classified information prior to							
		Classified Information	release to individuals without required access authorizations in accordance with NSA standards	procedures to transfer information confirmed to be unclassified from classified information						
DE	0	Physical and Environmental Protection	and policies.	systems to unclassified media.						
PE PE-1	1	Physical and Environmental Protection Physical and Environmental Protection Physical	The organization:	This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective	PM-9	P1	v	v	v	
L E-1	1	and Environmental Protection Physical and Environmental Protection Policy and	a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or	implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the PE family.	L IAI-A	r1	^	^	^	
		Procedures	roles]:	Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives,						
			a.1. A physical and environmental protection policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles,	regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at						
			responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and	the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures						
			compliance; and	unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy						
			a.2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the physical and environmental protection	for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the						
			policy and associated physical and environmental protection controls; and	complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security						
			b. Reviews and updates the current:	program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk						
			b.1. Physical and environmental protection policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];	management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.						
			and							
			b.2. Physical and environmental protection procedures [Assignment: organization-defined							
			frequency].			l				
PE-2	1	Physical and Environmental Protection Physical	The organization:		PE-3,PE-4,PS-3	P1	×	l ^x	×	
		Access Authorizations	 a. Develops, approves, and maintains a list of individuals with authorized access to the facility where the information system resides; 	contractors, and others) with permanent physical access authorization credentials are not considered visitors. Authorization credentials include, for example, badges, identification						
1			b. Issues authorization credentials for facility access:	cards, and smart cards. Organizations determine the strength of authorization credentials	1					
			c. Reviews the access list detailing authorized facility access by individuals [Assignment:	needed (including level of forge-proof badges, smart cards, or identification cards)						
			organization-defined frequency); and	consistent with federal standards, policies, and procedures. This control only applies to						
1 1			d. Removes individuals from the facility access list when access is no longer required.	areas within facilities that have not been designated as publicly accessible.	1					
			, and a second of the second o	0						
							<u></u>	L		
PE-2 (1)	2	Physical and Environmental Protection Physical	The organization authorizes physical access to the facility where the information system resides		AC-2,AC-3,AC-6					
		Access Authorizations Access by Position / Role	based on position or role.							
	_	Sharked and Sankara and David and Asia	The complete complete to the form of the order of the complete to the complete	Associately forms of any annual relative blood of the second of the seco	4 2 4 4 4 5 5		-		-	
PE-2 (2)	2	Physical and Environmental Protection Physical	The organization requires two forms of identification from [Assignment: organization-defined list		IA-2,IA-4,IA-5					
1		Access Authorizations Two Forms of	of acceptable forms of identification] for visitor access to the facility where the information	Personal Identity Verification (PIV) cards, and drivers' licenses. In the case of gaining access	1					
		Identification	system resides.	to facilities using automated mechanisms, organizations may use PIV cards, key cards, PINs. and biometrics.						
PE-2 (3)	2	Physical and Environmental Protection Physical	The organization restricts unescorted access to the facility where the information system resides	Due to the highly sensitive nature of classified information stored within certain facilities, it	PS-2 PS-6	1			1	
r'E-2 (3)	2	Access Authorizations Restrict Unescorted Access	to personnel with [Selection (one or more): security clearances for all information contained	is important that individuals lacking sufficient security clearances, access approvals, or	. 5-2,75-0					
		Julio Educio I inconcti offescorted Access	within the system; formal access authorizations for all information contained within the system;	need to know, be escorted by individuals with appropriate credentials to ensure that such						
			need for access to all information contained within the system; [Assignment: organization-defined							
			credentials]].							
PE-3	1	Physical and Environmental Protection Physical	The organization:	This control applies to organizational employees and visitors. Individuals (e.g., employees,	AU-2,AU-6,MP-2,MP-	P1	х	х	х	
		Access Control	a. Enforces physical access authorizations at [Assignment: organization-defined entry/exit points to	contractors, and others) with permanent physical access authorization credentials are not	4,PE-2,PE-4,PE-5,PS-					
			the facility where the information system resides] by;	considered visitors. Organizations determine the types of facility guards needed including,	3,RA-3					
			a.1. Verifying individual access authorizations before granting access to the facility; and	for example, professional physical security staff or other personnel such as administrative						
			a.2. Controlling ingress/egress to the facility using [Selection (one or more): [Assignment:	staff or information system users. Physical access devices include, for example, keys, locks,						
			organization-defined physical access control systems/devices]; guards];	combinations, and card readers. Safeguards for publicly accessible areas within						
			b. Maintains physical access audit logs for [Assignment: organization-defined entry/exit points];	organizational facilities include, for example, cameras, monitoring by guards, and isolating						
			c. Provides [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to control access to areas within							
			the facility officially designated as publicly accessible;	control systems comply with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies,						
			d. Escorts visitors and monitors visitor activity [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances requiring visitor escorts and monitoring]:	regulations, standards, and guidance. The Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management Program provides implementation guidance for identity, credential, and						
			e. Secures keys, combinations, and other physical access devices;	access management capabilities for physical access control systems. Organizations have						
1 1			e. Secures keys, combinations, and other physical access devices; f. Inventories [Assignment: organization-defined physical access devices] every [Assignment:	flexibility in the types of audit logs employed. Audit logs can be procedural (e.g., a written	1					
			organization-defined frequency]; and	log of individuals accessing the facility and when such access occurred), automated (e.g.,						
			g. Changes combinations and keys [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and/or when keys							
			are lost, combinations are compromised, or individuals are transferred or terminated.	can include facility access points, interior access points to information systems and/or						
				components requiring supplemental access controls, or both. Components of organizational	1					
				information systems (e.g., workstations, terminals) may be located in areas designated as						
				publicly accessible with organizations safeguarding access to such devices.						
										I .
pr 2/51	2	Obsised and Environmental Bretantian Obsised	The appointing appares physical accuse authoritations to the information and	This control aphancement provides additional abusing sequents for these areas with	pc. 2				v	
PE-3 (1)	2	Physical and Environmental Protection Physical Acress Control Information System Acress	The organization enforces physical access authorizations to the information system in addition to the physical access controls for the facility at laxing ment; arounization, defined physical access.		PS-2				х	
PE-3 (1)	2	Physical and Environmental Protection Physical Access Control Information System Access	the physical access controls for the facility at [Assignment: organization-defined physical spaces	facilities where there is a concentration of information system components (e.g., server	PS-2				х	
PE-3 (1)	2	Physical and Environmental Protection Physical Access Control Information System Access			PS-2				х	
		Access Control Information System Access	the physical access controls for the facility at [Assignment: organization-defined physical spaces containing one or more components of the information system].	facilities where there is a concentration of information system components (e.g., server rooms, media storage areas, data and communications centers).					Х	
PE-3 (1)		Access Control Information System Access Physical and Environmental Protection Physical	the physical access controls for the facility at [Assignment: organization-defined physical spaces containing one or more components of the information system]. The organization performs security checks [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] at the	facilities where there is a concentration of information system components (e.g., server rooms, media storage areas, data and communications centers). Organizations determine the extent, frequency, and/or randomness of security checks to	P5-2 AC-4,SC-7				х	
		Access Control Information System Access	the physical access controls for the facility at [Assignment: organization-defined physical spaces containing one or more components of the information system].	facilities where there is a concentration of information system components (e.g., server rooms, media storage areas, data and communications centers). Organizations determine the extent, frequency, and/or randomness of security checks to					х	

Control ID	Level	Control Name	Withdrawn	Control Text	Supplemental Guidance	Related Controls	Priority I	Low M	od Hig	h Notes
PE-3 (3)	2	Physical and Environmental Protection Physical Access Control Continuous Guards / Alarms / Monitorina		The organization employs guards and/or alarms to monitor every physical access point to the facility where the information system resides 24 hours per day, 7 days per week.		CP-6,CP-7				
PE-3 (4)	2	Physical and Environmental Protection Physical Access Control Lockable Casings		The organization uses lockable physical casings to protect [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] from unauthorized physical access.						
PE-3 (5)	2	Physical and Environmental Protection Physical Access Control Tamper Protection		The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to [Selection (lone or more): detect; prevent] physical tampering or alteration of [Assignment: organization-defined hardware components] within the information system.	Organizations may implement tamper detection/prevention at selected hardware components or tamper detection at some components and tamper prevention at other components. Tamper detection/prevention activities can employ many types of antitamper technologies including, for example, tamper-detection seals and anti-tamper coatings. Anti-tamper programs help to detect hardware alterations through counterfeiting and other supply-chain-related risks.	SA-12				
PE-3 (6)	2	Physical and Environmental Protection Physical Access Control Facility Penetration Testing		The organization employs a penetration testing process that includes [Assignment: organization- defined frequency], unannounced attempts to bypass or circumvent security controls associated with physical access points to the facility.		CA-2,CA-7				
PE-4	1	Physical and Environmental Protection Access Control for Transmission Medium		The organization controls physical access to [Assignment: organization-defined information system distribution and transmission lines] within organizational facilities using [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards].		MP-2,MP-4,PE-2,PE- 3,PE-5,SC-7,SC-8	P1	x	x	
PE-5	1	Physical and Environmental Protection Access Control for Output Devices		The organization controls physical access to information system output devices to prevent unauthorized individuals from obtaining the output.	Controlling physical access to output devices includes, for example, placing output devices in locked rooms or other secured areas and allowing access to authorized individuals only, and placing output devices in locations that can be monitored by organizational personnel. Monitors, printers, copiers, scanners, facsimile machines, and audio devices are examples of information system output devices.		P2	x	х	
PE-5 (1)	2	Physical and Environmental Protection Access Control for Output Devices Access to Output by Authorized Individuals		The organization: (a) Controls physical access to output from [Assignment: organization-defined output devices]; and (b) Ensures that only authorized individuals receive output from the device.	Controlling physical access to selected output devices includes, for example, placing printers, copiers, and facsimile machines in controlled areas with keypod access controls or limiting access to individuals with certain types of badges.					
PE-5 (2)		Physical and Environmental Protection Access Control for Output Devices Access to Output by Individual Identity		The information system: (a) Controls physical access to output from [Assignment: organization-defined output devices]; and (b) Links individual identity to receipt of the output from the device.	Controlling physical access to selected output devices includes, for example, installing security functionality on printers, copiers, and facsimile machines that allows organizations to implement authentication (e.g., using a PIN or hardware token) on output devices prior to the release of output to individuals.					
PE-5 (3)		Physical and Environmental Protection Access Control for Output Devices Marking Output Devices		The organization marks [Assignment: organization-defined information system output devices] indicating the appropriate security marking of the information permitted to be output from the device.	Outputs devices include, for example, printers, monitors, facsimile machines, scanners, copiers, and audio devices. This control enhancement is generally applicable to information system output devices other than mobiles devices.					
PE-6	1	Physical and Environmental Protection Monitoring Physical Access		The organization: a. Monitors physical access to the facility where the information system resides to detect and respond to physical security incidents; b. Reviews physical access logs [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and upon occurrence of [Assignment: organization-defined events or potential indications of events]; and c. Coordinates results of reviews and investigations with the organizational incident response capability.	Organizational incident response capabilities include investigations of and responses to detected physical security incidents. Security incidents include, for example, apparent security violations or suspicious physical access activities. Suspicious physical access activities include, for example: (i) accesses outside of normal work hours; (ii) repeated accesses to areas not normally accessed; (iii) accesses for unusual lengths of time; and (iv) out-of-sequence accesses.	CA-7,IR-4,IR-8	P1)	x x	x	
PE-6 (1)	2	Physical and Environmental Protection Monitoring Physical Access Intrusion Alarms / Surveillance Equipment		The organization monitors physical intrusion alarms and surveillance equipment.				Х	Х	
PE-6 (2)	2	Physical and Environmental Protection Monitoring Physical Access Automated Intrusion Recognition / Responses		The organization employs automated mechanisms to recognize [Assignment: organization-definea classes/types of intrusions] and initiate [Assignment: organization-defined response actions].		SI-4				
PE-6 (3)	2	Physical and Environmental Protection Monitoring Physical Access Video Surveillance		The organization employs video surveillance of [Assignment: organization-defined operational areas] and retains video recordings for [Assignment: organization-defined time period].	This control enhancement focuses on recording surveillance video for purposes of subsequent review, if circumstances so warrant (e.g., a break-in detected by other means). It does not require monitoring surveillance video although organizations may choose to do so. Note that there may be legal considerations when performing and retaining video surveillance, especially if such surveillance is in a public location.					
PE-6 (4)	2	Physical and Environmental Protection Monitoring Physical Access Monitoring Physical Access to Information Systems		The organization monitors physical access to the information system in addition to the physical access monitoring of the facility as [Assignment: organization-defined physical spaces containing one or more components of the information system].	This control enhancement provides additional monitoring for those areas within facilities where there is a concentration of information system components (e.g., server rooms, media storage areas, communications centers).	PS-2,PS-3			х	
PE-7	1	Physical and Environmental Protection Visitor Control	Х							[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PE-2 and PE-3]
PE-8	1	Physical and Environmental Protection Visitor Access Records		The organization: a. Maintains visitor access records to the facility where the information system resides for [Assignment: organization-defined time period]; and b. Reviews visitor access records [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	Visitor access records include, for example, names and organizations of persons visiting, visitor signatures, forms of identification, dates of access, entry and departure times, purposes of visits, and names and organizations of persons visited. Visitor access records are not required for publicly accessible areas.		P3)	x x	х	
PE-8 (1)	2	Physical and Environmental Protection Visitor Access Records Automated Records Maintenance		The organization employs automated mechanisms to facilitate the maintenance and review of visitor access records.					Х	
PE-8 (2)	2	Review Physical and Environmental Protection Visitor Access Records Physical Access Records	Х							[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PE-2]
PE-9	1	Physical and Environmental Protection Power Equipment and Cabling		The organization protects power equipment and power cabling for the information system from damage and destruction.	Organizations determine the types of protection necessary for power equipment and cabling employed at different locations both internal and external to organizational facilities and environments of operation. This includes, for example, generators and power cabling outside of buildings, internal cabling and uninterruptable power sources within an office or data center, and power sources for self-contained entities such as vehicles and satellites.	PE-4	P1	x	x	
PE-9 (1)	2	Physical and Environmental Protection Power Equipment and Cabling Redundant Cabling		The organization employs redundant power cabling paths that are physically separated by [Assignment: organization-defined distance].	Physically separate, redundant power cables help to ensure that power continues to flow in the event one of the cables is cut or otherwise damaged.					
PE-9 (2)	2	Physical and Environmental Protection Power Equipment and Cabling Automatic Voltage Controls		The organization employs automatic voltage controls for [Assignment: organization-defined critical information system components].						
PE-10	1	Physical and Environmental Protection Emergency Shutoff		The organization: a. Provides the capability of shutting off power to the information system or individual system components in emergency situations; b. Places emergency shutoff switches or devices in [Assignment: organization-defined location by information system or system component] to facilitate safe and easy access for personnel; and c. Protects emergency power shutoff capability from unauthorized activation.	This control applies primarily to facilities containing concentrations of information system resources including, for example, data centers, server rooms, and mainframe computer rooms.	PE-15	P1	x	x	
PE-10 (1)	2	Physical and Environmental Protection Emergency Shutoff Accidental / Unauthorized Activation	Х							[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PE-10]

Control ID PF-11	Level 1	Control Name Physical and Environmental Protection	Withdrawn	Control Text The organization provides a short-term uninterruptible power supply to facilitate [Selection (one or	Supplemental Guidance	Related Controls AT-3.CP-2.CP-7	Priority P1	Low N	viod High	Notes
	•	Emergency Power		need gamazion province a sind-term in initieri puncie power supply of admirate [Section] (the or more): an orderly shutdown of the information system; transition of the information system to long term alternate power] in the event of a primary power source loss.		3,05-2,05-7				
PE-11 (1)	2	Physical and Environmental Protection Emergency Power Long-Term Alternate Power Supply - Minimal Operational Capability		The organization provides a long-term alternate power supply for the information system that is capable of maintaining minimally required operational capability in the event of an extended loss of the primary power source.	This control enhancement can be satisfied, for example, by the use of a secondary commercial power supply or other external power supply. Lang-term alternate power supplies for the information system can be either manually or automatically activated.				х	
PE-11 (2)	2	Physical and Environmental Protection Emergency Power Long-Term Alternate Power Supply - Self-Contained		The arganization provides a long-term alternate power supply for the information system that is: (a) Self-contained; (b) Not reliant on external power generation; and (c) Capable of maintaining [Selection: minimally required operational capability; full operational capability] in the event of an extended loss of the primary power source.	This control enhancement can be satisfied, for example, by the use of one or more generators with sufficient capacity to meet the needs of the organization. Long-term alternate power supplies for organizational information systems are either manually or automatically activated.					
PE-12	1	Physical and Environmental Protection Emergency Lighting		The organization employs and maintains automatic emergency lighting for the information system that activates in the event of a power outage or disruption and that covers emergency exits and evacuation routes within the facility.	This control applies primarily to facilities containing concentrations of information system resources including, for example, data centers, server rooms, and mainframe computer rooms.	CP-2,CP-7	P1	x x	x	
PE-12 (1)	2	Physical and Environmental Protection Emergency Lighting Essential Missions / Business Functions		The organization provides emergency lighting for all areas within the facility supporting essential missions and business functions.						
PE-13	1	Physical and Environmental Protection Fire Protection		The organization employs and maintains fire suppression and detection devices/systems for the information system that are supported by an independent energy source.	This control applies primarily to facilities containing concentrations of information system resources including, for example, data centers, server rooms, and mainframe computer rooms. Fire suppression and detection devices/systems include, for example, sprinkler systems, handheld fire extinguishers, fixed fire hoses, and smoke detectors.		P1	х	x	
PE-13 (1)	2	Physical and Environmental Protection Fire Protection Detection Devices / Systems		The organization employs fire detection devices/systems for the information system that activate automatically and notify [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] and [Assignment: organization-defined emergency responders] in the event of a fire.	Organizations can identify specific personnel, roles, and emergency responders in the event that individuals on the notification list must have appropriate access authorizations and/or clearances, for example, to obtain access to facilities where classified operations are taking place or where there are information systems containing classified information.				х	
PE-13 (2)	2	Physical and Environmental Protection Fire Protection Suppression Devices / Systems		The organization employs fire suppression devices/systems for the information system that provide automatic notification of any activation to Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] and [Assignment: organization-defined emergency responders].	organizations can identify specific personnel, roles, and emergency responders in the event that individuals on the notification list must have appropriate access outhorizations and/or clearances, for example, to obtain access to facilities where classified operations are taking place or where there are information systems containing classified information.				х	
PE-13 (3)	2	Physical and Environmental Protection Fire Protection Automatic Fire Suppression		The organization employs an automatic fire suppression capability for the information system				X	x	
PE-13 (4)	2	Physical and Environmental Protection Fire Protection Inspections		when the facility is not stoffed on a continuous bosis. The organization ensures that the facility undergoes (Assignment: organization-defined frequency) inspections by authorized and qualified inspectors and resolves identified deficiencies within [Assignment: organization-defined time period].						
PE-14	1	Physical and Environmental Protection Temperature and Humidity Controls		The organization: a. Maintains temperature and humidity levels within the facility where the information system resides at [Assignment: organization-defined acceptable levels], and b. Monitors temperature and humidity levels [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	This control applies primarily to facilities containing concentrations of information system resources, for example, data centers, server rooms, and mainframe computer rooms.	AT-3	P1	x x	x	
PE-14 (1)	2	Physical and Environmental Protection Temperature and Humidity Controls Automatic Controls		The organization employs automatic temperature and humidity controls in the facility to prevent fluctuations potentially harmful to the information system.						
PE-14 (2)	2	Physical and Environmental Protection Temperature and Humidity Controls Monitoring with Alarms / Notifications		The organization employs temperature and humidity monitoring that provides an alarm or notification of changes potentially harmful to personnel or equipment.						
PE-15	1	Physical and Environmental Protection Water Damage Protection		The organization protects the information system from damage resulting from water leakage by providing master shutoff or isolation valves that are accessible, working properly, and known to kep personnel.	This control applies primarily to facilities containing concentrations of information system resources including, for example, data centers, server rooms, and mainframe computer rooms. Isolation valves can be employed in addition to or in lieu of master shutoff valves to shut off water supplies in specific areas of concern, without affecting entire organizations.	AT-3	P1	x x	x	
PE-15 (1)	2	Physical and Environmental Protection Water Damage Protection Automation Support		The organization employs automated mechanisms to detect the presence of water in the vicinity of the information system and alerts [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].	Automated mechanisms can include, for example, water detection sensors, alarms, and notification systems.				х	
PE-16		Physical and Environmental Protection Delivery and Removal		The organization authorizes, monitors, and controls [Assignment: organization-defined types of information system components] entering and exiting the facility and maintains records of those Items.	Effectively enforcing authorizations for entry and exit of information system components may require restricting access to delivery areas and possibly isolating the areas from the information system and media libraries.	CM-3,MA-2,MA- 3,MP-5,SA-12	P2	х	x	
PE-17	1	Physical and Environmental Protection Alternate Work Site		The organization: a. Employs [Assignment: organization-defined security controls] at alternate work sites; b. Assesses as feasible, the effectiveness of security controls at alternate work sites; and c. Provides a means for employees to communicate with information security personnel in case of security incidents or problems.	Alternate work sites may include, for example, government facilities or private residences of employees. While commonly distinct from alternative processing sites, alternate work sites may provide readily available alternate locations as part of contingency operations. Organizations may define different sets of security controls for specific alternate work sites or types of sites depending on the work-related activities conducted at those sites. This control supports the contingency planning activities of organizations and the federal telework initiative.	AC-17,CP-7	P2	x	x x	
PE-18	1	Physical and Environmental Protection Location of Information System Components		The organization positions information system components within the facility to minimize potential damage from [Assignment: organization-defined physical and environmental hazards] and to minimize the opportunity for unauthorized access.	Physical and environmental hazards include, for example, flooding, fire, tornados, earthquakes, hurricanes, acts of terrorism, vandalism, electromagnetic pulse, electrical interference, and other forms of incoming electromagnetic radiation. In addition, organizations consider the location of physical entry points where unauthorized individuals, while not being granted access, might nonetheless be in close proximity to information systems and therefore increase the potential for unauthorized access to organizational communications (e.g., through the use of wireless sniffers or microphones).	CP-2,PE-19,RA-3	P3		х	
PE-18 (1)	2	Physical and Environmental Protection Location of Information System Components Facility Site		The organization plans the location or site of the facility where the information system resides with regard to physical and environmental hazards and for existing facilities, considers the physical and environmental hazards in its risk mitigation strategy.		PM-8				
PE-19	1	Physical and Environmental Protection Information Leakage		The organization protects the information system from information leakage due to electromagnetic signals emanations.	Information leakage is the intentional or unintentional release of information to an untrusted environment from electromagnetic signals emanations. Security categories or classifications of information systems (with respect to confidentially) and organizational security policies guide the selection of security controls employed to protect systems against information leakage due to electromagnetic signals emanations.		PO			
PE-19 (1)	2	Physical and Environmental Protection Information Leakage National Emissions / Tempest Policies and Procedures		The organization ensures that information system components, associated data communications, and networks are protected in accordance with national emissions and TEMPEST policies and procedures based on the security category or classification of the information.						

Control ID	Level	Control Name	Withdrawn	Control Text	Supplemental Guidance	Related Controls	Priority	Laur A	dod 1	High	Makes
PF-20	1	Physical and Environmental Protection Asset	withdrawn	The organization:	Asset location technologies can help organizations ensure that critical assets such as	CM-8	PO	LOW N	//Ou /	-ugu	notes
	•	Monitoring and Tracking		a. Employs [Assignment: organization-defined asset location technologies] to track and monitor the location and movement of [Assignment: organization-defined assets] within [Assignment: organization-defined controlled areas]; and b. Ensures that asset location technologies are employed in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance.		C.III O					
DI	0	Planning									
PL-1		Planning Security Planning Policy and Procedures		The organization: a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]: a.1. A security planning policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and a.2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the security planning policy and associated security planning controls; and b. Reviews and updates the current: b.1. Security planning policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and b.2. Security planning procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the PL family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal alaw, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.	PM-9	P1	x x	>	x	
PL-Z	1	Planning System Security Plan		The organization: a. Develops a security plan for the information system that: a.1. Is consistent with the organization's enterprise architecture; a.2. Explicitly defines the authorization boundary for the system; a.3. Describes the operational context of the information system in terms of missions and business processes; a.4. Provides the security categorization of the information system including supporting rationale; a.5. Describes the operational environment for the information system and relationships with or connections to other information systems; a.6. Provides an overview of the security requirements for the system; a.7. Identifies any relevant overlays, if applicable; a.8. Describes the security controls in place or planned for meeting those requirements including a rationale for the tailoring decisions; and a.9. Is reviewed and approved by the authorizing official or designated representative prior to plan implementation; b. Distributes copies of the security plan and communicates subsequent changes to the plan to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]; c. Reviews the security plan for the information system [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; d. Updates the plan to address changes to the information or security control assessments; and e. Protects the security plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification.	or by reference) to enable a design and implementation that is unambiguously compliant with the intent of the plans and subsequent determinations of risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation if the plan is implemented as intended. Organizations can also apply tailoring guidance to the security control baselines in Appendix D and CNSS instruction 1253 to develop overlays for community-wide use or to address specialized requirements, technologies, or missions/environments of operation (e.g., DoD-atclaic, Federal Public Key Infrastructure, or	AC-2,AC-6,AC-14,AC-17,AC-20,CA-2,CA-3,AC-7,CM-9,CA-3,AC-7,CM-9,CA-3,AM-5,MP-2,MP-4,MP-5,MP-1,PM-1,PM-7,PM-8,PM-9,PM-11,SA-5,SA-17	P1	x x	,	×	
PL-2 (1)	2	Planning System Security Plan Concept of	Х								[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PL-7]
PL-2 (2)	2	Operations Planning System Security Plan Functional	Х								[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PL-8]
PL-2 (3)	2	Planning System Security Plan Plan Coordinate with Other Organizational Entities		The organization plans and coordinates security-related activities affecting the information system with fix-signment-organization-defined individuals or groups) before conducting such activities in order to reduce the impact on other organizational entities.	Security-related activities include, for example, security assessments, audits, hardware and software maintenance, patch management, and contingency plan testing. Advance planning and coordination includes emergency and nonemergency (i.e., planned or nonurgent unplanned) situations. The process defined by organizations to plan and coordinate security-related activities can be included in security plans for information systems or other documents, as appropriate.	CP-4,IR-4		X		х	
PL-3	1	Planning System Security Plan Update	Х								[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PL-2]
PL-4		Planning Rules of Behavior		The organization: a. Establishes and makes readily available to individuals requiring access to the information system the rules that describe their responsibilities and expected behavior with regard to information and information system usage; b. Receives a signed acknowledgment from such individuals, indicating that they have read, understand, and agree to abide by the rules of behavior, before authorizing access to information and the information system: c. Reviews and updates the rules of behavior (Assignment: organization-defined frequency); and d. Requires individuals who have signed a previous version of the rules of behavior to read and resign when the rules of behavior are revised/updated.	behavior based on individual user roles and responsibilities, differentiating, for example, between rules that apply to privileged users and rules that apply to general users. Extablishing rules of behavior for some types of non-organizational users including, for example, individuals who simply receive data/information from federal information systems, is often not feasible given the large number of such users and the limited nature of their interactions with the systems. Rules of behavior for both organizational and non- organizational users can also be established in Ace, System Use Notification. PL-4 b. (the signed acknowledgment portion of this control) may be satisfied by the security awareness training and role-based security training programs conducted by organizations if such training includes rules of behavior. Organizations can use electronic signatures for acknowledging rules of behavior.	AC-2,AC-6,AC-8,AC- 9,AC-17,AC-18,AC- 19,AC-20,AT-2,AT- 3,CM-11,IA-2,IA-4,IA- 5,MP-7,PS-6,PS-8,SA- 5	P2	x x		X	
PL-4 (1)		Planning Rules of Behavior Social Media and Networking Restrictions		The organization includes in the rules of behavior, explicit restrictions on the use of social media/networking sites and posting organizational information on public websites.	This control enhancement addresses rules of behavior related to the use of social media/networking sites: (I) when arganizational personnel are using such sites for official duties or in the conduct of official business; (II) when organizational information is involved in social media/networking transactions; and (III) when personnel are accessing social media/networking sites from organizational information systems. Organizations also address specific rules that prevent unauthorized entities from obtaining and/or inferring non-public organizational information (e.g., system account information, personally identifiable information) from social media/networking sites.			X	. ,	х	
PL-5		Planning Privacy Impact Assessment	X					\vdash			[Withdrawn: Incorporated into Appendix J, AR-2]
PL-7		Planning Security-Related Activity Planning Planning Security Concept of Operations	X	The organization: a. Develops a security Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the information system containing at a minimum, how the organization intends to operate the system from the perspective of information security; and b. Reviews and updates the CONOPS [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	The security CONOPS may be included in the security plan for the information system or in other system development life cycle-related documents, as appropriate. Changes to the CONOPS are reflected in ongoing updates to the security plan, the information security architecture, and other appropriate organizational documents (e.g., security specifications for procurements/acquisitions, system development life cycle documents, and systems/security engineering documents).	PL-2	PO				[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PL-2]

Control ID	Level	Control Name	Withdrawn	Control Text	Supplemental Guidance	Related Controls	Priority I	OW	Mod	High	Notes
PL-8	1	Planning Information Security Architecture	williamii	The organization:	This control addresses actions taken by organizations in the design and development of information			ow	X	X	Motes
1,50	1 1	rialiling illiorillation Security Architecture		a. Develops an information security architecture for the information system that:	systems. The information security architecture at the individual information system level is	7.SA-5.SA-	'		î .	^	
				a.1. Describes the overall philosophy, requirements, and approach to be taken with regard to	consistent with and complements the more global, organization-wide information security	17,Appendix J					
				protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of organizational information;	architecture described in PM-7 that is integral to and developed as part of the enterprise						
				a.2. Describes how the information security architecture is integrated into and supports the	architecture. The information security architecture includes an architectural description, the						
				enterprise architecture; and	placement/allocation of security functionality (including security controls), security-related information for external interfaces, information being exchanged across the interfaces, and the						
				a.3. Describes any information security assumptions about, and dependencies on, external	protection mechanisms associated with each interface. In addition, the security architecture can						
				services;	include other important security-related information, for example, user roles and access privileges						
				b. Reviews and updates the information security architecture [Assignment: organization-defined	assigned to each role, unique security requirements, the types of information processed, stored,						
				frequency] to reflect updates in the enterprise architecture; and	and transmitted by the information system, restoration priorities of information and information						
				c. Ensures that planned information security architecture changes are reflected in the security plan,	system services, and any other specific protection needs. In today's modern architecture, it is						
				the security Concept of Operations (CONOPS), and organizational procurements/acquisitions.	becoming less common for organizations to control all information resources. There are going to be key dependencies on external information services and service providers. Describing such						
					dependencies in the information security architecture is important to developing a comprehensive						
					mission/business protection strategy. Establishing, developing, documenting, and maintaining under						
					configuration control, a baseline configuration for organizational information systems is critical to						
					implementing and maintaining an effective information security architecture. The development of the information security architecture is coordinated with the Senior Agency Official for Privacy						
					(SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) to ensure that security controls needed to support privacy						
					requirements are identified and effectively implemented. PL-8 is primarily directed at organizations						
					(i.e., internally focused) to help ensure that organizations develop an information security						
					architecture for the information system, and that the security architecture is integrated with or						
					tightly coupled to the enterprise architecture through the organization-wide information security						
					architecture. In contrast, SA-17 is primarily directed at external information technology product/system developers and integrators (although SA-17 could be used internally within						
					organizations for in-house system development). SA-17, which is complementary to PL-8, is selected						
					when organizations outsource the development of information systems or information system						
					components to external entities, and there is a need to demonstrate/show consistency with the						
					organization's enterprise architecture and information security architecture.						
PL-8 (1	2	Planning Information Security Architecture		The organization designs its security architecture using a defense-in-depth approach that:	Organizations strategically allocate security safeguards (procedural, technical, or both) in	SC-29,SC-36					
		Defense-In-Depth									
1		4		defined locations and architectural layers]; and	achieve their objective. Requiring adversaries to defeat multiple mechanisms makes it						
1				(b) Ensures that the allocated security safeguards operate in a coordinated and mutually	more difficult to successfully attack critical information resources (i.e., increases adversary						
1				reinforcing manner.	work factor) and also increases the likelihood of detection. The coordination of allocated						
4					safeguards is essential to ensure that an attack that involves one safeguard does not						
1					create adverse unintended consequences (e.g., lockout, cascading alarms) by interfering						
4					with another safeguard. Placement of security safeguards is a key activity. Greater asset						
4					criticality or information value merits additional layering. Thus, an organization may						
1					choose to place anti-virus software at organizational boundary layers, email/web servers,						
4					notebook computers, and workstations to maximize the number of related safeguards						
4					adversaries must penetrate before compromising the information and information						
1					systems.						
01.07	2	Discrete Line County Assistant and		The second state of the se	Different information to the design of the second s	C4.43					
PL-8 (2	' ²	Planning Information Security Architecture Supplier Diversity		The organization requires that [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] allocated to [Assignment: organization-defined locations and architectural layers] are obtained from	Different information technology products have different strengths and weaknesses. Providing a broad spectrum of products complements the individual offerings. For example,	SA-12					
		Supplier Diversity		different suppliers.	vendors offering malicious code protection typically update their products at different						
				unjjerent suppners.	times, often developing solutions for known viruses, Trojans, or worms according to their						
					priorities and development schedules. By having different products at different locations						
					(e.g., server, boundary, desktop) there is an increased likelihood that at least one will						
					detect the malicious code.						
PL-9	1	Planning Central Management		The organization centrally manages [Assignment: organization-defined security controls and related	Central management refers to the organization-wide management and implementation of		PO PO				
				processes].	selected security controls and related processes. Central management includes planning,						
					implementing, assessing, authorizing, and monitoring the organization-defined, centrally						
					managed security controls and processes. As central management of security controls is						
					generally associated with common controls, such management promotes and facilitates						
					standardization of security control implementations and management and judicious use of						
					organizational resources. Centrally-managed security controls and processes may also meet						
					independence requirements for assessments in support of initial and ongoing authorizations						
					to operate as part of organizational continuous monitoring. As part of the security control						
					selection process, organizations determine which controls may be suitable for central						
					management based on organizational resources and capabilities. Organizations consider						
					that it may not always be possible to centrally manage every aspect of a security control. In such cases, the security control is treated as a hybrid control with the control managed and						
					implemented either centrally or at the information system level. Controls and control						
					enhancements that are candidates for full or partial central management include, but are						
					not limited to: AC-2 (1) (2) (3) (4); AC-17 (1) (2) (3) (9); AC-18 (1) (3) (4) (5); AC-19 (4); AC-						
					22; AC-23; AT-2 (1) (2); AT-3 (1) (2) (3); AT-4; AU-6 (1) (3) (5) (6) (9); AU-7 (1) (2); AU-11, AU						
					13, AU-16, CA-2 (1) (2) (3); CA-3 (1) (2) (3); CA-7 (1); CA-9; CM-2 (1) (2); CM-3 (1) (4); CM-4;						
					CM-6 (1); CM-7 (4) (5); CM-8 (all); CM-9 (1); CM-10; CM-11; CP-7 (all); CP-8 (all); SC-43; SI-						
					2; SI-3; SI-7; and SI-8.						
	1										
					7, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3,						
PM		Program Management									[Program Management Controls]

Control ID		Control Nove	Attal days	Control Total	Soundary and California	Balata d Canturda	Bulleralter		and the	
PM-1	tevel	Control Name Program Management Information Security	Withdrawn	Control Text The organization:	Supplemental Guidance Information security program plans can be represented in single documents or compilations of	Related Controls	Priority	LOW N	iou High	Notes [Program Management Controls]
L MI-T	1	Program Management Information Security Program Plan		a. Develops and disseminates an organization-wide information security program plan that:	Information security program plans can be represented in single documents or compilations of documents at the discretion of organizations. The plans document the program management	r IVI-O				[F10B1011 Management Controls]
		- 105 cont Fidil		a.1. Provides an overview of the requirements for the security program and a description of the	controls and organization-defined common controls. Information security program management					
				security program management controls and common controls in place or planned for meeting	sufficient information about the program management controls/common controls (including					
				those requirements;	specification of parameters for any assignment and selection statements either explicitly or by					
				a.2. Includes the identification and assignment of roles, responsibilities, management commitment	reference) to enable implementations that are unambiguously compliant with the intent of the					
				coordination among organizational entities, and compliance;	plans and a determination of the risk to be incurred if the plans are implemented as intended. The					
				a.3. Reflects coordination among organizational entities responsible for the different aspects of	security plans for individual information systems and the organization-wide information security program plan together, provide complete coverage for all security controls employed within the					
				information security (i.e., technical, physical, personnel, cyber-physical); and	organization. Common controls are documented in an appendix to the organization's information					
				a.4. Is approved by a senior official with responsibility and accountability for the risk being incurred	security program plan unless the controls are included in a separate security plan for an					
				to organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, and reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation;	information system (e.g., security controls employed as part of an intrusion detection system					
				b. Reviews the organization-wide information security program plan [Assignment: organization-	providing organization-wide boundary protection inherited by one or more organizational					
				defined frequency);	information systems). The organization-wide information security program plan will indicate					
				c. Updates the plan to address organizational changes and problems identified during plan	which separate security plans contain descriptions of common controls. Organizations have the flexibility to describe common controls in a single document or in multiple documents. In the case					
				implementation or security control assessments; and	of multiple documents, the documents describing common controls are included as attachments					
				d. Protects the information security program plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification.	to the information security program plan. If the information security program plan contains					
					multiple documents, the organization specifies in each document the organizational official or					
					officials responsible for the development, implementation, assessment, authorization, and monitoring of the respective common controls. For example, the organization may require that					
					the Facilities Management Office develop, implement, assess, authorize, and continuously					
					monitor common physical and environmental protection controls from the PE family when such					
					controls are not associated with a particular information system but instead, support multiple					
					information systems.					
PM-2	1	Program Management Senior Information		The organization appoints a senior information security officer with the mission and resources to	The security officer described in this control is an organizational official. For a federal					[Program Management Controls]
	1	Security Officer		coordinate, develop, implement, and maintain an organization-wide information security program.	agency (as defined in applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, or					
					regulations) this official is the Senior Agency Information Security Officer. Organizations may	4				
					also refer to this official as the Senior Information Security Officer or Chief Information					
L					Security Officer.					
PM-3	1	Program Management Information Security		The organization: a. Ensures that all capital planning and investment requests include the resources needed to	Organizations consider establishing champions for information security efforts and as part of including the necessary resources, assign specialized expertise and resources as needed.	PM-4,SA-2				[Program Management Controls]
		Resources		a. Ensures that all capital planning and investment requests include the resources needed to implement the information security program and documents all exceptions to this requirement:	of including the necessary resources, assign specialized expertise and resources as needed. Organizations may designate and empower an Investment Review Board (or similar group)					
				b. Employs a business case/Exhibit 300/Exhibit 53 to record the resources required; and	to manage and provide oversight for the information security-related aspects of the capital					
				c. Ensures that information security resources are available for expenditure as planned.	planning and investment control process.					
				, and a second of the second o						
PM-4	1	Program Management Plan of Action and		The organization:		CA-5				[Program Management Controls]
		Milestones Process		a. Implements a process for ensuring that plans of action and milestones for the security program	and is subject to federal reporting requirements established by OMB. With the increasing					
				and associated organizational information systems:	emphasis on organization-wide risk management across all three tiers in the risk					
				a.1. Are developed and maintained; a.2. Document the remedial information security actions to adequately respond to risk to	management hierarchy (i.e., organization, mission/business process, and information system), organizations view plans of action and milestones from an organizational					
				organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation; and	perspective, prioritizing risk response actions and ensuring consistency with the goals and					
				a.3. Are reported in accordance with OMB FISMA reporting requirements.	objectives of the organization. Plan of action and milestones updates are based on findings					
				b. Reviews plans of action and milestones for consistency with the organizational risk management	from security control assessments and continuous monitoring activities. OMB FISMA					
				strategy and organization-wide priorities for risk response actions.	reporting guidance contains instructions regarding organizational plans of action and					
					milestones.					
PM-5		Program Management Information System		The organization develops and maintains an inventory of its information systems.	This control addresses the inventory convices to 1500 to 0000					[Program Management Controls]
PM-5	1	Program Management Information System		The organization develops and maintains an inventory of its information systems.	This control addresses the inventory requirements in FISMA. OMB provides guidance on developing information systems inventories and associated reporting requirements. For					[Program Management Controls]
		inventory			specific information systems inventories and associated reporting requirements. For					
					annual FISMA reporting guidance.					
PM-6	1	Program Management Information Security		The organization develops, monitors, and reports on the results of information security measures	Measures of performance are outcome-based metrics used by an organization to measure					[Program Management Controls]
		Measures of Performance		of performance.	the effectiveness or efficiency of the information security program and the security controls					
					employed in support of the program.					
PM-7	1	Program Management Enterprise Architecture		The organization develops an enterprise architecture with consideration for information security	The enterprise architecture developed by the organization is aligned with the Federal	PL-2,PL-8,PM-11,RA-				[Program Management Controls]
				and the resulting risk to organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, other	Enterprise Architecture. The integration of information security requirements and	2,SA-3				
				organizations, and the Nation.	associated security controls into the organization's enterprise architecture helps to ensure that security considerations are addressed by organizations early in the system					
					that security considerations are addressed by organizations early in the system development life cycle and are directly and explicitly related to the organization's					
					mission/business processes. This process of security requirements integration also embeds					
					into the enterprise architecture, an integral information security architecture consistent					
					with organizational risk management and information security strategies. For PM-7, the					
					information security architecture is developed at a system-of-systems level (organization-					
					wide), representing all of the organizational information systems. For PL-8, the information					
					security architecture is developed at a level representing an individual information system					
					but at the same time, is consistent with the information security architecture defined for					
					the organization. Security requirements and security control integration are most effectively accomplished through the application of the Risk Management Framework and supporting					
					accomplished through the application of the Risk Management Framework and supporting security standards and guidelines. The Federal Segment Architecture Methodology provides					
							1			
					guidance on integrating information security requirements and security controls into enterprise architectures.					
					guidance on integrating information security requirements and security controls into					
					guidance on integrating information security requirements and security controls into					
					guidance on integrating information security requirements and security controls into enterprise architectures.					
PM-8	1	Program Management Critical Infrastructure		The organization addresses information security issues in the development, documentation, and	guidance on integrating information security requirements and security controls into enterprise architectures. Protection strategies are based on the prioritization of critical assets and resources. The	PM-1,PM-9,PM-				[Program Management Controls]
PM-8	1	Program Management Critical Infrastructure		The organization addresses information security issues in the development, documentation, and updating of a critical infrastructure and key resources protection plan.	guidance on integrating information security requirements and security controls into enterprise architectures. Protection strategies are based on the prioritization of critical assets and resources. The requirement and guidance for defining critical infrastructure and key resources and for	PM-1,PM-9,PM- 11,RA-3				[Program Management Controls]
PM-8	1	Program Management Critical Infrastructure			guidance on integrating information security requirements and security controls into enterprise architectures. Protection strategies are based on the prioritization of critical assets and resources. The requirement and guidance for defining critical infrastructure protection plan are found in applicable federa					[Program Management Controls]
PM-8	1	Program Management Critical Infrastructure			guidance on integrating information security requirements and security controls into enterprise architectures. Protection strategies are based on the prioritization of critical assets and resources. The requirement and guidance for defining critical infrastructure and key resources and for					[Program Management Controls]
PM-8		Plan			guidance on integrating information security requirements and security controls into enterprise architectures. Protection strategies are based on the prioritization of critical assets and resources. The requirement and guidance for defining critical infrastructure and key resources and for preparing an associated critical infrastructure protection plan are found in applicable federa laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance.					
-		Program Management Critical Infrastructure Plan Program Management Risk Management Strategy		updating of a critical infrastructure and key resources protection plan. The organization: a. Develops a comprehensive strategy to manage risk to organizational operations and assets,	guidance on integrating information security requirements and security controls into enterprise architectures. Protection strategies are based on the prioritization of critical assets and resources. The requirement and guidance for defining critical infrastructure and key resources and for preparing an associated critical infrastructure protection plan are found in applicable federa laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. An organization-wide risk management strategy includes, for example, an unambiguous expression of the risk tolerance for the organization, acceptable risk assessment	11,RA-3				[Program Management Controls]
-		Plan Program Management Risk Management		updating of a critical infrastructure and key resources protection plan. The organization: a. Develops a comprehensive strategy to manage risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation associated with the operation and use of	guidance on integrating information security requirements and security controls into enterprise architectures. Protection strategies are based on the prioritization of critical assets and resources. The requirement and guidance for defining critical infrastructure and key resources and for preparing an associated critical infrastructure protection plan are found in applicable federa laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. An organization-wide risk management strategy includes, for example, an unambiguous expression of the risk tolerance for the organization, acceptable risk assessment methodologies, risk mitigation strategies, a process for consistently evaluating risk across	11,RA-3				
-		Plan Program Management Risk Management		updating of a critical infrastructure and key resources protection plan. The organization: a. Develops a comprehensive strategy to manage risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation associated with the operation and use of information systems;	guidance on integrating information security requirements and security controls into enterprise architectures. Protection strategies are based on the prioritization of critical assets and resources. The requirement and guidance for defining critical infrastructure and key resources and for preparing an associated critical infrastructure protection plan are found in applicable federa laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. An organization-wide risk management strategy includes, for example, an unambiguous expression of the risk tolerance for the organization, acceptable risk assessment methodologies, risk mitigation strategies, a process for consistently evaluating risk across the organization with respect to the organization's risk tolerance, and approaches for	11,RA-3				
		Plan Program Management Risk Management		updating of a critical infrastructure and key resources protection plan. The organization: a. Develops a comprehensive strategy to manage risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation associated with the operation and use of information systems; b. Implements the risk management strategy consistently across the organization; and	guidance on integrating information security requirements and security controls into enterprise architectures. Protection strategies are based on the prioritization of critical assets and resources. The requirement and guidance for defining critical infrastructure and key resources and for preparing an associated critical infrastructure protection plan are found in applicable federa laws, Executive Orders, directives, policles, regulations, standards, and guidance. An organization-wide risk management strategy includes, for example, an unambiguous expression of the risk tolerance for the organization, acceptable risk assessment methodologies, risk mitigation strategies, a process for consistently evaluating risk across the organization with respect to the organization's risk tolerance, and approaches for monitoring risk over time. The use of a risk executive function can facilitate consistent,	11,RA-3				
-		Plan Program Management Risk Management		updating of a critical infrastructure and key resources protection plan. The organization: a. Develops a comprehensive strategy to manage risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation associated with the operation and use of information systems; b. Implements the risk management strategy consistently across the organization; and c. Reviews and updates the risk management strategy (Assignment: organization-defined	euidance on integrating information security requirements and security controls into enterprise architectures. Protection strategies are based on the prioritization of critical assets and resources. The requirement and guidance for defining critical infrastructure and key resources and for preparing an associated critical infrastructure protection plan are found in applicable federa laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. An organization-wide risk management strategy includes, for example, an unambiguous expression of the risk tolerance for the organization, acceptable risk assessment methodologies, risk mitigation strategies, a process for consistently evaluating risk across the organization with respect to the organization visits kolerance, and approaches for monitoring risk over time. The use of a risk executive function can facilitate consistent, organization-wide risk the six management strategy. The organization-wide risk	11,RA-3				
		Plan Program Management Risk Management		updating of a critical infrastructure and key resources protection plan. The organization: a. Develops a comprehensive strategy to manage risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation associated with the operation and use of information systems; b. Implements the risk management strategy consistently across the organization; and	guidance on integrating information security requirements and security controls into enterprise architectures. Protection strategies are based on the prioritization of critical assets and resources. The requirement and guidance for defining critical infrastructure and key resources and for preparing an associated critical infrastructure protection plan are found in applicable federa laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. An organization-wide risk management strategy includes, for example, an unambiguous expression of the risk tolerance for the organization, acceptable risk assessment methodologies, risk mitigation strategies, a process for consistently evaluating risk across the organization with respect to the organization's risk tolerance, and approaches for monitoring risk over time. The use of a risk executive function can facilitate consistent, organization-wide application of the risk management strategy. The organization-wide risk management strategy and be informed by risk-related inputs from other sources both management strategy. The organization-wide risk management strategy.	11,RA-3				
		Plan Program Management Risk Management		updating of a critical infrastructure and key resources protection plan. The organization: a. Develops a comprehensive strategy to manage risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation associated with the operation and use of information systems; b. Implements the risk management strategy consistently across the organization; and c. Reviews and updates the risk management strategy (Assignment: organization-defined	guidance on integrating information security requirements and security controls into enterprise architectures. Protection strategies are based on the prioritization of critical assets and resources. The requirement and guidance for defining critical infrastructure and key resources and for preparing an associated critical infrastructure protection plan are found in applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. An organization-wide risk management strategy includes, for example, an unambiguous expression of the risk tolerance for the organization, acceptable risk assessment methodologies, risk mitigation strategies, a process for consistently evaluating risk across the organization with respect to the organization's risk tolerance, and approaches for monitoring risk over time. The use of a risk executive function can facilitate consistent, organization-wide risk management strategy. The organization-wide risk management strategy can be informed by risk-related inputs from other sources both internal and external to the organization to ensure the strategy is oblit broad-based and	11,RA-3				
		Plan Program Management Risk Management		updating of a critical infrastructure and key resources protection plan. The organization: a. Develops a comprehensive strategy to manage risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation associated with the operation and use of information systems; b. Implements the risk management strategy consistently across the organization; and c. Reviews and updates the risk management strategy (Assignment: organization-defined	guidance on integrating information security requirements and security controls into enterprise architectures. Protection strategies are based on the prioritization of critical assets and resources. The requirement and guidance for defining critical infrastructure and key resources and for preparing an associated critical infrastructure protection plan are found in applicable federa laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. An organization-wide risk management strategy includes, for example, an unambiguous expression of the risk tolerance for the organization, acceptable risk assessment methodologies, risk mitigation strategies, a process for consistently evaluating risk across the organization with respect to the organization's risk tolerance, and approaches for monitoring risk over time. The use of a risk executive function can facilitate consistent, organization-wide application of the risk management strategy. The organization-wide risk management strategy and be informed by risk-related inputs from other sources both management strategy. The organization-wide risk management strategy.	11,RA-3				

Control ID	Level	Control Name Withdraw	n Control Text	Sunniamental Cuidanea	Related Controls	Deiositu I ou	Mod High	Notes
PM-10	1	Program Management Security Authorization	The organization:	Security authorization processes for information systems and environments of operation	CA-6	rnonty Low	Mou High	[Program Management Controls]
rm-10	1	Program wanagement Security Authorization Process	ine organization: a. Manages (i.e., documents, tracks, and reports) the security state of organizational information systems and the environments in which those systems operate through security authorization processes; b. Designates individuals to fulfill specific roles and responsibilities within the organizational risk management process, and c. Fully integrates the security authorization processes into an organization-wide risk management program.	require the implementation of an organization-wide risk management process, a Risk Management Framework, and associated security standards and guidelines. Specific roles within the risk management process include an organizational risk executive (function) and designated authorizing officials for each organizational information system and common control provider. Security authorization processes are integrated with organizational				[Frogram managenenic Controls]
PM-11	1	Program Management Mission/Business Process Definition	The organization: a. Defines mission/business processes with consideration for information security and the resulting risk to organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation; and b. Determines information protection needs arising from the defined mission/business processes and revises the processes as necessary, until achievable protection needs are obtained.	Information protection needs are technology-independent, required capabilities to counter g threats to organizations, individuals, or the Nation through the compromise of information (i.e., loss of condientiality, infergrity, or availability). Information protection needs are derived from the mission/business needs defined by the organization, the mission/business processes selected to meet the stated needs, and the organizational risk management strategy. Information protection needs determine the required security controls for the organization and the associated information systems supporting the mission/business processes. Inherent in defining an organization's information protection needs is an understanding of the level of adverse impact that could result if a compromise of information occurs. The security categorization process is used to make such potential impact determinations. Mission/business process definitions and associated information protection requirements are documented by the organization in accordance with organizational policy and procedure.	PM-7,PM-8,RA-2			[Program Management Controls]
PM-12	1	Program Management Insider Threat Program	The organization implements an insider threat program that includes a cross-discipline insider threat incident handling team.	Organizations handling classified information are required, under Executive Order 13587 and the National Policy on Insider Threat, to establish insider threat programs. The standards and guidelines that apply to insider threat programs in classified environments can also be employed effectively to improve the security of Controlled Unclassified information in non-national security systems. Insider threat programs in claudies exertivy controls to detect and prevent malicious insider activity through the centralized integration and analysis of both technical and non-technical information to identify potential insider threat concerns. A senior organizational official is designated by the department/agency head as the responsible individual to implement and provide oversight for the program. In addition to the centralized integration and analysis capability, insider threat programs as a minimum, prepare department/agency insider threat provide oversight for the program, an addition to the centralized integration and analysis capability, insider threat programs as a minimum, prepare department/agency individual employee activities on government-owned classified computers, provide insider threat awareness training to employees, receive access to information from all offices within the department/agency (e.g., human resources, legal, physical security, personnel security, information technology, information system security, and law enforcement) for insider threat programs can leverage the edistence of incident handling teams organizations may already have in place, such as computer security incident response teams. Human resources records are especially improvinted behavior and conflicts with coworkers and other colleagues.) These precursors an etter inform and guide organizational officials in more focused, targeted montroing efforts. The participation of a legal team is important to ensure that all monitoring activities are performed in accordance with appropriate legislation, directives, regulations, policies, stan	7,AU-10,AU-12,AU- 13,CA-7,IA-4,IR-4,MP- 7.PE-2.PS-3.PS-4.PS-			[Program Management Controls]
PM-13		Program Management Information Security Workforce	The organization establishes an information security workforce development and improvement program.	Information security workforce development and improvement programs include, for example: (i) defining the knowledge and skill levels needed to perform information security duties and tasks; (ii) developing role-based training programs for individuals assigned information security roles and responsibilities; and (iii) providing standards for measuring and building individual qualifications for incumbents and applicants for information security related positions. Such workforce programs can also include associated information security career paths to encourage: (i) information security professionals to advance in the field and fill positions with greater responsibility; and (ii) organizations to fill information security-related positions with qualified personnel. Information security workforce development and improvement programs are complementary to organizational security awareness and training programs. Information security workforce development and improvement programs focus on developing and institutionalizing core information security capabilities of selected personnel needed to protect organizational operations, assets, and individuals.	AT-2,AT-3			[Program Management Controls]
PM-14	1	Program Management Testing, Training, and Monitoring	The organization: a. Implements a process for ensuring that organizational plans for conducting security testing, training, and monitoring activities associated with organizational information systems: a.1. Are developed and maintained; and a.2. Continue to be executed in a timely manner; b. Reviews testing, training, and monitoring plans for consistency with the organizational risk management strategy and organization-wide priorities for risk response actions.	This control ensures that organizations provide oversight for the security testing, training, and monitoring activities conducted organization-wide and that those activities are coordinated. With the importance of continuous monitoring programs, the implementation of information security across the three tiers of the risk management hierarchy, and the widespread use of common controls, organizations coordinate and consolidate the testing and monitoring activities that are routinely conducted as part of ongoing organizational assessments supporting a variety of security controls. Security training activities, while typically focused on individual information systems and specific roles, also necessitate coordination across all organizational elements. Testing, training, and monitoring plans and activities are informed by current threat and vulnerability assessments.	AT-3,CA-7,CP-4,IR- 3,SI-4			[Program Management Controls]
PM-15	1	Program Management Contacts with Security Groups and Associations	The organization establishes and institutionalizes contact with selected groups and associations within the security community: a. To facilitate ongoing security education and training for organizational personnel; b. To maintain currency with recommended security practices, techniques, and technologies; and c. To share current security-related information including threats, vulnerabilities, and incidents.	Ongoing contact with security groups and associations is of paramount importance in an environment of rapidity changing technologies and threats. Security groups and associations include, for example, special interest groups, forums, professional associations, news groups, and/or peer groups of security professionals in similar organizations. Organizations select groups and associations based on organizational missions/business functions. Organizations abare threat, vulnerability, and includent information consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance.	SI-5			[Program Management Controls]

DM 16	Level	Control Name Withdrawn Program Management Threat Awareness	The organization implements a threat awareness program that includes a cross-organization	Supplemental Guidance Because of the constantly changing and increasing sophistication of adversaries, especially	Related Controls PM-12.PM-16	Priority	LOW N	1od High	Notes [Program Management Controls]
PM-16	1	Program	The organization implements a trivest awareness program that includes a cross-organization information-sharing capability.	secause of the constantly changing and increasing sophistication of adversaries, especially the advanced presistent threat (APT), it is becoming more likely that adversaries may successfully breach or compromise organizational information systems. One of the best techniques to address this concern is for organizations to share threat information. This can include, for example, sharing threat events (i.e., tactics, techniques, and procedures) that organizations have experienced, mitigations that organizations have found are effective against certain types of threats, threat information sharing may be billateral (e.g., december compressions), and the state of the compression of the compress	PM-12,PM-16				[Program Management Controls]
PS	0	Personnel Security							
PS-1	1	Personnel Security Personnel Security Policy and Procedures	The organization: a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]: a.1. A personnel security policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and a.2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the personnel security policy and associated personnel security controls, and b. Reviews and updates the current: b. 1. Personnel security policy (Assignment: organization-defined frequency); and b. 2. Personnel security procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the PS family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.	PM-9	P1	x x	x	
PS-2	1	Personnel Security Position Risk Designation	The organization: a. Assigns a risk designation to all organizational positions; b. Establishes screening criteria for individuals filling those positions; and c. Reviews and updates position risk designations [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	Position risk designations reflect Office of Personnel Management policy and guidance. Risk designations can guide and inform the types of authorizations individuals receive when accessing organizational information and information systems. Position screening criteria include explicit information security role appointment requirements (e.g., training, security clearances).	AT-3,PL-2,PS-3	P1	x	x	
PS-3		Personnel Security Personnel Screening	The organization: a. Screens individuals prior to authorizing access to the information system; and b. Rescreens individuals according to [Assignment: organization-defined conditions requiring rescreening and, where rescreening is so indicated, the frequency of such rescreening].	Personnel screening and rescreening activities reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, guidance, and specific criteria established for the risk designations of assigned positions. Organizations may define different rescreening conditions and frequencies for personnel accessing information systems based on types of information processed, stored, or transmitted by the systems.	AC-2,IA-4,PE-2,PS-2	P1	x x	х	
PS-3 (1)		Personnel Security Personnel Screening Classified Information	The organization ensures that individuals accessing an information system processing, storing, or transmitting classified information are cleared and indoctrinated to the highest classification level of the information to which they have access on the system.		AC-3,AC-4				
PS-3 (2)		Personnel Security Personnel Screening Formal Indoctrination	The organization ensures that individuals accessing an information system processing, storing, or transmitting types of classified information which require formal indoctrination, are formally indoctrinated for all of the relevant types of information to which they have access on the system.	Access Program (SAP), Restricted Data (RD), and Sensitive Compartment Information (SCI).	AC-3,AC-4				
PS-3 (3)	2	Personnel Security Personnel Screening Information with Special Protection Measures	The organization ensures that individuals accessing an information system processing, storing, or transmitting information requiring special protection: (a) Have valid access authorizations that are demonstrated by assigned official government duties; and (b) Satisfy (Assignment: organization-defined additional personnel screening criteria].	Organizational information requiring special protection includes, for example, Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) and Sources and Methods information (SAMI). Personnel security criteria include, for example, position sensitivity background screening requirements.					
PS-4		Personnel Security Personnel Termination	The organization, upon termination of individual employment: a. Disables information system access within [Assignment: organization-defined time period]; b. Terminates/revokes any authenticators/credentials associated with the individual; c. Conducts exit interviews that include a discussion of [Assignment: organization-defined information security topics]; d. Retrieves all security-related organizational information system-related property; e. Retains access to organizational information and information systems formerly controlled by terminated individual; and f. Notfiles [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] within [Assignment: organization-defined time period].	Information system-related property includes, for example, hardware authentication tokens, system administration technical manuals, keys, identification cards, and building passes. Evit interviews ensure that terminated individuals understand the security constraints imposed by being former employees and that proper accountability is achieved for information system-related property. Security topics of interest at exit interviews can include, for example, reminding terminated individuals of nondisclosure agreements and potential limitations on future employment. Exit interviews may not be possible for some terminated individuals, for example, in cases related to job abandoment, illnesses, and nonavailability of supervisors. Exit interviews may not important for individuals with security clearances. Timely execution of termination actions is essential for individuals terminated for cause. In certain situations, organizations consider disabiling the information system accounts of individuals that are being terminated prior to the individuals being notified.	AC-2,IA-4,PE-2,PS- 5,PS-6	P1	x x	x	
PS-4 (1)	2	Personnel Security Personnel Termination Post- Employment Requirements	The organization: (a) Notifies terminated individuals of applicable, legally binding post-employment requirements for the protection of organizational information; and (b) Requires terminated individuals to sign an acknowledgment of post-employment requirements as part of the arganizational termination process.	Organizations consult with the Office of the General Counsel regarding matters of post- employment requirements on terminated individuals.					
PS-4 (2)		Personnel Security Personnel Termination Automated Natification	The organization employs automated mechanisms to notify [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] upon termination of an individual.	In organizations with a large number of employees, not all personnel who need to know boots termination actions receive the appropriate onlifications' or j such natifications are received, they may not occur in a timely manner. Automated mechanisms can be used to send automatic alers on rotifications to specific organizational personnel or roles (e.g., management personnel, supervisors, personnel security officers, information security officers, systems administrators, or information technology administrators) when individuals are terminated. Such automatic alerts or notifications can be conveyed in a variety of ways, including, for example, telephonically, via electronic mail, via text message, or via websites.				x	
PS-5	1	Personnel Security Personnel Transfer	The organization: a. Reviews and confirms ongoing operational need for current logical and physical access authorizations to information systems/facilities when individuals are reassigned or transferred to other positions within the organization. In the organization of the organization orga	privileges); and (iv) providing for access to official records to which individuals had access at	AC-2,IA-4,PE-2,PS-4	P2	x x	x	

Control ID	evel.	Control Name Mitthdraum	Cantrol Taut	Supplemental Cuidonea	Related Controls	Deiositu	Leur	Mod	High	Mates
PS-6	1	Control Name Withdrawn Personnel Security Access Agreements	Control Text The organization: a. Develops and documents access agreements for organizational information systems; b. Reviews and updates the access agreements [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and c. Ensures that individuals requiring access to organizational information and information systems: c.1. Sign appropriate access agreements prior to being granted access; and c.2. Re-sign access agreements to maintain access to organizational information systems when access agreements have been updated or [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].		Related Controls PL-4,PS-2,PS-3,PS- 4,PS-8	Priority P3	X	X	X	Notes
PS-6 (1)	2	Personnel Security Access Agreements X	access agreements more over uponed or possignment, or gameaton running mequency j.							[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PS-3]
		Information Requiring Special Protection								[withdawn. mcorporated mto r5-5]
PS-6 (2)		Personnel Security Access Agreements Classified Information Requiring Special Protection	The organization ensures that access to classified information requiring special protection is granted only to individuals who: (a) Hove a valid access authorization that is demonstrated by assigned official government duties; (b) Satisfy associated personnel security criteria; and (c) Have read, understood, and signed a nondisclosure agreement.	Classified information requiring special protection includes, for example, collateral information, Special Access Program (SAP) information, and Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). Personnel security criteria reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance.						
		Personnel Security Access Agreements Post- Employment Requirements	The organization: (a) Notifies individuals of applicable, legally binding post-employment requirements for protection of organizational information; and (b) Requires individuals to sign an acknowledgment of these requirements, if applicable, as part of granting initial access to covered information.							
PS-7		Personnel Security Third-Party Personnel Security	The organization: a. Establishes personnel security requirements including security roles and responsibilities for third- party providers; b. Requires third-party providers to comply with personnel security policies and procedures established by the organization; c. Documents personnel security requirements; d. Requires third-party providers to notify [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] of any personnel transfers or terminations of third-party personnel who possess organizational credentials and/or badges, or who have information system privileges within [Assignment: organization-defined time period]; and e. Monitors provider compliance.	outsourced applications, and network and security management. Organizations explicitly include personnel security requirements in acquisition-related documents. Third-party providers may have personnel working a tragnational facilities with credentials, badges, or information system privileges issued by organizations. Notifications of third-party	PS-2,PS-3,PS-4,PS- 5,PS-6,SA-9,SA-21	P1	X	X	X	
PS-8		Personnel Security Personnel Sanctions	The organization: a. Employs a formal sanctions process for individuals failing to comply with established information security policies and procedures; and b. Notifies [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] when a formal employee sanctions process is initiated, identifying the individual sanctioned and the reason for the sanction.	in access agreements and can be included as part of general personnel policies and	PL-4,PS-6	P3	x	x	х	
RA RA-1		Risk Assessment Risk Assessment Risk Assessment Policy and	The organization:	This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective	PM-9	P1	х	х	х	
		Procedures	a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]: a. 1. A risk assessment policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compilance; and a.2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the risk assessment policy and associated risk assessment controls; and updates the current: b.1. Reviews and updates the current: b.1. Risk assessment policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and b.2. Risk assessment procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the RA family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws. Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.	s.					
RA-2	1	Risk Assessment Security Categorization	The organization: a. Categorizes information and the information system in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance: b. Documents the security categorization results (including supporting rationale) in the security plan for the information system; and c. Ensures that the authorizing official or authorizing official designated representative reviews and approves the security categorization decision.	Clearly defined authorization boundaries are a prerequisite for effective security categorization decisions. Security categories describe the potential adverse impacts to organizational operations, organizational assets, and individuals if organizational information and information systems are comprised through a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Organizations conduct the security categorization process as an organization-wide activity with the involvement of chief information officers, senior information security officers, information systems, and information owners/stewards. Organizations also consider the potential adverse impacts to other organizations and, in accordance with the USA PATRIOT Act 2001 and Homeland Security Presidential Directives, potential national-level adverse impacts. Security categorization processes carried out by organizations facilitate the development of inventories of information assets, and along with CM-8, mappings to specific information system components where information is processed, stored, or transmitted.	CM-8,MP-4,RA-3,SC-7	P1	x	x	x	
RA-3	1	Risk Assessment Risk Assessment	The organization: a. Conducts an assessment of risk, including the likelihood and magnitude of harm, from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of the information system and the information it processes, stores, or transmits; b. Documents risk assessment resust ins [belection: security plan; risk assessment report; [Assignment: organization-defined document]]; c. Reviews risk assessment resust [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; d. Disseminates risk assessment results to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]; and e. Updates the risk assessment [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] or whenever there are significant changes to the information system or environment of operation (including the identification of new threats and vulnerabilities), or other conditions that may impact the security state of the system.	Risk assessments take into account threats, vulnerabilities, likelihood, and impact to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation based on the operation and use of information systems. Risk assessments also take into account risk from external parties (e.g., service providers, contractors operating information systems on behalf of the organization, individuals accessing organizational information systems, outsourcing entities). In accordance with OMB policy and related E-authentication initiatives, authentication of public users accessing federal information systems may also be required to protect nonpublic or privacy-related information. As such, organizational assessments of risk also address public access to federal information systems. Risk assessments (either formal or informal) can be conducted at all three tiers in the risk		PI	x	x	x	
RA-4	1	Risk Assessment Risk Assessment Update X								[Withdrawn: Incorporated into RA-3]

.5 Lev	1	Risk Assessment Vulnerability Scanning	Withdrawn	Control Text			Priority	Low I	/lod	High	
	-			The organization:	Supplemental Guidance Security categorization of information systems guides the frequency and	CA-2 CA-7 CM-4 CM-	P1	x 1.		X	
		Risk Assessment Vulnerability Stanning		a. Scans for vulnerabilities in the information system and hosted applications [Assignment:	comprehensiveness of vulnerability scans. Organizations determine the required	6.RA-2.RA-3.SA-11.SI-	rı	^	.	^	
				organization-defined frequency and/or randomly in accordance with organization-defined process]		2					
				and when new vulnerabilities potentially affecting the system/applications are identified and	sources of vulnerabilities such as networked printers, scanners, and copiers are not						
				reported;	overlooked. Vulnerability analyses for custom software applications may require additional						
				b. Employs vulnerability scanning tools and techniques that facilitate interoperability among tools	approaches such as static analysis, dynamic analysis, binary analysis, or a hybrid of the three						
				and automate parts of the vulnerability management process by using standards for:	approaches. Organizations can employ these analysis approaches in a variety of tools (e.g.,						
				b.1. Enumerating platforms, software flaws, and improper configurations;	web-based application scanners, static analysis tools, binary analyzers) and in source code						
				b.2. Formatting checklists and test procedures; and	reviews. Vulnerability scanning includes, for example: (i) scanning for patch levels; (ii)						
				b.3. Measuring vulnerability impact;	scanning for functions, ports, protocols, and services that should not be accessible to users						
				c. Analyzes vulnerability scan reports and results from security control assessments;	or devices; and (iii) scanning for improperly configured or incorrectly operating information						
				d. Remediates legitimate vulnerabilities [Assignment: organization-defined response times] in	flow control mechanisms. Organizations consider using tools that express vulnerabilities in						
				accordance with an organizational assessment of risk; and	the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) naming convention and that use the Open						
				e. Shares information obtained from the vulnerability scanning process and security control	Vulnerability Assessment Language (OVAL) to determine/test for the presence of						
				assessments with [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to help eliminate similar	vulnerabilities. Suggested sources for vulnerability information include the Common						
				vulnerabilities in other information systems (i.e., systemic weaknesses or deficiencies).	Weakness Enumeration (CWE) listing and the National Vulnerability Database (NVD). In addition, security control assessments such as red team exercises provide other sources of						
					potential vulnerabilities for which to scan. Organizations also consider using tools that						
					express vulnerability impact by the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).						
					express value ability impact by the Common value ability scoring system (CV33).						
RA-5 (1)	2	Risk Assessment Vulnerability Scanning Update		The organization employs vulnerability scanning tools that include the capability to readily update	The vulnerabilities to be scanned need to be readily updated as new vulnerabilities are	SI-3,SI-7		,		x	
/		Tool Capability		the information system vulnerabilities to be scanned.	discovered, announced, and scanning methods developed. This updating process helps to						1
					ensure that potential vulnerabilities in the information system are identified and addressed						1
					as quickly as possible.						
RA-5 (2)		Risk Assessment Vulnerability Scanning Update		The organization updates the information system vulnerabilities scanned [Selection (one or more):		SI-3,SI-5				x	
		by Frequency / Prior to New Scan / When		[Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; prior to a new scan; when new vulnerabilities are							
		Identified		identified and reported].							
RA-5 (3)	2	Risk Assessment Vulnerability Scanning		The organization employs vulnerability scanning procedures that can identify the breadth and							
		Breadth / Depth of Coverage		depth of coverage (i.e., information system components scanned and vulnerabilities checked).							l .
$-\!\!\!\!-\!$											
RA-5 (4)		Risk Assessment Vulnerability Scanning		The organization determines what information about the information system is discoverable by	Discoverable information includes information that adversaries could obtain without	AU-13				X	
		Discoverable Information		adversaries and subsequently takes [Assignment: organization-defined corrective actions].	directly compromising or breaching the information system, for example, by collecting						
					information the system is exposing or by conducting extensive searches of the web.						
					Corrective actions can include, for example, notifying appropriate organizational personnel,						
					removing designated information, or changing the information system to make designated						
					information less relevant or attractive to adversaries.						
RA-5 (5)	2	Risk Assessment Vulnerability Scanning		The information system implements privileged access authorization to [Assignment: organization-	In cortain cituations, the nature of the vulnerability scanning may be more intrusive or the			- 1	.	v	
MA-3 (3)	-	Privileged Access		identified information system components] for selected [Assignment: organization-defined	information system component that is the subject of the scanning may be more inclusive of the				·	^	1
		Frivileged Access		vulnerability scanning activities].	sensitive information. Privileged access authorization to selected system components						l .
				Tuniciality scanning accordes.	facilitates more thorough vulnerability scanning and also protects the sensitive nature of						1
					such scanning.						1
RA-5 (6)	2	Risk Assessment Vulnerability Scanning		The organization employs automated mechanisms to compare the results of vulnerability scans		IR-4,IR-5,SI-4					
		Automated Trend Analyses		over time to determine trends in information system vulnerabilities.		,					
RA-5 (7)	2	Risk Assessment Vulnerability Scanning	X	·							[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-8]
		Automated Detection and Notification of									1
		Unauthorized Components									
RA-5 (8)	2	Risk Assessment Vulnerability Scanning Review		The organization reviews historic audit logs to determine if a vulnerability identified in the		AU-6					
		Historic Audit Logs		information system has been previously exploited.							
RA-5 (9)	2	Risk Assessment Vulnerability Scanning	X								[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CA-8]
		Penetration Testing and Analyses									
RA-5 (10)	2	Risk Assessment Vulnerability Scanning		The organization correlates the output from vulnerability scanning tools to determine the							
-6	1	Correlate Scanning Information Risk Assessment Technical Surveillance		presence of multi-vulnerability/multi-hop attack vectors. The organization employs a technical surveillance countermeasures survey at [Assignment:	Technical surveillance countermeasures surveys are performed by qualified personnel to		P0				
•	1	Risk Assessment Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Survey		Ine organization employs a technical surveillance countermeasures survey at [Assignment: organization-defined locations] [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined	detect the presence of technical surveillance devices/hazards and to identify technical		ru				l .
		Countermeasures survey			security weaknesses that could aid in the conduct of technical penetrations of surveyed						1
				frequency]; [Assignment: organization-defined events or indicators occur]].	facilities. Such surveys provide evaluations of the technical security postures of						1
					organizations and facilities and typically include thorough visual, electronic, and physical						l .
					examinations in and about surveyed facilities. The surveys also provide useful input into risk						1
					assessments and organizational exposure to potential adversaries.						1
											1
	0	System and Services Acquisition									
		System and Services Acquisition System and		The organization:	This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective	PM-9	P1	x >		x	
		Services Acquisition Policy and Procedures		a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or	implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the SA family.						l .
		1		roles]:	Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives,						1
				a.1. A system and services acquisition policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities,	regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at						1
				management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and	the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures						l .
				a.2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the system and services acquisition policy and	unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy						1
				associated system and services acquisition controls; and	for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the						1
				b. Reviews and updates the current:	complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security						1
				b.1. System and services acquisition policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and	program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk						l .
				b.2. System and services acquisition procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.						l .
											l .
											l .
	_										
		System and Services Acquisition Allocation of		The organization:	Resource allocation for information security includes funding for the initial information	PM-3,PM-11	P1	x >		x	
-2		Resources		a. Determines information security requirements for the information system or information system							
2				service in mission/business process planning;	system/service.						
-2											1
-2				b. Determines, documents, and allocates the resources required to protect the information system							
.2				or information system service as part of its capital planning and investment control process; and							
-2											

Control ID	Level	Control Name	Withdrawn	Control Text	Supplemental Guidance	Related Controls	Darley des		Aod High	Notes
SA-3	1	System and Services Acquisition System Development Life Cycle		The organization: a. Manages the information system using [Assignment: organization-defined system development life cycle] that incorporates information security crossiderations; b. Defines and documents information security roles and responsibilities throughout the system development life cycle; c. Identifies individuals having information security roles and responsibilities; and d. Integrates the organizational information security risk management process into system development life cycle activities.	A well-defined system development life cycle provides the foundation for the successful development, implementation, and operation of organizational information systems. To apply the required security controls within the system development life cycle requires a basic understanding of information security, threats, vulnerabilities, adverse impacts, and risk to critical missions/business functions. The security engineering principles in SA-8 cannot be properly applied if individuals that design, code, and test information systems and system components (including information technology products) do not understand security. Therefore, organizations include qualified personnel, for example, chief information security officers, security architects, security engineers, and information systems security officers in system development life cycle activities to ensure that security requirements are incorporated into organizational information systems. It is equally important that developens include individuals on the developments are math at possess the requisite security expertise and skills to ensure that needed security capabilities are effectively integrated into the information systems. Security avarentees and training programs can help ensure that individuals having key security roles and responsibilities have the appropriate experience, skills, and expertise to conduct assigned system development life cycle activities. The effective integration of security reordirements into enterprise architecture also helps to ensure that intorpriat ascruity considerations are addressed early in the system development life cycle and that those considerations are addressed early in the system development life cycle and that those considerations are directly related to the organizational mission/business processes. This process also facilitates the integration of the information security architecture into the enterprise architecture, consistent with organizational risk management and information security strategies.	AT-3,PM-7,SA-8	P1	x x	x	
SA-4	1	System and Services Acquisition Acquisition Process		The organization includes the following requirements, descriptions, and criteria, explicitly or by reference, in the acquisition contract for the information system component, or information system service in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, guidelines, and organizational mission/business needs: a. Security furtional requirements; b. Security strength requirements; c. Security strance requirements; d. Security-related documentation requirements; e. Requirements for protecting security-related documentation; f. Description of the information system development environment and environment in which the system is intended to operate; and	hardware, software, or firmware) that represent the building blocks of an information system.	CM-6,PL-2,PS-7,SA- 3,SA-5,SA-6,SA-11,SA- 12	P1	x	x	
SA-4 (1)	2	System and Services Acquisition Acquisition Process Functional Properties of Security Controls		The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to provide a description of the functional properties of the security controls to be employed.	Functional properties of security controls describe the functionality (i.e., security copability, functions, or mechanisms) visible at the interfaces of the controls and specifically exclude functionality and data structures internal to the operation of the controls.	SA-5		х	X	
SA-4 (2)	2	System and Services Acquisition Acquisition Process Design / Implementation Information for Security Controls		The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to provide design and implementation information for the security controls to be employed that includes: Selection (one or more): security-relevant external system interfaces; high-level design; low-level design; source code or hardware schematics; [Assignment: organization-defined design/implementation information]] at [Assignment: organization-defined level of detail].	Organizations may require different levels of detail in design and implementation documentation for security controls employed in organizational information systems, system components, or information system services based on mission/business requirements, requirements for trustworthiness/resiliency, and requirements for analysis and testing. Information systems can be partitioned into multiple subsystems. Each subsystem within the system can contain one or more modules. The high-level design for the system is expressed in terms of multiple subsystems and the interfaces between subsystems providing security-relevant functionality. The low-level design for the system is expressed in terms of modules with particular emphasis on software and firmware flut not excluding hardware) and the interfaces between modules providing security-relevant functionality. Source code and hardware schematics are typically referred to as the implementation representation of the information system.	SA-5		X	x x	
SA-4 (3)	2	System and Services Acquisition Acquisition Process Development Methods / Techniques / Practices		The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to demonstrate the use of a system development life cycle that includes [Assignment: organization-defined state-of-the-practice system/security engineering methods, software development methods, testing/evaluation/validation techniques, and quality control processes].	Following a well-defined system development life cycle that includes state-of-the-practice software development methods, systems/security engineering methods, quality control processes, and testing, evaluation, and validation techniques helps to reduce the number and severity of latent errors within information systems, system components, and information system services. Reducing the number/severity of such errors reduces the number of vulnerabilities in those systems, components, and services.	SA-12				
SA-4 (4)	2	System and Services Acquisition Acquisition Process Assignment of Components to Systems	Х							[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-8 (9)]
SA-4 (5)		System and Services Acquisition Acquisition Process System / Component / Service Configurations		The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to: (a) Deliver the system, component, or service with [Assignment: organization-defined security configurations] implemented; and (b) Use the configurations as the default for any subsequent system, component, or service reinstallation or upgrade.	(USCGB) and any limitations on functions, parts, protocols, and services. Security characteristics include, for example, requiring that all default passwords have been changed.	CM-8				
SA-4 (6)	2	System and Services Acquisition Acquisition Process Use of Information Assurance Products		The organization: (a) Employs only government off-the-shelf (GOTS) or commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) information assurance (IA) and IA-enabled information technology products that compose an NSA-approved solution to protect classified information when the networks used to transmit the information are at a lower classification level than the information being transmitted; and (b) Ensures that these products have been evaluated and/or validated by NSA or in accordance with NSA-approved procedures.	COTS Is ar IA-enabled information technology products used to protect classified information by cryptographic means may be required to use NSA-approved key management.	SC-8,SC-12,SC-13				

I money	Control Name	and the state of t	Control Total	Construented Coldenses	Deleted Controls	Delegate.		And III	Materia
revel 2		withdrawn		Supplemental Guidance		Priority	LOW	viou Hig	Notes
	Process NIAP-Approved Protection Profiles		(a) Limits the use of commercially provided information assurance (IA) and IA-enabled information technology products to those products that have been successfully evaluated against a National Information Assurance partnership (INIAP)-agroved Protection Profile for a specific technology type, if such a profile exist; and (b) Requires, if no NIAP-agroved Protection Profile exists for a specific technology type but a commercially provided information technology product relies on cryptographic functionality to enforce its security policy, that the cryptographic module is FIPS-validated.						
2	System and Services Acquisition Acquisition Process Continuous Monitoring Plan		The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to produce a plan for the continuous monitoring of security control effectiveness that contains [Assignment: organization-defined level of detail].	The objective of continuous monitoring plans is to determine if the complete set of planned, required, and deployed security controls within the information system, system component, or information system service continuous monitoring plans include a sufficient level of pleatil such that the information can be incorporated into the continuous monitoring strategies and programs implemented by arganizations.	CA-7				
2	System and Services Acquisition Acquisition Process Functions / Ports / Protocols / Services in Use		The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to identify early in the system development life cycle, the functions, ports, protocols, and services intended for organizational use.	The identification of functions, ports, protocols, and services early in the system development life cycle (e.g., during the initial requirements definition and design phases) allows organizations to influence the design of the information system, information system component, or information system service. This early involvement in the life cycle helps organizations to avoid or minimize the use of functions, ports, protocols, or services that pose unnecessarily high risks and understand the trade-offs involved in blocking specific ports, protocols, or services (or when requiring information system service providers to do so). Early identification of functions, ports, protocols, and services avoids costly retrofitting of security controls after the information system, system component, or information system services with organizations identifying which functions, ports, protocols, and services are provided from external sources.	CM-7,SA-9			X	
2	System and Services Acquisition Acquisition Process Use of Approved PIV Products		The organization employs only information technology products on the FIPS 201-approved products list for Personal Identity Verification (PIV) capability implemented within organizational information systems.		IA-2,IA-8		x z	x x	
1	System and Services Acquisition Information System Documentation		The organization: a. Obtains administrator documentation for the information system, system component, or information system service that describes: a. 1. Secure configuration, installation, and operation of the system, component, or service; a. 2. Effective use and mainternance of security functions/mechanisms; and a. 3. Known vulnerabilities regarding configuration and use of administrative (i.e., privileged) a. 3. Known vulnerabilities regarding configuration and use of administrative (i.e., privileged) b. Obtains user documentation for the information system, system component, or information system service that describes: b. 1. User-accessible security functions/mechanisms and how to effectively use those security functions/mechanisms; b. 2. Methods for user interaction, which enables individuals to use the system, component, or service in a more secure manner; and b. 3. User responsibilities in maintaining the security of the system, component, or information system service documentation when such documentation is either unavailable or nonesistent and takes [Assignment: organization-defined actions] in response; d. Protects documentation as required, in accordance with the risk management strategy; and e. Distributes documentation to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].			P2	x	x x	
2	System and Services Acquisition Information System Documentation Functional Properties of Security Controls	Х							[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-4 (1)]
2	System and Services Acquisition Information System Documentation Security-Relevant External System Interfaces	Х							[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-4 (2)]
2	System and Services Acquisition Information System Documentation High-Level Design	Х							[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-4 (2)]
2	System and Services Acquisition Information System Documentation Low-Level Design	Х							[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-4 (2)]
2	System and Services Acquisition Information System Documentation Source Code	Х							[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-4 (2)]
1	System and Services Acquisition Software Usage	Х							[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-10 and SI-7]
1	System and Services Acquisition User-Installed	Х							[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-11 and SI-7]
1	Software and Services Acquisition Security Engineering Principles		The organization applies information system security engineering principles in the specification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the information system.	Organizations apply security engineering principles primarily to new development information systems or systems undergoing major upgrades. For legacy systems, or systems undergoing major upgrades. For legacy systems, or organizations apply security engineering principles include, for example; (i) developing layered protections; (ii) establishing sound security policy, architecture, and controls as the foundation for design; (iii) incorporating security requirements into the system development life cycle; (iv) delineating physical and logical security boundaries; (v) ensuring that system developers are trained on how to build secure software; (vi) isloring security controls to meet organizational and operational needs; (viii) performing threat modeling to identify use cases, threat agents, attack vectors, and attack patterns as well as compensating controls and design patterns needed to mitigate risk; and (viii) reducing risk to acceptable levels, thus enabling informed risk management decisions.	17,SC-2,SC-3	P1		X	
	2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1	2 System and Services Acquisition Acquisition Process NIAP-Approved Protection Profiles 2 System and Services Acquisition Acquisition Process Continuous Monitoring Plan 2 System and Services Acquisition Acquisition Process Functions Ports Protocols Services in Use 2 System and Services Acquisition Acquisition Process Use of Approved Pro Products 1 System Documentation Information System Documentation Functional Properties of Security Controls 2 System and Services Acquisition Information System Documentation Functional Properties of Security Controls 2 System and Services Acquisition Information System Documentation Functional Properties of Security Controls 2 System and Services Acquisition Information System Documentation High-Level Design 2 System and Services Acquisition Information System Documentation Low-Level Design 3 System and Services Acquisition Information System Documentation Low-Level Design 4 System and Services Acquisition Software Usage Restrictions 5 System and Services Acquisition Software Usage Restrictions 5 System and Services Acquisition Software Usage Restrictions 5 System and Services Acquisition User-installed Software 1 System and Services Acquisition Software Usage Restrictions	2 System and Services Acquisition Acquisition Process NIAP-Approved Protection Profiles 2 System and Services Acquisition Acquisition Process Continuous Monitoring Plan 2 System and Services Acquisition Acquisition Process Functions / Ports / Protocols / Services in Use 2 System and Services Acquisition Acquisition Process Functions / Ports / Protocols / Services in Use 3 System and Services Acquisition Information System Documentation Source Code 2 System and Services Acquisition Information System Documentation Source Code 3 System and Services Acquisition Information System Documentation Source Code 4 System and Services Acquisition Information System Documentation Source Code 5 System and Services Acquisition Information System Documentation Source Code 5 System and Services Acquisition Information System Documentation Source Code 5 System and Services Acquisition Information System Documentation Source Code 5 System and Services Acquisition Information System Documentation Source Code 1 System and Services Acquisition User-Installed System and Services Acquisition Security	2 System and Services Acquisition Acquisition Process NAM-Approved Protection Profiles	Per de protection de Contraction Production (Contraction Production Contraction Production Contraction Production Contraction	Package Pack	2. Specimen of Section Appetition Appetiti	Both Comment of the content of t	## Description of the control of the

Control ID	Level	Control Name Withda	rawn Control Text	Supplemental Guidance	Related Controls	Priority	Low	Mod	High	Notes
SA-9		System and Services Acquisition External	The organization:	External information system services are services that are implemented outside of the	CA-3,IR-7,PS-7	P1	X	х	Х	
		Information System Services	a. Requires that providers of external information system services comply with organizational	authorization boundaries of organizational information systems. This includes services that						
			information security requirements and employ [Assignment: organization-defined security controls	are used by, but not a part of, organizational information systems. FISMA and OMB policy						
			in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations,	require that organizations using external service providers that are processing, storing, or						
			standards, and guidance;	transmitting federal information or operating information systems on behalf of the federal						
			 b. Defines and documents government oversight and user roles and responsibilities with regard to external information system services; and 	agencies are required to meet. Organizations establish relationships with external service						
			c. Employs [Assignment: organization-defined processes, methods, and techniques] to monitor	providers in a variety of ways including, for example, through joint ventures, business						
			security control compliance by external service providers on an ongoing basis.	partnerships, contracts, interagency agreements, lines of business arrangements, licensing						
			security control compliance by exernal service providers on all ongoing basis.	agreements, and supply chain exchanges. The responsibility for managing risks from the use						
				of external information system services remains with authorizing officials. For services						
				external to organizations, a chain of trust requires that organizations establish and retain a						
				level of confidence that each participating provider in the potentially complex consumer-						
				provider relationship provides adequate protection for the services rendered. The extent						
				and nature of this chain of trust varies based on the relationships between organizations						
				and the external providers. Organizations document the basis for trust relationships so the relationships can be monitored over time. External information system services						
				documentation includes government, service providers, end user security roles and						
				responsibilities, and service-level agreements. Service-level agreements define expectations						
				of performance for security controls, describe measurable outcomes, and identify remedies						
				and response requirements for identified instances of noncompliance.						
SA-9 (1)	2	System and Services Acquisition External	The organization:	Dedicated information country continue include for number incident	CA 6 BA 2			1	-	
SA-9 (1)	2	System and Services Acquisition External Information System Services Risk Assessments /	The organization: (a) Conducts an organizational assessment of risk prior to the acquisition or outsourcing of	Dedicated information security services include, for example, incident monitoring, analysis and response, operation of information security-related devices such as firewalls, or key	CA-0,KA-3				1	1
		Organizational Approvals	dedicated information security services; and	management services.					1	
		organizational Approvais	(b) Ensures that the acquisition or outsourcing of dedicated information security services is	management services.				1		
			approved by [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].					1		
SA-9 (2)	2	System and Services Acquisition External	The organization requires providers of [Assignment: organization-defined external information	Information from external service providers regarding the specific functions, ports,	CM-7			х	Х	
		Information System Services Identification of	system services] to identify the functions, ports, protocols, and other services required for the use	protocols, and services used in the provision of such services can be particularly useful						
		Functions / Ports / Protocols / Services	of such services.	when the need arises to understand the trade-offs involved in restricting certain						
C1 - 1-1	-	Control and Control Annual Market	The control of the co	functions/services or blocking certain ports/protocols.			-			
SA-9 (3)	2	System and Services Acquisition External Information System Services Establish / Maintain	The organization establishes, documents, and maintains trust relationships with external service providers based on [Assignment: organization-defined security requirements, properties, factors,	The degree of confidence that the risk from using external services is at an acceptable level depends on the trust that organizations place in the external providers, individually or in					1	
		Trust Relationship with Providers	providers based on [Assignment: organization-defined security requirements, properties, factors, or conditions defining acceptable trust relationships].	depends on the trust that organizations place in the external providers, individually or in combination. Trust relationships can help organization to gain increased levels of					1	
		Trust Netationship with Providers	or conditions defining acceptable trast relationships.	confidence that participating service providers are providing adequate protection for the						
				services rendered. Such relationships can be complicated due to the number of potential						
				entities participating in the consumer-provider interactions, subordinate relationships and						
				levels of trust, and the types of interactions between the parties. In some cases, the degree						
				of trust is based on the amount of direct control organizations are able to exert on external						
				service providers with regard to employment of security controls necessary for the						
				protection of the service/information and the evidence brought forth as to the						
				effectiveness of those controls. The level of control is typically established by the terms and conditions of the contracts or service-level agreements and can range from extensive						
				control (e.g., negotiating contracts or agreements that specify security requirements for						
				the providers) to very limited control (e.g., using contracts or service-level agreements to						
				obtain commodity services such as commercial telecommunications services). In other						
				cases, levels of trust are based on factors that convince organizations that required						
				security controls have been employed and that determinations of control effectiveness						
				exist. For example, separately authorized external information system services provided to						
				organizations through well-established business relationships may provide degrees of trust						
				in such services within the tolerable risk range of the organizations using the services.						
				External service providers may also outsource selected services to other external entities,						
				making the trust relationship more difficult and complicated to manage. Depending on the nature of the services, organizations may find it very difficult to place significant trust in						
				external providers. This is not due to any inherent untrustworthiness on the part of						
				providers, but to the intrinsic level of risk in the services.						
								1		
						<u> </u>	L		L	
SA-9 (4)	2	System and Services Acquisition External	The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to ensure that							
		Information System Services Consistent Interests	the interests of [Assignment: organization-defined external service providers] are consistent with	interests of the service providers may diverge from organizational interests. In such						
		of Consumers and Providers	and reflect organizational interests.	situations, simply having the correct technical, procedural, or operational safeguards in						
				place may not be sufficient if the service providers that implement and control those						
				safeguards are not operating in a manner consistent with the interests of the consuming						
				organizations. Possible actions that organizations might take to address such concerns include, for example, requiring background checks for selected service provider personnel,						
				examining ownership records, employing only trustworthy service providers (i.e., providers						
				with which organizations have had positive experiences), and conducting						
				periodic/unscheduled visits to service provider facilities.						
SA-9 (5)	2	System and Services Acquisition External	The organization restricts the location of [Selection (one or more): information processing;	The location of information processing, information/data storage, or information system		1			1	
		Information System Services Processing, Storage,	information/data; information system services] to [Assignment: organization-defined locations]	services that are critical to organizations can have a direct impact on the ability of those				1		
		and Service Location	based on [Assignment: organization-defined requirements or conditions].	organizations to successfully execute their missions/business functions. This situation exists when external providers control the location of processing, storage or services. The criteria					1	
									1	
				external providers use for the selection of processing, storage, or service locations may be different from organizational criteria. For example, organizations may want to ensure that					1	
				data/information storage locations are restricted to certain locations to facilitate incident					1	
				response activities (e.g., forensic analyses, after-the-fact investigations) in case of				1		
				information security breaches/compromises. Such incident response activities may be				1		
				adversely affected by the governing laws or protocols in the locations where processing					1	
				and storage occur and/or the locations from which information system services emanate.				1		
		1				1	1	1	1	
		l l								

Control ID L	evel	Control Name Wi	drawn Control Text	Supplemental Guidance	Related Controls	Priority	Low N	1od High	Notes
SA-10	1	System and Services Acquisition Developer Configuration Management	The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to: a. Perform configuration management during system, component, or service [Selection (one or more): design; development; implementation; operation]; b. Document, manage, and control the integrity of changes to [Assignment: organization-define configuration terms under configuration management]; c. implement only organization-approved changes to the system, component, or service; d. Document approved changes to the system, component, or service and the potential security impacts of such changes; and e. Track security flaws and flaw resolution within the system, component, or service and report findings to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel].	This control also applies to organizations conducting internal information systems development and integration. Organizations consider the quality and completeness of the configuration management activities conducted by developers as evidence of applying effective security safeguards. Safeguards include, for example, protecting from unauthorizer and officiation or destruction, the master copies of all material used to generate security-relevant portions of the system hardware, software, and firmware. Maintaining the integrity of changes to the information system, information system component, or information systems service requires configuration control throughout the system development life cycle to track authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes.	CM-3,CM-4,CM-9,SA- 12,Sh-2		x	x	
SA-10 (1)	2	System and Services Acquisition Developer Configuration Management Software / Firmware Integrity Verification	The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to enable integrity verification of software and firmware component of the com	This control enhancement allows organizations to detect unauthorized changes to software to. and firmware components through the use of tools, techniques, and/or mechanisms provided by developers. Integrity checking mechanisms can also address counterfeiting of software and firmware components. Organizations verify the integrity of software and firmware components, for example, through secure one-way hashes provided by developers. Deleved software and firmware components also include any updates to such components.	SI-7				
SA-10 (2)	2	System and Services Acquisition Developer Configuration Management Alternative Configuration Management Processes	The organization provides an alternate configuration management process using organization personnel in the obsence of a dedicated developer configuration management team.	al Atternate configuration management processes may be required, for example, when organization use commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) information technology products. Alternate configuration management processes include organizational personnel that: (i) are responsible for reviewing/approving proposed changes to information systems, system components, and information system services; and (ii) conduct security impoct and open prior to the implementation of any changes to systems, components, or services (e.g., a configuration control board that considers security impacts of changes during development and includes representatives of both the organization and the developer, when applicable).					
SA-10 (3)	2	System and Services Acquisition Developer Configuration Management Hardware Integrity Verification	The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to enable integrity verification of hardware components.	This control enhancement allows organizations to detect unauthorized changes to hardware components through the use of tools, techniques, and/or mechanisms provided by developers. Organizations we'lly the integrity of hardware components, for example, with hard-to-copy labels and verifiable serial numbers provided by developers, and by requiring the implementation of anti-tamper technologies. Delivered hardware components also include updates to such components.	SI-7				
SA-10 (4)	2	System and Services Acquisition Developer Configuration Management Trusted Generation	The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to employ tools for comparing newly generated versions of security relevant hardware descriptions and software/firmware source and object code with previous versions.	This control enhancement addresses changes to hardware, software, and firmware components between versions during development. In contrast, SA-10 (1) and SA-10 (3) allow arganizations to detect unauthorized changes to hardware, software, and firmware components through the use of tools, techniques, and/or mechanisms provided by developers.					
SA-10 (5)	2	System and Services Acquisition Developer Configuration Management Mapping Integrity for Version Control	The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to maintain the integrity of the mapping between the moster build data (hardware drawings and software/firmware code) describing the current version of secur relevant hardware, software, and firmware and the on-site master copy of the data for the current version.						
SA-10 (6)	2	System and Services Acquisition Developer Configuration Management Trusted Distribution	The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to execute procedures for ensuring that security-relevant hardware software, and firmware updates distributed to the organization are exactly as specified by the moster copies.	The trusted distribution of security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware updates helps to ensure that such updates are faithful representations of the moster copies maintained by the developer and have not been tampered with during distribution.					
SA-11	1	System and Services Acquisition Developer Security Testing and Evaluation	The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to: a. Create and implement a security assessment plan; b. Perform [Selection (one or more): unit; integration; system; regression] testing/evaluation at [Assignment: organization-defined depth and coverage]; c. Produce evidence of the execution of the security assessment plan and the results of the security assessment plan and the results of the security. d. Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process; and e. Correct flaws identified during security testing/evaluation.	be affected by the interconnection of system components or changes to those components.	CA-2,CM-4,SA-3,SA-4,SA-5,S1-2	P1	×	x	

Control ID	Level	Control Name Withdraw	n Control Text	Supplemental Guidance	Related Controls	Deiositu I.a	ou. Mac	l High	Natas
SA-11 (1)	2	System and Services Acquisition Developer Security Testing and Evaluation Static Code Analysis	The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to employ static code analysis tools to identify common flaws and document the results of the analysis.	Static code analysis provides a technology and methodology for security reviews. Such analysis can be used to identify security vulnerabilities and enforce security colling practices. Static code analysis is most effective when used early in the development process, when each code change can be automatically scanned for potential weaknesses. Static analysis can provide clear remediation guidance along with defects to enable developers to fas such defects. Evidence of correct implementation of static analysis can include, for example, gargerate defect density for critical defect spee, evidence and defects were inspected by developers or security professionals, and evidence that alefacts were fixed. An excessively high density of ignored findings (commany referred to as ignored or false positives) indicates a potential problem with the analysis process or tool. In such cases, organizations weigh the validity of the evidence against evidence from other sources.		Thomas a		, mgn	
SA-11 (2)	2	System and Services Acquisition Developer Security Testing and Evaluation Threat and Vulnerability Analyses	The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to perform threat and vulnerability analyses and subsequent testing/evaluation of the as-built system, component, or service.	Applications may deviate significantly from the functional and design specifications created during the requirements and design phases of the system development life cycle. Therefore, threat and vulnerability analyses of information systems, system components, and information system services prior to delivery are critical to the effective operation of those systems, components, and services. Threat and vulnerability analyses at this phase of the life cycle help to ensure that design or implementation changes have been accounted for, and that any new vulnerabilities created as a result of those changes have been reviewed and mitigated.					
SA-11 (3)	2	System and Services Acquisition Developer Security Testing and Evaluation Independent Verification of Assessment Plans / Evidence	The organization: (a) Requires an independent agent satisfying [Assignment: organization-defined independence criterial to verify the correct implementation of the developer security assessment plan and the evidence produced during security testing/evaluation; and (b) Ensures that the independent agent is either provided with sufficient information to complete the verification process or granted the authority to obtain such information.	experience) to verify the correct implementation of developer security assessment plans.	AT-3,CA-7,RA-5,SA- 12				
SA-11 (4)	2	System and Services Acquisition Developer Security Testing and Evaluation Manual Code Reviews	The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to perform a manual code review of [Assignment: organization-defined specific code] using [Assignment: organization-defined processes, procedures, and/or techniques].	Manual code reviews are usually reserved for the critical software and firmware components of information systems. Such code reviews en uniquely effective at identifying weaknesses that require knowledge of the application's requirements or context which are generally unavailable to more automated analytic tools and techniques such as static or dynamic analysis. Components benefiting from manual review include for example, verifying access control matrices against application controls and reviewing more detailed aspects of cryptographic implementations and controls.					
SA-11 (5)	2	System and Services Acquisition Developer Security Testing and Evaluation Penetration Testing	The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to perform penetration testing at (Assignment: organization-defined breadth/depth) and with (Assignment: organization-defined constraints).	Penetration testing is an assessment methodology in which assessors, using all available information technology product and/or information set methodology and end and/or information set methodology and with a product/system design specifications, source code, and administrator/operator manuals) and working under specific constraints, attempt to circumvent implemented security features of information testing you products and information systems. Penetration testing can include, for example, white, gray, or black box testing with analyses performed by skilled security professionals simulating adversory cotions. The objective of penetration testing is to uncover potential vulnerabilities in information technology products and information systems resulting from implementation errors, configuration faults, or other operational deployment weaknesses or deficiencies. Penetration tests can be performed in conjunction with automated and manual code reviews to provide greater levels of analysis than would ordinarily be possible.					
SA-11 (6)	2	System and Services Acquisition Developer Security Testing and Evaluation Attack Surface Reviews	The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to perform attack surface reviews.	Attack surfaces of information systems are exposed areas that make those systems more vulnerable to cyber attacks. This includes any accessible areas where weaknesses or deficiencies in information systems (including the hardware, software, and firmware components) provide apportunities for adversaries to exploit vulnerabilities. Attack surface reviews ensure that developers, 'i) analyze both design and implementation changes to information systems; and (ii) mitigate attack vectors generated as a result of the changes. Correction of identified flaws includes, for example, deprecation of unsafe functions.					
SA-11 (7)	2	System and Services Acquisition Developer Security Testing and Evaluation Verify Scope of Testing / Evaluation	The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to verify that the scape of security testing/evaluation provides complete coverage of required security controls at [Assignment: organization-defined depth of testing/evaluation].	Verifying that security testing/evaluation provides complete coverage of required security controls can be accomplished by a variety of analytic techniques ranging from informal to formal. Each of these techniques provides an increasing level of assurance corresponding to the degree of formally of the analysis. Rigorously demonstrating security control coverage at the highest levels of assurance can be provided by the use of formal modeling and analysis techniques including correlation between control implementation and corresponding lest cases.					
SA-11 (8)	2	System and Services Acquisition Developer Security Testing and Evaluation Dynamic Code Analysis	The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to employ dynamic code analysis tools to identify common flaws and document the results of the analysis.	Dynamic code analysis provides run-time verification of software programs, using tools copable of monitoring programs for memory corruption, user privilege issues, and other potential security problems. Dynamic code analysis employs run-time tools to help to ensure that security functionality performs in the manner in which it was designed. A specialized type of dynamic analysis, known as fuz testing, induces program failures by deliberately introducing molformed or random data into software programs. Fuzz testing strategies derive from the intended use of applications and the functional and design specifications for the applications. To understand the scope of dynamic code analysis and hence the assurance provided, organizations may also consider conducting code coverage analysis (nekeing the degree to which the code has been tested using metrics such as percent of subroutines tested or percent of program statements called during execution of the test suite) and/or concordance analysis (nekeing for words that are out of place in software code such as non-English language words or derogatory terms).					

			Withdrawn	Control Text	Supplemental Guidance	Related Controls	Priority	LOW N	rod High	Notes
SA-12	1	System and Services Acquisition Supply Chain		The organization protects against supply chain threats to the information system, system	Information systems (including system components that compose those systems) need to	AT-3,CM-8,IR-4,PE-	P1		×	
		Protection		component, or information system service by employing [Assignment: organization-defined	be protected throughout the system development life cycle (i.e., during design,	16,PL-8,SA-3,SA-4,SA-				
				security safeguards] as part of a comprehensive, defense-in-breadth information security strategy.	development, manufacturing, packaging, assembly, distribution, system integration,	8,SA-10,SA-14,SA-				
					operations, maintenance, and retirement). Protection of organizational information systems	15.SA-18.SA-19.SC-				
					is accomplished through threat awareness, by the identification, management, and	29,SC-30,SC-38,SI-7				
					reduction of vulnerabilities at each phase of the life cycle and the use of complementary,	25,50 50,50 50,51 7				
					mutually reinforcing strategies to respond to risk. Organizations consider implementing a					
					standardized process to address supply chain risk with respect to information systems and					
					system components, and to educate the acquisition workforce on threats, risk, and required					
					security controls. Organizations use the acquisition/procurement processes to require					
					supply chain entities to implement necessary security safeguards to: (i) reduce the likelihood					
					of unauthorized modifications at each stage in the supply chain; and (ii) protect information					
					systems and information system components, prior to taking delivery of such					
					systems/components. This control also applies to information system services. Security					
					safeguards include, for example: (i) security controls for development systems, development					
					facilities, and external connections to development systems; (ii) vetting development					
					personnel; and (iii) use of tamper-evident packaging during shipping/warehousing. Methods					
					for reviewing and protecting development plans, evidence, and documentation are					
					commensurate with the security category or classification level of the information system.					
					Contracts may specify documentation protection requirements.					
SA-12 (1)	2	System and Services Acquisition Supply Chain		The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined tailored acquisition strategies,	The use of acquisition and procurement processes by organizations early in the system	SA-19				
3,,,12 (1)	-				development life cycle provides an important vehicle to protect the supply chain.	I				
1		Protection Acquisition Strategies / Tools /		contract tools, and procurement methods] for the purchase of the information system, system		1		1		
1		Methods		component, or information system service from suppliers.	Organizations use available all-source intelligence analysis to inform the tailoring of	1		1		
					acquisition strategies, tools, and methods. There are a number of different tools and					
					techniques available (e.g., obscuring the end use of an information system or system					
					component, using blind or filtered buys). Organizations also consider creating incentives for					
1					suppliers who: (i) implement required security safequards; (ii) promote transparency into	1		1		
						1				
					their organizational processes and security practices; (iii) provide additional vetting of the					
[processes and security practices of subordinate suppliers, critical information system					
					components, and services; (iv) restrict purchases from specific suppliers or countries; and	1				
[(v) provide contract language regarding the prohibition of tainted or counterfeit					
					components. In addition, organizations consider minimizing the time between purchase					
					decisions and required delivery to limit opportunities for adversaries to corrupt information					
					system components or products. Finally, organizations can use trusted/controlled					
					distribution, delivery, and warehousing options to reduce supply chain risk (e.g., requiring					
					tamper-evident packaging of information system components during shipping and					
					warehousina).					
					warenousnig).					
64 43 (3)	-	Control and Construct Association & Construction		The control of the co	Constitution to the form the first of the fi			_		
SA-12 (2)	2	System and Services Acquisition Supply Chain		The organization conducts a supplier review prior to entering into a contractual agreement to	Supplier reviews include, for example: (i) analysis of supplier processes used to design,					
		Protection Supplier Reviews		acquire the information system, system component, or information system service.	develop, test, implement, verify, deliver, and support information systems, system					
					components, and information system services; and (ii) assessment of supplier training and					
					experience in developing systems, components, or services with the required security					
					capability. These reviews provide organizations with increased levels of visibility into					
					supplier activities during the system development life cycle to promote more effective					
					supply chain risk management. Supplier reviews can also help to determine whether					
					primary suppliers have security safeguards in place and a practice for vetting subordinate					
					suppliers, for example, second- and third-tier suppliers, and any subcontractors.					
					Suppliers, for example, second and time tier suppliers, and any subcontractors.					
SA-12 (3)	2	System and Services Acquisition Supply Chain	X							[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-12 (1)]
3A-12 (3)	2	Protection Trusted Shipping and Warehousing	^							[withdrawn. incorporated into 5A-12 [1]]
		Protection Trusted Shipping and Warehousing								
								_		
SA-12 (4)	2	System and Services Acquisition Supply Chain	X							[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-12 (13)]
		Protection Diversity of Suppliers								
SA-12 (5)	2	System and Services Acquisition Supply Chain		The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to limit harm	Supply chain risk is part of the advanced persistent threat (APT). Security safeguards and					
''		Protection Limitation of Harm		from potential adversaries identifying and targeting the organizational supply chain.	countermeasures to reduce the probability of adversaries successfully identifying and	1		1		
		,		,	targeting the supply chain include, for example: (i) avoiding the purchase of custom	1		1		
1						1		1		
					configurations to reduce the risk of acquiring information systems, components, or					
1					products that have been corrupted via supply chain actions targeted at specific	1		1		
1					organizations; (ii) employing a diverse set of suppliers to limit the potential harm from any	1		1		
					given supplier in the supply chain; (iii) employing approved vendor lists with standing	1		1		
					reputations in industry, and (iv) using procurement carve outs (i.e., exclusions to					
					commitments or obligations).	1				
					Communicates or congulations).					
CA 43 (C)	7	Sustana and Sanitana Assur-Way 1 Surat. St.	V						_	DATAblebassins Incorporated into CA 42 (41)
SA-12 (6)	2	System and Services Acquisition Supply Chain	X							[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-12 (1)]
		Protection Minimizing Procurement Time								
SA-12 (7)	2	System and Services Acquisition Supply Chain		The organization conducts an assessment of the information system, system component, or	Assessments include, for example, testing, evaluations, reviews, and analyses.	CA-2,SA-11				
[]		Protection Assessments Prior to Selection /		information system service prior to selection, acceptance, or update.	Independent, third-party entities or organizational personnel conduct assessments of	1		1		
		Acceptance / Update			systems, components, products, tools, and services, Organizations conduct assessments to	1				
		receptance / opunte				1				
					uncover unintentional vulnerabilities and intentional vulnerabilities including, for example,	1		1		
					malicious code, malicious processes, defective software, and counterfeits. Assessments can	1		1		
					include, for example, static analyses, dynamic analyses, simulations, white, gray, and black					
1					box testing, fuzz testing, penetration testing, and ensuring that components or services are	1		1		
					genuine (e.g., using tags, cryptographic hash verifications, or digital signatures). Evidence	1				
						1				
					generated during security assessments is documented for follow-on actions carried out by					
[organizations.					
SA-12 (8)	2	System and Services Acquisition Supply Chain		The organization uses all-source intelligence analysis of suppliers and potential suppliers of the	All-source intelligence analysis is employed by organizations to inform engineering,	SA-15				
		Protection Use of All-Source Intelligence		information system, system component, or information system service.	acquisition, and risk management decisions. All-source intelligence consists of intelligence					
					products and/or organizations and activities that incorporate all sources of information,					
					most frequently including human intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement and					
					signature intelligence, signals intelligence, and open source data in the production of					
					finished intelligence. Where available, such information is used to analyze the risk of both					
					intentional and unintentional vulnerabilities from development, manufacturing, and					
					delivery processes, people, and the environment. This review is performed on suppliers at					
					multiple tiers in the supply chain sufficient to manage risks.					

Control ID	revel		Withdrawn	Control Text	Supplemental Guidance	Related Controls	Priority	LOW	Wod High	Notes
SA-12 (9)	2	System and Services Acquisition Supply Chain		The organization employs (Assignment: organization-defined Operations Security (OPSEC)	Supply chain information includes, for example: user identities; uses for information					
		Protection Operations Security		safeguards] in accordance with classification guides to protect supply chain-related information	systems, information system components, and information system services; supplier					
				for the information system, system component, or information system service.	identities; supplier processes; security requirements; design specifications; testing and					
					evaluation results; and system/component configurations. This control enhancement					
					expands the scope of OPSEC to include suppliers and potential suppliers. OPSEC is a process					
					of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to					
					operations and other activities to: (i) identify those actions that can be observed by					
					potential adversaries; (ii) determine indicators that adversaries might obtain that could be					
					interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in sufficient time to cause					
					harm to organizations; (iii) implement safeguards or countermeasures to eliminate or					
					reduce to an acceptable level, exploitable vulnerabilities; and (iv) consider how aggregated					
					information may compromise the confidentiality of users or uses of the supply chain.					
					OPSEC may require organizations to withhold critical mission/business information from					
					suppliers and may include the use of intermediaries to hide the end use, or users, of					
					information systems, system components, or information system services.					
SA-12 (10)	2	System and Services Acquisition Supply Chain		The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to validate that						
		Protection Validate As Genuine and Not Altered		the information system or system component received is genuine and has not been altered.	to help determine if the components are genuine or have been altered. Security safeguards					
					used to validate the authenticity of information systems and information system					
					components include, for example, optical/nanotechnology tagging and side-channel					
					analysis. For hardware, detailed bill of material information can highlight the elements					
					with embedded logic complete with component and production location.					
SA-12 (11)	2	System and Services Acquisition Supply Chain		The organization employs [Selection (one or more): organizational analysis, independent third-		RA-5				
		Protection Penetration Testing / Analysis of		party analysis, organizational penetration testing, independent third-party penetration testing] of	delivered items. Supply chain elements are information technology products or product					
		Elements, Processes, and Actors		[Assignment: organization-defined supply chain elements, processes, and actors] associated with	components that contain programmable logic and that are critically important to			l		
				the information system, system component, or information system service.	information system functions. Supply chain processes include, for example: (i) hardware,					
					software, and firmware development processes; (ii) shipping/handling procedures; (iii)					
					personnel and physical security programs; (iv) configuration management tools/measures					
					to maintain provenance; or (v) any other programs, processes, or procedures associated					
					with the production/distribution of supply chain elements. Supply chain actors are					
					individuals with specific roles and responsibilities in the supply chain. The evidence					
					generated during analyses and testing of supply chain elements, processes, and actors is					
					documented and used to inform organizational risk management activities and decisions.					
SA-12 (12)	2	System and Services Acquisition Supply Chain		The organization establishes inter-organizational agreements and procedures with entities	The establishment of inter-organizational agreements and procedures provides for					
		Protection Inter-Organizational Agreements		involved in the supply chain for the information system, system component, or information system	notification of supply chain compromises. Early notification of supply chain compromises					
				service.	that can potentially adversely affect or have adversely affected organizational information					
					systems, including critical system components, is essential for organizations to provide					
					appropriate responses to such incidents.					
SA-12 (13)	2	System and Services Acquisition Supply Chain		The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to ensure an	Adversaries can attempt to impede organizational operations by disrupting the supply of					
		Protection Critical Information System		adequate supply of [Assignment: organization-defined critical information system components].	critical information system components or corrupting supplier operations. Safeguards to					
		Components			ensure adequate supplies of critical information system components include, for example:					
					(i) the use of multiple suppliers throughout the supply chain for the identified critical					
					components; and (ii) stockpiling of spare components to ensure operation during mission-					
					critical times.					
SA-12 (14)	2	System and Services Acquisition Supply Chain		The organization establishes and retains unique identification of [Assignment: organization-	Knowing who and what is in the supply chains of organizations is critical to gaining visibility					
		Protection Identity and Traceability		defined supply chain elements, processes, and actors] for the information system, system	into what is happening within such supply chains, as well as monitoring and identifying					
				component, or information system service.	high-risk events and activities. Without reasonable visibility and traceability into supply					
					chains (i.e., elements, processes, and actors), it is very difficult for organizations to					
					understand and therefore manage risk, and to reduce the likelihood of adverse events.					
					Uniquely identifying acquirer and integrator roles, organizations, personnel, mission and					
					element processes, testing and evaluation procedures, delivery mechanisms, support					
					mechanisms, communications/delivery paths, and disposal/final disposition activities as					
					well as the components and tools used, establishes a foundational identity structure for					
					assessment of supply chain activities. For example, labeling (using serial numbers) and					
					tagging (using radio-frequency identification [RFID] tags) individual supply chain elements					
					including software packages, modules, and hardware devices, and processes associated					
					with those elements can be used for this purpose. Identification methods are sufficient to					
					support the provenance in the event of a supply chain issue or adverse supply chain event.					
SA-12 (15)	2	System and Services Acquisition Supply Chain		The organization establishes a process to address weaknesses or deficiencies in supply chain	Evidence generated during independent or organizational assessments of supply chain					
]		Protection Processes to Address Weaknesses or		elements identified during independent or organizational assessments of such elements.	elements (e.g., penetration testing, audits, verification/validation activities) is documented			l		
		Deficiencies			and used in follow-on processes implemented by organizations to respond to the risks			l		
					related to the identified weaknesses and deficiencies. Supply chain elements include, for			l		
					example, supplier development processes and supplier distribution systems.					

Control ID	Level		Vithdrawn	Control Text	Supplemental Guidance	Related Controls	Priority	LOW IV	ou me	gn NO	
SA-13	1	System and Services Acquisition		The organization:	This control helps organizations to make explicit trustworthiness decisions when designing, developing, and implementing information systems that are needed to conduct critical	RA-2,SA-4,SA-8,SA-	PU				
		Trustworthiness		a. Describes the trustworthiness required in the [Assignment: organization-defined information	loganizational missions/business functions. Trustworthiness is a characteristic/property of an	14,SC-3					
				system, information system component, or information system service] supporting its critical	Information system that expresses the degree to which the system can be expected to preserve the						
				missions/business functions; and	confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information it processes, stores, or transmits.						
				b. Implements [Assignment: organization-defined assurance overlay] to achieve such trustworthiness.	Trustworthy information systems are systems that are capable of being trusted to operate within						
				trustworthiness.	defined levels of risk despite the environmental disruptions, human errors, and purposeful attacks						
					that are expected to occur in the specified environments of operation. Trustworthy systems are						
					important to mission/business success. Two factors affecting the trustworthiness of information						
					systems include: (i) security functionality (i.e., the security features, functions, and/or mechanisms employed within the system and its environment of operation); and (ii) security assurance (i.e., the						
					grounds for confidence that the security functionality is effective in its application). Developers.						
					implementers, operators, and maintainers of organizational information systems can increase the						
					level of assurance (and trustworthiness), for example, by employing well-defined security policy						
					models, structured and rigorous hardware, software, and firmware development techniques, sound						
					system/security engineering principles, and secure configuration settings (defined by a set of						
					assurance-related security controls in Appendix E). Assurance is also based on the assessment of evidence produced during the system development life cycle. Critical missions/business functions						
					levidence produced during the system development life cycle. Critical missions/business functions lare supported by high-impact systems and the associated assurance requirements for such systems.						
					The additional assurance controls in Table E-4 in Appendix E (designated as optional) can be used to						
					develop and implement high-assurance solutions for specific information systems and system						
					components using the concept of overlays described in Appendix I. Organizations select assurance						
					overlays that have been developed, validated, and approved for community adoption (e.g., cross-						
					organization, governmentwide), limiting the development of such overlays on an organization-by-						
					organization basis. Organizations can conduct criticality analyses as described in SA-14, to determine						
					the information systems, system components, or information system services that require high- assurance solutions. Trustworthiness requirements and assurance overlays can be described in the						
					security plans for organizational information systems.						
					Security plans for or burnzational information systems.						
SA-14	1	System and Services Acquisition Criticality		The organization identifies critical information system components and functions by performing a	Criticality analysis is a key tenet of supply chain risk management and informs the	CP-2,PL-2,PL-8,PM-	P0			-	
1		Analysis		criticality analysis for [Assignment: organization-defined information systems, information system	prioritization of supply chain protection activities such as attack surface reduction, use of all-						
1				components, or information system services] at [Assignment: organization-defined decision points		13,SA-15,SA-20					
1				in the system development life cycle].	conduct an end-to-end functional decomposition of an information system to identify	,					
1					mission-critical functions and components. The functional decomposition includes the						
1					identification of core organizational missions supported by the system, decomposition into						
					the specific functions to perform those missions, and traceability to the hardware, software,						
1					and firmware components that implement those functions, including when the functions are						
1					shared by many components within and beyond the information system boundary.						
1					Information system components that allow for unmediated access to critical components or						
1					functions are considered critical due to the inherent vulnerabilities such components create.						
1					Criticality is assessed in terms of the impact of the function or component failure on the						
1					ability of the component to complete the organizational missions supported by the						
1					information system. A criticality analysis is performed whenever an architecture or design is						
1					being developed or modified, including upgrades.						
1											
SA-14 (1)	2	System and Services Acquisition Criticality Analysis Critical Components with No Viable	X							[W	(ithdrawn: Incorporated into SA-20)
SA-15	1	Alternative Sourcing		The organization:	Development tools include, for example, programming languages and computer-aided	SA-3,SA-8	P2		х		
SA-15	1			The organization: a. Requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system	Development tools include, for example, programming languages and computer-aided design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use	SA-3,SA-8	P2		x		
SA-15	1	Alternative Sourcing System and Services Acquisition Development			Development tools include, for example, programming languages and computer-aided design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining	SA-3,SA-8	P2		x		
SA-15	1	Alternative Sourcing System and Services Acquisition Development		Requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: a.1. Explicitly addresses security requirements;	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk	SA-3,SA-8	P2		x		
SA-15	1	Alternative Sourcing System and Services Acquisition Development		Requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: 1. Explicitly addresses security requirements; 1. Explicitly addresses security requirements; 1. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process;	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life	SA-3,SA-8	P2		x	+	
SA-15	1	Alternative Sourcing System and Services Acquisition Development		Requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: a.1. Explicitly addresses security requirements;	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to	SA-3,SA-8	P2		х	+	
SA-15	1	Alternative Sourcing System and Services Acquisition Development		Requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: 1. Explicitly addresses security requirements; 2. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process; 3.1. Documents the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; and	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life	SA-3,SA-8	P2		x		
SA-15	1	Alternative Sourcing System and Services Acquisition Development		a. Requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: a.1. Explicitly addresses security requirements; a.2. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process; a.3. Documents the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; and a.4. Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to	SA-3,SA-8	P2		x		
SA-15	1	Alternative Sourcing System and Services Acquisition Development		Requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: 1. Explicitly addresses security requirements; 2. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process; 3.1 Documents the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; and 3.4 Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development; and	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to	SA-3,SA-8	P2		x		
SA-15	1	Alternative Sourcing System and Services Acquisition Development		a. Requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: a.1. Explicitly addresses security requirements; a.2. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process; a.3. Decuments the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; and a.4. Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development, and b. Reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to	SA-3,SA-8	P2		x		
SA-15	1	Alternative Sourcing System and Services Acquisition Development		Requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: 1. Explicitly addresses security requirements; 2. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process; 3.1. Decuments the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; 3.1. Decuments, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development; and 1.4. Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development; and 1. Reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations 1. Reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations.	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to	SA-3,SA-8	P2		x		
SA-15	1	Alternative Sourcing System and Services Acquisition Development		a. Requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: a. 1. Explicitly addresses security requirements; a. 2. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process; a. 3. Documents the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; and a. 4. Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development; and N. Reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations [Jassignment: organization-defined frequency] to determine if the process, standards, tool, and tool options/configurations selected and employed can astisfy [Assignment: organization-defined	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to	SA-3,SA-8	P2		x		
		Alternative Sourcing System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools		a. Requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: a. 1. Explicitly addresses security requirements; a. 2. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process; a. 3. Documents the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; and a. 4. Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development, and b. Reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations [Rasignment: organization-defined frequency] to determine if the process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations selected and employed can satisfy [Assignment: organization-defined security requirements].	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to track authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes.	SA-3,SA-8	P2		x		
SA-15 (1)		Alternative Sourcing System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools System and Services Acquisition Development		a. Requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: a. 1. Explicitly addresses security requirements; a. 2. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process; a. 3. Documents the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; and a. 4. Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development; and b. Reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to determine if the process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations selected and employed can asisty [Assignment: organization-defined security requirements].	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to track authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes. Organizations use quality metrics to establish minimum acceptable levels of information	SA-3,SA-8	P2		х		
		Alternative Sourcing System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools		a. Requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: a. 1. Explicitly addresses security requirements; a. 2. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process; a. 3. Documents the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; and a. 4. Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development and b. Reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to determine if the process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations selected and employed can satisfy [Assignment: organization-defined security requirements]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to:	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and miligation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to track authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes. Organizations use quality metrics to establish minimum acceptable levels of information system quality. Metrics may include quality gates which are collections of completion	SA-3,SA-8	P2		x		
		Alternative Sourcing System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools System and Services Acquisition Development		a. Requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: a. 1. Explicitly addresses security requirements; a. 2. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process; a. 3. Documents the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; and a. 4. Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development; and b. Reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations [Jassignment: organization-defined frequency] to determine if the process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations selected and employed can asisty [Assignment: organization-defined security requirements]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to: [10] Define quality metrics at the beginning of the development process; and	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to track authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes. Organizations use quality metrics to establish minimum acceptable levels of information system quality. Metrics may include quality gates which are collections of completion criterio or sufficiency standards representing the sostifactory execution of particular	SA-3,SA-8	P2		x		
		Alternative Sourcing System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools System and Services Acquisition Development		a. Requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: a. 1. Explicitly addresses security requirements; a. 2. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process; a. 3. Decuments the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; and a. 4. Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development; and b. Reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to determine if the process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations selected and employed can satisfy [Assignment: organization-defined security requirements]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to: (a) Define quality metrics at the beginning of the development process; and (b) Providee voldance of meeting the quality metrics [Selection (one or more): [Assignment:	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to track authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes. Organizations use quality metrics to establish minimum acceptable levels of information system quality. Metrics may include quality gates which are collections of completion criterio or sufficiency standards representing the satisfactory execution of particular phases of the system development project. A quality gate, for example, may require the	SA-3,SA-8	P2		x		
		Alternative Sourcing System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools System and Services Acquisition Development		Bequires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: a. 1. Explicitly addresses security requirements; a. 2. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process; a. 3. Documents the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; and a. 4. Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development; and b. Reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations Basignment: organization-defined frequency) to determine if the process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations selected and employed can satisfy [Assignment: organization-defined security requirements]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to: (10) Periou quality metrics at the beginning of the development process; and (10) Provide evidence of meeting the quality metrics [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]]. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to track authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes. Organizations use quality metrics to establish minimum acceptable levels of information system quality. Metrics may include quality gates which are collections of completion criterio or sufficiency standards representing the sostifactory execution of particular phases of the system development project. A quality gate, for example, may require the elimination of all complier warnings or or explicit determination that the warnings hove no	SA-3,SA-8	P2		x		
		Alternative Sourcing System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools System and Services Acquisition Development		a. Requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: a. 1. Explicitly addresses security requirements; a. 2. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process; a. 3. Decuments the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; and a. 4. Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development; and b. Reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to determine if the process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations selected and employed can satisfy [Assignment: organization-defined security requirements]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to: (a) Define quality metrics at the beginning of the development process; and (b) Providee voldance of meeting the quality metrics [Selection (one or more): [Assignment:	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to track authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes. Organizations use quality metrics to establish minimum acceptable levels of information system quality. Metrics may include quality gates which are collections of completion criterio or sufficiency standards representing the satisfactory execution of particular phases of the system development project. A quality gate, for example, may require the elimination of all compiler warnings on an explicit determination that the warnings have no impact on the effectiveness of required security copabilities. During the execution phases	SA-3,SA-8	P2		x		
		Alternative Sourcing System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools System and Services Acquisition Development		Bequires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: a. 1. Explicitly addresses security requirements; a. 2. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process; a. 3. Documents the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; and a. 4. Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development; and b. Reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations Basignment: organization-defined frequency) to determine if the process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations selected and employed can satisfy [Assignment: organization-defined security requirements]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to: (10) Periou quality metrics at the beginning of the development process; and (10) Provide evidence of meeting the quality metrics [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]]. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to track authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes. Organizations use quality metrics to establish minimum acceptable levels of information system quality. Metrics may include quality gates which are collections of completion criterio or sufficiency standards representing the satisfactory execution of particular phases of the system development project. A quality gate, for example, may require the elimination of all complier warnings or an explicit determination that the warnings have no impact on the effectiveness of required security capabilities. During the execution phases of development projects, validly gates provide clear, unambiguous indications of progress.	SA-3,SA-8	P2		x		
		Alternative Sourcing System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools System and Services Acquisition Development		Bequires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: a. 1. Explicitly addresses security requirements; a. 2. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process; a. 3. Documents the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; and a. 4. Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development; and b. Reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations Basignment: organization-defined frequency) to determine if the process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations selected and employed can satisfy [Assignment: organization-defined security requirements]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to: (10) Periou quality metrics at the beginning of the development process; and (10) Provide evidence of meeting the quality metrics [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]]. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to track authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes. Organizations use quality metrics to establish minimum acceptable levels of information system quality. Metrics may include quality gates which are collections of completion criterio as sufficiency standards representing the sostifactory execution of particular phases of the system development project. A quality gate, for example, may require the elimination of all compiler warnings or an explicit determination that the warnings have no impact on the effectiveness of required security capabilities. During the execution phases of development projects, quality gates provide clear, unambiguous indications of progress. Other metrics apply to the entire development project. These metrics can include defined.	SA-3,SA-8	P2		x		
		Alternative Sourcing System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools System and Services Acquisition Development		Bequires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: a. 1. Explicitly addresses security requirements; a. 2. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process; a. 3. Documents the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; and a. 4. Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development; and b. Reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations Basignment: organization-defined frequency) to determine if the process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations selected and employed can satisfy [Assignment: organization-defined security requirements]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to: (10) Periou quality metrics at the beginning of the development process; and (10) Provide evidence of meeting the quality metrics [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]]. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to track authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes. Organizations use quality metrics to establish minimum acceptable levels of information system quality. Metrics may include quality gates which are collections of completion criterio or sufficiency standards representing the satisfactory execution of particular phases of the system development project. A quality to gate, for example, may require the elimination of all compiler warnings or on explicit determination that the warnings have no impact on the effectiveness of required security capabilities. During the execution phases of development projects, quality gates provide clear, unambiguous indications of progress. Other metrics apply to the entire development project. These metrics can include defining it the severity thresholds of vulnerabilities. for example, requiring no known vulnerabilities.	SA-3,SA-8	P2		x		
		Alternative Sourcing System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools System and Services Acquisition Development		Bequires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: a. 1. Explicitly addresses security requirements; a. 2. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process; a. 3. Documents the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; and a. 4. Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development; and b. Reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations Basignment: organization-defined frequency) to determine if the process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations selected and employed can satisfy [Assignment: organization-defined security requirements]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to: (10) Periou quality metrics at the beginning of the development process; and (10) Provide evidence of meeting the quality metrics [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]]. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to track authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes. Organizations use quality metrics to establish minimum acceptable levels of information system quality. Metrics may include quality gates which are collections of completion criterio ar sufficiency standards representing the sostifactory execution of particular phases of the system development project. A quality gate, for example, may require the elimination of all compiler warnings or an explicit determination that the warnings have no impact on the effectiveness of required security capabilities. During the execution phases of development projects, quality gates provide clear, unambiguous indications of progress. Other metrics apply to the entire development projects, quality gates provide clear, unambiguous indications of progress. Other metrics apply to the entire development projects, quality gates provide clear, unambiguous indications of progress. Other metrics apply to the entire development project. These metrics in include defining the severity thresholds of vulnerabilities, for example, requiring no known vulnerabilities in the delivered information system with a Common Vulnerabilities for the delivered information system with a Common Vulnerabilities.	SA-3,SA-8	P2		x		
		Alternative Sourcing System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools System and Services Acquisition Development		Bequires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: a. 1. Explicitly addresses security requirements; a. 2. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process; a. 3. Documents the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; and a. 4. Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development; and b. Reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations Basignment: organization-defined frequency) to determine if the process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations selected and employed can satisfy [Assignment: organization-defined security requirements]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to: (10) Periou quality metrics at the beginning of the development process; and (10) Provide evidence of meeting the quality metrics [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]]. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to track authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes. Organizations use quality metrics to establish minimum acceptable levels of information system quality. Metrics may include quality gates which are collections of completion criterio or sufficiency standards representing the satisfactory execution of particular phases of the system development project. A quality to gate, for example, may require the elimination of all compiler warnings or on explicit determination that the warnings have no impact on the effectiveness of required security capabilities. During the execution phases of development projects, quality gates provide clear, unambiguous indications of progress. Other metrics apply to the entire development project. These metrics can include defining it the severity thresholds of vulnerabilities. for example, requiring no known vulnerabilities.	SA-3-SA-8	P2		x		
	2	Alternative Sourcing System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools System and Services Acquisition Development		Bequires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: a. 1. Explicitly addresses security requirements; a. 2. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process; a. 3. Documents the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; and a. 4. Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development; and b. Reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations Basignment: organization-defined frequency) to determine if the process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations selected and employed can satisfy [Assignment: organization-defined security requirements]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to: (10) Periou quality metrics at the beginning of the development process; and (10) Provide evidence of meeting the quality metrics [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]]. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to track authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes. Organizations use quality metrics to establish minimum acceptable levels of information system quality. Metrics may include quality gates which are collections of completion criterio ar sufficiency standards representing the sostifactory execution of particular phases of the system development project. A quality gate, for example, may require the elimination of all compiler warnings or an explicit determination that the warnings have no impact on the effectiveness of required security capabilities. During the execution phases of development projects, quality gates provide clear, unambiguous indications of progress. Other metrics apply to the entire development projects, quality gates provide clear, unambiguous indications of progress. Other metrics apply to the entire development projects, quality gates provide clear, unambiguous indications of progress. Other metrics apply to the entire development project. These metrics in include defining the severity thresholds of vulnerabilities, for example, requiring no known vulnerabilities in the delivered information system with a Common Vulnerabilities for the delivered information system with a Common Vulnerabilities.	SA-3,SA-8	P2		x		
SA-15 (2)	2	System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Quality Metrics		a. Requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: a.1. Explicitly addresses security requirements; a.2. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process; a.3. Documents the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; and a.4. Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development; and b. Reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to determine if the process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations selected and employed can asisty [Assignment: organization-defined security requirements]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to: (a) Define quality metrics at the beginning of the development process; and (b) Provide evidence of meeting the quality metrics (Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; [Assignment: organization-defined program review milestones]; upon delivery].	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to track authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes. Organizations use quality metrics to establish minimum acceptable levels of information system quality. Metrics may include quality gates which are collections of completion criterio ar sufficiency standards representing the satisfactory execution of particular phases of the system development project. A quality gate, or example, may require the elimination of all conpiler warnings or an explicit determination that the warnings have no impact on the effectiveness of required security capabilities. During the execution phases of development projects, quality gates provide clear, unambiguous indications of progress. Other metrics apply to the entire development project. These metrics can include defining the severity thresholds of vulnerabilities, for example, requiring no known vulnerabilities in the delivered information system with a Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) severity of Medium or High. Information system development teams select and deploy security tracking took, including, for example, vulnerability sorting, systems sorting,	SA-3,SA-8	P2		×		
SA-15 (2)	2	Alternative Sourcing System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Quality Metrics System and Services Acquisition Development		a. Requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: a. 1. Explicitly addresses security requirements; a. 2. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process; a. 3. Decuments the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; and a. 4. Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development, and b. Reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to determine if the process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations selected and employed can satisfy [Assignment: organization-defined security requirements]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to: (a) Define quality metrics at the beginning of the development process; and (b) Providee voltance of meeting the quality metrics [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; [Assignment: organization-defined program review milestones]; upon delivery].	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to track authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes. Organizations use quality metrics to establish minimum acceptable levels of information system quality. Metrics may include quality gates which are collections of completion criteria or sufficiency standards representing the satisfactory execution of particular phases of the system development project. A quality gate, for example, may require the elimination of all compiler warnings or an explicit determination that the warnings have no impact on the effectiveness of required security capabilities. During the execution phases of development projects, quality gates provide clear, unambiguous indications of progress. Other metrics apply to the entire development project. These metrics can include defining the severity thresholds of vulnerabilities, for example, requiring no known vulnerabilities in the delivered information system with a Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) severelty of Medium or High. Information system development teams select and deploy security tracking tooks, including,	SA-3,SA-8	P2		x		
SA-15 (1)	2	System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Quality Metrics System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Quality Metrics System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Security Tracking Tools		a. Requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: a.1. Explicitly addresses security requirements; a.2. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process; a.3. Documents the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; and a.4. Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development; and b. Reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to determine if the process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations selected and employed can satisfy [Assignment: organization-defined security requirements]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to: (a) Define quality metrics at the beginning of the development process; and (b) Provide evidence of meeting the quality metrics (Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; [Assignment: organization-defined program review milestones]; upon delivery]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to select and employ a security tracking tool for use during the development process.	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to track authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes. Organizations use quality metrics to establish minimum acceptable levels of information system quality. Metrics may include quality gates which are collections of completion criterio ar sufficiency standards representing the sostifactory execution of particular phases of the system development project. A quality gate, or example, may require the elimination of all congiler warnings or an explicit determination that the warnings have no impact on the effectiveness of required security capabilities. During the execution phases of development projects, quality gates provide clear, unambiguous indications of progress. Other metrics apply to the entire development project. These metrics can include defining the severity thresholds of vulnerabilities, for example, requiring no known vulnerabilities in the delivered information system with a Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) severity of Medium or High. Information system development teams select and deploy security tracking tooks, including, filtering, and tracking of completed work items or tasks associated with system development processes.		P2		X		
SA-15 (2)	2	System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Quality Metrics System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Quality Metrics System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Security Tracking Tools System and Services Acquisition Development		a Requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: a.1. Explicitly addresses security requirements; a.2. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process; a.3. Documents the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; and a.4. Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development; and b. Reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to determine if the process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations selected and employed can satisfy [Assignment: organization-defined security requirements]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to: (a) Define quality metrics at the beginning of the development process; and (b) Provide evidence of meeting the quality metrics [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; [Assignment: organization-defined program review milestones]; upon delivery]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to: Information system service to select and employ a security tracking tool for use during the development process. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to track authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes. Organizations use quality metrics to establish minimum acceptable levels of information system quality. Metrics may include quality gates which are collections of completion criterio or sufficiency standards representing the satisfactory execution of particular phases of the system development project. A quality gate, for example, may require the elimination of all compiler warnings or an explicit determination that the warnings have no development projects, quality gates provide clear, unambiguous indications of progress. Other metrics apply to the entire development project. These metrics can include defining the severity thresholds of vulnerabilities, for example, requiring no known vulnerabilities in the delivered information system with a Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) severity of Medium or High. Information system development teams select and deploy security tracking tools, including, for example, vulnerability-work item tracking systems that facilitate assignment, sorting, filtering, and tracking of completed work items or tasks associated with system development processes.		P2		X		
SA-15 (1)	2	System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Quality Metrics System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Quality Metrics System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Security Tracking Tools		a. Requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: a. 1. Explicitly addresses security requirements; a. 2. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process; a. 3. Documents the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; and a. 4. Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development; and b. Reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to determine if the process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations selected and employed can asitsfy [Assignment: organization-defined security requirements]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to: (a) Define quality metrics at the beginning of the development process; and (b) Provide evidence of meeting the quality metrics (Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]: [Assignment: organization-defined program review milestones]; upon delivery]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to select and employ a security tracking tool for use during the development process. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to perform a criticality analysis at [Assignment: organization-defined	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to track authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes. Organizations use quality metrics to establish minimum acceptable levels of information system quality. Metrics may include quality gates which are collections of completion criterio or sufficiency standards representing the sostifactory execution of particular phases of the system development project. A quality gate, for example, may require the elimination of all compiler warnings or an explicit determination that the warnings have no impact on the effectiveness of required security capabilities. During the execution phases of development projects, soully gates provide clear, unambiguous indications of progress. Other metrics apply to the entire development project. These metrics can include defining the severity thresholds of vulnerabilities, for example, requiring no honov nulnerabilities in the delivered information system with a Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) severity of Medium or High. Information system development teams select and deploy security tracking tools, including, for example, vulnerability confirmed to representations of the result of the ricking systems that facilitate assignment, sorting, filtering, and tracking of completed work items or tasks associated with system development provides developer input to the criticality analysis performed by regarizations in SA-14. Developer input is sentilate to such analysis because organizations		P2		x		
SA-15 (1)	2	System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Quality Metrics System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Quality Metrics System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Security Tracking Tools System and Services Acquisition Development		a. Requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: a.1. Explicitly addresses security requirements; a.2. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process; a.3. Documents the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; and a.4. Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development, and b. Reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to determine if the process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations selected and employed can satisfy [Assignment: organization-defined security requirements]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to: (a) Define quality metrics at the beginning of the development process; and (b) Provide evidence of meeting the quality metrics [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; [Assignment: organization-defined program review milestones]; upon delivery]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to select and employ a security tracking tool for use during the development process. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to select and employ a security tracking tool for use during the development process.	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to track authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes. Organizations use quality metrics to establish minimum occeptable levels of information system quality. Metrics may include quality gates which are collections of completion criteria or sufficiency standards representing the satisfactory execution of particular phases of the system development project. A quality gate, for example, may require the elimination of all compiler warnings or on explicit determination that the warnings have no development project, apuality gate provide clear, unambiguous indications of progress. Other metrics apply to the entire development project. These metrics on include definities in the delivered information system with a Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) severity of Medium or High. Information system development teams select and deploy security tracking tools, including, for example, vulnerability/work item tracking systems that facilitate assignment, sorting, filtering, and tracking of completed work items or tasks associated with system development processes. This control enhancement provides developer input to the criticality analysis performed by organizations in SA-14. Developer input is essential to such analysis because organizations may not have access to detailed design documentation for information system components		P2		x		
SA-15 (1)	2	System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Quality Metrics System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Quality Metrics System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Security Tracking Tools System and Services Acquisition Development		a. Requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: a. 1. Explicitly addresses security requirements; a. 2. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process; a. 3. Documents the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; and a. 4. Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development; and b. Reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to determine if the process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations selected and employed can asitsfy [Assignment: organization-defined security requirements]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to: (a) Define quality metrics at the beginning of the development process; and (b) Provide evidence of meeting the quality metrics (Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]: [Assignment: organization-defined program review milestones]; upon delivery]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to select and employ a security tracking tool for use during the development process. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to perform a criticality analysis at [Assignment: organization-defined	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to track authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes. Organizations use quality metrics to establish minimum acceptable levels of information system quality. Metrics may include quality gates which are collections of completion criterio ar sufficiency standards representing the sostifactory execution of particular phases of the system development project. A quality gate, for example, may require the elimination of all compiler warnings or an explicit determination that the warnings have no impact on the effectiveness of required security capabilities. During the execution phases of development projects, unlike yastes provide clear, unambiguous indictions of progress. Other metrics apply to the entire development project. These metrics can include defining the severity thresholds of vulnerabilities, for example, requiring not monw vulnerabilities in the delivered information system with a Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) severity of Medium or High. Information system development teams select and deploy security tracking tools, including, for example, vulnerability work item tracking systems that facilitate assignment, sorting, filtering, and tracking of completed work items or tasks associated with system development provides developer input to the critically sis because organizations may not have access to detailed design documentation for information system components that are developed as commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) information to technology products		P2		X		
SA-15 (1)	2	System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Quality Metrics System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Quality Metrics System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Security Tracking Tools System and Services Acquisition Development		a. Requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: a.1. Explicitly addresses security requirements; a.2. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process; a.3. Documents the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; and a.4. Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development, and b. Reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to determine if the process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations selected and employed can satisfy [Assignment: organization-defined security requirements]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to: (a) Define quality metrics at the beginning of the development process; and (b) Provide evidence of meeting the quality metrics [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; [Assignment: organization-defined program review milestones]; upon delivery]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to select and employ a security tracking tool for use during the development process. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to select and employ a security tracking tool for use during the development process.	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to track authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes. Organizations use quality metrics to establish minimum acceptable levels of information system quality. Metrics may include quality gates which are collections of completion criterio ar sufficiency standards representing the satisfactory execution of particular phases of the system development project. A quality gate, for example, may require the elimination of all compiler warnings or an explicit determination that the warnings have no impact on the effectiveness of required security republities. During the execution phases of development projects, quality gates provide clear, unambiguous indications of progress. Other metrics apply to the entire development project. These metrics include defining the severity thresholds of vulnerabilities, for example, requiring no known vulnerabilities in the delivered information system development projects and deploy security tracking tooks, including, for example, underability, work item select and deploy security tracking tooks, including, for example, underability, ond tracking of completed work items or tasks associated with system development projects exist the facilitate assignment, sorting, filtering, and tracking of completed work items or tasks associated with system development processes. Information system development teams select and deploy security tracking tooks, including, for example, valunerability, work item seential to such analysis because organizations in SA-14. Developer input is essential to such analysis because organizations may not have access to detai		P2		X		
SA-15 (2) SA-15 (2)	2 2	Alternative Sourcing System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Quality Metrics System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Guality Metrics System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Security Tracking Tools System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Criticality Analysis		a Requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: a.1. Explicitly addresses security requirements; a.2. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process; a.3. Decuments the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; and a.4. Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development, and b. Reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to determine if the process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations selected and employed can satisfy [Assignment: organization-defined security requirements]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to: (a) Define quality metrics at the beginning of the development process; and (b) Provide evidence of meeting the quality metrics [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; [Assignment: organization-defined program review milestones]; upon delivery]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to select and employ a security tracking tool for use during the development process. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to select and employ a security tracking tool for use during the development process.	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to track authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes. Organizations use quality metrics to establish minimum acceptable levels of information system quality. Metrics may include quality gates which are collections of completion criterio ar sufficiency standards representing the sostifactory execution of particular phases of the system development project. A quality gate, for example, may require the elimination of all compiler warnings or an explicit determination that the warnings have no impact on the effectiveness of required security capabilities. During the execution phases of development projects, unlike yastes provide clear, unambiguous indictions of progress. Other metrics apply to the entire development project. These metrics can include defining the severity thresholds of vulnerabilities, for example, requiring not monw vulnerabilities in the delivered information system with a Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) severity of Medium or High. Information system development teams select and deploy security tracking tools, including, for example, vulnerability work item tracking systems that facilitate assignment, sorting, filtering, and tracking of completed work items or tasks associated with system development provides developer input to the critically sis because organizations may not have access to detailed design documentation for information system components that are developed as commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) information to technology products	SA-4,SA-14	P2		x		
SA-15 (1)	2 2	System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Quality Metrics System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Quality Metrics System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Security Tracking Tools System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Criticolity Analysis System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Criticolity Analysis		a. Requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: a.1. Explicitly addresses security requirements; a.2. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process; a.3. Documents the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; and a.4. Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development; and b. Reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to determine if the process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations selected and employed can saits fy [Assignment: organization-defined security requirements]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to: (a) Define quality metrics at the beginning of the development process; and (b) Provide evidence of meeting the quality metrics [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; [Assignment: organization-defined program review milestones]; upon delivery]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to select and employ a security tracking tool for use during the development process. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to select and employ a security tracking tool for use during the development process.	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to track authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes. Organizations use quality metrics to establish minimum acceptable levels of information system quality. Metrics may include quality gates which are collections of completion criterio ar sufficiency standards representing the satisfactory execution of particular phases of the system development project. A quality gate, for example, may require the elimination of all compiler warnings or an explicit determination that the warnings have no impact on the effectiveness of required security republities. During the execution phases of development projects, quality gates provide clear, unambiguous indications of progress. Other metrics apply to the entire development project. These metrics include defining the severity thresholds of vulnerabilities, for example, requiring no known vulnerabilities in the delivered information system development projects and deploy security tracking tooks, including, for example, underability, work item select and deploy security tracking tooks, including, for example, underability, ond tracking of completed work items or tasks associated with system development projects exist the facilitate assignment, sorting, filtering, and tracking of completed work items or tasks associated with system development processes. Information system development teams select and deploy security tracking tooks, including, for example, valunerability, work item seential to such analysis because organizations in SA-14. Developer input is essential to such analysis because organizations may not have access to detai		P2		x		
SA-15 (2) SA-15 (2)	2 2	Alternative Sourcing System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Quality Metrics System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Guality Metrics System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Criticality Analysis System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Triteal Modeling		a. Requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: a. 1. Explicitly addresses security requirements; a. 2. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process; a. 3. Documents the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; and a. 4. Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development; and development; and b. Reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations (lassignment: organization-defined frequency) to determine if the process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations selected and employed can asisty [Assignment: organization-defined security requirements]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to: (a) Define quality metrics at the beginning of the development process; and (b) Provide evidence of meeting the quality metrics (Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; [Assignment: organization-defined program review milestones]; upon delivery]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to select and employ a security tracking tool for use during the development process. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to select and employ a security tracking tool for use during the development process. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to select and employ a security tracking tool for use during the development process. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to select and employ a security tracking tool for use during the development process.	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to track authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes. Organizations use quality metrics to establish minimum acceptable levels of information system quality. Metrics may include quality gates which are collections of completion criterio ar sufficiency standards representing the satisfactory execution of particular phases of the system development project. A quality gate, for example, may require the elimination of all compiler warnings or an explicit determination that the warnings have no impact on the effectiveness of required security republities. During the execution phases of development projects, quality gates provide clear, unambiguous indications of progress. Other metrics apply to the entire development project. These metrics include defining the severity thresholds of vulnerabilities, for example, requiring no known vulnerabilities in the delivered information system development projects and deploy security tracking tooks, including, for example, underability, work item select and deploy security tracking tooks, including, for example, underability, ond tracking of completed work items or tasks associated with system development projects exist the facilitate assignment, sorting, filtering, and tracking of completed work items or tasks associated with system development processes. Information system development teams select and deploy security tracking tooks, including, for example, valunerability, work item seential to such analysis because organizations in SA-14. Developer input is essential to such analysis because organizations may not have access to detai	SA-4,SA-14	P2		X		
SA-15 (2) SA-15 (2)	2 2	System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Quality Metrics System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Quality Metrics System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Security Tracking Tools System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Criticolity Analysis System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Criticolity Analysis		a. Requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: a.1. Explicitly addresses security requirements; a.2. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process; a.3. Documents the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; and a.4. Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development; and b. Reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to determine if the process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations selected and employed can asisty [Assignment: organization-defined security requirements]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to: (a) Define quality metrics at the beginning of the development process; and (b) Provide evidence of meeting the quality metrics [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; [Assignment: organization-defined program review milestones]; upon delivery]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to select and employ a security tracking tool for use during the development process. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to select and employ a security tracking tool for use during the development process. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to perform a criticality analysis of (Assignment: organization-defined breadt/depth) and of [Assignment: organization-defined decision points in the system development if cycie]. The organization requires that developers perform threat modeling and a vulnerability analysis for the information system at [Assignment: organization-de	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to track authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes. Organizations use quality metrics to establish minimum acceptable levels of information system quality. Metrics may include quality gates which are collections of completion criterio ar sufficiency standards representing the satisfactory execution of particular phases of the system development project. A quality gate, for example, may require the elimination of all compiler warnings or an explicit determination that the warnings have no impact on the effectiveness of required security republities. During the execution phases of development projects, quality gates provide clear, unambiguous indications of progress. Other metrics apply to the entire development project. These metrics include defining the severity thresholds of vulnerabilities, for example, requiring no known vulnerabilities in the delivered information system development projects and deploy security tracking tooks, including, for example, underability, work item select and deploy security tracking tooks, including, for example, underability, ond tracking of completed work items or tasks associated with system development projects exist the facilitate assignment, sorting, filtering, and tracking of completed work items or tasks associated with system development processes. Information system development teams select and deploy security tracking tooks, including, for example, valunerability, work item seential to such analysis because organizations in SA-14. Developer input is essential to such analysis because organizations may not have access to detai	SA-4,SA-14	P2		X		
SA-15 (2) SA-15 (2)	2 2	Alternative Sourcing System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Quality Metrics System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Guality Metrics System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Criticality Analysis System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Triteal Modeling		a Requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: a.1. Explicitly addresses security requirements; a.2. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process; a.3. Documents the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; and a.4. Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development; and b. Reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to determine if the process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations selected and employed can satisfy [Assignment: organization-defined security requirements]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to: (a) Define quality metrics at the beginning of the development process; and (b) Provide evidence of meeting the quality metrics [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; [Assignment: organization-defined program review milestones]; upon delivery]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to select and employ a security tracking tool for use during the development process. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to select and employ a security tracking tool for use during the development process. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to perform a criticality analysis at [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; The organization requires that developers perform threat modeling and a vulnerability analysis for the information system at [Assignment: organization-defined breadth/depth] that: (a) Uses [Assignment: organization-defined information concerning impact,	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to track authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes. Organizations use quality metrics to establish minimum acceptable levels of information system quality. Metrics may include quality gates which are collections of completion criterio ar sufficiency standards representing the satisfactory execution of particular phases of the system development project. A quality gate, for example, may require the elimination of all compiler warnings or an explicit determination that the warnings have no impact on the effectiveness of required security republities. During the execution phases of development projects, quality gates provide clear, unambiguous indications of progress. Other metrics apply to the entire development project. These metrics include defining the severity thresholds of vulnerabilities, for example, requiring no known vulnerabilities in the delivered information system development projects and deploy security tracking tooks, including, for example, underability, work item select and deploy security tracking tooks, including, for example, underability, ond tracking of completed work items or tasks associated with system development projects exist the facilitate assignment, sorting, filtering, and tracking of completed work items or tasks associated with system development processes. Information system development teams select and deploy security tracking tooks, including, for example, valunerability, work item seential to such analysis because organizations in SA-14. Developer input is essential to such analysis because organizations may not have access to detai	SA-4,SA-14	P2		X		
SA-15 (2) SA-15 (2)	2 2	Alternative Sourcing System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Quality Metrics System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Guality Metrics System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Criticality Analysis System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Triteal Modeling		a. Requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: a.1. Explicitly addresses security requirements; a.2. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process; a.3. Documents the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; and a.4. Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development; and b. Reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to determine if the process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations selected and employed can asisty [Assignment: organization-defined security requirements]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to: (a) Define quality metrics at the beginning of the development process; and (b) Provide evidence of meeting the quality metrics (Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; [Assignment: organization-defined program review milestones]; upon delivery]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to select and employ a security tracking tool for use during the development process. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to select and employ a security tracking tool for use during the development process. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to select and employ a security tracking tool for use during the development process. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to perform a criticality analysis of Issasgament: organization-defined developers The organization requires that developers perfor	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to track authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes. Organizations use quality metrics to establish minimum acceptable levels of information system quality. Metrics may include quality gates which are collections of completion criterio ar sufficiency standards representing the satisfactory execution of particular phases of the system development project. A quality gate, for example, may require the elimination of all compiler warnings or an explicit determination that the warnings have no impact on the effectiveness of required security republities. During the execution phases of development projects, quality gates provide clear, unambiguous indications of progress. Other metrics apply to the entire development project. These metrics include defining the severity thresholds of vulnerabilities, for example, requiring no known vulnerabilities in the delivered information system development projects and deploy security tracking tooks, including, for example, underability, work item select and deploy security tracking tooks, including, for example, underability, ond tracking of completed work items or tasks associated with system development projects exist the facilitate assignment, sorting, filtering, and tracking of completed work items or tasks associated with system development processes. Information system development teams select and deploy security tracking tooks, including, for example, valunerability, work item seential to such analysis because organizations in SA-14. Developer input is essential to such analysis because organizations may not have access to detai	SA-4,SA-14	P2		X		
SA-15 (2) SA-15 (2)	2 2	Alternative Sourcing System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Quality Metrics System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Guality Metrics System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Criticality Analysis System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Triteal Modeling		a Requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: a.1. Explicitly addresses security requirements; a.2. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process; a.3. Documents the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; and a.4. Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development; and b. Reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to determine if the process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations selected and employed can satisfy [Assignment: organization-defined security requirements]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to: (a) Define quality metrics at the beginning of the development process; and (b) Provide evidence of meeting the quality metrics [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; [Assignment: organization-defined program review milestones]; upon delivery]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to select and employ a security tracking tool for use during the development process. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to select and employ a security tracking tool for use during the development process. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to perform a criticality analysis at [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; The organization requires that developers perform threat modeling and a vulnerability analysis for the information system at [Assignment: organization-defined breadth/depth] that: (a) Uses [Assignment: organization-defined information concerning impact,	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to track authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes. Organizations use quality metrics to establish minimum acceptable levels of information system quality. Metrics may include quality gates which are collections of completion criterio ar sufficiency standards representing the satisfactory execution of particular phases of the system development project. A quality gate, for example, may require the elimination of all compiler warnings or an explicit determination that the warnings have no impact on the effectiveness of required security republities. During the execution phases of development projects, quality gates provide clear, unambiguous indications of progress. Other metrics apply to the entire development project. These metrics include defining the severity thresholds of vulnerabilities, for example, requiring no known vulnerabilities in the delivered information system development projects and deploy security tracking tooks, including, for example, underability, work item select and deploy security tracking tooks, including, for example, underability, ond tracking of completed work items or tasks associated with system development projects exist the facilitate assignment, sorting, filtering, and tracking of completed work items or tasks associated with system development processes. Information system development teams select and deploy security tracking tooks, including, for example, valunerability, work item seential to such analysis because organizations in SA-14. Developer input is essential to such analysis because organizations may not have access to detai	SA-4,SA-14	P2		X		
SA-15 (2) SA-15 (2)	2 2	Alternative Sourcing System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Quality Metrics System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Guality Metrics System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Criticality Analysis System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Triteal Modeling		a. Requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that: a.1. Explicitly addresses security requirements; a.2. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process; a.3. Documents the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; and a.4. Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development; and b. Reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to determine if the process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations selected and employed can asisty [Assignment: organization-defined security requirements]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to: (a) Define quality metrics at the beginning of the development process; and (b) Provide evidence of meeting the quality metrics (Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; [Assignment: organization-defined program review milestones]; upon delivery]. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to select and employ a security tracking tool for use during the development process. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to select and employ a security tracking tool for use during the development process. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to select and employ a security tracking tool for use during the development process. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to perform a criticality analysis of Issasgament: organization-defined developers The organization requires that developers perfor	design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to track authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes. Organizations use quality metrics to establish minimum acceptable levels of information system quality. Metrics may include quality gates which are collections of completion criterio ar sufficiency standards representing the satisfactory execution of particular phases of the system development project. A quality gate, for example, may require the elimination of all compiler warnings or an explicit determination that the warnings have no impact on the effectiveness of required security republities. During the execution phases of development projects, quality gates provide clear, unambiguous indications of progress. Other metrics apply to the entire development project. These metrics include defining the severity thresholds of vulnerabilities, for example, requiring no known vulnerabilities in the delivered information system development projects and deploy security tracking tooks, including, for example, underability, work item select and deploy security tracking tooks, including, for example, underability, ond tracking of completed work items or tasks associated with system development projects exist the facilitate assignment, sorting, filtering, and tracking of completed work items or tasks associated with system development processes. Information system development teams select and deploy security tracking tooks, including, for example, valunerability, work item seential to such analysis because organizations in SA-14. Developer input is essential to such analysis because organizations may not have access to detai	SA-4,SA-14	P2		X		

Control ID	Level	Control Name With	hdrawn	Control Text	Supplemental Guidance	Related Controls	Priority	Low M	od	High	Notes
SA-15 (5)	2	System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Attack Surface Reduction		The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to reduce attack surfaces to [Assignment: organization-defined thresholds].	Attock surface reduction is closely aligned with developer threat and vulnerability analyses and information system architecture and design. Attock surface reduction is a means of reducing risk to organizations by giving attackers less apportunity to exploit weaknesses or deficiencies (i.e., potential vulnerabilities) within information systems, information systems and information systems envices. Attack surface reduction includes, for example, applying the principle of least privilege, employing layered defenses, applying the principle of least functionality (i.e., restricting ports, protocols, functions, and services), deprecating unsafe functions, and eliminating application programming interfaces (APIs) that are vulnerable to cyber attacks.		nons,				
SA-15 (6)	2	System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Continuous Improvement		The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to implement an explicit process to continuously improve the development process.	Developers of information systems, information system components, and information system services consider the effectiveness/efficiency of current development processes for meeting quality objectives and addressing security capabilities in current threat environments.						
SA-15 (7)		System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Automated Vulnerability Analysis		The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to: (i) Perform an automated vulnerability analysis using [Assignment: organization-defined tools]; (b) Determine the exploitation potential for discovered vulnerabilities; (b) Determine potential risk mitigations for delivered vulnerabilities; and (d) Deliver the outputs of the tools and results of the analysis to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].		RA-5					
SA-15 (8)	2	System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Reuse of Threat / Vulnerability Information		The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to use threat modeling and vulnerability analyses from similar systems, components, or services to inform the current development process.	Analysis of vulnerabilities found in similar software applications can inform potential design or implementation issues for information systems under development. Similar information systems or system components may exist within developer organizations. Authoritative vulnerability information is available from a variety of public and private sector sources including, for example, the National Vulnerability Database.						
SA-15 (9)	2	System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Use of Live Data		The organization approves, documents, and controls the use of live data in development and test environments for the information system, system component, or information system service.	The use of live data in preproduction environments can result in significant risk to organizations. Organizations can minimize such risk by using test or dummy data during the development and testing of information systems, information system components, and information system services.						
SA-15 (10)	2	System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Incident Response Plan		The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to provide an incident response plan.	The incident response plan for developers of information systems, system components, and information system services is incorporated into organizational incident response plans to revoid the topy of incident response information not readily available to arganizations. Such information may be extremely helpful, for example, when organizations respond to vulnerabilities in commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) information technology products.	IR-8					
SA-15 (11)	2	System and Services Acquisition Development Process, Standards, and Tools Archive		The organization requires the developer of the information system or system component to archive the system or component to be released or delivered together with the corresponding	Archiving relevant documentation from the development process can provide a readily available baseline of information that can be helpful during information						
SA-16		Information System / Component System and Services Acquisition Developer- Provided Training		evidence supporting the final security review. The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to provide [Assignment: organization-defined training] on the correct use and operation of the implemented security functions, controls, and/or mechanisms.	system/component upgrades or modifications. This control applies to external and internal (in-house) developers. Training of personnel is an essential element to ensure the effectiveness of security controls implemented within organizational information systems. Training options include, for example, classroom-style training, web-based/computer-based training, and hands-on training. Organizations can also request sufficient training materials from developers to conduct in-house training or offerelf-training to organizational personnel. Organizations determine the type of training necessary and may require different types of training for different security functions, controls, or mechanisms.		P2		3	х	
SA-17	1	System and Services Acquisition Developer Security Architecture and Design		The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to produce a design specification and security architecture that: a. Is consistent with and supportive of the organization's security architecture which is established within and is an integrated part of the organization's enterprise architecture; b. Accurately and completely describes the required security functionality, and the allocation of security controls among physical and logical components; and c. Expresses how individual security functions, mechanisms, and services work together to provide required security capabilities and a unified approach to protection.	This control is primarily directed at external developers, although it could also be used for internal (in-house) development. In contrast, PL 8 is primarily directed at internal developers to help ensure that organizations develop an information security architecture and such security architecture is integrated or tightly coupled to the enterprise architecture. This distinction is important if when organizations outsource the development of information systems, information systems, components, or information systems services to external entities, and there is a requirement to demonstrate consistency with the organization's enterprise architecture and information security architecture.	PL-8,PM-7,SA-3,SA-8	P1		3	х	
SA-17 (1)		System and Services Acquisition Developer Security Architecture and Design Formal Policy Model		The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to: (a) Produce, as an integral part of the development process, a formal policy model describing the [Assignment: organization-defined elements of organizational security policy] to be enforced; and (b) Prove that the formal policy model is internally consistent and sufficient to enforce the defined elements of the organizational security policy when implemented.	policies). Organizations choose the particular formal modeling language and approach based on the nature of the behaviors/policies to be described and the available tools. Formal modeling tools include, for example, Gypsy and Zed.						
SA-17 (2)	2	System and Services Acquisition Developer Security Architecture and Design Security- Relevant Components		The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to: (a) Define security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware; and (b) Provide a rationale that the definition for security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware is complete.	Security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware represent the portion of the information system, component, or service that must be trusted to perform correctly in order to maintain required security properties.	SA-5					
SA-17 (3)	2	System and Services Acquisition Developer Security Architecture and Design Formal Correspondence		The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to: (a) Produce, as an integral part of the development process, a formal top-level specification that specifies the interfaces to security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware in terms of exceptions, error messages, and effects; (b) Show via proof to the extent feasible with additional informal demonstration as necessary, that the formal top-level specification is consistent with the formal policy model; (c) Show via informal demonstration, that the formal top-level specification completely covers the interfaces to security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware; (d) Show that the formal top-level specification is an accurate description of the implemented security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware mechanisms not addressed in the formal top-level specification but strictly internal to the security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware mechanisms not addressed in the formal top-level specification but strictly internal to the security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware.	correspondence is an important part of the assurance gained through modeling. It demonstrates that the implementation is an occurate transformation of the model, and that any additional code or implementation details present have no impact on the behaviors or policies being modeled. Formal methods can be used to show that the high-level security properties are satisfied by the formal information system description, and that the formal system description is correctly implemented by a description of some lower level, for example a hardware description. Consistency between the formal top-level specification and the formal policy models is generally not amenable to being fully proven. Therefore, a combination of formal/informal methods may be needed to show such consistency. Consistency between the formal top-level specification and the implementation may require the use of an informal demonstration due to limitations in the applicability of formal methods to prove that the specification accurately reflects the implementation. Hardware, software, and firmware mechanisms strictly internal to security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware include, for example, mapping registers and direct memory input/output.	SA-S					

Control ID	Level	Control Name	Withdrawn	Control Text	Supplemental Guidance	Related Controls	Deinsitus		and I		Motor
SA-17 (4)	2	System and Services Acquisition Developer	withthal	The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or	Correspondence is an important part of the assurance gained through modeling. It	SA-5	PHONEY	-OW IV	OU .	mgu	Notes
3/11/ (4)	-	Security Architecture and Design Informal		information system service to:	demonstrates that the implementation is an accurate transformation of the model, and	37.3					
1		Correspondence		(a) Produce, as an integral part of the development process, an informal descriptive top-level	that any additional code or implementation details present has no impact on the behaviors						
1				specification that specifies the interfaces to security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware in							
				terms of exceptions, error messages, and effects;	high-level/low-level design) and the formal policy model is generally not amenable to being						
				(b) Show via [Selection: informal demonstration, convincing argument with formal methods as	fully proven. Therefore, a combination of formal/informal methods may be needed to show						
				feasible] that the descriptive top-level specification is consistent with the formal policy model;	such consistency. Hardware, software, and firmware mechanisms strictly internal to						
				(c) Show via informal demonstration, that the descriptive top-level specification completely	security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware include, for example, mapping						
				covers the interfaces to security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware;	registers and direct memory input/output.						
1				(d) Show that the descriptive top-level specification is an accurate description of the interfaces to							
1				security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware; and							
				(e) Describe the security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware mechanisms not addressed in							
				the descriptive top-level specification but strictly internal to the security-relevant hardware,							
1				software, and firmware.							
1											
SA-17 (5)	2	System and Services Acquisition Developer		The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or		SC-3					
3A-17 (3)	2	Security Architecture and Design Conceptually		information system service to:		30-3					
1		Simple Design		(a) Design and structure the security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware to use a							
1				complete, conceptually simple protection mechanism with precisely defined semantics; and							
1				(b) Internally structure the security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware with specific							
1				regard for this mechanism.							
SA-17 (6)	2	System and Services Acquisition Developer		The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or		SA-11					
		Security Architecture and Design Structure for		information system service to structure security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware to							
		Testing		facilitate testing.							
SA-17 (7)	2	System and Services Acquisition Developer		The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or		AC-5,AC-6					
		Security Architecture and Design Structure for		information system service to structure security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware to							
5. 40		Least Privilege		facilitate controlling access with least privilege.		DE 2 CA 45 TO T	20	\rightarrow	-		
SA-18	1	System and Services Acquisition Tamper Resistance and Detection		The organization implements a tamper protection program for the information system, system component, or information system service.	Anti-tamper technologies and techniques provide a level of protection for critical information systems, system components, and information technology products against a	PE-3,SA-12,SI-7	PO				
		nesistance and Detection		component, or information system service.	number of related threats including modification, reverse engineering, and substitution.						
					Inumber of related threats including modification, reverse engineering, and substitution. Strong identification combined with tamper resistance and/or tamper detection is essential						
1					to protecting information systems, components, and products during distribution and when						
1					in use.						
SA-18 (1)	2	System and Services Acquisition Tamper		The organization employs anti-tamper technologies and techniques during multiple phases in the		SA-3					
		Resistance and Detection Multiple Phases of		system development life cycle including design, development, integration, operations, and	resistance and detection. Organizations employ obfuscation and self-checking, for						
1		SDLC		maintenance.	example, to make reverse engineering and modifications more difficult, time-consuming,						
1					and expensive for adversaries. Customization of information systems and system						
1					components can make substitutions easier to detect and therefore limit damage.						
					· · · · · ·						
SA-18 (2)	2	System and Services Acquisition Tamper		The organization inspects [Assignment: organization-defined information systems, system		SI-4					
1		Resistance and Detection Inspection of		components, or devices] [Selection (one or more): at random; at [Assignment: organization-	applied to mobile devices, notebook computers, or other system components taken out of						
1		Information Systems, Components, or Devices		defined frequency], upon [Assignment: organization-defined indications of need for inspection]] to	organization-controlled areas. Indications of need for inspection include, for example, when						
1				detect tampering.	individuals return from travel to high-risk locations.						
								_			
SA-19	1	System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity		The organization: a. Develops and implements anti-counterfeit policy and procedures that include the means to	Sources of counterfeit components include, for example, manufacturers, developers, vendors, and contractors. Anti-counterfeiting policy and procedures support tamper	PE-3,SA-12,SI-7	PO PO				
1		Authenticity		detect and prevent counterfeit components from entering the information system; and	resistance and provide a level of protection against the introduction of malicious code.						
1				b. Reports counterfeit information system components to [Selection (one or more): source of	External reporting organizations include, for example, US-CERT.						
				counterfeit component; [Assignment: organization-defined external reporting organizations];	External reporting organizations include, for example, 03-certs.						
1					l .						
				[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]].							
SA-19 (1)	2	System and Services Acquisition Component									
SA-19 (1)	2	System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Training		[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]].							
		Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Training		[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]]. The organization trains (Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles) to detect counterfeit information system components (including hardware, software, and firmware).							
SA-19 (1)		Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Training System and Services Acquisition Component		[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]]. The organization trains [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to detect counterfeit information system components (including hardware, software, and firmware). The organization maintains configuration control over [Assignment: organization-defined]							
		Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Training System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Configuration Control for		[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]]. The organization trains [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to detect counterfeit information system components (including hardware, software, and firmware). The organization maintains configuration control over [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] awaiting service/repair and serviced/repaired components							
SA-19 (2)	2	Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Training System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Configuration Control for Component Service / Repair		[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]]. The organization trains [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to detect counterfeit information system components (including hardware, software, and firmware). The organization maintains configuration control over [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] awaiting service/repair and serviced/repaired components awaiting service/repair and serviced/repaired components							
		Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Training System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Configuration Control for Component Service / Repair System and Services Acquisition Component		[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]]. The organization trains [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to detect counterfeit information system components (including hardware, software, and firmware). The organization maintains configuration control over [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] awaiting service/repair and service/depoired components awaiting return to service. The organization disposes of information system components using [Assignment: organization-	Proper disposal of information system components helps to prevent such components from						
SA-19 (2) SA-19 (3)	2	Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Training System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Configuration Control for Component Service Repair System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal		[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]]. The organization trains [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to detect counterfeit information system components (including hardware, software, and firmware). The organization maintains configuration control over [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] awaiting service/repair and serviced/repaired components awaiting return to service. The organization dispose of information system components using [Assignment: organization-defined techniques and methods].	Proper disposal of information system components helps to prevent such components from entering the gray market.						
SA-19 (2)	2	Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Training System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Configuration Control for Component Service / Repoir System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component System and Services Acquisition Component		[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]]. The organization trains [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to detect counterfeit information system components (including hardware, software, and firmware). The organization maintains configuration control over [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] awaiting service/repair and service/depiared components awaiting return to service. The organization disposes of information system components using [Assignment: organization-defined techniques and methods]. The organization scans for counterfeit information system components [Assignment: organization-defined techniques and methods].							
SA-19 (2) SA-19 (3) SA-19 (4)	2 2 2	Authenticity Anti-Counterfieit Training System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Configuration Control for Component Services Repair System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal Authenticity Auth-Counterfiet Scanning		[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]]. The organization trains [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to detect counterfeit information system components (including hardware, software, and firmware). The organization maintains configuration control over [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] awaiting service/repair and serviced/repaired components awaiting return to service. The organization disposes of information system components using [Assignment: organization-defined techniques and methods]. The organization scans for counterfeit information system components [Assignment: organization-defined feetingues and methods].	entering the gray market.	CP-7 SA-8 SA-14	PO				
SA-19 (2) SA-19 (3)	2 2 2	Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Training System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Configuration Control for Component Service Repair System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Scanning System and Services Acquisition Customized System and Services Acquisition Customized		[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]]. The organization trains [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to detect counterfeit information system components (including hardware, software, and firmware). The organization maintains configuration control over [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] awaiting service/repair and service/depoired components awaiting return to service. The organization disposes of information system components using [Assignment: organization-defined techniques and methods]. The organization scans for counterfeit information system components [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	entering the gray market. Organizations determine that certain information system components likely cannot be	CP-2,SA-8,SA-14	PO				
SA-19 (2) SA-19 (3) SA-19 (4)	2 2 2	Authenticity Anti-Counterfieit Training System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Configuration Control for Component Services Repair System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal Authenticity Auth-Counterfiet Scanning		[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]]. The organization trains [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to detect counterfeit information system components (including hardware, software, and firmware). The organization maintains configuration control over [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] awaiting service/repair and serviced/repaired components awaiting return to service. The organization disposes of information system components using [Assignment: organization-defined techniques and methods]. The organization scans for counterfeit information system components [Assignment: organization-defined feetingues and methods].	entering the gray market. Organizations determine that certain information system components likely cannot be trusted due to specific threats to and vulnerabilities in those components, and for which	CP-2,5A-8,5A-14	PO				
SA-19 (2) SA-19 (3) SA-19 (4)	2 2 2	Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Training System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Configuration Control for Component Service Repair System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Scanning System and Services Acquisition Customized System and Services Acquisition Customized		[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]]. The organization trains [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to detect counterfeit information system components (including hardware, software, and firmware). The organization maintains configuration control over [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] awaiting service/repair and service/depoired components awaiting return to service. The organization disposes of information system components using [Assignment: organization-defined techniques and methods]. The organization scans for counterfeit information system components [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	entering the gray market. Organizations determine that certain information system components likely cannot be	CP-2,SA-8,SA-14	PO				
SA-19 (2) SA-19 (3) SA-19 (4)	2 2 2	Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Training System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Configuration Control for Component Service Repair System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Scanning System and Services Acquisition Customized System and Services Acquisition Customized		[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]]. The organization trains [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to detect counterfeit information system components (including hardware, software, and firmware). The organization maintains configuration control over [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] awaiting service/repair and service/depoired components awaiting return to service. The organization disposes of information system components using [Assignment: organization-defined techniques and methods]. The organization scans for counterfeit information system components [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	entering the gray market. Organizations determine that certain information system components likely cannot be trusted due to specific threats to and vulnerabilities in those components, and for which there are no viable security controls to adequately mitigate the resulting risk. Re-	CP-2,SA-8,SA-14	PO				
SA-19 (2) SA-19 (3) SA-19 (4)	2 2 2	Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Training System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Configuration Control for Component Service Repair System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Scanning System and Services Acquisition Customized System and Services Acquisition Customized		[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]]. The organization trains [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to detect counterfeit information system components (including hardware, software, and firmware). The organization maintains configuration control over [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] awaiting service/repair and service/depoired components awaiting return to service. The organization disposes of information system components using [Assignment: organization-defined techniques and methods]. The organization scans for counterfeit information system components [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	entering the gray market. Organizations determine that certain information system components likely cannot be trusted due to specific threats to and vulnerabilities in those components, and for which there are no viable security controls to adequately mitigate the resulting risk. Reinplementation or custom development of such components helps to satisfy requirements for higher assurance. This is accomplished by initiating changes to system components (including hardware, software, and firmware) such that the standard attacks by adversaries	CP-2,SA-8,SA-14	PO				
SA-19 (2) SA-19 (3) SA-19 (4)	2 2 2	Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Training System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Configuration Control for Component Service Repair System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Scanning System and Services Acquisition Customized System and Services Acquisition Customized		[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]]. The organization trains [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to detect counterfeit information system components (including hardware, software, and firmware). The organization maintains configuration control over [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] awaiting service/repair and service/depoired components awaiting return to service. The organization disposes of information system components using [Assignment: organization-defined techniques and methods]. The organization scans for counterfeit information system components [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	entering the groy market. Organizations determine that certain information system components likely cannot be trusted due to specific threats to and vulnerabilities in those components, and for which there are no viable security controls to adequately mitigate the resulting risk. Reimplementation or custom development of such components helps to satisfy requirements for higher assurance. This is accomplished by initiating changes to system components (including hardware, software, and firmware) such that the standard attacks by adversaries are less likely to succeed. in situations where no alternative sourcing is available and	CP-2,5A-8,5A-14	PO				
SA-19 (2) SA-19 (3) SA-19 (4)	2 2 2	Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Training System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Configuration Control for Component Service Repair System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Scanning System and Services Acquisition Customized System and Services Acquisition Customized		[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]]. The organization trains [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to detect counterfeit information system components (including hardware, software, and firmware). The organization maintains configuration control over [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] awaiting service/repair and service/depoired components awaiting return to service. The organization disposes of information system components using [Assignment: organization-defined techniques and methods]. The organization scans for counterfeit information system components [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	entering the gray market. Organizations determine that certain information system components likely cannot be trusted due to specific threats to and vulnerabilities in those components, and for which there are no viable security controls to a dequately mitigate the resulting risk. Reimplementation or custom development of such components flepts to satisfy requirements for higher assurance. This is accomplished by initiating changes to system components (including hardware, software, and firmware) such that the standard stacks by adversaries are less likely to succeed. In situations where no alternative sourcing is available and organizations choose not to re-implement or custom develop critical information system	CP-2,SA-8,SA-14	PO				
SA-19 (2) SA-19 (3) SA-19 (4)	2 2 2	Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Training System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Configuration Control for Component Service Repair System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Scanning System and Services Acquisition Customized System and Services Acquisition Customized		[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]]. The organization trains [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to detect counterfeit information system components (including hardware, software, and firmware). The organization maintains configuration control over [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] awaiting service/repair and service/depoired components awaiting return to service. The organization disposes of information system components using [Assignment: organization-defined techniques and methods]. The organization scans for counterfeit information system components [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	entering the groy market. Organizations determine that certain information system components likely cannot be trusted due to specific threats to and vulnerabilities in those components, and for which there are no viable security controls to adequately mitigate the resulting risk. Re- implementation or custom development of such components helps to satisfy requirements for higher assurance. This is accomplished by initiating changes to system components (including hardware, software, and firmware) such that the standard attacks by adversaries are less likely to succeed. In situations where no alternative sourcing is available and organizations choose not to re-implement or custom develop critical information system components, additional safeguards can be employed (e.g., enhanced auditing, restrictions	CP-2,5A-8,5A-14	PO				
SA-19 (2) SA-19 (3) SA-19 (4)	2 2 2	Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Training System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Configuration Control for Component Service Repair System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Scanning System and Services Acquisition Customized System and Services Acquisition Customized		[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]]. The organization trains [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to detect counterfeit information system components (including hardware, software, and firmware). The organization maintains configuration control over [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] awaiting service/repair and service/depoired components awaiting return to service. The organization disposes of information system components using [Assignment: organization-defined techniques and methods]. The organization scans for counterfeit information system components [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	entering the gray market. Organizations determine that certain information system components likely cannot be trusted due to specific threats to and vulnerabilities in those components, and for which there are no viable security controls to adequately mitigate the resulting risk. Reinplementation or custom development of such components helps to satisfy requirements for higher assurance. This is accomplished by initiating changes to system components (including hardware, software, and firmware) such that the standard stacks by adversaries are less likely to succeed. In situations where no alternative sourcing is available and organizations choose not to re-implement or custom develop critical information system components, additional safeguards can be employed (e.g., enhanced auditing, restrictions on source code and system utility access, and protection from deletion of system and	CP-2,5A-8,5A-14	PO				
SA-19 (2) SA-19 (3) SA-19 (4)	2 2 2	Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Training System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Configuration Control for Component Service Repair System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Scanning System and Services Acquisition Customized System and Services Acquisition Customized		[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]]. The organization trains [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to detect counterfeit information system components (including hardware, software, and firmware). The organization maintains configuration control over [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] awaiting service/repair and service/depoired components awaiting return to service. The organization disposes of information system components using [Assignment: organization-defined techniques and methods]. The organization scans for counterfeit information system components [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	entering the groy market. Organizations determine that certain information system components likely cannot be trusted due to specific threats to and vulnerabilities in those components, and for which there are no viable security controls to adequately mitigate the resulting risk. Re- implementation or custom development of such components helps to satisfy requirements for higher assurance. This is accomplished by initiating changes to system components (including hardware, software, and firmware) such that the standard attacks by adversaries are less likely to succeed. In situations where no alternative sourcing is available and organizations choose not to re-implement or custom develop critical information system components, additional safeguards can be employed (e.g., enhanced auditing, restrictions	CP-2,SA-8,SA-14	PO				
SA-19 (2) SA-19 (3) SA-19 (4) SA-20	2 2 2	Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Training System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Configuration Control for Component Services Repair System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Polymore System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Scanning System and Services Acquisition Customized Development of Critical Components		[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]]. The organization trains [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to detect counterfeit information system components (including hardware, software, and firmware). The organization maintains configuration control over [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] awaiting service/repair and service/drepoired components awaiting return to service. The organization disposes of information system components using [Assignment: organization-defined techniques and methods]. The organization scans for counterfeit information system components [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. The organization re-implements or custom develops [Assignment: organization-defined critical information system components].	organizations determine that certain information system components likely cannot be trusted due to specific threats to and vulnerabilities in those components, and for which there are no viable security controls to adequately mitigate the resulting risk. Reimplementation or custom development of such components helps to satisfy requirements for higher assurance. This is accomplished by initiating changes to system components (including hardware, software, and firmware) such that the standard stacks by adversaries are less likely to succeed. In situations where no alternative sourcing is available and organizations choose not to re-implement or custom develop critical information system components, additional safeguards can be employed (e.g., enhanced auditing, restrictions on source code and system utility access, and protection from deletion of system and application files.		PO				
SA-19 (2) SA-19 (3) SA-19 (4)	2 2 2	Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Training System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Configuration Control for Component Services Repair System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Auth-Counterfeit Scanning System and Services Acquisition Customized Development of Critical Components System and Services Acquisition Poveloper		[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]]. The organization trains [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to detect counterfeit information system components (including hardware, software, and firmware). The organization maintains configuration control over [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] awaiting service/repair and service/depoired components awaiting return to service. The organization disposes of information system components using [Assignment: organization-defined techniques and methods]. The organization scans for counterfeit information system components [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. The organization re-implements or custom develops [Assignment: organization-defined critical information system components].	entering the gray market. Organizations determine that certain information system components likely cannot be trusted due to specific threats to and vulnerabilities in those components, and for which there are no viable security controls to adequately mitigate the resulting risk. Reimplementation or custom development of such components helps to satisfy requirements for higher assurance. This is accomplished by initiating changes to system components (including hardware, software, and firmware) such that the standard stacks by adversaries are less likely to succeed. In situations where no alternative sourcing is available and organizations choose not to re-implement or custom develop critical information system components, additional safeguards can be employed (e.g., enhanced auditing, restrictions on source code and system utility access, and protection from deletion of system and application files. Because the information system, system component, or information system service may be		PO				
SA-19 (2) SA-19 (3) SA-19 (4) SA-20	2 2 2	Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Training System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Configuration Control for Component Services Repair System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Polymore System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Scanning System and Services Acquisition Customized Development of Critical Components		[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]]. The organization trains [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to detect counterfeit information system components (including hardware, software, and firmware). The organization maintains configuration control over [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] awaiting return to service. The organization disposes of information system components using [Assignment: organization-defined techniques and methods]. The organization scans for counterfeit information system components [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. The organization re-implements or custom develops [Assignment: organization-defined critical information system components].	organizations determine that certain information system components likely cannot be trusted due to specific threats to and vulnerabilities in those components, and for which there are no viable security controls to adequately mitigate the resulting risk. Reimplementation or custom development of such components helps to satisfy requirements for higher assurance. This is accomplished by initiating changes to system components (including hardware, software, and firmware) such that the standard stacks by adversaries are less likely to succeed. In situations where no alternative sourcing is available and organizations choose not to re-implement or custom develop critical information system components, additional safeguards can be employed (e.g., enhanced auditing, restrictions on source code and system utility access, and protection from deletion of system and application files. Because the information system, system component, or information system service may be employed in critical activities essential to the national and/or economic security interests of		PO				
SA-19 (2) SA-19 (3) SA-19 (4) SA-20	2 2 2	Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Training System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Configuration Control for Component Services Repair System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Auth-Counterfeit Scanning System and Services Acquisition Customized Development of Critical Components System and Services Acquisition Poveloper		[Assignment: organization rednice] personnel or roles]]. The organization trains [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to detect counterfeit information system components (including hardware, software, and firmware). The organization maintains configuration control over [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] awaiting service/repair and service/depoired components awaiting return to service. The organization disposes of information system components using [Assignment: organization-defined techniques and methods]. The organization scans for counterfeit information system components [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. The organization re-implements or custom develops [Assignment: organization-defined critical information system components]. The organization requires that the developer of [Assignment: organization-defined information system, system component, or information system service].	entering the gray market. Organizations determine that certain information system components likely cannot be trusted due to specific threats to and vulnerabilities in those components, and for which there are no viable security controls to adequately mitigate the resulting risk. Reimplementation or custom development of such components helps to satisfy requirements for higher assurance. This is accomplished by initiating changes to system components (including hardware, software, and firmware) such that the standard stacks by adversaries are less likely to succeed. In situations where no alternative sourcing is available and organizations choose not to re-implement or custom develop critical information system components, additional safeguards can be employed (e.g., enhanced auditing, restrictions on source code and system utility access, and protection from deletion of system and application files. Because the information system, system component, or information system service may be employed in critical activities essential to the national and/or economic security interests of the United States, organizations have a strong interest in ensuring that the developer its.		PO				
SA-19 (2) SA-19 (3) SA-19 (4) SA-20	2 2 2	Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Training System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Configuration Control for Component Services Repair System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Auth-Counterfeit Scanning System and Services Acquisition Customized Development of Critical Components System and Services Acquisition Poveloper		[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]]. The organization trains [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to detect counterfeit information system components (including hardware, software, and firmware). The organization maintains configuration control over [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] awaiting service/eppir and serviced/repoired components owaiting return to service. The organization disposes of information system components using [Assignment: organization-defined techniques and methods]. The organization scans for counterfeit information system components [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. The organization re-implements or custom develops [Assignment: organization-defined critical information system components]. The organization requires that the developer of [Assignment: organization-defined information system, system component, or information system service]: a. Have appropriate access authorizations as determined by assigned [Assignment: organization-defined information system, system component, or information system service]: a. Have appropriate access authorizations as determined by assigned [Assignment: organization-defined difficults] and	entering the groy market. Organizations determine that certain information system components likely cannot be trusted due to specific threats to and vulnerabilities in those components, and for which there are no viable security controls to adequately mitigate the resulting risk. Reimplementation or custom development of such components helps to satisfy requirements for higher assurance. This is accomplished by initiating changes to system components (including hardware, software, and firmware) such that the standard attacks by adversaries are less likely to succeed. In situations where no alternative sourcing is available and organizations choose not to re-implement or custom develop critical information system components, additional sefeguaries can be employed (e.g., enhanced auditing, restrictions on source code and system utility access, and protection from deletion of system and application files. Because the information system, system component, or information system service may be employed in critical activities essential to the national and/or economic security interests of the United States, organizations have a strong interest in ensuring that the developer is trustworthy. The degree of trust required of the developer may need to be consistent with		PO				
SA-19 (2) SA-19 (3) SA-19 (4) SA-20	2 2 2	Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Training System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Configuration Control for Component Services Repair System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Auth-Counterfeit Scanning System and Services Acquisition Customized Development of Critical Components System and Services Acquisition Poveloper		[Assignment: organization rednice] personnel or roles]]. The organization trains [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to detect counterfeit information system components (including hardware, software, and firmware). The organization maintains configuration control over [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] awaiting service/repair and service/depoired components awaiting return to service. The organization disposes of information system components using [Assignment: organization-defined techniques and methods]. The organization scans for counterfeit information system components [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. The organization re-implements or custom develops [Assignment: organization-defined critical information system components]. The organization requires that the developer of [Assignment: organization-defined information system, system component, or information system service].	entering the gray market. Organizations determine that certain information system components likely cannot be trusted due to specific threats to and vulnerabilities in those components, and for which there are no viable security controls to a dequately mitigate the resulting risk. Re- implementation or custom development of such components helps to satisfy requirements for higher assurance. This is accomplished by initiating changes to system components (including hardware, software, and firmware) such that the standard attacks by adversaries are less likely to succeed. In situations where no alternative sourcing is available and organizations choose not to re-implement or custom develop critical information system components, additional safeguards can be employed (e.g., enhanced auditing, restrictions on source code and system utility access, and protection from deletion of system and application files. Because the information system, system component, or information system service may be employed in critical activities essential to the national and/or economic security interests of the United States, organizations have a strong interest in ensuring that the developer its trustworthy. The degree of trust required of the developer may need to be consistent with act of the individuals accessing the information system(component) review or composition which we have the consistent of the developer way need to be consistent with act of the individuals accessing the information system(component) review or composition with act of the individuals accessing the information system components and the developer of the developer may need to be consistent with that of the individuals accessing the information system(component) review or components and the developer and the de		PO				
SA-19 (2) SA-19 (3) SA-19 (4) SA-20	2 2 2	Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Training System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Configuration Control for Component Services Repair System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Auth-Counterfeit Scanning System and Services Acquisition Customized Development of Critical Components System and Services Acquisition Poveloper		[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]]. The organization trains [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to detect counterfeit information system components (including hardware, software, and firmware). The organization maintains configuration control over [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] awaiting service/eppir and serviced/repoired components owaiting return to service. The organization disposes of information system components using [Assignment: organization-defined techniques and methods]. The organization scans for counterfeit information system components [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. The organization re-implements or custom develops [Assignment: organization-defined critical information system components]. The organization requires that the developer of [Assignment: organization-defined information system, system component, or information system service]: a. Have appropriate access authorizations as determined by assigned [Assignment: organization-defined information system, system component, or information system service]: a. Have appropriate access authorizations as determined by assigned [Assignment: organization-defined difficults] and	entering the groy market. Organizations determine that certain information system components likely cannot be trusted due to specific threats to and vulnerabilities in those components, and for which there are no viable security controls to adequately mitigate the resulting risk. Re- implementation or custom development of such components helps to satisfy requirements for higher assurance. This is accomplished by initiating changes to system components (including hardware, software, and firmware) such that the standard stacks by adversaries are less likely to succeed. In situations where no alternative sourcing is available and organizations choose not to re-implement or custom develop critical information system components, additional safeguards can be employed (e.g., enhanced auditing, restrictions on source code and system utility access, and protection from deletion of system and application files. Because the information system, system component, or information system service may be employed in critical activities essential to the national and/or economic security interests of the United States, organizations have a strong interest in ensuring that the developer is trustworthy. The degree of trust required of the developer may need to be consistent with that of the individuals accessing the information system/component/service once deployed. Examples of authorization and personnel screening criteria include clearance, satisfactory		PO				
SA-19 (2) SA-19 (3) SA-19 (4) SA-20	2 2 2	Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Training System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Configuration Control for Component Services Repair System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Auth-Counterfeit Scanning System and Services Acquisition Customized Development of Critical Components System and Services Acquisition Poveloper		[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]]. The organization trains [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to detect counterfeit information system components (including hardware, software, and firmware). The organization maintains configuration control over [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] awaiting service/eppir and serviced/repoired components owaiting return to service. The organization disposes of information system components using [Assignment: organization-defined techniques and methods]. The organization scans for counterfeit information system components [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. The organization re-implements or custom develops [Assignment: organization-defined critical information system components]. The organization requires that the developer of [Assignment: organization-defined information system, system component, or information system service]: a. Have appropriate access authorizations as determined by assigned [Assignment: organization-defined information system, system component, or information system service]: a. Have appropriate access authorizations as determined by assigned [Assignment: organization-defined difficults] and	entering the gray market. Organizations determine that certain information system components likely cannot be trusted due to specific threats to and vulnerabilities in those components, and for which there are no viable security controls to a dequately mitigate the resulting risk. Re- implementation or custom development of such components helps to satisfy requirements for higher assurance. This is accomplished by initiating changes to system components (including hardware, software, and firmware) such that the standard attacks by adversaries are less likely to succeed. In situations where no alternative sourcing is available and organizations choose not to re-implement or custom develop critical information system components, additional safeguards can be employed (e.g., enhanced auditing, restrictions on source code and system utility access, and protection from deletion of system and application files. Because the information system, system component, or information system service may be employed in critical activities essential to the national and/or economic security interests of the United States, organizations have a strong interest in ensuring that the developer its trustworthy. The degree of trust required of the developer may need to be consistent with act of the individuals accessing the information system(component) review or composition which we have the consistent of the developer way need to be consistent with act of the individuals accessing the information system(component) review or composition with act of the individuals accessing the information system components and the developer of the developer may need to be consistent with that of the individuals accessing the information system(component) review or components and the developer and the de		PO				
SA-19 (2) SA-19 (3) SA-19 (4) SA-20	2 2 2	Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Training System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Configuration Control for Component Services Repair System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Auth-Counterfeit Scanning System and Services Acquisition Customized Development of Critical Components System and Services Acquisition Poveloper		[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]]. The organization trains [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to detect counterfeit information system components (including hardware, software, and firmware). The organization maintains configuration control over [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] awaiting service/eppir and serviced/repoired components owaiting return to service. The organization disposes of information system components using [Assignment: organization-defined techniques and methods]. The organization scans for counterfeit information system components [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. The organization re-implements or custom develops [Assignment: organization-defined critical information system components]. The organization requires that the developer of [Assignment: organization-defined information system, system component, or information system service]: a. Have appropriate access authorizations as determined by assigned [Assignment: organization-defined information system, system component, or information system service]: a. Have appropriate access authorizations as determined by assigned [Assignment: organization-defined difficults] and	entering the gray market. Organizations determine that certain information system components likely cannot be trusted due to specific threats to and vulnerabilities in those components, and for which there are no viable security controls to a dequately mitigate the resulting risk. Reinplementation or custom development of such components high to satisfy requirements for higher assurance. This is accomplished by initiating changes to system components (including hardware, software, and firmware) such that the standard stacks by adversaries are less likely to succeed. In situations where no alternative sourcing is available and organizations choose not to re-implement or custom develop critical information system components, additional safeguards can be employed (e.g., enhanced auditing, restrictions on source code and system utility access, and protection from deletion of system and application files. Because the information system, system component, or information system service may be employed in critical activities essential to the national and/or economic security interests of the United States, organizations have a strong interest in ensuring that the developer is trustworthy. The degree of trust required of the developer may need to be consistent with that of the individuals accessing the information system/component/service once deployed. Examples of authorization and personnel screening criteria include clearance, satisfactory background checks, cittlesnish, and nationality. Trustworthniess of developers may also		PO				
SA-19 (2) SA-19 (3) SA-19 (4) SA-20	2 2 2	Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Training System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Configuration Control for Component Services Repair System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Auth-Counterfeit Scanning System and Services Acquisition Customized Development of Critical Components System and Services Acquisition Poveloper		[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]]. The organization trains [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to detect counterfeit information system components (including hardware, software, and firmware). The organization maintains configuration control over [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] awaiting service/eppir and serviced/repoired components owaiting return to service. The organization disposes of information system components using [Assignment: organization-defined techniques and methods]. The organization scans for counterfeit information system components [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. The organization re-implements or custom develops [Assignment: organization-defined critical information system components]. The organization requires that the developer of [Assignment: organization-defined information system, system component, or information system service]: a. Have appropriate access authorizations as determined by assigned [Assignment: organization-defined information system, system component, or information system service]: a. Have appropriate access authorizations as determined by assigned [Assignment: organization-defined difficults] and	entering the groy market. Organizations determine that certain information system components likely cannot be trusted due to specific threats to and vulnerabilities in those components, and for which there are no viable security controls to adequately mitigate the resulting risk. Reimplementation or custom development of such components helps to satisfy requirements for higher assurance. This is accomplished by initiating changes to system components (including hardware, software, and firmware) such that the standard stacks by adversaries are less likely to succeed. In situations where no alternative sourcing is available and organizations choose not to re-implement or custom develop critical information system components, additional safeguards can be employed (e.g., enhanced auditing, restrictions on source code and system utility access, and protection from deletion of system and application files. Because the information system, system component, or information system service may be employed in critical activities essential to the national and/or economic security interests of the United States, organizations have a strong interest in ensuring that the developer is trustworthy. The degree of trust required of the developer may need to be consistent with that of the individuals accessing the information system/component/service once deployed. Examples of authorization and personnel screening criteria include clearance, satisfactory background checks, citizenship, and nationality. Trustworthiness of developers may also include a review and analysis of company ownership and any relationships the company has		PO				
SA-19 (2) SA-19 (3) SA-19 (4) SA-20	2 2 2	Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Training System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Configuration Control for Component Services Repair System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Auth-Counterfeit Scanning System and Services Acquisition Customized Development of Critical Components System and Services Acquisition Poveloper		[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]]. The organization trains [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to detect counterfeit information system components (including hardware, software, and firmware). The organization maintains configuration control over [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] awaiting service/eppir and serviced/repoired components owaiting return to service. The organization disposes of information system components using [Assignment: organization-defined techniques and methods]. The organization scans for counterfeit information system components [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. The organization re-implements or custom develops [Assignment: organization-defined critical information system components]. The organization requires that the developer of [Assignment: organization-defined information system, system component, or information system service]: a. Have appropriate access authorizations as determined by assigned [Assignment: organization-defined information system, system component, or information system service]: a. Have appropriate access authorizations as determined by assigned [Assignment: organization-defined difficults] and	organizations determine that certain information system components likely cannot be trusted due to specific threats to and vulnerabilities in those components, and for which there are no viable security controls to adequately mitigate the resulting risk. Reinplementation or custom development of such components helps to satisfy requirements for higher assurance. This is accomplished by initiating changes to system components (including hardware, software, and firmware) such that the standard stacks by adversaries are less likely to succeed. In situations where no alternative sourcing is available and organizations choose not to re-implement or custom develop critical information system components, additional safeguards can be employed (e.g., enhanced auditing, restrictions on source code and system utility access, and protection from deletion of system and application files. Because the information system, system component, or information system service may be employed in critical activities essential to the national and/or ecromic security interests of the United States, organizations have a strong interest in ensuring that the developer is trustworthy. The degree of trust required of the developer may need to be consistent with that of the individuals accessing the information system/component/service once deployed. Examples of authorization and personnel screening criteria include clearance, satisfactory background checks, citizenship, and nationality. Trustworthiness of developers may also include a review and analysis of company ownership and any relationships the company has with entities potentially affecting the quality/relatibility of the systems, components, or		PO				
SA-19 (2) SA-19 (3) SA-19 (4) SA-20	2 2 2 1 1	Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Training System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Configuration Control for Component Services Repair System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Auth-Counterfeit Scanning System and Services Acquisition Customized Development of Critical Components System and Services Acquisition Developer System and Services Acquisition Developer System and Services Acquisition Developer System and Services Acquisition Developer		IASSignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] . The organization trains Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to detect counterfeit information system components (including hardware, software, and firmware). The organization maintains configuration control over Assignment: organization-defined information system components] awaiting service/repair and serviced/repaired components owniting return to service. The organization disposes of information system components using Assignment: organization-defined techniques and methods . The organization scars for counterfeit information system components Assignment: organization-defined frequency . The organization scars for counterfeit information system components Assignment: organization-defined critical information system components . The organization requires that the developer of Assignment: organization-defined information system, system component, or information system, system component, or information system service : a. Have appropriate access authorizations as determined by assigned Assignment: organization-defined information system, system component, or information-defined additional personnel screening criteria . The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or	entering the gray market. Organizations determine that certain information system components likely cannot be trusted due to specific threats to and vulnerabilities in those components, and for which there are no viable security controls to adequately mitigate the resulting risk. Re- implementation or custom development of such components helps to satisfy requirements for higher assurance. This is accomplished by initiating changes to system components (including hardware, software, and firmware) such that the standard stacks by adversaries are less likely to succeed. In situations where no alternative sourcing is available and organizations choose not to re-implement or custom develop critical information system components, additional safeguards can be employed (e.g., enhanced auditing, restrictions on source code and system utility access, and protection from deletion of system and application files. Because the information system, system component, or information system service may be employed in critical activities essential to the national and/or economic security interests of the United States, organizations have a strong interest in ensuring that the developer is trustworthy. The degree of trust required of the developer may need to be consistent with that of the individuals accessing the information system/component/service once deployed. Examples of authorization and personnel screening criteria include clearance, satisfactory background checks, citizenship, and nationality. Trustworthiness of developers may also include a review and analysis of company ownership and any relationships the company has with entities potentially affecting the quality/reliability of the systems, components, or services being developed. Satisfying required access authorizations and personnel screening criteria includes, for		PO				
SA-19 (2) SA-19 (3) SA-19 (4) SA-20	2 2 2 1 1	Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Training System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Configuration Control for Component Service Repair System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Auth-Counterfeit Scanning System and Services Acquisition Customized Development of Critical Components System and Services Acquisition Developer Screening		[Assignment: organization trains [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to detect counterfeit information system components (including hardware, software, and firmware). The organization maintains configuration control over [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] awaiting service/repair and service/repaired components awaiting return to service. The organization disposes of information system components using [Assignment: organization-defined techniques and methods]. The organization scans for counterfeit information system components [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. The organization re-implements or custom develops [Assignment: organization-defined critical information system components]. The organization requires that the developer of [Assignment: organization-defined information system, system component, or information system, system component organization-defined information system, system component, or information system service]: a. Have appropriate access authorizations as determined by assigned [Assignment: organization-defined information system, system component, or information-defined additional personnel screening criteria].	organizations determine that certain information system components likely cannot be trusted due to specific threats to and vulnerabilities in those components, and for which there are no viable security controls to adequately mitigate the resulting risk. Reinplementation or custom development of such components helps to satisfy requirements for higher assurance. This is accomplished by initiating changes to system components (including hardware, software, and firmware) such that the standard attacks by adversaries are less likely to succeed. In situations where no alternative sourcing is available and organizations choose not to re-implement or custom develop critical information system components, additional safeguards can be employed (e.g., enhanced auditing, restrictions on source code and system utility access, and protection from deletion of system and application files. Because the information system, system component, or information system service may be employed in critical activities seemal to the national and/or economic security interests of the United States, organizations have a strong interest in ensuring that the developer is trustworthy. The degree of trust required of the developer may need to be consistent with that of the individuals accessing the information system/component/service once deployed. Examples of authorization and personnel screening criteria include clearance, satisfactory background checks, citzenship, and nationality. Trustworthiness of developers may also include a review and analysis of company ownership and any relationships the company has with entities potentially affecting the quality/reliability of the systems, components, or services being developed. Satisfying required access authorizations and personnel screening criteria includes, for example, providing a listing of all the individuals authorized to perform development		PO				
SA-19 (2) SA-19 (3) SA-19 (4) SA-20	2 2 2 1 1	Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Training System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Configuration Control for Component Services Repair System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Auth-Counterfeit Scanning System and Services Acquisition Customized Development of Critical Components System and Services Acquisition Developer System and Services Acquisition Developer System and Services Acquisition Developer System and Services Acquisition Developer		IASSignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] . The organization trains Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to detect counterfeit information system components (including hardware, software, and firmware). The organization maintains configuration control over Assignment: organization-defined information system components] awaiting service/repair and serviced/repaired components owniting return to service. The organization disposes of information system components using Assignment: organization-defined techniques and methods . The organization scars for counterfeit information system components Assignment: organization-defined frequency . The organization scars for counterfeit information system components Assignment: organization-defined critical information system components . The organization requires that the developer of Assignment: organization-defined information system, system component, or information system, system component, or information system service : a. Have appropriate access authorizations as determined by assigned Assignment: organization-defined information system, system component, or information-defined additional personnel screening criteria . The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or	organizations determine that certain information system components likely cannot be trusted due to specific threats to and vulnerabilities in those components, and for which there are no viable security controls to adequately mitigate the resulting risk. Reinplementation or custom development of such components helps to satisfy requirements for higher assurance. This is accomplished by initiating changes to system components (including hardware, software, and firmware) such that the standard attacks by adversaries are less likely to succeed. In situations where no alternative sourcing is available and organizations choose not to re-implement or custom develop critical information system components, additional safeguards can be employed (e.g., enhanced auditing, restrictions on source code and system utility access, and protection from deletion of system and application files. Because the information system, system component, or information system service may be employed in critical activities essential to the national and/or economic security interests of the United States, organizations have a strong interest in ensuring that the developer its trustworthy. The degree of trust required of the developer may need to be consistent with that of the individuals accessing the information system/component/service once deployed. Examples of authorization and personnel screening criteria include clearance, satisfactory background checks, citizenship, and nationality. Trustworthiness of developers may also include a review and analysis of company ownership and any relationships the company has with entities potentially affecting the quality/reliability of the systems, components, or services being developed. Sotisfying required access authorizations and personnel screening criteria includes, for example, providing a listing of all the individuols authorized to perform development activities on the selected information system, system component, or information system, system component, or information system, system compo		PO				
SA-19 (2) SA-19 (3) SA-19 (4) SA-20	2 2 2 1 1	Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Training System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Configuration Control for Component Services Repair System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Auth-Counterfeit Scanning System and Services Acquisition Customized Development of Critical Components System and Services Acquisition Developer System and Services Acquisition Developer System and Services Acquisition Developer System and Services Acquisition Developer		[Assignment: organization trains [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to detect counterfeit information system components (including hardware, software, and firmware). The organization maintains configuration control over [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] awaiting service/repair and service/repaired components awaiting return to service. The organization disposes of information system components using [Assignment: organization-defined techniques and methods]. The organization scans for counterfeit information system components [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. The organization re-implements or custom develops [Assignment: organization-defined critical information system components]. The organization requires that the developer of [Assignment: organization-defined information system, system component, or information system, system component organization-defined information system, system component, or information system service]: a. Have appropriate access authorizations as determined by assigned [Assignment: organization-defined information system, system component, or information-defined additional personnel screening criteria].	organizations determine that certain information system components likely cannot be trusted due to specific threats to and vulnerabilities in those components, and for which there are no viable security controls to adequately mitigate the resulting risk. Reinplementation or custom development of such components helps to satisfy requirements for higher assurance. This is accomplished by initiating changes to system components (including hardware, software, and firmware) such that the standard stacks by adversaries are less likely to succeed. In situations where no alternative sourcing is available and organizations choose not to re-implement or custom develop critical information system components, additional safeguards can be employed (e.g., enhanced auditing, restrictions on source code and system utility access, and protection from deletion of system and application files. Because the information system, system component, or information system service may be employed in critical activities essential to the national and/or economic security interests of the United States, organizations have a strong interest in ensuring that the developer is trustworthy. The degree of trust required of the developer may need to be consistent with that of the individuals accessing the information system/component/service once deployed. Examples of authorization and personnel screening criteria include claerance, satisfaction between the information system and any relationships the company has with entities potentially affecting the quality/reliability of the systems, components, or services being developed. Satisfying required access authorizations and personnel screening criteria includes, for example, providing a listing of all the individuals authorized to perform development activities on the selected information system component, or information system.		PO				
5A-19 (2) 5A-19 (3) 5A-19 (4) 5A-20	2 2 2 1 1	Authenticity Anti-Counterfeit Training System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Configuration Control for Component Services Repair System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Component Disposal System and Services Acquisition Component Authenticity Auth-Counterfeit Scanning System and Services Acquisition Customized Development of Critical Components System and Services Acquisition Developer System and Services Acquisition Developer System and Services Acquisition Developer System and Services Acquisition Developer		[Assignment: organization trains [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to detect counterfeit information system components (including hardware, software, and firmware). The organization maintains configuration control over [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] awaiting service/repair and service/repaired components awaiting return to service. The organization disposes of information system components using [Assignment: organization-defined techniques and methods]. The organization scans for counterfeit information system components [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. The organization re-implements or custom develops [Assignment: organization-defined critical information system components]. The organization requires that the developer of [Assignment: organization-defined information system, system component, or information system, system component organization-defined information system, system component, or information system service]: a. Have appropriate access authorizations as determined by assigned [Assignment: organization-defined information system, system component, or information-defined additional personnel screening criteria].	entering the gray market. Organizations determine that certain information system components likely cannot be trusted due to specific threats to and vulnerabilities in those components, and for which there are no viable security controls to adequately mitigate the resulting risk. Reinplementation or custom development of such components helps to satisfy requirements for higher assurance. This is accomplished by initiating changes to system components (including hardware, software, and firmware) such that the standard stacks by adversaries are less likely to succeed. In situations where no alternative sourcing is available and organizations choose not to re-implement or custom develop critical information system components, additional safeguards can be employed (e.g., enhanced auditing, restrictions on source code and system utility access, and protection from deletion of system and application files. Because the information system, system component, or information system service may be employed in critical activities essential to the national and/or economic security interests of the United States, organizations have a strong interest in ensuring that the developer is trustworthy. The degree of trust required of the developer may need to be consistent with that of the individuals accessing the information system/component/service once deployed. Examples of authorization and personnel screening criteria include clearance, satisfactory background checks, citizenship, and nationality. Trustworthiness of developers may also include a review and analysis of company ownership and any relationships the company has with entities potentially affecting the quality/reliability of the systems, components, or services being developed. Sotisfying required access authorizations and personnel screening criteria includes, for example, providing a listing of all the individuols authorized to perform development activities on the selected information system, system component, or information system, system component, or informa		PO				

Control ID	l acced	Control None	h dan	Control Tout	Considerated Coldenses	Bullate d Controlla	Delenates.			·	Notes
SA-22	1	Control Name With System and Services Acquisition Unsupported	nurawn	Control Text The organization:	Supplemental Guidance Support for information system components includes for example, software patches	Related Controls PL-2.SA-3	Priority P0	Low	wiola Hi	ig(i)	Notes
JA-22		System Components		a. Replaces information system components when support for the components is no longer	firmware updates, replacement parts, and maintenance contracts. Unsupported	F L-2,3M-3	1.0				
		System components		a. Replaces information system components when support for the components is no longer available from the developer, vendor, or manufacturer; and	components (e.g., when vendors are no longer providing critical software patches), provide		l				
				b. Provides justification and documents approval for the continued use of unsupported system	a substantial opportunity for adversaries to exploit new weaknesses discovered in the		l				
				components required to satisfy mission/business needs.	currently installed components. Exceptions to replacing unsupported system components						
					may include, for example, systems that provide critical mission/business capability where						
					newer technologies are not available or where the systems are so isolated that installing						
					replacement components is not an option.						
SA-22 (1)	2	System and Services Acquisition Unsupported		The organization provides [Selection (one or more): in-house support; [Assignment: organization-	This control enhancement addresses the need to provide continued support for selected						
	-	System Components Alternative Sources for		defined support from external providers]] for unsupported information system components.	information system components that are no longer supported by the original developers,						
		Continued Support			vendors, or manufacturers when such components remain essential to mission/business						
					operations. Organizations can establish in-house support, for example, by developing						
					customized patches for critical software components or secure the services of external						
					providers who through contractual relationships, provide ongoing support for the						
					designated unsupported components. Such contractual relationships can include, for example, Open Source Software value-added vendors.						
					example, Open Source Software value-daded veridors.						
SC	0	System and Communications Protection									
SC-1	1	System and Communications Protection System		The organization:	This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective	PM-9	P1	x :	x x		
		and Communications Protection Policy and		a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or	implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the SC family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws. Executive Orders, directives.						
		Procedures		roles]: a.1. A system and communications protection policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles,	regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at						
				responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and	the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures						
				compliance: and	unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy						
				a.2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the system and communications protection	for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the						
				policy and associated system and communications protection controls; and	complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security						
				b. Reviews and updates the current:	program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk						
				b.1. System and communications protection policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];	management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.						
				h 2 Sustain and communications protection procedures [Assignment: exemination defend							
				 b.2. System and communications protection procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. 							
SC-2	1	System and Communications Protection		The information system separates user functionality (including user interface services) from	Information system management functionality includes, for example, functions necessary to	SA-4,SA-8,SC-3	P1		х х		
	•	Application Partitioning		information system management functionality.	administer databases, network components, workstations, or servers, and typically requires				ľ		
					privileged user access. The separation of user functionality from information system		l				
					management functionality is either physical or logical. Organizations implement separation						
					of system management-related functionality from user functionality by using different						
					computers, different central processing units, different instances of operating systems,						
					different network addresses, virtualization techniques, or combinations of these or other						
					methods, as appropriate. This type of separation includes, for example, web administrative interfaces that use separate authentication methods for users of any other information						
					system resources. Separation of system and user functionality may include isolating						
					administrative interfaces on different domains and with additional access controls.						
	-	S. T.			This state is a second	16.3		\vdash			
SC-2 (1)	2	System and Communications Protection Application Partitioning Interfaces for Non-		The information system prevents the presentation of information system management-related functionality at an interface for non-privileged users.	This control enhancement ensures that administration options (e.g., administrator privileges) are not available to general users (including prohibiting the use of the grey-out	AC-3					
		Privileged Users		January 2. on merjoce jor non princegeo osers.	option commonly used to eliminate accessibility to such information). Such restrictions						
		.5			include, for example, not presenting administration options until users establish sessions						
					with administrator privileges.						
SC-3	1	System and Communications Protection		The information system isolates security functions from nonsecurity functions.	The information system isolates security functions from nonsecurity functions by means of			1 T	х	T	
		Security Function Isolation			an isolation boundary (implemented via partitions and domains). Such isolation controls	5,SA-8,SA-13,SC-2,SC- 7.SC-39					
					access to and protects the integrity of the hardware, software, and firmware that perform those security functions. Information systems implement code separation (i.e., separation	7,5C-39					
					of security functions from nonsecurity functions) in a number of ways, including, for						
					example, through the provision of security kernels via processor rings or processor modes.						
					For non-kernel code, security function isolation is often achieved through file system						
					protections that serve to protect the code on disk, and address space protections that						
					protect executing code. Information systems restrict access to security functions through						
					the use of access control mechanisms and by implementing least privilege capabilities.						
					While the ideal is for all of the code within the security function isolation boundary to only						
					contain security-relevant code, it is sometimes necessary to include nonsecurity functions within the isolation boundary as an exception.						
								\sqcup			
SC-3 (1)	2	System and Communications Protection Security		The information system utilizes underlying hardware separation mechanisms to implement	Underlying hardware separation mechanisms include, for example, hardware ring						
		Function Isolation Hardware Separation		security function isolation.	architectures, commonly implemented within microprocessors, and hardware-enforced						
					address segmentation used to support logically distinct storage objects with separate attributes (i.e., readable, writeable).						
SC-3 (2)	2	System and Communications Protection Security		The information system isolates security functions enforcing access and information flow control				\vdash			
		Function Isolation Access / Flow Control		from nonsecurity functions and from other security functions.	scanned and monitored. Security functions that are potentially isolated from access and						
		Functions			flow control enforcement functions include, for example, auditing, intrusion detection, and						
					anti-virus functions.			\vdash			
SC-3 (3)	2	System and Communications Protection Security Function Isolation Minimize Nonsecurity		The organization minimizes the number of nonsecurity functions included within the isolation	In those instances where it is not feasible to achieve strict isolation of nonsecurity functions						
		Function Isolation Minimize Nonsecurity Functionality		boundary containing security functions.	from security functions, it is necessary to take actions to minimize the nonsecurity-relevant functions within the security function boundary. Nonsecurity functions contained within the						
		runctionality			isolation boundary are considered security-relevant because errors or maliciousness in such						
					software, by virtue of being within the boundary, can impact the security functions of						
					organizational information systems. The design objective is that the specific portions of						
					information systems providing information security are of minimal size/complexity.						
					Minimizing the number of nonsecurity functions in the security-relevant components of						
					information systems allows designers and implementers to focus only on those functions						
					which are necessary to provide the desired security capability (typically access						
					enforcement). By minimizing nonsecurity functions within the isolation boundaries, the						
					amount of code that must be trusted to enforce security policies is reduced, thus contributing to understandability.						
SC-3 (4)	2	System and Communications Protection Security		The organization implements security functions as largely independent modules that maximize	The reduction in inter-module interactions helps to constrain security functions and to						
		Function Isolation Module Coupling and Cohesiveness		internal cohesiveness within modules and minimize coupling between modules.	manage complexity. The concepts of coupling and cohesion are important with respect to modularity in software design. Coupling refers to the dependencies that one module has on		l				
		CONCURCIESS			other modules. Cohesion refers to the relationship between the different functions within a						
					particular module. Good software engineering practices rely on modular decomposition,						
					layering, and minimization to reduce and manage complexity, thus producing software						
					modules that are highly cohesive and loosely coupled.	1					
		i l				1	l .	1	- 1		

Control ID	Level	Control Name	Withdrawn	Control Text	Supplemental Guidance	Related Controls	Priority	Low N	And High	Notes
SC-3 (5)	2	System and Communications Protection Security	vicialawii	The organization implements security functions as a layered structure minimizing interactions	The implementation of layered structures with minimized interactions among security	nelated controls	THOM,		ioa iiigii	notes
		Function Isolation Layered Structures		between layers of the design and avoiding any dependence by lower layers on the functionality or correctness of higher layers.	functions and non-looping layers (i.e., lower-layer functions do not depend on higher-layer functions) further enables the isolation of security functions and management of					
SC-4	1	System and Communications Protection Information in Shared Resources		The information system prevents unauthorized and unintended information transfer via shared system resources.	complexity. This control prevents information, including encrypted representations of information, produced by the actions of prior users/roles for the actions of processes acting on behalf of prior users/roles from being available to any current users/roles (or current processes) that obtain access to shared system resources (e.g., registers, main memory, hard disks) after tobar ensources have been released back to information systems. The control of information in shared resources is also commonly referred to as object reuse and residual information in shared resources is also commonly referred to as object reuse and residual information protection. This control does not address: (i) information remanence which refers to residual representation of data that has been nominally erased or removed; (ii) covert channels (including storage and/or timing channels) where shared resources are manipulated to violate information flow restrictions; or (iii) components within information systems for which there are only single users/roles.	AC-3,AC-4,MP-6	P1	x	x	
SC-4 (1)	2	System and Communications Protection Information in Shared Resources Security Levels	Х							[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-4]
SC-4 (2)	2	System and Communications Protection Information in Shared Resources Periods Processing		The information system prevents unauthorized information transfer via shared resources in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined procedures] when system processing explicitly switches between different information classification levels or security categories.	This control enhancement applies when there are explicit changes in information processing levels during information system operations, for example, during multilevel rocessing and periods processing with information at different classification levels or security categories. Organization-defined procedures may include, for example, approved sanitization processes for electronically stored information.					
SC-5	1	System and Communications Protection Denial of Service Protection		The information system protects against or limits the effects of the following types of denial of service attacks: [Assignment: organization-defined types of denial of service attacks or references to sources for such information] by employing [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards].	A variety of technologies exist to limit, or in some cases, eliminate the effects of denial of service attacks. For example, boundary protection devices can filter certain types of packets to protect information system components on internal organization networks from being directly affected by denial of service attacks. Employing increased capacity and bandwidth combined with service redundancy may also reduce the susceptibility to denial of service attacks.	SC-6,SC-7	P1	x x	х	
SC-5 (1)	2	System and Communications Protection Denial of Service Protection Restrict Internal Users		The information system restricts the ability of individuals to launch (Assignment: organization- defined denial of service attacks) against other information systems.	Restricting the ability of individuals to launch denial of service attacks requires that the mechanisms used for such attacks are unavailable. Individuals of concern can include, for example, hostile insiders or external adversaries that have successfully breached the information system and are using the system as a platform to launch cyber attacks on third parties. Organizations can restrict the ability of individuals to connect and transmit arbitrary information on the transport medium (i.e., network, wireless spectrum). Organizations can also limit the ability of individuals to use excessive information system resources. Protection against individuals having the ability to launch denial of service attacks may be implemented on specific information systems or an boundary devices prohibiting egress to potential target systems.					
SC-5 (2)	2	System and Communications Protection Denial of Service Protection Excess Capacity / Bandwidth / Redundancy		The information system manages excess capacity, bandwidth, or other redundancy to limit the effects of information flooding denial of service attacks.	Managing excess capacity ensures that sufficient capacity is available to counter flooding attacks. Managing excess capacity may include, for example, establishing selected usage priorities, quotas, or partitioning.					
SC-5 (3)	2	System and Communications Protection Denial of Service Protection Detection / Monitoring		The organization: (a) Employs [Assignment: organization-defined monitoring tools] to detect indicators of denial of service attacks against the information system; and (b) Monitors [Assignment: organization-defined information system resources] to determine if sufficient resources exist to prevent effective denial of service attacks.	Organizations consider utilization and capacity of information system resources when managing risk from denial of service due to malicious attacks. Denial of service attacks can originate from external or internal sources. Information system resources sensitive to denial of service include, for example, physical disk storage, memory, and CPU cycles. Common sofgewards to prevent denial of service attacks related to storage utilization and capacity include, for example, instituting disk quotas, configuring information systems to automatically alert administrators when specific storage capacity thresholds are reached, using file compression technologies to maximize available storage space, and imposing separate partitions for system and user data.	CA-7,SI-4				
SC-6	1	System and Communications Protection Resource Availability		The information system protects the availability of resources by allocating [Assignment: organization-defined resources] by [Selection (one or more); priority; quota; [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards]].	Priority protection helps prevent lower-priority processes from delaying or interfering with the information system servicing any higher-priority processes. Quotas prevent users or processes from obtaining more than predetermined amounts of resources. This control does not apply to information system components for which there are only single users/roles.		PO			
SC-7	1	System and Communications Protection Boundary Protection		The information system: a. Monitors and controls communications at the external boundary of the system and at key internal boundaries within the system; b. Implements subnetworks for publicly accessible system components that are [Selection: physically, logically] separated from internal organizational networks; and c. Connects to external networks or information systems only through managed interfaces consisting of boundary protection devices arranged in accordance with an organizational security architecture.	Managed interfaces include, for example, gateways, routers, firewalls, guards, network-based malicious code analysis and virtualization systems, or encrypted tunnels implemented within a security architecture (e.g., routers protecting firewalls or application gateways residing on protected subnetworks). Subnetworks that are physically or logically separated from internal networks are referred to as demilitared zones or DNAS. Restricting or prohibiting external web traffic to designated web servers within managed interfaces and prohibiting external veb traffic to designated web servers within managed interfaces and prohibiting external veb raffic to designated web servers within managed interfaces and prohibiting external veb raffic to designated web servers within managed interfaces and implementation of security controls associated with the use of such services. Commercial telecommunications services are commonly based on network components and consolidated management systems shared by all attached commercial customers, and may also include third party-provided access lines and other service elements. Such transmission services may represent sources of increased risk despite contract security provisions.	AC-4,AC-17,CA-3,CM-7,CP-8,IR-4,RA-3,SC-5,SC-13	P1	x x	x	
SC-7 (1)	2	System and Communications Protection Boundary Protection Physically Separated Subnetworks	Х							[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-7]
SC-7 (2)	2	System and Communications Protection Boundary Protection Public Access	Х					$\sqcup \bot$		[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-7]
SC-7 (3)	2	System and Communications Protection Boundary Protection Access Points		The organization limits the number of external network connections to the information system.	Limiting the number of external network connections facilitates more comprehensive monitoring of inbound and outbound communications traffic. The Trusted Internet Connection (TIC) initiative is an example of limiting the number of external network connections.			X	X	

Section and Communication Protection Protection External relations Protection Protection External relations Protection	Priority		X 2	x x x	[Withdrawn: Incorporate	rd into SC-7 (18))
Society Protection External			x 2	x	(Withdrawn: Incorporate	rd into SC-7 (18)]
Boundary Protection Dany by Opdiquit / Allow by Exception Lev, day by Opdiquit / Allow by Exception Lev, day of Internation striffs (by exception) Lev, day of Internation string (by exception) Lev, day of Internation striffs (by exception device, and provided internation			x ;	x	[Withdrawn: Incorporate	rd into SC-7 (18))
Source Protection Response to Recognized Solitors Society System and Communications Protection The information system, in conjunction with a remote device, prevents the device from Soundary Protection Prevent Split Funneling for Remote Devices This control enhancement is implemented within remote devices (e.g., notebook computers) through configuration settings from being readly configurable by such This source device, and spreading the device between settings that allows through a configuration settings from being readly configurable by such This split tunneling of configuration settings from being readly configurable by such This split tunneling of configuration settings from being readly configurable by such This split tunneling of configuration settings from being readly configurable by such This split tunneling of configuration settings from being readly configurable by such This split tunneling of configuration settings that the split tunneling of configuration settings that the configuration is provided by a probabiling the connection of the remote device, and by probabiling the connection of the remote device, and by probabiling the connection of the remote device is using split tunneling. Split tunneling in provided tunneling in provided provided in the provided provided in the provided provided provided in the provided provided in the provided provided in the provided provid			x ;	x	[Withdrawn: Incorporate	nd into SC-7 (18)]
Source of Prevent Split Tunneling for Remote Devices simultaneously establishing non-remote connections with the system and communications is implemented within the information system by the detection of split tunneling of configuration settings to disable split tunneling in the remote device, and by prohibiting the connection if the remote device is using split tunneling. Split tunneling might be desirable by remote users to communicate with local information system resources such as printerly life servers. However, split tunneling might be desirable by remote users of communications which local information system resources such as printerly life servers. However, split tunneling might be desirable by remote users of the connection in system resources such as printerly life servers. However, split tunneling might be desirable by remote users of the connection of the explitation of a system resources such as printerly life servers. However, split tunneling might be desirable by remote users of the connections of the explitation of a system resources such as printerly life servers. However, split tunneling might be desirable by remote users of the connection of the explitation of a system resources such as printerly life servers. However, split tunneling might be desirable to communications with a sufficient observable by remote users of the connections, when adequately provisioned VPM does not eliminate the need for preventing split tunneling. SC-7 (8) 2 System and Communications Protection The information system routes Assignment: organization-defined external networks] through authenticated proxy server are evaluated to manage complexity on the proxy server is a server in specific proxy server are evaluated to manage complexity on the proxy server is a server organization of proxy server are evaluated to manage complexity on the proxy server are evaluated to manage complexity on the proxy server are evaluated to manage complexity on the proxy server are evaluated to manage complexity on to the proxy se			, ,	x		
Boundary Protection Route Traffic to Authenticated Proxy Servers Le, information system or application) that acts as an intermediary for clients requesting information system ever evaluated to manage complexity and to provide addition to the proxy server are evaluated to manage complexity and to provide addition to the proxy server are evaluated to manage complexity and to provide additional protection by limiting direct connectivity. Web content filtering devices are one of the most common proxy servers providing access to the Internet. Proxy servers support logging individual Transmission Control Protection Bottom Protection Bottom Protection Restrict Threatening Outgoing Communications Traffic Sc-7 (9) 2 System and Communications Protection			3	х		
Boundary Protection Restrict Threatening Outgoing Communications Traffic Outgoing Communications Traffic Outgoing Communications Traffic Operation Systems Sy						
Boundary Protection Restrict Threatening Outgoing Communications Traffic Outgoing Communications Traffic Outgoing Communications Traffic Operation Systems Sy		1 1				
denial of service attacks and traffic containing malicious code.						
Sc-7 (10) 2 System and Communications Protection Behavior prevent Unauthorized explitration of information across managed interfaces. Suffiguration information systems include, for example: (i) strict adherence to protocol formats; (ii) monitoring of be devanting from information systems; (iii) monitoring and reassembling packet headers; and (iv) employing traffic profile analysis to detect deviations from the volume/types of traffic expected within arganizations or call backs to command and control centers. Pewices enforcing strict adherence to protocol formats include, for example, deep packet inspection firewalls and XML gateways. These devices very by adherence to protocol formats and specification at the application layer and serve to identify vulnerabilities that cannot be detected by evices operating at the network or transport layers. This control enhancement is closely associated with cross-domain solutions and system guards enforcing information flow requirements.						
Sc-7 (11) 2 System and Communications Protection The information system only allows incoming communications from [Assignment: organization—defined authorized for authorized for a defined authorized sources] to be routed to [Assignment: organization—defined authorized authorized for a defined authorized sources] to be routed to [Assignment: organization—defined authorized authorized for a several floations from floating for a several floations floating floa						
Sc-7 (12) 2 System and Communications Protection The organization implements [Assignment: organization-defined host-based boundary protection Host-based boundary protection mechanisms include, for example, host-based firewalls. Information system components employing host-based boundary protection mechanisms include, for example, host-based boundary protection mechanisms include for example, host-based boundary protection mechanisms include for example,						
SC-7 (13) 2 System and Communications Protection The organization isolates [Assignment: organization-defined information security tools, Boundary Protection Isolation of Security Tools / Mechanisms / Support Components The organization isolates [Assignment: organization-defined information security tools, mechanisms, and support components] from other internal information system components by implementing physically separate subnetworks with managed interfaces to other components of the system. SA-8,SC-2,SC-3						
Sc-7 (14) 2 System and Communications Protection Boundary Protection Protects Against Unauthorized Physical Connections Unauthorized Physi						
SC-7 (15) 2 System and Communications Protection The information system routes all networked, privileged accesses through a dedicated, managed Boundary Protection Route Privileged Network Accesses Accesses Accesses						

						Related Controls					
SC-7 (16)	Level	Control Name Wi System and Communications Protection	thdrawn	Control Text	Supplemental Guidance This control enhancement protects network addresses of information system components	Related Controls	Priority	Low P	vlod H	ligh	Notes
30-7 (10)	2	Boundary Protection Prevent Discovery of		The information system prevents discovery of specific system components composing a managed interface.	that are part of managed interfaces from discovery through common tools and techniques						
		Components / Devices		interjuce.	used to identify devices on networks. Network addresses are not available for discovery						
		components y Bevices			(e.g., network address not published or entered in domain name systems), requiring prior						
					knowledge for access. Another obfuscation technique is to periodically change network						
					addresses.						
SC-7 (17)	2	System and Communications Protection		The information system enforces adherence to protocol formats.	Information system components that enforce protocol formats include, for example, deep	SC-4					
	_	Boundary Protection Automated Enforcement of		, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	packet inspection firewalls and XML gateways. Such system components verify adherence						
		Protocol Formats			to protocol formats/specifications (e.g., IEEE) at the application layer and identify						
					significant vulnerabilities that cannot be detected by devices operating at the network or						
					transport layers.						
SC-7 (18)	2	System and Communications Protection		The information system fails securely in the event of an operational failure of a boundary	Fail secure is a condition achieved by employing information system mechanisms to ensure	CP-2 SC-24		_	×		
50 / (10)	-	Boundary Protection Fail Secure		protection device.	that in the event of operational failures of boundary protection devices at managed	2,30 24					
					interfaces (e.g., routers, firewalls, guards, and application gateways residing on protected						
					subnetworks commonly referred to as demilitarized zones), information systems do not						
					enter into unsecure states where intended security properties no longer hold. Failures of						
					boundary protection devices cannot lead to, or cause information external to the devices to						
					enter the devices, nor can failures permit unauthorized information releases.						
					enter the devices, nor can junares permit andathorized injornation releases.						
SC-7 (19)	2	System and Communications Protection		The information system blocks both inbound and outbound communications traffic between	Communication clients independently configured by end users and external service			+			
50 / (15)	-	Boundary Protection Blocks Communication from		[Assignment: organization-defined communication clients] that are independently configured by	providers include, for example, instant messaging clients. Traffic blocking does not apply to						
		Non-Organizationally Configured Hosts		end users and external service providers.	communication clients that are configured by organizations to perform authorized						
		Non-organizationally configured nosts		end users and external service providers.	functions.						
SC-7 (20)	2	System and Communications Protection		The information system provides the capability to dynamically isolate/segregate [Assignment:	The capability to dynamically isolate or segregate certain internal components of			-			
30-7 (20)	-	Boundary Protection Dynamic Isolation /		organization-defined information system components] from other components of the system.	organizational information systems is useful when it is necessary to partition or separate	1			- 1		
		Seareaation		organization-acjinea injorniation system components) from other components of the system.	certain components of dubious oriain from those components possessina areater						
		Segregation				1			- 1		
					trustworthiness. Component isolation reduces the attack surface of organizational information systems. Isolation of selected information system components is also a means	1			- 1		
							1				
					of limiting the damage from successful cyber attacks when those attacks occur.		1				
SC-7 (21)		Control of		The second of th		CA-9.SC-3		\vdash	- 1.	,	
SC-7 (21)	2	System and Communications Protection		The organization employs boundary protection mechanisms to separate [Assignment:		CM-9,3C-3			X	١	
		Boundary Protection Isolation of Information		organization-defined information system components] supporting [Assignment: organization-	and/or business functions. Such isolation limits unauthorized information flows among						
		System Components		defined missions and/or business functions].	system components and also provides the opportunity to deploy greater levels of						
					protection for selected components. Separating system components with boundary						
					protection mechanisms provides the capability for increased protection of individual						
					components and to more effectively control information flows between those components.						
					This type of enhanced protection limits the potential harm from cyber attacks and errors.						
					The degree of separation provided varies depending upon the mechanisms chosen.						
					Boundary protection mechanisms include, for example, routers, gateways, and firewalls						
					separating system components into physically separate networks or subnetworks, cross-						
					domain devices separating subnetworks, virtualization techniques, and encrypting						
					information flows among system components using distinct encryption keys.						
SC-7 (22)	2	System and Communications Protection		The information system implements separate network addresses (i.e., different subnets) to	Decomposition of information systems into subnets helps to provide the appropriate level						
		Boundary Protection Separate Subnets for		connect to systems in different security domains.	of protection for network connections to different security domains containing information						
		Connecting to Different Security Domains			with different security categories or classification levels.						
SC-7 (23)	2	System and Communications Protection		The information system disables feedback to senders on protocol format validation failure.	Disabling feedback to senders when there is a failure in protocol validation format prevents						
		Boundary Protection Disable Sender Feedback on			adversaries from obtaining information which would otherwise be unavailable.						
		Protocol Validation Failure									
SC-8	1	System and Communications Protection		The information system protects the [Selection (one or more): confidentiality; integrity] of	This control applies to both internal and external networks and all types of information	AC-17,PE-4	P1		x x	(
		Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity		transmitted information.	system components from which information can be transmitted (e.g., servers, mobile						
					devices, notebook computers, printers, copiers, scanners, facsimile machines).						
					Communication paths outside the physical protection of a controlled boundary are exposed						
					to the possibility of interception and modification. Protecting the confidentiality and/or						
					integrity of organizational information can be accomplished by physical means (e.g., by						
					employing protected distribution systems) or by logical means (e.g., employing encryption						
					techniques). Organizations relying on commercial providers offering transmission services as						
					commodity services rather than as fully dedicated services (i.e., services which can be highly						
					specialized to individual customer needs), may find it difficult to obtain the necessary						
					assurances regarding the implementation of needed security controls for transmission						
					confidentiality/integrity. In such situations, organizations determine what types of	1			- 1		
					confidentiality/integrity services are available in standard, commercial telecommunication						
					service packages. If it is infeasible or impractical to obtain the necessary security controls						
					and assurances of control effectiveness through appropriate contracting vehicles,	1			- 1		
					organizations implement appropriate compensating security controls or explicitly accept the	1			- 1		
					additional risk.						
					additional risk.		1				
SC-8 (1)	2	System and Communications Protection		The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to [Selection (one or more):	Encrypting information for transmission protects information from unauthorized disclosure	SC-13		,	(x	(
220(1)	_	Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity		prevent unauthorized disclosure of information; detect changes to information) during	and modification. Cryptographic mechanisms implemented to protect information integrity			ľ	l^		
		Cryptographic or Alternate Physical Protection		transmission unless otherwise protected by [Assignment: organization-defined alternative	include, for example, cryptographic hash functions which have common application in						
		- , p g. aprile of riteriote Filysical Florection		physical safequards].	digital signatures, checksums, and message authentication codes. Alternative physical						
		1		p,	security safeguards include, for example, protected distribution systems.						
					protected distribution systems.						
						AU-10		+			
SC-0 /21	2	Sustem and Communications Protection I		The information system maintains the [Selection Jone or more]: confidentiality intervity of	Information can be either unintentionally or maliciously disclosed or modified decises						
SC-8 (2)	2	System and Communications Protection Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity Pre /		The information system maintains the [Selection (one or more): confidentiality; integrity] of	Information can be either unintentionally or maliciously disclosed or modified during	' '					
SC-8 (2)	2	Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity Pre /		The information system maintains the [Selection (one or more): confidentiality; integrity] of information during preparation for transmission and during reception.	preparation for transmission or during reception including, for example, during						
SC-8 (2)	2			The information system maintains the [Selection (one or more): confidentiality; integrity] of information during preparation for transmission and during reception.	preparation for transmission or during reception including, for example, during aggregation, at protocol transformation points, and during packing/unpacking. These						
SC-8 (2)	2	Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity Pre /		The information system maintains the [Selection (one or more): confidentiality; integrity] of information during preparation for transmission and during reception.	preparation for transmission or during reception including, for example, during aggregation, at protocol transformation points, and during packing/unpacking. These unauthorized disclosures or modifications compromise the confidentiality or integrity of the						
		Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity Pre / Post Transmission Handling		information during preparation for transmission and during reception.	preparation for transmission or during reception including, for example, during aggregation, at protocol transformation points, and during packing/unpacking. These unauthorized disclosures or modifications compromise the confidentiality or integrity of the information.						
SC-8 (2)		Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity Pre / Post Transmission Handling System and Communications Protection		Information during preparation for transmission and during reception. The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect message externals	preparation for transmission or during reception includina, for example, during aggregation, at protocal transformation points, and during packing/unpacking. These unauthorized disclosures or modifications compromise the confidentiality or integrity of the information. This control enhancement addresses protection against unauthorized disclosure of	SC-12,SC-13					
		Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity Pre / Post Transmission Handling System and Communications Protection Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity		information during preparation for transmission and during reception.	preparation for transmission or during reception includina, for example, during oggregation, at protocol transformation points, and during packing/unpacking. These unauthorized disclosures or modifications compromise the confidentiality or integrity of the information. This control enhancement addresses protection against unauthorized disclosure of information. Message externals include, for example, message headers/routing						
		Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity Pre / Post Transmission Handling System and Communications Protection		Information during preparation for transmission and during reception. The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect message externals	preparation for transmission or during reception including, for example, during agregation, a protocal transformation points, and during packing/inpacking. These unauthorized disclosures or modifications compromise the confidentiality or integrity of the information. This control enhancement addresses protection against unauthorized disclosure of information. Message externals include, for example, message headers/routing information. This control enhancement prevents the exploitation of message externals and						
		Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity Pre / Post Transmission Handling System and Communications Protection Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity		Information during preparation for transmission and during reception. The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect message externals	preparation for transmission or during reception includina, for example, during aggregation, at protocal transformation points, and during packing/unpacking. These unauthorized disclosures or modifications compromise the confidentiality or integrity of the information. This control enhancement addresses protection against unauthorized disclosure of information. Message externals include, for example, message headers/routing information. This control enhancement prevents the exploitation of message externals and applies to both internal and external networks or links that may be visible to individuals						
		Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity Pre / Post Transmission Handling System and Communications Protection Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity		Information during preparation for transmission and during reception. The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect message externals	preparation for transmission or during reception including, for example, during agregation, a protocal transprendito points, and during packing/inpacking. These unauthorized disclosures or modifications compromise the confidentiality or integrity of the information. This control enhancement addresses protection against unauthorized disclosure of information. Message externals include, for example, message headers/routing information. This control enhancement prevents the exploitation of message externals and applies to both internal and external networks or links that may be visible to individuals who are not authorized users. Header/routing information is sometimes transmitted						
		Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity Pre / Post Transmission Handling System and Communications Protection Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity		Information during preparation for transmission and during reception. The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect message externals	preparation for transmission or during reception includina, for example, during aggregation, at protocal transformation points, and during packing/inapacking. These unauthorized disclosures or modifications compromise the confidentiality or integrity of the information. This control enhancement addresses protection against unauthorized disclosure of information. Message externals include, for example, message headers/routing information. This control enhancement prevents the exploitation of message externals and applies to both internal and external networks or links that may be visible to individuals who are not authorized users. Header/routing information is sometimes transmitted unencrypted because the information is not properly identified by organizations so having						
		Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity Pre / Post Transmission Handling System and Communications Protection Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity		Information during preparation for transmission and during reception. The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect message externals	preparation for transmission or during reception including, for example, during agregation, a protocal transpromation points, and during packin/unpacking. These unauthorized disclosures or modifications compromise the confidentiality or integrity of the information. This control enhancement addresses protection against unauthorized disclosure of information. Message externals include, for example, message headers/routing information. This control enhancement prevents the exploitation of message externals and applies to both internal and external networks or links that may be visible to individuals who are not authorized users. Header/routing information is sometimes transmitted unencrypted because the information is not properly identified by organizations as having significant value or because encrypting the information can result in lower network						
		Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity Pre / Post Transmission Handling System and Communications Protection Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity		Information during preparation for transmission and during reception. The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect message externals	preparation for transmission or during reception includina, for example, during aggregation, a protocal transformation points, and during packing/inapacking. These unauthorized disclosures or modifications compromise the confidentiality or integrity of the information. This control enhancement addresses protection against unauthorized disclosure of information. Message externals include, for example, message headers/routing information. This control enhancement prevents the exploitation of message externals and applies to both internal and external networks or links that may be visible to individuals who are not authorized users. Header/routing information is sometimes transmitted unencypted because the information is not properly identified by organizations as having significant value or because encrypting the information can result in lower network performance and/or higher costs. Alternative physical safeguards include, for example,						
		Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity Pre / Post Transmission Handling System and Communications Protection Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity		Information during preparation for transmission and during reception. The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect message externals	preparation for transmission or during reception including, for example, during agregation, a protocal transpromation points, and during packin/unpacking. These unauthorized disclosures or modifications compromise the confidentiality or integrity of the information. This control enhancement addresses protection against unauthorized disclosure of information. Message externals include, for example, message headers/routing information. This control enhancement prevents the exploitation of message externals and applies to both internal and external networks or links that may be visible to individuals who are not authorized users. Header/routing information is sometimes transmitted unencrypted because the information is not properly identified by organizations as having significant value or because encrypting the information can result in lower network						

Control ID	level	Control Name	Withdrawn	Control Taut	Supplemental Guidance	Deleted Centrals	Deiositu		Mark.	High	Natas
SC-8 (4)	2	System and Communications Protection	withuraWh	Control Text The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to conceal or randomize	This control enhancement addresses protection against unauthorized disclosure of	Related Controls SC-12,SC-13	Priority	-000	MOU	ngn	Notes
		Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity Conceal / Randomize Communications		communication patterns unless otherwise protected by [Assignment: organization-defined alternative physical safeguards].	information. Communication patterns include, for example, frequency, periods, amount, and predictability. Changes to communication spatterns can reveal information having intelligence value especially when combined with other available information having intelligence value especially when combined with other available information systems. This control enhancement prevents the derivation of intelligence based on communications patterns and applies to both internal and external networks or links that may be visible to individuals who are not outhorized users. Encrypting the links and transmitting incontinuous, Executionation prevents the derivation of intelligence from the system communications patterns. Alternative physical safeguards include, for example, protected distribution systems.						
SC-9	1	System and Communications Protection Transmission Confidentiality	Х								[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-8]
SC-10	1	System and Communications Protection Network Disconnect		The information system terminates the network connection associated with a communications session at the end of the session or after [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of inactivity.	This control applies to both internal and external networks. Terminating network connections associated with communications sessions include, for example, de-allocating associated TCP/P address/por pairs at the operating system level, or de-allocating networking assignments at the application level if multiple application sessions are using a single, operating system-level network connection. Time periods of inactivity may be established by organizations and include, for example, time periods by type of network access or for specific network accesses.		P2	,	•	х	
SC-11		System and Communications Protection Trusted Path		The information system establishes a trusted communications path between the user and the following security functions of the system: [Assignment: organization-defined security functions to include at a minimum, information system authentication and re-authentication].	Trusted paths are mechanisms by which users (through input devices) can communicate directly with security functions of information systems with the requisite assurance to support information security policies. The mechanisms can be activated only by users or the security functions of organizational information systems. User responses via trusted paths are protected from modifications by or disclosure to untrusted applications. Organizations employ trusted paths for high-assurance connections between security functions of information systems and users (e.g., during system logons). Enforcement of trusted communications paths is typically provided via an implementation that meets the reference monitor concept.	AC-16,AC-25	PO				
SC-11 (1)	2	System and Communications Protection Trusted Path Logical Isolation		The information system provides a trusted communications path that is logically isolated and distinguishable from other paths.							
SC-12		System and Communications Protection Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management		The organization establishes and manages cryptographic keys for required cryptography employed within the information system in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined requirements for key generation, distribution, storage, access, and destruction].		SC-13,SC-17	P1 :	x)	•	х	
SC-12 (1)	2	System and Communications Protection Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management Availability		The organization maintains availability of information in the event of the loss of cryptographic keys by users.	Escrowing of encryption keys is a common practice for ensuring availability in the event of lass of keys (e.g., due to forgotten passphrase).					х	
SC-12 (2)	2	System and Communications Protection Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management Symmetric Keys		The organization produces, controls, and distributes symmetric cryptographic keys using [Selection: NIST FIPS-compliant; NSA-approved] key management technology and processes.							
SC-12 (3)	2	System and Communications Protection Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management Asymmetric Keys		The organization produces, controls, and distributes asymmetric cryptographic keys using [Selection: NSA-approved key management technology and processes; approved PRI Class 3 certificates or prepositioned keying material; approved PRI Class 3 or Class 4 certificates and hardware security tokens that protect the user's private key].							
SC-12 (4)	2	System and Communications Protection Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management PKI Certificates	Х								[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-12]
SC-12 (5)	2	System and Communications Protection Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management PKI Certificates / Hardware Tokens	Х								[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-12]
SC-13	1	System and Communications Protection Cryptographic Protection		The information system implements [Assignment: organization-defined cryptographic uses and type of cryptography required for each usel in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards.	individuals have the necessary clearances for such information but lack the necessary formal access approvals. Cryptography can also be used to support random number generation and		P1 ;	x	•	x	
SC-13 (1)	2	System and Communications Protection Cryptographic Protection FIPS-Validated Cryptography	Х								[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-13]
SC-13 (2)	2	System and Communications Protection Cryptographic Protection NSA-Approved Cryptography	Х								[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-13]
SC-13 (3)	2	System and Communications Protection Cryptographic Protection Individuals without Formal Access Approvals	Х								[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-13]
SC-13 (4)	2	System and Communications Protection Cryptographic Protection Digital Signatures	Х								[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-13]
SC-14	1	System and Communications Protection Public	Х								[Withdrawn: Capability provided by AC-2, AC-3, AC-5, AC-6, SI-3, SI-4, SI-5, SI-7, SI-10]
SC-15	1	Access Protections System and Communications Protection Collaborative Computing Devices		The information system: a. Prohibits remote activation of collaborative computing devices with the following exceptions: [Assignment: organization-defined exceptions where remote activation is to be allowed]; and b. Provides an explicit indication of use to users physically present at the devices.	Collaborative computing devices include, for example, networked white boards, cameras, and microphones. Explicit indication of use includes, for example, signals to users when collaborative computing devices are activated.	AC-21	P1 :	x >	(х	[3, 51-4, 51-5, 51-7, 51-10]
SC-15 (1)	2	System and Communications Protection Collaborative Computing Devices Physical Disconnect		The information system provides physical disconnect of collaborative computing devices in a manner that supports ease of use.	Failing to physically disconnect from callaborative computing devices can result in subsequent compromises of organizational information. Providing easy methods to physically disconnect from such devices ofter a callaborative computing session helps to ensure that participants actually carry out the disconnect activity without having to go through complex and tedious procedures.						

control ID I	Level	Control Name	Withdrawn	Control Text	Supplemental Guidance	Related Controls	Priority	Low	Mod	High	Notes [Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-7]
SC-15 (2)	2	Collaborative Computing Devices Blocking	, x								[withdrawn: incorporated into SC-7]
		Inbound / Outbound Communications Traffic									
SC-15 (3)	2	System and Communications Protection		The organization disables or removes collaborative computing devices from [Assignment:	Failing to disable or remove collaborative computing devices from information systems or						
		Collaborative Computing Devices Disabling /		organization-defined information systems or information system components] in [Assignment:	information system components can result in subsequent compromises of organizational						
		Removal in Secure Work Areas		organization-defined secure work areas].	information including, for example, eavesdropping on conversations.						
SC-15 (4)	2	System and Communications Protection		The information system provides an explicit indication of current participants in [Assignment:	This control enhancement helps to prevent unauthorized individuals from participating in			_	-	-	
SC-15 (4)	2	Collaborative Computing Devices Explicitly		organization-defined online meetings and teleconferences].	Inis control enhancement helps to prevent unauthorized individuals from participating in collaborative computing sessions without the explicit knowledge of other participants.						
		Indicate Current Participants		organization-defined online meetings and teleconferences).	Conaborative computing sessions without the explicit knowledge of other participants.						
C-16	1	System and Communications Protection		The information system associates [Assignment: organization-defined security attributes] with	Security attributes can be explicitly or implicitly associated with the information contained	AC-3.AC-4.AC-16	P0				
		Transmission of Security Attributes		information exchanged between information systems and between system components.	in organizational information systems or system components.						
SC-16 (1)	2	System and Communications Protection		The information system validates the integrity of transmitted security attributes.		AU-10,SC-8					
		Transmission of Security Attributes Integrity			information includes security attributes.						
C-17	1	Validation System and Communications Protection Public		The organization issues public key certificates under an [Assignment: organization-defined	For all certificates, organizations manage information system trust stores to ensure only	SC-12	P1		V	V	
	1	Key Infrastructure Certificates		certificate policy or obtains public key certificates from an approved service provider.	approved trust anchors are in the trust stores. This control addresses both certificates with	3C-12	rı		l^	^	
		ney initiative certificates		certificate policy; or obtains passic key certificates from an approved service provider.	visibility external to organizational information systems and certificates related to the						
					internal operations of systems, for example, application-specific time services.						
C-18	1	System and Communications Protection Mobile		The organization:			P2		x	х	
		Code		Defines acceptable and unacceptable mobile code and mobile code technologies;		2,CM-6,SI-3					
				b. Establishes usage restrictions and implementation guidance for acceptable mobile code and	maliciously. Mobile code technologies include, for example, Java, JavaScript, ActiveX,						
				mobile code technologies; and c. Authorizes, monitors, and controls the use of mobile code within the information system.	Postscript, PDF, Shockwave movies, Flash animations, and VBScript. Usage restrictions and implementation guidance apply to both the selection and use of mobile code installed on						
				c. Authorizes, monitors, and controls the use of mobile code within the information system.	servers and mobile code downloaded and executed on individual workstations and devices						
					(e.g., smart phones). Mobile code policy and procedures address preventing the						
					development, acquisition, or introduction of unacceptable mobile code within organizational	ı					
					information systems.						
					·						
SC-18 (1)	2	System and Communications Protection Mobile		The information system identifies [Assignment: organization-defined unacceptable mobile code]	Corrective actions when unacceptable mobile code is detected include, for example,			-		1	I
		Code Identify Unacceptable Code / Take		and takes [Assignment: organization-defined corrective actions].	blocking, quarantine, or alerting administrators. Blocking includes, for example, preventing						
		Corrective Actions			transmission of word processing files with embedded macros when such macros have been defined to be unacceptable mobile code.						
SC-18 (2)	2	System and Communications Protection Mobile		The organization ensures that the acquisition, development, and use of mobile code to be	aejinea to be unacceptable mobile code.						
30-10 (2)	2	Code Acquisition / Development / Use		deployed in the information system meets [Assignment: organization-defined mobile code							
		code (requisition) bevelopment / osc		requirements].							
SC-18 (3)	2	System and Communications Protection Mobile		The information system prevents the download and execution of [Assignment: organization-							
.		Code Prevent Downloading / Execution		defined unacceptable mobile code].							
SC-18 (4)	2	System and Communications Protection Mobile		The information system prevents the automatic execution of mobile code in [Assignment:	Actions enforced before executing mobile code, include, for example, prompting users prior						
		Code Prevent Automatic Execution		organization-defined software applications] and enforces [Assignment: organization-defined	to opening electronic mail attachments. Preventing automatic execution of mobile code						
				actions] prior to executing the code.	includes, for example, disabling auto execute features on information system components employing portable storage devices such as Compact Disks (CDs), Digital Video Disks						
					(DVDs), and Universal Serial Bus (USB) devices.						
					(500), and annersal serial bus (500) devices.						
SC-18 (5)	2	System and Communications Protection Mobile		The organization allows execution of permitted mobile code only in confined virtual machine							
		Code Allow Execution Only in Confined		environments.							
		Environments									
C-19	1	System and Communications Protection Voice		The organization:		CM-6,SC-7,SC-15	P1		l×	×	
		Over Internet Protocol		a. Establishes usage restrictions and implementation guidance for Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) technologies based on the potential to cause damage to the information system if used							
				maliciously: and							
				b. Authorizes, monitors, and controls the use of VoIP within the information system.							
C-20	1	System and Communications Protection Secure		The information system:	This control enables external clients including, for example, remote Internet clients, to	AU-10,SC-8,SC-12,SC-	P1	х	х	х	
		Name / Address Resolution Service (Authoritative		a. Provides additional data origin authentication and integrity verification artifacts along with the	obtain origin authentication and integrity verification assurances for the host/service name	13,SC-21,SC-22					
		Source)		authoritative name resolution data the system returns in response to external name/address	to network address resolution information obtained through the service. Information						
				resolution queries; and	systems that provide name and address resolution services include, for example, domain						
				b. Provides the means to indicate the security status of child zones and (if the child supports secure resolution services) to enable verification of a chain of trust among parent and child domains, when							
				operating as part of a distributed, hierarchical namespace.	authoritative data. The means to indicate the security status of child zones includes, for						
				operating as part of a distributed, filerarchical flamespace.	example, the use of delegation signer resource records in the DNS. The DNS security						
					controls reflect (and are referenced from) OMB Memorandum 08-23. Information systems						
					that use technologies other than the DNS to map between host/service names and network						
					addresses provide other means to assure the authenticity and integrity of response data.						
			ı								
- 1								_	_	-	0.000
											[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-20]
SC-20 (1)	2	System and Communications Protection Secure	X								
SC-20 (1)	2	Name / Address Resolution Service (Authoritative	Х								
SC-20 (1)			Х	The information system provides data gripin and intensity protection artifacts for interval							
, ,		Name / Address Resolution Service (Authoritative Source) Child Subspaces System and Communications Protection Secure	Х	The information system provides data origin and integrity protection artifacts for internal name/address resolution aueries							
, ,		Name / Address Resolution Service (Authoritative Source) Child Subspaces System and Communications Protection Secure Name / Address Resolution Service (Authoritative	Х	The information system provides data origin and integrity protection artifacts for internal name/address resolution queries.							
, ,	2	Name / Address Resolution Service (Authoritative Source) Child Subspaces System and Communications Protection Secure Name / Address Resolution Service (Authoritative Source) Data Origin / Integrity	X								
, ,	2	Name / Address Resolution Service (Authoritative Source) (I-hild Subspaces System and Communications Protection Secure Name / Address Resolution Service (Authoritative Source) Data Origin / Integrity System and Communications Protection Secure	Х	name/address resolution queries. The information system requests and performs data origin authentication and data integrity		SC-20,SC-22	P1	х	x	х	
SC-20 (2)	2	Name / Address Resolution Service (Authoritative Source) Child Subposition Service (Authoritative System and Communications Protection Secure Name / Address Resolution Service (Authoritative Source) Data Origin / Integrity System and Communications Protection Secure Name / Address Resolution Service (Recursive or Name / Address Resolution Service (Recursive or Name / Paddress Resolution Service or Name / Paddress Resolution Service (Recursive or Name / Paddress Resolution S	X	name/address resolution queries. The information system requests and performs data origin authentication and data integrity verification on the name/address resolution responses the system receives from authoritative	authenticated channels to trusted validation providers. Information systems that provide	SC-20,SC-22	P1	х	х	х	
SC-20 (2)	2	Name / Address Resolution Service (Authoritative Source) (I-hild Subspaces System and Communications Protection Secure Name / Address Resolution Service (Authoritative Source) Data Origin / Integrity System and Communications Protection Secure	X	name/address resolution queries. The information system requests and performs data origin authentication and data integrity	authenticated channels to trusted validation providers. Information systems that provide name and address resolution services for local clients include, for example, recursive	SC-20,SC-22	P1	х	х	х	
SC-20 (2)	2	Name / Address Resolution Service (Authoritative Source) Child Subposition Service (Authoritative System and Communications Protection Secure Name / Address Resolution Service (Authoritative Source) Data Origin / Integrity System and Communications Protection Secure Name / Address Resolution Service (Recursive or Name / Address Resolution Service (Recursive or Name / Paddress Resolution Service or Name / Paddress Resolution Service (Recursive or Name / Paddress Resolution S	X	name/address resolution queries. The information system requests and performs data origin authentication and data integrity verification on the name/address resolution responses the system receives from authoritative	authenticated channels to trusted validation providers. Information systems that provide name and address resolution services for local clients include, for example, recursive resolving or caching domain name system (DNS) servers. DNS client resolvers either perform	SC-20,5C-22	P1	x	х	х	
SC-20 (2)	2	Name / Address Resolution Service (Authoritative Source) Child Subposition Service (Authoritative System and Communications Protection Secure Name / Address Resolution Service (Authoritative Source) Data Origin / Integrity System and Communications Protection Secure Name / Address Resolution Service (Recursive or Name / Address Resolution Service (Recursive or Name / Paddress Resolution Service or Name / Paddress Resolution Service (Recursive or Name / Paddress Resolution S	X	name/address resolution queries. The information system requests and performs data origin authentication and data integrity verification on the name/address resolution responses the system receives from authoritative	authenticated channels to trusted validation providers. Information systems that provide name and address resolution services for local clients include, for example, recursive resolving or caching domain name system (DNS) servers. DNS client resolvers either perform validation of DNSSEC signatures, or clients use authenticated channels to recursive resolvers	SC-20,5C-22	P1	x	X	x	
SC-20 (2)	2	Name / Address Resolution Service (Authoritative Source) Child Subposition Service (Authoritative System and Communications Protection Secure Name / Address Resolution Service (Authoritative Source) Data Origin / Integrity System and Communications Protection Secure Name / Address Resolution Service (Recursive or Name / Address Resolution Service (Recursive or Name / Paddress Resolution Service or Name / Paddress Resolution Service (Recursive or Name / Paddress Resolution S	X	name/address resolution queries. The information system requests and performs data origin authentication and data integrity verification on the name/address resolution responses the system receives from authoritative	authenticated channels to trusted validation providers. Information systems that provide name and address resolution services for local clients include, for example, recursive resolving or caching domain name system (DNS) servers. DNS client resolvers either perform validation of DNSSE signatures, or clients use authenticated channels to recursive resolvers that perform such validations. Information systems that use technologies other than the:	SC-20,SC-22	P1	X	x	х	
SC-20 (2)	2	Name / Address Resolution Service (Authoritative Source) Child Subposition Service (Authoritative System and Communications Protection Secure Name / Address Resolution Service (Authoritative Source) Data Origin / Integrity System and Communications Protection Secure Name / Address Resolution Service (Recursive or Name / Address Resolution Service (Recursive or Name / Paddress Resolution Service or Name / Paddress Resolution Service (Recursive or Name / Paddress Resolution S	х	name/address resolution queries. The information system requests and performs data origin authentication and data integrity verification on the name/address resolution responses the system receives from authoritative	authenticated channels to trusted validation providers. Information systems that provide name and address resolution services for local clients include, for example, recursive resolving or caching domain name system (DNS) serves. DNS client resolvers either perform validation of DNSSEC signatures, or clients use authenticated channels to recursive resolvers that perform such validations. Information systems that use technologies other than the DNS to map between host/service names and network addresses provide other means to	SC-20,SC-22	P1	х	x	x	
SC-20 (2)	2	Name / Address Resolution Service (Authoritative Source) Child Subposition Service (Authoritative System and Communications Protection Secure Name / Address Resolution Service (Authoritative Source) Data Origin / Integrity System and Communications Protection Secure Name / Address Resolution Service (Recursive or Name / Address Resolution Service (Recursive or Name / Paddress Resolution Service or Name / Paddress Resolution Service (Recursive or Name / Paddress Resolution S	X	name/address resolution queries. The information system requests and performs data origin authentication and data integrity verification on the name/address resolution responses the system receives from authoritative	authenticated channels to trusted validation providers. Information systems that provide name and address resolution services for local clients include, for example, recursive resolving or caching domain name system (DNS) servers. DNS client resolvers either perform validation of DNSSE signatures, or clients use authenticated channels to recursive resolvers that perform such validations. Information systems that use technologies other than the:	SC-20,SC-22	P1	x	x	x	
SC-20 (2)	2	Name / Address Resolution Service (Authoritative Source) [Child Subspaces System and Communications Protection Secure Name / Address Resolution Service (Authoritative Source) [Dato Grigin Integrity System and Communications Protection Secure Name / Address Resolution Service (Recursive or Caching Resolver) System and Communications Protection Secure System Syste	X	name/address resolution queries. The information system requests and performs data origin authentication and data integrity verification on the name/address resolution responses the system receives from authoritative	authenticated channels to trusted validation providers. Information systems that provide name and address resolution services for local clients include, for example, recursive resolving or caching domain name system (DNS) serves. DNS client resolvers either perform validation of DNSSEC signatures, or clients use authenticated channels to recursive resolvers that perform such validations. Information systems that use technologies other than the DNS to map between host/service names and network addresses provide other means to	SC-20,SC-22	P1	x	x	x	[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-21]
SC-20 (2)	1	Name / Address Resolution Service (Authoritative Source) Child Subspaces System and Communications Protection Secure Name / Address Resolution Service (Authoritative Source) Dato Grigin / Integrity System and Communications Protection Secure Name / Address Resolution Service (Recursive or Caching Resolver) System and Communications Protection Secure Name / Address Resolution Service (Recursive or System and Communications Protection Secure Name / Address Resolution Service (Recursive or Name / Name / Address Resolution Service (Recursive or Name / Name	X	name/address resolution queries. The information system requests and performs data origin authentication and data integrity verification on the name/address resolution responses the system receives from authoritative	authenticated channels to trusted validation providers. Information systems that provide name and address resolution services for local clients include, for example, recursive resolving or caching domain name system (DNS) serves. DNS client resolvers either perform validation of DNSSEC signatures, or clients use authenticated channels to recursive resolvers that perform such validations. Information systems that use technologies other than the DNS to map between host/service names and network addresses provide other means to	SC-20,SC-22	P1	x	x	х	[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-21]
SC-20 (2)	1	Name / Address Resolution Service (Authoritative Source) [Child Subspaces System and Communications Protection Secure Name / Address Resolution Service (Authoritative Source) [Dato Grigin Integrity System and Communications Protection Secure Name / Address Resolution Service (Recursive or Caching Resolver) System and Communications Protection Secure System Syste	X	name/address resolution queries. The information system requests and performs data origin authentication and data integrity verification on the name/address resolution responses the system receives from authoritative	authenticated channels to trusted validation providers. Information systems that provide name and address resolution services for local clients include, for example, recursive resolving or caching domain name system (DNS) serves. DNS client resolvers either perform validation of DNSSEC signatures, or clients use authenticated channels to recursive resolvers that perform such validations. Information systems that use technologies other than the DNS to map between host/service names and network addresses provide other means to	SC-20,SC-22	P1	x	x	x	[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-21]

Control ID	revel	Control Name Withdrawn System and Communications Protection	Control Text The information systems that collectively provide name/address resolution service for an	Supplemental Guidance Information systems that provide name and address resolution services include for	Related Controls SC-2.SC-20.SC-21.SC-	Priority P1	LOW	Mod	Hìgh Y	Notes
SL-22	1	System and Communications Protection Architecture and Provisioning for Name / Address Resolution Service	The information systems that collectively provide namey-adoress resolution service for an organization are fault-tolerant and implement internal/external role separation.	information systems that provide name and across resolutions services include, for example, domain name system (DNS) servers. To eliminate single points of failure and to enhance redundancy, organizations employ at least two authoritative domain name system servers, one configured as the primary server and the other configured as the secondary servers. Additionally, organizations typically deploy the servers in two geographically separated network subnetworks (i.e., not located in the same physical facility). For role separation, DNS servers with internal roles only process name and address resolution requests from within organizations (i.e., on external networks information requests from clients external roles only process name and address resolution information requests from clients external to organizations (i.e., on external networks including the Internet). Organizations specify clients that can access authoritative DNS servers in particular roles (e.g., by address ranges,	24	PI	*	*	*	
				explicit lists).						
SC-23	1	System and Communications Protection Session Authenticity	The information system protects the authenticity of communications sessions.	This control addresses communications protection at the session, versus packet level (e.g., sessions in service-oriented architectures providing web-based services) and establishes grounds for confidence at both ends of communications sessions in ongoing identities of other parties and in the validity of information transmitted. Authenticity protection includes, for example, protecting against manin-the-middle attacks/session hijacking and the insertion of false information into sessions.	SC-8,SC-10,SC-11	P1		х	х	
SC-23 (1)	2		The information system invalidates session identifiers upon user logout or other session termination.	This control enhancement curtails the ability of adversaries from capturing and continuing to employ previously valid session IDs.						
SC-23 (2)	2	System and Communications Protection Session X Authenticity User-Initiated Logouts / Message Displays								[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-12 (1)]
SC-23 (3)	2	System and Communications Protection Session Authenticity Unique Session Identifiers with Randomization	The information system generates a unique session identifier for each session with [Assignment: organization-defined randomness requirements] and recognizes only session identifiers that are system-generated.	This control enhancement curtails the ability of odversaries from reusing previously valid session IDs. Employing the concept of randomness in the generation of unique session identifiers helps to protect against brute-force attacks to determine future session identifiers.	SC-13					
SC-23 (4)	2	System and Communications Protection Session X Authenticity Unique Session Identifiers with Randomization								[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-23 (3)]
SC-23 (5)	2	System and Communications Protection Session	The information system only allows the use of [Assignment: organization-defined certificate authorities] for verification of the establishment of protected sessions.	Reliance on certificate authorities (CAs) for the establishment of secure sessions includes, for example, the use of Secure Socket Loyer (SSL) and/or Transport Loyer Security (TLS) certificates. These certificates, after verification by the respective certificate authorities, facilitate the establishment of protected sessions between web clients and web servers.	SC-13					
SC-24	1		The information system fails to a [Assignment: organization-defined known-state] for [Assignment: organization-defined types of failures] preserving [Assignment: organization-defined system state information] in failure.		CP-2,CP-10,CP-12,SC- 7,SC-22	P1			х	
SC-25	1	System and Communications Protection Thin Nodes	The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] with minimal functionality and information storage.	The deployment of information system components with reduced/minimal functionality (e.g., diskless nodes and thin client technologies) reduces the need to secure every user endpoint, and may reduce the exposure of information, information systems, and services to yelve ratacks.	SC-30	P0				
SC-26	1	System and Communications Protection Honeypots	The information system includes components specifically designed to be the target of malicious attacks for the purpose of detecting, deflecting, and analyzing such attacks.	A honeypot is set up as a decoy to attract adversaries and to deflect their attacks away from the operational systems supporting organizational missions/business function. Depending upon the specific usage of the honeypot, consultation with the Office of the General Counsel before deployment may be needed.	SC-30,SC-44,SI-3,SI-4	P0				
SC-26 (1)	2	System and Communications Protection X		before deployment may be needed.						[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-35]
SC-27	1	Honeypots Detection of Malicious Code System and Communications Protection	The information system includes: [Assignment: organization-defined platform-independent	Platforms are combinations of hardware and software used to run software applications.	SC-29	PO				
		Platform-Independent Applications	applications].	Platforms include: (i) operating systems; (ii) the underlying computer architectures, or (iii) both. Platform-independent applications are applications that run on multiple platforms. Such applications promote portability and reconstitution on different platforms, increasing the availability of critical functions within organizations while information systems with specific operating systems are under attack.						
SC-28	1	System and Communications Protection Protection of Information At Rest	The information system protects the [Selection (one or more): confidentiality; integrity] of [Assignment: organization-defined information at rest].	This control addresses the confidentiality and integrity of information at rest and covers user information and system information. Information at rest refers to the state of information when it is located on storage devices as specific components of information systems. System-related information requiring protection includes, for example, configurations or rule sets for firewalls, gateways, intrusion detection/prevention systems, filtering routers, and authenticator content. Organizations may employ different mechanisms to achieve confidentiality and integrity protections, including the use of cryptographic mechanisms and file share scanning, Integrity protection can be achieved, for example, by implementing Write-Once-Read-Many (WORM) technologies. Organizations may also employ other security controls including, for example, secure off-line storage in lieu of online storage when adequate protection of information at rest cannot otherwise be achieved and/or continuous monitoring to identify malicious code at rest.	AC-3,AC-6,CA-7,CM- 3,CM-5,CM-6,PE- 3,SC-8,SC-13,SI-3,SI-7	P1		x	x	
SC-28 (1)	2	System and Communications Protection Protection of Information At Rest Cryptographic Protection	The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to prevent unauthorized disclosure and modification of [Assignment: organization-defined information] on [Assignment: organization-defined information system components].	Selection of cryptographic mechanisms is based on the need to protect the confidentiality and integrity of organizational information. The strength of mechanism is commensurate with the security octeagon vadify classification of the information. This control enhancement applies to significant concentrations of digital media in organizational area designated for media storage and also to limited quantities of media generally associated with information system components in operational environments (e.g., portable storage devices, mobile devices). Organizations have the flexibility to either encrypt all information on storage devices (e.g., fill disk encryption) or encrypt specific data structures (e.g., files, records, or fields). Organizations employing cryptographic mechanisms to protect information at rest also consider cryptographic key management solutions.						
SC-28 (2)	2	System and Communications Protection Protection of Information At Rest Off-Line Storage	The organization removes from online storage and stores off-line in a secure location [Assignment: organization-defined information].	Removing organizational information from online information system storage to off-line storage eliminates the possibility of individuals gaining unauthorized access to the information through a network. Therefore, organizations may choose to move information to off-line storage in lieu of protecting such information in online storage.						

Control ID	Lovol	Control Name Withdrawn	Control Text	Supplemental Guidance	Related Controls	Priority I	ow. B	And.	High	Notes
SC-29	1	System and Communications Protection	The organization employs a diverse set of information technologies for [Assignment: organization-	Increasing the diversity of information technologies within organizational information	SA-12,SA-14,SC-27	PO			5.11	Notes -
		Heterogeneity	defined information system components] in the implementation of the information system.	systems reduces the impact of potential exploitations of specific technologies and also defends against common mode failures, including those failures intended by supply chain attacks. Diversity in information technologies also reduces the likelihood that the means adversaries use to compromise one information system component will be equally effective against other system components, thus further increasing the adversary work factor to successfully complete planned cyber attacks. An increase in diversity may add complexity and management overhead which could ultimately lead to mistakes and unauthorized configurations.						
SC-29 (1)	2	System and Communications Protection Heterogeneity Virtualization Techniques	The organization employs virtualization techniques to support the deployment of a diversity of operating systems and applications that are changed [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	While frequent changes to operating systems and applications pose configuration management challenges, the changes can result in an increased work factor for adversaries in order to carry out successful cyber attacks. Changing virtual operating systems or applications, as opposed to changing actual operating systems/applications, provide virtual changes that impede attacker success while reducing configuration management efforts. In addition, virtualization techniques can assist organizations in isolating untrustworthy software and/or software of dubious provenance into confined execution environments.						
SC-30	1	System and Communications Protection Concealment and Misdirection	The organization employ [Assignment: organization-defined concealment and misdirection techniques] for [Assignment: organization-defined information systems] at [Assignment: organization-defined time periods] to confuse and mislead adversaries.	concealment and misdirection techniques can significantly reduce the targeting capability of adversaries (i.e., window of opportunity and available attack surface) to initiate and complete cyber attacks. For example, virtualization techniques provide organizations with the ability to disguise information systems, potentially reducing the likelihood of successful attacks without the cost of having multiple platforms. increased use of concealment/misdirection techniques including, for example, randomness, uncertaintry, and trivualization, may sufficiently confuse and mislead adversaries and subsequently increase the risk of discovery and/or exposing tradecraft. Concealment/misdirection techniques may also provide organizations additional time to successfully perform core missions and business functions. Because of the time and effort required to support concealment/misdirection techniques, it is anticipated that such techniques would be used by organizations on a very limited basis.	SC-26,SC-29,SI-14	PO				
SC-30 (1)	2	System and Communications Protection X Concealment and Misdirection Virtualization Techniques								[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-29 (1)]
SC-30 (2)	2	System and Communications Protection Concealment and Misdirection Randomness	The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined techniques] to introduce randomness into organizational operations and assets.	landomness introduces increased levels of uncertainty for adversaries regarding the octions organizations take in defending against cyber attacks. Such actions may impede the ability of adversaries to correctly target information resources of organizations supporting critical missions/business functions. Uncertainty may also cause adversaries to hesitate before initiating or continuing attacks. Misdirection techniques involving randomness include, for example, performing certain routine actions at different times of day, employing different information technologies (e.g. browsers, search engines), using different suppliers, and rotating roles and responsibilities of organizational personnel.						
SC-30 (3)	2	System and Communications Protection Concealment and Mosilerction Change Processing / Storage Locations	The organization changes the location of [Assignment: organization-defined processing and/or storage] [Selection: [Assignment: organization-defined time frequency]; at random time intervals]].	Adversaries target critical organizational missions/business functions and the information resources supporting those missions and functions while at the same time, trying to minimize exposure of their existence and tradecraft. The static homogeneous, and deterministic nature of organizational information systems targeted by adversaries, make such systems more susceptible to cyber attacks with liess adversary cast and effort to be successful. Changing organizational processing and storage locations (sometimes referred to as miving torget defense) addresses the advanced persistent threat (APT) using techniques such as virtualization, distributed processing, and replication. This enables organizations to relocate the information resources (i.e., processing and/or storage) supporting critical missions and business functions. Changing locations of processing activities and/or storage sites introduces uncertainty into the targeting activities by adversaries. This uncertainty increases the work factor of adversaries making compromises or breaches to organizational information systems much more difficult and time-consuming, and increases the chances that adversaries may inadvertently disclose aspects of tradecraft while attempting to locate critical organizational resources.						
SC-30 (4)	2	System and Communications Protection Concediment and Misdirection Misleading Information	The organization employs realistic, but misleading information in [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] with regard to its security state or pasture.	This control enhancement misleads potential adversaries regarding the nature and extent of security safeguards deployed by organizations. As a result, adversaries may employ incorrect (and as a result ineffective) attack techniques. One way of misleading adversaries is for organizations to place misleading information regarding the specific security control deployed in external information systems that are known to be accessed or targeted by adversaries. Another technique is the use of deception nets (e.g., honeynets, virtualized environments) that mimic actual aspects of organizational information systems but use, for example, out-of-date software configurations.						
SC-30 (5)	2	System and Communications Protection Concealment and Misdirection Concealment of System Components	The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined techniques] to hide or conceal [Assignment: organization-defined information system components].	By hiding, disguising, or otherwise concealing critical information system components, organizations may be able to decrease the probability that adversaries target and successfully compromise those sastes. Potential means for organizations to hide and/or conceal information system components include, for example, configuration of routers or the use of honeynets or virtualization techniques.						
SC-31	1	System and Communications Protection Covert Channel Analysis	The organization: a. Performs a covert channel analysis to identify those aspects of communications within the information system that are potential avenues for covert [Selection (one or more): storage; timing] channels; and b. Estimates the maximum bandwidth of those channels.	lead to covert channels. Covert channel analysis is a meaningful activity when there is the	AC-3,AC-4,PL-2	PO				
SC-31 (1)		System and Communications Protection Covert Channel Analysis Test Covert Channels for Exploitability	The organization tests a subset of the identified covert channels to determine which channels are exploitable.							
SC-31 (2)	2	System and Communications Protection Covert Channel Analysis Maximum Bandwidth	The organization reduces the maximum bandwidth for identified covert [Selection (one or more); storage; timing] channels to [Assignment: organization-defined values].	Information system developers are in the best position to reduce the maximum bandwidth for identified covert storage and timing channels.						

Control ID	Level	Control Namo	Withdrawn	Control Text	Supplemental Guidance	Related Controls	Priority	Low N	Mod High	Notes
SC-31 (3)	2	System and Communications Protection Covert Channel Analysis Measure Bandwidth in Operational Environments	Waliorawii	The organization measures the bandwidth of [Assignment: organization-defined subset of identified covert channels] in the operational environment of the information system.	This control enhancement addresses covert channel bandwidth in operational environments versus developmental environments. Measuring covert channel bandwidth in operational environments helps organizations to determine how much information can be covertly leaked before such leakage adversely affects organizational missions/business functions. Covert channel bandwidth may be significantly different when measured in those settings that are independent of the particular environments of operation (e.g., laboratories or development environments).			20W N	neu nigh	
SC-32	1	System and Communications Protection Information System Partitioning		The organization partitions the information system into [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] residing in separate physical domains or environments based on [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances for physical separation of components].	Information system partitioning is a part of a defense-in-depth protection strategy. Organizations determine the degree of physical separation of system components from physically distinct components in separate racks in the same room, to components in separate rooms for the more critical components, to more significant geographical separation of the most critical components. Security categorization can guide the selection of appropriate candidates for domain partitioning. Managed interfaces restrict or prohibit network access and information flow among partitioned information system components.	AC-4,SA-8,SC-2,SC- 3,SC-7	P0			
SC-33	1	System and Communications Protection Transmission Preparation Integrity	Х							[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-8]
SC-34	1	Transmission Preparation integrity System and Communications Protection Non- Modifiable Executable Programs		The information system at [Assignment: organization-defined information system components]: a. Loads and executes the operating environment from hardware-enforced, read-only media, and b. Loads and executes [Assignment: organization-defined applications] from hardware-enforced, read-only media.	The term operating environment is defined as the specific code that hosts applications, for example, operating systems, executives, or monitors including virtual machine monitors (i.e., hypervisors). It can also include certain applications running directly on hardware platforms. Hardware-enforced, read-only media include, for example, Compact Disk-Recordable (CD-NR) digital video Disk-Recordable (CD-NR) disk drives and one-time programmable read-only memory. The use of non-modifiable storage ensures the integrity of software from the point of creation of the read-only image. The use of reprogrammable read-only memory can be accepted as read-only media provided: (i) integrity can be adequately protected from the point of initial writing to the insertion of the memory into the information system; and (ii) there are reliable hardware protections against reprogramming the memory while installed in organizational information systems.	AC-3,SI-7	PO			
SC-34 (1)	2	System and Communications Protection Non- Modifiable Executable Programs No Writable Storage		The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] with no writeable storage that is persistent across component restart or power on/off:	This control enhancement: (i) eliminates the possibility of malicious code insertion via persistent, writeable storage within the designated information system components; and (ii) applies to both fixed and removable storage, with the latter being addressed directly or as specific restrictions imposed through access controls for mobile devices.	AC-19,MP-7				
SC-34 (2)	2	System and Communications Protection Non- Modifiable Executable Programs Integrity Protection / Read-Only Media		The organization protects the integrity of information prior to storage on read-only media and controls the media after such information has been recorded onto the media.	Security safeguards prevent the substitution of media into information systems or the reprogramming of programmable read-only media prior to installation into the systems. Security safeguards include, for example, a combination of prevention, detection, and response.	AC-5,CM-3,CM-5,CM- 9,MP-2,MP-4,MP- 5,SA-12,SC-28,SI-3				
SC-34 (3)		System and Communications Protection Non- Modifiable Executable Programs Hardware- Based Protection		The organization: ((a) Employs hardware-based, write-protect for [Assignment: organization-defined information system [irmware components]; and (b) Implements specific procedures for [Assignment: organization-defined authorized individuals] to manually disable hardware write-protect for firmware modifications and re-enable the write-protect prior to returning to operational mode.						
SC-35	1	System and Communications Protection Honeyclients		The information system includes components that proactively seek to identify malicious websites and/or web-based malicious code.	Honeyclients differ from honeypots in that the components actively probe the Internet in search of malicious code (e.g., worms) contained on external websites. As with honeypots, honeyclients require some supporting isolation measures (e.g., virtualization) to ensure that any malicious code discovered during the search and subsequently executed does not infect organizational information systems.	SC-26,SC-44,SI-3,SI-4	PO			
SC-36	1	System and Communications Protection Distributed Processing and Storage		The organization distributes [Assignment: organization-defined processing and storage] across multiple physical locations.	Distributing processing and storage across multiple physical locations provides some degree of redundancy or overlap for organizations, and therefore increases the work factor of adversaries to adversely impact organizational operations, assets, and individuals. This control does not assume a single primary processing or storage location, and thus allows for parallel processing and storage.	CP-6,CP-7	P0			
SC-36 (1)	2	System and Communications Protection Distributed Processing and Storage Politing Techniques		The organization employs polling techniques to identify patential faults, errors, or compromises to [Assignment: organization-defined distributed processing and storage components].	Distributed processing and/or storage may be employed to reduce opportunities for odversaries to successfully compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information and information systems. However, distribution of processing and/or storage components does not prevent adversaries from compromising one (or more) of the distributed components. Polling compress the processing results and/or storage content from the various distributed components and subsequently voting on the outcomes. Polling identifies potential faults, errors, or compromises in distributed processing and/or storage components.	SI-4				
SC-37		System and Communications Protection Out-Of- Band Channels		The organization employ, [Assignment: organization-defined out-of-band channels] for the physica delivery or electronic transmission of [Assignment: organization-defined information, information system components, or devices] to [Assignment: organization-defined individuals or information systems].	systems, network paths physically separate from network paths used for operational traffic, or nonelectronic paths such as the US Postal Service. This is in contrast with using the same channels (i.e., in-band channels) that carry routine operational traffic. Out-of-band channels do not have the same vulnerability/exposure as in-band channels, and hence the confidentiality, integrity, or availability compromises of in-band channels will not compromise the out-of-band channels. Organizations may employ out-of-band channels in the delivery or transmission of many organizational items including, for example, identifiers/authenticators, configuration management changes for hardware, firmware, or software, cryptographic key management information, security updates, system/data backups, maintenance information, and malicious code protection updates.		PO			
SC-37 (1)	2	System and Communications Protection Out-Of- Band Channels Ensure Delivery / Transmission		The organization employs (Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards) to ensure that only [Assignment: organization-defined individuals or information systems] receive the [Assignment: organization-defined information, information system components, or devices].	Techniques and/or methods employed by organizations to ensure that only designated information systems or individuals receive particular information, system components, or devices include, for example, sending authenticators via courier service but requiring recipients to show some form of government-issued photographic identification as a condition of receipt.					

Control ID	Louis	Control Name Withdray	n Control Text	Supplemental Guidance	Deleted Controls	Data de la la			Mater
SC-38	1	Control Name Withdray System and Communications Protection	The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined operations security safeguards] to	Operations security (OPSEC) is a systematic process by which potential adversaries can be	Related Controls RA-2.RA-5.SA-12	Priority Lo	w Mo	u High	Notes
30 30	-	Operations Security	protect key organizational information throughout the system development life cycle.	denied information about the capabilities and intentions of organizations by identifying controlling, and protecting generally unclassified information that specifically relates to the planning and execution of sensitive organizational activities. The OPSEC process involves five steps: (i) identification of critical information (e.g., the security categorization process); (ii) analysis of thrests; (iii) analysis of unlerabilities; (iv) assessment of risks; and (v) the application of appropriate countermeasures. OPSEC safeguards are applied to both organizational information systems and the environments in which those systems operate. OPSEC safeguards help to protect the confidentiality of key information including, for example, imiting the sharing of information with suppliers and potential suppliers of information system components, information technology products and services, and with other non-organizational elements and individuals, information critical to mission/business success includes, for example, user identifies, element uses, suppliers, supply chain processes, functional and security requirements, system design specifications, testing protocols, and security control implementation details.	, ,,				
SC-39		System and Communications Protection Process Isolation	The information system maintains a separate execution domain for each executing process.	Information systems can maintain separate execution domains for each executing process by assigning each process a separate address space. Each information system process has a distinct address space so that communication between processes is performed in a manner controlled through the security functions, and one process cannot modify the executing code of another process. Maintaining separate execution domains for executing processes can be achieved, for example, by implementing separate address spaces. This capability is available in most commercial operating systems that employ multi-state processor technologies.		P1 X	x	x	
SC-39 (1)	2	System and Communications Protection Process Isolation Hardware Separation	The information system implements underlying hardware separation mechanisms to facilitate process separation.	Hardware-based separation of information system processes is generally less susceptible to compromise than software-based separation, thus providing greater assurance that the separation will be enforced. Underlying hardware separation mechanisms include, for example, hardware memory management.					
SC-39 (2)	2	System and Communications Protection Process	The information system maintains a separate execution domain for each thread in [Assignment: organization-defined multi-threaded processing].						
SC-40	1	System and Communications Protection Wireless Link Protection	organization-regime minit-interactic processing). The information system protects external and internal [Assignment: organization-defined wireless links] from [Assignment: organization-defined types of signal parameter attacks or references to sources for such attacks].	This control applies to internal and external wireless communication links that may be visible to individuals who are not authorized information system users. Adversaries can exploit the signal parameters of wireless links it size to all dequately protected. There are many ways to exploit the signal parameters of wireless links to gain intelligence, deny service, or to spoof users of organizational information systems. This control reduces their impact of attacks that are unique to wireless systems. If organizations rely on commercial service providers for transmission services as commodify items rather than as fully dedicated services, it may not be possible to implement this control.	AC-18,SC-5	PO			
SC-40 (1)	2	System and Communications Protection Wireless Link Protection Electromagnetic Interference	The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms that achieve (Assignment: arganization-defined level of protection) against the effects of intentional electromagnetic interference.	This control enhancement protects against intentional jamming that might deny or impair communications by ensuring that wrietess spread spectrum woveforms used to provide anti-jam protection are not predictable by unauthorized individuals. The control enhancement may also coincidentally help to mitigate the effects of unintentional jamming due to interference from legitimate transmitters sharing the same spectrum. Mission requirements, projected threats, concept of operations, and applicable legislation, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines determine levels of wireless link availability and performance/cryptography needed.	SC-12,SC-13				
SC-40 (2)	2	System and Communications Protection Wireless Link Protection Reduce Detection Potential	The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to reduce the detection potential of wireless links to [Assignment: organization-defined level of reduction].	This control enhancement is needed for covert communications and protecting wireless transmitters from being geo-located by their transmissions. The control enhancement transmits spread spectrum wavelprims used to achieve low probability of detection are not predictable by unauthorized individuals. Mission requirements, projected threats, concept of operations, and applicable legislation, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines determine the levels to which wireless links should be undetectable.	SC-12,SC-13				
SC-40 (3)	2	System and Communications Protection Wireless Link Protection Imitative or Manipulative Communications Deception	The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to identify and reject wireless transmissions that are deliberate attempts to achieve imitative or manipulative communications deception based on signal parameters.	This control enhancement ensures that the signal parameters of wireless transmissions are not predictable by unauthorized individuals. Such unpredictability reduces the probability of imitative or manipulative communications deception based upon signal parameters alone.	SC-12,SC-13				
SC-40 (4)		System and Communications Protection Wireless Link Protection Signal Parameter Identification	The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to prevent the identification of [Assignment: organization-defined wireless transmitters] by using the transmitter signal parameters.	Radio fingerprinting techniques identify the unique signal parameters of transmitters to fingerprint such transmitters for purposes of tracking and mission/user identification. This control enhancement protects against the unique identification of wireless transmitters for purposes of intelligence exploitation by ensuring that anti-fingerprinting alterations to signal parameters are not predictable by unautohized individuals. This control enhancement helps assure mission success when anonymity is required.	SC-12,SC-13				
SC-41	1	System and Communications Protection Port and I/O Device Access	The organization physically disables or removes [Assignment: organization-defined connection ports or input/output devices] on [Assignment: organization-defined information systems or information system components].	Connection ports include, for example, Universal Serial Bus (USB) and Firewire (IEEE 1394). Input/output (I/O) devices include, for example, Compact Disk (CD) and Digital Video Disk (DVO) drives. Physically disabiling or removing such connection ports and I/O devices helps prevent exfiltration of information from information systems and the introduction of malicious code into systems from those ports/devices.		PO			
SC-42		System and Communications Protection Sensor Capability and Data	The information system: a. Prohibits the remote activation of environmental sensing capabilities with the following exceptions: [Assignment: organization-defined exceptions where remote activation of sensors is allowed]; and b. Provides an explicit indication of sensor use to [Assignment: organization-defined class of users]	accelerometers. While the sensors on mobiles devices provide an important function, if activated covertly, such devices can potentially provide a means for adversaries to learn valuable information about individuals and organizations. For example, remotely activating the GPS function on a mobile device could provide an adversary with the ability to track the specific movements of an individual.		PO			
SC-42 (1)	2	System and Communications Protection Sensor Capability and Data Reporting to Authorized Individuals or Roles	The organization ensures that the information system is configured so that data or information collected by the [Assignment: organization-defined sensors] is only reported to authorized individuals or roles.	In situations where sensors are activated by authorized individuals (e.g., end users), it is still possible that the data/information collected by the sensors will be sent to unauthorized entities.					

Control ID	Level	Control Name	/ithdrawn Control Text	Supplemental Guidance	Related Controls	Priority	Low	Mod High	Notes
SC-42 (2)	2	System and Communications Protection Sensor	The organization employs the following measures: [Assignment: organization-defined measures at the state of information collected by [Assignment: organization defined consequition of the state of the						
		Capability and Data Authorized Use	so that data or information collected by [Assignment: organization-defined sensors] is only us for authorized purposes.	traffic navigation could be misused to track movements of individuals. Measures to					
			Jor authorized purposes.	mitigate such activities include, for example, additional training to ensure that authorized					
				parties do not abuse their authority, or (in the case where sensor data/information is					
				maintained by external parties) contractual restrictions on the use of the data/information.					
SC-42 (3)	2	System and Communications Protection Sensor	The organization prohibits the use of devices possessing [Assignment: organization-defined	For example, organizations may prohibit individuals from bringing cell phones or digital					
		Capability and Data Prohibit Use of Devices	environmental sensing capabilities] in [Assignment: organization-defined facilities, areas, or	cameras into certain facilities or specific controlled areas within facilities where classified					
			systems].	information is stored or sensitive conversations are taking place.					
SC-43	1	System and Communications Protection Usage	The organization:	Information system components include hardware, software, or firmware components (e.g.,	CM-6,SC-7	P0			
		Restrictions	a. Establishes usage restrictions and implementation guidance for [Assignment: organization-	Voice Over Internet Protocol, mobile code, digital copiers, printers, scanners, optical					
			defined information system components] based on the potential to cause damage to the	devices, wireless technologies, mobile devices).					
			information system if used maliciously; and b. Authorizes, monitors, and controls the use of such components within the information syste						
			b. Authorizes, monitors, and controls the use of such components within the information syste	m.					
SC-44	1	System and Communications Protection	The organization employs a detonation chamber capability within [Assignment: organization-	Detonation chambers, also known as dynamic execution environments, allow organizations	SC-7 SC-25 SC-26 SC-	PΩ			
	-	Detonation Chambers	defined information system, system component, or location].	to open email attachments, execute untrusted or suspicious applications, and execute	30				
				Universal Resource Locator (URL) requests in the safety of an isolated environment or					
				virtualized sandbox. These protected and isolated execution environments provide a means					
				of determining whether the associated attachments/applications contain malicious code.					
				While related to the concept of deception nets, the control is not intended to maintain a					
				long-term environment in which adversaries can operate and their actions can be observed.					
1				Rather, it is intended to quickly identify malicious code and reduce the likelihood that the					
				code is propagated to user environments of operation (or prevent such propagation					
				completely).					
							\vdash		
SE .		Security	The constitution	The DB in contrast of the cont	404 404 405 :-				[Privacy Controls]
SE-1	1	Security Inventory of Personally Identifiable	The organization:	The PII inventory enables organizations to implement effective administrative, technical,	AR-1, AR-4, AR-5, AT-				[Privacy Controls]
		Information	 a. Establishes, maintains, and updates [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] an inventhal that contains a listing of all programs and information systems identified as collecting, using, 	and physical security policies and procedures to protect PII consistent with Appendix F, and to mitigate risks of PII exposure. As one method of gathering information for their PII	1, DM-1, PM-5				
			maintaining, or sharing personally identifiable information (PII); and	inventories, organizations may extract the following information elements from Privacy					
				ent: Impact Assessments (PIA) for information systems containing PII: (i) the name and acronym					
				ents for each system identified; (ii) the types of PII contained in that system; (iii) classification of					
			for all new or modified information systems containing PII.	level of sensitivity of all types of PII, as combined in that information system; and (iv)					
				classification of level of potential risk of substantial harm, embarrassment, inconvenience,					
				or unfairness to affected individuals, as well as the financial or reputational risks to					
				organizations, if PII is exposed. Organizations take due care in updating the inventories by					
				identifying linkable data that could create PII.					
SE-2	1	Security Privacy Incident Response	The organization:	In contrast to the Incident Response (IR) family in Appendix F, which concerns a broader	AR-1, AR-4, AR-5, AR-				[Privacy Controls]
			a. Develops and implements a Privacy Incident Response Plan; and	range of incidents affecting information security, this control uses the term Privacy Incident	6, AU-1 through 14,				
			b. Provides an organized and effective response to privacy incidents in accordance with the	to describe only those incidents that relate to personally identifiable information (PII). The	IR-1 through IR-8, RA-				
			organizational Privacy Incident Response Plan.	organization Privacy Incident Response Plan is developed under the leadership of the	1				
				SAOP/CPO. The plan includes: (i) the establishment of a cross-functional Privacy Incident Response Team that reviews, approves, and participates in the execution of the Privacy					
				Incident Response Plan; (ii) a process to determine whether notice to oversight					
				organizations or affected individuals is appropriate and to provide that notice accordingly;					
				(iii) a privacy risk assessment process to determine the extent of harm, embarrassment.					
				inconvenience, or unfairness to affected individuals and, where appropriate, to take steps to					
				mitigate any such risks; (iv) internal procedures to ensure prompt reporting by employees					
				and contractors of any privacy incident to information security officials and the Senior					
				Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO), consistent with					
				organizational incident management structures; and (v) internal procedures for reporting					
				noncompliance with organizational privacy policy by employees or contractors to					
				appropriate management or oversight officials. Some organizations may be required by law					
				or policy to provide notice to oversight organizations in the event of a breach. Organizations					
				may also choose to integrate Privacy Incident Response Plans with Security Incident					
				Response Plans, or keep the plans separate.					
61	•	Sustant and Information Integrity					\vdash		
SI-1		System and Information Integrity System and Information Integrity System and	The organization:	This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective	PM-9	P1	v .	/ V	
21-1	1	Information Integrity System and Information Integrity Policy and Procedures	a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or	implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the SI family.	L IAI-A	r 1	^ ¹	` '	
			roles]:	Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws. Executive Orders, directives.					
			a.1. A system and information integrity policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsible						
			management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and	the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures					
				and unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy					
			associated system and information integrity controls; and	for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the					
			b. Reviews and updates the current:	complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security					
			b.1. System and information integrity policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; an						
			b.2. System and information integrity procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequenc	 management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures. 					
			b.2. System and information integrity procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequenc]. management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.					
			b.2. System and information integrity procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequence]]. management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.					

control ID	Level	System and Information Integrity I Flam	withdrawn	Control Text The organization:	Supplemental Guidance Organizations identify information systems affected by announced software flaws including			Low N	ιοί	eligii v	Notes
51-2	1	System and Information Integrity Flaw Remediation		The organization: a. Identifies, reports, and corrects information system flaws:	potential vulnerabilities resulting from those flaws, and report this information to	5,CM-8,MA-2,IR-4,RA-		^ ^			
		Remediation		b. Tests software and firmware updates related to flaw remediation for effectiveness and potential		5,SA-10,SA-11,SI-11					
				side effects before installation:	relevant software updates include, for example, patches, service packs, hot fixes, and anti-	5,3A-10,3A-11,3I-11					
				c. Installs security-relevant software and firmware updates within [Assignment: organization-	virus signatures. Organizations also address flaws discovered during security assessments.						
				defined time period] of the release of the updates; and	continuous monitoring, incident response activities, and system error handling.						
				d. Incorporates flaw remediation into the organizational configuration management process.	Organizations take advantage of available resources such as the Common Weakness						
1					Enumeration (CWE) or Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) databases in						
					remediating flaws discovered in organizational information systems. By incorporating flaw						
					remediation into ongoing configuration management processes, required/anticipated						
					remediation actions can be tracked and verified. Flaw remediation actions that can be						
					tracked and verified include, for example, determining whether organizations follow US-						
					CERT guidance and Information Assurance Vulnerability Alerts. Organization-defined time						
					periods for updating security-relevant software and firmware may vary based on a variety of						
					factors including, for example, the security category of the information system or the						
					criticality of the update (i.e., severity of the vulnerability related to the discovered flaw).						
					Some types of flaw remediation may require more testing than other types. Organizations						
					determine the degree and type of testing needed for the specific type of flaw remediation						
					activity under consideration and also the types of changes that are to be configuration-						
					managed. In some situations, organizations may determine that the testing of software						
					and/or firmware updates is not necessary or practical, for example, when implementing						
					simple anti-virus signature updates. Organizations may also consider in testing decisions,						
					whether security-relevant software or firmware updates are obtained from authorized sources with appropriate digital signatures.						
1					sources with appropriate digital signatures.						
1											
1											
								\perp			
SI-2 (1)	2	System and Information Integrity Flaw		The organization centrally manages the flaw remediation process.	Central management is the organization-wide management and implementation of flaw					Х	
		Remediation Central Management			remediation processes. Central management includes planning, implementing, assessing,						
					authorizing, and monitoring the organization-defined, centrally managed flaw remediation						
(2)					security controls.						
SI-2 (2)	2	System and Information Integrity Flaw		The organization employs automated mechanisms [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]		CM-6,SI-4		x		^	
		Remediation Automated Flaw Remediation Status		to determine the state of information system components with regard to flaw remediation.							
SI-2 (3)	2	System and Information Integrity Flaw		The organization:	This control enhancement requires organizations to determine the current time it takes on			-			
31-2 (3)	2	Remediation Time to Remediate Flaws /		(a) Measures the time between flaw identification and flaw remediation; and	the average to correct information system flaws after such flaws have been identified, and						
		Benchmarks for Corrective Actions		(b) Establishes [Assignment: organization-defined benchmarks] for taking corrective actions.	subsequently establish organizational benchmarks (i.e., time frames) for taking corrective						
		Benchmarks for corrective Actions		(b) Establishes (Assignment, Organization-defined benchmarks) for taking corrective actions.	actions. Benchmarks can be established by type of flaw and/or severity of the potential						
					vulnerability if the flaw can be exploited.						
SI-2 (4)	2	System and Information Integrity Flaw	X		valuerability if the flaw can be exploited.						[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-2]
31-2 (4)	~	Remediation Automated Patch Management									1
1		Tools									
SI-2 (5)	2	System and Information Integrity Flaw		The organization installs [Assignment: organization-defined security-relevant software and	Due to information system integrity and availability concerns, organizations give careful						
/		Remediation Automatic Software / Firmware		firmware updates] automatically to [Assignment: organization-defined information system	consideration to the methodology used to carry out automatic updates. Organizations						
		Updates		components].	must balance the need to ensure that the updates are installed as soon as possible with the						
					need to maintain configuration management and with any mission or operational impacts						
					that automatic updates might impose.						
SI-2 (6)	2	System and Information Integrity Flaw		The organization removes [Assignment: organization-defined software and firmware components]	Previous versions of software and/or firmware components that are not removed from the						
		Remediation Removal of Previous Versions of		after updated versions have been installed.	information system after updates have been installed may be exploited by adversaries.						
		Software / Firmware			Some information technology products may remove older versions of software and/or						
					firmware automatically from the information system.						
SI-3	1	System and Information Integrity Malicious		The organization:		CM-3,MP-2,SA-4,SA- 8.SA-12.SA-13.SC-	P1	x x		х	
		Code Protection		Employs malicious code protection mechanisms at information system entry and exit points to detect and eradicate malicious code:	servers, web servers, proxy servers, remote-access servers, workstations, notebook computers, and mobile devices. Malicious code includes, for example, viruses, worms.	7,SC-26,SC-44,SI-2,SI-					
				b. Updates malicious code protection mechanisms whenever new releases are available in	Trojan horses, and spyware. Malicious code can also be encoded in various formats (e.g.,	4,SI-7					
				accordance with organizational configuration management policy and procedures; c. Configures malicious code protection mechanisms to:	UUENCODE, Unicode), contained within compressed or hidden files, or hidden in files using						
					steganography. Malicious code can be transported by different means including, for						
				c.1. Perform periodic scans of the information system [Assignment: organization-defined	example, web accesses, electronic mail, electronic mail attachments, and portable storage						
				frequency] and real-time scans of files from external sources at [Selection (one or more); endpoint;	devices. Malicious code insertions occur through the exploitation of information system vulnerabilities. Malicious code protection mechanisms include, for example, anti-virus						
				network entry/exit points] as the files are downloaded, opened, or executed in accordance with							
				organizational security policy; and	signature definitions and reputation-based technologies. A variety of technologies and						
				c.2. [Selection (one or more): block malicious code; quarantine malicious code; send alert to	methods exist to limit or eliminate the effects of malicious code. Pervasive configuration						
				administrator; [Assignment: organization-defined action]] in response to malicious code detection;	management and comprehensive software integrity controls may be effective in preventing						
				d Addresses the receipt of false positives during molicious and detection and are all and the	execution of unauthorized code. In addition to commercial off-the-shelf software, malicious						
				d. Addresses the receipt of false positives during malicious code detection and eradication and the							
				resulting potential impact on the availability of the information system.	bombs, back doors, and other types of cyber attacks that could affect organizational						
					missions/business functions. Traditional malicious code protection mechanisms cannot						
					always detect such code. In these situations, organizations rely instead on other safeguards						
					including, for example, secure coding practices, configuration management and control,						
					trusted procurement processes, and monitoring practices to help ensure that software does						
					not perform functions other than the functions intended. Organizations may determine that						
					in response to the detection of malicious code, different actions may be warranted. For						
					example, organizations can define actions in response to malicious code detection during periodic scans, actions in response to detection of malicious downloads, and/or actions in						
					response to detection of maliciousness when attempting to open or execute files.						
SI-3 (1)	2	System and Information Integrity Malicious Code		The organization centrally manages malicious code protection mechanisms.	Central management is the organization-wide management and implementation of	AU-2,SI-8		X		Х	
[' ' '		Protection Central Management			malicious code protection mechanisms. Central management includes planning,	'					
1					implementing, assessing, authorizing, and monitoring the organization-defined, centrally						
					managed flaw malicious code protection security controls.						
SI-3 (2)	2	System and Information Integrity Malicious Code		The information system automatically updates malicious code protection mechanisms.	Malicious code protection mechanisms include, for example, signature definitions. Due to	SI-8		X		X	
		Protection Automatic Updates			information system integrity and availability concerns, organizations give careful						
					consideration to the methodology used to carry out automatic updates.						
											Complete to the control of the contr
SI-3 (3)	2	System and Information Integrity Malicious Code	X								[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-6 (10)]
51.275	,	Protection Non-Privileged Users System and Information Integrity Malicious Code		The information system updates malicious code protection mechanisms only when directed by a	This control enhancement may be appropriate for situations where for reasons of security	AC C CM E		-			
SI-3 (4)	2	Protection Updates Only by Privileged Users		privileged user.	or operational continuity, updates are only applied when selected/approved by designated	AC-0,CIVI-3					
		. rocceson Opaaces Only by Privilegea Osers		princeges soci.	or operational continuity, updates are only applied when selected/approved by designated organizational personnel.						
SI-3 (5)	2	System and Information Integrity Malicious Code	X		a games personner						[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-7]
		Protection Portable Storage Devices									

Control ID	Level	Control Name Withdrawn	Control Text	Supplemental Guidance	Related Controls	Priority_L	Low	Mod	High	Notes
SI-3 (6)	2	System and Information Integrity Malicious Code	The organization:		CA-2,CA-7,RA-5					
		Protection Testing / Verification	(a) Tests malicious code protection mechanisms [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] by							
			introducing a known benign, non-spreading test case into the information system; and (b) Verifies that both detection of the test case and associated incident reporting occur.							
			[-7,7,							
SI-3 (7)	2	System and Information Integrity Malicious Code	The information system implements nonsignature-based malicious code detection mechanisms.	Nonsignature-based detection mechanisms include, for example, the use of heuristics to						
		Protection Nonsignature-Based Detection		detect, analyze, and describe the characteristics or behavior of malicious code and to provide safeguards against malicious code for which signatures do not yet exist or for						
				which existing signatures may not be effective. This includes polymorphic malicious code						
				(i.e., code that changes signatures when it replicates). This control enhancement does not						
				preclude the use of signature-based detection mechanisms.						
SI-3 (8)	2	System and Information Integrity Malicious Code	The information system detects [Assignment: organization-defined unauthorized operating	This control enhancement can also be applied to critical interfaces other than kernel-based	AU-6					
3, 3 (0)	-	Protection Detect Unauthorized Commands	system commands] through the kernel application programming interface at [Assignment:	interfaces, including for example, interfaces with virtual machines and privileged	7.0 0					
			organization-defined information system hardware components] and [Selection (one or more):	applications. Unauthorized operating system commands include, for example, commands						
			issues a warning; audits the command execution; prevents the execution of the command].	for kernel functions from information system processes that are not trusted to initiate such						
				commands, or commands for kernel functions that are suspicious even though commands of that type are reasonable for processes to initiate. Organizations can define the malicious						
				commands to be detected by a combination of command types, command classes, or						
				specific instances of commands. Organizations can define hardware components by						
				specific component, component type, location in the network, or combination therein.						
				Organizations may select different actions for different types/classes/specific instances of potentially malicious commands.						
				potentially mulcious communus.						
SI-3 (9)	2	System and Information Integrity Malicious Code	The information system implements [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to	This control enhancement protects against unauthorized commands and replay of	SC-12,SC-13,SC-23					
		Protection Authenticate Remote Commands	authenticate [Assignment: organization-defined remote commands].	authorized commands. This capability is important for those remote information systems						
				whose loss, malfunction, misdirection, or exploitation would have immediate and/or serious consequences (e.g., injury or death, property damage, loss of high-valued assets or						
				sensitive information, or failure of important missions/business functions). Authentication						
				safeguards for remote commands help to ensure that information systems accept and						
				execute in the order intended, only authorized commands, and that unauthorized						
				commands are rejected. Cryptographic mechanisms can be employed, for example, to authenticate remote commands.						
				- Charles Communication						
SI-3 (10)	2	System and Information Integrity Malicious Code	The organization:	The application of selected malicious code analysis tools and techniques provides						
		Protection Malicious Code Analysis	(a) Employs [Assignment: organization-defined tools and techniques] to analyze the characteristics and behavior of malicious code; and	organizations with a more in-depth understanding of adversary tradecraft (i.e., tactics, techniques, and procedures) and the functionality and purpose of specific instances of						
			(b) Incorporates the results from malicious code analysis into organizational incident response and							
			flaw remediation processes.	effective organizational responses to current and future threats. Organizations can conduct						
				malicious code analyses by using reverse engineering techniques or by monitoring the						
SI-4	1	System and Information Integrity Information	The organization:	behavior of executing code. Information system monitoring includes external and internal monitoring. External	AC-3,AC-4,AC-8,AC-	21	,	¥	¥	
	-	System Monitoring	a. Monitors the information system to detect:	monitoring includes the observation of events occurring at the information system boundary		· [.		<u> </u>	
		· -	a.1. Attacks and indicators of potential attacks in accordance with [Assignment: organization-	(i.e., part of perimeter defense and boundary protection). Internal monitoring includes the	7,AU-9,AU-12,CA-					
			defined monitoring objectives]; and		7,IR-4,PE-3,RA-5,SC-					
			a.2. Unauthorized local, network, and remote connections; b. Identifies unauthorized use of the information system through [Assignment: organization-	information systems, for example, by observing audit activities in real time or by observing other system aspects such as access patterns, characteristics of access, and other actions.	7,SC-26,SC-35,SI-3,SI-					
			defined techniques and methods];	The monitoring objectives may guide determination of the events. Information system	ľ					
			c. Deploys monitoring devices:	monitoring capability is achieved through a variety of tools and techniques (e.g., intrusion						
			c.1. Strategically within the information system to collect organization-determined essential	detection systems, intrusion prevention systems, malicious code protection software,						
			information; and c.2. At ad hoc locations within the system to track specific types of transactions of interest to the	scanning tools, audit record monitoring software, network monitoring software). Strategic locations for monitoring devices include, for example, selected perimeter locations and near						
			organization;	server farms supporting critical applications, with such devices typically being employed at						
			d. Protects information obtained from intrusion-monitoring tools from unauthorized access,	the managed interfaces associated with controls SC-7 and AC-17. Einstein network						
			modification, and deletion;	monitoring devices from the Department of Homeland Security can also be included as						
			 e. Heightens the level of information system monitoring activity whenever there is an indication of increased risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the 	monitoring devices. The granularity of monitoring information collected is based on organizational monitoring objectives and the capability of information systems to support						
			Nation based on law enforcement information, intelligence information, or other credible sources	such objectives. Specific types of transactions of interest include, for example, Hyper Text						
			of information;	Transfer Protocol (HTTP) traffic that bypasses HTTP proxies. Information system monitoring						
			f. Obtains legal opinion with regard to information system monitoring activities in accordance with							
			applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, or regulations; and g. Provides [Assignment: organization-defined information system monitoring information] to	Output from system monitoring serves as input to continuous monitoring and incident response programs. A network connection is any connection with a device that						
			[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] [Selection (one or more): as needed;	communicates through a network (e.g., local area network, Internet). A remote connection						
			[Assignment: organization-defined frequency]].	is any connection with a device communicating through an external network (e.g., the						
				Internet). Local, network, and remote connections can be either wired or wireless.						
									<u>L</u> _	
SI-4 (1)	2	System and Information Integrity Information	The organization connects and configures individual intrusion detection tools into an information							
		System Monitoring System-Wide Intrusion Detection System	system-wide intrusion detection system.							
SI-4 (2)	2	System and Information Integrity Information	The organization employs automated tools to support near real-time analysis of events.	Automated tools include, for example, host-based, network-based, transport-based, or				Х	х	
,=/		System Monitoring Automated Tools for Real-		storage-based event monitoring tools or Security Information and Event Management						
		Time Analysis		(SIEM) technologies that provide real time analysis of alerts and/or notifications generated						
SI-4 (3)	2	System and Information Integrity Information	The organization employs automated tools to integrate intrusion detection tools into access	by organizational information systems.						
31-4 (3)	2	System Monitoring Automated Tool Integration	control and flow control mechanisms for rapid response to attacks by enabling reconfiguration of							
			these mechanisms in support of attack isolation and elimination.							
SI-4 (4)	2	System and Information Integrity Information	The information system monitors inbound and outbound communications traffic [Assignment:	Unusual/unauthorized activities or conditions related to information system inbound and				Х	X	
		System Monitoring Inbound and Outbound Communications Traffic	organization-defined frequency] for unusual or unauthorized activities or conditions.	outbound communications traffic include, for example, internal traffic that indicates the presence of malicious code within organizational information systems or propagating						
		Communications riujic		among system components, the unauthorized exporting of information, or signaling to						
				external information systems. Evidence of malicious code is used to identify potentially						
				compromised information systems or information system components.						
SI-4 (5)	2	System and Information Integrity Information	The information system alerts [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] when the	Alerts may be generated from a variety of sources, including, for example, audit records or	AU-5,PE-6			Х	X	
2.4(3)	-	System Monitoring System-Generated Alerts	following indications of compromise or potential compromise occur: [Assignment: organization-	inputs from malicious code protection mechanisms, intrusion detection or prevention	-,				ľ	
			defined compromise indicators].	mechanisms, or boundary protection devices such as firewalls, gateways, and routers.						
				Alerts can be transmitted, for example, telephonically, by electronic mail messages, or by						
				text messaging. Organizational personnel on the notification list can include, for example, system administrators, mission/business owners, system owners, or information system						
				security officers.						
SI-4 (6)	2	System and Information Integrity Information X								[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-6 (10)]
		System Monitoring Restrict Non-Privileged Users								
				1					1	1

Control ID	Level	Control Name Withdrawn	Control Text	Supplemental Guidance	Related Controls	Priority	Low Mod	High	Notes
SI-4 (7)	2	System and Information Integrity Information	The information system notifies [Assignment: organization-defined incident response personnel	Least-disruptive actions may include, for example, initiating requests for human responses.					
		System Monitoring Automated Response to Suspicious Events	(identified by name and/or by role)] of detected suspicious events and takes [Assignment: organization-defined least-disruptive actions to terminate suspicious events].						
SI-4 (8)	2	System and Information Integrity Information X System Monitoring Protection of Monitoring Information							[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-4]
SI-4 (9)	2	System and Information Integrity Information System Monitoring Testing of Monitoring Tools	The organization tests intrusion-monitoring tools [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].	Testing intrusion-monitoring tools is necessary to ensure that the tools are operating correctly and continue to meet the monitoring objectives of organizations. The frequency of testing depends on the types of tools used by organizations and methods of deployment.	CP-9				
SI-4 (10)	2	System and Information Integrity Information System Monitoring Visibility of Encrypted Communications	The organization makes; provisions so that [Assignment: organization-defined encrypted communications traffic] is visible to [Assignment: organization-defined information system monitoring tools].	Organizations bolance the potentially conflicting needs for encrypting communications traffic and for having insight into such traffic from a monitoring perspective. For some organizations, the need to ensure the confidentiality of communications traffic is paramount; for others, mission-assurance is of greater concern. Organizations determine whether the visibility requirement applies to internal encrypted traffic, encrypted traffic intended for external destinations, or a subset of the traffic types.					
SI-4 (11)	2	System and Information Integrity Information System Monitoring Analyze Communications Traffic Anomalies	The organization analyzes outbound communications traffic at the external boundary of the information system and selected [Assignment: organization-defined interior points within the system (e.g., subnetworks, subsystems)] to discover anomalies.	Anomalies within organizational information systems include, for example, large file transfers, long-time persistent connections, unusual protocols and ports in use, and attempted communications with suspected malicious external addresses.					
SI-4 (12)	2	System and Information Integrity Information System Monitoring Automated Alerts	The organization employs automated mechanisms to alert security personnel of the following inappropriate or unusual activities with security implications: [Assignment: organization-defined activities that trigger alerts].	This control enhancement focuses on the security alerts generated by organizations and transmitted using automated means. In contrast to the alerts generated by information systems in St-4 (s), which tend to facus on information sources internal to the systems (e.g., audit records), the sources of information for this enhancement can include other entities as well (e.g., suspicious activity reports, reports on potential insider threats).	AC-18,IA-3				
SI-4 (13)	2	System and Information Integrity Information System Monitoring Analyze Traffic / Event Patterns	The arganization: (a) Analyzes communications traffic/event patterns for the information system; (b) Develops profiles representing common traffic patterns and/or events; and (c) Uses the traffic/event profiles in tuning system-monitoring devices to reduce the number of false positives and the number of false negatives.						
SI-4 (14)	2	System and Information Integrity Information System Monitoring Wireless Intrusion Detection	The arganization employs a wireless intrusion detaction system to identify roque wireless devices and to detect attack attempts and potential compromises/breaches to the information system.	Wireless signals may radiate beyond the confines of arganization-controlled facilities. Organizations proactively search for unauthorized wireless connections including the conduct of thorough scans for unauthorized wireless access points. Scans are not limited to those areas within facilities containing information systems, but also include areas outside of facilities as needed, to verify that unauthorized wireless access points are not connected to the systems.	AC-18,IA-3				
SI-4 (15)	2	System and Information Integrity Information System Monitoring Wireless to Wireline Communications	The organization employs an intrusion detection system to monitor wireless communications traffic as the traffic passes from wireless to wireline networks.		AC-18				
SI-4 (16)	2	System and Information Integrity Information System Monitoring Correlate Monitoring Information	The organization correlates information from monitoring tools employed throughout the information system.	Correlating information from different monitoring tools can provide a more comprehensive view of information system activity. The correlation of monitoring tools that usually work in isolation (e.g. Nost monitoring, network monitoring, anti-virus software) can provide an arganization-wide view and in so doing, may reveal otherwise unseen attack patterns. Understanding the capabilities/limitations of diverse monitoring tools and how to maximize the utility of information generated by those tools can help organizations to build, operate, and maintain effective monitoring programs.					
SI-4 (17)	2	System and information integrity Information System Monitoring Integrated Situational Awareness	The organization correlates information from monitoring physical, cyber, and supply chain activities to achieve integrated, organization-wide situational awareness.	This control enhancement correlates monitoring information from a more diverse set of information sources to achieve integrated situational awareness. Integrated situational owareness from a combination of physical, cyber, and supply chain monitoring activities enhances the capability of organizations to more quickly detect sophisticated cyber attacks and investigate the methods and techniques employed to carry out such attacks. In contrast to 5-4 (16) which correlates the various cyber monitoring information, this control enhancement correlates monitoring beyond just the cyber domain. Such monitoring may help reveal attacks on organizations that are operating across multiple attack vectors.	SA-12				
SI-4 (18)	2	System and Information Integrity Information System Monitoring Analyze Traffic / Covert Exfiltration	The organization analyzes outbound communications traffic at the external boundary of the information system (i.e., system perimeter) and at [Assignment: organization-defined interior points within the system (e.g., subsystems, subnetworks)] to detect covert exfiltration of information.	Covert means that can be used for the unauthorized exfiltration of organizational information include, for example, steganography.					
SI-4 (19)	2	System and information Integrity Information System Monitoring Individuals Posing Greater Risk	The organization implements [Assignment: organization-defined additional monitoring] of individuals who have been identified by [Assignment: organization-defined sources] as posing an increased level of risk.	Indications of increased risk from individuals can be obtained from a variety of sources including, for example, human resource records, intelligence agencies, low enforcement organizations, and/or other credible sources. The monitoring of individuals is closely coordinated with management, legal, security, and human resources officials within organizations conducting such monitoring and complies with federal legislation, Executive Orders, policies, directives, regulations, and standards.					
SI-4 (20)	2	System and Information Integrity Information System Monitoring Privileged Users	The organization implements [Assignment: organization-defined additional monitoring] of privileged users.						
SI-4 (21)	2	System and Information Integrity Information System Monitoring Probationary Periods	The organization implements [Assignment: organization-defined additional monitoring] of individuals during [Assignment: organization-defined probationary period].						
SI-4 (22)	2	System and Information Integrity Information System Monitoring Unauthorized Network Services	The information system detects network services that have not been authorized or approved by [Assignment: organization-defined authorization or approval processes] and [Selection (one or more): audits; alerts [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]].	Unauthorized or unapproved network services include, for example, services in service- ariented architectures that lack organizational verification or validation and therefore may be unreliable or serve as malicious rogues for valid services.	AC-6,CM-7,SA-5,SA-9				
SI-4 (23)	2	System and Information Integrity Information System Monitoring Host-Based Devices	The organization implements [Assignment: organization-defined host-based monitoring mechanisms] at [Assignment: organization-defined information system components].	Information system components where host-based monitoring can be implemented include, for example, servers, workstations, and mobile devices. Organizations consider employing host-based monitoring mechanisms from multiple information technology product developers.					
SI-4 (24)	2	System and Information Integrity Information System Monitoring Indicators of Compromise	The information system discovers, collects, distributes, and uses indicators of compromise.	Indicators of compramise (IOC) are forensic artifacts from intrusions that are identified on organizational information systems (at the host or network level). IOCs provide organizations with valuable information on objects or information systems that have been compromised. IOCs for the discovery of compromised hosts can include for example, the creation of registry key values. IOCs for network striffic include, for example, Universal Resource Locator (URL) or protocol elements that indicate malware command and control servers. The rapid distribution and adoption of IOCs can improve information security by reducing the time that information systems and organizations are vulnerable to the same exploit or attack.					

Control ID	1474		Withdrawn	Control Text	Supplemental Guidance The United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) generates security alerts	Related Controls	Priority D1	LOW I	viole H	ugio I	Notes
SI-5	1	System and Information Integrity Security Alerts, Advisories, and Directives		The organization: a. Receives information system security alerts, advisories, and directives from [Assignment: organization-defined external organizations] on an ongoing basis; b. Generates internal security alerts, advisories, and directives as deemed necessary; c. Disseminates security alerts, advisories, and directives to: [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined elements within the organization-defined personnel or roles]; [Assignment: organization-defined elements within the organization; [Assignment: organization]; and d. Implements security directives in accordance with established time frames, or notifies the issuing organization of the degree of noncompliance.	and advisories to maintain situational awareness across the federal government. Security directives are issued by OMB or other designated organizations with the responsibility and authority to issue such directives. Compliance to security directives is essential due to the		P1	X X	x x		
SI-5 (1)	2	System and Information Integrity Security Alerts, Advisories, and Directives Automated Alerts and Advisories		The organization employs automated mechanisms to make security alert and advisory information available throughout the organization.	The significant number of changes to organizational information systems and the environments in which those systems operate requires the dissemination of security-related information to a variety of organizational entities that have a direct interest in the success of organizational missions and business functions. Based on the information provided by the security alerts and advisories, changes may be required at one or more of the three tiers related to the management of information security risk including the governance level, mission/business process/enterprise architecture level, and the information system level.				X		
SI-6	1	System and Information Integrity Security Function Verification		The information system: a. Verifies the correct operation of [Assignment: organization-defined security functions]; b. Performs this verification [Selection (one or more]; [Assignment: organization-defined system transitional states]; upon command by user with appropriate privilege; [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; c. Notifies [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] of failed security verification tests and d. [Selection (one or more): shuts the information system down; restarts the information system; [Assignment: organization-defined alternative action(s)]] when anomalies are discovered.	Transitional states for information systems include, for example, system startup, restart, shutdown, and abort. Notifications provided by information systems include, for example, electronic alerts to system administrators, messages to local computer consoles, and/or hardware indications such as lights.	CA-7,CM-6	P1		x		
SI-6 (1)	2	System and Information Integrity Security Function Verification Notification of Failed Security Tests	Х								[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-6]
SI-6 (2)	2	System and Information Integrity Security Function Verification Automation Support for Distributed Testing		The information system implements automated mechanisms to support the management of distributed security testing.		SI-2					
SI-6 (3)	2	System and Information Integrity Security Function Verification Report Verification Results		The organization reports the results of security function verification to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].	Organizational personnel with potential interest in security function verification results include, for example, senior information security officers, information system security managers, and information systems security officers.	SA-12,SI-4,SI-5					
SI-7	1	System and Information Integrity Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity		The organization employs integrity verification tools to detect unauthorized changes to [Assignment: organization-defined software, firmware, and information].	Unauthorized changes to software, firmware, and information can occur due to errors or malicious activity (e.g., tampering). Software includes, for example, operating systems (with key internal components such as kernels, drivers), middleware, and applications. Firmware includes, for example, the Basic Input Output System (BiOS). Information includes metadata such as security attributes associated with information. State-of-the-practice integrity-checking mechanisms (e.g., parity checks, cyclical redundancy checks, cryptographic hashes) and associated tools can automatically monitor the integrity of information systems and hosted applications.	SA-12,SC-8,SC-13,SI-3	P1		x x		
SI-7 (1)	2	System and Information Integrity Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity Integrity Checks		The information system performs an integrity check of [Assignment: organization-defined software, firmware, and information] [Selection (one or more): at startup; at [Assignment: organization-defined transitional states or security-relevant events]; [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]].	Security-relevant events include, for example, the identification of a new threat to which arganizational information systems are susceptible, and the installation of new hardware, software, or firmware. Transitional states include, for example, system startup, restart, shutdown, and abort.			,	ζ χ		
SI-7 (2)	2	System and Information Integrity Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity Automated Notifications of Integrity Violations		The organization employs automated tools that provide notification to [Assignment: organization- defined personnel or roles] upon discovering discrepancies during integrity verification.	The use of automated tools to report integrity violations and to notify organizational personnel in a timely matter is an essential precursor to effective six response. Personnel having an interest in integrity violations include, for example, mission/business owners, information system owners, systems administrators, software developers, systems integrators, and information security officers.				X		
SI-7 (3)	2	System and Information Integrity Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity Centrally- Managed Integrity Tools		The organization employs centrally managed integrity verification tools.		AU-3,SI-2,SI-8					
SI-7 (4)	2	System and Information Integrity Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity Tamper- Evident Packaging	Х								[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-12]
SI-7 (5)	2	System and Information Integrity Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity Automated Response to Integrity Violations		The information system automatically [Selection (one or more): shuts the information system down; restarts the information system; implements [Assignment: organization-defined security sofeguards]] when integrity violations are discovered.	Organizations may define different integrity checking and normaly responses: (i) by type of information (e.g., Jirmware, software, user dato); (ii) by specific information (e.g., boot firmware, boot firmware for a specific types of machines); or (iii) a combination of both. Automatic implementation of specific safeguards within organizational information systems includes, for example, reversing the changes, halting the information system, or triggering audit alerts when unauthorized modifications to critical security files occur.				x		
SI-7 (6)	2	System and Information Integrity Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity Cryptographic Protection		The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to detect unauthorized changes to software, firmware, and information.	Cryptographic mechanisms used for the protection of integrity include, for example, digital signatures and the computation and application of signed hashes using asymmetric cryptography, protecting the confidentiality of the yeards to generate the hash, and using the public key to verify the hash information.	SC-13					
SI-7 (7)		System and Information Integrity Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity Integration of Detection and Response		The organization incorporates the detection of unauthorized [Assignment: organization-defined security-relevant changes to the information system] into the organizational incident response copability.	This control enhancement helps to ensure that detected events are tracked, monitored, corrected, and available for historical purposes. Maintaining historical records is important both for being able to identify and discern adversary actions over an extended period of time and for possible legal actions. Security-relevant changes include, for example, unauthorized changes to established configuration settings or unauthorized elevation of information system privileges.	IR-4,IR-5,SI-4		į,	x x		
SI-7 (8)	2	System and Information Integrity Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity Auditing Capability for Significant Events		The information system, upon detection of a potential integrity violation, provides the capability to audit the event and initiates the following actions: [Selection (one or more): generates an audit record; alerts current user; alerts [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]; [Assignment: organization-defined other actions]].	Organizations select response actions based on types of software, specific software, or	AU-2,AU-6,AU-12					
SI-7 (9)	2	System and Information Integrity Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity Verify Boot Process		The information system verifies the integrity of the boot process of (Assignment: organization-defined devices).	Ensuring the integrity of boot processes is critical to starting devices in known/trustworthy states. Integrity verification mechanisms provide organizational personnel with assurance that only trusted code is executed during boot processes.						

SI-7 (10)	2	System and Information Integrity Software.	witalaraWii	Control Text The information system implements [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to	Supplemental Guidance Unauthorized modifications to boot firmware may be indicative of a sophisticated,	Related Controls	Priority	LOW	WIOG	High	Notes
31-7 (10)	2	Firmware, and Information Integrity Protection		protect the integrity of boot firmware in [Assignment: organization-defined devices].	targeted cyber attack. These types of cyber attacks can result in a permanent denial of						
1		of Boot Firmware			service (e.g., if the firmware is corrupted) or a persistent malicious code presence (e.g., if						
(L					code is embedded within the firmware). Devices can protect the integrity of the boot						
1					firmware in organizational information systems by: (i) verifying the integrity and						
(L					authenticity of all updates to the boot firmware prior to applying changes to the boot devices; and (ii) preventing unauthorized processes from modifying the boot firmware.						
(L					devices, and (ii) preventing and an orized processes from modifying the book firmware.						
SI-7 (11)	2	System and Information Integrity Software,		The organization requires that [Assignment: organization-defined user-installed software] execute	Organizations identify software that may be of greater concern with regard to origin or						
1		Firmware, and Information Integrity Confined		in a confined physical or virtual machine environment with limited privileges.	potential for containing malicious code. For this type of software, user installations occur in						
(L		Environments with Limited Privileges			confined environments of operation to limit or contain damage from malicious code that						
SI-7 (12)	2	System and Information Integrity Software,		The organization requires that the integrity of [Assignment: organization-defined user-installed	may be executed. Organizations verify the integrity of user-installed software prior to execution to reduce the			+		+	
31-7 (12)	2	Firmware, and Information Integrity Integrity		software] be verified prior to execution.	likelihood of executing malicious code or code that contains errors from unauthorized						
(L		Verification			modifications. Organizations consider the practicality of approaches to verifying software						
1					integrity including, for example, availability of checksums of adequate trustworthiness						
					from software developers or vendors.						
SI-7 (13)	2	System and Information Integrity Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity Code		The organization allows execution of binary or machine-executable code obtained from sources with limited or no warranty and without the provision of source code only in confined physical or	This control enhancement applies to all sources of binary or machine-executable code including, for example, commercial software/firmware and open source software.						
(L		Execution in Protected Environments		virtual machine environments and with the explicit approval of [Assignment: organization-defined	medaling, for example, commercial software, firmware and open source software.						
\longrightarrow				personnel or roles].							
SI-7 (14)	2	System and Information Integrity Software,		The organization:	This control enhancement applies to all sources of binary or machine-executable code	SA-5				X	
(l		Firmware, and Information Integrity Binary or Machine Executable Code		(a) Prohibits the use of binary or machine-executable code from sources with limited or no warranty and without the provision of source code; and	including, for example, commercial software/firmware and open source software. Organizations assess software products without accompanying source code from sources						
1		Muchine Executable Code		(b) Provides exceptions to the source code requirement only for compelling mission/operational	with limited or no warranty for potential security impacts. The assessments address the						
1				requirements and with the approval of the authorizing official.	fact that these types of software products may be very difficult to review, repair, or extend,						
1					given that organizations, in most cases, do not have access to the original source code, and						
					there may be no owners who could make such repairs on behalf of organizations.						
61.7/151	-	Custom and Information Intensity Cof-		The information system involvments as attacamble mechanisms to system (************************************	Contenentia authorization includes for authorization that as f						
SI-7 (15)	2	System and Information Integrity Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity Code		The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to authenticate [Assignment: organization-defined software or firmware components] prior to installation.	Cryptographic authentication includes, for example, verifying that software or firmware components have been digitally signed using certificates recognized and approved by			1			
(I		Authentication		g	organizations. Code signing is an effective method to protect against malicious code.			1			
oxed											
SI-7 (16)	2	System and Information Integrity Software,		The organization does not allow processes to execute without supervision for more than	This control enhancement addresses processes for which normal execution periods can be						
		Firmware, and Information Integrity Time Limit		[Assignment: organization-defined time period].	determined and situations in which organizations exceed such periods. Supervision						
		on Process Execution W/O Supervision			includes, for example, operating system timers, automated responses, or manual oversight and response when information system process anomalies occur.						
					and response when injurnation system process unormalies occur.						
SI-8	1	System and Information Integrity Spam		The organization:	Information system entry and exit points include, for example, firewalls, electronic mail	AT-2,AT-3,SC-5,SC-	P2		х	х	
(L		Protection		a. Employs spam protection mechanisms at information system entry and exit points to detect and	servers, web servers, proxy servers, remote-access servers, workstations, mobile devices,	7,SI-3					
(L				take action on unsolicited messages; and	and notebook/laptop computers. Spam can be transported by different means including, for						
(L				b. Updates spam protection mechanisms when new releases are available in accordance with	example, electronic mail, electronic mail attachments, and web accesses. Spam protection						
(L				organizational configuration management policy and procedures.	mechanisms include, for example, signature definitions.						
SI-8 (1)	2	System and Information Integrity Spam		The organization centrally manages spam protection mechanisms.	Central management is the organization-wide management and implementation of spam	AU-3.SI-2.SI-7			x	X	
1		Protection Central Management			protection mechanisms. Central management includes planning, implementing, assessing,						
1					authorizing, and monitoring the organization-defined, centrally managed spam protection						
510(2)	-	Control and to form of the total and the Linear		The later with the state of the	security controls.			+			
SI-8 (2)	2	System and Information Integrity Spam Protection Automatic Updates		The information system automatically updates spam protection mechanisms.					^	^	
SI-8 (3)	2	System and Information Integrity Spam		The information system implements spam protection mechanisms with a learning capability to	Learning mechanisms include, for example, Bayesian filters that respond to user inputs						
1 1		Protection Continuous Learning Capability		more effectively identify legitimate communications traffic.	identifying specific traffic as spam or legitimate by updating algorithm parameters and						
\vdash					thereby more accurately separating types of traffic.						
SI-9	1	System and Information Integrity Information	Х								[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-2, AC-3, AC-5, AC-6]
SI-10	1	Input Restrictions System and Information Integrity Information		The information system checks the validity of [Assignment: organization-defined information	Checking the valid syntax and semantics of information system inputs (e.g., character set,		P1		x	x	
[]		Input Validation		inputs].	length, numerical range, and acceptable values) verifies that inputs match specified					1	
1					definitions for format and content. Software applications typically follow well-defined						
1					protocols that use structured messages (i.e., commands or queries) to communicate						
(L					between software modules or system components. Structured messages can contain raw or						
(L					unstructured data interspersed with metadata or control information. If software applications use attacker-supplied inputs to construct structured messages without properly						
1					encoding such messages, then the attacker could insert malicious commands or special						
1					characters that can cause the data to be interpreted as control information or metadata.						
1					Consequently, the module or component that receives the tainted output will perform the						
1					wrong operations or otherwise interpret the data incorrectly. Prescreening inputs prior to						
					passing to interpreters prevents the content from being unintentionally interpreted as commands. Input validation helps to ensure accurate and correct inputs and prevent attacks						
					such as cross-site scripting and a variety of injection attacks.						
					and a second decided.						
SI-10 (1)	2	System and Information Integrity Information		The information system:		CM-3,CM-5		1			
(L		Input Validation Manual Override Capability		(a) Provides a manual override capability for input validation of [Assignment: organization-defined inputs];				1			
1								1			
, l				(b) Restricts the use of the manual override capability to only [Assignment: organization-defined		1	1	1	1		
				authorized individuals]; and							The state of the s
				(c) Audits the use of the manual override capability.							
SI-10 (2)	2	System and Information Integrity Information		(c) Audits the use of the manual override capability. The organization ensures that input validation errors are reviewed and resolved within	Resolution of input validation errors includes, for example, correcting systemic causes of						
SI-10 (2)	2	System and Information Integrity Information Input Validation Review / Resolution of Errors		(c) Audits the use of the manual override capability.	Resolution of input validation errors includes, for example, correcting systemic causes of errors and resubmitting transactions with corrected input.						
		Input Validation Review / Resolution of Errors		(c) Audits the use of the manual override capability. The organization ensures that input validation errors are reviewed and resolved within [Assignment: organization-defined time period].	errors and resubmitting transactions with corrected input.						
				(c) Audits the use of the manual override capability. The organization ensures that input validation errors are reviewed and resolved within	errors and resubmitting transactions with corrected input. A common vulnerability in organizational information systems is unpredictable behavior when invalid inputs are received. This control enhancement ensures that there is						
		Input Validation Review / Resolution of Errors System and Information Integrity Information		(c) Audits the use of the manual override capability. The organization ensures that input validation errors are reviewed and resolved within [Assignment: organization-defined time period]. The information system behaves in a predictable and documented manner that reflects	errors and resubmitting transactions with corrected input. A common vulnerability in organizational information systems is unpredictable behavior when invoild inputs are received. This control enhancement ensures that there is predictable behavior in the face of invoild inputs by specifying information system						
		Input Validation Review / Resolution of Errors System and Information Integrity Information		(c) Audits the use of the manual override capability. The organization ensures that input validation errors are reviewed and resolved within [Assignment: organization-defined time period]. The information system behaves in a predictable and documented manner that reflects	errors and resubmitting transactions with corrected input. A common vulnerability in organizational information systems is unpredictable behavior when invalid inputs are received. This control enhancement ensures that there is predictable behavior in the face of invalid inputs by specifying information system responses that facilitate transitioning the system to known states without adverse,						
SI-10 (3)	2	Input Validation Review / Resolution of Errors System and Information Integrity Information Input Validation Predictable Behavior		(c) Audits the use of the manual override copability. The organization ensures that input validation errors are reviewed and resolved within [Assignment: organization-defined time period]. The information system behaves in a predictable and documented manner that reflects organizational and system objectives when invalid inputs are received.	errors and resubmitting transactions with corrected input. A common vulnerability in organizational information systems is unpredictable behavior when involid inputs are received. This control enhancement ensures that there is predictable behavior in the face of jinvalid inputs by specifying information system responses that facilitate transitioning the system to known states without adverse, unintended side effects.						
SI-10 (3)	2	Input Validation Review / Resolution of Errors System and Information Integrity Information Input Validation Predictable Behavior System and Information Integrity Information		(c) Audits the use of the manual override capability. The organization ensures that input validation errors are reviewed and resolved within [Assignment: organization-defined time period]. The information system behaves in a predictable and documented manner that reflects organizational and system objectives when invalid inputs are received. The organization accounts for timing interactions among information system components in	errors and resubmitting transactions with corrected input. A common vulnerability in organizational information systems is unpredictable behavior when invalid inputs are received. This control enhancement ensures that there is predictable behavior in the face of invalid injust by specifying information system responses that facilitate transitioning the system to known states without adverse, unintended side effects. In addressing invalid information system inputs received across protocol interfaces, timing						
SI-10 (3)	2	Input Validation Review / Resolution of Errors System and Information Integrity Information Input Validation Predictable Behavior		(c) Audits the use of the manual override copability. The organization ensures that input validation errors are reviewed and resolved within [Assignment: organization-defined time period]. The information system behaves in a predictable and documented manner that reflects organizational and system objectives when invalid inputs are received.	errors and resubmitting transactions with corrected input. A common vulnerability in organizational information systems is unpredictable behavior when involid inputs are received. This control enhancement ensures that there is predictable behavior in the face of jinvalid inputs by specifying information system responses that facilitate transitioning the system to known states without adverse, unintended side effects.						
SI-10 (3)	2	Input Validation Review / Resolution of Errors System and Information Integrity Information Input Validation Predictable Behavior System and Information Integrity Information		(c) Audits the use of the manual override capability. The organization ensures that input validation errors are reviewed and resolved within [Assignment: organization-defined time period]. The information system behaves in a predictable and documented manner that reflects organizational and system objectives when invalid inputs are received. The organization accounts for timing interactions among information system components in	errors and resubmitting transactions with corrected input. A common vulnerability in organizational information systems is unpredictable behavior when involid inputs are received. This control enhancement ensures that there is predictable behavior in the face of invalid inputs by specifying information system responses that facilitate transitioning the system to known states without adverse, unintended side effects. In addressing invalid information system inputs received across protocol interfaces, timing interactions become relevant, where one protocol needs to consider the impact of the error						
SI-10 (3)	2	Input Validation Review / Resolution of Errors System and Information Integrity Information Input Validation Predictable Behavior System and Information Integrity Information		(c) Audits the use of the manual override capability. The organization ensures that input validation errors are reviewed and resolved within [Assignment: organization-defined time period]. The information system behaves in a predictable and documented manner that reflects organizational and system objectives when invalid inputs are received. The organization accounts for timing interactions among information system components in	errors and resubmitting transactions with corrected input. A common vulnerability in organizational information systems is unpredictable behavior when invoid inputs are received. This control enhancement ensures that there is predictable behavior in the face of invoid inputs by specifying information system responses that facilitate transitioning the system to known states without adverse, unintended side effects. In addressing invalid information system inputs received across protocol interfaces, timing interactions become relevant, where one protocol needs to consider the impact of the error response on other protocols within the protocol stack. For example, 802.11 standard wireless network protocols do not interact well with Transmission Control Protocols (TCP) when packets are dropped (which could be due to invoid packet input). TCP assumes						
SI-10 (3)	2	Input Validation Review / Resolution of Errors System and Information Integrity Information Input Validation Predictable Behavior System and Information Integrity Information		(c) Audits the use of the manual override capability. The organization ensures that input validation errors are reviewed and resolved within [Assignment: organization-defined time period]. The information system behaves in a predictable and documented manner that reflects organizational and system objectives when invalid inputs are received. The organization accounts for timing interactions among information system components in	errors and resubmitting transactions with corrected input. A common vulnerability in organizational information systems is unpredictable behavior when invalid inputs are received. This control enhancement ensures that there is predictable behavior in the face of invalid inputs by specifying information system responses that facilitate transitioning the system to known states without adverse, unintended side effects. In addressing invalid information system inputs received across protocol interfaces, timing interactions become relevant, where one protocol needs to consider the impact of the error response on other protocods within the protocol stack. For example, 802.11 standard wireless network protocods do not interact well with Transmission Control Protocols (TCP) when packets are dropped (which could be due to invalid packet input). TCP assumes packet losses are due to congestion, while packets solt over 802.11 links are typically						
SI-10 (3)	2	Input Validation Review / Resolution of Errors System and Information Integrity Information Input Validation Predictable Behavior System and Information Integrity Information		(c) Audits the use of the manual override capability. The organization ensures that input validation errors are reviewed and resolved within [Assignment: organization-defined time period]. The information system behaves in a predictable and documented manner that reflects organizational and system objectives when invalid inputs are received. The organization accounts for timing interactions among information system components in	errors and resubmitting transactions with corrected input. A common vulnerability in organizational information systems is unpredictable behavior when invoid inputs are received. This control enhancement ensures that there is predictable behavior in the face of jurialid inputs by specifying information system responses that facilitate transitioning the system to known states without adverse, unintended side effects. In addressing invalid information system inputs received across protocol interfaces, timing interactions become relevant, where one protocol needs to consider the impact of the error response on other protocols within the protocol stack. For example, 802.11 standard wireless network protocols do not interact well with Transmission Control Protocols (TCP) when packets are dropped (which could be due to involid packet input). TCP assumes packet losses are due to confession, while packets lost over 802.11 links are typically dropped due to collisions or noise on the link. If TCP makes a congestion response, it takes						
SI-10 (3)	2	Input Validation Review / Resolution of Errors System and Information Integrity Information Input Validation Predictable Behavior System and Information Integrity Information		(c) Audits the use of the manual override capability. The organization ensures that input validation errors are reviewed and resolved within [Assignment: organization-defined time period]. The information system behaves in a predictable and documented manner that reflects organizational and system objectives when invalid inputs are received. The organization accounts for timing interactions among information system components in	errors and resubmitting transactions with corrected input. A common vulnerability in organizational information systems is unpredictable behavior when involid injurs are received. This control enhancement ensures that there is predictable behavior in the face of invalid injurst by specifying information system responses that focilitate transitioning the system to known states without adverse, unintended side effects. In addressing invalid information system inputs received across protocol interfaces, timing interactions become relevant, where one protocol needs to consider the impact of the error response on other protocols within the protocol stack. For example, 802.11 standard wireless network protocols do not interact well with Transmission Control Protocols (TCP) when packets are dropped (which could be due to involid packet input). TCP assumes packet losses are due to congestion, while packets solt over 802.11 links are typically dropped due to collisions or noise on the link. If TCP makes congestion response, it tokes precisely the wrong action in response to a collision event. Adversaries may be able to use						
SI-10 (3)	2	Input Validation Review / Resolution of Errors System and Information Integrity Information Input Validation Predictable Behavior System and Information Integrity Information		(c) Audits the use of the manual override capability. The organization ensures that input validation errors are reviewed and resolved within [Assignment: organization-defined time period]. The information system behaves in a predictable and documented manner that reflects organizational and system objectives when invalid inputs are received. The organization accounts for timing interactions among information system components in	errors and resubmitting transactions with corrected input. A common vulnerability in organizational information systems is unpredictable behavior when invoid inputs are received. This control enhancement ensures that there is predictable behavior in the face of jurialid inputs by specifying information system responses that facilitate transitioning the system to known states without adverse, unintended side effects. In addressing invalid information system inputs received across protocol interfaces, timing interactions become relevant, where one protocol needs to consider the impact of the error response on other protocols within the protocol stack. For example, 802.11 standard wireless network protocols do not interact well with Transmission Control Protocols (TCP) when packets are dropped (which could be due to involid packet input). TCP assumes packet losses are due to confession, while packets lost over 802.11 links are typically dropped due to collisions or noise on the link. If TCP makes a congestion response, it takes						

Control ID	Level	Control Name	1868h duorra	Control Tout	Supplemental Guidance	Related Controls	Deinsitu	Laur M	lad High	Notes
SI-10 (5)	Level 2	Control Name System and Information Integrity Information Input Validation Restrict Inputs to Trusted Sources and Approved Formats	williawn	Control Text The organization restricts the use of information inputs to [Assignment: organization-defined trusted sources] and/or [Assignment: organization-defined formats].	Supplemental Soutenice This control enhancement applies the concept of whitelisting to information inputs. Specifying known trusted sources for information inputs and acceptable formats for such inputs can reduce the probability of malicious activity.	Related Controls	Priority	Low M	ioa High	Hotes
Si-11	1	System and Information Integrity Error Handling		The information system: a. Generates error messages that provide information necessary for corrective actions without revealing information that could be exploited by adversaries; and b. Reveals error messages only to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].	Organizations carefully consider the structure/content of error messages. The extent to which information systems are able to identify and handle error conditions is guided by organizational policy and operational requirements. Information that could be exploited by adversaries includes, for example, erroneous logon attempts with passwords entered by mistake as the userame, mission/business information that can be derived from (if not stated explicitly by) information recorded, and personal information such as account numbers, social security numbers, and credit card numbers. In addition, error messages may provide a covert channel for transmitting information.	AU-2,AU-3,SC-31	P2	x	x	
SI-12	1	System and Information Integrity Information Handling and Retention		The organization handles and retains information within the information system and information output from the system in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and operational requirements.	Information handling and retention requirements cover the full life cycle of information, in some cases extending beyond the disposal of information systems. The National Archives and Records Administration provides guidance on records retention.	AC-16,AU-5,AU- 11,MP-2,MP-4	P2	х	х	
SI-13	1	System and Information Integrity Predictable Fallure Prevention		The organization: a. Determines mean time to failure (MTTF) for [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] in specific environments of operation; and b. Provides substitute information system components and a means to exchange active and standby components at [Assignment: organization-defined MTTF substitution criteria].	While MTTF is primarily a reliability issue, this control addresses potential failures of specific information system components that provide security capability. Failure rates reflect installation-specific consideration, not industry-average. Organizations define criteria for substitution of information system components based on MTTF value with consideration for resulting potential harm from component failures. Transfer or responsibilities between active and standby components does not compromise safety, operational readiness, or security capability (e.g., preservation of state variables). Standby components remain available at all times except for maintenance issues or recovery failures in progress.		PO			
SI-13 (1)		System and Information Integrity Predictable Failure Prevention Transferring Component Responsibilities		The organization takes information system components out of service by transferring component responsibilities to substitute components no later than [Assignment: organization-defined fraction or percentage] of mean time to failure.						
SI-13 (2)	2	System and Information Integrity Predictable Failure Prevention Time Limit on Process Execution Without Supervision	Х							[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-7 (16)]
SI-13 (3)	2	Execution Without Supervision System and Information Integrity Predictable Failure Prevention Manual Transfer Between Components		The organization manually initiates transfers between active and standby information system components [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] if the mean time to failure exceeds [Assignment: organization-defined time period].						
SI-13 (4)	2	System and Information Integrity Predictable Failure Prevention Standby Component Installation / Notification		The organization, if information system component failures are detected: (a) Ensures that the standby components are successfully and transparently installed within [Assignment: organization-defined time period]; and did not consider the period of the p	Automatic or manual transfer of components from standby to active mode can occur, for example, upon detection of component failures.					
SI-13 (5)	2	System and Information Integrity Predictable Failure Prevention Failover Capability		The organization provides [Selection: real-time; near real-time] [Assignment: organization-defined failover capability] for the information system.	Failover refers to the automatic switchover to an alternate information system upon the failure of the primary information system. Failover capability includes, for example, incorporating mirrored information system operations at alternate processing sites or periodic data mirroring at regular intervals defined by recovery time periods of orannizations.					
SI-14		System and Information Integrity Non-Persistence		The organization implements non-persistent [Assignment: organization-defined information system components and services] that are initiated in a known state and terminated [Selection (one or more): upon end of session of use; periodically at [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]].	the targeting capability of adversaries (i.e., window of opportunity and available attack surface) to initize and complete cyber attacks. By implementing the concept of non-persistence for selected information system components, organizations can provide a known state computing resource for a specific period of time that does not give adversaries sufficient time on target to exploit vulnerabilities in organizational information systems and the environments in which those systems operate. Since the advanced persistent threat is a high-end threat with regard to capability, intent, and targeting, organizations assume that over an extended period of time, a percentage of cyber attacks will be successful. Non-persistent information system components and services are activated as required using protected information and terminated periodically or upon the end of sessions. Non-persistence increases the work factor of adversaries in attempting to compromise or breach organizational information systems. Non-persistent system components can be implemented, for example, by periodically re-imaging components or by using a variety of common virtualization techniques. Non-persistent). The benefit of periodic refreshes of information systems components can be implemented using virtualization techniques as part of virtual machines or an environment of processes on physical machines (either persistent or non-persistent). The benefit of periodic refreshes of information system components/services is that it does not require organizations to fortermine, the refreshes of information system components or survices have occurred (something that way often be difficult for organizations to determine). The refresh of selected information system components of attacks, but not with such frequency to prevent the spread or intended impact of attacks, but not with such frequency to prevent the spread or intended impact of attacks, but not with such frequency that it makes the information system components of attacks, but not with such freque	Sc-30,Sc-34	PO			
		System and Information Integrity Non- Persistence Refresh from Trusted Sources		The organization ensures that software and data employed during information system component and service refreshes are obtained from [Assignment: organization-defined trusted sources].	from selected off-line secure storage facilities.					
SI-15		System and Information Integrity Information Output Filtering		The information system validates information output from [Assignment: organization-defined software programs and/or applications] to ensure that the information is consistent with the expected content.	Certain types of cyber attacks (e.g., SQL injections) produce output results that are unexpected or inconsistent with the output results that would normally be expected from software programs or applications. This control enhancement focuses on detecting extraneous content, preventing such extraneous content from being displayed, and alerting monitoring tools that anomalous behavior has been discovered.	SI-3,SI-4	P0			
SI-16	1	System and Information Integrity Memory Protection		The information system implements [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to protect its memory from unauthorized code execution.	Some adversaries launch attacks with the intent of executing code in non-executable regions of memory or in memory locations that are prohibited. Security safeguards employed to protect memory include, for example, date axecution prevention and address space layout randomization. Data execution prevention safeguards can either be hardware-enforced or software-enforced with hardware providing the greater strength of mechanism.	AC-25,SC-3	P1	x	x	
SI-17	1	System and Information Integrity Fail-Safe Procedures		The information system implements [Assignment: organization-defined fail-safe procedures] when [Assignment: organization-defined failure conditions occur].	Failure conditions include, for example, loss of communications among critical system components or between system components and operational facilities. Fails-afe procedures include, for example, alerting operator personnel and providing specific instructions on subsequent steps to take (e.g., do nothing, reestablish system settings, shut down processes, restart the system, or contact designated organizational personnel).	CP-12,CP-13,SC-24,SI 13	- PO			
TR	0	Transparency								[Privacy Controls]

Control ID I	ovol	Control Name Withdrawn	Control Text	Supplemental Guidance	Related Controls	Priority Low	Mod	High Notes
TR-1	1	Transparency Privacy Notice	The organization: a. Provides effective notice to the public and to individuals regarding: (i) its activities that impact privacy, including its collection, use, sharing, safeguarding, maintenance, and disposal of personally identifiable information (Pili); (ii) authority for collecting Pil; (iii) the choices, if any, individuals may have regarding how the organization uses Pil and the consequences of exercising or not exercising those choices; and (iv) the ability to access and have Pil amended or corrected if necessary, b. Describes: (i) the Pil the organization collects and the purpose(s) for which it collects that information; (ii) how the organization uses Pil and the purpose(s) for which it collects that information; (ii) how the eta-aliative properties of those entities, and the purpose for such sharing; (iv) whether individuals have the ability to consent to specific uses or sharing of Pil and how to exercise any such consent; (v) how individuals may obtain access to Pil; and (v) how the Pil will be protected; and c. Revises its public notices to reflect changes in practice or policy that affect Pil or changes in its activities that impact privacy, before or as soon as practicable after the change.	demonstrates the privacy considerations that the organization has addressed in implementing its information practices. The organization may provide general public notice through a variety of means, as required by law or policy, including System of Records Notices (SQRNs), Privacy Impact Assessments (PlAs), or in a website privacy policy. As required by the Privacy Act, the organization also provides direct notice to individuals via Privacy Act Statements on the paper and electronic forms it uses to collect PII, or on	AP-1, AP-2, AR-1, AR- 2, [P-1, [P-2, [P-3, UL- 1, UL-2			[Privacy Controls]
TR-1 (1)	2	Transparency Privacy Notice Real-Time or Layered Notice	The organization provides real-time and/or layered notice when it collects PII.	Real-time notice is defined as notice at the point of collection. A layered notice approach involves providing individuals with a summary of key points in the organization's privacy policy. A second notice provides more detailed/specific information.				[Privacy Controls]
TR-2	1	Transparency System of Records Notices and Privacy Act Statements	The organization: a. Publishes System of Records Notices (SORNs) in the Federal Register, subject to required oversight processes, for systems containing personally identifiable information (PII); b. Keeps SORNs current; and c. Includes Pivicy ACt Statements on its forms that collect PII, or on separate forms that can be retained by individuals, to provide additional formal notice to individuals from whom the information is being collected.	Organizations issue SORNs to provide the public notice regarding PII collected in a system of records, which the Privacy Act defines as "a group of any records under the control of any agency from which information is retrieved by the name of an individual or by some identifying number, symbol, or other identifier." SORNs explain how the information is used, retained, and may be corrected, and whether certain protions of the system are subject to Privacy Act exemptions for law enforcement or national security reasons. Privacy Act Statements provide notice of: (i) the authority of organizations to collect PII; (ii) whether providing PII is mandatory or optional; (iii) the principal purpose(s) for which the PII is to be used; (v) the intended disclosures (routine uses) of the information; and (v) the consequences of not providing all or some portion of the information requested. When information is collected verbally, organizations read a Privacy Act Statement prior to initiating the collection of PII (for example, when conducting telephone interviews or surveys).	DI-2			[Privacy Controls]
TR-2 (1)	2	Transparency System of Records Notices and Privacy Act Statements Public Website Publication	The organization publishes SORNs on its public website.					[Privacy Controls]
TR-3	1	Transparency Dissemination of Privacy Program Information	The organization: a. Ensures that the public has access to information about its privacy activities and is able to communicate with its Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy (Officer (CPO); and b. Ensures that its privacy practices are publicly available through organizational websites or otherwise.	Organizations employ different mechanisms for informing the public about their privacy practices including, but not limited to, Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAS), System of Records Notices (SORMs), privacy reports, publicly available web pages, email distributions, blogs, and periodic publications (e.g., quarterly newsletters). Organizations also employ publicly facing email addresses and/or phone lines that enable the public to provide feedback and/or direct questions to privacy offices regarding privacy practices.	AR-6			[Privacy Controls]
UL	0	Use Limitation						[Privacy Controls]
UL-1		Use Limitation Internal Use	The organization uses personally identifiable information (PIII) internally only for the authorized purpose(s) identified in the Privacy Act and/or in public notices.	These steps include monitoring and auditing organizational use of PII and training organizational personnel on the authorized uses of PII. With guidance from the Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) and where appropriate, legal counsel, organizations document processes and procedures for evaluating any proposed new uses of PII to assess whether they fall within the scope of the organizational authorities. Where appropriate, organizations obtain consent from individuals for the new use(§) of PII.	4, AR-5, IP-1, TR-1, TR-2			[Privacy Controls]
UL-2	1	Use Limitation Information Sharing with Third Parties	The organization: a. Share personally identifiable information (PII) externally, only for the authorized purposes identified in the Privacy Act and/or described in its notice(s) or for a purpose that is compatible with those purposes; b. Where appropriate, enters into Memoranda of Understanding, Memoranda of Agreement, Letters of Intent, Computer Matching Agreements, or similar agreements, with third parties that specifically excite the PII covered and specifically expenses for which the PII may be used; c. Monitors, audits, and trains its staff on the authorized sharing of PII with third parties and on the consequences of unauthorized use or sharing of PII; and d. Evaluates any proposed new instances of sharing PII with third parties to assess whether the sharing is authorized and whether additional or new public notice is required.	uses described in the existing organizational public notice(s). When a proposed new instance of external sharing of PII is not currently authorized by the Privacy Act and/or specified in a notice, organizations evaluate whether the proposed external sharing is compatible with the purpose(s) specified in the notice. If the proposed sharing is compatible, organizations review, update, and republish their Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAG), System of Records	AR-3, AR-4, AR-5, AR- 8, AP-2, DI-1, DI-2, IP- 1, TR-1			[Privacy Controls]