

DE LA RECHERCHE À L'INDUSTRIE



OPEN-SOURCING SOFTWARE CONFIDENCE

OPEN WORLD FORUM

How do you
trust (your) open-source systems?

What are the means to build trust?

■ Process-based assurance

- Based on testing, V&V tools designed in the 1980s
- Familiar, but **expensive** to scale up to large, participative process

Inapplicable to COTS software components

■ Product-based assurance

- Using formal methods to provide strong guarantees regarding:
 - Compliance with software safety requirements
 - Absence of software security vulnerabilities
- Disruptive, but help meet mandatory requirements **at reduced costs**

**Next-generation verification tools are reaching maturity
in terms of cost effectiveness and industrial integration**

Tools to understand software properties

- Properties are formalized using **unequivocal specifications**

$\backslash forall\ a, i\ ;\ \backslash valid(a+(0..N-1))\ ==>\ 0\ <= i < N ==> a[i] <= C$

- Software systems are analyzed as **sets of rules**
 - Transforming the system state
 - Satisfying certain properties

On a given perimeter

- Formal methods are used to **prove** that some software properties hold...
- ... or to **provide insight** on why other properties do not.

A FORMALISM FOR SOFTWARE VALIDATION

Handles logical formulas

ACSL: a mathematical universe

```
/*@ ensures \result >= x && \result >= y;  
    ensures \result == x || \result == y; */
```

```
int max (int x, int y) {  
    return (x > y) ? x : y;  
}
```


Computational universe

Frame the
computational
universe
using logics

Modifies transistor states on micro-chips
during execution

```
unsigned int M ;  
/*@  
requires \valid (p) && \valid (q);  
ensures  M == (*p + *q) / 2;  
*/  
void mean ( unsigned int* p,  
            unsigned int* q ) {  
if (* p >= * q )  
    M = (* p - * q ) / 2 + * q ;  
else  
    M = (* q - * p ) / 2 + * p ;  
}
```

- Caller-callee contract
- Callee **requires** some pre-conditions from the caller
- Callee **ensures** some post-conditions hold when it returns



ENFORCING CODING STANDARDS WITH FRAMA-C


- Result Airbus and Atos have designed the Taster plugin on top of Frama-C to enforce coding standards.
- Conclusion Frama-C yields productivity gains and ensures code quality.

Benefits :

- ✓ Eases code review on syntactic or typing rules.
- ✓ Validation of semantic rules:
 - dataflow related rules on variables,
 - runtime errors requiring a value analysis.

SEMANTICAL ANALYSIS

- Automated process
- Integral & pointer ranges
- Some ACSL verifications
- Runtime-errors threats
- Side-effects & dependency analysis
- Program structure & transformations



CHECKING INTRINSIC FAULTS IN SCADA SYSTEMS

- Result Researchers have demonstrated the absence of multiple fault families in safety-critical software.
- In addition derived analyses cover structural properties on memory separation and cyclic behaviors.
- Conclusion Frama-C enables highly-automated verification runs.


- > 100+ kloc
- > C source code
- > Highest certification requirements

- > 80% code coverage
- > 200 alarms

- > 500 gTgTm2


DETECTION OF A SECURITY FLAW IN A COTS COMPRESSION LIBRARY

- **Result** CEA researchers identified a bug in the QuickLZ library. This bug was acknowledged by the designer and corrected in version beta 1.5.1.
- **Conclusion** Software analysis can be applied to general-purpose COTS, enabling their use in security-critical systems.




DEDUCTIVE VERIFICATION

- Assisted process
- Full range of ACSL specifications
- Proof of code conformity
- Use of external solvers
- Function call sequences



FORMAL ALGORITHMIC CONFORMANCE PROOF




```
% Conflict during interval [B,T]
conflict_2D?(s,v) : bool =
    EXISTS (t: Lookahead): sqv(s+t*v) < sq(D)

% 2-D Conflict Detection (cd2d)
cd2d?(s,v) : bool =
    horizontal_los?(s+B*v) OR omega_vv(s)(v) < 0

% THEOREM: cd2d is correct and complete
cd2d : THEOREM
conflict_2D?(s,v)
    IFF
    cd2d?(s,v)
```

ZEROVM: HYPERVISOR FOR THE CLOUD

- Isolation done by technique similar to Chrome NaCl:
 - Untrusted program compiled by a custom compiler
 - A validator check the binary before running it
- ZeroVM allows the untrusted application to use OS syscalls only as authorized by the manifest
 - Ex: Restrict which file/pipe can be read/write for how much
 - Verification using the Frama-C WP plugin of this property



RUNTIME MONITORING AND VERIFICATION

- Result Use program analysis and transformations to synthesize:
 - security monitors
 - fault injectors
- Conclusion Runtime code can be added to harden legacy software through hardware-enabled runtime verification.

```
00: extern int a, b;  
01: void f(int);  
  
03: void g(){  
04:     if (b == 0) a = 1;  
05:     else if(b == 1) a = 2;  
06:     else return;  
  
08:     assert((a == 1 && b == 0) || (a == 2 && b == 1));  
09:     f(a);  
10: }
```



Great for:

- Give examples of real programs to verify
- If you find a bug, you can propose a patch

Problems:

- The code writer can't be reached anymore
- Question too hard for the current maintainer
- Can't ask benevolent developer to right formal specification

FRAMA-C

AN OPEN-SOURCE FRAMEWORK


FRAMA-C: LGPL 2.1

- A major release about every six months
- 9000+ downloads
- 3000+ messages on public mailing-list
- BTS, wiki, blogs publics
- Presents on Stackoverflow
- Used for teaching and research in France, England, Germany, Portugal, Russia, USA, ...



OPEN-SOURCE AND INNOVATION

- Industries appreciate:
 - the plugin system
 - possibility to look into the kernel
 - other open-source plugins for ideas
- Creation of a start-up in 2013:
 - packaging et dedicated analysis
 - support et industrial licences
 - composants validation kits



TRUST **IN** SOFT

Merci! Question?